2019 US Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increased 14.5%; Healthcare Exports Decreased 31.1%; Donations Decreased 20.5%

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
February 2020

December 2019 Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Decrease 65.7%- 1
95th In December 2019 Of 223 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
US$257.6 Million In 2019 Compared To US$224.9 Million In 2018- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 14.5%; Cuba Ranks 56th - 2
December 2019 Healthcare Product Exports US$34,918.00- 2
December 2019 Humanitarian Donations US$1,506,113.00- 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 16


DECEMBER 2019 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 65.7%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in December 2019 were US$4,371,126.00 compared to US$12,775,779.00 in December 2018 and US$11,963,399.00 in December 2017.

United States exports in 2019 were US$257,659,479.00 compared to US$224,910,413.00 in 2018, representing an increase of 14.5%.

The following are the ten largest (U.S. Dollar value) food product/agricultural product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba for 2001 through 2019 under provisions of TSREEA:

2019 (Ranking; Product; U.S. Dollar Value; % Of Total U.S. Exports To Cuba)

Chicken Leg Quarters (Frozen)
US$131,667,577.00
51.1%

Chicken Meat (Frozen)
US$35,768,471.00
13.9%

Soybean Oil Cake
US$32,852,225.00
12.8%

Chicken Legs (Frozen)
US$18,079,528.00
7.0%

Soybeans
US$15,275,733.00
5.9%

Corn
US$9,855,157.00
3.8%

Calcium Phosphates
US$8,833,684.00
3.4%

Chicken Sausage
US$1,261,260.00
.50%

Articles Of Wood
US$80,000.00
.03%

Flour Meal & Pellets Of Fish
US$61,071.00
.02%

Total Value Of 10 Largest Exports To Cuba US$253,734,706.00
Total U.S. Exports To Cuba US$257,659,479.00
10 Largest As % of Exports To Cuba 98.5%

Total agricultural commodity and food product exports to the Republic of Cuba since the first shipments in December 2001 exceed US$6,132,872,696.00.

Healthcare Product Exports in 2019 were US$1,096,505.00 compared to US$3,492,553.00 in 2018, representing a decrease of 31.3%.

Humanitarian Donations in 2019 were US$7,150,989.00 compared to US$8,998,855.00 in 2018, representing a decrease of 20.5%.

The contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

LINK To COMPLETE REPORT

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Elliott Abrams Press Briefing About Venezuela At US Department Of State: Will President Trump Confront President Putin, Prime Minister Modi, President Erdogan?

Briefing With Special Representative for Venezuela Elliott Abrams
02/06/2020 07:27 PM EST

Elliott Abrams, U.S. Special Representative for Venezuela
Washington, D.C.
Press Correspondents' Room


MS ORTAGUS: Hello, everybody. Okay, we’re going to jump right in. It’s going to be fully on the record. He’s got some opening remarks, and then we’ll go into Q&A. Per usual, try to give everybody a chance to ask a question, so please be respectful of your colleagues. And when I say last question, that means last question, so that way we don’t – avoid what happened yesterday with the confusion about what was off and what was on. Okay?

MR ABRAMS: Okay. To begin with, the safety and health of Americans is always a top concern for the Department of State. We’ve learned that the Citgo 6 have been taken from house arrest by the regime’s intelligence agency, SEBIN, and we believe they are now detained at its Helicoide prison.

QUESTION: Could you spell that?

MR ABRAMS: Yes. H-e-l-i-c-o-i-d-e.

QUESTION: Sorry, one more time?

MR ABRAMS: H-e-l-i-c-o-i-d-e. We condemn this cruel and indefensible action and demand that their long, unjust detention come to an end and they be allowed to leave Venezuela. We urge the regime to release unconditionally all persons who are being detained for political reasons, including National Assembly deputies Juan Requesens – he’s been held for 548 days, Gilber Caro, and Ismael Leon.

The past few weeks of meetings, from a meeting with Secretary Pompeo in Bogota on January 20th to those held this week with the Vice President and with Secretary Pompeo and, of course, most significantly the Oval Office meeting with the President, should make clear the commitment of the United States to support Juan Guaido as interim president of Venezuela and support the restoration of democracy to Venezuela.

The reception Juan Guaido received at the State of the Union speech was a reminder that support for him and for this cause remains an entirely bipartisan effort in Washington, and that display of support in the United States comes after Guaido’s visit to Europe and Canada, where strong support was demonstrated by a series of leaders of democratic nations. Our message to those nations is that increased and strengthened travel and financial sanctions on key figures in and around the Maduro regime will accelerate their abandonment of the regime and help to end it. But as Treasury always states, when imposing sanctions, sanctions need not be permanent for those who want to contribute to Venezuela’s democratic future.

As several administration officials have noted, the Russians may soon find that their continued support of Maduro will no longer be cost-free. Others who continue to profit from or support Maduro should take warning. And more generally, you will see steps unfold in the coming weeks that demonstrate the seriousness of our intentions in Venezuela.

What’s happening there is a great tragedy for the people of Venezuela and has imposed enormous costs on their neighbors as well. Venezuelans have the right to live in freedom, and we would be – will be taking additional actions to support them.

As Secretary Pompeo explained in his statement several weeks ago – I’m quoting here – “A swift negotiated transition to democracy is the most effective and sustainable route to peace and prosperity in Venezuela… 2020 presents the opportunity to provide the Venezuelan people with what they have been demanding for years: genuinely free and fair Presidential and National Assembly elections to choose their leadership and begin the long process of renewal.”

Thank you.

MS ORTAGUS: Go ahead, Matt.

QUESTION: So on the Citgo 6, can I just ask – I realize you can’t speak for Maduro and his people, but is it your sense or do you get the idea at all that this, that their return to prison, is at all like a retaliation for the State of the Union, the White House meeting, the kind of reception that he’s been getting?

MR ABRAMS: I would not speculate on that. I don’t know.

QUESTION: Okay. Well, the timing is interesting.

MR ABRAMS: The timing —

QUESTION: And how long have they been in house arrest? I mean, it’s been months, right? So—

MR ABRAMS: House arrest is —

MS ORTAGUS: Longer than that. Oh, house arrest.

MR ABRAMS: House arrest is not that long. It’s probably just a couple of months. The timing is suspicious, but I can’t speculate as to why it happened now.

QUESTION: Thanks.

MS ORTAGUS: Go ahead, Nick.

QUESTION: Elliott, two questions. One, you talk about Russia will find its support is not cost-free. So what are you going to do to the Russians? Would that include possibly sanctioning Rosneft, or is that even on the table despite the turmoil that it would cause?

And second, it just looks more and more like Maduro is entrenched in power. There is some indication that the economy is coming back a little bit. What are the – what are the pressure points? What do you – what do you do about the fact that he is more and more entrenched? Guaido looks further from the office of the presidency.

MR ABRAMS: That, of course, is not the way we see it. Nicolas Maduro is the successor of, the heir to, Hugo Chavez, and yet we see significant abandonment of Chavismo. All of a sudden, he decides dollarization is just fine. There is report after report of privatization of PDVSA or parts of PDVSA, of turning over joint ventures to the foreign oil company partner. This is a complete abandonment of Chavismo.

Why is this happening? It’s happening because their backs are against the wall. A lot of attention is paid, rightly, to what’s going on on the opposition side; but when we look at the regime side, we see that sanctions have had and are having a significant impact, and sanctions will increase. Every time I meet with the press, people say, “You’ve run out of sanctions,” and every time I say, “No, we haven’t.”

QUESTION: No, that’s North Korea. (Laughter.)

MR ABRAMS: So we – we’ll be taking – I have no announcement to make.

QUESTION: Embargoed until the end?

MS ORTAGUS: Yeah. Sorry.

MR ABRAMS: I think I’ve discussed Rosneft with the press previously and drawn attention to its growing role in Venezuela. The national security advisor mentioned them, I think, yesterday. When we have an announcement to make, we’ll make it, and that’s not today.

MS ORTAGUS: One quick thing. I forgot to say this at the beginning, but can we keep this embargoed till the end? Okay, great. Carol, go ahead.

QUESTION: I have a timing question, too. With the high-profile visits that Guaido has had here with the Secretary, the Vice President, the President, the State of the Union, and some of the strong language of the Secretary and the – the Secretary of State and the President both saying they hope that this will lead to a transitional government, are you more concerned? What’s going to happen to him when he goes back to Venezuela? Is he more in danger now by the very warm reception he got here? Doesn’t this put him at greater risk?

MR ABRAMS: He got a very warm reception from Trudeau and Johnson and Merkel and Macron and Mark Rutte. It’s a very broad international coalition. I can’t speculate as to what’s in Nicolas Maduro’s mind. Every day that he is in Venezuela, Juan Guaido is at risk. So are all the members of the opposition. And all you have to do is to read the report of Michelle Bachelet to read that people are actually executed – they are murdered – by the regime.

So we do not underestimate the risks to Guaido, and that is why many people, starting with the President, have called him brave. It’s true. We, needless to say, hope that, as happened last time he left the country, he will be able to return unmolested, and we hope that the regime makes the calculation, particularly after this trip, that the support for Guaido is strong and that the counter-reaction to any move against him would make it a mistake for the regime. I won’t appeal to them morally because I think that would be an extremely foolish appeal. But we’re very concerned about it and we hope that he will return safely.

QUESTION: And if anything happens to him, is the U.S. prepared to do anything?

MR ABRAMS: We are prepared. I’m not going to discuss it today because we would – we wouldn’t want to discuss it publicly anyway, and of course, we strongly hope that it will not be necessary to face that.

MS ORTAGUS: Robbie.

QUESTION: Last month there was a small scandal in Spain that seemed to indicate the new government there is softening its support for Guaido. Have you been in contact with any of your Spanish colleagues since then, and is there any indication that their support for Guaido might be wavering?

MR ABRAMS: Have we been in contact, first? Yes. You would expect that. I mean, we were in touch with the European governments all the time about Venezuela among many other issues.
We are – we think it’s unfortunate that President Sanchez did not agree to meet with Guaido. We have received a number of assurances that Spain’s commitment to the restoration of democracy in Venezuela remains firm.

MS ORTAGUS: Humeyra.

QUESTION: Two questions. Alejandro Betancourt is someone under federal investigation here in the U.S., but he met with Guaido’s father, and Rudy Giuliani was also there. I am wondering if you are aware of this meeting, because this meeting has to do with Guaido’s finances, and I am wondering if you know where Guaido’s finances are coming from and whether you’ve got any worries about his funding.

And my second question is with regards to the warning to the oil companies. Did the U.S. Government at any point told Rosneft outright that it would be okay to lift Venezuelan crude if it’s only to pay for the debts of PDVSA?

MR ABRAMS: On the second point, let me say we have sanctions. If you’re not violating the sanctions, then what you’re doing is not contrary to the rules that the United States is trying to set out. And there are a number of companies – we can start with Chevron – that remain in Venezuela and that are clearly not violating U.S. sanctions today. The rules about sanctions can always change. The licenses that are given can be withheld; those that are withheld can be given. So the rules of the game can change.

As to private conversations with Rosneft officials, they’re private so I don’t want to answer that part of it.

The first part – we’ve been told by the Venezuelan embassy and by Venezuelan officials, and by that I mean legitimate officials not regime officials, that the facts as stated in the press are not correct and that Guaido’s father was not at that meeting. I don’t really know much more about it than I know in the press, except we’ve asked and been told he was not there.

QUESTION: Do you know —

QUESTION: You’ve been assured he wasn’t there? Because we’ve – if there was a videotape of him there, would that surprise you?

MR ABRAMS: We’ve been told he was not there. I get surprised by things every day.

QUESTION: That’s what – the videotape, would it surprise you? And also —

MS ORTAGUS: Wait, wait, wait. I’m sorry. I don’t know who you are, but this is not how we do things here. Thank you. Lara, go ahead.

QUESTION: Thank you. Could you talk a little bit more about the Citgo 6, what kind of steps the United States is preparing to take if they are not released from the prison, what kind of conditions are in that prison, if you’ve had any kind of communications with them either directly or indirectly since they were taken from house arrest?

MR ABRAMS: We had – first, we have had communications with some family members, and indeed the first information we had about their being taken from house arrest – they’re not – I should say they are not in one place. They were in their houses where they didn’t all live together. So we heard first from one family member saying this had happened. And then, of course, the question was: Why this individual? Why this one of the six? We very quickly learned it’s not one of the six, it’s all of the six. Then the question was: Where are they? We think we know where they are.

The conditions of house arrest, while terrible in comparison with freedom, were better, obviously, than the conditions in the prison. We had real concerns about the health of all of the men in prison, questions about their access to doctors, their access to medicine, their diet, unsurprisingly, also their mood. And you can imagine that being returned to prison will raise in each of their minds, “How long will I be here?”

So we take this very seriously. And we’ve taken – we’ve made a number of efforts today that, for obvious reasons, I’m not going to talk about to find out more about what’s going on and to get them released from prison.

QUESTION: And they were moved exactly when? When did you first find out from that family member?

MR ABRAMS: Yesterday.

QUESTION: Okay.

MS ORTAGUS: Kylie.

QUESTION: With regard to Rosneft, what would be a tangible benefit of actually sanctioning them? I know you won’t talk about if you’re going to or not, but why would that be an effective measure? And then on the flipside of that, you’ve often discussed getting funding to those who are supporting Guaido in Venezuela. Is there any success on that front? Do you see anything coming?

MR ABRAMS: Yes. On the latter, I can start with that. Money did not flow immediately when Congress approved it, because we wanted to make sure we had a system in place. Actually, this goes through AID, and AID wanted to make sure that it had a system in place that would be fully accountable to Congress and could count for every penny, because it was obvious that the regime would start telling lies about this money. And they are, and you can read regime accusations about how millions and millions of dollars have gone into Guaido’s pocket, for example. These are all lies. No money goes to Juan Guaido; not one penny goes to Juan Guaido.

The money is being used – just to give you an example of something that happened recently, we – in one of the embassies of interim President Guaido there was no office. That is, he had appointed an ambassador, the ambassador was in that country, but they literally didn’t have an office at which they could do work, serve Venezuelans who happened to be in that country. And one of the things we can do with that money is rent an office. That is the kind of thing that’s being done. For more details, probably AID is the most up-to-date place to go.

I guess I will not answer the first part of the question. If sanctions are imposed on Rosneft, then – or as always happens with anybody, Treasury would make an announcement. They would explain what they were doing. We would have further explanations. So if and when it happened that we imposed additional sanctions, come back to us.

MS ORTAGUS: Okay.

QUESTION: Any update on the status of the U.S. embassy, the status of the protecting power being worked out for that? And can you give us kind of a summary of what the – for lack of a better term, the embassy in exile in Bogota is doing? I forget the name of the unit, the facility over there.

MR ABRAMS: Yeah. We call it the VAU, the Venezuelan Affairs Unit, V-A-U. They’re at work.

QUESTION: Doing?

MR ABRAMS: They keep in close touch with Venezuelans in the opposition, in civil society more broadly in the country. As you know, we have to have a certain minimal contact with the regime for things like UN affairs. They do that. They —

QUESTION: Who do they deal with in the regime? Lower-level guys like —

MR ABRAMS: They deal with people in the ministry of foreign affairs, as they did in Caracas. And they analyze. I mean, they offer cables, as any normal embassy unit would do. They send cables to Washington describing what they think is going on in Venezuela.
The first part?

QUESTION: The protecting power for the embassy, is that any —

MR ABRAMS: Yes. No change. I would like to thank the Swiss – because they are not our protecting power; the agreement did not go through – but they have been willing when we’ve asked them to undertake some tasks to protect Americans or to help the interests of the United States informally, and they have always been willing to do that. The reason the agreement has not gone through is that the Maduro regime is unwilling to accept the agreement, and I don’t expect that will change.

MS ORTAGUS: Go ahead.

QUESTION: Do you know how President Guaido paid for his travels around the world? Is any U.S. aid money being used to fund those travels? And then on the Citgo 6, one of their lawyers said he had raised concerns about their safety under house arrest to stakeholders. Do you know if the State Department had heard any of those concerns, and was anything done to try to address that before they were taken last night?

MR ABRAMS: They’re under – they were under constant surveillance. There were varying numbers of spies, of intelligence agents, constantly around the – their houses. It would not be unreasonable to assume that they’re being bugged, that they’re being eavesdropped on. So it’s a quite stressful situation in addition to being kept from their families by not being allowed to leave Venezuela.

So we’ve been aware of this, and the regime obviously has not been – has not been willing to let them leave the country or to improve their situation. Now we regress to their being in jail.

QUESTION: And then on the first, how is —

MR ABRAMS: Oh, sorry.

QUESTION: How are they funding the travels?

MR ABRAMS: In principle, paying for travel is a legitimate expense. Again, AID can tell you more, but in principle, this is something that we are able to do. Whether we did it for this particular travel, I don’t know.
MS ORTAGUS: Go ahead, Shaun.

QUESTION: Sure. Could I ask you about the talks with Guaido, whether there was any discussion about Venezuelans here in the United States, the issue of protected status for the Venezuelans? Was it something that he has raised – that he raised? Was that a discussion that you had? What message did you give on whether Venezuelans can actually stay and be protected?

MR ABRAMS: The Venezuelan officials, President Guaido, Ambassador Vecchio, Foreign Minister Borges always raise that question. And members of Congress raise it too, particularly those who have a lot of Venezuelans living in their districts, that is, to say – in mostly parts of Florida. Since I last talked to you, that situation has not changed. There is a – I wouldn’t say there is a complete freeze on the deportation of Venezuelans, but the number of deportations is extremely low. But no further steps have been taken with respect to regularizing their presence.

QUESTION: And why is that that no further steps have been taken? Is there an interest in doing that?

MR ABRAMS: Well, as I said previously, I would say the administration view is that TPS has been changed by the courts. And they have essentially removed the “T,” which makes it very unattractive, I would say, not only for this administration, but for its successors to grant TPS if it’s going to be permanent, because it’s not supposed to be. It’s supposed to be temporary. So we continue to discuss what the other options are.

MS ORTAGUS: Last one. You had your hand raised.

QUESTION: Oh, yes. I wanted to ask you: So, to follow up on Humeyra’s question before, do you have much insight into how Guaido and the opposition is funded and who funds them, and do you have some concerns about who funds them and how they’re funded and a lack of transparency?

MR ABRAMS: Well, I wouldn’t call it a lack of transparency. This is, as far as we’re concerned, a foreign government. You saw the treatment of President Guaido in Washington. It’s exactly the same treatment that any foreign head of state would get. I don’t remember ever asking a Mexican diplomat, “Tell me how your president funds himself, tell” – or a Spanish diplomat or a German diplomat. So I —

QUESTION: But they don’t control the government.

MR ABRAMS: I know that —

QUESTION: It’s a little different here, isn’t it?

MR ABRAMS: I know that we will be in a better – we are already in a better position, and we’ll continue to be in an increasingly good position to help them in ways that they need help. But I would – I hear all the time from ambassadors representing President Guaido who tell me, “I’m going to have to leave in two weeks or four weeks because there is no salary and I am running out of money.” I hear from Guaido representatives who say, “I don’t have an office. I’m working out of my bedroom, out of my living room.” So for anybody who thinks there’s a lot of money sloshing around, that’s completely, completely false.

MS ORTAGUS: Okay. Thank you.

MR ABRAMS: Thank you.

QUESTION: Thanks.

QUESTION: Thank you.

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President Trump To Meet At 2:00 pm Today In Oval Office With Interim President Juan Guaido Of Venezuela

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

February 5, 2020

Statement from the Press Secretary on the Visit of Interim President Juan Guaido of Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 

Today, President Donald J. Trump will welcome Interim President Juan Guaido of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the White House.  The visit is an opportunity to reaffirm the commitment of the United States to the people of Venezuela and to discuss how we can work with President Guaido to expedite a democratic transition in Venezuela that will end the ongoing crisis.  We will continue to work with our partners in the region to confront the illegitimate dictatorship in Venezuela, and we will stand alongside the Venezuelan people to ensure a future that is democratic and prosperous.  

UPDATED DAILY GUIDANCE AND PRESS SCHEDULE FOR WEDNESDAY,  FEBRUARY 5, 2020  

UPDATE: THE PRESIDENT participates in the arrival of the Interim President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and a restricted bilateral meeting.

2:00PM- THE PRESIDENT participates in the arrival of the Interim President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. South Portico
 
2:15PM- THE PRESIDENT participates in a restricted bilateral meeting with the Interim President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Oval Office

From The White House late evening on 5 February 2020:

Today, President Donald J. Trump met with Interim President Juan Guaido of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. This meeting was a historic discussion about how we can work together with our partners in the region to achieve a democratic transition in Venezuela. President Trump underscored the United States’ commitment to end the corrupt and violent dictatorship of Nicolas Maduro. Both leaders shared the importance of securing the return of freedom for all Venezuelans that will promote and safeguard a democratic and prosperous future for the Western Hemisphere. 

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Spain's Melia Hotels International CEO Confirms He Is Restricted From Entering United States Due To Libertad Act Title IV Letter; Says 50 Other Companies Impacted

Mr. Gabriel Escarrer, Founder and CEO of Palma, Spain-based Melia Hotels International S.A., has confirmed receipt on 11 October 2019 of a Libertad Act Title IV letter from the United States Department of State.  Mr. Escarrer and members of his immediate family are restricted from entering the United States. 

According to a report by the Associated Press (AP): “The European Union's ambassador to Cuba, Alberto Navarro, said he was aware of 14 members of Meliá’s board and their families being subject to U.S. sanctions.”

According to the AP, “[t]he Spanish government said it was aware of only Meliá having been targeted by the State Department, not any other Spanish companies.”

Melia Hotels International reported in a statement it believes more than 50 other companies have received similar notifications.

The United States Department of State has refused to provide the number of Title IV letters sent during the Clinton Administration, Bush Administration, Obama Administration and Trump Administration. One Title IV letter may impact more than one individual- members of board of directors, individuals and families with significant ownership may also be subject to visa restrictions. The Trump Administration is believed to have issued more Title IV letters than previous administrations.

Currently, only one other company is known to remain impacted by a Title IV letter: Toronto, Canada-based Sherritt International Corporation which was sanctioned during the Clinton Administration.

Melia Hotels International S.A. has been listed as a defendant in one Title III lawsuit using provisions of the Libertad Act. 

Statement From Company (2/5/2020):

Palma de Mallorca, 5 de febrero de 2020.Vistas las informaciones publicadas, Meliá Hotels International, S.A. quiere informar lo siguiente:

Confirmamos que en fecha 11/10/19, el Vicepresidente Ejecutivo y Consejero Delegado de Meliá Hotels International, S.A. recibió una carta del Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos de América por la que, en aplicación del Titulo IV del “Liberty Act” (también conocida como Ley Helms Burton) y en caso de no aceptar una serie de condiciones relacionadas con la actividad en la República de Cuba de empresas  filiales,   en un plazo de 45 días se le prohibiría el acceso a los Estados Unidos de América.  Creemos que cartas similares habrían sido dirigidas a más de medio centenar  de empresas con intereses en Cuba.

La Administración Estadounidense vinculaba esta notificación a la actividad que determinadas empresas filiales mantienen con entidades públicas cubanas para la gestión de dos hoteles situados en la región de Holguín, que estarían ubicados, a su entender, en una parcela de una propiedad expropiada a la familia Sanchez Hill a finales de los años 50 del siglo pasado. Cabe recordar que la demanda iniciada en España por los supuestos representantes de la familia mencionada fue desestimada íntegramente por nuestros tribunales en primera instancia.

Las condiciones impuestas por el Departamento de Estado norteamericano no resultaban asumibles por la Compañía, además de su cumplimiento ser contrario a la normativa europea (conocida como Estatuto de Bloqueo) que considera que la Ley Helms Burton infringe los más elementales principios de Derecho internacional.

En cumplimiento de la normativa comunitaria antes referida, se ha puesto en manos de las instituciones nacionales españolas y, especialmente, de las autoridades comunitarias, la resolución de esta cuestión, confiando que su dedicación, diligencia y estrecha colaboración acabarán dando una satisfactoria solución a esta situación.

Reiteramos, como no podría ser de otra manera, nuestro respeto y confianza en la implicación e impulso hacia una solución positiva por parte de las autoridades españolas y comunitarias, así como en los Tribunales, insistiendo una vez más en la lealtad, legalidad y responsabilidad con las que nuestras filiales han  desempeñado siempre su gestión empresarial en Cuba, y esperamos que la presente controversia producida por la activación de los títulos III y IV de la Ley Helms Burton sea resuelta de manera favorable a los intereses de nuestro Grupo.

Previous Posts: 

U.S. Shareholders Control 10.04% Of Spain's Melia Hotels; Company Reports Libertad Act/Trump Administration Impact Upon Cuba Operations 

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2019/11/10/xnlt2n3jfd0sc3k8yvc0495iqkvfo0?rq=Melia%20Hotels%20International 

Plaintiffs Appeal Dismissal Of Lawsuit In Spain Against Melia Hotels; Plaintiffs Sue In U.S.; Why Did Melia Hotels Offer US$5 Million Then US$3,197.75? 

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2019/10/3/plaintiffs-appeal-lawsuit-dismissal-in-spain-against-melia-hotels-international-plaintiffs-also-have-sued-melia-hotels-international-in-the-united-states?rq=Melia%20Hotels%20International 

Melia Hotels International Presents In Spain Its Response To Appeal By Plaintiffs Of Case Dismissal; Company Reportedly Receives Title IV Letter 

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2019/11/23/melia-hotels-international-presents-in-spain-its-response-to-appeal-by-plaintiffs-of-case-dismissal?rq=Melia%20Hotels%20International 

Libertad Act 

The Trump Administration has made operational Title III and further implemented Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”). 

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.   

Title IV restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims.  One Canada-based company is currently subject to this provision based upon a certified claim. 

Suspension History 

Title III has been suspended every six months since the Libertad Act was enacted in 1996- by President William J. Clinton, President George W. Bush, President Barack H. Obama and President Donald J. Trump.   

On 16 January 2019, The Honorable Mike Pompeo, United States Secretary of State, reported a suspension for forty-five (45) days. 

On 4 March 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a suspension for thirty (30) days. 

On 3 April 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a further suspension for fourteen (14) days through 1 May 2019. 

On 17 April 2019, the Trump Administration reported that it would no longer suspend Title III. 

On 2 May 2019 certified claimants and non-certified claimants were permitted to file lawsuits in United States courts. 

Certified Claims Background 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the USFCSC and have not been resolved for nearing sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s.  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims US$8,521,866,236.75.  

The first asset to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery in 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International; the certified claim also includes land adjacent to the Jose Marti International Airport in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement.   

Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 requires that an asset had a value of US$50,000.00 when expropriated by the Republic of Cuba without compensation to the original owner.  Of the 5,913 certified claims, 913, or 15%, are valued at US$50,000.00 or more.  Adjusted for inflation, US$50,000.00 (3.70% per annum) in 1960 has a 2019 value of approximately US$427,267.01.  The USFCSC authorized 6% per annum, meaning the 2019 value of US$50,000.00 is approximately US$1,649,384.54.  

The ITT Corporation Agreement 

In July 1997, then-New York City, New York-based ITT Corporation and then-Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based STET International Netherlands N.V. signed an agreement whereby STET International Netherlands N.V. would pay approximately US$25 million to ITT Corporation for a ten-year right (after which the agreement could be renewed and was renewed) to use assets (telephone facilities and telephone equipment) within the Republic of Cuba upon which ITT Corporation has a certified claim valued at approximately US$130.8 million.  ETECSA, which is now wholly-owned by the government of the Republic of Cuba, was a joint venture controlled by the Ministry of Information and Communications of the Republic of Cuba within which Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based Telecom Italia International N.V. (formerly Stet International Netherlands N.V.), a subsidiary of Rome, Italy-based Telecom Italia S.p.A. was a shareholder.  Telecom Italia S.p.A., was at one time a subsidiary of Ivrea, Italy-based Olivetti S.p.A.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International. 

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Libertad Act Lawsuit Against Societe Generale Moved From Court In Florida To Court In New York

SUCESORES DE DON CARLOS NUNEZ Y DONA PURA GALVEZ, INC., BDA BANO NUNEZ V. SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE, S.A., D/B/A SG AMERICAS, INC.; THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA, D/B/A SCOTIA HOLDINGS (US) INC., A/K/A THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA, MIAMI AGENCY; THE NATIONAL BANK OF CANADA, D/B/A NATIONAL BANK OF CANADA FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.; AND BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA, S.A., D/B/A BBVA, USA., [1:19-cv-22842; Southern Florida District]

NOTE: Case transferred to New York Southern District On 2 February 2020 [1:20-cv-00851] before Judge Laura Taylor Swain, appointed in 2000 by The Honorable William J. Clinton, President of the United States.

Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, LLP (plaintiff)
Law Offices Of Paul Sack A. Law, P.A. (plaintiff)
Mayer Brown LLP (defendant)
ReedSmith LLP (defendant)

Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion To Transfer Venue (1/29/2020)

Order (1/30/2020)

Defendant Societe Generale, S.A.’s Reply In Support Of Its Motion To Dismiss The Amended Complaint (1/10/2020)

Defendant Societe Generale, S.A.’s Unopposed Motion For Leave To Exceed The Page Limitation As To Its Reply In Support Of Its Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (1/7/2020)

Case Transfer Order (2/4/2020)

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During State Of The Union, President Trump Mentions Cuba Twice, Venezuela & China Five Times, Iran Four Times, Syria Twice, No Mention Of Russia

PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP IS REBUILDING OUR MILITARY AND PROTECTING AMERICA’S INTERESTS ABROAD

“We desire peace, cooperation, and mutual gain with all. But I will never fail to defend America’s interests.” – President Donald J. Trump

STANDING UP FOR FREEDOM: President Trump has stood up for freedom around the world.
President Trump has stood with the Venezuelan people as they have faced horrific oppression and violence under the illegitimate Maduro dictatorship.

The Trump Administration has enacted crippling sanctions on Maduro, his Cuban sponsors, and his cronies, cutting off their financial resources.

President Trump responded to the Venezuelan people’s fight for democracy and led an international coalition to recognize Juan Guaido as the legitimate interim president.

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT TRUMP IN STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS
U.S. Capitol
Washington, D.C.
4 February 2020
9:06 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you very much. Madam Speaker, Mr. Vice President, members of Congress, the First Lady of the United States -- (applause) -- and my fellow citizens:

Excerpts:

As we restore -- (applause) -- American leadership throughout the world, we are once again standing up for freedom in our hemisphere. (Applause.) That's why my administration reversed the failing policies of the previous administration on Cuba. (Applause.)

We are supporting the hopes of Cubans, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans to restore democracy. The United States is leading a 59-nation diplomatic coalition against the socialist dictator of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro. (Applause.) Maduro is an illegitimate ruler, a tyrant who brutalizes his people. But Maduro's grip on tyranny will be smashed and broken.

Here this evening is a very brave man who carries with him the hopes, dreams, and aspirations of all Venezuelans. Joining us in the Gallery is the true and legitimate President of Venezuela, Juan Guaidó. (Applause.) Mr. President, please take this message back to your homeland. (Applause.) Thank you, Mr. President. Great honor. Thank you very much.

Please take this message back that all Americans are united with the Venezuelan people in their righteous struggle for freedom. Thank you very much, Mr. President. (Applause.) Thank you very much.

Socialism destroys nations. But always remember: Freedom unifies the soul. (Applause.)

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New Libertad Act Court Documents For Mata v. Expedia, Hotels.com, Booking.com

MARICELA MATA, ET. AL., V. MELIA HOTELS INTERNATIONAL, S.A., ET AL. [1:19-cv-22529; Southern Florida District]

NOTE: On 2 January 2020, thirty-five plaintiffs were dismissed, and eight defendants were dismissed without prejudice Melia Hotels International, S.A.; Melia Hotels USA LLC, Trivago GMBH, Grupo Hotelero Gran Caribe, Corporacion de Comercio y Turismo Internacional Cubanacan S.A.; Grupo de Turismo Gaviota S.A.; Raul Doe 1-5, and Mariela Roe 1-5. The case is now known as Maricela Mata, et al. v. Expedia, Inc., et. al.

Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Arent Fox (defendant- Melia Hotels)
Coffey Burlington, P.P. (defendant- Melia Hotels)
Akerman LLP (defendant) for Expedia, Inc.; Hotels.com L.P.; Hotels.com GP, LLC; Orbitz, LLC; and Travelocity.com, LP
Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP (defendant) for Expedia, Inc.; Hotels.com L.P.; Hotels.com GP, LLC; Orbitz, LLC; and Travelocity.com, LP
Baker & McKenzie LLP (defendant) for Booking Holdings Inc. and Booking.com B.V.

On 3 February 2020, plaintiff submitted:

Unopposed Motion For Leave To Set Discovery Conference

On 30 January 2020, plaintiff submitted:

Post-Discovery Hearing Administrative Order

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Cuba Reports 9.2% Decrease In Visitor Arrivals For 2019 Compared To 2018; 436,352 Fewer

From Ministry of Tourism of the Republic of Cuba (MINTUR) and ONE:

The Republic of Cuba reported 4,275,558 visitors in 2019 compared to 4,711,910 visitors in 2018.

There are revisions to data reported for 2019 and 2018.

LINK To ONE Report

Cuba Reports 2018 Visitor Statistics: https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2019/2/7/cuba-reports-2018-visitor-statistics?rq=Cuba%20tourism

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Havana Docks Corporation Appeals Dismissal Of Carnival Corporation Lawsuit: The 99-Year Lease Remains In Force

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES [1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District]

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

Filed 2/3/2020: Plaintiff’s Motion For Leave To File First Amended Complaint

Excerpt

On January 3 and 7, 2020, respectively, the Court dismissed with prejudice two separate, but related, cases brought by Havana Docks against MSC Cruises (“MSC”) and Norwegian Cruise Line (“NCL”). (See Havana Docks v. MSC Cruises SA Co, et al., 19-cv-23588, D.E. 40 (the “MSC Case”); Havana Docks Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 19-cv-23591, D.E. 42 (the “NCL Case”) (collectively, the “Dismissal Orders”).) As demonstrated below, Havana Docks can state a claim against Defendant Carnival Corporation (“Carnival”) under Title III and the Court’s interpretation of that statute in the Dismissal Orders. Havana Docks, thus, respectfully requests leave to file a first amended complaint, attached as Exhibit A, that sets forth new factual allegations that give rise to a claim for relief under Title III.

First, as the Eleventh Circuit has made clear, Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (“LIBERTAD Act”) established a new statutory remedy recognizing the certified claim owned by the former owners of confiscated property as the statutorily created property interest that is actionable under the LIBERTAD Act. See Glen v. Club Mediterranee S.A., 450 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The Helms-Burton Act refers to the property interest that former owners of the confiscated property now have as ownership of a ‘claim to such property.’”). If given an opportunity to amend, Havana Docks can allege facts showing its certified claim is not time-limited. The terms of the certified claim expressly state that the claim does not expire until “the date of settlement.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 4, 13.) That date has not yet come.

Second, Havana Docks can factually allege that the concession did not “expire” by its terms in 2004, a factual finding the Dismissal Orders characterize as “undisputed.” As an amended complaint would make clear, Havana Docks’ concession agreement included a 99-year leasehold interest that was cut short by 44-years because of the confiscation by the Cuban Government, and thus did not expire. It was confiscated. Havana Docks’ claim certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (“FCSC”), included the value of the loss of the remaining 44 years of the concession. Those 44-years of concessionary rights are property interests in the Subject Property that Havana Docks has never enjoyed and received no compensation for. They remain outstanding and can support a claim under Title III.

Third, the concession agreement, which the Court has not yet had the benefit of reviewing, and which terms would be alleged in the amended complaint, includes an indemnity right to be paid by the Cuban Government to Havana Docks that is expressly triggered by the expropriation. That unsatisfied indemnity right was not time-limited and was included in the valuation of the loss certified by the FCSC. The plain language of the LIBERTAD Act recognizes this type of unpaid debt as an obligation that attaches to the confiscated property. See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(4)(B)(ii) (defining the term “confiscated” to include “the failure of the Cuban Government to pay, on or after January 1, 1959-- . . . a debt which is a charge on property nationalized, expropriated, or otherwise taken by the Cuban Government.” (emphasis added)). So too does Cuban law in effect at the time of expropriation. See Codigo Civil, Title II, Art. 349 (“No one shall be deprived of his property, except by competent authority and with sufficient cause of public utility, always after the proper indemnity. If this requisite has not been fulfilled the judges shall protect, and in a proper case, replace the condemned party in possession.”) (emphasis added). This right to indemnity is an outstanding interest in the Subject Property that is actionable under Title III, as Havana Docks will factually allege if permitted leave to file a first amended complaint.

Fourth, Havana Docks’ certified claim recognizes ownership of property beyond the concession that was not addressed in the Dismissal Orders. If allowed to replead, Havana Docks will also allege facts to show that the FCSC certified a valuation for losses of property interests beyond the confiscated concession.

Fifth, Carnival trafficked in the Subject Property at various points between 1996 and 2004. In the Dismissal Orders, the Court did “not deprive Plaintiff of a remedy for trafficking” and “ensure[d] that persons like Plaintiff may recover for any trafficking of their confiscated property” that took “place between 1960 and 2004.” (Id. at pp. 9-10.) As detailed below, Havana Docks can factually allege that Carnival trafficked in the Subject Property at numerous points between 1996 and 2004. Havana Docks requests leave to file a first amended complaint setting forth new allegations to support this theory of liability.

Filed 2/3/2020: Exhibit A [Proposed] Amended Complaint

Excerpt

16. Further, the concession granted to the Plaintiff the contractual right to be indemnified for the value of the work constructed by it on the Subject Property in the event of expropriation, as follows:

Seventh: If during the continuance of the concession the works may be expropriated by virtue of Article 50 of the Law of Ports, the government or its departments will indemnify the concessionary to the value of the work constructed by it, including the Custom House Inspectors Department and the wharf on the north side of the pier, but not the value of the machinery, rolling stock, equipment and apparatus referred to in the preceding clause, in case the concessionary may decide to remove them.

(See Exhibit B.)

17. This indemnity right gave the Plaintiff an interest in the Subject Property that was not time-limited. As an express term of the concession, the indemnity right—which by the terms of the concession was not time limited—was certified by the FCSC. The “value of the work constructed by” Havana Docks and its predecessor-in-interest include the value of the San Francisco, Machina and Santa Clara Piers, as reflected in the certified claim.

Related Post:

Carnival Agrees To Provide Havana Docks Corporation Additional Time To Respond; All Dimissals Will Be Appealed: https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2020/1/9/y4c523aijwijnzw068pfuduwppli6q

Other Lawsuits Filed:

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [1:19-cv-23591; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23590; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. MSC CRUISES SA CO, AND MSC CRUISES (USA) INC. [1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable (defendant)

LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/563a4585e4b00d0211e8dd7e/t/5e388ac24c13b47cb59f1fc6/1580763842323/Libertad+Act+Filing+Statistics.pdf

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American Airlines Seeking Additional Flights From Miami To Havana After JetBlue Airways Ceases Most Flights

By Evan Hoopfer- Staff Writer, Dallas Business Journal

30 January 2020

American Airlines is looking to add flights to Havana after a competitor gave up routes to the Cuban capital. American Airlines Group Inc. (Nasdaq: AAL) applied earlier this week for 14 more weekly flights from Miami to Havana. If American were to get the two extra daily routes, that would increase its service from Miami to Havana from its current six daily flights to eight.

Travel to Havana is limited to 20 daily departures by the government so, when an opportunity arises to add service, carriers often jump at the chance.

If awarded the flights, American plans to start the new service on or around June 4, the Fort Worth-based airline said in a regulatory filing. The service would be flown on a 172-seat Boeing 737-800 aircraft.

American's application comes after JetBlue Airways Corp. (Nasdaq: JBLU) gave back the 14 slots to the U.S. Department of Transportation. JetBlue notified the government Jan. 16 that it would be returning seven weekly Orlando flights, one weekly Boston flight and six weekly New York City flights to Havana. The stoppage in the JetBlue flights to Havana would become effective April 29, the carrier said in a regulatory filing.

Miami has been a key part of American's Cuba business. Last year, for instance, it transferred a Havana route from Charlotte to Miami because the South Florida market is proving to have strong demand for Cuba travel. Last fall in an interview with the Dallas Business Journal, Vasu Raja, senior vice president of Network Strategy for American, said the carrier's service to Cuba was an example of the company's attempt to prioritize long-term success over what can sometimes be short-term hardship. Raja said at the time that when the carrier started Cuba flights, they weren't performing well.

"Two years later, Cuba was among the most profitable markets we had in the Caribbean," Raja said. "We turned regional jets into mainline jets. We became a very strong operator in Cuba. We could have cut those flights. It would've been great for near-term earnings, great for the reliability of the airline, but we would've foreclosed on this thing which has now become a really important part of who we are."

LINK To AA FILING WITH USDOT

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Libertad Act Court Case Filing Update: 21 Lawsuits; 35 Law Firms; 112 Attorneys; 3,600 Documents Filed

As of 1 February 2020, more than eight months since Trump Administration made operational Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”):

21 Lawsuits Filed
US$137,508.00 Court Filing Fees
35 Law Firms
112 Listed Attorneys
580+ Document Filings
3,600+ Filed Court Documents
US$4+ Million In Law Firm Billable Hours (estimated 85% by defendants)
106 Companies/Individuals, excluding attorneys, are lawsuit parties
73 Plaintiffs
4 Class Action status requests
70 Defendants
5 Companies notified as will be added as defendants unless prompt settlement

Lawsuits have been filed in the United States District Courts in Southern Florida (16), Washington DC (1), Western Washington State (1), Nevada (1), Southern District New York (1), and Delaware (1).

The 35 Law firms retained by plaintiffs/defendants: Akerman; Andrews & Springer; Arent Fox; Aronovitz Law; Baker & McKenzie; Ballard Spahr; Bird & Bird; Boies Schiller Flexner; Bracewell; Coffey Burlington; Colson Hicks Eidson; Cueto Law Group; Ewusiak Law; Hogan Lovells; Holland & Knight; Jones Walker; Kantrowitz, Goldhamer, & Graifman; Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton; Law Offices Of Paul Sack; Manuel Vazquez PA; Margol & Margol; Mayer Brown; Morgan, Lewis & Bockius; Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell; Pacifica Law Group; Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman; Reed Smith; Reid Collins & Tsai; Rice Reuther Sullivan & Carroll; Rivero Mestre; Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess; Scott Douglass & McConnico; Steptoe & Johnson; Venable; Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford.

The twenty-seven (27) member Brussels, Belgium-based European Union (EU) has confirmed its intention to issue a Request For Proposal (RFP) to law firms in the United States.  The law firms would be retained to file “amicus curiae” (friend-of-the-court) motions and other motions on behalf of each Libertad Act Title III lawsuit defendant who is domiciled in the EU.  

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset. 

LINK To Complete Statistics Report

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NH Hotels Of Spain Files Motion To Dismiss In Capri Hotel Libertad Act Lawsuit

On 27 September 2019, John S. Shepard Family Trust, through John S. Shepard and Lawrence Jaffe, as Co-Trustees, filed a lawsuit using the Title III provision of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”) against v. NH Hotels USA, Inc., NH Hotel Group, S.A., and Jolly Hotels U.S.A., Inc. The lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court For The Southern District In New York.

LINK To Initial Filing

LINK To Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss

Excerpts:

Defendants NH Hotels USA, Inc. (“NH USA”), Jolly Hotels, USA, Inc. (“Jolly”) and NH Hotel Group, S.A. (“NH Spain”) (collectively, “Defendants,” and NH USA and Jolly together the “U.S. Defendants”) respectfully submit this Memorandum of Law in support of their motion to dismiss the Amended Civil Action Complaint, dated January 17, 2020 (“Compl.”) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (2), (5) and (6).

While the Amended Complaint provides scant details of the public records maintained by
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, those records show that in late 1956, Julius J. (“Skip”)
Shepard signed an agreement to manage a hotel to be built in Havana. He executed that agreement
as president of a Cuban corporation he formed to operate the proposed hotel. Shepard’s Cuban
company had the right to manage the hotel pursuant to a 20-year lease that was to begin on
November 1, 1957, and end on October 31, 1977.4 The hotel was named the Capri and opened in
late 1957. On January 1, 1959 the dictator Fulgencio Batista fled Cuba and U.S. tourism dried up
overnight. Julius Shepard borrowed from a Cuban bank to keep the Hotel Capri open by pledging
as security the shares in his Cuban company, which were forfeited when he defaulted on the loans.
Insolvent, Shepard returned to the United States in mid-1960. On October 24, 1960, the
Government of Cuba nationalized Shepard’s Cuban corporation pursuant to Resolution 3 of Law
851.5

The Amended Complaint confirms that Shepard had an ownership interest in an entity that
briefly operated but never owned the Hotel Capri in Havana. See Compl. ¶ 20. An Amended
Proposed Decision of the FCSC, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Amended Complaint, confirms this.

Under no principle of law or equity should Defendants be compelled to compensate Plaintiff for the acts of third parties, such as a Cuban military unit and a foreign government. The Helms-Burton Act’s cause of action may only be construed justly if it is read in conformity with Article III of the Constitution to provide a cause of action solely to those who allege standing to sue based on an articulated and demonstrated causal connection between a defendant’s conduct and a plaintiff’s injury. See United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916) (“A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.”). Defendants respectfully submit the Court should dismiss the Complaint in this case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of standing and therefore lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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Havana Docks Corporation Files Appeals In MSC Cruises Lawsuit Dismissed By Judge

Certified claimant Havana Docks Corporation has filed four lawsuits using the Title III provision of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).  Given their similarities, one judge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida is presiding over the four cases.
In January 2020, two of the lawsuits (Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings and MSC Cruises) were dismissed with prejudice by the presiding judge; the dismissals with prejudice were unusual. 

On 31 January 2020, Havana Docks Corporation in its case against MSC Cruises SA CO., and MSC Cruises (USA) Inc., filed 1) an 18-page Plaintiff’s Motion For Reconsideration And Leave To Amend, And Request For Hearing 2) a 12-page  [Proposed] Amended Complaint and 3) a 4-page Notice Of Filing The Declaration Of Aziza Elayan-Martinez In Support Of Plaintiff’s Motion For Reconsideration And Leave To Amend 

LINK: Plaintiff’s Motion For Reconsideration And Leave To Amend, And Request For Hearing 

LINK: [Proposed] Amended Complaint 

LINK: Notice Of Filing The Declaration Of Aziza Elayan-Martinez In Support Of Plaintiff’s Motion For Reconsideration And Leave To Amend 

Previous Post With Links To All Cases Filed By Havana Docks Corporation: 

Royal Caribbean Seeks Dismissal Of Libertad Act Lawsuit; Using Same Arguments Judge Agreed To For Two Other Cases (13 January 2020)

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2020/1/13/x58vrupsbh46pw7tx9pyfplohgz4ci

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In Libertad Act Lawsuits, “Ownership” Defines The Process

In Libertad Act Lawsuits, “Ownership” Defines The Process
If Owner Wasn’t Alive In 1996, Title III Doesn’t Apply?
What About Companies Transferring Ownership Of A Claim?
The Politics Of Judges In Florida Dismissing Cases Filed By Cuban-Americans
Did Congress Intend To Short-Circuit “Justice”?
Will U.S. Congress Intervene?

There is one argument by the defendants in Libertad Act lawsuits which has received scant attention thus far- outside of the courtroom.  The definition of “ownership.”   

The position by some defendants is unless the original owner of the claim is alive, there is no basis for a Title III lawsuit using provisions of the Libertad Act.  Meaning, that if the original owner died in 1996 after enactment of the Libertad Act, then the ability to use Title III to seek damages from third-parties no longer exists.  Is someone who inherits an asset considered to be the owner? 

In some instances, the original owners of certified claims and non-certified claims had died prior to 1996; and their estates distributed assets to heirs.  Generally, an individual who inherits an asset is then considered to be the owner.  

The political question:  In 1996, was the intention of the United States Congress to preclude the descendants, the heirs, of certified claims and non-certified claims from obtaining “justice” from those who “traffic” in assets? 

From Libertad Act: Applicability: “(A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, actions may be brought under paragraph (1) with respect to property confiscated before, on, or after March 12, 1996.  (B) In the case of property confiscated before March 12, 1996, a United States national may not bring an action under this section on a claim to the confiscated property unless such national acquires ownership of the claim before March 12, 1996.  (C) In the case of property confiscated on or after March 12, 1996, a United States national who, after the property is confiscated, acquires ownership of a claim to the property by assignment for value, may not bring an action on the claim under this section.” 

Might members of the United States Congress, particularly those representing the state of Florida where 80% of the twenty Libertad Act lawsuits have been filed in the United States District Court in Southern Florida, seek to amend the Libertad Act to ensure that heirs to certified claims and non-certified claims remain eligible to file lawsuits using the Libertad Act?  

From a filing in the Libertad Act case of Jose Ramon Lopez Regueiro vs. American Airlines Inc. and LATAM Airlines Group, S.A.: “(B) In the case of property confiscated before March 12, 1996, a United States national may not bring an action under this section on a claim to the confiscated property unless such national acquires ownership of the claim before March 12, 1996. [Emphasis added.]  “United States national” is defined (for a natural person) as “any United States citizen.” 22 U.S.C. § 6023(15). Plaintiff alleges that the Airport was confiscated in 1959. Compl. ¶ 13.  Under the plain meaning of 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B), quoted above, Plaintiff “may not bring an action” under Title III unless he both was a U.S. citizen and acquired his claim before March 12, 1996. This is clear from Congress’s description of this provision: . . . in the case of property confiscated before the date of enactment of this Act, the U.S. national had to have owned the claim to the property before the date of enactment in order to bring an action under this section.” 

From a filing in the Libertad Act case of Javier Garcia-Bengochea vs. Carnival Corporation: “THIRD DEFENSE – FAILURE TO OWN CLAIM: Plaintiff’s claim is barred because he does not own the claim he asserts.  FOURTH DEFENSE – UNTIMELY ACQUISITION OF CLAIM Plaintiff’s claim is barred because, to the extent he ever acquired the claim he asserts, he acquired his claim after March 12, 1996. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B). As shown in the attached Exhibit 1 (which includes a certified translation), if Plaintiff acquired the claim he asserts at all, he acquired the claim from his cousin Desiderio Parreno via a will executed in 2000.  Accordingly, Plaintiff acquired his claim, if at all, after March 12, 1996.” 

In the Title III Libertad Act lawsuit filed by Irving, Texas-based Exxon Mobil Corporation (2018 revenues approximately US$290 billion), its certified claim for US$71,611,002.90 was originally filed by Standard Oil Company.  Standard Oil changed its name to Exxon Corporation in 1972 and Exxon Corporation changed its name to Exxon Mobil Corporation in 1999.  Exxon Mobil Corporation is seeking treble damages as permitted by Title III of the Libertad Act.  Could the transition in ownership of the certified claim be construed by a judge as not dissimilar from an owner who dies and the assets of the estate are inherited by third-parties after 1996?     

The Trump Administration has made operational Title III and further implemented Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).   

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.   

Title IV restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims.  One Canada-based company is currently subject to this provision based upon a certified claim. 

Excerpts From The Libertad Act 

Person.--The term "person" means any person or entity, including any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. 

Property.--(A) The term "property" means any property (including patents, copyrights, trademarks, and any other form of intellectual property), whether real, personal, or mixed, and any present, future, or contingent right, security, or other interest therein, including any leasehold interest. 

(B) For purposes of title III of this Act, the term "property" does not include real property used for residential purposes unless, as of the date of the enactment of this Act-- the claim to the property is held by a United States national and the claim has been certified under title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949; or the property is occupied by an official of the Cuban Government or the ruling political party in Cuba. 

Traffics.--(A) As used in title III, and except as provided in subparagraph (B), a person "traffics" in confiscated property if that person knowingly and intentionally-- sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property, engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property, or causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person, without the authorization of any United States national who holds a claim to the property. 

To deter trafficking in wrongfully confiscated property, United States nationals who were the victims of these confiscations should be endowed with a judicial remedy in the courts of the United States that would deny traffickers any profits from economically exploiting Castro's wrongful seizures. 

Increased liability.--(A) Any person that traffics in confiscated property for which liability is incurred under paragraph (1) shall, if a United States national owns a claim with respect to that property which was certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, be liable for damages computed in accordance with subparagraph (C). 

Applicability.--(A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, actions may be brought under paragraph (1) with respect to property confiscated before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

In the case of property confiscated before the date of the enactment of this Act, a United States national may not bring an action under this section on a claim to the confiscated property unless such national acquires ownership of the claim before such date of enactment. 

In the case of property confiscated on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, a United States national who, after the property is confiscated, acquires ownership of a claim to the property by assignment for value, may not bring an action on the claim under this section. 

Treatment of certain actions.--(A) In the case of a United States national who was eligible to file a claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 but did not so file the claim, that United States national may not bring an action on that claim under this section. 

Claims not certified.--If in an action under this title a claim has not been so certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, the court may appoint a special master, including the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, to make determinations regarding the amount and ownership of the claim. Such determinations are only for evidentiary purposes in civil actions brought under this title and do not constitute certifications under title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949. 

Suspension.--After this title and the amendments of this title have taken effect-- no person shall acquire a property interest in any potential or pending action under this title; 

The Certified Claims 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the USFCSC and have not been resolved for nearing sixty years. The USFCSC permitted interest to be accrued in the amount of 6% per annum; with the current value of the 5,913 certified claims approximately US$8,521,866,156.95.   

The first asset to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery in 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).   

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust.  

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement.

Ownership_Puzzle_WSH.jpg

Ismael Sene Alegret: The Passing Of A Friend & Mentor

Today passed Mr. Ismael Sene Alegret (1937 to 2020), known throughout the Republic of Cuba as “Mr. Baseball.”  Fellow citizens, seeing him on the street, in a restaurant, or entering a hotel would stop him, engage him, perhaps create a photograph.  He was respected.  

For representatives of the United States business community whose engagement with the Republic of Cuba began in the early 1990’s, Mr. Sene remains a legendary figure regarded as having done perhaps more than any individual to educate and nurture and befriend all whom he encountered.   

He never recoiled from something new- never said no; he always wanted to find a way to create an opportunity from an idea.   

If he encountered a wall, he built a ladder or went around it.  If he encountered water, he built a bridge or a boat.  If it was raining, he got an umbrella rather than retreating indoors.  There was never a telephone number he did not have or could not obtain; never a meeting he could not arrange.  He wanted to help the citizens of his country.  He would always smile when reminding those who had the joy to know him that he shared the day of his birth with Josef Stalin.   

His career included postings in Europe while with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba and various positions in Havana with the Ministry for Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation of the Republic of Cuba.  In 1993, he was instrumental in the creation of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council.   

There was a time when almost every senior-level executive of a United States company- including chairmen and chief executive officers would meet with him- not only for his jokes (which were legendary) and baseball stories, but for his perspective- a candid insight that was far too often lacking from those above him and those below him.  He was refreshing.  He was honest.  Even in retirement, his counsel was sought by visitors from throughout the world. 

There were some in the Republic of Cuba who viewed him with suspicion and befuddlement- why did Mr. Sene have such magnetism for executives from United States companies and for journalists?  Because he never failed to try and present all sides of an issue; not just two sides or one side.   

The whittling away of members of his generation- their wisdom, their practicality, and especially their civility has adversely impacted the relationship between the Republic of Cuba and the United States.  In his later years, parties to the system he tirelessly worked within treated him shabbily and disrespectfully.  

Mr. Sene, the man, the husband, the father, and grandfather would never ask for anything for himself- if he did ask, it would be for his family.   

The memories left by Mr. Sene afford this day a bit less sadness than would be otherwise when a friend passes.  He was a good man.  He is a good memory. 

John   

LINKS To Memorial Service And Article:

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=f1NwzkY_sBE

http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2020/01/28/el-ultimo-adios-al-senor-beisbol-fotos/#.XjF7AjnoOaN

LINKS To Videos Of Interview With Mr. Sene:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8C5kb1QByhA

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y0d8KRzq7Zc 

https://www.univision.com/univision-news/sports/cubas-baseball-exodus-video

ismael-sene-fallecio-min.jpg

JetBlue Airways Cancelling Boston To Havana & Other Flights Operated Since November 2018

On 16 January 2020, Long Island City, New York-based JetBlue Airways Corporation (2019 revenues exceeding US$8 billion) reported that the company would cease its Boston-Havana flight operations.

 “Nearly three and a half years after becoming the first airline to operate commercial service between the U.S. and Cuba in more than 50 years, JetBlue remains committed to serving Cuba via Havana’s José Martí International Airport (HAV). At the same time, changes to the regulatory landscape have affected travel trends to the island. To best meet current demand JetBlue will adjust schedules to maintain up to three daily flights to Havana from Fort Lauderdale and revise to once weekly service on Saturdays from New York-JFK. Through these gateway cities, JetBlue will continue to offer travelers convenient nonstop and connecting options to Cuba from across the airline’s network.” 

JetBlue will cease daily JFK-Havana (HAV) flights 28 April 2020 and on 2 May 2020 will begin weekly Saturday flights; and continue to operate up to three three daily flights from Fort Lauderdale to HAV.

LINK To JetBlue USDOT Filing

Economic Eye On Cuba 

20 April 2017: Long Island City, New York-based JetBlue Airways Corporation (2016 revenues exceeding US$6.4 billion) for the second time requested the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) to authorize “the first-ever non-stop service between Boston, Massachusetts [Logan International Airport- BOS], and Havana, Cuba [Jose Marti International Airport- HAV]” commencing on 1 November 2017.  

Jet Blue Airways Corporation had first requested the route on 2 March 2016.  The once-per-week flight, using a 162-seat Airbus A-320 aircraft, would operate on Saturdays with departure at 9:45 am and arrival at 1:45 pm.  The request by Jet Blue Airways Corporation to the USDOT was to transport “persons, property and mail.” 

If the once-per-week flight operated at capacity on an annual basis, the service would transport 8,424 passengers.  Approximately 10,000 individuals of Cuban decent reside in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.  

If the USDOT grants the request by Jet Blue Airways Corporation, given the low number of potential passengers of Cuban descent, the service would be overwhelmingly focused upon “people-to-people” and “educational activities” given the large number of educational institutions located in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and northern Connecticut that would use BOS as a departure point to HAV.   

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/5/18/nez9vv71hkndkzexqe9nfgmq8u2ish?rq=Jet%20Blue 

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/4/22/what-does-jetblue-know-or-doesnt-know-seeking-additional-routes-to-cuba?rq=Boston 

26 June 2018: JetBlue – First Airline to Operate Commercial Service between the U.S. and Cuba in 50+ Years – Will Soon Fly From Four U.S. Gateways 

NEW YORK--(BUSINESS WIRE)-- JetBlue (NASDAQ: JBLU), the first airline to operate commercial service between the U.S. and Cuba in more than five decades, today announced it is again expanding and diversifying its flying schedule in Havana with new service from Boston and more flights from Fort Lauderdale. New England and South Florida nonstop service, combined with JetBlue’s existing nonstop service from New York and Orlando, means JetBlue will link Cuba’s capital with four American cities – more than any other U.S. airline.  

“As the first airline to operate commercial service between the U.S. and Cuba, we are proud to celebrate another first as the only carrier to serve Havana from Boston while also growing our successful service in Fort Lauderdale,” said John Checketts, vice president network planning, JetBlue. “JetBlue will operate more than 50 weekly flights between the U.S. and Cuba from every one of our east coast focus cities.”

New England Nonstop 

Starting November 10, 2018, JetBlue will operate Saturday service between Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) and Havana’s Jose Marti International Airport (HAV). JetBlue, already the leading airline at Logan, will be the only carrier to offer nonstop service between New England and Cuba. Seats are on sale today with an introductory fare of $129 one way (a).  

JetBlue has sought a nonstop route between Boston and Havana since first applying for commercial service to Cuba in 2016. Boston has over 120 institutions of higher education and more university students per capita than most other cities in the world. These educational institutions, as well as the healthcare and biotechnology companies located in the greater Boston area will benefit from the new, once-weekly service.  

The new service also benefits customers in a number of other JetBlue cities – including Detroit, Cleveland and Pittsburgh – where travelers will benefit from new connecting options which make Havana just one stop away from home.  

Saturday Schedule between Boston (BOS) and Havana (HAV) Beginning November 10, 2018

BOS-HAV Flight #867

12:30 p.m. – 4:30 p.m.

HAV-BOS Flight #868

5:30 p.m. – 9:14 p.m. 

Havana will be the 68th destination served from Boston and the 17th international city. No other airline serves as many domestic or international cities at Logan. The added flights at Logan advance JetBlue’s plan to grow its leadership position in Boston. The airline plans to reach 200 daily flights in the coming years and already operates more than 150 daily flights.  

Strengthening South Florida 

JetBlue will also add an additional flight between its Fort Lauderdale focus city and Havana which will operate Sunday through Friday. The airline will now operate up to three daily flights between South Florida and Cuba’s capital city. JetBlue’s Cuba service in the Sunshine State provides convenient nonstop service to communities throughout the greater Fort Lauderdale and Miami areas. The added flight will also offer a new afternoon departure from Fort Lauderdale and a new evening flight from Havana.  

Schedule between Fort Lauderdale (FLL) and Havana (HAV) Beginning November 4, 2018

FLL-HAV Flight #1899

3:08 p.m. – 4:30 p.m.

HAV-FLL #1900

5:30 p.m. – 6:43 p.m. 

Customer Favorite to Cuba 

Flights between the U.S. and Havana feature the most legroom in coach (b) and complimentary and unlimited name-brand snacks and soft drinks. Select flights also feature free Fly-Fi, the fastest broadband internet in the sky (c); free, live DIRECTV® programming and 100 channels of SiriusXM® radio in every seatback.  

JetBlue is proud to offer customer-friendly baggage allowances for travelers flying to or from Cuba, with the ability to check up to a total of three bags or boxes, each up to 99 lbs. and up to 80 linear inches (length + width +height) (d). Please see JetBlue’s Checked Baggage page for more information.  

In addition to Havana, JetBlue serves three other Cuban cities with daily service from Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood: Santa Clara – Abel Santamaría Airport (SNU); Camagüey – Ignacio Agramonte Airport (CMW); Holguín – Frank País Airport (HOG)  

In September 2017, JetBlue opened a City Ticket Office and an Airport Ticket Office in Havana. Both locations offer a convenient option for Cubans to book travel on JetBlue, with the added benefit of in-person interactions which will provide the personal, helpful and simple customer experience the airline is known for.  

JetBlue’s commercial service launch followed nearly five years of successful charter service operating multiple routes between Cuban markets and U.S. cities. In that time, JetBlue built strong relationships with airport authorities and worked closely together to make the successful launch of commercial service possible.  

All U.S. customers traveling to Cuba must be authorized to do so under the U.S. government’s Cuban Assets Control Regulations and they must certify that they qualify for one of the twelve approved travel categories outlined by the U.S. Department of Treasury. All travelers to Cuba must make their own determinations with respect to the appropriate travel category, as well as the type of visa required by Cuba for their purpose of travel.  

LINK To Media Release: http://blueir.investproductions.com/investor-relations/press-releases/2018/06-26-2018-150051397

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Might Cubaexport In 2020 Permit “Independent Entrepreneurs” To Export Coffee Beans, Cocoa and Honey To The United States?

On 17 August 2016, New York, New York-based Nespresso USA, Inc., a subsidiary of Vevey, Switzerland-based Nestle S.A. (2018 revenues US$92 billion) commenced sale of Cafecito de Cuba capsules throughout the United States and other countries.

The opportunity resulted from a decision published on 22 April 2016 by the Obama Administration to expand the variety of products produced by “independent Cuban entrepreneurs” for commercial use authorized to be directly and indirectly exported from the Republic of Cuba to the United States. The first products authorized were textiles, coffee and charcoal. The first agricultural commodity was coffee and the second was charcoal.

Despite repeated entreaties from United States-based importers small, medium and large, the government of the Republic of Cuba has thus far resisted permitting coffee beans, cocoa and honey to be directly exported to the United States, although processed coffee beans have been permitted to be indirectly imported through Switzerland to the United States.

There are again anticipated efforts in 2020 for United States-based importers to work with Republic of Cuba government-operated Cubaexport to identify source-compliant commodities, specifically coffee, cocoa and honey, for direct and indirect import to the United States.

The State Department's Section 515.582 List
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
Goods and Services Eligible for Importation


“In accordance with the policy changes announced by the President on December 17, 2014, to further engage and empower the Cuban people, Section 515.582 of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (31 CFR Part 515 – the CACR) authorizes the importation into the United States of certain goods and services produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs as determined by the State Department as set forth on the Section 515.582. The goods whose import is authorized by Section 515.582 are goods produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs, as demonstrated by documentary evidence, that are imported into the United States, except for goods specified in the following sections/chapters of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTS).”

LINK: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/563a4585e4b00d0211e8dd7e/t/571a83d4b6aa608067034e42/1461355477041/WhatMayBeImportedFromCubaEntrepreneurs.pdf

Cuba Cocoa Production (Government 3 December 2019):

2020- 1,800 metric tons (projected)
2019- 1,700 metric tons
2018- Not Reported
2017- 230 metric tons
2016- 2,200 metric tons

Cuba Cocoa Production (Rome, Italy-based Food And Agriculture Organization 29 December 2019):

2019- Not Reported
2018- Not Reported
2017- 231 metric tons
2016- 2,058 metric tons
2015- 1,500 metric tons
2014- 2,188 metric tons
2013- 1,425 metric tons

Production is geographically focused in Baracoa, Guantanamo (approximately 90% of production), Santiago de Cuba, Granma and Holguin. Development has also initiated in Sancti Spiritus and Pinar del Rio. The most suitable conditions are found in the eastern provinces, into the main mountain range of Cuba Nipe-Sagua-Baracoa, the eastern extreme of the country.

From Zurich, Switzerland-based Barry Callebaut AG (2018 revenues exceeded US$8 billion): https://www.cacao-barry.com/en-OC/chocolate-couverture-cocoa/chd-q70cub/cuba

Link To PDF From Barry Callebaut About Cuba Chocolate

Problems continue with coffee supply in Cuba

NOTE: Government of Cuba reported 2019/2020 coffee crop projected 1,400 metric tons

Miami, Florida, Dec 3 (OnCuba) The delays in the distribution of coffee in Cuba will continue during the month of December due to this industry’s continuous production problems inherited from the past on the island, the Cubadebate digital site reported this Sunday.

Francisco Silva, general director of merchandise sales of the Ministry of Domestic Trade (MINCIN), said that the delays in the arrival of the packaging used for the marketing of that product caused the delays. In November there were also delays in the delivery of coffee to the wholesale markets, which led to its distribution in the last week of the month. Francisco Silva, general director of merchandise sales of the Ministry of Domestic Trade (MINCIN), said that the Delays in the arrival of the packaging used for the marketing of that product caused the delays.

Usually that product of the rationed family food basket, which is sold through the ration book in Cuban grocery stores, is sold at the beginning of each month. According to Silva, production is expected to be completed on December 5, so the effects will be resolved more quickly than last month. The official explained that the supply recovery process will be “gradual.” In addition, he said that the coffee in the rationed family food basket will have priority with respect to that destined for social consumption, in coffee shops and other establishments dedicated to its commerce.

Silva regretted that in some provinces alternatives were sought through the use of other types of packaging, but production achieved “much less yield.” He clarified that they have already restarted the production of coffee that is sold in chain stores in foreign exchange. This also is experiencing problems of shortage. The MINCIN official considered that, based on the information received from the industry, a more favorable situation is expected in January in the supply of that product, one of the most demanded in the Cuban market.

Cuban company increases its honey exports

Sancti Spiritus, Cuba, Dec 27 (Prensa Latina) The honey processing plant in the Cuban province of Sancti Spiritus will contribute this year about 30 percent of the national production exported to the international market, reported a company executive.

Alberto Bravo, director of the enterprise, one of the most modern in Cuba, told reporters that it will close 2019 with nearly 3,000 tons of processed honey, out of some 8,000 tons achieved in the country. Currently, most of the exportable product is packaged in 210-liter (55-gallon) tanks. He explained that in order to expand sales, a line of 'mini-dosis' portions (19 grams) with packaging of Spanish origin was launched, with a maximum production capacity of around 5,000 units per day.

To comply with the country's strategy to expand and achieve a better presence of exportable items, Bravo added, a new line will be launched next year to package the honey in more attractive and commercial formats. This will allow the presentation of the products in a variety of containers for the foreign market and expand the offers to the tourism sector and local stores. Honey and its derivatives are currently one of the most important exportable items of the Ministry of Agriculture's Agroforestry Business Group, providing annual revenues of about 20 million dollars. October 2019- The governmental Cuban honey company (Apicuba) reported that the 2019 domestic crop is expected to reach around 10,000 tonnes, 13.2% more than last year.

Cuba sees record honey production levels

Matanzas, Cuba, Nov 5 (Prensa Latina) The Apiculture Basic Enterprise Unit (UEB) of the western province of Matanzas broke its annual honey production record, by accumulating 1,668 tons of the precious product, it was reported here. Beekeepers of the territory thus exceeded the 1,604 tons of the previous record set in 2016, detailed Rubén Jesús Lugo, head of production at the UEB, speaking to the local radio station Radio 26.

These results are due, Lugo noted, to the excellent climatic conditions of the year, which have favored the essential flowering plants for the production of the exquisite nectar. He highlighted that technical and scientific attention to producers had been prioritized, taking advantage of transhumance to change queen bees and in this way ensure the greater health and strength of beehives. According to statistical data, Matanzas beekeepers also excel in the production of propolis and beeswax, and in the rearing of queen bees, surpassing annual plans.

Specialists and technicians recalled that the UEB suffered the loss of half of its beehives last year, due to the effects of Subtropical Storm Alberto. Honey has been used for thousands of years throughout the world, either as a foodstuff, or as medicine. Highlighted are its vitamin content, it antioxidants, and therapeutic, antimicrobial and antiseptic characteristics. Honey can help to heal and prevent infections in wounds and superficial burns, and is also used in cosmetics.

Cuba seeks to increase exports of non-conventional agricultural products

HAVANA, July 7 (Xinhua) -- Cuba seeks to increase exports of non-conventional agricultural products like honey, charcoal, coffee and pine resin to various markets around the world and contribute to the government's strategy of diversification of foreign markets.

Mercedes de la Cruz, acting director of marketing at GAF, said that the main market for Cuban honey is Europe, with Germany in the highest demand. The group is also exploring markets in other countries, such as Canada, Costa Rica, Colombia and China. "The goal is to increase the added value of our products by producing smaller and more varied formats that sell for a higher price. In the case of honey, the price is above 4,000 dollars per ton," De la Cruz said.

Cuba currently exports its honey in large formats to various markets in Europe. Lazaro Garcia, director of honey producer Apicuba, explained that each year Cuba produces about 8,000 tons of honey, of which around 95 percent is destined for exports. The producer's intention, according to Garcia, is to have a total of 220,000 hives, increasing production in the near future to 15,000 tons of honey annually. If current prices are maintained, the honey production could generate 61 million dollars.

Another promising product of the group is charcoal, with exports of more than 28,000 tons, mostly sent to Europe, particularly Turkey, Greece, Spain and Italy. De la Cruz said that currently seven state companies are producing charcoal, which is expected to reach 130,000 tons for export this year. These favorable results came from the diversification of charcoal production from highly valued hardwoods and African marabou which is abundant in Cuba.

Increasing coffee production on the island is another objective of the agricultural group, which is expected to grow substantially. According to Forteza, the group is collaborating with Vietnam to develop high-quality coffee after last year's all-time low production rate because of storms. "We want to develop our own high-quality Arabica coffee in Vietnam and their robust coffee here in Cuba. This project is focused on the eastern provinces of Granma and Santiago in Cuba and we plan to extend it to other areas," he said. Despite the industry's setbacks, significant steps have been taken, such as the introduction of ecological coffee bean pulpers. "We also improved the technology in the two plants we have in Guantanamo and Santiago in Cuba, which has raised the quality of our strongest product," Forteza said. Currently Japan is the main market for Cuban Arabica coffee, purchasing the product for around 10,000 dollars per ton.

Cuba is also engaged in diversifying and expanding production of other items like pine resin, cocoa, coconut and henequen plant fibers to bring in foreign currency and replace imports.

LINK To Previous Posts:

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/9/28/honey-from-cuba-could-be-imported-to-the-us-thus-far-cuba-says-no?rq=honey

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/6/20/nespresso-to-indirectly-import-coffee-from-cuba-to-usa?rq=coffee

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/9/17/lavazza-from-italy-nespresso-from-switzerland-vie-for-cubas-coffee-productionexports?rq=nespresso

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/6/20/97q82rfwiq1pb8a7ycv7p6gpkttwab?rq=nespresso