Why Is Cuba Deputy Foreign Minister Lying, Misleading, And Misstating Commercial Relationship With U.S.? Isn’t He Supposed To Encourage, Nurture, And Support It?

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Why Is Cuba Deputy Foreign Minister Lying, Misleading, And Misstating Commercial Relationship With United States?

Isn’t He Supposed To Encourage, Nurture, And Support It?

The Militant
New York, New York
2 December 2024

Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister Says, ‘End US embargo!’
By Lea Sherman 

NEWARK, N.J. — Carlos Fernández de Cossío, Cuba’s deputy minister of foreign affairs, spoke to a meeting of 35 at Rutgers Law School here Nov. 14.  Law professor Charles Auffant, who has organized trips to study Cuba’s legal system for the past 20 years, chaired the meeting. He announced these trips will now be open to undergraduate students.  Fernández de Cossío focused on the devastating impact of Washington’s 64-year economic war against the Cuban people and their socialist revolution. 

“The U.S. prohibits any imports to Cuba with only a few exceptions, and it prohibits imports to Cuba from any country, regardless of the product, if it has 10% or more U.S. product in it. What products in the world does that not include?” he said. Examples he gave included getting parts for dialysis machines or parts to repair Cuba’s aging electrical grid. 

“This is multiplied more and more, repeated in every area,” he said. “No import of metal, no cars, candy bars and much more. And Cuba cannot use U.S. dollars in its trade with international partners.” 

He [de Cossio] pointed out that under both Presidents Donald Trump and Joseph Biden, the U.S. has unjustly put Cuba on its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.  The embargo has caused severe problems with basic services like electricity and health care. “Many in Cuba are looking to move,” said Fernández de Cossío.  At the same time, all of Washington’s attempts to isolate Cuba — the 1961 invasion at the Bay of Pigs, CIA schemes to assassinate Fidel Castro — have failed to undo the revolution.  “Cuba has a respectful and cooperative relationship with the majority of countries of the world,” he said. “We have a firm determination for Cuba to be free of foreign interference, but we are willing to have constructive, civilized relations with the U.S.” 

Coffee from the Republic of Cuba is available throughout the United States through an agreement signed in 2016 between New York, New York-based Nespresso USA Inc., a subsidiary of Lausanne, Switzerland-based Nestle Nespresso S.A. (2023 revenue approximately US$111 billion); Arlington, Virginia-based TechnoServe; and Republic of Cuba government-operated Cubaexport, under the auspice of the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Republic of Cuba. 

From Nespresso: “The green coffee sourced for Cafecito de Cuba is 100% pure Arabica, grown by smallholder farmers in the provinces of Granma and Santiago de Cuba in the eastern part of Cuba.  Nespresso coffee experts in Switzerland then used a split roasting technique to enhance the potential of the beans and highlight their authenticity. One part of the beans was roasted for a shorter time to a lighter colour to bring out the coffee’s unique flavours and aromas. The second part was roasted longer to a much darker colour to create a strong body with a dense, velvety texture and intense rich flavours.”  LINK: https://nestle-nespresso.com/news/Nespresso-brings-Cuban-coffee-back-to-US 

United States-based companies have approached Cubaexport to seek authorization to import coffee directly from the Republic of Cuba to the United States.  Those entreaties were rejected. 

Charcoal from the Republic of Cuba has been imported directly to the United States.  The first company, Hialeah, Florida-based Fogo Premium Lump Charcoal purchased four (4) 20ft containers with the first delivered in January 2017 and the second in July 2018.  The second company Foley, Alabama-based GulfWise Commerce LLC, affiliated with Foley, Alabama-based Woerner Companies reported delivery in May 2019 to Port Everglades, Florida, of two (2) forty-foot containers.  Neither company reported transactional issues with the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, or Office of Legal Adviser (OLA) at the United States Department of State. 

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Links To Related Analyses 

Cuba: Acknowledging Impact Was Not Necessarily A Shrewd Political Statement. For Biden Administration, If It's Working, Why Change It? For Plaintiffs, Libertad Act Doing What It Was Designed To Do.  October 03, 2023 

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Cuba Minister Of Foreign Affairs Said That Only U.S. Vessels Are Permitted For U.S. Exports To Cuba. That Was Inaccurate. August 23, 2023 

Mr. de Cossio At MINREX In Cuba Not Quite Accurate With His Comments About Biden-Harris Administration Efforts With MSMEs And Remittances December 20, 2022 

Coffee & Charcoal Have Been Imported From Cuba; U.S. Companies Want More. Agricultural Commodities/Food Products/Healthcare Products Have Been Exported To Cuba; U.S. Companies Want More. October 02, 2021

Senator Ted Cruz (R- Texas) Signs On As A Co-Sponsor Of Bacardi's Cuba Trademark Legislation- After It Passes U.S. Senate And U.S. House Of Representatives

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"Unaminous Consent" Reflects Ineffectiveness And Incompetance Of Members Of Congress, Organizations, Lobbying Enterprises Focusing Upon The Republic of Cuba.

From Congress.gov Bill Alert

S.746 - No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act (118th Congress)
Sponsor: Sen. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ] (Introduced 03/09/2023)

Has changes in: Related Bill (1 new, 1 total)

Related Bill: H.R.1505 

November 19, 2024 - Issue: Vol. 170, No. 171 — Daily Edition

118th Congress (2023 - 2024) - 2nd Session 

NO STOLEN TRADEMARKS HONORED IN AMERICA ACT OF 2023; Congressional Record Vol. 170, No. 171 (Senate - November 19, 2024)

PDF (224KB) 

[Page S6638] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] 

NO STOLEN TRADEMARKS HONORED IN AMERICA ACT OF 2023 

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 1505 and the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.  The senior assistant legislative clerk read as follows:  A bill (H.R. 1505) to modify the prohibition on recognition by United States courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, trade names, or commercial names. 

There being no objection, the committee was discharged, and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill. 

Mr. SCHUMER. I ask unanimous consent that the bill be considered read a third time and passed and that the motion to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

The bill (H.R. 1505) was ordered to a third reading, was read the third time, and passed. 

NO STOLEN TRADEMARKS HONORED IN AMERICA ACT OF 2023
13 November 2023           

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1505) to modify the prohibition on recognition by United States courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, trade names, or commercial names, as amended.  The Clerk read the title of the bill. The text of the bill is as follows: H.R. 1505  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ``No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act of 2023''. 

SEC. 2. MODIFICATION OF PROHIBITION. 

Section 211 of the Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 (as contained in section 101(b) of division A of Public Law 105-277; 112 Stat. 2681- 88) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(2)-- (A) by inserting ``or entity of the executive branch'' after ``U.S. court''; (B) by striking ``by a designated national''; and (C) by inserting before the period ``that was used in connection with a business or assets that were confiscated unless the original owner of the mark, trade name, or commercial name, or the bonafide successor-in-interest has expressly consented''; (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) by inserting ``or entity of the executive branch'' after ``U.S. court''; and (B) by striking ``by a designated national or its successor-in-interest''; (3) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); (4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following: ``(d) Subsections (a)(2) and (b) of this section shall apply only if the person or entity asserting the rights knew or had reason to know at the time when the person or entity acquired the rights asserted that the mark, trade name, or commercial name was the same as or substantially similar to a mark, trade name, or commercial name that was used in connection with a business or assets that were confiscated.''; and (5) in subsection (e), as so redesignated, by striking ``In this section:'' and all that follows through ``(2) The term'' and inserting ``In this section, the term''.  

Links To Related Analyses 

"CRF I Limited Welcomes Decisive English Court of Appeal Ruling" Against Banco Nacional de Cuba. The US$100 Million Lawsuit Continues.

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“CRF I Limited Welcomes Decisive English Court of Appeal Ruling in Favor of CRF London, 19th Nov 2024

CRF I Limited ("CRF") is pleased to announce that the English Court of Appeal has unanimously ruled in favor of CRF in its ongoing litigation against Banco Nacional de Cuba (BNC). This decisive ruling, while expected, marks a significant step forward in CRF’s legal strategy. The ruling affirms the validity of CRF's claims and underscores their enforceability under English law. With this favorable outcome, CRF will now proceed to the Merits phase of the trial, where we remain confident of securing a win. The facts are clear: Cuba borrowed these sums and has failed to honor its repayment obligations, a pattern that has been consistent across its dealings. CRF has made persistent efforts to engage with Cuban authorities to negotiate the debt in good faith since 2013. Despite our ongoing willingness to negotiate a fair resolution, the Cuban side has shown little interest in constructive dialogue. As such, CRF will continue to pursue this case with determination, seeking justice and enforcing our legal rights. David Charters, Chairman of CRF, commented: "Today’s ruling reinforces our confidence as we advance to the next phase. While CRF has consistently sought a fair and equitable settlement, we remain steadfast in pursuing justice for our stakeholders if negotiations are not forthcoming." CRF looks forward to continuing its legal pursuit and ultimately securing a favorable outcome for the benefit of its stakeholders.”

Excerpts From Court Decision

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION) ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
COMMERCIAL COURT (KBD)
Mrs Justice Cockerill
Claim No.  CL-2020-000092
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 19 November 2024
Before: LADY JUSTICE ASPLIN, LORD JUSTICE ARNOLD and LORD JUSTICE PHILLIPS

Between: CRF 1 LIMITED Claimant/Respondent - and – BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA Defendant/Appellant (2) THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA Defendant

Jawdat Khurshid KC and Andrew Pearson (instructed by Rosenblatt) for the Claimant/Respondent (“CRF”)
Alison Macdonald KC, Anton Dudnikov and Mark Belshaw (instructed by PCB Byrne LLP) for the Defendant/Appellant (“BNC”)

Hearing dates: 24 and 25 July 2024
Approved Judgment
 
This judgment was handed down remotely at 2 pm on Tuesday 19 November 2024 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives

Conclusion

Mrs Justice Cockerill As I would uphold the Judge’s decision that the debts were validly assigned to CRF, I do not consider that it is necessary to address BNC’s challenge to the Judge’s contingent finding that, if the assignments were not valid, BNC ratified them by its subsequent correspondence.  I would dismiss the appeal.  
Lord Justice Arnold I agree.
Lady Justice Asplin I also agree.

Link To Court Document In Word Format
Link To CRF Media Release In PDF Format

Links To Related Analyses 

In London, China Bank Proceeds With Lawsuit Against Cuba For Potential US$1.3 Billion. Another Plaintiff In London Received Legal Fees From Cuba- That Lawsuit Continues In Litigation.. June 28, 2023

Verdict By London Court In Cuba Debt Lawsuit: From Court- Money Remains Owed By Cuba, Cuba Lawfully Changed Assignment Process, Plaintiff Will Seek New Assignment. Another Year In Court? April 04, 2023

36 Months Of Litigation; US$5.8 Million On Attorneys By Cayman Islands-Based Plaintiff And Havana-Based Defendants, Now London Trial. KCs Lead Sides. Issues: Interpol Red Notice, Jurisdiction, Bribery January 13, 2023

China-Owned Bank In London Sues Cuba Central Bank And Government Of Cuba. Either Sue For Custodian Account Holders Or Be Sued By Them? Embarrassing For Cuba To Be Sued By "Good Friend." December 21, 2021

UK Lawsuit Seeks US$100+ Million From Central Bank Of Cuba & Government Of Cuba. Four Countries. Three Banks. Questions- Defining A "Loan" And Capacity To Contract. Read The 14 Court Filings. December 06, 2021

Bacardi's Cuba Trademark Stripping Legislation Fast-Track To Becoming Law Because Of Charles Schumer (D-NY), U.S. Senate Majority Leader. Why? Representative Jerrod Nadler (D- NY) Helped Too. Why?

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"Unaminous Consent" Reflects Ineffectiveness And Incompetance Of Members Of Congress, Organizations, Lobbying Enterprises Focusing Upon The Republic of Cuba.

From Congress.gov Bill Alert

S.746 - No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act (118th Congress)
Sponsor: Sen. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ] (Introduced 03/09/2023)

Has changes in: Related Bill (1 new, 1 total)

Related Bill: H.R.1505 

November 19, 2024 - Issue: Vol. 170, No. 171 — Daily Edition

118th Congress (2023 - 2024) - 2nd Session 

NO STOLEN TRADEMARKS HONORED IN AMERICA ACT OF 2023; Congressional Record Vol. 170, No. 171 (Senate - November 19, 2024)

PDF (224KB) 

[Page S6638] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] 

NO STOLEN TRADEMARKS HONORED IN AMERICA ACT OF 2023 

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 1505 and the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.  The senior assistant legislative clerk read as follows:  A bill (H.R. 1505) to modify the prohibition on recognition by United States courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, trade names, or commercial names. 

There being no objection, the committee was discharged, and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill. 

Mr. SCHUMER. I ask unanimous consent that the bill be considered read a third time and passed and that the motion to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

The bill (H.R. 1505) was ordered to a third reading, was read the third time, and passed. 

NO STOLEN TRADEMARKS HONORED IN AMERICA ACT OF 2023
13 November 2023           

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1505) to modify the prohibition on recognition by United States courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, trade names, or commercial names, as amended.  The Clerk read the title of the bill. The text of the bill is as follows: H.R. 1505  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ``No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act of 2023''. 

SEC. 2. MODIFICATION OF PROHIBITION. 

Section 211 of the Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 (as contained in section 101(b) of division A of Public Law 105-277; 112 Stat. 2681- 88) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(2)-- (A) by inserting ``or entity of the executive branch'' after ``U.S. court''; (B) by striking ``by a designated national''; and (C) by inserting before the period ``that was used in connection with a business or assets that were confiscated unless the original owner of the mark, trade name, or commercial name, or the bonafide successor-in-interest has expressly consented''; (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) by inserting ``or entity of the executive branch'' after ``U.S. court''; and (B) by striking ``by a designated national or its successor-in-interest''; (3) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); (4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following: ``(d) Subsections (a)(2) and (b) of this section shall apply only if the person or entity asserting the rights knew or had reason to know at the time when the person or entity acquired the rights asserted that the mark, trade name, or commercial name was the same as or substantially similar to a mark, trade name, or commercial name that was used in connection with a business or assets that were confiscated.''; and (5) in subsection (e), as so redesignated, by striking ``In this section:'' and all that follows through ``(2) The term'' and inserting ``In this section, the term''.  

Links To Related Analyses 

Havana Docks Corporation Seeks Court Of Appeals Rehearing In Libertad Act Lawsuit Against Four Cruise Lines. Decision Likely In December 2024. Next And Final Stop Would Be U.S. Supreme Court.

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Excerpts From Filing

RULE 35 STATEMENT

I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied professional judgment, that the divided panel decision in this case conflicts with Glen v. Club Méditerranée, S.A., 450 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2006), and involves the following question of exceptional importance: Whether the LIBERTAD Act imposes liability for trafficking in property that the plaintiff hypothetically would have owned had the Cuban government not confiscated it, as opposed to property that the plaintiff actually owned at the time of confiscation and reflected in a claim against the Cuban government.  Christopher Landau Attorney of Record for Plaintiff-Appellee Havana Docks Corporation

INTRODUCTION

The divided panel decision in this case (Tab A) contradicts not only the plain language and express purposes of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Tab B), and this Court’s decision in Glen v. Club Méditerranée, S.A., 450 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2006), but U.S. policy toward Cuba. If there’s one area where Congress has actively exercised its plenary constitutional authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause over the past three decades, it’s the U.S. economic relationship with Cuba. Congress carefully chose its words in promulgating a highly detailed statutory regime that governs every aspect of that relationship, and prohibits any economic activity unless expressly authorized by law.

LINK To PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING OR REHEARING EN BANC
LINK To PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING OR REHEARING EN BANC

LINK TO PREVIOUS ANALYSIS

Cruise Lines Win Most Arguments Before 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals. Does Havana Docks Corporation Seek En Banc Review, U.S. Supreme Court Review, Or Accept Decision? Oct 22, 2024

Internal Operating Procedure for Rule 35 En Banc Determination

1.  Time.  Except as otherwise provided by FRAP 25(a) for inmate filings, a petition for rehearing en banc whether or not combined with a petition for rehearing is timely only if received by the clerk within the time specified in 11th Cir. R. 35-2.

2.  Panel Has Control.  A petition for rehearing en banc will also be treated as a petition for rehearing before the original panel.  Although a copy of the petition for rehearing en banc is distributed to each panel judge and every active judge of the court, the filing of a petition for rehearing en banc does not take the appeal out of plenary control of the panel deciding the appeal. The panel may, on its own, grant rehearing by the panel and may do so without action by the full court.  A petition for rehearing will not be treated as a petition for rehearing en banc.

3.  Requesting a Poll.  Within 30 days of the date that the clerk transmits the petition for rehearing en banc, any active Eleventh Circuit judge may advise the “notify judge” that in the event the panel declines to grant rehearing, the judge requests that a poll be taken regarding en banc consideration. The “notify judge” is the writing judge if that judge is a member of this court.  If the writing judge is a visiting judge, the notify judge will be the senior active judge of this court on the panel or, if none, the senior non-active judge of this court on the panel.  At the same time the judge shall notify the clerk to withhold the mandate, and the clerk will enter an order withholding the mandate. If the panel, after such notice, concludes not to grant rehearing, the notify judge will inform the chief judge of that fact and that a request was made that a poll be taken regarding en banc consideration.  After giving the other judges a reasonable time to respond to the poll request, the chief judge then polls the court by written ballot on whether rehearing en banc is to be granted.

4.  No Poll Request.  If after expiration of the specified time for requesting a poll, the notify judge has not received a poll request from any active member of the court, the panel, without further notice, may take such action as it deems appropriate on the petition for rehearing en banc.  In its order disposing of the appeal or other matter and the petition, the panel must note that no poll was requested by any judge of the court in regular active service.

5.  Requesting a Poll on Court’s Own Motion.  Any active Eleventh Circuit judge may request that the court be polled on whether rehearing en banc should be granted whether or not a petition for rehearing en banc has been filed by a party.  This is ordinarily done by a letter from the requesting judge to the chief judge with copies to the other active and senior judges of the court and any other panel member.  At the same time the judge shall notify the clerk to withhold the mandate, and the clerk will enter an order withholding the mandate.  The identity of the judge will not be disclosed in the order.

6.  Polling the Court.  Upon request to poll, the chief judge will give the other judges a reasonable time to respond to the poll request and then conducts a poll.  Each active judge receives a form ballot that is used to cast a vote.  A copy of each judge’s ballot is sent to all other active judges.  The ballot form indicates whether the judge voting desires oral argument if en banc is granted.
 
7.  Effect of Recusal or Disqualification on Number of Votes Required.  A recused or disqualified judge is not counted in the base when calculating whether a majority of circuit judges in regular active service have voted to rehear an appeal en banc.  If, for example, there are 12 circuit judges in regular active service on this court, and five of them are recused or disqualified in an appeal, rehearing en banc may be granted by affirmative vote of four judges (a majority of the seven non-recused and non-disqualified judges).

8.  Negative Poll.  If the vote on the poll is unfavorable to en banc consideration, the chief judge enters the appropriate order.

9.  En Banc Rehearing Procedures Following Affirmative Poll.

a.  Appeal Managers.  When an appeal is voted to be reheard en banc, the chief judge shall designate as appeal managers a group of active judges of this court.  The chief judge will ordinarily designate the judge who authored the panel opinion, the judge who requested that the court be polled regarding whether the appeal should be reheard en banc, and a judge who dissented from or specially concurred in the panel opinion, if they are active circuit judges of this court.  The chief judge may, however, designate other active circuit judges as appeal managers.

b.  Initial Notice to Counsel.  The clerk meanwhile notifies counsel that rehearing en banc has been granted but that they should not prepare en banc briefs until they are advised of the issue(s) to be briefed and length limitations on briefs.

c.  Notice of Issue(s) to be Briefed.  The appeal managers prepare and circulate to the other members of the en banc court a proposed notice to the parties advising which issue(s) should be briefed to the en banc court, length limitations on briefs, and whether the appeal will be orally argued or submitted on briefs. The notice may also set the time limits for oral argument. In appeals with multiple appellants or appellees, the notice may direct parties to file a single joint appellants’ or appellees’ en banc brief.  In such cases the side directed to file a single joint brief may be allotted some extension of the length limitations that would otherwise apply to the brief.  Members of the en banc court thereafter advise the appeal managers of any suggested changes in the proposed notice.  Provided that no member of the en banc court objects, counsel may be advised that the en banc court will decide only specified issues, and after deciding them, remand other issues to the panel.  Once the form of the notice has been approved by the court, the clerk issues the notice to counsel.

d.  Oral Argument.  Appeals to be reheard en banc will ordinarily be orally argued unless fewer than three of the judges of the en banc court determine that argument should be heard.

“FRAP 35. En Banc Determination (a) When Hearing or Rehearing En Banc May Be Ordered.  A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service and who are not disqualified may order that an appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals en banc.  An en banc hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) (2) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance. (b) Petition for Hearing or Rehearing En Banc.  A party may petition for a hearing or rehearing en banc. (1) The petition must begin with a statement that either: (A) the panel decision conflicts with a decision of the United States Supreme Court or of the court to which the petition is addressed (with citation to the conflicting case or cases) and consideration by the full court is therefore necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (B) the proceeding involves one or more questions of exceptional importance, each of which must be concisely stated; for example, a petition may assert that a proceeding presents a question of exceptional importance if it involves an issue on which the panel decision conflicts with the authoritative decisions of every other United States Court of Appeals that has addressed the issue. (2) Except by the court’s permission: (A) a petition for an en banc hearing or rehearing produced using a computer must not exceed 3,900 words; and (B) a handwritten or typewritten petition for an en banc hearing or rehearing must not exceed 15 pages. (3) For purposes of the limits in Rule 35(b)(2), if a party files both a petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc, they are considered a single document even if they are filed separately, unless separate filing is required by local rule. (c) Time for Petition for Hearing or Rehearing En Banc.  A petition that an appeal be heard initially en banc must be filed by the date when the appellee’s brief is due.  A petition for a rehearing en banc must be filed within the time prescribed by Rule 40 for filing a petition for rehearing. (d) Number of Copies.  The number of copies to be filed must be prescribed by local rule and may be altered by order in a particular case. Rev.: 12/16 147 FRAP 35(e) Response.  No response may be filed to a petition for an en banc consideration unless the court orders a response.  The length limits in Rule 35(b)(2) apply to a response. (f) Call for a Vote.  A vote need not be taken to determine whether the case will be heard or reheard en banc unless a judge calls for a vote.”

What Secretary Of State Marco Rubio Means For Cuba And Venezuela... Terrifying For Some, Spanish Language Fluency Becomes Important, End Of Airplane Metaphor, And Precursor For Vance-Rubio 2028?

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Initial thoughts… 

For United States Senator Marco Rubio (R-Florida), his January 2025 confirmation hearing may be a repeat of Antony Blinken’s confirmation hearing in January 2021 where he said in response to a question about Cuba- that the while the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), where he was Deputy Secretary of State, had normalized relations with Cuba without informing in advance members of the United States Senate, he would work with the United States Senate on “the take-off, inflight, and landing” for Cuba-related decisions during the Biden-Harris Administration. 

For soon-to-be Secretary of State Rubio, his only issue with his former members of the United States Senate will likely be to what extent punishing further Cuba and Venezuela is productive towards the goal of “regime change” in terms of changing the behavior of the regimes. 

Senator Rubio will bring to Foggy Bottom in Washington DC a robust focus towards Cuba and Venezuela.  He and Michael Waltz, soon-to-be Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, given they are both from the State of Florida, will take another look at the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) and National Security Council (NSC) playbook for Cuba and Venezuela. 

The search will be for what was authorized during the Clinton-Gore Administration (1993-2001), Bush-Cheney Administration (2001-2009), Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), and Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025), and how to reverse, rescind, strengthen, or lessen. 

While China and other countries have used sanctions imposed upon them by the United States as opportunities to restructure, strengthen, revitalize, and absorb, with results being commercial, economic, financial, and political stability and in most instances, Cuba just complains and asks others to help them, so they do not have to make difficult decisions. 

When Mauricio Claver-Carone was appointed Senior Director, Western Hemisphere Affairs at the National Security Council, everyone involved in anything relating to Cuba was terrified because for the first time there was a person whose previous life’s focus was Cuba- and how to dismantle anything that smelled of engagement, re-engagement, cooperation, or appeasement.  He had the authority and desire to use the authority- which he did with immense impact. 

With Secretary of State Rubio, whose parents are of Cuban descent, and whose advocacy for policies, regulations, and statutes relating to Cuba are well known, the Claver-Carone terrifying years will be replaced by the Rubio terrifying years- where the United States Secretary of State has far more authority. 

Antony Blinken speaks fluently French.  Senator Rubio speaks fluently Spanish.  Secretary of State Rubio will have the capacity and energy and desire to sit one-on-one with the heads of state and heads of government of the countries in The Americas to make his case about Cuba and Venezuela. 

Senator Rubio wanted to be president of the United States and continues to want to be president of the United States.  He can envision a “Vance-Rubio” 2028 Republican Party ticket.  

That desire for future public office will be an addictive incentive to not only espouse what the Trump-Vance Administration wants, but to achieve that the Trump-Vance Administration wants.  Achievements make for better campaign slogans.  Meaning for anyone focusing upon Cuba, the worst of all possible nightmares- and one that could last four years.

Link To Complete Analysis In PDF Format

Government Of Cuba Turned To United States Companies To Replace Utility Poles After Two Previous Hurricanes. Will They Again?

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The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992.  Other product exports and imports are guided by regulations implemented (1992 to present) by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, and United States Department of State. 

After the TSREEA was enacted, the government of the Republic of Cuba stated that it would not purchase “a grain of rice or a kernel of corn” due to the payment of cash in advance requirement.  United States-based companies, trade organizations, and members of the United States Congress were public in their disappointment given the extraordinary two-year effort to craft legislation, obtain support in the United States House of Representatives and United States Senate, and then signed into law. 

In November 2001, Hurricane Michelle impacted the Republic of Cuba.  Subsequently, the government of the Republic of Cuba stated that it would make a “one-off” purchase of products using provisions of the TSREEA.  The first deliveries in December 2001 and consisted of corn, poultry, and rice.  The initial list of products desired included wood, utility poles, and other products deemed necessary for reconstruction.  Utility poles would not be purchased until 2004. 

To date, TSREEA-authorized agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba exceeds US$7,557,299,406.00. 

U.S. firms sign first Cuba trade deals  

“HAVANA Nov 21, 2001 (Reuters) - Four agribusinesses became the first U.S. firms in four decades to sign trade accords with Cuba to supply food worth about $20 million in the wake of Hurricane Michelle, business sources said Wednesday.  Representatives of Archer Daniels Midland Company, Cargill, Riceland Foods and ConAgra, were in Havana this week to sign the agreements with Cuban state company Alimport to provide wheat, corn, soy and rice, said John Kavulich, president of the New York-based U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council.  

The deals came after Cuba -- subject to a U.S. embargo since soon after President Fidel Castro's 1959 revolution -- appealed to Washington to speed up authorization to buy food and medicines from the United States on a one-off basis to replenish stocks used after its worst storm in half a century.  Hurricane Michelle struck central Cuba on Nov. 4, killing five people, flattening thousands of houses, and severely damaging crops earmarked for both export and local needs.  Washington had first offered to send humanitarian aid via non-government bodies, but Havana replied with a polite refusal and a counteroffer to buy food and medicines with cash. 

HAVANA SAYS SALES ARE EXCEPTIONAL  

Havana has stressed, however, that the sales are exceptional because of the hurricane damage, and has reiterated its appeal for a full lifting of the embargo.  "The contracts being signed with Cuba should not be seen as as a start of a ongoing commercial relationship with Cuba. They are taking place under a humanitarian umbrella after Hurricane Michelle as the Cubans have made clear they don't expect to continue with these purchases," Kavulich said.  Kavulich said Cuba has made clear it wants to buy U.S. products on an emergency basis to cope with the hurricane aftermath and has no interest in continuing to buy U.S. goods under current embargo restrictions.”

United States Department of State
Washington DC
6 May 2004

Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba
Released by the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs

Chapter 5: Modernizing Infrastructure

As for power transmission, the power grid is near capacity and is also declining due to the lack of maintenance. Another problem is that most of the existing infrastructure is based on above-ground transmission lines strung on wooden poles, which make the Cuban system more vulnerable to extreme weather when compared to more modern concrete poles.60 Only parts of old Havana have buried lines61 that were recently put in place.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Medium-term: The U.S. Government should be prepared to provide assistance in assessing the age and condition of the transmission and local distribution grids. Existing wooden poles could be upgraded to concrete poles.

Long-term: The U.S. Government should be prepared to provide assistance in assessing existing power plants in an effort to determine if they should be converted or upgraded to process/utilize more efficient technologies through import/export incentives.

The owner of one Alabaman pole-making business, which first shipped utility poles to Cuba after Hurricane Charley in [August] 2004, says that competition is fierce for the Cuban business, especially since a large-scale electrification project in Cuba has boosted demand.

USA TODAY

U.S. To Cuba Ag/Food Exports Increased 53% In September 2024. Other Items Included Luggage, Rear View Mirrors, Solar Cells, Fans (US$210,000.00), +US$7 Million In Vehicles

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ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
November 2024

September 2024 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 53.3% - 1
51st Of 222 September 2024 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 23.0% - 2
Cuba Ranked 49th Of 222 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets - 2
September 2024 Healthcare Product Exports US$0.00 - 2
September 2024 Humanitarian Donations US$4,223,070.00 - 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase - 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 19

SEPTEMBER 2024 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 53.3% - Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in September 2024 were US$31,150,492.00 compared to US$20,317,573.00 in September 2023 and US$38,167,679.00 in September 2022.

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

January 2024 through September 2024 TSREEA exports were US$310,966,013.00 compared to January 2023 through September 2023 TSREEA exports of US$252,804,946.00.

Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed US$7,557,299,406.00.

Other products exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in September 2024 include: Bean Seeds For Sowing (US$7,281.00), Pepper Seeds For Sowing (US$6,427.00), Animal Livers (US$32,670.00), Adhesives (US$3,000.00), Articles Of Cement (US$14,346.00), Articles Of Porcelain Or China (US$14,687.00), Fans (US$210,000.00),  

Used Vehicle (1500cc-3000cc) 2024 Exports- US$45,458,544.
New Vehicle (+3000cc) 2024 Exports- US$4,566,028.00

First Reported Exports:
Public Transport Type Passenger Vehicle- US$22,000.00
Rear View Mirrors For Vehicles- US$2,668.00

First Reported Exports:
Solar Cells Assembled Into Modules Or Panels- US$4,141.00
Photosensitive Semiconductor Devices- US$6,378.00
Primary Batteries, Lithium- US$360,000.00

Total Thus Far In 2024:
Solar Cells, Not Made Into Panels Or Modules- US$18,584.00

First Reported Exports:
Trunks, Suitcases, Vanity Cases- US$5,854.00

Humanitarian Donations January 2024 Through September 2024: US$49,931,684.00
Humanitarian Donations For Calendar Year 2023: US$36,563,551.00

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT (AWAITING PORT DATA).

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

Why Is the "largest independent energy producer in Cuba” Neither A Sponsor Nor Listed As Having A Speaker At The Cuba Energy Summit In December 2024?

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Cuba Energy Summit 

“Join Cuba's Energy Future

Upstream Operations, Midstream, LNG and Refineries, Energy Transition and Renewable Energies vast potential in one of the upcoming energy hubs in the region. IN-VR as Cuba’s partner to attract investments and developments in the country, will provide an exclusive opportunity for networking between the Government, IOCs, NOCs, service providers, and key decision makers of the region. The Cuba Energy  Summit will create a unique platform to bring together international and local Oil and Gas companies, Government Officials, Renewable Energy companies, service providers, and key decision makers of the region. The conference will provide insightful information on the current state and upcoming projects, potential development and future investment opportunities in the country.” 

SHERRITT INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

“Sherritt is a world leader in using hydrometallurgical processes to mine and refine nickel and cobalt – metals deemed critical for the energy transition. Sherritt’s Moa Joint Venture has a current estimated mine life of 25 years and has embarked on an expansion program focused on increasing annual mixed sulphide precipitate production by approximately 20% of contained nickel and cobalt. The Corporation’s Power division, through its ownership in Energas S.A., is the largest independent energy producer in Cuba with installed electrical generating capacity of 506 MW, representing approximately 10% of the national electrical generating capacity in Cuba. The Energas facilities are comprised of two combined cycle plants that produce low-cost electricity from one of the lowest carbon emitting sources of power in Cuba. Sherritt’s common shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol “S”.

Sherritt is a world leader in the mining and refining of nickel and cobalt -- metals essential for the growing adoption of electric vehicles. Its Technologies Group creates innovative, proprietary solutions for oil and mining companies around the world to improve environmental performance and increase economic value.  Sherritt is also the largest independent energy producer in Cuba.”

https://www.sherritt.com/English/Home/default.aspx

Will Cuba See Another Mineral Export Become Less Valuable As Battery Technology Develops? While Diaz-Canel Administration Continues To Strangle Re-Emerging Private Sector.

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Bloomberg (7 November 2024): The world’s No. 1 cobalt miner is sounding the alarm over the rapidly shrinking role of the metal in the energy transition. The reason is the adoption of cobalt-free lithium iron phosphate, or LFP, batteries gaining momentum in recent years because they are cheaper to manufacture. Chinese company CMOC’s bearish view of the market comes amid a glut of the metal that’s been largely created by its expansion of two huge copper-cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

LINK: Cuba Has Nickel And Cobalt. Vehicle Electric Batteries Use Nickel And Cobalt. Cuba Should Benefit. September 25, 2021 

London, United Kingdom-based NS Energy: ”Cuba – 500,000 tonnes: Around 7% of the world’s cobalt reserves are based in Cuba, estimated by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) at 500,000 tonnes.  The country ranks fifth among the world’s largest cobalt-producing countries, with national output in 2020 of around 3,600 tonnes.  Most of Cuba’s cobalt reserves are based in the east of the island in the Moa region, and are primarily extracted alongside nickel, which is a major mining business in Cuba.  A joint venture between Canadian miner Sherritt International and General Nickel Company of Cuba produces the metal via open pit mining at deposits in Moa."

London, United Kingdom-based Cobalt Institute: “98% of cobalt is mined as a by product of copper or nickel.  Cobalt is mined in several countries, with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) being by far the largest producer. Mineral extraction accounts for 90% of the country’s exports and constitutes a core element of the Congolese economy. The majority of all cobalt mined in the DRC comes from large scale mines that are mostly operated by large-scale mining companies. They make a significant contribution to the social and economic development of the country. 

COBALT IS A TECHNOLOGY-ENABLING METAL THAT IS PART OF THE SOLUTION TO THE GREEN ENERGY TRANSITION. 

It is a key part of the lithium-ion batteries that give electric vehicles the range and durability needed by consumers. It is also used in electronic devices, jet engines and renewable energy storage, to name a few. Additional cobalt chemical properties allow for hard wearing and abrasion resistance, advanced pigment solutions and various other uses. Cobalt can be recycled and reused over and over, playing an essential role in the green energy transition.” 

Toronto, Canada-based Sherritt International Corporation 

Sherritt International is a recognized world leader in the production of high purity nickel and cobalt metal from lateritic ore. Mining and refining only in non-conflict jurisdictions, through its Moa Joint Venture, the high quality battery and alloy ready nickel and cobalt produced are used worldwide in stainless steel, specialty steel, chemical and welding applications. The high purity nickel and cobalt powder and briquettes are sought after for the most-favoured battery cathode chemistries in the rapidly expanding electric vehicle market.  Nickel and cobalt are refined in Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta, Canada from mixed sulphide intermediate prepared at the mine and processing plant in Moa, Cuba. This 50/50 joint venture, has the capacity to produce up to 35,000 tonnes of nickel and 3,800 tonnes of cobalt (100% basis) per year.  In addition, Sherritt offers various other products for sale through its wholly-owned fertilizer business and sulphuric acid and ammonia production facilities. 

Cobalt is a hard, lustrous, grey metal that is used in the production of high temperature, wear resistant super alloys, catalysts, paint dryers, cemented carbides, magnetic alloys, pigments, rechargeable batteries and chemicals. 

The Moa Joint Venture’s finished cobalt (briquettes and powder) at 99.9% purity, exceeds the LME cobalt specification. In 2019, it supplied 3,376 tonnes (100% basis) or approximately 2.5% of world primary cobalt and was the 4th largest producer of refined cobalt metal and powder (100% basis).

Over the last decade, growth in the chemical sector, primarily in battery chemicals, has increased the demand for cobalt. The rapidly emerging EV (Electric Vehicle) market, as well as the world’s reliance on global communications in the form of mobile phones and tablet technology has been a driving force for increased cobalt consumption. Strong recovery from the superalloy sector has also helped the market remain in relative balance. Over the long term, positive growth is expected in the rechargeable battery sector (hybrid and electric vehicle applications). 

  • Cobalt Briquettes: Cobalt briquettes are suitable for melting applications, high speed steel, super alloy, medical device, fine chemical and battery applications. The briquettes are conveniently sized for easy handling and reduction of dust. The dissolving properties of the briquettes also make this material favoured in chemical applications. [Specifications] 

  • Cobalt Powder: Cobalt powders are suitable for high purity chemical dissolving uses such as paint dryer, catalyst, battery chemical and fine chemical applications. [Specifications] 

30 October 2024: TORONTO--(BUSINESS WIRE)-- Sherritt International Corporation (“Sherritt”, the “Corporation”) (TSX: S), a world leader in using hydrometallurgical processes to mine and refine nickel and cobalt – metals deemed critical for the energy transition – today reported its financial results for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2024. All amounts are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted.  

Leon Binedell, President and CEO of Sherritt commented, “Our Metals division has achieved remarkable progress, with finished nickel production reaching its highest quarterly level in two years. We have successfully reduced our net direct cash costs to US$5.16 per pound, demonstrating a significant year-over-year improvement even with materially lower cobalt by-product prices. Our Power division has also excelled, recording the highest quarterly electricity production in nine years. Additionally, we completed work to bring another gas turbine online, enabling us to generate electricity from new gas wells, including a new well that began production in October. This will further increase production and allow us to realize higher distributions of dividends in Canada going forward.”  

Mr. Binedell continued, “Despite this quarter’s lower nickel and cobalt prices, our available liquidity in Canada increased 27% to $71 million. We are beginning to realize savings from the cost reduction initiatives announced in the first half of the year and we made additional workforce reductions in the third quarter to lower our costs further. During the fourth quarter, we expect to receive another significant distribution from Power and the recommencement of dividends from the Cobalt Swap agreement. Looking ahead, phase two of our expansion at the Moa JV is advancing as planned, with commissioning and ramp-up scheduled for the first half of next year which will increase our mixed sulphide production to our refinery, displacing lower-margin third-party feed and maximizing our profitability.”  

Financial Times
London, United Kingdom
20 July 2018

Panasonic cuts ties with supplier over Cuban cobalt fears
Japanese group concerned materials in its batteries for Tesla could fall foul of US sanctions

Panasonic has suspended ties with a Canadian supplier amid concerns that Cuban cobalt, a target of US sanctions, was used in batteries it supplied for Tesla’s electric vehicles.  

The Japanese battery supplier said on Friday it did not know how much Cuban cobalt was ultimately used in the lithium ion batteries it supplied to the US market for Tesla “due to commingling of sources by its suppliers in several phases of manufacturing processes”.

The company declined to identify its Canadian supplier but a person with knowledge of Panasonic’s supply chain identified the company as Sherritt International. The Canadian company produces cobalt at the Moa mine in Cuba through a joint venture with the Cuban state-owned General Nickel Company. Sherritt declined to comment.  

Panasonic said the suspension of ties was a precautionary measure following guidance from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control over the scope of the US ban on Cuban-origin imports, which dates back to 1960. Tesla said it had been informed by Panasonic that a small portion of Model S and Model X batteries may contain trace amounts of cobalt from Sherritt. Only some vehicles produced after February 2018 are affected, and there is no impact on battery cells produced at its gigafactory in Nevada, including for its mass-market Model 3 cars. Panasonic’s move, which was first reported by Reuters, comes as Tesla and other carmakers scramble to secure supplies for an ambitious rollout of electric cars.  

The price of cobalt, more than half of which comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo, has more than doubled over the past year. It will be increasingly difficult for carmakers to meet their targets without using more cobalt from the DRC, according to Gavin Montgomery, an analyst at consultancy Wood Mackenzie in London. “To reach these kinds of aspirations in terms of gigafactory volumes [of Tesla batteries], it’s going to be a struggle using existing mines or feedstocks,” Mr Montgomery said. “Everyone is going to have to rely on the DRC for cobalt one way or the other.” One consultant who works closely with big companies throughout the electric vehicle supply chain said that it was “surprising” that Panasonic had only now realised that its batteries may contain Cuban cobalt, but added that Sherritt was not a major supplier to the company.  

About 4 per cent of global cobalt mined production came from Cuba last year, according to Darton Commodities. Another Tokyo-based expert in the EV supply chain, who is a specialist in cobalt, said that while Japanese companies did not normally use Cuban cobalt — and it was in any case a small component of the Japanese EV supply chain — some certainly did so. Caspar Rawles, a London-based analyst at Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, said Panasonic would probably be able to tap into its wide range of suppliers and internal stocks to plug the gap from the suspended Sherritt supply.  

“Negotiation season for long-term raw material supply contracts is just around the corner and Panasonic can replace inventory in this period to meet the needs of their Tesla obligations, so it is less likely that they will need to source additional material from the spot market,” Mr Rawles said. The supply issue came to light as both Tesla and Panasonic, its exclusive battery supplier, are working to develop cobalt-free batteries to cut their reliance on the metal.  

Yoshio Ito, the head of Panasonic’s automotive business, recently said it would aim to halve the use of cobalt for the type of automotive batteries used for Tesla’s EVs in two to three years. “We have already achieved this at the research and development level,” Mr Ito told reporters in Tokyo. He declined to provide a timeline for the mass production of such batteries, saying safety and quality assurances would take time. In a statement on Friday, Tesla reiterated that the company was “aiming to achieve close to zero usage of cobalt in the near future”.

U.S. Department Of State Spokesperson Responds After UNGA Vote On Cuba... Comfortable Continuing To Be In The Minority With Israel Only Supporter.

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United States Department of State
Washington DC
30 October 2024
Press Briefing- Matthew Miller, Spokesperson

QUESTION: Well, let’s stay in that region – well, semi-in that region, and so the vote happened today in the UN on the Cuba embargo. Do you know what the vote was?

MR MILLER: Yeah, it was a predictable vote in line with past votes. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Yeah. Exactly. But just for the record, let’s say, it was 187 to 2 —

MR MILLER: Yeah.

QUESTION: — with one abstention.

MR MILLER: I am —

QUESTION: And the one abstention wasn’t even a Pacific Island nation. It was Moldova.

MR MILLER: Yeah. I’m aware of the – I’m aware of the long history —

QUESTION: So two.

MR MILLER: — of UN votes on this matter.

QUESTION: So you – yes, okay. So at what point, though, are you guys going to realize that the entire world, with the exception of you and Israel, thinks that the embargo is a really bad idea and should be stopped?

MR MILLER: Look, I think we are quite clear on the opinion of other countries around the world. And it’s one with which we —

QUESTION: So that —

MR MILLER: And it’s one with which we disagree. We take their opinion seriously, but we make our own policy determinations, and —

QUESTION: You do? It’s 32 years in a row with the exception of one year when you guys abstained. That was 2019. And —

MR MILLER: We – look, we take their views quite seriously, but we make our own determinations about these matters.

QUESTION: All right. You know what? Well —

MR MILLER: And we disagree.

QUESTION: Then – you take their views quite seriously? That is not borne out by the facts, that you continue to persist with this.

MR MILLER: We take them seriously, but we make our own decisions on this policy and others. So —

QUESTION: Okay. And are you comfortable, then, with it’s – just once again, it’s just you and Israel standing up.

MR MILLER: Certainly we would welcome other countries sharing our opinion in this. But we’re not blind to the history of countries around the world having a very different view of this matter. It long predates this administration. But as I said, we make our own determinations.

QUESTION: But what about the Obama —

MR MILLER: And with that —

QUESTION: What about the Obama administration disagreement? Were they wrong?

MR MILLER: I don’t have anything to comment on previous administration decisions. Thanks, everyone.

Spelling Exaggerate? Responding To Cuba UN Resolution, U.S. Ambassador Says US$100 billion When Truth Was US$36,563,551.00. Not The First Time A U.S. Diplomat Voiced Untruths About Cuba.

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U.S. Department Of State Can’t Stop Exaggerating.  Then Ask Why Credibility Issues. 

Ambassador Folmsbee At United Nations: “nearly $336 million in agricultural products and authorized another $100 billion in humanitarian exports” To The Republic Of Cuba. 

Facts: US$342,607,027.00 In Agricultural Products And US$36,563,551.00 In Humanitarian Exports From The United States To The Republic Of Cuba. 

30 October 2024
Ambassador Paul Folmsbee
Senior Advisor for Western Hemisphere Affairs
New York, New York

AS DELIVERED 

“Thank you, Mr. President, and thank you members of the General Assembly.  The United States stands with the Cuban people. We strongly support their pursuit of a future with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

Approximately 1,000 unjustly detained political prisoners remain behind bars in Cuba – more than at any point in Cuba’s recent history. Nearly 700 of those detentions are connected to the July 11, 2021, historic protests. These people have languished in horrible conditions in Cuban jails for exercising their freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly to demand better living conditions from their government. 

Despite Cuba’s membership in the UN Human Rights Council, the Cuban government has delayed responding to several requests by special procedures that mandate holders of the UN Human Rights Council send independent experts to Cuba, who would help advance respect for human rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of religion or belief, and the freedom of peaceful assembly. Some of these requests have remained pending for more than 10 years. 

Sanctions are one element of our broader effort to advance democracy and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba. We therefore oppose this resolution.  That said, we recognize the challenges the Cuban people face. That is why U.S. sanctions include exemptions and authorizations relating to exports of food, medicine, and other basic goods to Cuba. 

The United States remains a significant source of basic goods to the Cuban people. In 2023, the United States exported nearly $336 million in agricultural products and authorized another $100 billion in humanitarian exports, demonstrating America’s desire to help the Cuban people. 

We encourage this body to urge the Cuban government to adhere to its human rights obligations and listen to the Cuban people and their aspirations to determine their own future. Thank you.” 

FACTS: 

Important for the United States Department of State to be accurate with its data and be accurate with its narrative.  Clarity is critical to diplomacy.  Unfortunately, this is not the first moment for the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025).  Nor is the problem limited to one political party- Democrats and Republicans have been culprits. 

The presentation by Ambassador Folmsbee suggests that the US$336 million in agricultural products and US$100 billion in humanitarian exports were due to executive branch largess when in fact the exports are authorized by United States statute- enacted by the United States Congress, and signed into law by a president. 

Most egregious is the statement about US$100 billion in humanitarian exports having been “authorized” in 2023.  The Biden-Harris Administration knows that license applications for transactions requiring a license often include valuations that are far above what may be actually delivered by an individual, group, company, or organization.  Where some licenses are two years or more in validity, applicants are encouraged by the respective United States government entities to increase the potential valuation, so another license is not required prior to the expiration of the license. 

The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 regulates the export of agricultural commodities and food products from the United States to the Republic of Cuba. 

  • The value of TSREEA exports in 2023 was US$342,607,027.00 with the Republic of Cuba ranking 53rd of 227 export markets for United States agricultural commodities and food products. 

  • Since December 2001 when the first TSREEA-authorized exports departed the United States to the Republic of Cuba, the cumulative twenty-three year total exceeds US$7,526,148,914.00. 

The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 regulates the export of medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, and healthcare products from the United States to the Republic of Cuba. 

  • The value of CDA exports in 2023 was US$839,500.00. 

  • The cumulative total from 2003 exceeds US$37,388,306.00.   

The export from the United States to the Republic of Cuba for other products and services are regulated by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.  

  • The value of humanitarian product donations in 2023 was US$36,563,551.00. 

  • The value of humanitarian product donations thus far in 2024 exceeds US$45,708,614.00. 

Tweet By Biden-Harris Department Of State Emulates Trump-Pence Department Of State.  So Much For Wanting To Be Different.  Channeling Michael Kozak. 

Tweet Published By The Embassy of the United States, Havana, Republic of Cuba (22 February 2023): “En 2021, Estados Unidos autorizó más de 4.200 millones de dólares en exportaciones humanitarias a Cuba. En 2022, autorizamos 7.600 millones de dólares de exportaciones humanitarias. Estas exportaciones tienen como objetivo ayudar directamente al pueblo cubano.” 

English Translation (Google): “In 2021, the United States authorized more than $4.2 billion in humanitarian exports to Cuba. In 2022, we authorize $7.6 billion of humanitarian exports. These exports are intended to directly help the Cuban people.” 

Follow-Up Email From The United States Department of State: “The 2022 figure is 7.6 billion dollars, the 2021 figure is 4.2 billion.  These are figures reflect the combined value of all goods authorized for export from the US to Cuba including food, medicine, and everyday goods.  These are not strictly confined to purchases from US companies but include humanitarian donations by individuals and organizations.  The authorized figure does not necessarily reflect actual exports or donations.” 

For perspective:  

Agricultural Commodity/Food Commercial Exports Delivered To Cuba

2022- US$328,536,988.00

2021- US$304,774,413.00 

For the period 2001 through 2022, from when the first agricultural commodity and food products were exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under provisions of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, the value delivered was US$6,903,726,366.00.   

Healthcare Products Commercial Exports Delivered To Cuba

2022- US$9,226,763.00

2021- US$487,886.00 

For the period 2003 through 2022, the value of healthcare products (medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals) delivered from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 was US$36,419,340.00. 

Donations Delivered To Cuba

2022- US$30,083,306.00

2021- US$11,074,090.00 

For the period 2014 through 2022, the value of humanitarian donations delivered from the United States to the Republic of Cuba was US$68,682,418.00. 

Why did not the United States Department of State not include the details, the context, in its initial tweet?  Because the intention was to deliberately mislead to the benefit of the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) and to the detriment of the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ).   

  • The message was designed to embarrass, humiliate the government of the Republic of Cuba.  That objective is perfectly acceptable when using facts to support the goal.  That objective is profoundly objectionable when using the imperator, the credibility of the government of the United States government. 

  • The misuse of data in this manner permits the government of the Republic of Cuba to justifiably respond- it is accused by the United States Department of State of lying and misusing statistics and here the United States Department of State engages in equally egregious behavior. 

This official statement from the United States Embassy in Havana, Republic of Cuba, is a repeat of what previous administrations have done- be reckless with the facts, and present information that they know fully is misleading.  It’s disrespectful.  It's disgraceful. 

The Biden-Harris Administration knows that the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce has since the Bush-Cheney Administration (2001-2009) and during the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), and Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) encouraged companies, organizations, and individuals who are exporting products from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- whether commercial (sold) or donated, not be required to seek a BIS license (if one is required) for the precise U.S. Dollar value of a particular shipment.   

Rather, to reduce paperwork, the exporter is encouraged to bundle expectations.  For example, if a company has an order for US$2 million in poultry, then the exporter might seek a license value of US$75 million or more or less so that if there are subsequent orders within the validity of the BIS license (usually three years to four years) additional BIS licenses are not required.  Same is true for donations- if an organization is hopeful to have US$10 million, then include US$100 million or more or less in the BIS license application.  

One example of how the data in the Tweet published on 22 February 2023 by the United States Department of State is misleading- the US$7.6 billion value is more than the value of all agricultural commodity, food product, healthcare product, and donations since December 2001.  

LINK TO STATISTICS IN PDF FORMAT 

Related Tweets From United States Department Of State 

“On 23 September 2019, The Honorable Michael G. Kozak, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs “retweeted” a “tweet” from the Embassy of the United States in Cuba.  LINK: https://twitter.com/WHAAsstSecty/status/1176240454104473601  

The publication of a US$12 billion “authorized” value since January 2018 is misleading and unnecessarily reinforces questions of credibility for statements by the United States Department of State.  Context is important.  Thus far in 2019, approximately US$186,114,479.00 (through 30 July 2019) in ag/food products have been exported from the United States to Cuba. Thus far in 2019, Cuba ranks 50th among 229 United States ag/food export markets.  Exports in 2018 were US$224,910,413.00 and exports in 2017 were US$268,800,005.00.  

Since December 2001, more than US$6,061,327,697.00 (through 30 July 2019) in ag/food products have been exported to Cuba.  Link To monthly report: https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2019/9/6/us-ag-exports-to-cuba-increased-1002-in-july-remain-up-10-year-to-year  

For many years, through the Bush-Cheney Administration, Obama-Biden Administration and thus far through the Trump-Pence Administration, United States exporters have been encouraged by the United States Department of Commerce to submit export license requests with gross estimates, often aspirational, so that they would not need to repeatedly seek licenses.  Most licenses are valid for two years.    

During the Bush-Pence Administration, the process was initiated at the recommendation of United States exporters to lessen often repetitive paperwork and was enthusiastically accepted by the United States Department of Commerce.  

Important to note that the values placed in the license applications often are done without any input from the Cuba-based importer.  As a result, the overall authorized values are often inflated.  This is not the first time an administration has misused the data- and previous administrations have corrected the context by which they have used the data.”

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. Department Of State Confirms "No" Vote Today At United Nations On Cuba Government-Sponsored Resolution

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United States Department of State
Washington DC
29 October 2024
Press Briefing- Matthew Miller, Spokesperson

QUESTION: Before we get into the Middle East, I just wanted to ask you if you got an answer to my question about the Cuba vote, UN.

MR MILLER: I know there’s going to be a vote today. I don’t believe it’s happened yet; it’s occurring this afternoon.

QUESTION: Yes.

MR MILLER: So what was your question? How we will vote?

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR MILLER: We will vote no, but –

QUESTION: You’ll vote no?

MR MILLER: We will vote no.

QUESTION: And have you lined up anyone to – other –

MR MILLER: As I said – as I previewed yesterday, it was likely.

QUESTION: Have you lined up anyone –

MR MILLER: I didn’t think we were going to vote, I think —

QUESTION: Okay.

MR MILLER: — for a resolution condemning ourself.

QUESTION: Fine. But —

MR MILLER: And in fact, we will vote no.

QUESTION: But have you lined up anyone to vote with you?

MR MILLER: I think I’ll wait until we see the vote results to talk about the outcome.

QUESTION: So no, you’re not sure if you’ll get one or two others?

MR MILLER: I would not expect an outcome –

QUESTION: Dissimilar to previous –

MR MILLER: — dissimilar – as I was saying, inconsistent – “dissimilar” is a better word – to previous outcomes. This is a resolution –

QUESTION: In other words, it will be another demonstration of the entire – virtually the entire world’s opposition to this, to the embargo. Right?

MR MILLER: I wouldn’t expect a dissimilar result, but we have made our position clear —

QUESTION: All right.

MR MILLER: — on it for some time, and we’ll continue in our vote at the UN today.

LINKS TO RELATED ANALYSES

U.S. Department Of State: Cuba UN Vote Not On Spokesperson's "Bingo Card" Oct 29, 2024

Cuba Is Governance Example Of The Medical Term “Failure To Thrive”  United Nations Resolution Will Not Fix Cuba- Nor Force Others To Fix Cuba. Python Suffocating Re-Emerging Private Sector. Oct 27, 2024

United Nations Vote This Week On Resolution Submitted Annually By Government Of Cuba About Relationship With The United States. Vote Outcome Certainty. Impact Not. Oct 27, 2024

Hesitant To Engage With Cuba? Read Second Paragraph Of Forward-Looking Statements In Sherritt International Corporation's Cuba Impact Statement. Cringeworthy For Legal Counsel

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Sherritt Reaffirms 2024 Guidance Following the Nationwide Power Outage in Cuba

NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION TO UNITED STATES NEWSWIRE SERVICES OR FOR DISSEMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES
October 28, 2024 05:05 PM Eastern Daylight Time

TORONTO--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Sherritt International Corporation (“Sherritt” or the “Corporation”) (TSX:S) today announced an update on its operations in Cuba following the nationwide power outage that began on October 18, 2024 (please refer to Sherritt’s press release dated October 21, 2024 titled “Sherritt Provides an Operational Update”). Despite the power outage and adverse weather from the tropical storm that occurred shortly after, Sherritt maintains its 2024 guidance ranges.

The Moa nickel mine and all Energas S.A. (“Energas”) facilities returned to full operating capacity on October 27, 2024. Following the power outage, the Moa nickel mine was operating at a reduced capacity of 50% to 60% with power sourced from the mine site’s own power generating capabilities. Despite this, there was not a material impact to mixed sulphides production. Moreover, the Corporation’s refinery in Alberta had strategically built-up feed inventory earlier in the year, ensuring reliable feed throughput for finished nickel production. At Energas, operations had partially resumed by Saturday, October 19, 2024 although some temporary disruptions continued due to the complexities involving the power grid. Energas was instrumental in assisting to restore power to the Cuban national grid. The Energas facilities, which are comprised of two reliable combined cycle plants, generate low-cost electricity from domestically sourced natural gas and are among the lowest carbon emitting power sources in Cuba.

Throughout the nationwide power outage, all environmental protection and safety activities at sites in Cuba continued uninterrupted, and there were no environmental incidents or injuries reported among personnel.

About Sherritt International

Sherritt is a world leader in using hydrometallurgical processes to mine and refine nickel and cobalt – metals deemed critical for the energy transition. Sherritt’s Moa Joint Venture has a current estimated mine life of 25 years and has embarked on an expansion program focused on increasing annual mixed sulphide precipitate production by approximately 20% of contained nickel and cobalt. The Corporation’s Power division, through its ownership in Energas S.A., is the largest independent energy producer in Cuba with installed electrical generating capacity of 506 MW, representing approximately 10% of the national electrical generating capacity in Cuba. The Energas facilities are comprised of two combined cycle plants that produce low-cost electricity from one of the lowest carbon emitting sources of power in Cuba. Sherritt’s common shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol “S”.

Forward-Looking Statements

This press release contains certain forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements can generally be identified by the use of statements that include such words as “believe”, “expect”, “anticipate”, “intend”, “plan”, “forecast”, “likely”, “may”, “will”, “could”, “should”, “suspect”, “outlook”, “potential”, “projected”, “continue” or other similar words or phrases. Specifically, forward-looking statements in this document include, but are not limited to, statements regarding, the Corporation’s 2024 guidance.

Forward-looking statements are not based on historical facts, but rather on current expectations, assumptions and projections about future events, including commodity and product prices and demand; the level of liquidity and access to funding; share price volatility; production results; realized prices for production; earnings and revenues; global demand for electric vehicles and the anticipated corresponding demand for cobalt and nickel; the commercialization of certain proprietary technologies and services; advancements in environmental and greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction technology; GHG emissions reduction goals and the anticipated timing of achieving such goals, if at all; statistics and metrics relating to Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) matters which are based on assumptions or developing standards; environmental rehabilitation provisions; environmental risks and liabilities; compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations; risks related to the U.S. government policy toward Cuba; and certain corporate objectives, goals and plans for 2024. By their nature, forward-looking statements require the Corporation to make assumptions and are subject to inherent risks and uncertainties. There is significant risk that predictions, forecasts, conclusions or projections will not prove to be accurate, that the assumptions may not be correct and that actual results may differ materially from such predictions, forecasts, conclusions or projections.

The Corporation cautions readers of this press release not to place undue reliance on any forward-looking statement as a number of factors could cause actual future results, conditions, actions or events to differ materially from the targets, expectations, estimates or intentions expressed in the forward-looking statements. These risks, uncertainties and other factors include, but are not limited to, uncertainty in the ability to accurately forecast the timing of operations operating at full capacity following the power outages of the Cuban national grid, security market fluctuations and price volatility; level of liquidity and the related ability of the Moa Joint Venture to pay dividends; access to capital; access to financing; the risk to Sherritt’s entitlements to future distributions (including pursuant to the Cobalt Swap) from the Moa Joint Venture, the impact of infectious diseases, the impact of global conflicts; changes in the global price for nickel, cobalt, oil, gas, fertilizers or certain other commodities; risks related to Sherritt’s operations in Cuba; risks related to the U.S. government policy toward Cuba, including the U.S. embargo on Cuba and the Helms-Burton legislation; political, economic and other risks of foreign operations; uncertainty in the ability of the Corporation to enforce legal rights in foreign jurisdictions; uncertainty regarding the interpretation and/or application of the applicable laws in foreign jurisdictions; compliance with applicable environment, health and safety legislation and other associated matters; risks associated with governmental regulations regarding climate change and greenhouse gas emissions; risks relating to community relations; maintaining social license to grow and operate; risks related to environmental liabilities including liability for reclamation costs, tailings facility failures and toxic gas releases; uncertainty about the pace of technological advancements required in relation to achieving ESG targets; risks to information technologies systems and cybersecurity; identification and management of growth opportunities; the ability to replace depleted mineral reserves; risk of future non-compliance with debt restrictions and covenants; risks associated with the Corporation’s joint venture partners; variability in production at Sherritt’s operations in Cuba; risks associated with mining, processing and refining activities; potential interruptions in transportation; uncertainty of gas supply for electrical generation; reliance on key personnel and skilled workers; growth opportunity risks; the possibility of equipment and other failures; uncertainty of resources and reserve estimates; the potential for shortages of equipment and supplies, including diesel; supplies quality issues; risks related to the Corporation’s corporate structure; risks associated with the operation of large projects generally; risks related to the accuracy of capital and operating cost estimates; foreign exchange and pricing risks; credit risks; shortage of equipment and supplies; competition in product markets; future market access; interest rate changes; risks in obtaining insurance; uncertainties in labour relations; legal contingencies; risks related to the Corporation’s accounting policies; uncertainty in the ability of the Corporation to obtain government permits; failure to comply with, or changes to, applicable government regulations; bribery and corruption risks, including failure to comply with the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act or applicable local anti-corruption law; the ability to accomplish corporate objectives, goals and plans for 2023; and the ability to meet other factors listed from time to time in the Corporation’s continuous disclosure documents.

In addition to the risks noted above, factors that could, alone or in combination, prevent the Corporation from successfully achieving the benefits from expansion opportunities may include, without limitation: identifying suitable commercialization and other partners; successfully advancing discussions and successfully concluding applicable agreements with external parties and/or partners; successfully attracting required financing; successfully developing and proving technology required for the potential opportunity; successfully overcoming technical and technological challenges; successful environmental assessment and stakeholder engagement; successfully obtaining intellectual property protection; successfully completing test work and engineering studies, prefeasibility and feasibility studies, piloting, scaling from small scale to large scale production; procurement, construction, commissioning, ramp-up to commercial scale production and completion; unanticipated cost increases; supply chain challenges and securing regulatory and government approvals. There can be no assurance that any opportunity will be successful, commercially viable, completed on time or on budget, or will generate any meaningful revenues, savings or earnings, as the case may be, for the Corporation. In addition, the Corporation will incur costs in pursuing any particular opportunity, which may be significant. Readers are cautioned that the foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive and should be considered in conjunction with the risk factors described in the Corporation’s other documents filed with the Canadian securities authorities, including without limitation the “Managing Risk” section of the Management’s Discussion and Analysis for the three and six months ended June 30, 2024 and the Annual Information Form of the Corporation dated March 21, 2024 for the period ending December 31, 2023, which is available on SEDAR at www.sedarplus.ca.

The Corporation may, from time to time, make oral forward-looking statements. The Corporation advises that the above paragraph and the risk factors described in this press release and in the Corporation’s other documents filed with the Canadian securities authorities should be read for a description of certain factors that could cause the actual results of the Corporation to differ materially from those in the oral forward-looking statements. The forward-looking information and statements contained in this press release are made as of the date hereof and the Corporation undertakes no obligation to update publicly or revise any oral or written forward-looking information or statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by applicable securities laws. The forward-looking information and statements contained herein are expressly qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement.

For further information, please contact:
Tom Halton
Director, Investor Relations and Corporate Affairs
Email: investor@sherritt.com
Telephone: (416) 935-2451
www.sherritt.com

U.S. Department Of State: Cuba UN Vote Not On Spokesperson's "Bingo Card"

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United States Department of State
Washington DC
28 October 2024
Press Briefing- Matthew Miller, Spokesperson

QUESTION:  Tomorrow, as you may know, is the annual vote in the UN General Assembly condemning the U.S. embargo on Cuba.  You were aware of that?

MR MILLER:  I was not tracking this on my bingo card, so go right ahead.

QUESTION:  I’m just wondering how the U.S. is going to vote this year.

MR MILLER:  I doubt we’ll be voting to condemn ourselves, so —

QUESTION:  Well, you abstained one year.  The last year of Obama’s presidency, you guys abstained on it and it caused a bit of a ripple.  But as you probably know, it’s basically the entire world votes to condemn it, and you and Israel – and in some cases, Palau or another Pacific Island nation joins in voting against.  This year it’s most likely just going to be U.S. and Israel.  So do you have anything to say about this —

MR MILLER:  I don’t —

QUESTION:  — yearly display of isolation on the international stage —

MR MILLER:  I don’t.

QUESTION:  — at least in terms of this one policy?

MR MILLER:  I’m sure I will tomorrow – I’m sure I will tomorrow if the vote takes place, but no, not today.  So —

QUESTION:  Yeah?  Okay.  Thank you.

Links To Related Analyses

Cuba Is Governance Example Of The Medical Term “Failure To Thrive”  United Nations Resolution Will Not Fix Cuba- Nor Force Others To Fix Cuba. Python Suffocating Re-Emerging Private Sector. Oct 27, 2024

United Nations Vote This Week On Resolution Submitted Annually By Government Of Cuba About Relationship With The United States. Vote Outcome Certainty. Impact Not. Oct 27, 2024

Cuba Obtains "Partner" Status With BRICS. Cuba Does Not Bring Anything To BRICS Members. Cuba Wants Access To Funds From NDB. Oct 26, 2024

Cruise Lines Win Most Arguments Before 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals. Does Havana Docks Corporation Seek En Banc Review, U.S. Supreme Court Review, Or Accept Decision? Oct 22, 2024

The White House Answers Questions About Providing Assistance To Cuba- And Reinforces Cuba Is Victim Of Its Own Decisions. Oct 22, 2024

Thus Far In 2024, Cubans Imported More Than US$200,000.00 In Generators; More Than US$1 Million In Air Conditioners And Parts Oct 19, 2024

U.S. Department Of Commerce Seeking Comments On "Effectiveness of Licensing Procedures for the Export and Reexport of Agricultural Commodities to Cuba" Oct 16, 2024

U.S. Exports To Cuba Decrease, But Remain Up 20% Year-To-Year. Another US$8.7 In Vehicle Exports. Razors Too Oct 11, 2024

Cuba Included In U.S. Presidential Determination Regarding Trafficking In Persons Oct 1, 2024

Cuba Foreign Minister In Interview Reinforces Reasons For Unease By U.S. Companies Toward Cuba- Despite Their Wanting To Support Re-Emerging Private Sector. Sep 29, 2024

Cuba Government Describes Commercial, Economic, Financial Impact Of U.S. Policies, Regulations, And Statutes Sep 29, 2024

U.S. Senator From Nevada Newest Co-Sponsor For Bacardi Trademark Legislation. Unlikely To Become Law In 2024... But In 2025? Sep 29, 2024

2024 Address By Minister Of Foreign Affairs To The United Nations General Assembly Sep 29, 2024

Cuba Is Governance Example Of The Medical Term “Failure To Thrive”  United Nations Resolution Will Not Fix Cuba- Nor Force Others To Fix Cuba. Python Suffocating Re-Emerging Private Sector.

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Cuba Is Governance Example Of The Medical Term “Failure To Thrive” 

A UNGA Resolution Will Not Fix Cuba- Nor Force Others To Fix Cuba 

Forcefully Embracing The Anachronistic Rather Than Chasing The Dynamic 

Cuba’s Government Decisions Resembling A Public Sector Python Suffocating Private Sector Prey- Excruciatingly Painful And Slow 

“Failure to Thrive” in older adults “may represent a final common pathway toward death unless interventions can reverse the course.”   

For a government, “Failure to Thrive” is defined as a pathway toward ruin where a government continues to repeat mistakes despite knowing in advance the outcome of those decisions.  Or worse- a failed state. 

For a government official in the city of Havana, Republic of Cuba, taking a sedative, falling asleep and hoping the morning brings news that 25 December 1991 was only a horrible nightmare is not an effective strategy for governance.  11,997 days ago, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) ceased to exist, and its fifteen republics became fifteen countries.  The U.S.S.R. was created on 30 December 1922. 

The government of the Republic of Cuba will find broad support this week for its resolution submitted annually to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) which criticizes policies, regulations, and statutes of the United States government which impact the Republic of Cuba. 

There will also be a less visible question each of the 193-member country delegations of the UNGA will discuss among themselves.   

That question is why does the government of the Republic of Cuba not avail itself, and actively so, to all of the commercial, cultural, economic, financial, and political opportunities for engagement with the United States which are specifically authorized by policies, regulations, and statutes as implemented by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, and United States Department of State? 

  • “The meaningful part of the relationship- the economic blockade and the aggression against the Cuban economy- has not changed” since the end of the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021).  “It has been faithfully applied by the Biden administration.”  Carlos Fernandez de Cossio, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba 

  • “Economic blockade means #Cuba can’t sell any product in the US or export any product to any company in any country that exports to the US.”  Senior Official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba.  Fact Check:  In 2016, coffee was first authorized for import to the United States.  Since 2016, healthcare products have been imported to the United States for evaluation.  In 2017, charcoal was first authorized for import to the United States.  New York, New York-based Nespresso USA Inc., a subsidiary of Lausanne, Switzerland-based Nestle S.A. (2023 revenue approximately US$105 billion) exports products to the United States and imports products from the Republic of Cuba. 

Most egregious remains the unwillingness of successive governments in the Republic of Cuba, beginning with the [Raul] Castro-Machado Ventura Administration (2006-2018) and continuing with the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2018- ) to embrace fully commercial opportunities authorized during the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) and continuing thus far through the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025).   

Whereas the [Fidel] Castro-[Raul] Castro Administration (1976-2008) knew how to create and then use leverage, subsequent governments in the Republic of Cuba only knew and know how to abdicate the creation of and use of leverage.   

For example, when the Trade Sanctions Reform and Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 was signed into law during the final months of the Clinton-Gore Administration (1993-2001), President Fidel Castro proclaimed that since the law required payment of cash in advance and did not permit payment terms or provision of financing, there would be no purchases of agricultural commodities or food products from United States-based companies.  However, sensing opportunities to create a commercial constituency throughout the United States, the first purchase of US$4.8 million in December 2001 described as a “one-off” due to the impact of a hurricane has since cumulatively totaled more than US$7.5 billion twenty-three years later with the Republic of Cuba ranking annually within the top sixty of two hundred and twenty United States agricultural commodity and food product export markets.  The Republic of Cuba has ranked as high as 25th.  The first export of corn from the United States was sourced from nine states, thus crystalizing what would become a substantive agriculturally based advocacy constituency.   

If the Castro-Machado Ventura Administration and then Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration permitted fully those commercial opportunities authorized during the Obama-Biden Administration and thus far during Biden-Harris Administration, the impact of decisions by the Trump-Pence Administration could have been mitigated.  Important to note that not all Obama-Biden Administration Republic of Cuba-focused decisions were halted or reversed by the Trump-Pence Administration.   

Had there been by 20 January 2017 hundreds of United States-based companies with operations throughout the Republic of Cuba employing tens of thousands of Republic of Cuba nationals, the Trump-Pence Administration may have been constricted in what it decided to excise from then-authorized policy and regulations relating to the Republic of Cuba.      

From 17 December 2014 to 20 January 2017 the government of the Republic of Cuba failed to authorize United States-based companies to create a presence that would be resistant to being rolled-up like a carpet.  What the government of the Republic of Cuba did authorize was not wide, was not deep.  There were no roots.  The marquee examples consisted of one hotel management contract and port calls for cruise ships.  All were easily cancelled- and they were.   

Hundreds of small, medium, and large United States-based accountancies, assemblers, law firms, manufacturers, retailers, service providers, and wholesalers were prepared to establish a presence within the Republic of Cuba.  They were rebuffed.  

Additionally, from 2015 there were United States-based companies engaging and re-engaging with the Republic of Cuba who had claims certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC). 

·       There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the USFCSC and have not been resolved for more than sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims is approximately US$10 billion.  

The government of the Republic of Cuba had opportunities to provide some certified claimants with full or partial settlements at little out-of-pocket cost to the government of the Republic of Cuba.   

During the Obama-Biden Administration, some of the most high-profile certified claimants had engaged or re-engaged with the Republic of Cuba marketplace.  The revenues earned in the Republic of Cuba by these claimants would have easily provided funding for not only the original value of the certified claim, but for the interest-compiling value of the certified claim.   

The decision by the government of the Republic of Cuba to ignore those entreaties was the commercial equivalent of self-flagellation.  The takeaway was then and remains today that the government of the Republic of Cuba would rather its people suffer.   

Had that small number of certified claimants settled their claims against the government of the Republic of Cuba, a result would have been a substantial increase in interest by United States-based companies.   

A settlement of certified claims would have also provided an opportunity landscape whereby United States-based companies could develop quickly a deep and wide presence not only throughout the Republic of Cuba, but throughout the economy of the Republic of Cuba. 

There is no minimizing the commercial, economic, and financial impairment to the Republic of Cuba since 1960 by policies, regulations, and statutes implemented by successive occupants of The White House.  Most, but not all the policies, regulations, and statutes implemented are designed to be coercive, even punitive. 

However, not all can be rationally viewed as without off-ramps.  These choices are not ideal from the perspective of successive administrations in the Republic of Cuba, but if engaged they would not singularly or collectively guarantee the demise of the political infrastructure within the country.  Managed improperly, there would continue suffering.  Managed with dexterity, there could be prosperity, depending of course upon one’s definition of prosperity.    

GlobalPost, Boston, Massachusetts, 4 October 2024: “Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel, meanwhile, is looking to China and Russia for help.  If the US won’t permit American companies to invest and operate in Cuba, Newsweek magazine reported, the Cuban government has little choice but to seek out other powerful patrons whose governments share its autocratic bent.  That is called “doubling down” in geopolitical parlance.” 

What GlobalPost reported is untrue.  What Newsweek was reported as writing was untrue.  On 10 May 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration instructed the OFAC to issue the first license authorizing direct investment in and direct financing to a privately-owned company located in the Republic of Cuba owned by a Republic of Cuba national.   

More than two years later, the government of the Republic of Cuba has yet to publish the regulations for delivering the investment and the financing.  The delay does not only impact investors in the United States, but in all countries.  The government of the Republic of Cuba is engaging in collective punishment of its entrepreneurs. 

And recently the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration prohibited privately-owned companies in the Republic of Cuba from maintaining commercial bank accounts in the United States- which was recently authorized by the Biden-Harris Administration. 

The government of the Republic of Cuba had means, motive, and opportunity during Obama-Biden Administration and continuing through the Biden-Harris Administration to create a commercial, economic, and financial landscape- both wide and deep throughout the country from Havana to Santiago de Cuba.  All three were painfully squandered. 

The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration not only wants it both ways, it wants it all ways.  Embracing governments which are in conflict with the government of the United States and then seeking commercial, economic, financial, military, and political support from those governments.   

  • Simultaneously, the messaging from officials in Havana that the Republic of Cuba is “open for business” with United States companies and entrepreneurs.   

  • Simultaneously, continuing for more than two years its refusal to enact laws and regulations which would make transparent, which would create accountability, and permit direct investment in and direct financing to privately-owned companies in the Republic of Cuba, which the Biden-Harris Administration first authorized on 10 May 2022.   

In August 2024, the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration further restricted the re-emerging private sector by identifying one hundred and twenty-five sectors within which the re-emerging private sector is prohibited from operating in “forms of agriculture, manufacturing of pharmaceutical products, financial intermediation, trade, book editing and layout, television programming and broadcasting, telecommunications activities, forms of transportation and storage, defense, public security, and provision of social services.  While the goals of the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration may not be to deprive the re-emerging private sector of the oxygen required for not only sustainability, but for prosperity and expansion, the result of decisions by the government of the Republic of Cuba is likened to constricting the caloric intake of a child- the result is stunted growth, anemic functioning, and potentially death. 

The decisions by the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration resemble a public sector python suffocating its private sector prey… a slow and painful process for the prey. 

Because Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration continues to recoil from sustainable commercial, economic, financial, and political reforms, its options for survival narrow to seeking disguised charity from governments and organizations whose interests are unaligned with those of the United States.  Thus, China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Turkiye, and Venezuela become, for the government of the Republic of Cuba, its personal United Nations.   

The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration knows fully how these decisions reverberate throughout Washington DC and specifically in the State of Florida, home to the largest population of individuals of Cuban descent outside of the Republic of Cuba itself.  A reported one million Republic of Cuba nationals have departed the island during the last four years- approximately 10% of its population. 

On the one side of the “Pushmi-Pullyu” from the 1967 motion picture Doctor Doolittle is the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration continuing to publicly espouse for an improved commercial, economic, financial, and political relationship with the Biden-Harris Administration which will at 12:00 pm on 20 January 2025 transition to either the Harris-Walz Administration (2025-2029) or the Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029). 

On the other side of the “Pushmi-Pullyu” is the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration doing and saying about everything that might be included on a how-to list specifically drafted to antagonize The White House and the United States Congress. 

  • Engage and Support China, Iran, North Korea, Russia.  Check. 

  • Criticize Israel.  Check. 

  • Support (or not condemn) Hezbollah and Hamas.  Check. 

  • Not robustly support Ukraine.  Check. 

  • Permit Russian naval vessels to visit ports in the Republic of Cuba.  Check. 

  • Not enacting laws and publishing regulations which would respond positively to licenses issued by the OFAC authorizing direct investment in and direct financing to the re-emerging private sector in Cuba.  Check. 

  • Refusing to authorize private companies to have operating bank accounts in the United States.  Check.

  • Failing to embrace all the decisions by the Biden-Harris Administration which benefit the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.  Check. 

When a resolution submitted annually to the UNGA receives a substantial number of votes for, with some voting against and some abstaining, but what the resolution calls for is ignored year after year, probably an indicator that a new approach is required.  

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

United Nations Vote This Week On Resolution Submitted Annually By Government Of Cuba About Relationship With The United States. Vote Outcome Certainty. Impact Not.

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United Nations
New York, New York
29 October 2024
10:00 am to 13:00 pm
General Assembly Hall
29th Plenary Meeting

Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba - Item 38: Report of the Secretary-General (A/79/80); Draft resolution (A/79/L.6) 

  • Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (A/79/80) 

  • Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (A/79/L.6) 

Debate on the item.  

LINK To United Nations Schedule 

United Nations
New York, New York
30 October 2024
10:00 am to 13:00 pm
General Assembly Hall
30th Plenary Meeting

Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba - Item 38 : Report of the Secretary-General (A/79/80); Draft resolution (A/79/L.6) 

  • Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (A/79/80)

  • Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (A/79/L.6)  

Debate on the item (continued) and action on the draft resolution.  

LINK To United Nations Schedule 

Cuba Obtains "Partner" Status With BRICS. Cuba Does Not Bring Anything To BRICS Members. Cuba Wants Access To Funds From NDB.

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Prensa Latina News Agency
Havana, Republic of Cuba
25 October 2024

“Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel today has highlighted his country's joining the BRICS+ as an associate member, which was approved at the group's 16th Summit held in Kazan, Russia.  

In his profile on X social media, the Head of State wrote: “Cuba is honored to join the Brics+ as a partner country, five letters and a great hope for the countries of the South, in the arduous path towards a more just, democratic, equitable and sustainable international order.” 

Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez also reaffirmed Cuba’s interest and commitment to work together with the members of this group in defense of multilateralism, peace, international law and the construction of a development and cooperation agenda that responds to the priorities of the South. 

The Caribbean nation was admitted as an associate member of the BRICS together with 12 other countries; these are Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.” 

BRIC/BRICS/BRICS+ 

BRIC was created in September 2006 and officially organized in June 2009 by the governments of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.   

In December 2010, the government of South Africa became a member; and BRIC became BRICS.   

In January 2024, the governments of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia became members of BRICS.  The government of Argentina was granted an invitation to membership in BRICS, but the invitation was declined in December 2023.   

In September 2024, the government of Turkiye applied for membership in BRICS. 

In October 2024, the governments of Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkiye, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam were granted “partner” status in BRICS.  

Government connectivity with BRICS is by consensus. 

New Development Bank (NDB)

The president of NDB is H.E. Mrs. Dilma Rousseff, President of Brasil (2011-2016) and chief of staff to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva from 2005 to 2010. The NDB was created in 2014.

“The New Development Bank (NDB) is a multilateral development bank established by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) with the purpose of mobilising resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs).  Our strong mandate and potential put us in a unique position to contribute to global growth and development.”