From U.S. Cruise Lines: Cuba Is Good And Cuba Has Potential

From the Miami, Florida-based Florida-Caribbean Cruise Association: 

According to Mr. Pierfrancesco Vago, executive chairman of Geneva, Switzerland-based MSC Cruises, the Republic of Cuba is “not a panacea for the whole cruise industry” and “still, there will be big growth,” and the fifteen-year (15) contract for London, United Kingdom-based Global Ports Holding through its office in Istanbul, Turkey, to manage and develop the cruise port in the city of Havana will “definitely help.  Bigger ships will come,” and “Cuba is a fantastic experience.” 

Mr. Micky Arison, chairman of Miami, Florida-based Carnival Corp. & plc, shared that guest satisfaction is very high for cruises to the Republic of Cuba and thus far the number of passengers to the Republic of Cuba in 2017 was less than the number of passengers that visit Cozumel, Mexico, in one (1) week.

Next Trade Subcommittee Chairman May Disappoint Advocates Seeking Changes To Cuba Laws/Regulations

For the 116th Congress, The Honorable Bill Pascrell (D- New Jersey) will likely become Chairman of the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means of the United States House of Representatives. 

Dec 17, 2014- Press Release  

Paterson, NJ – Today, U.S. Rep. Bill Pascrell, Jr. (D-NJ-09) issued the following statement regarding the U.S. – Cuba relationship. 

“Today’s news is certainly momentous, especially for those of us who lived through the Cuban Missile Crisis and witnessed the decades of oppression the Cuban people faced at the hands of the Castro regime. That oppression continues to this day, evidenced by the imprisonment of Alan Gross for doing nothing more than attempting to provide humanitarian aid to the Cuban people. I’m very pleased that after more than five years and deteriorating health, Alan will be coming home to his family. 

I have many questions about the President’s announcement. It is clear that our 50-year long embargo of Cuba has failed to bring about the change we desired to free the Cuban people from an oppressive regime.  However, I share the concern of Senator Menendez and others that the quick normalization of relations that the President envisions are only rewarding the Cuban government for decades of bad behavior and gross violations of human rights. I will be monitoring these developments closely and must insist that any opening of relations comes side-by-side with an opening of the Cuban government's political system from totalitarianism to one that respects democracy, human rights, and personal freedoms -- that is the only Cuba we can recognize. 

This is a moment for US-Cuban relations and today we say yes to the potential for change, but we must say no to an immediate halt of sanctions on Cuba.” 

About Subcommittee On Trade: 

“The jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Trade shall include bills and matters referred to the Committee on Ways and Means that relate to customs and customs administration including tariff and import fee structure, classification, valuation of and special rules applying to imports, and special tariff provisions and procedures which relate to customs operation affecting exports and imports; import trade matters, including import impact, industry relief from injurious imports, adjustment assistance and programs to encourage competitive responses to imports, unfair import practices including antidumping and countervailing duty provisions, and import policy which relates to dependence on foreign sources of supply; commodity agreements and reciprocal trade agreements involving multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations and implementation of agreements involving tariff and non-tariff trade barriers to and distortions of international trade; international rules, organizations and institutional aspects of international trade agreements; budget authorizations for the customs revenue functions of the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. International Trade Commission, and the U.S. Trade Representative; and special trade-related problems involving market access, competitive conditions of specific industries, export policy and promotion, access to materials in short supply, bilateral trade relations including trade with developing countries, operations of multinational corporations, and trade with non-market economies.  Source: Rules of the Committee on Ways and Means”

You Write That The Policy Is Stupid; You Could Have Changed The Policy... That Defines Stupid.

14 November 2018

9:43 am

Twitter

@brhodes 

Ben Rhodes: 

“There is zero reason to believe these sanctions will change the Cuban government. There is a 100 percent certainty that the US embargo is hurting the Cuban people. What a sick and stupid policy.”

Mr. Ben Rhodes, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Communications at the National Security Council (NSC) during the Obama Administration. 

Response: 

On 11/14/18, Ben Rhodes @brhodes wrote about Cuba “What a sick and stupid policy.”  Policy can be changed- Obama Administration could have permitted direct correspondent banking, more agricultural imports and reduced financial restrictions.  It didn’t.  That was stupid policy.

Could Red Habanero Peppers Follow Coffee To The United States?

The United States Department of State authorizes the direct import and indirect import of agricultural commodities from the Republic of Cuba to the United States. The first such product was coffee (https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/7/14/update-hecho-en-cuba-begins-to-mean-something-obama-administration-will-help-accept-certification-from-cuba?rq=Nespresso)

From the United States Department of State:

Q: What are some examples of independent Cuban entrepreneurs?

A: Cuba’s nascent private sector includes self-employed individuals, private small businesses, and private cooperatives that are independent of Cuba’s state sector. Those importing goods or services authorized by § 515.582 must obtain documentary evidence that demonstrates the entrepreneur’s independent status, such as a copy of a license to be self-employed issued by the Cuban government or, in the case of an entity, evidence that demonstrates that the entrepreneur is a private entity that is not owned or controlled in whole or in part by the Cuban government.

LINKS:

https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/cuba/515582/237473.htm

https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/cuba/515582/237471.htm

https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/cuba/515582/index.htm

Cuba will resume hot pepper exports

http://www.granma.cu/cuba/2018-11-12/retomaran-exportacion-de-aji-picante-12-11-2018-21-11-30

"The state newspaper Granma, the official organ of the Communist Party of Cuba, announced that the country would resume its exports of hot pepper as soon as December.

The Horticultural Company Wilfredo Peña, which already has a contract to deliver about 300 kilograms of this product to a foreign client, will be in charge of the production of this plant, which is usually used in the flavoring of many foods and medicinal remedies.

Producers will grow the red Habanero variety, which is considered one of the most interesting varieties outside of Cuba, in a greenhouse of 0.26 hectares.

The managers in charge of this project said that their company had exported more than one ton of this variety of chili to Canada per month a couple of years ago, but of the yellow variety. However, the production was completely paralyzed due to the scarcity of covering for the greenhouses.

Producers expect to collect the chili in the beginning of December and the area will be planted again in January 2019, followed by similar cycles in April and August, which should result in a monthly harvest of close to 1.5 or 1.6 tons.

The cultivation procedures include the elimination of the lower quality products, as well as the use of suitable fertilizers by means of fertigation.

Specialists of the Ministry of Agriculture who are working on this project told the press that they were working so that the pepper's red color was as intense as possible and that they would try to introduce other parameters through laboratory tests so that the product's spiciness level met the international quality standards.

The fruits will be exported in three-kilogram boxes, which will be exported through the Frank Pais International Airport, where they will be verified by specialists of Plant Health and Customs before being exported, as is required for international shipments of plant products."

Brazil Paying Cuba Approximately US$479 Million Annually For Healthcare Workers (Who Are Taxed 75% By Cuba)

The government of the Federative Republic of Brazil reported that 11,420 Republic of Cuba nationals (physicians and nurses) are working within the country providing health services to areas lacking consistent quality healthcare. Reuters has reported that the “health ministry said in a statement that it had managed in three days to get 92 percent of the Brazilian doctors needed to replace the departing Cubans, signing up 25,901 physicians. More than 17,500 had been enlisted, while almost 8,000 had already been allocated to specific municipalities, the statement said.” There is also reporting that the number is 8,332 of which approximately 6,000 will be returning to the Republic of Cuba at the request of the government of the Republic of Cuba due to disputes with the government of the Federative Republic of Brazil relating to compensation terms and status of relatives of the healthcare professionals residing in the Federative Republic of Brazil.

The government of Brazil reportedly pays the government of the Republic of Cuba approximately US$3,500.00 per month (US$42,000.00 annually) per healthcare professional.  There is also reporting that the monthly payment is US$3,100.00 plus room and board. Using the US$3,500.00 value, on an annual basis, the government of Republic of Cuba reportedly receives US$479,640,000.00 of which it would retain approximately US$359,730,000.00. 

The healthcare professional reportedly retains US$900.00 per month (US$10,800.00 annually) and the government of the Republic of Cuba reportedly retains US$2,600.00 per month.  The government of the Republic of Cuba retains 75% of each U.S. Dollar.

The Supreme Accountability Office of Brazil was reported to confirm that a total of US$1.5 billion (US$260 million per year) was paid to the Republic of Cuba during the last five (5) years. Republic of Cuba nationals working as healthcare providers were paid a total of US$125 million during the five-year period; this equates to a compensation rate of 9.61%- meaning that the government of the Republic of Cuba retained 90.39% of the total funds paid by the government of Brazil to the Republic of Cuba.

The government of the Republic of Cuba reportedly has approximately 21,000 to 37,000 to 50,000 healthcare professionals working within sixty-seven (67) to seventy-seven (77) countries; with the largest contingent, reported as 21,700, in Venezuela. According to the government of the Republic of Cuba, approximately 1,000 healthcare professionals work in Algeria as a component of a three-year 2.1 million barrels per day oil barter agreement. According to the government of the Republic of Cuba there are 450 healthcare professionals working in Qatar.

If the 21,000 to 37,000 to 50,000 healthcare professionals are invoiced at US$42,000.00 on an annual basis, the government of the Republic of Cuba would receive approximately US$882 million to US$1.554 billion to US$2.1 billion on an annual basis, of which it would retain approximately US$661.5 million to US$1.165 billion to US$1.575 billion.

According to Republic of Cuba government-operated Prensa Latina news agency, the Ministry of Public Health of the Republic of Cuba (MINSAP) reported for the five-year duration of the program that “nearly 20,000 Cuban collaborators attended to some 113 million people in more than 3,600 municipalities, according to official statistics.”  Using this data, the Republic of Cuba could have received a total of approximately US$4.2 billion from the five-year duration of the program.

U.S. Department Of State Updates "Cuba Restricted List" ... After 14 Day Delay

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

November 14, 2018  

As part of the Trump Administration’s efforts to prevent U.S. funds from reaching the Cuban military, intelligence, and security services, the State Department is adding 26 subentities to the Cuba Restricted List, including 16 hotels owned by the Cuban military. The Department is also updating the names of five already listed subentities to ensure they remain current. The changes take effect Thursday, November 15, 2018. The Department will continue to update the list periodically, in accordance with the June 2017 National Security Presidential Memorandum Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba. The Federal Register will publish the update, and the list will be available on the Department’s website here.  

The Cuba Restricted List contains entities and subentities controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, and security services or personnel. Direct financial transactions with these entities and subentities are generally prohibited because they would disproportionately benefit those services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba. For more information on the Cuba Restricted List, please refer to Treasury regulations at 31 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 515, here, and to Commerce regulations at 15 CFR parts 730-774, here.  

https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/cuba/cubarestrictedlist/287349.htm

Below is the U.S. Department of State’s list of entities and subentities under the control of, or acting for or on behalf of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba. For information regarding the prohibition on direct financial transactions with these entities, please see the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control website and the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security website. All entities and subentities were listed effective November 9, 2017, unless otherwise indicated.  

*** Entities or subentities owned or controlled by another entity or subentity on this list are not treated as restricted unless also specified by name on the list. ***  

Ministries

MINFAR — Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias

MININT — Ministerio del Interior  

Holding Companies

CIMEX — Corporación CIMEX S.A.

Compañía Turística Habaguanex S.A.

GAESA — Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A.

Gaviota — Grupo de Turismo Gaviota

UIM — Unión de Industria Militar  

Hotels in Havana and Old Havana

Aparthotel Montehabana (Habaguanex)

Gran Hotel Manzana Kempinski (Gaviota)

H10 Habana Panorama (Gaviota)

Hostal Valencia (Habaguanex)

Hotel Ambos Mundos (Habaguanex)

Hotel Armadores de Santander (Habaguanex)

Hotel Beltrán de Santa Cruz (Habaguanex)

Hotel Conde de Villanueva (Habaguanex)

Hotel del Tejadillo (Habaguanex)

Hotel el Bosque (Habaguanex)

Hotel el Comendador (Habaguanex)

Hotel el Mesón de la Flota (Habaguanex)

Hotel Florida (Habaguanex)

Hotel Habana 612 (Habaguanex)

Hotel Kohly (Habaguanex)

Hotel Los Frailes (Habaguanex)

Hotel Marqués de Prado Ameno (Habaguanex)

Hotel Palacio del Marqués de San Felipe y Santiago de Bejucal (Habaguanex)

Hotel Palacio O'Farrill (Habaguanex)

Hotel Park View (Habaguanex)

Hotel Raquel (Habaguanex)

Hotel San Miguel (Habaguanex)

Hotel Telégrafo (Habaguanex)

Hotel Terral (Habaguanex)

Iberostar Grand Packard Hotel (Gaviota) Effective November 15, 2018

Memories Miramar Havana (Gaviota)

Memories Miramar Montehabana (Gaviota)

SO/ Havana Paseo del Prado (Gaviota) Effective November 15, 2018  

Hotels in Santiago de Cuba

Villa Gaviota Santiago (Gaviota)  

Hotels in Varadero

Blau Marina Varadero Resort (Gaviota) (also Fiesta Americana Punta Varadero effective November 15, 2018)

Grand Memories Varadero (Gaviota)

Hotel Las Nubes (Gaviota) Effective November 15, 2018

Hotel Oasis (Gaviota) Effective November 15, 2018

Iberostar Bella Vista (Gaviota) Effective November 15, 2018

Iberostar Laguna Azul (Gaviota)

Iberostar Playa Alameda (Gaviota)

Meliá Marina Varadero (Gaviota)

Meliá Peninsula Varadero (Gaviota)

Memories Varadero (Gaviota)

Naviti Varadero (Gaviota)

Ocean Varadero El Patriarca (Gaviota)

Ocean Vista Azul (Gaviota)

Paradisus Princesa del Mar (Gaviota)

Paradisus Varadero (Gaviota)

Sol Sirenas Coral (Gaviota)  

Hotels in Pinar del Rio

Hotel Villa Cabo de San Antonio (Gaviota)

Hotel Villa Maria La Gorda y Centro Internacional de Buceo (Gaviota)  

Hotels in Baracoa

Hostal 1511 (Gaviota)

Hostal La Habanera (Gaviota)

Hostal La Rusa (Gaviota)

Hostal Rio Miel (Gaviota)

Hotel El Castillo (Gaviota)

Hotel Porto Santo (Gaviota)

Villa Maguana (Gaviota)  

Hotels in Cayos de Villa Clara

Angsana Cayo Santa María (Gaviota) Effective November 15, 2018

Dhawa Cayo Santa María (Gaviota)

Golden Tulip Aguas Claras (Gaviota) Effective November 15, 2018

Hotel Cayo Santa María (Gaviota)

Hotel Playa Cayo Santa María (Gaviota)

Iberostar Ensenachos (Gaviota)

Las Salinas Plana & Spa (Gaviota) Effective November 15, 2018

La Salina Noreste (Gaviota) Effective November 15, 2018

La Salina Suroeste (Gaviota) Effective November 15, 2018

Meliá Buenavista (Gaviota)

Meliá Cayo Santa María (Gaviota)

Meliá Las Dunas (Gaviota)

Memories Azul (Gaviota)

Memories Flamenco (Gaviota)

Memories Paraíso (Gaviota)

Ocean Casa del Mar (Gaviota)

Paradisus Los Cayos (Gaviota) Effective November 15, 2018

Royalton Cayo Santa María (Gaviota)

Sercotel Experience Cayo Santa María (Gaviota) Effective November 15, 2018

Sol Cayo Santa María (Gaviota)

Starfish Cayo Santa María (Gaviota) Effective November 15, 2018

Valentín Perla Blanca (Gaviota) Effective November 15, 2018

Villa Las Brujas (Gaviota)

Warwick Cayo Santa María (Gaviota) (also Labranda Cayo Santa María Hotel effective November 15, 2018)  

Hotels in Holguín

Blau Costa Verde Beach & Resort (Gaviota) (also Fiesta Americana Holguín Costa Verde effective November 15, 2018)

Hotel Playa Costa Verde (Gaviota)

Hotel Playa Pesquero (Gaviota)

Memories Holguín (Gaviota)

Paradisus Río de Oro Resort & Spa (Gaviota)

Playa Costa Verde (Gaviota)

Playa Pesquero Premium Service (Gaviota)

Sol Rio de Luna y Mares (Gaviota)

Villa Cayo Naranjo (Gaviota)

Villa Cayo Saetia (Gaviota)

Villa Pinares de Mayari (Gaviota)  

Hotels in Jardines del Rey

Grand Muthu Cayo Guillermo (Gaviota) Effective November 15, 2018

Hotel Playa Coco Plus (Gaviota)

Iberostar Playa Pilar (Gaviota)

Meliá Jardines del Rey (Gaviota)

Memories Caribe (Gaviota)

Pestana Cayo Coco (Gaviota)  

Hotels in Topes de Collantes

Hostal Los Helechos (Gaviota)

Kurhotel Escambray (Gaviota) Effective November 15, 2018

Los Helechos (Gaviota)

Villa Caburni (Gaviota)  

Tourist Agencies

Crucero del Sol

Gaviota Tours  

Marinas

Marina Gaviota Cabo de San Antonio (Pinar del Rio)

Marina Gaviota Cayo Coco (Jardines del Rey)

Marina Gaviota Las Brujas (Cayos de Villa Clara)

Marina Gaviota Puerto Vita (Holguín)

Marina Gaviota Varadero (Varadero)  

Stores in Old Havana

Casa del Abanico (Habaguanex)

Colección Habana (Habaguanex)

Florería Jardín Wagner (Habaguanex)

Joyería Coral Negro (CIMEX) – Additional locations throughout Cuba

La Casa del Regalo (Habaguanex)

San Ignacio 415 (Habaguanex)

Soldadito de Plomo (Habaguanex)

Tienda El Navegante (Habaguanex)

Tienda Muñecos de Leyenda (Habaguanex)

Tienda Museo El Reloj Cuervo y Sobrinos (Habaguanex)  

Entities Directly Serving the Defense and Security Sectors

ACERPROT — Agencia de Certificación y Consultoría de Seguridad y Protección (alias Empresa de Certificación de Sistemas de Seguridad y Protección effective November 15, 2018)

AGROMIN — Grupo Empresarial Agropecuario del Ministerio del Interior

APCI — Agencia de Protección Contra Incendios

CAHOMA — Empresa Militar Industrial Comandante Ernesto Che Guevara

CASEG — Empresa Militar Industrial Transporte Occidente

CID NAV — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo Naval

CIDAI — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de Armamento de Infantería

CIDAO — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo del Armamento de Artillería e Instrumentos Ópticos y Ópticos Electrónicos

CORCEL — Empresa Militar Industrial Emilio Barcenas Pier

CUBAGRO — Empresa Comercializadora y Exportadora de Productos Agropecuarios y Agroindustriales

DATYS — Empresa Para El Desarrollo De Aplicaciones, Tecnologías Y Sistemas

DCM TRANS — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo del Transporte

DEGOR — Empresa Militar Industrial Desembarco Del Granma

DSE — Departamento de Seguridad del Estado

EMIAT — Empresa Importadora Exportadora de Abastecimientos Técnicos

Empresa Militar Industrial Astilleros Astimar

Empresa Militar Industrial Astilleros Centro

Empresa Militar Industrial Yuri Gagarin

ETASE — Empresa de Transporte y Aseguramiento

Ferretería TRASVAL

GELCOM — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo Grito de Baire

Impresos de Seguridad

MECATRONICS — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de Electrónica y Mecánica

NAZCA — Empresa Militar Industrial Granma

OIBS — Organización Integración para el Bienestar Social

PLAMEC — Empresa Militar Industrial Ignacio Agramonte

PNR — Policía Nacional Revolucionaria

PROVARI — Empresa de Producciones Varias

SEPSA — Servicios Especializados de Protección

SERTOD — Servicios de Telecomunicaciones a los Órganos de la Defensa Effective November 15, 2018

SIMPRO — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de Simuladores

TECAL — Empresa de Tecnologías Alternativas

TECNOPRO — Empresa Militar Industrial "G.B. Francisco Cruz Bourzac"

TECNOTEX — Empresa Cubana Exportadora e Importadora de Servicios, Artículos y Productos Técnicos Especializados

TGF — Tropas de Guardafronteras

UAM — Unión Agropecuaria Militar

ULAEX — Unión Latinoamericana de Explosivos

XETID — Empresa de Tecnologías de la Información Para La Defensa

YABO — Empresa Militar Industrial Coronel Francisco Aguiar Rodríguez  

Additional Subentities of CIMEX

ADESA/ASAT — Agencia Servicios Aduanales (Customs Services)

Cachito (Beverage Manufacturer)

Contex (Fashion)

Datacimex

ECUSE — Empresa Cubana de Servicios

Inmobiliaria CIMEX (Real Estate)

Inversiones CIMEX

Jupiña (Beverage Manufacturer)

La Maisón (Fashion)

Najita (Beverage Manufacturer)

Publicitaria Imagen (Advertising)

Residencial Tarara S.A. (Real Estate / Property Rental) Effective November 15, 2018

Ron Caney (Rum Production)

Ron Varadero (Rum Production)

Telecable (Satellite Television)

Tropicola (Beverage Manufacturer)

Zona Especializada de Logística y Comercio (ZELCOM)  

Additional Subentities of GAESA

Almacenes Universales (AUSA)

ANTEX — Corporación Antillana Exportadora

Compañía Inmobiliaria Aurea S.A. (GAESA) Effective November 15, 2018

Dirección Integrada Proyecto Mariel (DIP)

Empresa Inmobiliaria Almest (Real Estate)

GRAFOS (Advertising)

RAFIN S.A. (Financial Services)

Sociedad Mercantin Inmobiliaria Caribe (Real Estate)

TECNOIMPORT

Terminal de Contenedores de la Habana (TCH)

Terminal de Contenedores de Mariel, S.A.

UCM — Unión de Construcciones Militares

Zona Especial de Desarrollo Mariel (ZEDM)

Zona Especial de Desarrollo y Actividades Logísticas (ZEDAL)  

Additional Subentities of Gaviota

AT Comercial

Manzana de Gomez (Shopping Mall)  

PhotoService

Plaza La Estrella Effective November 15, 2018

Plaza Las Dunas Effective November 15, 2018

Plaza Las Morlas Effective November 15, 2018

Plaza Las Salinas Effective November 15, 2018

Plaza Las Terrazas del Atardecer Effective November 15, 2018

Plaza Los Flamencos Effective November 15, 2018

Plaza Pesquero Effective November 15, 2018

Producciones TRIMAGEN S.A. (Tiendas Trimagen)  

Additional Subentities of Habaguanex

Sociedad Mercantil Cubana Inmobiliaria Fenix S.A. (Real Estate)  

List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated With Cuba as of November 9, 2017

Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs

November 8, 2017 

Below is the U.S. Department of State’s list of entities and subentities under the control of, or acting for or on behalf of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba. For information regarding the prohibition on direct financial transactions with these entities, please see the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control website and the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security website.  

*** Entities or subentities owned or controlled by another entity or subentity on this list are not treated as restricted unless also specified by name on the list. ***  

Ministries

MINFAR — Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias

MININT — Ministerio del Interior

Holding Companies

CIMEX — Corporación CIMEX S.A.

Companía Turística Habaguanex S.A.

GAESA — Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A.

Gaviota — Grupo de Turismo Gaviota

UIM — Unión de Industria Militar  

Hotels in Havana and Old Havana

Aparthotel Montehabana (Habaguanex)

Gran Hotel Manzana Kempinski (Gaviota)

H10 Habana Panorama (Gaviota)

Hostal Valencia (Habaguanex)

Hotel Ambos Mundos (Habaguanex)

Hotel Armadores de Santander (Habaguanex)

Hotel Beltrán de Santa Cruz (Habaguanex)

Hotel Conde de Villanueva (Habaguanex)

Hotel del Tejadillo (Habaguanex)

Hotel el Bosque (Habaguanex)

Hotel el Comendador (Habaguanex)

Hotel el Mesón de la Flota (Habaguanex)

Hotel Florida (Habaguanex)

Hotel Habana 612 (Habaguanex)

Hotel Kohly (Habaguanex)

Hotel Los Frailes (Habaguanex)

Hotel Marqués de Prado Ameno (Habaguanex)

Hotel Palacio del Marqués de San Felipe y

Hotel Palacio O'Farrill (Habaguanex)

Hotel Park View (Habaguanex)

Hotel Raquel (Habaguanex)

Hotel San Miguel (Habaguanex)

Hotel Telégrafo (Habaguanex)

Hotel Terral (Habaguanex)

Memories Miramar Havana (Gaviota)

Memories Miramar Montehabana (Gaviota)

Santiago de Bejucal (Habaguanex)  

Hotels in Santiago de Cuba

Villa Gaviota Santiago (Gaviota)  

Hotels in Varadero

Blau Marina Varadero Resort (Gaviota)

Grand Memories Varadero (Gaviota)

Iberostar Laguna Azul (Gaviota)

Iberostar Playa Alameda (Gaviota)

Meliá Marina Varadero (Gaviota)

Meliá Peninsula Varadero (Gaviota)

Memories Varadero (Gaviota)

Naviti Varadero (Gaviota)

Ocean Varadero El Patriarca (Gaviota)

Ocean Vista Azul (Gaviota)

Paradisus Princesa del Mar (Gaviota)

Paradisus Varadero (Gaviota)

Sol Sirenas Coral (Gaviota)  

Hotels in Pinar del Rio

Hotel Villa Cabo de San Antonio (Gaviota)

Hotel Villa Maria La Gorda y Centro Internacional de Buceo (Gaviota)  

Hotels in Baracoa

Hostal 1511 (Gaviota)

Hostal La Habanera (Gaviota)

Hostal La Rusa (Gaviota)

Hostal Rio Miel (Gaviota)

Hotel El Castillo (Gaviota)

Hotel Porto Santo (Gaviota)

Villa Maguana (Gaviota)  

Hotels in Cayos de Villa Clara

Dhawa Cayo Santa María (Gaviota)

Hotel Cayo Santa María (Gaviota)

Hotel Playa Cayo Santa María (Gaviota)

Iberostar Ensenachos (Gaviota)

Meliá Buenavista (Gaviota)

Meliá Cayo Santa María (Gaviota)

Meliá Las Dunas (Gaviota)

Memories Azul (Gaviota)

Memories Flamenco (Gaviota)

Memories Paraíso (Gaviota)

Ocean Casa del Mar (Gaviota)

Royalton Cayo Santa María (Gaviota)

Sol Cayo Santa María (Gaviota)

Villa Las Brujas (Gaviota)

Warwick Cayo Santa María (Gaviota)  

Hotels in Holguín

Blau Costa Verde Beach & Resort (Gaviota)

Hotel Playa Costa Verde (Gaviota)

Hotel Playa Pesquero (Gaviota)

Memories Holguín (Gaviota)

Paradisus Río de Oro Resort & Spa (Gaviota)

Playa Costa Verde (Gaviota)

Playa Pesquero Premium Service (Gaviota)

Sol Rio de Luna y Mares (Gaviota)

Villa Cayo Naranjo (Gaviota)

Villa Cayo Saetia (Gaviota)

Villa Pinares de Mayari (Gaviota)  

Hotels in Jardines del Rey

Hotel Playa Coco Plus (Gaviota)

Iberostar Playa Pilar (Gaviota)

Meliá Jardines del Rey (Gaviota)

Memories Caribe (Gaviota)

Pestana Cayo Coco (Gaviota)  

Hotels in Topes de Collantes

Hostal Los Helechos (Gaviota)

Los Helechos (Gaviota)

Villa Caburni (Gaviota)  

Tourist Agencies

Crucero del Sol

Gaviota Tours  

Marinas

Marina Gaviota Cabo de San Antonio (Pinar del Rio)

Marina Gaviota Cayo Coco (Jardines del Rey)

Marina Gaviota Las Brujas (Cayos de Villa Clara)

Marina Gaviota Puerto Vita (Holguín)

Marina Gaviota Varadero (Varadero)  

Stores in Old Havana

Casa del Abanico (Habaguanex)

Colección Habana (Habaguanex)

Florería Jardín Wagner (Habaguanex)

Joyería Coral Negro (CIMEX) – Additional locations throughout Cuba

La Casa del Regalo (Habaguanex)

San Ignacio 415 (Habaguanex)

Soldadito de Plomo (Habaguanex)

Tienda El Navegante (Habaguanex)

Tienda Munecos de Leyenda (Habaguanex)

Tienda Museo El Reloj Cuervo y Sobrinos (Habaguanex)  

Entities Directly Serving the Defense and Security Sectors

ACERPROT — Agencia de Certificación y Consultoría de Seguridad y Protección

AGROMIN — Grupo Empresarial Agropecuario del Ministerio del Interior

APCI — Agencia de Protección Contra Incendios

CAHOMA — Empresa Militar Industrial Comandante Ernesto Che Guevara

CASEG — Empresa Militar Industrial Transporte Occidente

CID NAV — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo Naval

CIDAI — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de Armamento de Infantería

CIDAO — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo del Armamento de Artillería e Instrumentos Ópticos y Ópticos Electrónicos

CORCEL — Empresa Militar Industrial Emilio Barcenas Pier

CUBAGRO — Empresa Comercializadora y Exportadora de Productos Agropecuarios y Agroindustriales

DATYS — Empresa Para El Desarrollo De Aplicaciones, Tecnologías Y Sistemas

DCM TRANS — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo del Transporte

DEGOR — Empresa Militar Industrial Desembarco Del Granma

DSE — Departamento de Seguridad del Estado

EMIAT — Empresa Importadora Exportadora de Abastecimientos Técnicos

Empresa Militar Industrial Astilleros Astimar

Empresa Militar Industrial Astilleros Centro

Empresa Militar Industrial Yuri Gagarin

ETASE — Empresa de Transporte y Aseguramiento

Ferretería TRASVAL

GELCOM — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo Grito de Baire

Impresos de Seguridad

MECATRONICS — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de Electrónica y Mecánica

NAZCA — Empresa Militar Industrial Granma

OIBS — Organización Integración para el Bienestar Social

PLAMEC — Empresa Militar Industrial Ignacio Agramonte

PNR — Policía Nacional Revolucionaria

PROVARI — Empresa de Producciones Varias

SEPSA — Servicios Especializados de Protección

SIMPRO — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de Simuladores

TECAL — Empresa de Tecnologías Alternativas

TECNOPRO — Empresa Militar Industrial "G.B. Francisco Cruz Bourzac"

TECNOTEX — Empresa Cubana Exportadora e Importadora de Servicios, Artículos y Productos Técnicos Especializados

TGF — Tropas de Guardafronteras

UAM — Unión Agropecuaria Militar

ULAEX — Unión Latinoamericana de Explosivos

XETID — Empresa de Tecnologías de la Información Para La Defensa

YABO — Empresa Militar Industrial Coronel Francisco Aguiar Rodríguez  

Additional Subentities of CIMEX

ADESA/ASAT — Agencia Servicios Aduanales (Customs Services)

Cachito (Beverage Manufacturer)

Contex (Fashion)

Datacimex

ECUSE — Empresa Cubana de Servicios

Inmobiliaria CIMEX (Real Estate)

Inversiones CIMEX

Jupina (Beverage Manufacturer)

La Maisón (Fashion)

Najita (Beverage Manufacturer)

Publicitaria Imagen (Advertising)

Ron Caney (Rum Production)

Ron Varadero (Rum Production)

Telecable (Satellite Television)

Tropicola (Beverage Manufacturer)

Zona Especializada de Logística y Comercio (ZELCOM)  

Additional Subentities of GAESA

Almacenes Universales (AUSA)

ANTEX — Corporación Antillana Exportadora

Dirección Integrada Proyecto Mariel (DIP)

Empresa Inmobiliaria Almest (Real Estate)

GRAFOS (Advertising)

RAFIN S.A. (Financial Services)

Sociedad Mercantin Inmobiliaria Caribe (Real Estate)

TECNOIMPORT

Terminal de Contenedores de la Habana (TCH)

Terminal de Contenedores de Mariel, S.A.

UCM — Unión de Construcciones Militares

Zona Especial de Desarrollo Mariel (ZEDM)

Zona Especial de Desarrollo y Actividades Logísticas (ZEDAL)

Additional Subentities of Gaviota

AT Comercial

Manzana de Gomez (Shopping Mall)

PhotoService

Producciones TRIMAGEN S.A. (Tiendas Trimagen)  

Additional Subentities of Habaguanex

Sociedad Mercantil Cubana Inmobiliaria Fenix S.A. (Real Estate)

LINK TO PRINTED TEXT

Donation Of Tractors From Sonalika In India Is Challenge For John Deere & Caterpillar

Hoshiarur, India-based Sonalika Group (www.sonalika.com):

"Incorporated in 1969 to accomplish newer heights of success, Sonalika Group has come a long way. Over the years, it has diversified into many new businesses in order to meet the better needs of the market and customers. Today the group is among the top three tractor manufacturers of India and provides a complete product line including tractors, multi-utility vehicles, engines, farm machinery attachments, diesel gensets, auto components and pick & carry cranes." Sonalika tractors are marketed in more than 100 countries

Sonalika has donated sixty (60) tractors and one-hundred-and-ten (110) implements to the Republic of Cuba through the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Cuba.

Moline, Illinois-based Deere & Company (2017 revenues approximately US$27 billion) continues to explore opportunities to establish a distribution center in the Republic of Cuba; the company has announced that it will provide internal financing for exports to the Republic of Cuba- the first United States company to make such an announcement.

San Juan, Puerto Rico-based Rimco, the Republic of Cuba distributor for Peoria, Illinois-based Caterpillar Inc. (2017 revenues approximately US$38 billion) has a distribution center within the Republic of Cuba government-operated Special Development Zone of Mariel (ZEDM).

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/2/27/competition-from-donations-and-long-term-government-financing-are-hurdles-to-john-deere-and-caterpillar?rq=caterpillar

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/11/3/john-deere-could-provide-us30-million-in-financing-for-us-exports-to-cuba?rq=caterpillar

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/11/2/caterpillars-distributor-to-establish-distribution-center-in-cuba?rq=caterpillar

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/9/27/cuba-will-require-long-term-financing-for-agricultural-equipment-purchases-from-belarus?rq=tractors

A Hilton Hotel, Again, Refuses To Accommodate Ambassador From Cuba Citing U.S. Regulations

McLean, Virginia-based Hilton Worldwide Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: HLT) had global revenues of approximately US$9 billion in 2017. 

Hilton Worldwide Holdings, Inc., has a claim against the government of the Republic of Cuba certified with the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (CU-2965) in the amount of US$1,854,574.60.  LINK: https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/cuba/documents/1501-3000/2965.pdf

United States statutes, regulations and policies impacting the Republic of Cuba are managed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and Office of Legal Advisor (OLA) of the United States Department of State. LINK to: https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/cuba/index.htm

BBC

London, United Kingdom

14 November 2018 

US hotel in Japan refuses Cuba ambassador

Reuters

A US-owned hotel in Japan has been criticised by Japanese authorities after it denied the Cuban ambassador a room over fears it would violate US sanctions on Cuba. 

The Hilton Fukuoka Sea Hawk told Ambassador Carlos Pereria he could not stay last month because it could not accommodate Cuban government guests.  That prompted a Cuban complaint. 

Japanese officials in the city have since told the hotel it was illegal to refuse rooms based on nationality. 

The Cuban embassy booked the room through a travel agency, which informed the hotel of the guests' identity, the Asahi Shimbun newspaper reported.  However when Mr Pereira arrived in the south-western city on a trip to visit Cubans playing for the city's baseball team he was told he could not stay. 

In its subsequent complaint, the Cuban argued that applying US law in Japan encroached on Japan's sovereignty, the Asahi Shimbun said.  But a Hilton representative in the Japanese capital Tokyo told the Kyodo news agency that the firm had to comply with US law because it was based in the US. 

In 2006, the Mexican authorities fined a US-owned Sheraton hotel for expelling a 16-person Cuban delegation from a hotel in Mexico City. 

In 2007 a Norwegian hotel, the Scandic Edderkoppen, refused to let a delegation of 14 Cuban officials stay as it was part of a chain that had been bought by Hilton since the Cubans last visited.  Then Norwegian deputy foreign minister Raymond Johansen told Reuters that it was "totally unacceptable".

The Mainichi

Tokyo, Japan

14 November 2018 

FUKUOKA (Kyodo) -- The Cuban ambassador to Japan was denied a room at a Hilton hotel in southwestern Japan last month, the U.S. hotel group said Wednesday, citing Washington's economic sanctions against the Latin American country.  

The local government has instructed the hotel in Fukuoka to correct the practice as Japanese law prohibits hotels from rejecting guests based on nationality.  

Hilton Fukuoka Sea Hawk told Kyodo News that it refused the ambassador's stay to comply with U.S. laws as an American company.  

The Tokyo travel agency that made the reservation for Oct. 2 for Ambassador Carlos Pereira and embassy officials said it received a phone call from the hotel the same day saying the group could not stay there.  

The agency later received a document that said the hotel "cannot accommodate guests representing the Cuban government."  

The ambassador was visiting Fukuoka to meet with Cuban players belonging to the professional baseball club SoftBank Hawks, the Cuban Embassy said.  

The Japanese law on hotel business stipulates that hotels should not reject guests except for cases involving infectious diseases or illegal activities.  

The health ministry said a rejection based on nationality breaches the law and hotels in Japan should abide by the law.  

A public relations official of the Hilton hotel said, "We are declining stays by government officials and those related to state-run companies from countries subjected to U.S. economic sanctions such as North Korea, Iran and Syria."  

But the official added that the company will discuss the issue based on instructions from the Japanese government.  

The United States has maintained an economic embargo against Cuba since the 1960s following the Cuban Revolution and the nationalization of American-owned properties.

U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 42% In September; Decrease 12% For Year

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©

November 2018

September 2018 Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Decrease 42.6%- 1

12.2% Decrease Year-To-Year-5

Cuba Ranks 54th Of 224 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2

September 2018 Healthcare Product Exports US$962,509.00- 2

September 2018 Humanitarian Donations US$366,907.00- 3

Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase- 3

U.S. Port Export Data- 15

 SEPTEMBER 2018 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE %- Exports of food products & agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in September 2018 were US$12,226,970.00 compared to US$21,329,099.00 in September 2017 and US$32,170,530.00 in September 2016.   

January 2018 through September 2018 exports were US$187,930,881.00 compared to US$214,122,226.00 for the same period in 2017.

For 2017, exports were US$268,800,005.00 compared to US$170,551,329.00 in 2016.

Agricultural product and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba since December 2001 exceed US$5,746,022,091.00 through September 2018 under provisions of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000.

LINK To Complete Report

Cuba & The 116th U.S. Congress: Who’s Who; Could Farm Bill Provision Be In Jeopardy?

The Democratic Party controls the United States House of Representatives:  

The Honorable Eliot Engel (D- New York) will be chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States House of Representatives. Representative Engel was supportive of Obama Administration initiatives relating to the Republic of Cuba.

The Honorable Albio Sires (D- New Jersey) will likely be chairman of the Western Hemisphere subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee.  Mr. Sires is the ranking Democratic member of the sub-committee.  He is of Cuban descent and was not supportive of Obama Administration initiatives relating to the Republic of Cuba.   

The Honorable Christopher Smith (R- New Jersey) will be ranking Republican on the Foreign Affairs Committee; Representative Smith was not supportive of Obama Administration initiatives relating to the Republic of Cuba.   

The Honorable Carlos Curbelo (R- Florida), who is of Cuban descent, was defeated in his re-election effort on 6 November 2018.  

The Republican Party controls of the United States Senate:  

The Honorable James Risch (R- Idaho), will become Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.  Senator Risch was not supportive of Obama Administration initiatives relating to the Republic of Cuba. 

One member of the United States Senate remains the most influential Member of the United States Congress relating to the Republic of Cuba- The Honorable Marco Rubio (R-Florida).  He is of Cuban descent.  He will become the ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Relations.  He will remain chairman of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate.  He is thinking about the next opportunity to run for president of the United States; his first effort in 2016 having been unsuccessful.   

The second-most influential member of the United States Senate with respect to the Republic of Cuba is The Honorable Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey), who is also of Cuban descent.  Senator Menendez will remain the ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Relations.   

The third-most influential member of the United States Senate with respect to the Republic of Cuba is The Honorable Ted Cruz (R- Texas), who is also of Cuban descent.  They represent three percent (3%) of the one hundred (100)-member United States Senate.  

NOTE: An amendment passed by the United States Senate to what is known as the “Farm Bill” remains expected to be enacted into law during the remaining days of the 115th Congress.   

The amendment, authored by The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp (D- North Dakota), a member of the United States Senate (who lost her re-election effort on 6 November 2018), was made likely (and ironically) to be included in the legislation specifically due to efforts by Senator Marco Rubio.  The amendment will permit United States taxpayer funds to be used for United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs managed by independent organizations for agricultural commodity and food product promotion in the Republic of Cuba.  Senator Rubio added language to prohibit any of the USDA funds from being directed to any Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba (FAR)-owned/controlled/affiliated entity.   

There remains a possibility that the United States Senate-approved amendment may be removed by members of the “Farm Bill” conference committee representing the House of Representatives in its current party configuration. 

The Next Months (Or Years) …  

After 6 November 2018, regardless of which political party controls which chamber of the United States Congress, the Trump Administration (with assistance from some members of the United States Congress) will continue to pursue commercial, economic and political policies and regulations designed to promote “regime change” in the Republic of Cuba.  However, according to a senior-level official of the Trump Administration, “the phrase ‘regime change’ will focus upon changing the behavior of the leadership of the regime as we are unlikely to replace those who lead the regime.”   

The Trump Administration’s term ends in 805 days… 

Rules and policies for the United States House of Representatives tend to make easier inserting and retaining a legislative measure while rules and policies for the United States Senate tend to make easier preventing and removing a legislative measure. 

Republic of Cuba-focused legislation is generally hostage to members of the United States Congress believing: 1) a perception that the legislation will benefit the Republic of Cuba and 2) a perception that the legislation will harm the Republic of Cuba.  Both 1 and 2 are not necessarily mutually-exclusive to one another. 

Legislative history has shown the Republic of Cuba to be a low-value commodity; to be traded away in most instances because it lacks importance.  The legislative calendar is littered with Members of Congress pronouncing they would not permit legislation unrelated to the Republic of Cuba to proceed unless issues relating to the Republic of Cuba were resolved.  In the end, no Member of Congress was going to seek to hold appropriation or other legislation of national importance because of the Republic of Cuba. 

Prudent to remember that the last change in United States law relating to the Republic of Cuba was more than 6,585 days ago- nearly eighteen (18) years. 

The Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC) in The White House is The Honorable Mauricio Claver-Carone, a highly competent and skilled political operative… who is of Cuban descent.  His role in shaping the United States relationship with the Republic of Cuba and his relationships with members of the United States Congress should not be undervalued and ignored at one’s peril. 

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and the Office of Legal Adviser (OLA) at the United States Department of State will continue to be weaponized for use towards the Republic of Cuba.

LINK to complete analysis

8 Days Later, Despite Statement Of Ambassador Bolton, Still No Changes To Cuba Restricted List

On 8 November 2017, the United States Department of State published its List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (RESAC).  There have been no changes since. 

Changes to the RESAC have not been published on the Internet site of the United States Department of State (https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/cuba/cubarestrictedlist/275331.htm).

In an unpublished restricted draft of prepared remarks by The Honorable John Bolton, Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor, on 1 November 2018 at Miami Dade College (MDC) in Miami, Florida, the text included “Further, today, the State Department added over two dozen additional entities owned or controlled by the Cuban military and intelligence services to the restricted list of entities with which financial transactions by U.S. persons are prohibited.”   

In the published text of the delivered remarks by Ambassador Bolton, the present tense in terms of publication of additions to the RESAC was replaced with the future tense: “In this respect, I believe that within days the administration will add over two dozen additional entities owned or controlled by the Cuban military and intelligence services to the restricted list of entities with which financial transactions by U.S. persons are prohibited. And I believe even more will come as well.  The Cuban military and intelligence agencies must not profit from the United States, its people, its travelers, or its businesses.” 

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/11/1/text-of-remarks-by-national-security-advisor-john-bolton-in-florida 

If the United States Department of State was not prepared to release an update to the RESAC, then Ambassador Bolton should not have included the reference in his remarks.

President Diaz-Canel Using Ilyushin 96-300 Aircraft For Official Travel

BBC News

3 March 2006

London, United Kingdom 

Castro buys new presidential jet

Cuba is buying one of Russia's most up-to-date airliners, carefully crafted for President Fidel Castro's personal comfort.  

The purchase is part of an initial Cuban order for two brand new Ilyushin planes worth $110 million (£63 million) which Russian officials say is a shot in the arm for their struggling airline industry.  

To head off criticism that a new presidential jet is an expensive luxury in austere times, Cuba says one of its new planes is being used to ferry workers to and from Venezuela.  

To finance the deal, Cuba has paid 15% of the total sum up front, the rest coming from a 10-year loan from Russian banks.  

Creature comforts  

Russian NTV Mir television said the designers at Ilyushin had worked hard to give Mr Castro as smooth and secure a journey as possible.  

"This is a sofa bed on which he can spend his hours of rest or read a book from his own library. Everything has been designed to be as ergonomic as possible, with a personal reading lamp," designer Aleksandr Kuchukhidze told the channel.  

Principal interior designer Anton Nikolayev added: "Beige colours will predominate. Business meetings and talks can be held here."  

The station showed the little luxuries the president could expect: a DVD player, drinks bar and leather seats. But security is paramount too: the plane comes with armoured cockpit doors and a system for making bombs safe.  

Export breakthrough  

The report showed the Ilyushin Il-96-300, built in Voronezh, being handed over at Havana's Jose Marti airport. It said the order was one of the biggest the Voronezh Ilyushin plant had secured this decade.  

"These are the first Russian civilian aircraft to have been exported in the last 15 years," Ilyushin finance director Aleksandr Rubtsov said.  

"We are convinced that Cuba can become a springboard for exporting our planes, above all in the countries of Latin America."  

Russia and Cuba plan to sign another contract in Cuba on 10 March for the supply of a further five airliners, for an undisclosed sum.  

Cuba has been a key customer of Soviet-built aircraft - whether civilian Ilyushins or military MiGs - since the Cold War era.  

Even today, Cuban pilots for the newest Ilyushins are being trained in Russia, and Ilyushin engineers are in to Havana to school ground crews on maintaining the planes.  

From Wikipedia: 

Transportation for the Cuban President is the responsibility of Cubana de Aviación, one of Cuba's state-owned airlines. Although the entire fleet is available for presidential use, the most commonly used aircraft are 2 Ilyushin Il-96.  

The government of Cuba operated a Ilyushin Il-62 and Ilyushin Il-96 in 2015. 

The Ilyushin Il-96 (Russian: Илью́шин Ил-96) is a Russian four-engined long-haul wide-body airliner designed by Ilyushin in the former Soviet Union and manufactured by the Voronezh Aircraft Production Association in Russia. It is powered by four Aviadvigatel PS-90 two-shaft turbofan engines. 

The Il-96-300 is the initial variant and is fitted with Aviadvigatel (Soloviev) PS-90A turbofans with a thrust rating of 16,000 kgf (157 kN, 35,300 lbf). Development started in the mid-80s while the first prototype flew on 28 September 1988. The first Il-96 entered service with Aeroflot in 1993.  

Range with 262 passengers and fuel reserves (for holding 75 minutes at an altitude of 450 m) in a two-class configuration is about 11,000 km (5,940 nmi), allowing flights from Moscow to US west coast cities, a great improvement over the Ilyushin Il-86. A highly customized version of the Il-96-300, called Il-96-300PU is used as the primary aircraft in the Russian presidential aircraft fleet. Four were used by Russian president Vladimir Putin, and by Dmitry Medvedev as VIP planes. The VIP aircraft is operated by Russia State Transport Company. The Cuban leadership use the IL-96-300.

Cuba Releases 2018-2019 Portfolio Of Opportunities For Foreign Investment

Cuba Portfolios Of Opportunities For Foreign Investment

 LINK To 2018/2019 Document In PDF Format- Part 1, Part 2, Part 3

 LINK To 2017-2018 Document In PDF Format

 LINK To 2016-2017 Document In PDF Format

LINK To 2015 Document In PDF Format

LINK To 2015 Document In PDF Format

LINK To 2014 Document In PDF Format

LINK To Investor Guide

With Ambassador Bolton's Speech, Trump Administration Did Not Project Preparedness

The Dog That Didn’t (yet) Bite

Trump Administration Did Not Project Preparedness

OFAC Is Feared Because It’s Unpredictable With Its SDN List

State Department Has Become Predictable With Its RESAC List

U.S. Companies Prefer Predictability

Trump Administration Seems To Be Accommodating 

An important component of the Trump Administration’s strategy towards the Republic of Cuba is the creation and maintenance of uncertainty.  Absence of predictability is an essential tool for reducing and eliminating commercial interest toward any marketplace. 

On 8 November 2017, the United States Department of State published its List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (RESAC).  There have been no changes since. 

In an unpublished restricted draft of prepared remarks by The Honorable John Bolton, Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor, on 1 November 2018 at Miami Dade College (MDC) in Miami, Florida, the text included “Further, today, the State Department added over two dozen additional entities owned or controlled by the Cuban military and intelligence services to the restricted list of entities with which financial transactions by U.S. persons are prohibited.”   

In the published text of the remarks by Ambassador Bolton, released by The White House in the late evening of 2 November 2018, the present tense in terms of publication of additions to the RESAC was replaced with the future tense: “In this respect, I believe that within days the administration will add over two dozen additional entities owned or controlled by the Cuban military and intelligence services to the restricted list of entities with which financial transactions by U.S. persons are prohibited. And I believe even more will come as well.  The Cuban military and intelligence agencies must not profit from the United States, its people, its travelers, or its businesses.” 

Changes to the RESAC have not been published on the Internet site of the United States Department of State (https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/cuba/cubarestrictedlist/275331.htm).  If the United States Department of State was not prepared to release an update to the RESAC, then Ambassador Bolton should not have included the reference in his remarks. 

Additionally, neither the prepared nor delivered text of Ambassador Bolton’s remarks was not released by The White House in advance; and were not released on 1 November 2018. 

During the event, Ambassador Bolton shared that “And I believe even more will come as well….  We're going to make sure that we put as much pressure on as we can.” 

Ambassador Bolton confirmed that the Trump Administration has discussed (using a term to create and maintain uncertainty and fear) with members of the United States Congress to permit the implementation of Title III of the Libertad Act of 1996 which would authorize lawsuits in United States Federal Courts for assets expropriated by the government of the Republic of Cuba from individuals who were not United States citizens at the time of expropriation.   

The 5,913 certified claimants (those who were United States citizens at the time of expropriation) oppose the implementation of Title III on the basis that the interests of United States citizens should not be subjugated to the interests of non-United States citizens; and that the certified claimants, whose expropriated assets represent the foundation for United States policies, regulations and laws impacting the Republic of Cuba should remain the primary focus of The White House.  The implementation of Title III has been suspended by the occupant of The White House every six months since 1996.  

While uncertainty can be an effective political tool, when a statement is made about the availability of material information that is critical to real-time decision-making by individuals and companies subject to United States jurisdiction, important for the material information to be available in real-time.   

Normally, when a text is subjected to a thorough multi-week or multi-day inter-agency review, particularly in advance of a high-profile address such as that of Ambassador Bolton, the three (3) primary departments: United States Department of State, United States Department of the Treasury and United States Department of Commerce have their respective notifications issued simultaneously and/or immediately following the high-profile address.  That did not happen on 1 November 2018 or thus far on 2 November 2018.  The event at MDC was in the planning process from at least 18 October 2018 and had been scheduled for 30 October 2018.   

When The Honorable Donald Trump, President of the United States, delivered remarks in Miami, Florida, on 16 June 2017, the United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Commerce and United States Department of State each published corresponding regulatory and policy changes on their respective Internet sites.  

A primary reason for the effectiveness of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury is the absence of predictability when publishing changes to the list of Specially Designated Nationals And Blocked Persons List (SDN). 

If the Trump Administration genuinely wanted to discourage individuals and companies subject to United States jurisdiction from interest towards the Republic of Cuba, it would instruct the United States Department of State to adopt the unpredictability of the OFAC.   

However, when a public statement is delivered, particularly by a senior official at The White House, the information should be immediately available.   

The United States Department of State should announce that changes to the RESAC may be published at any time and then add one or more every month. 

Doing so would then require constant monitoring of the RESAC; and that would require time and money to be allocated by interested parties.  The result would be exhaustion by some individuals and companies. 

OFAC is powerful and feared because it is unpredictable. 

The United States Department of State has become predictable which lessens its power. 

Thus far, for United States companies, the restraint shown through what the Trump Administration has chosen not to do, the bite, is an indication of the limits to which its bark need be feared.

LINK To Complete Text

DHS Reports 92 Students From Cuba Studied In U.S. In 2017; No Data Yet For 2018

From The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS): 

1 November 2018 

“Last week, ICE launched a series of data sets on ICE.gov about the international student population. Here’s a link to that data, https://www.ice.gov/sevis/whats-new#tab2, as well as a link to the news release announcing the data library, https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/sevp-publishes-2017-international-student-data. Per the data, in calendar year 2017, there were 92 international students from Cuba studying at U.S. schools.” 

From The DHS Report 

“North America 

North America saw the largest proportional decline of students coming into the United States to study.  Specifically, the decline in the number of Mexican (-1,120) and Canadian (-357) students accounted for the overall continental trend.  However, there were marginal gains in the number of students from some Latin American and Caribbean countries.  Honduras sent 155 more students, which is a 7 percent increase from last year, and Cuba more than doubled its international student population by sending 25 more students.”

Text of Remarks By National Security Advisor John Bolton In Florida

Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton Delivers Remarks on the Trump Administration’s Policies in Latin America

at

Miami Dade College in Miami, Florida

Thursday, November 1, 2018

NOTE: The White House initially refused to release the text of the delivered remarks by Ambassador Bolton. According to The National Security Council (NSC) on 1 November 2018, the text of the delivered remarks is expected to be released in the afternoon; they were published late in the evening of 2 November 2018. The White House did not provide a reason(s) for not releasing the delivered text in a timely manner.

LINK To Embargoed Text

LINK To Delivered Text

Permitting Other Than U.S. Certified Claimants- Think Texaco & Marriott, To Bring Actions To U.S. Courts Is Self-Defeating

Permitting Other Than U.S. Certified Claimants- Think Texaco & Marriott, To Bring Actions To U.S. Courts Is Self-Defeating

The soil upon which United States policy, regulations and laws sprouted since 1961 was created by the seizure of assets by the government of the Republic of Cuba.

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards have been certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC- https://www.justice.gov/fcsc) at the United States Department of Justice which are valued at US$1,902,202,284.95.

Of these claims, thirty (30) United States-based companies hold 56.85% of the total value. The USFCSC permitted interest to be accrued in the amount of 6% per annum; with the current value ranging from US$6 billion to US$9 billion.

Posts About Certified Claims & Trump Administration

31 August 2018

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/8/29/ouktsdg4gyrblq7zudchikvdd6abdo?rq=certified%20claims

June 14 2018

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/6/14/trump-administration-may-be-focusing-upon-certified-claims-unlike-obama-administration?rq=certified%20claims

17 July 2017

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/7/11/memo-from-nsc-to-potus-this-week-for-title-iii-suspension-capitulate-incapacitate-or-negotiate?rq=certified%20claims

29 May 2017

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/5/29/0t6ts1bv3by20ot3mi9bydvdqv3e86?rq=certified%20claims

1 January 2017

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/1/12/h2uudthnn6be8hfgxifqsrdo4aqpb0?rq=certified%20claims

1 December 2016

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/12/1/zigs56x0gme3a9rqg7aecx9vf2gqgk?rq=certified%20claims

13 September 2016

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/8/6/obama-administration-wont-seek-dismissal-of-civil-judgements-against-cuba-to-help-certified-claimants?rq=certified%20claims

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What U.S. Does Towards Venezuela & Cuba Impacts Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Ecuador

Can Venezuela be repaired without jeopardizing the financial benefits received by Cuba? 

Does Cuba benefit from a crisis-infused Venezuela which creates systemic commercial, economic and political issues for Colombia? 

The government of the Republic of Cuba has no incentive to provoke measures that would replace the Maduro Administration when those measures will result in economic and financial pain for the Republic of Cuba and require the Republic of Cuba to make commercial and economic changes that it does not want to make and has not had to make because other countries (Venezuela, China, Russia, among others) have provided resources to forestall those decisions.   

Since 2000, Venezuela has, beginning with the Chavez Administration and continuing through the Maduro Administration provided the Republic of Cuba with more than US$1 billion to upwards of US$4 billion annually in discounted oil (with multi-year repayment terms), import financing, loans, grants, and employment for thousands of Republic of Cuba nationals. 

The United States government believes that the Maduro Administration remains in place due in large measure to efforts by the government of the Republic of Cuba.   

The United States government believes the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba (FAR) and the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Cuba (MININT) have the capability to organize the replacement of the Maduro Administration which would accelerate a stabilization and subsequent repair to the commercial, economic and political infrastructure within Venezuela. 

The United States government believes that the exodus primarily to Colombia of more than 2 million citizens from Venezuela is a responsibility of the government of the Republic of Cuba.  During the last two years, the exodus has increased the population of Colombia and created employment stresses (decreasing wages and increasing unemployment) and increased crime.  

The government of the Republic of Cuba has a role in the peace process between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government of Colombia; some FARC members are attending educational workshops in the Republic of Cuba. 

Venezuela & Oil & Cuba: Decisions Have Consequences For The United States

Increasing oil production in the United States creates employment opportunities.  Consistent oil prices are good for United States consumers.  Lower oil prices are good for United States consumers.

 If oil prices become too low and remain too low, there is negative impact upon United States oil producers, particularly those involved in fracking. 

Higher oil prices can permit oil-producing countries to increase their imports.  However, oil prices need be below a level(s) that will decrease the consumption by importers. 

Higher oil prices can increase revenues of United States-based oil producers, but at the potential expense of United States-based oil consumers.  Oil producers prefer to export product when prices are higher rather than direct production within the United States. 

A challenge is how to seek a price level for oil that is low enough to maintain and, if necessary, stimulate economic activity- spending by consumers and companies where oil is a significant input cost, and high enough to retain exploration expenditures and fund purchases by oil-producing countries whose revenues would be strained to manage imports.  

Lower oil prices assist countries with limited or without domestic oil production including China and Republic of Cuba. 

Lower oil prices are challenging for oil-producing countries (OPEC-members, Russia, Iran, Venezuela among others).  Members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): Algeria, Angola, Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela.  OPEC Observers include Egypt, Mexico, Norway, Oman and Russia among other countries. 

Lower oil prices can stimulate a focus upon inefficiencies in oil-producing countries, particularly where governments lack transparency, accountability and democratic institutions.  Those governments will adapt to survive; they are not typically suicidal.  They may refocus on the non-oil-dependent sectors of their economies. 

Higher oil prices can insulate countries considered autocratic or not-ideal democracies to continue behavior deemed detrimental to the interests of democracies.  Venezuela will continue to assist the Republic of Cuba. 

Lower oil prices would lessen revenues for Venezuela, which would complicate the ability for Venezuela to repay loans to China and Russia among others.  Higher oil prices would accelerate the ability of Venezuela to repay China and Russia among others, but higher oil prices negatively impact the economy of China and the Republic of Cuba by increasing the cost of an important import.  

If China and Russia choose not to continue their support the Maduro Administration, Venezuela will need to make survival choices- and a primary one is the elimination financial support to the Republic of Cuba and to other Caribbean Sea-area countries.   

Russia and Saudi Arabia among other OPEC members may desire a hobbled Venezuela as the result is a lessening of oil supplies which assist to maintain higher oil prices. 

The Trump Administration must balance the impact of lessening oil production from Iran, which the Trump Administration supports, with a decrease in global oil production, which may result in higher oil prices.  There is value in an increase in countries contributing oil to the global marketplace- lower and consistent oil prices.   

However, if Venezuela increases its oil production, there could be downward pricing, which would benefit the United States- and allies and foes.  Increasing oil production by Venezuela could also stabilize the Maduro Administration- which would result in the Republic of Cuba continuing to receive financial support from Venezuela.

A stabilized Venezuela may also positively impact Colombia, which would likely see a lessening of migration from Venezuela.   

The impact of decisions by the United States government to influence commercial, economic and political outcomes in Venezuela and the Republic of Cuba cannot today be siloed from collateral impact towards allies and towards foes.

LINK to complete post text

Crowley Reports Approximately 10% Decline In Business With Cuba

Jacksonville, Florida-based Crowley Marine Corporation’s subsidiary Crowley Liner Services, reported that its “business” with the Republic of Cuba (Link To Shipping Page) thus far in 2018 had declined approximately 10% compared to 2017.

United States agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba have declined approximately 8.8% thus far in 2018 compared to 2017.

Crowley Liner Services transports products from the United States to the Republic of Cuba including agricultural commodities (poultry- which represents approximately 61% of all agricultural commodity/food product exports to Cuba thus far in 2018), food products, Obama initiative shipments, and shipments for the United States Embassy in Havana. Crowley Liner Services has also transported charcoal from the Republic of Cuba to the United States for sale by Hialeah, Florida-based Fogo Premium Hardwood.

About Crowley
”Jacksonville-based Crowley Holdings Inc., a holding company of the 126-year-old Crowley Maritime Corporation, is a privately held family and employee-owned company that provides marine solutions, energy and logistics services in domestic and international markets. Crowley operates under four business units: Crowley LOGISTICS, a singular ocean liner and logistics supply chain division; Crowley SHIPPING, which encompasses ownership, operations and management of vessels, including tankers, container ships, tugboats and barges; Crowley FUELS, a fuel transportation, distribution and sales division that also provides liquefied natural gas (LNG) and related services; and Crowley SOLUTIONS, which focuses on government services, including vessel management for government agencies, as well as engineering, project management, naval architecture through its subsidiary Jensen Maritime, and marine salvage and emergency response through its 50 percent ownership in Ardent Global. Additional information about Crowley, its subsidiaries and business units may be found at  www.crowley.com.”