Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Is Focus Of Two Libertad Act Lawsuits At DC Court Of Appeals: Exxon Mobil Versus Cimex S.A. (Cuba), Cimex S.A. (Panama), Union Cuba-Petroleo

EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION V. CORPORACION CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), CORPRACION CIMEX, S.A. (Panama), AND UNION CUBA-PETROLEO [1:19-cv-01277; Washington DC]. 31 October 2021 to Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia [21-7127 and 21-8010].

Steptoe & Johnson (plaintiff)
CrossCastle, PLLC (plaintiff)
Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, P.C. (defendant)

Link To Libertad Act Title III Lawsuit Filing Statistics

Case 21-7127

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES TO BE PRESENTED ON APPEAL: Corporación CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) (“CIMEX (Cuba)”) will present the following issues in the present appeal: 1. Whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s expropriation exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3), alone controls Plaintiff’s action, so that its requirements must be satisfied for there to be subject matter and personal jurisdiction, or whether subject matter and personal jurisdiction may alternatively be established under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s commercial activity exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2); 2. Whether the requirements of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s “direct effect” prong of the commercial activity exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), have been satisfied as to CIMEX (Cuba).

Defendant Corporacion Cimex, S.A. (Cuba’s) Notice Of Appeal (10/31/21)
Certificate As To Parties, Rulings, And Related Cases (11/30/21)
Statement Of The Issues To Be Presented On Appeal (11/30/21)

Underlying Decisions From Which Appeal Arises (11/30/21)
Memorandum Opinion And Order (11/23/21)
Civil Docket For Case (11/31/21)

Case 21-8010 

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW: Whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s expropriation exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3), alone controls Plaintiff’s statutory action for “trafficking” in “confiscated” property, so that its requirements must be satisfied for there to be subject-matter jurisdiction, or whether subject-matter jurisdiction may alternatively be established under the commercial activity exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).

Petitioners Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Panama) And Unión Cuba-Petróleo’s Petition For Permission To Appeal Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. § 1292(B) (12/03/21) 

Plaintiff Exxon Mobil Corporation’s Response To Petitioners’ Petition For Permission To Appeal Pursuant To 28 U.S.C.§ 1292(B) & Conditional Cross-Petition To Appeal Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. § 1292(B) (12/10/21) 

Petitioners/Cross-Respondents Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Panama) And Unión Cuba-Petróleo’s Response To Conditional Cross-Petition And Reply (12/16/21)

Why Did ING Bank Refuse To Transfer Funds Connected To Cuba? There Were 619 Million Reasons.

Prensa Latina News Agency
Havana, Republic of Cuba
19 January 2022

London, Jan 19 (Prensa Latina) The ING Dutch bank [Amsterdam, The Netherlands-based ING Groep N.V.; 2021 assets US$1.1 Trillion] blocked donations to a Progressive International delegation that will travel to Havana to support free access to Covid-19 vaccines promoted by Cuban, it was reported here today.  

By: Ana Luisa Brown  

In a communique sent to Prensa Latina on Wednesday, the organization that groups left-wing activists from all over the world denounced that the multinational banking institution based in the Netherlands has joined the economic, financial and commercial blockade maintained by the United States against the Caribbean island for 60 years. The text adds that the decision taken by ING shows the extraterritorial scope of the unilateral measure imposed by Washington, which seeks, it said, not only to asphyxiate Cuban, but also to hinder international solidarity with that country.  After branding the decision of the Dutch bank as scandalous, the organization recalled that while European countries administer booster doses, the majority of the inhabitants of the poorest nations on the planet have not even received an injection against the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus.  In the face of this vaccine blockade, Cuba emerges as a driving force of internationalism with its promise to share its vaccines with the world, he added.  Progressive International launched weeks ago a fundraising campaign to finance the trip to Havana of a delegation that will organize a special briefing on the Caribbean island’s efforts to produce its own anti-Covid-19 vaccines, and its willingness to share them with the world.  Despite the blocking of donations by ING Bank, a spokesperson for the organization told Prensa Latina that plans to hold the meeting in the Cuban capital remain unchanged.  The event scheduled for January 25, which is part of the Union for Vaccine Internationalism promoted by Progressive International, will be attended by Cuban scientists, ministers and public health officials. pgh/abo/mem/nm 

Correspondence From ING To Progressive International 

Onderwerp
Betalingsopdracht Leeuwarden, 18 januari 2022
Geachte heerKenmerk
Wij hebben uw opdracht ontvangen om van uw Betaalrekening met over te maken naar Progressive International (Services) Ltd in Duitsland onder vermelding van: In verband met ons beleid om geen zaken te doen of te faciliteren met een aantal nader omschreven landen en gesanctioneerde partijen, kunnen we deze transactie niet uitvoeren. In deze brief leest u meer hierover.
Ons beleid
ING evalueert periodiek haar dienstverlening vanuit econornisch, strategisch en risico-perspectief. Mede op basis van deze evaluatie is het beleid gebaseerd. Dit brengt met zich mee <lat ING om zakelijke redenen geen klantrelaties wenst aan te gaan of te continueren en ook geen transacties wenst te faciliteren met directe of indirecte betrokkenheid van bepaalde landen, personen of bedrijven.
Deze beslissing is van invloed op:
de landen: Cuba, Iran, Noord-Korea, Sudan, Syrie en de Krirn regio in Oekrai:ne;
door de overheid gecontroleerde banken en bedrijven uit Wit-Rusland;
overige (inter)nationaal gesanctioneerde personen/entiteiten.
Om bovengenoemde redenen kunnen wij de opdracht niet uitvoeren.
Het transactiebedrag wordt zo spoedig mogelijk, inclusief de eventueel in rekening gebrachte kosten, naar uw Betaalrekening teruggeboekt.
Deze brief sturen we zowel per post als per mail naar
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Met vriendelijke groet, KYC Specials

Link To Document 

Google Translate (with redactions from original document) 

ING
Tesselschadestraat 1, 8913 HA Leeuwarden
Postbus 99960, 8900 GA Leeuwarden
ING Bank N.V. statutair gevestigd te Amsterdam Handelsregister nr. 33031431 Amsterdam
Subject Payment order Leeuwarden, January 18, 2022
Dear Sir: We have been instructed to transfer from your Payment Account to Progressive International (Services) Ltd in Germany stating:
In connection with our policy of not doing or facilitating business with some specified countries and sanctioned parties, we do not execute this transaction. You can read more about this in this letter.
Our Policy
ING periodically evaluates its services from an economic, strategic and risk perspective. The policy is based partly on this evaluation. This implies that ING does not wish to enter into or continue customer relationships for business reasons, nor does it wish to facilitate transactions with direct or indirect involvement of certain countries, persons or companies.
This decision affects: - the countries: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Syria and the Krirn region in Ukraine; - government-controlled banks and companies from Belarus; - other (inter)nationally sanctioned persons/entities. For the above reasons, we cannot carry out the order. The transaction amount will be refunded to your Payment Account as soon as possible, including any costs charged.
We will send this letter both by post and by e-mail to
More information
Do you have any questions regarding this letter? Then you can reach us on working days from 08.30 to 17.00 on telephone number 058 295 2854.

ING Bank N.V.
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
October 2020
Link: ING Financial Economic Crime Statement- October 2020

United States Department of the Treasury
Washington DC
12 June 2012

U.S. Treasury Department Announces $619 Million Settlement with ING Bank, N.V.
Largest-Ever Settlement Reached in a Sanctions Case
Link: https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/tg1612.aspx 

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
1 April 2021

Excerpts: 

The shift also corresponded with a U.S. investigation into the Dutch bank ING, which had a 50% stake in a bank in Curacao called Netherlands Caribbean Bank, or NCB. The bank was incorporated as a joint venture in 1993, and Acemex was one of two Cuban partners in it. 

In July 2006, OFAC designated the Curacao-based bank to the Specially Designated Nationals list, another one of the mechanisms of U.S. blacklisting, because of its substantial Cuban ownership. It did not blacklist Acemex. The Caribbean bank was shut down, but ING ultimately acknowledged in 2012 that it moved more than $2 billion through the United States on behalf of Cuba and Iran — some of it through Netherlands Caribbean Bank. In a Treasury Department settlement ING agreed to forfeit $619 million.

This screenshot shows part of a confidential State Department memo sent from The Hague in December 2007 discussing an investigation into the Dutch bank ING and its operations in and with Cuba. The document lists Acemex Management Company Limited, by then domiciled in tiny Liechtenstein, as co-owner of a bank in the former Dutch colony of Curaçao. 

The Wall Street Journal
New York, New York
12 June 2012

ING Fined a Record Amount
Penalty of $619 Million Tied to Cuba, Iran for Violating U.S. Economic Sanctions

By Reed Albergotti  

ING Bank has agreed to pay a record penalty of $619 million for illegally moving billions of dollars through the U.S. banking system on behalf of Cuban and Iranian clients and threatening to fire employees if they failed to conceal the origin of the money. 

The U.S. prohibits certain countries and entities from accessing the U.S. banking system through sanctions enforced by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control. Banks in Manhattan, which process most of the world's U.S. dollar payments, use "filters" to prevent terrorists, money launderers and other criminals from gaining access. 

But the bank, a unit of ING Groep NV, one of the Netherlands largest banks, used a system to "strip," or delete, references to Cuba and Iran and, through more than 20,000 separate transactions, successfully moved more than $2 billion through the U.S. financial system. It is the fourth major bank to settle with New York and U.S. authorities in recent years over such activities. 

In 2009, Switzerland's Credit Suisse Group AG agreed to pay $536 million and the U.K.'s Lloyds Banking Group PLC agreed to pay $350 million to settle similar allegations with New York and U.S. authorities. The U.K.'s Barclays PLC settled allegations in 2010, agreeing to pay $298 million. ING's fine is the largest ever for these types of violations. 

ING profited by courting business from sanctioned entities like Iran and Cuba, according to court documents filed on Tuesday. Its clients in Cuba included a range of people, from individuals who wanted to cash U.S. travelers checks to government ministries. It also engaged in transactions with Iran's central bank and state-owned National Iranian Oil Co. 

Cyrus Vance Jr., the Manhattan district attorney, who is investigating other banks for possible similar violations, said in an interview Tuesday that "stripping" cases are about more than monetary damages. "They ensure that rogue regimes and human-rights abusers are isolated and feel economic pressure from sanctions," he said. 

Mr. Vance and the Justice Department noted that ING devoted significant resources to conducting an internal probe starting in 2006 and cooperating with the government. U.S. authorities said they would drop charges against the bank after 18 months, provided ING agrees to certain overhauls and cooperates with the government. 

From the early 1990s until 2007, employees processed these transactions with the approval and encouragement of senior corporate managers and legal and compliance departments, the court documents said. 

On several occasions, ING employees raised concerns about the practice, but were rebuffed by executives in ING's compliance department, the documents said. In 2003, an employee in London in an email implied that the "stripping" records might be problematic and pointed to a global "climate of anti-money-laundering and [Office of Foreign Assets Control] sanctions," the documents said. The concerns were rebuffed, according to court documents. 

In 2004, after receiving an email from another person in ING's London offices, inquiring about the bank's practice of covering up its dealings with Iran and Cuba, a legal department employee responded: "We have been dealing with Cuba (and ways around clearing through Manhattan) for a lot of years now and I'm pretty sure that we know what we are doing in avoiding any fines," according to court documents.  The court documents didn't name the employees involved in the email exchanges. 

The Dutch bank on Tuesday acknowledged responsibility for its conduct and that of its employees as part of the deferred prosecution agreement with the Manhattan district attorney's office and the Justice Department. At least three separate investigations into ING were under way by U.S. and New York authorities for the past two years. 

Jan Hommen, CEO of ING Groep, said in a statement: "The violations that took place until 2007 are serious and unacceptable. The facts as compiled in the statement of the Department of Justice describe a very different ING than the company we're all working so hard for today." 

To get around Cuban sanctions, ING often worked with a subsidiary, the Netherlands Caribbean Bank, a joint venture with a shipping company owned by the Cuban government, according to the court documents. ING's branch in Curaçao accepted American currency from the Cuban subsidiary and then "stripped" it of any connection to the communist nation so the money could flow through U.S. financial institutions. 

In emails excerpted in the court documents, ING executives talked of firing employees who failed to strip out records of the bank's dealings with sanctioned entities and at one point actually posted a how-to guide to the practice of stripping on a company intranet. In one email, an attorney in ING Groep's legal department described the widespread practice of stripping within the company as ING's "little white lie." 

The system by which ING circumvented U.S. sanctions also involved forming shell companies and rerouting payments through multiple banks so they couldn't be traced back to their origins in Cuba and Iran. According to court documents, this practice was called "handighei," which roughly translates as "tricky business." 

ING said it took a provision of €370 million ($462 million) in the first quarter of the year to cover the penalties, set up a team to prevent and detect money laundering, closed its representative office in Cuba in 2007, and ended relationships with sanctioned entities.

Cuba Updates Status Of Micro, Small & Medium-Sized Enterprises

Prensa Latina News Agency
Havana, Republic of Cuba
19 January 2022

Havana, Jan 19 (Prensa Latina) Cuba has set up 1,000 micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), of 1,422 private companies and 27 state-owned enterprises approved throughout the country as a result of a favorable process, authorized sources stated.

By: Ileana Ferrer Fonte

Of that total, 885 are registered in the commercial registry, while a considerable number of them are taking the necessary steps to be included in the mechanism implemented in all territories, with a decisive participation of the Ministry of Justice, panelists speaking at the Cuban roundtable TV program explained this Tuesday.

It is about the legal constitution of these new forms of management, in which the mercantile registry and the network of companies of Legal Consultancy and Collective Law Firms take part, Olga Lidia Perez, general director of Notary’s Offices and Public Registries, highlighted.

Upon assessing the development of the establishment of those entities, to which 22 non-agricultural cooperatives have been added, the official highlighted the participation of the legal sector, with an important advisory role, in addition to train notaries in commercial law to meet the needs of the new actors.

About the issue, Deputy Minister of Economy and Planning Johana Odriozola described the number of MSMEs as significant, after four months of being authorized its implementation throughout the country, and led by Havana, with 594, followed by Granma, with 157.

The deputy minister said that the procedure does not end with the setting up of MSMEs, but it covers their coherent inclusion in the economy and how they can contribute to the country’s economic and social growth.

"Ninth Summit of the Americas" Scheduled For 6 June 2022 To 10 June 2022 In Los Angeles, California. Cuba And Venezuela Should Be Invited- And Both Countries Should Participate.

The White House
Washington DC
18 January 2022

President Biden Announces Host City for Ninth Summit of the Americas

The vital national interests of the United States are inextricably bound to the fortunes of our closest neighbors in the Americas. To that end, the ability of our democracies to close the gap between what we promise and what we deliver depends in no small part on what we do, together, to make it better.

The United States will host the Ninth Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles, California in June 2022 with a focus on “Building a Sustainable, Resilient, and Equitable Future” for our hemisphere. [6 June 2022 to 10 June 2022 with the Los Angeles Convention Center the primary venue.]

The Summit of the Americas is the only hemisphere-wide convening of leaders from the countries of North, South, and Central America and the Caribbean. U.S. leadership in the Summit process underscores our deep and historical commitment to the people of the Western Hemisphere as well as our commitment to realizing the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative. Working with the city of Los Angeles, Mayor of Los Angeles Eric Garcetti, and Governor of California Gavin Newsom, the United States looks forward to convening leaders and stakeholders across the hemisphere to advance our shared commitment to economic prosperity, security, human rights, and dignity.

The White House
Washington DC
20 January 2022

Background Press Call By Senior Administration Officials On the Summit of the Americas

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Great. Thank you, [senior administration official]. And Happy New Year, everybody. I am very excited to talk with you today now that we have announced the city and dates for the Summit of the Americas -- the ninth Summit of the Americas -- which will be June 6th through 10th in Los Angeles, California. So with that said, look, the summit, I'll say, will focus on -- our theme for the summit is: “Building a Sustainable, Resilient, and Equitable Future.” As you know, the Summit of the Americas is the only convening that brings together all the leaders of the Western Hemisphere. Also making sure that for a region that is so dependent on fossil fuels, to ensure that we are mobilizing capital to help facilitate what is a global energy transition away from fossil fuels and toward the energies of the future. Making sure that the hemisphere does not get left behind is something that we're very focused on. Of course, issues of climate finance in areas like the Caribbean, Small Island Development States that are impacted by climate change.

And then lastly, you know, obviously the situation in Cuba -- the direction that the President has been to be tough on the regime, but soft on the Cuban people. And that approach has led us to -- after the July 11th protests -- to really raise the profile of those individuals that have been responsible for the for the brutal crackdown. We've imposed individual sanctions on Cuba Security Force officials with the Canadian, UK, and EU support and, at the same time, prioritized the delivery of food, medicine, and humanitarian supplies to the Cuban people. And then expanded our support for tools to avoid censorship so that Cubans can communicate to from and among each other. As they demand greater freedoms.

Question- A couple of questions, if I may. The first one is: Is the White House preparing a special announcement, particularly on immigration, during the summit? Should we expect anything -- any announcement particularly? Maybe you cannot share the announcement today, obviously, but at least the topics that you are interested in? And second question: Cuba participated for the first time in this Summit of the Americas in the summit in Panama. It was not invited in Peru’s. But I was wondering if the United States is likely to invite the Cuban regime to the summit. And also, what's going to happen with Nicaragua and Venezuela?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So, the second question is easier to answer. We have not yet made decisions on what the invitation list will look like. And we want to have that conversation with the countries of the region. I think that -- I think the operating assumption is that we look forward to welcoming the democratically elected leaders of the Organization of American States to the summit. So, you know, but I think we'll make more formal announcements on the invitations as we get closer to the summit date.

Question- Hello. Thank you for doing this. I’d like to know specifically if you expect Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela to participate in the summit.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you for the question. So, look, on Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela -- so, again, we don't have like a formal position to announce, but I'll just restate what I said to Gustau, which is: We look forward to welcoming the democratically-elected leaders of the Western Hemisphere, given just this affirmation of democratic values and the need to have democracies debate some of these issues. But, again, we, as the host, have a lot of -- I think, decide, ultimately, who will be invited. But we're going to consult with the countries of the Organization of American States as the Secretary for the summit. And we'll announce something I think as we -- as we put together, I think, just the agenda and the invitations, et cetera. We'll have announcements in the future.

Icelandair Wins DOT Authorization For 170 Round-Trip Charter Flights From Miami, Orlando, And Houston To Havana. Despite Objections From Three Airlines And Airline Pilots Association.

United States Department of Transportation
Washington DC
13 January 2022

XX Allocation of charters from the 2021/2022 U.S.-Havana public charter pool established in Order 2020-5-7, as follows:  

Icelandair requests allocation of 170 round-trip charter flights to be operated between Miami (136 flights), Orlando (17 flights), and Houston (17 flights), on the one hand, and Havana, on the other hand, on behalf of the public charter operator Anmart Superior Travel, LLC, d/b/a Anmart Air, LLC (Anmart Air). Icelandair proposes to operate during the period of February 1, 2022, through May 31, 2022.  

XX Statements of authorization under 14 C.F.R. Part 212 to provide the round-trip charters described above (undocketed applications # 2021-2779, 2021-2780, and 2021-2781).  

D I S P O S I T I O N  

XX Granted, application of Icelandair for allocation of 170 round-trip charter flights from the 2021/2022 U.S.-Havana public charter pool (see Discussion below)

XX Granted, applications of Icelandair for statements of authorization under 14 C.F.R. Part 212 (see attachments). 

LINK To USDOT DECISION 

Recent Analyses 

Icelandair Application To Provide U.S.-Cuba Charter Flights Has Increasing Opposition- From U.S. Charter Operators.  January 02, 2022 

3,545 Miles From Its Headquarters, Icelandair Seeks To Operate Orlando-Havana Charter Flights Using 182-Passenger B757-223 Aircraft. Icelandair Services MCO-KEF Market.  October 20, 2021

Related Article

ch-aviation
Stansstad, Switzerland
17 January 2022

The US Department of Transportation has granted Icelandair (FI, Reykjavik Keflavik) all of its requested charter rights for services between the US and Havana Int'l despite considerable opposition from American carriers active in the same market. 

The regulator allocated 170 round-trip charter rights to the Icelandic carrier, comprising 136 flights from Miami Int'l and 17 each from Orlando Int'l and Houston Intc'l, between February 1 and May 31, 2022. In a separate decision, the DOT also authorised Icelandair to operate four round-trip flights from Orlando to Havana between January 11-31, 2022. All flights will be operated on behalf of tour operator Anmart Air. 

iAero Airways, GLOBALX, and World Atlantic Airlines, joined by the US Air Line Pilots' Association (ALPA), collectively objected to Icelandair's application in late 2021. However, the DOT found no basis for their arguments, roundly rejecting all of them and siding fully with the Icelandic carrier. 

In particular, the DOT agreed with Icelandair in rejecting allegations of the lack of reciprocity. The regulator underlined that it was not aware of any seventh-freedom request by US operators that had been denied by the Icelandic authorities. It also dismissed claims of Icelandair's alleged "undue reliance" on the proposed seventh-freedom operations. The DOT also noted that while the number of flights seemed high based on 2020 traffic figures, it was solely because Icelandair - like most other carriers - operated a skeleton network to the US that year. Finally, the DOT pointed out that even though the US-Havana market is capped at 3,600 round-trip flights per year, there are still unallocated frequencies left that US carriers are free to apply for if they can secure charter clients.

Code Name: Turkey. At Hearing, Havana Docks Corp 332 Pages: Four Cruise Lines Knew They Were Wrong. Intervention From President Trump. Collectively Grossed US$1.1 Billion; Paid Cuba US$138 Million.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Excerpts From Plaintiff Filings:

MR. [Frank] DEL RIO [President & CEO Of Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings]: “Until the – my perspective is -- and for my three brands -- until Congress officially repeals Helms-Burton, even if OFAC were to -- even if you can go backdoor through OFAC, it wouldn't be the proper thing to do, and I don't think you can do it on a sustained basis. Maybe you can do 50 folks at a time, but to run a business, you have to bring thousands of people at a time on an ongoing basis. I don't think that backdoor or that loophole, if you will, would work on a sustained basis.”

Venable LLP To Cruise Lines International Association- Attorney Client Privileged/Attorney Work Product/Privileged And Confidential (2/20/2019): “Since the Act took effect, OFAC's authorizations for travel and carrier services to and from Cuba have expanded. However, we anticipate that a court could interpret the Travel Exception narrowly, sucl1 that only persons engaged in activity that was otherwise authorized under U.S.”

PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF FILING SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PRESENTATIONS (1/14/22)

Exhibit 1
Exhibit 2
Exhibit 3
Exhibit 4
Exhibit 5
Exhibit 6
Exhibit 7
Exhibit 8
Exhibit 9
Exhibit 10
Exhibit 11
Exhibit 12

Link: Notice Of Filing Carnival Corporation’s Individual Summary Judgment Motion Presentation (1/19/22)

Link: Four Cruise Lines Use 77-Page Presentation To Refute Argument That They "Trafficked" When Using Port In Havana. They Had No Choice; Every Decision Legal. January 14, 2022

Link: Libertad Act Title III Lawsuit Filing Statistics

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [1:19-cv-23591; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23590; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. MSC CRUISES SA CO, AND MSC CRUISES (USA) INC. [1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES [1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

Royal Caribbean Re-Sold Cuba "Tourist Visas" At 50% Mark-Up To Its Cruise Passengers On 341 Voyages That Included Cuba. Did Other Three Defendant Cruise Lines? Did Cuba Know? Approve?

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23590; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

Link: PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF FILING SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PRESENTATIONS (1/14/22)
Link: Exhibit 10 (1/14/22)
Link: Libertad Act Title III Lawsuit Filing Statistics

LINK: Four Cruise Lines Use 77-Page Presentation To Refute Argument That They "Trafficked" When Using Port In Havana. They Had No Choice; Every Decision Legal. January 14, 2022

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [1:19-cv-23591; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. MSC CRUISES SA CO, AND MSC CRUISES (USA) INC. [1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES [1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

Four Cruise Lines Use 77-Page Presentation To Refute Argument That They "Trafficked" When Using Port In Havana. They Had No Choice; Every Decision Legal.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. CARNIVAL CORPORATION, Defendant.
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. MSC CRUISES SA, MSC CRUISES SA CO, and MSC CRUISES (USA) INC., Defendants.
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., Defendant.
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD., Defendant.

Notice Of Filing Carnival Corporation’s Individual Summary Judgment Motion Presentation (1/19/22)

Notice Of Filing Defendants’ Omnibus Summary Judgment Motion Presentation (1/13/22)
Defendants’ Omnibus Summary Judgement Motion (1/13/22)

Order Amending Scheduling Order And Certain Pretrial Deadlines (1/14/22)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [1:19-cv-23591; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23590; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. MSC CRUISES SA CO, AND MSC CRUISES (USA) INC. [1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES [1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

How Much Might Russia Spend To Return To Cuba? How Many Personnel? Annual Economic Impact And Fee To Cuba.

RT (286 January 2022): Claims that Moscow could soon send troops and hardware to Cuba, barely 100 miles off the US coast, should be ruled out because such a move would destroy the island nation’s hopes of normalizing relations with Washington, former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev has warned. Speaking with journalists on Thursday, Medvedev, who held his country’s top job between 2008 and 2012 and is now Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, said that the two Latin American countries are close partners of Moscow, but are also sovereign nations who are “trying to escape from isolation and reestablish normal relations with the US to some extent.” “We can’t deploy anything there,” he went on. “Even if, as is the case in Cuba, this is only because of their geopolitical position, their own national interests.” The ex-leader argued that there shouldn’t even be discussion of such a plan, because it would “provoke tension in the world.” In reference to ongoing disputes surrounding Ukraine, where Western leaders have accused Russia of planning an invasion, Medvedev insisted that his country does not want war, and that security negotiations are the only way to de-escalate tensions between Russia and NATO, the US-led military bloc. Earlier this month, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, in an interview with RTVI, said that he would not rule out the possibility of building military infrastructure in Cuba or Venezuela, and that it would depend on “the actions of our American colleagues.” US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan responded, noting that Russian military activity in Latin America had not been a point of discussion at recent security talks, but said that the US would act “decisively” if it did happen. On Wednesday, Moscow’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reported that President Vladimir Putin had spoken with the leaders of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, and had agreed to step up collaboration with them in a range of areas, including military matters. On Thursday, Lavrov expressed disappointment concerning Washington’s response to Russia’s recent security proposals, saying that the US had refused to make concessions concerning the expansion of NATO in eastern Europe. “The main issue is our clear position on the unacceptability of further NATO expansion to the east and the deployment of highly destructive weapons that could threaten the territory of the Russian Federation,” the diplomat explained.

MEXICO CITY (UrduPoint News / Sputnik - 28th January, 2022) The deployment of Russian military infrastructure in Cuba is a delicate issue and cannot be announced in advance, Russian Ambassador to Cuba Andrey Guskov has said in an interview with Sputnik. "Regarding the possibility of deploying Russian military infrastructure in Cuba, given the sensitivity of this topic, it cannot be announced in advance," the diplomat said, adding that Cuban laws do not strictly prohibit the deployment of foreign military infrastructure on its soil.

RT (26 January 2022): Russian President Vladimir Putin has agreed with the leaders of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua to develop partnerships in a range of areas, including stepping up military collaboration, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has announced. Speaking on Wednesday in an appearance in front of the Duma – Russia’s parliament – Lavrov reported that Putin had talked recently with the leaders of the three Central American countries, and that they had agreed to work together to strengthen their strategic cooperation. “President Putin held recent telephone conversations with his colleagues from these three governments, with whom we are very close and friendly, and they agreed to look at further ways to deepen our strategic partnership in all areas, with no exceptions,” Lavrov stated. He noted that Russia already has close relations with these countries in many spheres, “including military and military-technical.” Asked about the prospects of increased military cooperation with the three countries, Lavrov answered, “for the immediate future, we are counting on regular meetings of the corresponding committees.”

Office of the President
Moscow, Russia
24 January 2022

"Telephone conversation with President of Cuba Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez
Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with President of the Republic of Cuba Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez. The leaders had an in-depth exchange of opinions on bilateral cooperation in trade, the economy and investment. The President of Cuba thanked Russia for the humanitarian aid supplied to the republic, including in the context of countering COVID-19. The presidents discussed further coordination of Russia’s and Cuba’s actions in the international arena in line with the principles of strategic partnership and the traditions of friendship and mutual understanding. Vladimir Putin and Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening bilateral relations and agreed to intensify contacts at different levels."

13 January 2022

From a senior-level official of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation as to an initially projected U.S. Dollar value and fixed personnel to deliver a “robust” presence to the Republic of Cuba for the operational capabilities of fixed wing aircraft, drones, vessels, submarines, search & rescue, and personnel: 

1) Upgrades (radar, runways, facilities, fuel depots, roadways, etc.) and uses of military airports and civilian airports (those for dual use) US$75 million.  

2) Upgrades (dredging, facilities, fuel depots, etc.) and uses of ports US$75 million.  

3) Upgrades and uses of housing for personnel US$25 million.  Personnel estimate 2,500 combined civilian and military.  

4) Upgrades to communications infrastructure US$100 million.  

5) Upgrades and uses of electrical grid US$20 million for airports and ports and facilities.  

6) Annual fee to government of Republic of Cuba: US$275 million.  

7) Annualized economic impact US$100 million.

Venezuela Increasing Exports To Cuba Of Fuels And Food Products; In 2021, Total Retail Value Of Fuels Approximately US$2.8 Billion. Unknown If Cuba Paid.

Reuters
London, United Kingdom
13 January 2022

Venezuela has ramped up shipments of gasoline and food to Cuba since November, providing key supplies to one of President Nicolas Maduro's closest allies, according to documents from Venezuelan state-run oil company PDVSA and Refinitiv Eikon tanker tracking data.

From late November through early January, PDVSA shipped at least three cargoes carrying about 197,000 barrels of gasoline, along with other refined products to Cuba's Nuevitas, Matanzas and Havana ports, the documents and data showed. The cargoes arrived at the Caribbean nation's ports aboard the Cuban-flagged tankers Maria Cristina and Alicia. PDVSA, Venezuela's oil ministry and Cuba's foreign ministry did not reply to requests for comment.

Venezuela had minimized gasoline exports to Cuba since early 2020 as its domestic production dwindled due to the poor condition of PDVSA's refineries. Fuel shortages in the OPEC nation have left long lines of consumers waiting for gasoline and diesel at stations.

Both Venezuela and Cuba are under U.S. sanctions, including on oil supply and shipping between the nations, for what Washington says are their repressive policies. The left-leaning governments in Caracas and Havana blame the sanctions for worsening humanitarian conditions in their countries and accuse the United States of trying to topple them.

The shipments came as gasoline production rebounded in Venezuela. The South American country from mid-2020 to mid-2021 had been forced to turn to Iran for imported gasoline to complement its domestic output. But, thanks in part to supplies of refinery parts from Iran that allowed PDVSA to undertake long-delayed maintenance work and repairs, Venezuela has increased its output of gasoline blendstock and components to almost 160,000 barrels per day (bpd) this year, according to sources.

Venezuela's overall oil supply to Cuba last year fell to 56,300 bpd of crude and refined products and some 73,000 metric tonnes of petroleum coke, from 76,600 bpd and 100,000 metric tonnes respectively the previous year, according to an analysis of PDVSA's export reports and tanker tracking data.

Since December, Venezuela also has exported 222 containers and hundreds of bags of food on ships Icoa Uru and Melba, which discharged at Cuba's Mariel and Santiago ports, the documents and data showed. The recent cargoes followed humanitarian deliveries of food and medical equipment by Venezuela and Mexico, which were confirmed in August by Cuban authorities. Russia and China also provided assistance to the island last year amid the coronavirus pandemic.

Venezuela's opposition has long criticized the government's decision to supply fuel to Cuba amid widespread shortages at home. The lack of enough output in 2018 led PDVSA to buy nearly $440 million worth of foreign oil and ship it to Cuba on friendly credit terms, and often at a loss, a Reuters investigation found.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oil-imports-exclusive/exclusive-as-venezuelans-suffer-maduro-buys-foreign-oil-to-subsidize-cuba-idUSKCN1IG1TO.

Cuba, short on fuel and food supplies for decades, was in particularly dire straits last year, as the pandemic struck the island nation mid-year, alongside widespread protests and shortages of energy and basic supplies. Maduro, who has visited Cuba twice in recent months, has said U.S. sanctions on Venezuela and any attempts to block its trade with countries including Cuba are illegal. Venezuelan diesel provision to Cuba was among the arguments used by the United States to suspend in 2020 the authorizations it had extended for oil-for-fuel swaps, allowing PDVSA to allocate crude exports while importing diesel. The U.S. Department of Treasury, in charge of sanction enforcement, declined to comment.

Japan Delivering Buses To Cuba Through "Non-Reimbursable Financial Aid" While Cuba Continues To Owe Japan Approximately US$1 billion

Prensa Latina News Agency
Havana, Republic Of Cuba
13 January 2022

Cuba thanked the Government of Japan for a donation of 84 buses as part of the Non-Reimbursable Financial Aid, through the Procurement Agency, Japan International Cooperation System JICS). 

By Juan M. Garcia 

Cuban Ambassador in Tokyo Miguel A. Ramirez explained on his Twitter account and a video on YouTube that the buses left Colombia, where they were assembled, on January 9 and must arrive in eastern Cuba on Thursday.  Ramirez also recognized the efficient management of the companies Itochu Corporation, Isuzu Motors and Busscar de Colombia.  He expressed his gratitude for the countless expressions of solidarity from the Japanese government with Cuba, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic.  According to Havana’s General Directorate of Provincial Transportation, these buses will be used to reinforce transportation in the Cuban capital. The buses are part of a development project for the city and the improvement of passenger movement, for which they will be operated by the Guanabo and Bahia bus terminals, and will be start providing services after the technical and quality reviews have been carried out by Cuban authorities. 

LINKS To Japan-Related Posts: 

President Biden Rejects BIS License Application To Export Electric Vehicles/Chargers To Cuba's Self-Employed, MSME's. Reversal Of "General Policy Of Approval." President Trump Authorized EV Exports.  December 20, 2021 

Cuba Reported In New Agreement With Paris Club "Group Of Creditors Of Cuba" To Restructure Defaulted Payment Terms. Previously Forgave 75% Of Debt. Officials Expect Further Defaults.  October 21, 2021 

U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken And Japan Foreign Minister Motegi Discussed Cuba. Why Did U.S. Department Of State Not Mention It?  July 27, 2021 

Paris Club Offers Cuba One-Year Moratorium; Cuba Wants Two-Years And Much More.  June 20, 2020 

Mitsubishi Fuso Truck and Bus Corporation Sells 96 Trucks To Cupet In Cuba.  April 18, 2020 

JICA Opens Office; Japan Continues Focus Upon Cuba.  March 11, 2018 

Cuba Continues To Rely On Donated Garbage Trucks.  January 20, 2019 

Russia & China Providing Substantial (And Long-Term) Financing For Vehicle Purchases.  January 23, 2018 

Paris Club Members Reach Debt Repayment Agreement With Cuba.  December 12, 2015

Joint Hearing On 12 January 2022, Delayed From December 2021, Consequential For Libertad Act Lawsuits. Expected Disclosure Of Previously Sealed Documents. Eight Law Firms, Dozens Of Attorneys.

NOTE: ORDER RESETTING HEARING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the parties’ Joint Notice Regarding December 14th Hearing. See, e.g., Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-cv-21724, ECF No. [422]. Upon review, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the pending Motions for Summary Judgment are reset for hearing on Wednesday, January 12, 2022, at 9:30 a.m., before the undersigned in Courtroom 10-2, 400 North Miami Avenue, Miami, Florida 33128. The Court will allocate the morning and afternoon for the hearing. LINK To Order

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. CARNIVAL CORPORATION, Defendant.
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. MSC CRUISES SA, MSC CRUISES SA CO, and MSC CRUISES (USA) INC., Defendants.
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., Defendant.
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD., Defendant.

ORDER SETTING HEARING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the parties’ Joint Request for Oral Argument on Motions for Summary Judgment. See Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-cv-21724, ECF No. [376]; Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises, SA, et al., No. 19-cv-23588, ECF No. [260]; Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 19-cv-23590, ECF No. [181]; and Havana Docks Corp. v Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., No. 19-cv-23591, ECF No. [283], (collectively, the “Motions”). Upon review of the Motions, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motions are GRANTED, and the pending Motions for Summary Judgment are set for hearing on Tuesday, December 14, 2021 at 9:30 a.m. before the undersigned in Courtroom 10-2, 400 North Miami Avenue, Miami, Florida 33128. The Court recognizes that we continue to be in the midst of a global pandemic. As such, to the extent that the parties would prefer to appear by video conference, the parties should promptly notify the Court. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on October 25, 2021.

Plaintiff Havana Docks Corporation’s Response In Opposition To Defendant’s Motion To Remove Cases From Pretrial And Trial Calendar (1/10/22)

LINK To Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion For Permission To Bring Electronic Equipment To The Courthouse For Use At The January 12, 2022 Hearing (1/6/22)

LINK To Order Setting Hearing On Motions For Summary Judgement (10/26/21)

LINK To Plaintiff's Motion For Permission To Use Sealed Records At The December 14th Hearing (11/19/21)

LINK To Foreign Claims Settlement Commission Certification Of Loss (4/21/71)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [1:19-cv-23591; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23590; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. MSC CRUISES SA CO, AND MSC CRUISES (USA) INC. [1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES [1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

U.S. Agricultural Commodity/Food Product (Including Coffee/Ketchup/Fresh Vegetables/Pet Food) Exports To Cuba Increase 144.2% In November 2021; Up 85.4% Year-To-Year.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
January 2022

November 2021 Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Increase 144.2%- 1
54th Of 226 November 2021 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 85.4%- 2
Cuba Ranked 53rd Of 2021 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets- 2
November 2021 Healthcare Product Exports US$6,976.00- 2
November 2021 Humanitarian Donations US$1,307,924.00- 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 16

NOVEMBER 2021 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 144.2%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in November 2021 were US$27,699,046.00 compared to US$11,339,843.00 in November 2020 and US$2,965,515.00 in November 2019.

November 2021 Exports Included: Chicken Leg Quarters (Frozen); Chicken Meat (Frozen); Chicken Legs (Frozen); Soybeans; Fruit; Coffee; Ketchup; Fresh Beans; Fresh Vegetables; Dog And Cat Food.

January 2021 through November 2021 exports were US$276,683,109.00 compared to US$149,209,570.00 for the period January 2020 through November 2020, representing a period increase of 85.4%.

Since December 2001, agricultural commodity and food product exports reported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba is US$6,572,910,533.00.

This report contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

Click here for a list of agricultural commodities eligible for export to Cuba under Section 902(1) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000

LINK To Complete Report In PDF Format

Good Intentions In Op-Ed By An Advocacy Group Does Not Excuse Errors Of Fact To Support Argument. There Is Travel. There Is Trade. There Is Not (Yet) Investment; Loans Perhaps.

Chicago Tribune
Chicago, Illinois
10 January 2022

Op-ed: The US should use agricultural trade to help Cuba and build lasting economic bridges 

By Paul Johnson, chair of the United States Agriculture Coalition for Cuba. 

Excerpt: 

“There is no other communist country in the world where we prohibit U.S. citizens from traveling, trading or investing.”  

Rebuttal: 

Travel is authorized.
Trade is authorized.
Investment is not (yet); loans perhaps.

The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 codified twelve categories of authorized travel for individuals subject to United States jurisdiction to the Republic of Cuba: 

“Travel-related transactions are permitted by general or specific licenses for certain travel related to the 12 categories of activities identified in §515.560(a). Those travel-related transactions permitted by general license, subject to specified criteria and conditions, include: family visits; official business of the U.S. government, foreign governments, and certain intergovernmental organizations; journalistic activity; professional research; educational activities; religious activities; athletic competitions by amateur or semi-professional athletes or athletic teams; support for the Cuban people; humanitarian projects; activities of private foundations or research or educational institutes; exportation, importation, or transmission of information or information materials; and certain authorized export transactions.” 

LINK To Statute: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/563a4585e4b00d0211e8dd7e/t/563a86afe4b0a7d393c4c410/1446676143897/tsra.pdf 

If Mr. Johnson was correct with the statement “prohibit U.S. citizens from traveling,” then the following would not have been possible: 

LINK: Airbnb Fined By OFAC For Accepting In Cuba Guests Traveling Outside Of The Twelve Authorized Categories January 03, 2022 

During the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), United States-based cruise lines operated itineraries that included the Republic of Cuba; the five-largest United States-based airlines provided regularly-scheduled services from multiple airports in the United States to airports throughout the Republic of Cuba; United States-based airlines operated ticket offices in the Republic of Cuba; a United States-based hotel management company held licenses to manage two properties in the Republic of Cuba.  Although the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) imposed and re-imposed restrictions upon travel, travel does remain authorized by statute. 

Since 2017, Moline, Illinois-based Deere & Company and Peoria, Illinois-based Caterpillar have received authorization from the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce to export more than US$5 million in products (agricultural equipment, farm machinery, agriculture/farm implements) to the Republic of Cuba. Boston, Massachusetts-based General Electric has exported approximately US$20 million in steam turbines to the Republic of Cuba.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose.  Since the first exports using provisions of the TSREEA commenced in December 2001, the total value of agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba have exceeded US$6,572,911,558.00.  The Republic of Cuba has averaged among the fifty-largest United States agricultural commodity and food products markets.  

Exports of healthcare products (medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals) to the Republic of Cuba are subject to provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, which require end use-verification, but are not subject to cash-in-advance payment requirements. Exports have included: Medicaments (penicillin and insulin); Dentifrices (toothpastes); Laboratory regents; Ultrasonic scanning equipment; Artificial limbs; Medical appliances; Surgical appliances (dental); Opthalmic (eye); Cannulae (tubing) and gelatin capsules.  Since 2003, the total value of healthcare product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba exceeds US$27,185,601.00. 

LINK To Statute: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/563a4585e4b00d0211e8dd7e/t/563a85f6e4b0fe64c5674af5/1446675958092/cda.pdf 

Exports using the TSREEA and CDA are managed by regulations maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and BIS. 

Mr. Johnson is partially accurate in stating that the OFAC does not authorize individuals subject to United States jurisdiction from delivering a direct investment to an individual or company located in the Republic of Cuba.  The OFAC is reviewing whether a specific license may be issued for this purpose.  As to the provision of a direct loan, the issue remains under OFAC review as to whether existing OFAC regulations authorize a direct loan to a self-employed Republic of Cuba national.  

There have been imports, both directly and indirectly, from the Republic of Cuba to the United States: 

LINK: Coffee & Charcoal Have Been Imported From Cuba; U.S. Companies Want More. Agricultural Commodities/Food Products/Healthcare Products Have Been Exported To Cuba; U.S. Companies Want More.October 02, 2021

Cuba's COVID-19 Vaccines Not On New List Of "Approved Vaccines" For Entry Into The United Kingdom

Government Of The United Kingdom
London, England
10 January 2022

“Approved vaccines: You must have had a complete course of one of the following vaccines at least 14 days (the day you have your final dose does not count as one of the 14 days) before you arrive in England:

Covaxin
Moderna
Janssen (single dose vaccine)
Novavax (Nuvaxovid and Covovax)
Oxford/AstraZeneca
Pfizer BioNTech
Sinopharm Beijing
Sinovac-CoronaVac

Formulations of these vaccines, such as AstraZeneca Covishield, AstraZeneca Vaxzevria and Moderna Takeda, also qualify as approved vaccines.”

The Republic of Cuba is not included among the list of "Countries with an approved proof of vaccination and examples of proof required- List of countries and territories with approved proof of vaccination for travel to England and examples of proof of vaccination."

https://www.gov.uk/guidance/countries-with-approved-covid-19-vaccination-programmes-and-proof-of-vaccination?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=govuk-notifications-topic&utm_source=475a10ca-034e-4bd7-a660-6377108f7fdd&utm_content=immediately

Reuters
London, United Kingdom
20 December 2021

Excerpts:

Cuba has said its homegrown, protein-based Abdala, Soberana 02 and Soberana Plus shots give upwards of 90% protection against symptomatic COVID-19 when offered in three-dose schemes.

However, Cuba has not yet published results of its large-scale clinical trials in peer-reviewed journals, nor has it submitted the documents required by the World Health Organization for approval of its vaccines, according to the WHO's online tally. As a result, some public health experts in other countries remain leery of recommending them until the results are vetted. "They have been slow to publish results," said Moss. "If (the vaccines) got WHO qualification... that could be really important globally."

The documents and data necessary for vetting the Soberana vaccines, developed by Cuba's Finlay Vaccine Institute, will be delivered to the WHO in the first quarter of 2022, Vicente Verez, Finlay's head, told Reuters. Verez said WHO standards, which assess not only the vaccine but also manufacturing facilities, had slowed Cuba down. "It's a first-world standard," Verez said, noting the expense involved to bring facilities to that level. "We need to advance on our manufacturing process to ensure that when we apply, we get WHO pre-qualification." Verez said Cuba is negotiating with both Canada and Italy to produce its vaccines in those countries for export to regions in need, including Africa.

Prensa Latina News Agency
Havana, Republic Of Cuba
20 January 2022

By: Aleynes Palacios Hurtado

According to a tweet by the Finlay Vaccine Institute (IFV, in Spanish), which developed this vaccine, the publication addresses the advantages of using OMVs (Outer Membrane Vesicles) as adjuvants in protein subunit vaccines against this coronavirus, which causes the Covid-19 pandemic. This institute tweeted that “Cuban science keeps on building scientific evidence of the Soberana vaccines. This recent article is about Soberana 01’s development and immunogenicity.” Entitled “A Covid-19 vaccine candidate composed of the SARS-CoV-2 RBD dimer and Neisseria meningitidis outer membrane vesicles,” the Chemical Biology article reports that it was observed that, with Soberana 01, the formulation with OMVs triggers a greater neutralizing effect against RBD mutants in alarming SARS-CoV-2 variants, including the RBD triple mutant of the Beta one. It also reported that the advantages of using OMVs as adjuvants in protein subunit vaccines against this virus were proven. The satisfactory results justify the continuation of the study with Phase 2 and Phase 3 clinical trials with this vaccine candidate. Cuba developed three Covid-19 vaccines (Soberana 02, Soberana Plus and Abdala) and two vaccine candidates: Soberana 01 and Mambisa, the latter to be administered nasally, developed by the Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (CIGB, in Spanish), which also developed Abdala, the first vaccine created in Latin America to fight Covid-19.

Context Is Crucial… “Under a brief détente, the Obama[-Biden] administration held talks with the Cuban government on the issue, but got nowhere.” 3 Certified Claims Discussions In 766 Days.

Context Is Crucial… 

“Under a brief détente, the Obama[-Biden] administration held talks with the Cuban government on the issue, but got nowhere.” (El Nuevo Herald- 9 January 2022) 

The Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) never linked commercial, economic, or political re-engagement with the Republic of Cuba to a resolution of the certified claims- the soil from which United States policy, regulations and laws sprouted due to the seizure by the Republic of Cuba on 6 August 1960 of an oil refinery owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc. 

The Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) has an opportunity to correct what both the Obama-Biden Administration and Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) failed to do. 

The reported efforts by the Obama-Biden Administration to seek a resolution to the 5,913 certified claims valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were chronicled by three (3) meetings in 2,923 days during its two terms in office; or since the announcement of a bilateral rapprochement on 17 December 2014- three (3) meetings in 766 days.   

Dishonest for officials of the Obama-Biden Administration to describe three meetings in eight years as confirmation that a settlement of the certified claims was a “top priority” of Obama-Biden Administration. 

Critical to appreciating how a resolution of the certified claims was not a “top priority” for the Obama-Biden Administration is to note that after the first meeting and after the second meeting, the United States Department of State reported that a follow-up meeting to each had not been scheduled. 

The Obama-Biden Administration never made an effort to link a resumption of regularly-scheduled commercial airline service, licenses for a hotel management company, continued operations for an electronic remittance service provider or anything else to a settlement of the certified claims.  That commercial linkage may have met limited resistance from the Republic of Cuba. 

Had the Obama-Biden Administration linked a settlement of the certified claims to an expansion of commercial activities in the Republic of Cuba by United States companies, quite likely that the Trump-Pence Administration would not have implemented on 2 May 2019 Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).  Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.   

The Biden-Harris Administration should consider linkage between an active re-engagement with the Republic of Cuba by United States companies to the settlement of at least three certified claims- those relating to airline, hotel, and remittance.  For example: 

Less than 10% of landing fees paid to the Republic of Cuba during the period 1 December 2016 to 30 November 2018 by Atlanta, Georgia-based Delta Air Lines (2020 revenue US$24.4 billion) would have settled the US$964,278.20 certified claim held by Delta Air Lines. 

Less than six months of remittance transfer fees paid to the Republic of Cuba by Denver, Colorado-based Western Union Company (2020 revenue US$4.8 billion) would have settled the US$4,264,727.08 certified claim held by Western Union Company.

The second-largest certified claim valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International (2020 revenue US$10.5 billion); the certified claim also includes land adjacent to the Jose Marti International Airport (HAV) in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  A subsidiary of Marriott International, Inc., Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide LLC, held a series of two-year licenses from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury in Washington DC to manage two (2) properties located in the Republic of Cuba.  The OFAC licenses were first issued during the Obama-Biden Administration and renewed during the Trump-Pence Administration before being terminated in 2020.  The monthly hotel management contract payments to the Republic of Cuba from Marriott International could have been directed to repay the certified claim. 

Bilateral Background 

United States Department of State
Washington, DC

“The United States and Cuba will hold the third government-to-government meeting on claims in Havana, Cuba, on January 12, 2017. The U.S. delegation will be led by Brian Egan, the Legal Adviser for the U.S. Department of State. The meeting will allow the delegations to build upon previous discussions in Havana and Washington, DC, and to exchange views on technical details and methodologies regarding outstanding claims. Outstanding U.S. claims include claims of U.S. nationals that were certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, claims related to unsatisfied U.S. court judgments against Cuba, and claims held by the United States Government. The United States continues to view the resolution of these claims as a top priority.” 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Havana, Republic of Cuba

"CUBA, January 12, 2017. On Thursday, January 12, the third meeting between representatives of the governments of Cuba and the United States on the subject of mutual compensation was held in Havana. The Cuban delegation was chaired by Abelardo Moreno Fernández, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and the US, by Brian Egan, State Department legal adviser. At this meeting, which continued in Washington on July 28, 2016, delegations continued the exchange on the claims of both States and evaluated possible mechanisms for joint settlement of mutual claims as part of the negotiation process of this complex theme.  The Cuban delegation reiterated that within the framework of this solution, it is essential to consider the claims of the Cuban people for human and economic damages, as reflected in the sentences issued by the Provincial People's Court of Havana in 1999 and 2000, respectively.  The representatives of both governments reiterated the importance and usefulness of continuing these exchanges. (Cubaminrex)" 

Bilateral Meeting Timeline 

• 17 December 2014 to 8 December 2015- 356 days between President Barack Obama’s 2,283-word statement (that did not mention certified claimants) and the first meeting of representatives from the government of the Republic of Cuba and the United States Department of State to discuss the issue of certified claims. 

• 8 December 2015 and 28 July 2016- 233 days between the first meeting and second meeting of representatives from the government of the Republic of Cuba and the United States Department of State to discuss the issue of certified claims. 

• 28 July 2016 to 12 January 2017- 168 days between the second meeting and third meeting of representatives from the government of the Republic of Cuba and the United States Department of State to discuss the issue of certified claims. 

• 12 January 2017 to 20 January 2017- 8 days between the third meeting of representatives from the government of the Republic of Cuba and the United States Department of State to discuss the issue of certified claims and the end of the Obama Administration. 

Based upon the results, the Obama-Biden Administration had no intention of negotiating a settlement, but remained content with the imagery of dialogue.  The questions that the United States Department of State never answered:   

• Why haven’t Certified Claimants Sector Working Groups been established?
  Why haven’t certified claimants been summoned to meetings at the United States Department of State to create a negotiating platform?
  Is there a Certified Claimants Committee? Thirty (30) of the certified claimants account for 56% of the principal value of the certified claims.
  Have Agendas been created- and followed?
  Have Modalities of Settlements been established?
  Where is the Guidance?

Certified Claims Background 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims is approximately US$8,750,130,510.77.  

The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

From the certified claim filed by Texaco: “The Cuban corporation was intervened on June 29, 1960, pursuant to Resolution 188 of June 28, 1960, under Law 635 of 1959.  Resolution 188 was promulgated by the Government of Cuba when the Cuban corporation assertedly refused to refine certain crude oil as assertedly provided under a 1938 law pertaining to combustible materials.  Subsequently, this Cuban firm was listed as nationalized in Resolution 19 of August 6, 1960, pursuant to Cuban Law 851.  The Commission finds, however, that the Cuban corporation was effectively intervened within the meaning of Title V of the Act by the Government of Cuba on June 29, 1960.” 

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International; the certified claim also includes land adjacent to the Jose Marti International Airport in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  The third-largest certified claim valued at US$97,373,414.72 is controlled by New York, New York-based North American Sugar Industries, Inc.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement.   

El Nuevo Herald
Miami, Florida
9 January 2022

Castro confiscó sus apartamentos. Diplomáticos de EEUU y ahora turistas se quedan allí
[Castro confiscated their apartments. US diplomats and now tourists stay there]

Excerpts: 

“Por qué los activos inmobiliarios de la familia García-Bengochea se convirtieron en negocios rentables, aunque no para él, tiene mucho que ver con el hecho de que las reclamaciones de propiedades confiscadas sin compensación por el gobierno cubano, incluidas las 5,913 certificadas por el Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos, nunca se han resuelto. Bajo una breve distensión, la administración Obama sustuvo conversaciones con el gobierno cubano sobre el tema, pero no llegaron a ninguna parte.” 

Google Translate: “Why the García-Bengochea family's real estate assets became profitable businesses, although not for him, has a lot to do with the fact that claims for properties confiscated without compensation by the Cuban government, including the 5,913 certified by the Department Justice of the United States, have never been resolved. Under a brief détente, the Obama administration held talks with the Cuban government on the issue, but got nowhere.” 

““Cualquier empresa estadounidense que se enriquezca ilegalmente a través de propiedades confiscadas por el régimen de Castro está violando la ley estadounidense y debe rendir cuentas”, dijo Rubio. “No es la primera vez que Airbnb anima a viajar a lugares conocidos por abusos contra los derechos humanos e incluso genocidio. A pesar de que la Administración Biden no ha mostrado ningún interés en estar realmente con la comunidad cubanoamericana, debería hacer cumplir la ley de los Estados Unidos y castigar a las empresas involucradas en prácticas similares“.” 

Google Translate: “"Any US company that illegally enriches itself through property confiscated by the Castro regime is violating US law and must be held accountable," Rubio said. “This is not the first time Airbnb has encouraged travel to places known for human rights abuses and even genocide. Even though the Biden Administration has shown no interest in actually being with the Cuban-American community, it should enforce US law and punish companies involved in similar practices."”  

“Javier García-Bengochea, actualmente un exitoso neurocirujano en Jacksonville, Florida, era solo un bebé cuando salió de Cuba con su familia, luego de que Fidel Castro confiscara sus negocios y propiedades en 1960 como parte de un amplio esfuerzo de expropiación que desencadenó lo que se convertiría en un embargo estadounidense de seis décadas. Años después, dos edificios de apartamentos de lujo en los exclusivos barrios de Miramar y Alturas de Miramar de La Habana, confiscados a su familia, terminaron como una lucrativa renta en Airbnb y como residencia para diplomáticos estadounidenses en La Habana. García-Bengochea alega que tanto la empresa estadounidense como el Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos le deben dinero. “Al menos el Departamento de Estado pretende servir a nuestro cuerpo diplomático. Airbnb está promocionando cínicamente nuestra propiedad robada únicamente con fines de lucro y en violación de la ley de Estados Unidos”, dijo.” 

Google Translate: “Javier García-Bengochea, now a successful neurosurgeon in Jacksonville, Florida, was just a baby when he left Cuba with his family, after Fidel Castro confiscated his businesses and properties in 1960 as part of a broad expropriation effort that triggered what it would become a six-decade American embargo. Years later, two luxury apartment buildings in Havana's exclusive Miramar and Alturas de Miramar neighborhoods, confiscated from his family, ended up as a lucrative rental on Airbnb and as a residence for American diplomats in Havana. García-Bengochea alleges that both the US company and the US State Department owe him money. “At least the State Department intends to serve our diplomatic corps. Airbnb is cynically promoting our stolen property solely for profit and in violation of US law, "he said.” 

LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics 

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Links To Related Analyses 

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/1/12/h2uudthnn6be8hfgxifqsrdo4aqpb0?rq=233 

http://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/12/1/zigs56x0gme3a9rqg7aecx9vf2gqgk?rq=certified%20claims 

http://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/7/29/transcript-of-state-department-briefing-about-us-cuba-claims-discussion?rq=department%20of%20state%2C%20cuba 

http://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/7/24/28-29-july-2016-may-be-near-last-opportunity-for-us-claimants-to-advocate-face-to-face-for-settlement-before-the-end-of-the-obama-administration?rq=department%20of%20state%2C%20cuba 

http://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/7/28/us-department-of-state-reports-on-claims-discussion?rq=department%20of%20state%2C%20cuba

Question For Barack Obama, 44th President of the United States, About Cuba’s Cuentapropistas And MSME’s… 22 March 2016 Seems So Long Ago.

Question For Barack Obama, 44th President of the United States, About Cuba’s Cuentapropistas And MSME’s… 22 March 2016 Seems So Long Ago.

Preface   

In a press statement on the Republic of Cuba’s Independence Day, directed to the 11.3 million citizens of the 800-mile-long archipelago, The Honorable Antony Blinken, United States Secretary of State (who in the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) served as Deputy Secretary of State from 2015-2017 and Deputy National Security Advisor from 2013-2015), expressed United States support for Republic of Cuba entrepreneurs: “The United States recommits to accompanying the Cuban people in your quest to determine your own future.  We will support those improving the lives of families and workers, cuentapropistas who have forged their own economic paths, and all who are building a better Cuba- and a better tomorrow for themselves in Cuba.”  

Secretary of State Blinken was, in his remarks, reiterating the bipartisan conviction of every United States president from Obama-to-Trump-to-Biden that the United States should “support the development of private business and [the] operation of economic activity in the non-state sector by self-employed individuals,” as that language is codified at 31 CFR § 515.570(g)(3). 

Such a position would accord with the Biden-Harris Administration’s reiteration of support for cuentapropistas, as articulated by Secretary Blinken on 20 May 2021, and previously espoused by then-United States President Barack Obama (when now President Biden was then Vice President Biden) when he said in the Gran Teatro de la Habana on 22 March 2016: “In a global economy, powered by ideas and information, a country's greatest asset is its people.  In the United States, we have a clear monument to what the Cuban people can build: it’s called Miami.  Here in Havana, we see that same talent in cuentapropistas...And in recent years, the Cuban government has begun to open up to the world, and to open up more space for that talent to thrive.  In just a few years, we’ve seen how cuentapropistas can succeed while sustaining a distinctly Cuban spirit.” 

Question For President Obama 

Why would (should) the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) make changes to its policies and regulations; reverse or revise Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) policies and regulations; and resurrect, reverse, or revise Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) policies and regulations relating to the self-employed and to owners of micro, small, and medium-size enterprises (MSME’s) in the Republic of Cuba when viewing the following landscape? 

Given in the 117th United States Congress the evenly-divided membership in the United States Senate and the five-member margin for the Democratic Party in the United States House of Representatives impacted the Biden-Harris Administration legislative and regulatory agendas and personnel selection process in 2021 and will impact this year through Election Day on Tuesday, 8 November 2022; and impact further if the Democratic Party loses control of the 118th United States Congress (3 January 2023 to 3 January 2025) and passes legislation from November 2022 to January 2022 during a “lame duck session” that President Joseph Biden signs into law; 

Given the unknown results of the 8 November 2022 contests for membership in the 118th United States Congress (3 January 2023 to 3 January 2025) and for state offices (governors and legislatures); 

Given the federal, state, and local office election results in the State of Florida in 2016;

Given the federal, state, and local office election results in the State of Florida in 2018;

Given the federal, state, and local office election results in the State of Florida in 2020; 

Given the 2020 Census result adds one seat in the United States House of Representatives to the State of Florida which will be contested in 2022;  

Given the anticipated challenges impacting Democratic Party federal, state, and local office candidates in the State of Florida in 2022; 

Given the anticipated challenges impacting Democratic Party federal, state, and local office candidates in the State of Florida in 2024. 

Given the statements on 27 April 2020 to CBS News (Miami, Florida) by Joseph Biden, then candidate for the presidential nomination of the Democratic Party: “Yes, I would.  In large part, I would go back,” Biden said.  “I’d still insist they keep the commitments they said they would make when we, in fact, set the policy in place… Wouldn’t he be rewarding Cuba at a time when they are supporting and propping up Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela?  “Well, they’re having great difficulty propping up Maduro,” he said.  “Number one, Maduro is in real trouble.  Number two, there’s no reason why we cannot still sanction them, but failing to recognize them at all is a different thing than sanctioning them.”  He said engaging with Cuba isn’t just about Cuba, it also strengthens the United States’ hand throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.” 

Given the statements on 18 July 2020 to The Washington Post by Joseph Biden, then candidate for the presidential nomination of the Democratic Party: “I have no illusions about the situation in Cuba, and it’s deeply concerning that the Cuban government continues to assert strong political and economic control while failing to respect press freedom and the freedom of assembly,”… “But Cuba is not represented solely by its leadership. There are many different sectors that we can and should work with to support progress in Cuba- including entrepreneurs, religious groups, universities, young people and human rights defenders.” 

Given changes to the commercial (expansive), economic (expansive), and political (constrained) infrastructures within the Republic of Cuba in 2021; 

Given there remain consistent inconsistencies rather than collective engagement by countries allied with the United States and those distant from the United States with their commercial, economic, and political cooperation for United States statutes, policies, and regulations impacting the Republic of Cuba.  The Republic of Cuba’s primary benefactors continue to be China, Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Venezuela;  

Given the Biden-Harris Administration has not changed policies and regulations impacting the Republic of Cuba implemented during the Trump-Pence Administration which were reversals primarily of policies and regulations implemented during the Obama-Biden Administration; 

And Given the Biden-Harris Administration has implemented new policies and regulations impacting the Republic of Cuba.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

LINKS To Self-Employed, Micro, Small & Medium-Size Enterprise (MSME) Analyses 

Embassy Of Italy: V International Workshop of Women Entrepreneurs In Cuba: "The Talent Of Women. Art, Crafts & Design”  January 6, 2022  

Why Is National Security Council (NSC) In The White House Refusing To Permit U.S.-Based Investors/Financiers To Directly Support Women-Owned (Or Men-Owned) Businesses In Cuba? State Dept. Complicit?  January 6, 2022  

President Biden Rejects BIS License Application To Export Electric Vehicles/Chargers To Cuba's Self-Employed, MSME's. Reversal Of "General Policy Of Approval." President Trump Authorized EV Exports.  December 20, 2021 

Cuba Again Expanding MSME Authorizations To Include Accessing Foreign Capital, Foreign Bank Accounts, Local Development Projects Qualify.  December 02, 2021 

Why Won't Biden Administration Permit U.S. Entities To Invest/Finance MSMEs? In December, Cuba’s FIMELSA Begins Convertible Currency-Equivalent Loans At 6.5% For 120 Days; Lower For CUP.  November 25, 2021

Update: More Than 700 Micro, Small And Medium-Sized Enterprises Approved In Cuba  November 25, 2021

OFAC & BIS To 107 Tech Companies? Cuba. Yes, You Can Go There, But We Dare You. "Encourage & Enable" Not The Same As "Access & Use." Memo: Donilon, Klain, Ricchetti, Richmond, Sullivan.  November 23, 2021

Will President Biden's Statement That His Is "a small business presidency” Extend To Supporting Small Businesses In Cuba?  November 22, 2021

Update On Registration Of Micro, Small & Medium-Size Enterprises In Cuba. Now More Than 600.  November 21, 2021

Cuba Continues To Report On Activity Of MSME's- The Numbers Increase.  November 06, 2021

Joint Venture Between Banco de Sabadell Of Spain And Banco International de Comercio In Cuba Will Provide Financing In Foreign Currency To MSMEs & Non-Agricultural Cooperatives  November 05, 2021

Beginning Today Residents Of Cuba May Purchase And Install Residential Solar Systems. Cost 55,000.00 Pesos (US$2,300.00). Call 7833-3333.  November 04, 2021 

Bormey srl Among The First 35 Newly-Constituted Medium-Sized Enterprises In Cuba, Exported 5,000 Peanut Bars To Italy. Is United States Next? U.S. Department Of State Regulations Would Approve.  October 26, 2021 

Cuba Approves First 35 MIPYME Applications- Confirms No Application Thus Far Denied. Many More Applications Expected. Result Beneficial For Biden Administration Goal To Support SME's.  September 30, 2021

Cuba Suspends Tariffs And Fees For Non-Commercial (SME's Next?) Solar Systems. Another Opportunity For Biden-Harris Administration To Support U.S. Exporters And Florida Companies Should Benefit.  July 30, 2021

ProLimp Cleaning In Cuba Precisely Type Of Entrepreneurship Biden Administration Should Support. Will Cuba Permit U.S. Venture Capitalists?  March 08, 2021 

Cuba To Unify Currencies; Result Could Present Opportunities For Biden Administration And U.S. Companies  December 11, 2020

To Delay Or Not To Delay, That Is A Question In Libertad Act Lawsuit Against Cruise Lines Carnival, MSC, Royal Caribbean, And Norwegian

Excerpts:

"Defendants Carnival Corporation d/b/a Carnival Cruise Line (“Carnival”), MSC Cruises S.A., MSC Cruises SA Co., and MSC Cruises (USA) Inc. (collectively, “MSC Cruises”), Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. (“Royal Caribbean”), and Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd. (“Norwegian”) (collectively, “Defendants”) hereby file this Motion and request that this Honorable Court remove each of these cases from the pretrial and trial calendar until resolution of the various significant pretrial motions pending in each such case."

“Additionally, on December 20, 2021, the Eleventh Circuit, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a), invited the United States Government to file an amicus brief addressing a range of Helms-Burton Act issues in three related cases pending before the appellate court: (1) Mario Del Valle, et al., v. Trivago GMBH, et al., No. 20-12407, (2) Javier Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corporation, No. 20-12960, and (3) Javier Garcia-Bengochea v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD., No. 20-14251. Among other issues, the Eleventh Circuit invited the Government to address the nature of the lawful-travel exception, which is squarely implicated in Havana Docks’ cases against the four Defendants here as well. The Eleventh Circuit’s Order is attached as Exhibit A."

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES [1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. MSC CRUISES SA CO, AND MSC CRUISES (USA) INC. [1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [1:19-cv-23591; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23590; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

LINK: Defendants’ Motion To Remove Cases From Pretrial And Trial Calendar (12/29/21)
LINK: Notice Of Striking Ecf No. 431 (12/30/21)
LINK: Plaintiff’s Partial Objection To Report And Recommendation On Plaintiff’s Motion To Exclude Opinion Of Julian Ackert (12/24/21)

LINK TO LIBERTAD ACT TITLE III LAWSUIT FILING STATISTICS

Copa Airlines Of Panama References Potential For Libertad Act Lawsuit Due To Cuba Operations. "...we could face such claims in the future."

United States Securities And Exchange Commission
Washington DC

Form 20-F
23 April 2021

Our operations in Cuba may adversely affect the market price of our Class A shares 

We currently offer passenger, cargo and mail transportation services to and from Cuba. For the year ended December 31, 2020, our transported passengers to and from Cuba represented approximately 4.5% of our total passengers. Our operating revenues from Cuban operations during the year ended December 31, 2020 represented approximately 1.4% of our total consolidated operating revenues for the year. Our assets located in Cuba are not significant. 

The United States administers and enforces broad economic and trade sanctions and restrictions against Cuba, and groups opposed to the Cuban regime may seek to exert pressure on companies doing business in Cuba. U.S. policy towards Cuba has been in flux in recent years and uncertainty remains over the future of U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba and the impact such sanctions will have on our operations, particularly if the United States imposes additional relevant sanctions. While we believe our operations in Cuba are in compliance with all applicable laws, any violations of U.S. sanctions could result in the imposition of civil and/or criminal penalties and have an adverse effect on our business and reputation. 

Additionally, Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (the Helms-Burton Act) provides a cause of action for U.S. nationals to bring claims against any person who traffics in property expropriated by the Cuban Government. The scope of any potential claims under the Helms-Burton Act are uncertain and companies with commercial dealings in Cuba have faced claims for damages; we could face such claims in the future. Emphasis Added. 

Certain U.S. states have enacted or may enact legislation regarding investments by state-owned investors, such as public employee pension funds and state university endowments, in companies that have business activities with Cuba. As a result, such state-owned institutional investors may be subject to restrictions with respect to investments in companies such as ours, which could adversely affect the market for our shares. 

As a part of our strategic relationship with UAL, Copa provides flights through code-sharing arrangements to over 200 other destinations.  In addition to code-shares provided with our Star Alliance partners, Copa also has code-sharing arrangements in place with several other carriers, including Air France, KLM, Iberia, Air Europa, Emirates, Gol, Azul and Cubana. 

Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Aruba, Curaçao, St. Maarten, Bahamas, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago combined represented the following revenue percentages:  2020- 2.7% ; 2019- 3.8%; 2018- 3.7%; 2017- 3.7%; 2016- 5.9%. 

Copa currently offers approximately 104 daily scheduled flights among 54 destinations in 25 countries in North, Central, South America and the Caribbean from its Panama City hub. Copa provides passengers with access to flights to more than 200 other destinations through code-share arrangements with our Star Alliance partners and other carriers including Air France, KLM, Iberia, Emirates, Gol, Azul, Tame, Cubana and Aeromexico. Through its Panama City hub, Copa Airlines is able to consolidate passenger traffic from multiple points to serve each destination effectively. 

LINK To 20-F Filing
LINK To Libertad Act Title III Lawsuit Filing Statistics

Aviacionline.com
Buenos Aires, Argentina
6 January 2022

Being Cuba one of the Panamanian company’s most important markets, and after the lifting of the restrictions imposed by the island, COPA now reestablishes connections to Santa Clara (SNU) and increases its flights to Havana (HAV). 

As reported by ECASA, the Cuban Company of Airports and Airport Services, and further confirmed by Cirium and the company itself, COPA increased from two to four daily flights to Havana (HAV) on January 3, and before the end of the month, it will operate five services a day. Besides, as of January 11, it will resume flights to Abel Santamaría International Airport, which serves Santa Clara, with flights on Tuesdays. As of February, they will increase to two weekly services. 

The airline encouraged passengers to stay informed about the requirements established both by Copa and by the immigration and health authorities of the destination country.  Tickets for these new flights are already available both on Copa’s website and at sales offices and travel agencies.  Copa , Conviasa, Fly Allways, and Wingo are the only companies that offer connectivity to the island from Central and South America. Because of its wide range of destinations, the Panamanian airline plays an important role in connections to the Caribbean country. Avianca and LATAM have not shown any signs of an early return to Havana (HAV).