Cuba Libertad Act Defendants Differ To Court Of Appeals: Booking.com Says No Oral Arguments Required; Expedia Entites Say Otherwise

MARIO DEL VALLE, ENRIQUE FALLA, MARIO ECHEVARRIA V. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, ORBITZ, LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING HOLDINGS INC. Initial defendants were: TRIVAGO GMBH, BOOKING.COM B.V., GRUPO HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE I-5, AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22619 Southern Florida District; 20-12407 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]

Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie, LLP (defendant)
Scott Douglass & McConnico (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

Notice Of Incorrect Statement Of Related Case (10/6/20)
Brief Of Defendants-Appellees Booking.Com B.V. And Booking Holdings Inc. (11/2/20)
Supplemental Appendix Of Defendants- Appellees Booking.com B.V. And Booking Holdings Inc. (11/2/20)
Brief Of Appellees Expedia Group, Inc., Hotels.com, L.P., Hotels.com GP, LLC, And Orbitz, LLC (11/2/20)

LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

Excerpts From Filings:

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellees Booking.com B.V. and Booking Holdings Inc. submit that oral argument is unnecessary in this case because it is a straightforward appeal concerning personal jurisdiction. This Court should affirm the district court’s judgment without argument.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue I: The first issue, reviewed de novo, is whether personal jurisdiction can be maintained over foreign defendants based on the accessibility of a website in Florida, under Sections 48.193(1)(a)(1) (the “doing business” section) and 48.193(1)(a)(2) (the “committing a tort” section) of the Florida long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause.

Issue II: The second issue is whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint without granting a conditional request for jurisdictional discovery contained solely in the plaintiffs’ response in opposition to a motion to dismiss.

Issue III: The third issue is whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend where plaintiffs did not move the district court for leave to amend.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The Expedia Entities respectfully submit that oral argument would be helpful to the Court in deciding this appeal. While the personal jurisdiction issue does not in-volve any novel or unusual questions, the issues regarding standing and failure to state a claim present issues of first impression regarding the proper interpretation of the Helms-Burton Act. Though the Act was adopted in 1996, the private right of action in Title III was suspended until May 2019. As such, most courts have not yet ad-dressed or resolved fundamental aspects of the statute’s enforcement. This appeal presents one of the first opportunities for this Court to address certain of those is-sues.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether the second amended complaint contains factual allegations as to each of the Expedia Entities sufficient to make out a prima facie case of specific per-sonal jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause.

2. Whether Plaintiffs lack standing under Article III of the Constitution and, thus, the federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.

3. As an alternative ground for affirmance, whether Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) because Plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing that a. Plaintiffs own “the claim[s]” to the allegedly confiscated properties and acquired ownership of those claims before March 12, 1996, as required by 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B); b. the Expedia Entities “knowingly and intentionally” engaged in or profit-ed from commercial activity concerning confiscated property, as required by the Act’s definition of traffics, 22 U.S.C. § 6023(A); c. the Expedia Entities engaged in conduct that falls outside the lawful-travel clause in the Act’s definition of traffics, 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(B)(iii); d. the allegedly confiscated properties meet the Act’s definition of property, which excludes most “real property used for residential purposes.”