Judge Denies Norwegian Cruise Line Motion To Dismiss In Libertad Act Lawsuit- "... the Court again remains unpersuaded" And Focus On Knowledge

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [1:19-cv-23591; Southern Florida District]

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)

LINK To Order (1 September 2020)
LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Statistics

Excerpts From 27-Page Order:

“As noted above, Title III took effect on August 1, 1996, seeid. § 6085(a), and liability for trafficking thus attached to conduct on confiscated property beginning on November 1, 1996 (i.e., three months after Title III’s effective date), see § 6082(a)(1)(A). Likewise, President Clinton’s statements regarding the actions taken pursuant to Title III of the Act further buttress the notion that liability for trafficking in confiscated property under Title III could be imposed for conduct occurring on or after November 1, 1996. Thus, contrary to its position in the Motion, NCL’s alleged conduct on the Subject Property was not lawful prior to the suspension being lifted in May 2019. Instead, liability for trafficking under Title III attached beginning on November 1, 1996, and the consistent suspension of the right to bring an action under Title III did not affect this liability. In other words, NCL’s alleged conduct in Cuba occurred after the enactment of Title III,7 and the penalty for liability has remained unchanged since Title III was enacted, thus putting traffickers on notice of their potential liability under § 6082(a)(1)(A) since Title III took effect in 1996."

“Moreover, with regard to NCL’s contention it lacked fair notice that liability under Title III could be imposed for its conduct in Cuba due to the government’s encouragement of relations with Cuba and Title III’s consistent history of ongoing suspensions, the Court again remains unpersuaded."

“Despite the absence of any lawsuits being filed pursuant to Title III since its enactment, NCL was on notice of Title III’s existence from the time it became law in 1996, and it had an obligation to familiarize itself with the mandates of Title III, especially once it began operating in Cuba. Locke, 471 U.S. at 108; Texaco, Inc., 454 U.S. at 532; N. Laramie Land Co., 268 U.S. at 283. Moreover, the government’s encouragement to travel to Cuba and to increase commercial relations with Cuba does not in any way absolve NCL of its obligations to also comply with federal law—namely, by not trafficking in confiscated property without the consent of a claimant. Thus, NCL has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the application of Title III to its conduct in Cuba constitutes a due process violation. See Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984) (“It is by now well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come . . . with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.” (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976))). Accordingly, NCL’s Motion is denied as to its due process claim.”