Carnival Corporation Lawsuit: "Plaintiff's injury is concrete, particularized, and imminent" Says Court- Case To Proceed

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES [1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District]

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

LINK: Omnibus Order (14 September 2020)

Excerpts From 23-Page Order:

The Court has carefully considered the Motion, the Response, the Reply, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied.

Under the LIBERTAD Act, trafficking in confiscated property is an invasion of a legally protected interest — i.e. a statutorily constructed property interest in the Subject Property, which conveys a right to prevent third-party use of the same. The remedy for the violation of that right is compensation from third parties for trafficking in the Subject Property. That the legal right and remedy at issue in this case are statutorily constructed does not sway the Court’s analysis in favor of Defendant, because, as discussed in the ensuing sections, Plaintiff’s injury is concrete, particularized, and imminent.

As detailed above, Congress was prompted to enact Title III because the remedies for (1) the wrongful confiscation of property by foreign governments; and (2) the subsequent unjust enrichment and economic exploitation of that property by foreign investors at the expense of the rightful owners, were ineffective. 22 U.S.C. § 6081(10).4 Quite simply, the right identified by Congress was a property interest, and Defendant presents no clear argument why an infringement on a property right lacks concreteness. Defendant appears to argue that the injury here is not concrete because the Subject Property was initially confiscated by the Cuban Government and Plaintiff cannot be injured by its subsequent use. While the injury may have its origin in the confiscation, Defendant does not explain how the continued use of the Subject Property makes Plaintiff’s harm less tangible today. Stated otherwise, Plaintiff’s injury is “real” because it is not receiving the benefit of its interest in the Subject Property, and Defendant’s subsequent trafficking in the confiscated property has undermined Plaintiff’s right to compensation for that expropriation.

Contrary to the conclusion in Glen v. American Airlines that the plaintiff had no standing because there was no allegation of concrete harm, the Court finds that the allegations of profiting from the use of property that was expropriated without obtaining consent or paying adequate compensation to the original owner is sufficient concrete harm for standing purposes.

In sum, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to recover monetary damages for the injuries it sustained as a result of Defendant’s unlawful trafficking in the Subject Property, to which it owns a Certified Claim.

Finally, the Court is unpersuaded by Defendant’s argument that the Court can resolve the purported time bar issue, which is an affirmative defense, at this juncture.