In New Filing, Plaintiffs In Libertad Act Lawsuit Against Expedia, Hotels.com, Booking.com, Orbitz, Argue They Have "Constitutional Standing" & Previous Court Order Was "Mystifyingly Myopic"
/DIEGO TRINIDAD v. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, LLC, ORBITZ, LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING HOLDINGS INC. [1:19-cv-22629; Southern Florida District] Case dismissed with leave to amend on 16 November 2020.
Rivero Mestre (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez (plaintiff)
Akerman LLP (defendant- Expedia Group, Inc., Expedia, Inc.)
Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP (defendant- terminated 2/12/20))
Baker & McKenzie (defendant- Booking Holdings, Inc., Booking.com B.V.)
LINK To 48-Page Filing (3/4/21)
Excerpts:
In separate Motions to Dismiss, defendants Booking Holdings Inc. and Booking.com B.V. (the “Booking defendants”2), and Expedia Group, Inc., Hotels.com L.P., Hotels.com GP, LLC, and Orbitz, LLC (the “Expedia defendants”3) (jointly, the “defendants”), demand dismissal of the Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages (D.E. 125) (“Am Comp.” or “complaint”), inter alia, for plaintiffs’ lack of so-called “constitutional standing” to bring their claim, on the notion that there is no causal connection between plaintiffs’ injury and defendants’ trafficking. See Expedia MTD at 5-9; Booking MTD at 12-15. This is a rank mischaracterization of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6021, et. seq. (“Title III” of “the Act”), not to mention Article III of the U.S. Constitution. The express language of Title III and the operative complaint make clear that plaintiffs’ injury in this case is not the Cuban government’s theft of their properties in Varadero, Cuba (the “Properties”).
In their motions, defendants admit that they trafficked in the Barceló Solymar and the Occidental Arenas Blancas (the “Trafficked Hotels”), which were built on the Properties.4 Expedia MTD at 1 (“Decades after the Cuban government allegedly confiscated the Properties, certain subsidiaries of defendant Expedia Group, Inc. (‘Expedia Group’) began to offer travelers the ability to secure reservations at the Resorts through web-based systems . . . .”); Booking MTD at 4 (“[T]he booking.com website only permitted reservations to be completed at the [Trafficked Hotels].”). Plaintiffs’ injury—indeed the sole focus of Title III and this action—is defendants’ trafficking (including benefitting from others’ trafficking) in the Properties, which these defendants have admitted.
In addition to an ill-conceived “constitutional standing” argument, defendants argue that the complaint fails to allege a prima facie case for “doing business” long-arm jurisdiction under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1), despite its easily proven allegations that defendants and their agents have offices in Florida with hundreds of employees, are registered to do business in Florida, are registered as sellers of travel in Florida, and do business in Florida every day of the year, including actively marketing the Trafficked Hotels to Florida residents (using, inter alia, emails sent to targeted Floridians to promote trafficking in the Trafficked Hotels and their locale), and enticing Florida residents to use their interactive websites, through which Floridians can—and do—reserve and pay for rooms at the Trafficked Hotels.
Defendants place unwarranted reliance on a dismissal order in Del Valle v. Trivago, 2020 WL 2733729 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2020). That order was ill-founded and is under appeal for dismissing the action based on a mystifyingly myopic reading of the complaint’s jurisdiction allegations.6 The allegations here are materially different, far more detailed, and discovery already has confirmed that defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction.
MARIO ECHEVARRIA, ESTHER SANCHEZ, CONSUELO CUEVAS, AND CARMEN FLORIDO V. EXPEDIA, INC., TRIVAGO GMBLJ, A GERMAN LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, BOOKING.COM B.V., A DUTCH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, GRUPO HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE 1-5, AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22620; Southern Florida District]. Lawsuit dismissed with leave to amend on 16 November 2020.
Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie (defendant- Booking Holdings, Inc., Booking.com B.V.)
Scott Douglas & McConnico LLP (defendant- Expedia, Inc., Hotels.com GP, LLC, Hotels.com L.P., Orbitz, LLC)
Akerman LLP (defendant- Expedia, Inc., Hotels,com GP, LLC, Hotels.com L.P., Orbitz, LLC)
LINK To 49-Page Filing (3/4/21)
Excerpts:
In separate Motions to Dismiss, defendants Booking Holdings Inc. and Booking.com B.V. (the “Booking defendants”2), and Expedia Group, Inc., Hotels.com L.P., Hotels.com GP, LLC, and Orbitz, LLC (the “Expedia defendants”3) (jointly, the “defendants”), demand dismissal of the Amended Complaint for Damages (D.E. 116) (“Am Comp.” or “complaint”), inter alia, for plaintiffs’ lack of so-called “constitutional standing” to bring their claim, on the notion that there is no causal connection between plaintiffs’ injury and defendants’ trafficking. See Expedia MTD at 6-10; Booking MTD at 12-15. This is a rank mischaracterization of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6021, et. seq. (“Title III” of “the Act”), not to mention Article III of the U.S. Constitution. The express language of Title III and the operative complaint make clear that plaintiffs’ injury in this case is not the Cuban government’s theft of their property on Cayo Coco, Cuba (the “Property”).
In their motions, defendants admit that they trafficked in the Pullman Cayo Coco (the “Trafficked Hotel”), which was built on the Property.4 Expedia MTD at 1 (“More than fifty years after the Cuban government allegedly confiscated the Property, certain subsidiaries of defendant Expedia Group, Inc. . . . began to offer travelers the ability to secure reservations at the Pullman Cayo Coco through web-based systems . . . .”); Booking MTD at 4 (“[T]he booking.com website only permitted reservations to be completed at the Pullman Cayo Coco . . . .”). Plaintiffs’ injury—indeed the sole focus of Title III and this action—is defendants’ trafficking (including benefitting from others’ trafficking) in the Property, which these defendants have admitted.
In addition to an ill-conceived “constitutional standing” argument, defendants argue that the complaint fails to allege a prima facie case for “doing business” long-arm jurisdiction under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1), despite its easily proven allegations that defendants and their agents have offices in Florida with hundreds of employees, are registered to do business in Florida, are registered as sellers of travel in Florida, and do business in Florida every day of the year, including actively marketing the Trafficked Hotel to Florida residents (using, inter alia, emails sent to targeted Floridians to promote trafficking in the Trafficked Hotel and their locale), and enticing Florida residents to use their interactive websites, through which Floridians can—and do—reserve and pay for rooms at the Trafficked Hotel.
Defendants place unwarranted reliance on a dismissal order in Del Valle v. Trivago, 2020 WL 2733729 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2020). That order was ill-founded and is under appeal for dismissing the action based on a mystifyingly myopic reading of the complaint’s jurisdiction allegations.6 The allegations here are materially different, far more detailed, and discovery already has confirmed that defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction.