JUAN B. PUJOL MOREIRA, in his personal capacity, and as Personal Representative and Administrator of the ESTATE OF NIEVES PUJOL, a/k/a NIEVES MOREIRA MARTINEZ, MARIA JULIA PUJOL MOREIRA, INES MARIA PUJOL FAGET, as Personal Representative and Executor of the ESTATE OF ARCADIO JOAQUIN PUJOL IZQUIERDO, SARA L. PUJOL, as Personal Representative and Administrator of the ESTATE OF LAUREANO PUJOL ROJAS, LUIS R. PUJOL ROJAS, ANA H. FRAGA, LORENZO PEREZ PUJOL, FRANCISCO PUJOL MENESES, PILAR M. PUJOL MENESES, and RAUL PUJOL MENESES, Plaintiffs, v. SOCIETE GENERALE, S.A. and BNP PARIBAS, S.A. [1:20-cv-09380; Southern District Of New York]

Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, LLP (plaintiff)
MoloLamken LLC (plaintiff)
Mayer Brown LLP (defendant)
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP (defendant)

Link To 27-Page Joint Reply Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss The Amended Complaint Pursuant To Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure 12(B)(1), 12(B)(2) And 12(B)(6) (5/10/21)

LINK To One Page Letter From Plaintiffs Attorney (5/6/21)

Link To 55-Page Memorandum Of Law In Opposition To Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss The Amended Complaint (4/19/21)

Excerpts From Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss

Unable to allege actual injury, Plaintiffs argue that they suffered a theoretical harm from “the wrongful exploitation of th[e] confiscated property” (Opp. 9), pointing to “common-law principles” under which a person who interferes “with another person’s property interests” is liable in restitution to the “rightful owners.” Id. at 9-10. But Plaintiffs’ argument fails because, inter alia, reliance on such principles requires an ownership interest in the confiscated assets— and Plaintiffs had no such interest in Banco Pujol at the time of the alleged trafficking.

As shown in the Moving Brief (at 12-18), the statutory language and policy make clear that Section 6084 is a statute of repose—and Plaintiffs brought their claims outside the two-year repose period. Plaintiffs’ response distorts the Act’s text and disregards the statutory purpose.

Further, to the extent that the Estate Plaintiffs maintain that they have now come to own the claims, they cannot meet the Act’s March 12, 1996 cut-off date, because they necessarily acquired the claims from the heirs after the decedents died and thus long after March 12, 1996. Plaintiffs argue that the Estate Plaintiffs should be exempted from the cut-off based on a purported policy argument they profess to glean from legislative history. See Opp. 39-40. But as Glen v. Trip Advisor explained when rejecting that argument, “legislative history can never defeat unambiguous statutory text.” 2021 WL 1200577, at *9 (quoting Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1750 (2020)). In any event, Plaintiffs omit the crucial words that preceded the legislative history they purport to quote—“in part”—and thus ignore that Congress had multiple motivations for the cut off.

Economic Eye On Cuba

Societe Generale And BNP Paribas Argue That Plaintiffs Should Not "be exempted from the cut-off based on a purported policy argument they profess to glean from legislative history."

U.S. - Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.