Seaboard Marine In Libertad Act Lawsuit Argues As Other Defendants Have- Plaintiffs Did Not Own Claim Before 12 March 1996

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD MARINE, LTD., Defendant. [1:20-cv-25176; Southern Florida District].

Horr, Novak & Skipp, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields (plaintiff)
Barakat Law (plaintiff)
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (defendant)

LINK TO: Defendant’s Reply In Support Of Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (5/11/21)

Excerpts:

Even so, Plaintiffs argue that the allegation that Seaboard operated one vessel to the Port of Mariel a few weeks after the initial Complaint was served “defeats Seaboard’s claims.” (Opp’n 21–22.) The operative complaint does not allege that the initial Complaint’s allegation provided Seaboard with the requisite knowledge. Nor could it. The initial Complaint does not identify the Port of Mariel (or the container terminal) as property confiscated by the Cuban Government and to which Plaintiffs own a claim.

Second, Plaintiffs identify no allegation of activity by Seaboard that amounts to trafficking “through the ZEDM.”

Lastly, the Opposition does not address, and therefore concedes,7 that there are no allegations showing Seaboard’s scienter as to trafficking through the ZEDM. There are no facts alleged to show that Seaboard knew or had reason to know that the ZEDM trafficked in confiscated property and that Seaboard intended to cause, direct, participate in, or profit from that activity. (Mot. 12.) For this additional and independent reason, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Seaboard trafficked through the ZEDM.

Lest there be any doubt, courts have unanimously held that plaintiffs that acquire a claim to confiscated property by inheritance must have done so before March 12, 1996.

Plaintiffs argue that the estates acquired claims to confiscated property before March 12, 1996 because the estates “maintain[ed] the original acquisition date [by the Rosell Siblings] of the confiscated property.” (Opp’n at 3.) But the caselaw is clear that property does not become part of an estate until the death of the decedent. (Mot. at 16); see also Sharps v. Sharps, 214 So. 2d 492, 495 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1968) (applying rule). Plaintiffs identify no caselaw to the contrary.

Because the estates did not acquire claims to the confiscated property before March 12, 1996, they cannot bring Title III claims.