Maersk To Libertad Act Lawsuit Plaintiffs- Sue Cuba Not Us; You Don't Own The Port; Louisiana Has No Jurisdiction- Company Is Foreign

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL; EMMA RUTH BLANCO, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF ALFREDO BLANCO ROSELL, JR; HEBE BLANCO MIYARES, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF BYRON BLANCO ROSELL; SERGIO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, in his personal capacity, and as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF ENRIQUE BLANCO ROSELL; EDUARDO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF FLORENTINO BLANCO ROSELL; LIANA MARIA BLANCO; SUSANNAH VALENTINA BLANCO; LYDIA BLANCO BONAFONTE; JACQUELINE M. DELGADO; BYRON DIAZ BLANCO, JR.; MAGDELENA BLANCO MONTOTO; FLORENTINO BLANCO DE LA TORRE; JOSEPH E. BUSHMAN; CARLOS BLANCO DE LA TORRE; and GUILLERMO BLANCO DE LA TORRE VERSUS A.P. MOLLER-MAERSK A/S (a/k/a A.P. MOLLER-MAERSK GROUP); MAERSK A/S (a/k/a MAERSK LINE A/S); MAERSK, INC.; and MAERSK AGENCY U.S.A., INC [2:21-cv-00339 Eastern District of Louisiana].

Pusateri, Johnston, Guillot & Greenbaum, LLC (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)

Link To Motion To Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim (7/6/21)
Link To Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction (7/6/21)

Excerpts From Motion To Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim

As an initial matter, Article III standing is not established by the mere fact that Helms-Burton gives Plaintiffs a right to sue persons who traffic in confiscated property. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (“Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.”); see also Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc. No. 4:20-CV-482-A, 2020 WL 4464665, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2020) (dismissing plaintiff’s Helms-Burton claim based on his failure to establish Article III standing). “Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirement by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”

Plaintiffs primarily allege that in 1960, the Cuban government seized the Confiscated Property from the Blanco Rosell Siblings without compensation. (Compl. ¶¶ 2–5, 88, 93.) Plaintiffs further allege that the Cuban Government created ZEDM, built a container terminal allegedly incorporating the Confiscated Property, and subsuming their concession rights, and that, as a result, ZEDM traffics in the Confiscated Property. (Id. ¶¶ 95–103.)

Any injury from the alleged confiscation; creation, management, or control of the ZEDM, or the building of the Port of Mariel or its container terminal, is traceable only to the Cuban Government. Plaintiffs have no standing to sue Maersk, or anyone else, for an “injury that results from the independent action of [the Cuban Government which is] not before the court.” Simon, 426 U.S. at 41–42.

Plaintiffs do not allege that they own claims to the Port of Mariel or its container terminal, as required by Helms-Burton. Indeed, neither the port nor the terminal is part of the Confiscated Property—even as defined in the Complaint. (Compl. ¶ 4). Plaintiffs also fail to allege, because they cannot, that they had a right to use or benefit from either. This case is thus distinguishable from other Helms-Burton cases where the allegations were sufficient to allege Article III standing. For example, in Havana Docks, the plaintiff had a certified claim to “waterfront real property in the Port of Havana, Cuba, identified as the Havana Cruise Port Terminal[,]” which the plaintiff “owned, possessed, managed , and used . . . from 1917 until the Cuban Government confiscated it in 1960.” Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises SA Co., 484 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1187 (S.D. Fla. 2020). The complaint alleged that the defendant cruise line “use[d] the [Havana Cruise Port Terminal] by regularly embarking and disembarking their passengers on the [Havana Cruise Port Terminal]. Id. The court held standing existed because plaintiff was not receiving “the benefit of its interest in the [Havana Cruise Port Terminal] . . . .” Id. at 1992. By contrast, Plaintiffs have not suffered a “real” injury because they do not have a claim, certified or otherwise, to the Port of Mariel, its container terminal, or to any benefit arising from them.

Excerpts From Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction

a. Because Louisiana unquestionably is not a “paradigm forum” and none of the Maersk defendants is “at home” in the State of Louisiana, the exercise of general jurisdiction is impermissible.
b. Because the facts here fail to create the requisite “substantial connection” between the Maersk defendants, the State of Louisiana and plaintiffs’ Cuba-centric claims, specific jurisdiction likewise does not exist under the facts of this case.
IV. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) does not afford this Honorable Court personal jurisdiction over the foreign-country defendants, as the exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate the governing jurisdictional tenets.