Judge In Libertad Act Lawsuit Against Seaboard Marine Dismisses 17 Plaintiffs; Remaining Plaintiff Wins Rulings- They Own The Property. Seaboard Trafficked And Knew It Was Trafficking. Settlement?

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD MARINE, LTD., Defendant. [1:20-cv-25176; Southern Florida District].

Horr, Novak & Skipp, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields (plaintiff)
Barakat Law (plaintiff)
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (defendant)

Order On Motion To Dismiss (7/27/21)
LINK TO LIBERTAD ACT TITLE III LAWSUITS STATISTICS

Excerpts From Ruling:

There are eighteen Plaintiffs in this action, including Odette Blanco de Fernandez (“Ms. Fernandez”), the estates of her four deceased siblings Alfredo Blanco Rosell, Byron Blanco Rosell, Enrique Blanco Rosell, and Florentine Blanco Rosell (“Estates”), and the descendants of the Blanco Rosell Siblings (“Inheritors”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). See ECF No. [45] ¶¶ 16-33.

For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

On September 29, 1960, the Cuban Government announced the confiscation without compensation of all assets owned by the Blanco Rosell Siblings, including: Maritima Mariel, Central San Ramón, Azucarera Mariel, along with their property, rights, and shares—i.e., the 70-Year Concession and land owned by these entities (“Confiscated Property”). Id. ¶¶ 74-75 (quoting Cuban Official Gazette, Resolution No. 436, at 23406 (Sept. 29, 1960) (English Translation)). Following the Cuban Government’s confiscation, the Blanco Rosell Siblings fled Cuba and became United States citizens before March 12, 1966. Id. ¶ 5.

Defendant is an ocean transportation company that operates vessels between the United States and the Caribbean Basin. Id. ¶ 34. The Amended Complaint alleges that beginning on or about May 9, 2019, Defendant operated approximately twenty-four voyages where its vessels sailed from the Port of New Orleans to the Port of Mariel in Cuba.

Defendant now moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint, arguing that the Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege that: (1) Defendant trafficked in the Confiscated Property; (2) Defendant “knowingly and intentionally” trafficked in the Confiscated Property; and (3) Plaintiffs, other than Ms. Fernandez, have an actionable ownership interest in the Confiscated Property. See ECF No. [52]. In their Response, Plaintiffs take the opposing position on each of Defendant’s bases for dismissal.

Upon review, the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant engaged in “commercial activity using or otherwise benefited from” the Port of Mariel and the container terminal without Plaintiffs’ authorization, thereby trafficking in Plaintiffs’ Confiscated Property.

Defendant maintains that Plaintiffs’ allegation regarding trafficking must fail because it “merely tracks the statutory definition[.]” ECF No. [52] at 14 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A)(ii)). The Court is not persuaded.

Defendant further contends that “the container terminal is not property to which Plaintiffs[] own a claim that could provide a basis for their Title III claims” because the Port of Mariel and its container terminal were constructed in March of 2009 and, therefore “decades after the Cuban Government confiscated the property in 1960.” ECF No. [52] at 14. However, the Amended Complaint sufficiently sets forth that in constructing the Port of Mariel and its container terminal in ZEDM, the Cuban Government exploited the same rights that were granted to the Blanco Rosell Siblings in the 70-Year Concession.

Additionally, the Court is not convinced that Plaintiffs should somehow be precluded from asserting a Title III claim because the Cuban Government enhanced and/or changed the nature of the Confiscated Property following its illegal confiscation. Holding as such would certainly undermine Congress’ stated goal of protecting the claims of United States nationals whose property was wrongfully confiscated by the Cuban Government. See 22 U.S.C. § 6022(6) (one reason for passing Title III was “to protect United States nationals against confiscatory takings and the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime.”).

The Amended Complaint also plausibly alleges that Defendant trafficked in the Confiscated Property through the acts of the ZEDM.

At this stage of the proceedings, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled an ownership interest in the Confiscated Property.

Thus, the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges that Defendant participated in, and profited from, the Cuban Government’s confiscation and possession of the Confiscated Property without Plaintiffs’ authorization.

Lastly, Defendant seeks dismissal of the Inheritors and Heirs from this action, arguing that they do not have an actionable ownership interest in the Confiscated Property because they acquired their claims after March 12, 1996.6 The relevant provision of the LIBERTAD Act provides: “In the case of property confiscated before March 12, 1996, a United States national may not bring an action under this section on a claim to the confiscated property unless such national acquires ownership of the claim before March 12, 1996.” 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The unambiguous language of § 6082(a)(4)(B) instructs that a United States national cannot bring an action under Title III “unless such national” acquires an interest to the confiscated property before March 12, 1996. Id. The statutory language also makes clear that the United States national who acquired ownership of the claim must be the same United States national who brings the Title III action.

The Court agrees that the Inheritors have not plausibly alleged that they acquired claims to the Confiscated Property before March 12, 1996. Indeed, because each of the deceased Blanco Rosell Siblings died after March 12, 1996, the Inheritors could not have acquired a claim to the Confiscated Property before the statutory cutoff. ECF No. [45] ¶¶ 17-20. In their Response, Plaintiffs effectively urge the Court to disregard the plain language of Title III, as well as the clear guidance from every court that has addressed this precise issue—including the Eleventh Circuit. See Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., 835 F. App’x 1011, 1012 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).7 The Court declines to do so. Accordingly, because the Inheritors did not acquire their claims to the Confiscated Property until after the statutory cutoff, they cannot maintain an action under Title III.

Similarly, the Estates do not have an actionable ownership interest in the Confiscated Property and cannot maintain a Title III action on behalf of the deceased Blanco Rosell Siblings. The Eleventh Circuit has instructed that “[i]n the absence of an expression of contrary intent, the survival of a federal cause of action is a question of federal common law.”

While there is no dispute that the deceased Blanco Rosell Siblings acquired their claims to the Confiscated Property before March 12, 1996, ECF No. [45] ¶¶ 17-20, the Court disagrees that “the estates and personal representatives ‘stepped into the shoes’ of the decedents [and] maintain[ed] the original acquisition date of the Confiscated Property[.]”

Indeed, it is well-settled that upon the death of the four Blanco Rosell Siblings, their assets became property of their respective estates and no longer belonged to them individually.

The following Plaintiffs are dismissed from this action: (1) Estate of Alfredo Blanco Rosell; (2) Estate of Byron Blanco Rosell; (3) Estate of Enrique Blanco Rosell; (4) Estate of Florentino Blanco Rosell; (5) Emma Ruth Blanco; (6) Liana Maria Blanco; (7) Susannah Valentina Blanco; (8) Hebe Blanco Miyares; (9) Lydia Blanco Bonafonte; (10) Jacqueline M. Delgado; (11) Byron Diaz Blanco, Jr.; (12) Magdelena Blanco Montoto; (13) Sergio Blanco; (14) Florentino Blanco de la Torre; (15) Joseph E. Bushman; (16) Carlos Blanco de la Torre; and (17) Guillermo Blanco De La Torre.