Crowley Maritime Corporation Mostly Loses On Motion To Dismiss In Libertad Act Lawsuit. Judge Says Libertad Act Definition Of Trafficking Is Constitional.
/ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. CROWLEY MARITIME CORPORATION, Defendant. [3:20-cv-01426 Middle District Florida; Transferred To Florida Southern District 1:21-cv-20443].
Murphy & Anderson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe P.A. (plaintiff)
Horr, Novak & Skipp P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable LLP (defendant)
Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics
Excerpts From Order
“The Supreme Court has explained that ‘[c]entral to assessing concreteness is whether the asserted harm has a “close relationship” to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts—such as physical harm, monetary harm, or various intangible harms.’” Glen v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 20-10903, 2021 WL 3285307, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 2021). Here, Plaintiffs allege that they were harmed when Defendants used the Confiscated Property “without consent from or paying adequate compensation to Plaintiffs.” [ECF No. 50 ¶ 144]. This harm “bears a close relationship to unjust enrichment, which has indisputable commonlaw roots.” Glen, 2021 WL 3285307, at *2. Indeed, Congress passed the Act, in part, because it found the remedies for “unjust enrichment from the use of wrongfully confiscated property . . . by private entities at the expense of the rightful owners of the property” to be ineffective. 22 U.S.C. § 6081(8). See Havana Docks, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 1192 (finding a concrete injury where the plaintiff “allege[d] that [defendant] profited from its use of the Subject Property at [plaintiff’s] expense.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged a concrete and particularized harm.
B. Traceability To have standing, Plaintiffs must also show that their injuries are “fairly traceable” to Defendants’ use of the Confiscated Property. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. “To show traceability, a plaintiff must allege that his injury is ‘connect[ed] with the conduct about which he complains.’” Glen, 2021 WL 3285307 (quoting Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416 (2018)). The SAC alleges that Defendants profited from their use of the Confiscated Property without compensating Plaintiffs. See [ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 7, 11]. Accordingly, like in the Glen and the Havana Docks cases, “there exists a causal link between a claimant’s injury from the Cuban Government’s expropriation of their property and a subsequent trafficker’s unjust enrichment from its use of that confiscated property.” Havana Docks, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 1230. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff has adequately alleged traceability.
C. Redressability “The element of redressability requires that ‘it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.’” Hollywood Mobile Estates, Ltd. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 641 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561)). The parties do not dispute, and the Court agrees, that the element of redressability is properly alleged here. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently established, at this stage of the litigation, that they have standing, and the Motion shall be denied on this ground.
Defendants argue that the SAC must be dismissed because it fails to adequately allege that (1) Plaintiffs’ own a claim to the Container Terminal or the Concession; (2) Defendants’ alleged conduct constitutes “trafficking”; and (3) Defendants’ use of the Container Terminal is not “incident to lawful travel to Cuba.” [ECF No. 59]. The Court disagrees.
Defendants focus much of their argument on the notion that Plaintiffs do not “own a claim” to the Container Terminal because ZEDM’s ports, docks, warehouses, and facilities did not exist until 2009, nearly fifty years after the Cuban government confiscated Plaintiffs’ property. Defendants’ argument is without merit.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs sufficiently allege trafficking under the Act. First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants use the Container Terminal, including storing their containers in the storage yard, and that using the Confiscated Property makes “[Defendants’] container business at the Port of Mariel possible and profitable.” [ECF No. 50 at ¶ 114]. This is enough to plausibly allege that Defendants “engage[d] in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property.” 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A)(ii). In addition, Plaintiffs allege that ZEDM and AUSA all traffic in the Confiscated Property by developing and operating the Port of Mariel, and that Defendants profit from ZEDM and AUSA’s trafficking in the property. This is enough to plausibly allege that Defendants “profit[] from trafficking . . . by another person, or otherwise engage[] in trafficking . . . through another person.” 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A)(iii). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a violation of the Act.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are required to plead around the lawful travel defense set forth in § 6023(13). The Court disagrees. “The lawful travel exception is an affirmative defense to trafficking that must be established by [Defendants], not negated by Plaintiff.” Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp, 407 F. Supp. 3d 1281, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2019).11 Therefore, the burden is on Defendants to establish that their activity in the Port of Mariel and Container Terminals was incident to lawful travel to Cuba. Id. at 1287. As this defense is not apparent on the face of the SAC, it is inappropriate for consideration at this stage of the litigation. Id.
Defendants argue that the Estates and Heirs do not have an actionable ownership interest in the Confiscated Property because they acquired their claims after March 12, 1996. On this point, the Court agrees.
In addition, the Court does not find the term “trafficking” to be unconstitutionally vague. A civil statute “is not unconstitutionally vague if persons of reasonable intelligence can derive a core meaning from the statute.” Seniors Civil Lib. Ass’n, Inc. v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). This Court, and the many other courts interpreting the Act, have not had difficulty in discerning the meaning of “trafficking.” Accordingly, the Motion on this ground is denied.
Title III Does Not Violate the Due Process Clause.
