Plaintiff In Four Cruise Line Libertad Act Lawsuit Files Appellate Brief: "underscores the need for strong deterrence to counteract the lure of doing business in Cuba"
/HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES [Consolidated to 1:19-cv-23591; 1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District; 23-10171, 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. MSC CRUISES SA CO, AND MSC CRUISES (USA) INC. [Consolidated to 1:19-cv-23591; 1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]; Judgement Entered 12/30/22; 23-10171, 11th Circuit Court of Appeals].
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable (defendant)
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [Consolidated to 1:19-cv-23591; 1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]; Judgement Entered 12/30/22; 23-10171, 11th Circuit Court of Appeals].
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [Consolidated to 1:19-cv-23591; 1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]; Judgement Entered 12/30/22; 23-10171, 11th Circuit Court of Appeals].
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)
Link: 09/29/2023- Appellee's Brief filed by Appellee-Cross Appellant Havana Docks Corporation. [23-10171]
Link: Libertad Act Title 3 Lawsuit Filing Statistics
excerpts…
“ARGUMENT: I. The District Court Correctly Applied The LIBERTAD Act To Hold The Cruise Lines Liable For Trafficking In Property Confiscated From Havana Docks By The Cuban Government.
A. The Cruise Lines Used “Property” Confiscated By TheCuban Government To Which Havana Docks Owns A Certified Claim. 1. The Certified Claim And The LIBERTAD Act’s Conclusive Presumption Establish That The Cruise Lines Used Havana Docks’ Confiscated Property. 2. The Cruise Lines’ Efforts To Avoid The Certified Claim And The Conclusive Presumption Are Meritless. a. The LIBERTAD Act Validly Forecloses The Cruise Lines’ Collateral Attack On Havana Docks’ Certified Claim. b. Havana Docks’ Concession Did Not “Expire” In 2004, As It Was Confiscated And Ceased To Exist In 1960.
B. The Cruise Lines’ Use Of Havana Docks’ Confiscated Property Was Neither Incident To “Lawful Travel” To Cuba Nor “Necessary” To The Conduct Of Such Travel. 1. The Cruise Lines Did Not Engage In “Lawful Travel” To Cuba. a. The Cruise Lines’ Activities In Cuba Were Not Incident to “Lawful Travel” Under The LIBERTAD Act. b. The Cruise Lines’ Activities In Cuba Were Not Incident to “Lawful Travel” Under The CACR. 2. The Cruise Lines’ Use Of Havana Docks’ Confiscated Property Was Not “Necessary” To Their Travel To Cuba.
… If anything, the cruise lines’ decision to use Havana Docks’ confiscated property with actual knowledge of Havana Docks’ certified claim and their own potential liability under the LIBERTAD Act only underscores the need for strong deterrence to counteract the lure of doing business in Cuba (and thereby propping up the country’s repressive and hostile regime). See NCL Dkt. 449, at 20-29 (summarizing evidentiary record of cruise lines’ knowledge of Havana Docks, the LIBERTAD Act, and their potential liability). As noted above in the Statement of Facts, the cruise lines docked their massive ships hundreds of times on the very same piers in the very same terminal confiscated from Havana Docks and identified in the certified claim, disembarked almost a million tourists there for shore tours run by the Cuban regime, and put at least $130 million in hard currency into that regime’s pockets.
The cruise lines also reaped more than a billion dollars in net revenues for opening up this new tourist market: from 2015 to 2019, Cuba cruises generated net revenues of roughly $112 million for Carnival, $272 million for MSC, $330 million for Royal, and $300 million for Norwegian. Dkt. 445-7, at 2, 5; Dkt. 477, at 90. And regardless of whether the cruise lines “lost money, made money, or merely broke even,” Carnival Br. 55, they were unmistakably positioning themselves to make vast sums of money as first movers in a potentially lucrative Cuban tourism market. Cf. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 459-62 (1993) (assessing substantive due process challenge to punitive damages in part by reference to potential, not actual, injury or gain from defendant’s conduct). Insofar as the cruise lines repackage their “lawful travel” argument as part of their substantive due process argument, see Carnival Br. 54-55, it is no more persuasive. As the district court explained, “[t]here is simply no evidence in the record in any of these cases that the United States government encouraged or licensed Defendants to engage in trafficking of Plaintiff’s property.”
In the final analysis, the cruise lines have no one but themselves to blame. They could have avoided trafficking liability under the LIBERTAD Act altogether by securing Havana Docks’ authorization. See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A). But they made no effort to do so, and now must bear responsibility for the consequences of that choice.”
From an attorney not participating in this Libertad Act Title III lawsuit: “The United States Supreme Court grants approximately one hundred of the 7,000 certiorari petitions it receives each year. Of those one hundred cases, several are mandatory jurisdiction (e.g. lawsuits between states, California and Arizona arguing over Colorado River water). Then there are the cases that the United States Supreme Court has remanded but has agreed to review substantively when a procedural element is cleared up, then there are the inevitable death penalty appeals, abortion issues, civil liberties, voting rights, congressional redistributing, and all the other matters in which the young law clerks are most interested. Then there will be in the year ahead many executive privilege claims (i.e. indicting in four jurisdictions a former president and active presidential candidate). In the end the United States Supreme Court may accept only a couple of essentially commercial cases (e.g. suits for damages against corporations). So, the odds are realistically about 1%, or even less that certiorari will be granted in such cases, particularly if the United States government is content with the statute and its outcome, as the United States Department of State is with Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Libertad). So why get involved? The odds of prevailing at the United States Courts of Appeal is generally less than 10% because a lower court cannot be reversed except under the very high standard of “clear error” in applying the law. The short message is- don’t lose in the lower court and consider carefully settling if you do.”
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