New Regulation Interpretation Decision By U.S. Supreme Court Could Impact Cuba-Related Decisions (Commerce And Travel) By Biden-Harris Administration And A Potential Second Trump Administration.
/New Regulation Interpretation Decision By United States Supreme Court Could Impact Cuba-Related Decisions By Biden-Harris Administration And Potential Trump Administration.
Potential To Reverse, Authorize Despite Preference By The White House.
Federal Court Judges Could Be Asked To Decide Issues Relating To Commerce And Travel.
Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) of 1917, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Libertad) of 1996, and Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 each have Republic of Cuba-centric provisions which have been implemented by United States government agencies, departments, and other entities.
In some instances, the language in the statute provides clarity, provides a requirement as to how a provision is to be defined, is to be interpreted, and is to be implemented.
In other instances, the language in the statute permits, specifically or by interpretation, the executive branch to determine if, when, and how a provision is adopted.
Members of the United States Congress (House of Representatives and Senate) who have an interest in Republic of Cuba-centric and Republic of Cuba-related legislation focus upon how a statute may be implemented by the executive branch.
The primary executive branch entities which manage and implement Republic of Cuba-centric and Republic of Cuba-related statues are the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, Office of Cuban Affairs (OCA), Office of the Legal Adviser (OLA), and other offices within United States Department of State.
The 28 June 2024 decision by the United States Supreme Court which returns to the judicial branch a role in interpreting statutory provisions which have been previously interpreted by instrumentalities of the executive branch does not necessarily mean there will be an immediate document avalanche arriving on the steps of ninety-four (94) United States District Courts.
However, there may be court filings, particularly in the three (3) U.S. District Courts located in the State of Florida. The Northern District with four (4) offices. The Middle District with five (5) offices. The Southern District with five (5) offices- importantly the cities of Miami, Fort Lauderdale, West Palm Beach, Fort Pierce, and Key West.
Plaintiffs (with prodding and assistance from members of the United States Congress) could focus upon how TWEA, CDA, Libertad, and TSREEA statutes have provisions interpreted by the executive branch that 1) Authorize rather than prohibit and 2) Not authorize rather than permit United States-based public sectors and private sectors re-engagement with Republic of Cuba-based public sectors and re-emerging private sectors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES ET AL. v. RAIMONDO, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 22–451. Argued January 17, 2024—Decided June 28, 2024*
excerpts
The Court granted certiorari in these cases limited to the question whether Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, should be overruled or clarified. Under the Chevron doctrine, courts have sometimes been required to defer to “permissible” agency interpretations of the statutes those agencies administer—even when a reviewing court reads the statute differently. Id., at 843. In each case below, the reviewing courts applied Chevron’s framework to resolve in favor of the Government challenges by petitioners to a rule promulgated by the National Marine Fisheries Service pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 U. S. C. §1801 et seq., which incorporates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §551 et seq.
Held: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron is overruled. Pp. 7–35.
Chevron is overruled. Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires. Careful attention to the judgment of the Executive Branch may help inform that inquiry. And when a particular statute dele gates authority to an agency consistent with constitutional limits, courts must respect the delegation, while ensuring that the agency acts within it. But courts need not and under the APA may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous. Because the D. C. and First Circuits relied on Chevron in deciding whether to uphold the Rule, their judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
