Background Interview With Trump Administration Officials

The following excerpts are from an “on background” interview by the Economic Eye On Cuba© with two senior-level officials in the Trump Administration.     

Question: The [Nicolas] Maduro Administration remains in control of Venezuela; the [Miguel] Diaz-Canel Administration remains in control of [Republic of] Cuba.  Do you believe there has become an optical challenge for the Trump Administration- promising too much too quickly?   

Senior Official One: I wish that everyone would take seriously our statements about Cuba and Venezuela.  I think that there is a belief, or maybe a hope, that President Trump is bluffing and we don’t have a strategy.  We’re not and we do.  There is an overall strategy, but good strategies change with the realities of the landscape; we’d be pretty stupid to maintain a plan when the situation on the ground changes.  President Trump is adapting to the conditions- but, and let me stress, that does not mean he is deviating from the goal- a better Cuba and a better Venezuela.  This is our backyard- we take that seriously. 

Senior Official Two: Some people here in Washington believed that the ‘stars aligned’ during the [George W.] Bush Administration- we had, I mean they had [The Honorable] Otto Reich [recess appointment- Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs 2002-2003 and United States Ambassador to Venezuela 1986-1989] among others.  But, what was expected never really materialized.  I remember the nearly 1,000 businessmen attending that food show [U.S. Food & Agribusiness Exhibition in 2002] in Havana.  They never were proactive. 

For President Trump, the stars have aligned, and Venezuela is the tool that we believe can provide change within two countries which have a long and complicated history with the United States.  We have the team in place that every president should want- committed to the goal and capable of implementing a strategy rather than just talking about implementing a strategy.  First, using sanctions to remove an illegitimate leader who has made a mess of his country.  Anyone defending what Maduro has done to his citizens has to have their head examined.  Second, while we do not expect immediate political change in Cuba because of our direct sanctions on Venezuela and direct and indirect sanctions upon Cuba, we believe that at least one result will be changes to the Cuban economy because of what the [Juan] Guaido Administration is doing regarding oil exports to Cuba- and we are helping Interim President Guaido achieve his goal of no longer subsidizing the Cuban regime.  Cuba will have to adjust to losing 30% or more of its heavily-subsidized oil imports, and that means permitting more of a market-based economy.  They won’t like it, but their ability to derail it is pretty fast moving beyond their control. 

Question: The Obama Administration was viewed has having weaponized the OFAC [Office of Foreign Assets Control of the United States Department of the Treasury], has the Trump Administration “nuclearized” the OFAC and what about the impact upon third countries, particularly smaller countries, and how OFAC sanctions impact the ability of the Trump Administration to corral assistance, including from the EU [Brussels, Belgium-based European Union], Canada, Japan, China and Russia? 

Senior Official One: I’m not certain I would agree with the characterization that we have “nuclearized” the OFAC.  The OFAC is a tool in the arsenal of the United States.  Can sanctions be coercive?  Yes, they can be.  The Trump Administration is using the OFAC in several ways, but two are primary.  First, if a country wants to engage with the United States- their companies, their banks, etc., then we expect certain behaviors- such as supporting human rights and democracy and good governance and good behavior.  So, the OFAC plays a huge role in our relationship with Syria, Iran, North Korea, Russia, China, Cuba and Venezuela.  Second, some governments just don’t get it- killing your citizens, permitting your citizens to suffer, raping- stealing from the treasury, remaining in office for decades absent free and fair elections- all of those are wrong.  The United States, and this president, is doing what we believe is right.  

Senior Official Two:  I will echo those statements and add this regarding the impact upon our allies.  We want their help and we need their help.  The United States does not want to be alone- and we aren’t alone in Venezuela or Syria or North Korea or Iran or Russia or China.  Cuba is another matter.  The EU, Canada and Japan can and should be more helpful regarding Cuba- and we believe they will be.  As for smaller countries, we are working with them so they can not only mitigate any impact, but thrive once Mr. Maduro has departed Venezuela.  Secretary [of State Mike] Pompeo has been pretty clear about our support for countries in this hemisphere. 

Question: With respect to the implementation of Title III [authorizing lawsuits] of the [Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Libertad Act) of 1996] Libertad Act, thus far, at least publicly, members of the EU and other countries have not been supportive of decisions by the Trump Administration taken in 2018 and thus far in 2019.  What makes you believe they will be helpful? 

Senior Official Two: I can’t, won’t get into details as to our private conversations, but countries whose companies are active in Cuba understand they will gain far more from a Cuba that makes political changes and changes to its economy than they do from what Cuba looks like today.  I’m guessing that you are indirectly asking about the claims? 

Question: Yes, specifically the 5,913 certified claimants.  To date, statements by the Trump Administration and briefings focus more about political change to Cuba than about settling the US$1.9 billion [US$1,902,202,284.95] in certified claims against Cuba.  The Libertad Act, specifically Title III and Title IV [visa prohibitions on executives and their families], have a focus upon certified claims, yet the Trump Administration is not focusing upon the certified claimants- no meetings, etc. 

Senior Official One: I want to push back against that characterization.  President Trump has not forgotten about the claimants- and I reference both certified and not certified.  The tools of the Libertad Act are numerous, and the State Department has updated the Cuba Restricted List twice, each time expanding the number of entities that are affiliated with the Cuban military.  Our goal is to discourage transactions with these entities- do any U.S. companies really want to engage with a Cuba dominated by the military rather than civilians?  What would U.S. companies say if [Bethesda, Maryland-based] Marriott [International] and [Fort Worth, Texas-based] American Airlines were owned by the Pentagon and flight attendants wore military uniforms and all revenues went to the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff controlled [Bentonville, Arkansas-based Wal-Mart?  That’s not a good model for us and not for Cuba and not for any country. 

Question: But what about a bilateral negotiation to settle the certified claims?  If the certified claims are settled, then would not be more likely for the United States to have the support of the EU, Canada, Japan, and others for further changes in Cuba? 

Senior Official Two: I disagree with your premise that resolving the certified claims is most important; I would argue that democracy and human rights are more important.  This does not mean that we are not focused on the claims; we are.  The Obama Administration wasn’t.  If the Cubans want to send a certified check for US$1.9 billion, we will deposit it and then distribute it.   

Question: Then why not agree to a negotiation?  The expropriation of the Texaco [White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation with a certified claim valued at US$56,196,422.73] refinery in 1960 was pretty much the foundation for where the relationship is today.  Why not focus on the foundation?  Why not meet with the largest certified claimants?  Why not permit the certified claimants to have officially-approved negotiations?  The Obama Administration failed to use its time to do so; now the Trump Administration can make a deal; the President is focused upon deals- this would be settling a nearing sixty-year-old problem.  That has to be enticing?   

Senior Official One: We are not there yet.  And, while the seizure of the refinery was wrong, was illegal, the three regimes [General Fidel Castro, General Raul Castro, Mr. Miguel Diaz-Canel] since have done other things that are far worse.  But, I agree that the Obama Administration failed to use its time to extract concessions from Cuba or to condition the presence of U.S. companies upon changes to how Cuba pays workers and what U.S. companies could do in Cuba.  That was a missed opportunity.  As for the idea of certified claimants, as a group, seeking to negotiate a settlement for the monies owed to them- if the Cuban government agreed to it, we would consider it.  If our international partners want to help, terrific.  We are always open to help with solving problems.  The Cubans have an embassy in Washington; we have an embassy in Havana.  Each has plenty of space for negotiations.  They have our telephone number and email. 

Senior Official Two: It’s been suggested- and written that the Trump Administration is not seeking a resolution to the many issues keeping the United States from having a normal relationship with Cuba; that the goal is to perpetuate issues for political purposes.  That’s not accurate.  There are so many more important issues in the world facing the United States- so, the more problems that can be resolved, the better for this country and for the world.  This president likes moving issues from the in-box to the out-box to the resolved-box.   

Question: What is the position of the Trump Administration towards the certified claims settlement proposal [link] created in December of 2018? 

Senior Official One: It was creative, but there are some problems with its approach.  First, the normal process is for the negotiation to be government-to-government.  The proposal adds a private sector dynamic- Mr. [Kenneth] Feinberg, if I remember correctly, as basically a special negotiator.  Second, we’ve thus far seen no evidence that the Cuban government wants to negotiate. 

Question: Has the Trump Administration connected, directly or indirectly, with the Diaz-Canel Administration for the purpose of opening a channel for negotiating a settlement for the certified claims? 

Senior Official One: Neither of us can comment upon any direct or indirect communications relating to the claims.  Good effort though. 

Question: Can you appreciate that from the perspective of the United States business community, it seems that every issue but the certified claims is a priority for the Trump Administration?  Which runs counter to the deal-making image of the President. 

Senior Official Two: I don’t know if we are going to have an answer for you that you seem to want- certainly, prior to the issues now facing the citizens of Venezuela, there may have been a moment for a dialogue, or more accurately, a negotiation process to take root.  And, remember that we have the unresolved issue of the attacks upon our diplomats- and diplomats from other countries.  That is a consequential impediment to any negotiation process. 

Question: But, isn’t there an ability to de-link issues; I think “siloing” is the term, so that everything doesn’t stop? 

Senior Official One: We are prepared to, use your term, “silo.”  The Cubans are not too interested at the moment.  They need to want to resolve issues.  What we mostly hear is how they are victims- they want US$900 billion from the United States.  That’s crazy talk. 

Question: Can you understand if the Cuban government was reticent now to initiate negotiations regarding the certified claims given the vitriol from the Trump Administration?  Could the Trump Administration not seek to engage in a victory-lap until the negotiations were complete and a settlement was announced?  Doesn’t there need to be a bit of political space- a quiet period so that the Cuban government feels that the negotiations are about a settlement rather than a public relations moment for the Trump Administration? 

Senior Official Two: Remember- the United States did not take nearly 6,000 pieces of property and assets from Cuba; companies and individuals in the United States are the victims.  All administrations operate on multiple tracks- some you see, some you don’t.  What they did was wrong; if they want to make it right, we are prepared to listen. 

Question: If the Diaz-Canel Administration back-channeled or front-channeled an openness to have a face-to-face, bilateral negotiation to settle the 5,913 certified claims, and only the 5.913 certified claims, would the Trump Administration be prepared to have senior-level representatives sit across the table and negotiate? 

Senior Official Two: There is quite a bit to that question.  That would be quite a diplomatic bomb throwing.  As we said earlier, I’m not certain we are there yet- meaning, well, that would be a shocker.  Frankly, there might be considerable pressure from our friends in other countries to engage- which we might.  However, there is tremendous distance between an overture and a negotiation.   Having said that, if there was a sincere outreach, we would respond. 

Question: So, a negotiation is not off-the-table?  Is not a non-starter?  The Trump Administration would negotiate agree to a negotiation even if the government of Cuba said that it is limited to the 5,913 certified claimants? 

Senior Official One: I am starting to see that we are moving from an oval to a circle with your questions.  Let’s end here: If there is a succinct outreach from the Cubans, whether directly or indirectly, President Trump will respond.  Again, our goal is to resolve issues, not perpetuate them.    

Question: There is a rumor that the Trump Administration has asked Panama and other countries to de-flag vessels used to transport oil from/to Cuba and Venezuela. 

Senior Official One: No comment. 

Senior Official Two: No comment.

LINK To Complete Text In PDF Format

Vice President Pence Confirms "Stronger Action Against Cuba" In "Coming Weeks"

The White House

Office of the Vice President

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

April 5, 2019

REMARKS BY VICE PRESIDENT PENCE TO RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

Rice University

Houston, Texas

Excerpt:

The truth is, the dictator has lost the support of his people, and he's seen more than a thousand uniformed soldiers reject his leadership and rally to the banner of freedom.  And the truth is, the only way he clings to power is with the help that he receives from communist Cuba.  I heard as much from the First Lady of Venezuela just last week. 
 
Cuba’s leaders are the real imperialists in the Western Hemisphere.  (Applause.)  The truth has to be told.  For decades, Cuba has tried to create client states across this region.  While normal countries export goods, Cuba exports tyranny and strong-arm tactics.  Cuba’s influence has driven Venezuela’s failure, and the time has come to liberate Venezuela from Cuba.  (Applause.)
 
That’s just one more reason why President Trump kept his word when he reversed the failed policies of the last administration toward the dictatorship in Havana.  In the coming weeks, the United States will be taking even stronger action against Cuba.  In this administration, I promise you, it will always be Que Viva Cuba Libre.

LINK TO COMPLETE TEXT

Trump Administration Sanctioning Venezuela Oil Companies And Vessels Used To Export Oil To Cuba

Press Releases: The United States Sanctions Companies Enabling Shipment of Venezuelan Oil to Cuba

04/05/2019 03:54 PM EDT

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

April 5, 2019  

Today, the United States sanctioned two companies, Ballito Bay Shipping Inc. and ProPer in Management Inc., operating in Venezuela’s oil sector and the vessel Despina Andrianna used to transport oil to Cuba. Additional vessels, in which Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA has interests, are being identified as blocked property, pursuant to Executive Order 13850. These actions target entities and vessels that have been enabling the former Maduro regime to continue undermine the prosperity and democracy that Venezuelans deserve.

The former Maduro regime continues to line its pockets with the profits from natural resources that properly belong to the people of Venezuela. Meanwhile, Cuba is propping up the former regime and facilitating its repression of the Venezuelan people, through its military and intelligence support to Maduro.  

The United States is taking action to curtail this and other ongoing corrupt activities of Nicolas Maduro and malign actors. We encourage companies, banks, and other institutions to refrain from providing services that support his repressive practices. We also urge countries to take appropriate legal measures to deprive Maduro and his cronies of assets held overseas and to prevent travel to their countries.  

We will continue to use the full weight of U.S. economic and diplomatic power to complete the peaceful transition to a once-again free, prosperous and stable Venezuela.

LINK To OFAC Announcement:

https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20190405.aspx

Trump Administration Issues Another Extension- Two Weeks... Could Negotiations With EU And Others Be Underway?

Today, the Trump Administration informed the United States Congress of its intention(s) for what-happens-next relating to the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Libertad Act) of 1996. 

The extension may be due to a coincidentally-timed visit this week to Washington DC by twenty-eight (28) foreign ministers representing the twenty-nine (29) members of the Brussels, Belgium-based North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for a recognition of the 70th anniversary of the organization.   

Some foreign ministers (including from Spain and Canada) reported using their meetings with officials of the United States government, including with The Honorable Mike Pompeo, United States Secretary of State, to share their opinions as to the implementation of provisions of the Libertad Act. 

This new two-week suspension and the previous thirty-day suspension should reasonably convey to the 5,913 certified claimants that the Trump Administration has participated in substantive negotiations and plans to continue substantive negotiations with governments, including with the Republic of Cuba, to provide for a prompt resolution for the certified claimants.  If the thirty-day suspension and two-week suspension have been to further determine what the Trump Administration should do absent of negotiations with governments including with the Republic of Cuba, then questionable as to the strategy of the Trump Administration: is the goal solving the problem or maintaining the problem?   

There has yet to be a formal public and private outreach by The White House and the United States Department of State to the largest (first and second equal 24% of the total and thirty equal 56% of the total) certified claimants to attend group meetings and individual meetings to discuss what the certified claimants believe to be meaningful methods to seek a prompt settlement.   

“For Immediate Release 

MEDIA NOTE

April 3, 2019 

Secretary Pompeo Extends For Two Weeks Title III Suspension with an Exception (LIBERTAD Act) 

Today, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo announced his decision to continue for two weeks, from April 18 through May 1, 2019, the current suspension with an exception of the right to bring an action under Title III of the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act.  The current suspension expires April 17.  The Secretary has reported to the appropriate Congressional committees that this determination is necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.  Suspension does not apply to:  

The right to bring an action against a Cuban entity or sub-entity identified by name on the State Department’s List of Restricted Entities and Sub-entities Associated with Cuba (known as the Cuba Restricted List), as may be updated from time to time. 

The Department continues to examine human rights conditions in Cuba, including ongoing repression of the rights of the Cuban people to free speech, free expression and free assembly.  The Department is also monitoring Cuba’s continued military, security, and intelligence support to Nicolas Maduro, who is responsible for repression, violence, and a man-made humanitarian crisis in  in Venezuela.  

We encourage any person doing business in Cuba to reconsider whether they are trafficking in confiscated property and abetting the Cuban dictatorship.”   

This two-week extension of the 4 March 2019 partial (although there is debate as to whether it was partial) implementation of Title III of the Libertad Act should be cautiously viewed by opponents as Title III of the Libertad Act has been implemented and the use of Title IV of the Libertad Act is expected to become a focus of attention.   

There remains support within The White House and in the United States Congress for a Title III lawsuit to be filed, to be adjudicated, and for a plaintiff to receive monetary damages with Spain-based companies among the expected first targets.  There is a visceral need for an example to be established and the Trump Administration is patient and while what was announced on 4 March 2019 has yet to result in a legal filing, that does not mean that nothing will be filed. 

Title III of the Libertad Act authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim where the owner of the certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using the asset.   

Title IV of the Libertad Act restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims.  One company is currently subject to this provision. 

The Trump Administration’s decision on 4 March 2019 is not (yet) about creating an efficient timeline to negotiate a settlement with the Republic of Cuba for the 5,913 certified claims.   

The Trump Administration mantra is much about resolving what its predecessors failed to do; and the Trump Administration heralds its negotiating prowess.  To date, the mantra and the prowess are missing from the discussion- could The Honorable Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, not have been fully-briefed as to his options?  Negotiation is his preferred default position and thus far the Trump Administration has been devoid of negotiations (and negotiators) relating to the Republic of Cuba.    

LINK To Kushner/Greenblatt/Feinberg Certified Claims Settlement Proposal 

Press Releases: Secretary Enacts 30-Day Suspension of Title III (LIBERTAD Act) With an Exception

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

March 4, 2019  

Today, Secretary Pompeo reported to the appropriate Congressional committees his determination that an additional suspension for 30 days through April 17, 2019, of the right to bring an action under Title III of the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act is necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba, with the below exception. Beginning March 19, suspension shall not apply to:  

The right to bring an action against a Cuban entity or sub-entity identified by name on the State Department’s List of Restricted Entities and Sub-entities Associated with Cuba (known as the Cuba Restricted List), as may be updated from time to time. 

We will continue to study the impact of this suspension on the human rights situation in Cuba. The Cuba Restricted List identifies entities and sub-entities under the control of Cuban military, intelligence, or security services. These security services are directly responsible for the repression of the Cuban people. We encourage any person doing business in Cuba to reconsider whether they are trafficking in confiscated property and abetting the Cuban dictatorship.

Refresher: Kushner/Greenblatt/Feinberg Process To Settle 5,913 Certified Claims

Troika To Negotiate Settlement Of Certified Claims Against Cuba?

Kushner, Greenblatt & Feinberg

The Process: Briefings, Lunch, Travel

It’s Primarily About Real Estate; So Why Not Use Real Estate Executives?

Two Largest Claims Account For 24%; Thirty Account For 56% Of Total

President Trump Can Negotiate A Deal That Eluded Eleven Of His Predecessors  

Settlement Is Possible Without Cuba Putting Up Cash

Every Country Cuba Owes Will Benefit From A Settlement

EU Should Be Advocating For A Swift Agreement 

The Trump Administration has created the political moment for tag-team negotiators Mr. Jason Greenblatt (DOB 1967; Assistant to the President and Special Representative for International Negotiations) and Mr. Jared Kushner (DOB 1981; Senior Advisor to the President & Director- Office of American Innovation) to expand their bilateral portfolios to include the Republic of Cuba. 

LINK To Proposal

Did Vice President Pence Confirm That Additional Cuba Sanctions Are Coming?

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
April 2, 2019 

REMARKS BY VICE PRESIDENT PENCE 
IN MEETING WITH THE FAMILY MEMBERS OF 
CITGO EXECUTIVES CURRENTLY DETAINED BY THE 
MADURO REGIME IN VENEZUELA

Vice President's Ceremonial Office 

Q- Will the U.S. take any (inaudible) actions to help (inaudible)? [Bold Added]

THE VICE PRESIDENT:  The United States is going to continue to take strong action not only to isolate Venezuela, but also we're looking at strong action against Cuba, which continues to provide personnel and support to the dictatorship in Venezuela and enables the oppression of the people of Venezuela.  

At this point, this President is looking at a broad range of options.  There's a great deal more we can do, and we're prepared to do it.  But we call today on the regime to immediately release these five Americans and one legal permanent resident.  They're being held illegally.  But this regime should release all political prisoners.  But to accomplish that, the rule of law has to be restored, democracy has to be restored, and Nicolás Maduro must go.  It's time for a new day for Venezuela.  

U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 27.8% In January; Ranks 54th Of 229 U.S. Export Markets

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©

April 2019

January 2019 Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Increase 27.8%- 1

Cuba Ranked 54th of 229 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2

January 2019 Healthcare Product Exports US$24,098.00- 2

January 2019 Humanitarian Donations US$269,435.00- 3

Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase- 3

U.S. Port Export Data- 16 

JANUARY 2019 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 27.8%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in January 2019 were US$23,884,686.00 compared to US$18,680,345.00 in January 2018 and US$14,149,848.00 in January 2017.  Exporters in January 2019 included among others: Atlanta, Georgia-based AJC International (poultry); Atlanta, Georgia-based Intervision Foods (poultry); Chattanooga, Tennessee-based Koch Foods (poultry); Salisbury, Maryland-based Perdue Agribusiness (soybeans); Little Rock, Arkansas-based Mountaire Farms (poultry).

LINK To Complete Analysis

Turkish Airlines Flights To/From Cuba And Other Countries Are An Airborne Embassy

Istanbul, Turkey-based Turkish Airlines operates an Airbus-330 aircraft for its thirteen-hour-plus flights from Istanbul Airport (IST) to Jose Marti International Airport (HAV) in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  LINK: https://www.turkishairlines.com/en-int/flights/flights-to-havana/ 

The opening of the new US$12 billion Istanbul Airport (IST) at 2:00 pm (14:00) on 6 April 2019, which replaces Istanbul Ataturk Airport, is for Turkey far more important as a political moment for domestic and international audiences than a moment to demonstrate competence in construction and commercial expectations. 

The government of Turkey, which retains a controlling shareholding in Turkish Airlines, has successfully integrated the connectivity of its airline with the creation of and maintenance in political relationships. 

Turkish Airlines has become an airborne diplomatic tool; a civilian version of an AWACS aircraft- constantly scanning for information and providing information. 

Turkish Airlines (300 destinations) is an airborne embassy and Turkish Cargo (serving 123 countries) is an airborne chamber of commerce. 

Turkish Airlines aircraft are a means by which to transport the flag, transport the image, transport the perspective, and provide transportation for political and commercial leadership in other countries to visit Turkey. 

Turkey-based companies have commercial operations in the Republic of Cuba including those focused in airport operations and port operations: 

http://www.tavhavalimanlari.com.tr/en-en/pages/announcements.aspx?aID=297 

http://www.globalportsholding.com/news-details/113/awarded-agreement-for-operation-of-havana-cruise-port-cuba 

From Turkish Airlines: 

“Turkish Airlines, opening more international gateways across the world for its passengers than any other airline, currently offers a wide range of flights to 304 destinations in 122 countries. 

Turkish Airlines, who has been performing a rising performance in its passenger potential for more than ten years, carried 10.4 million passenger in 2003. This figure rose to 29.1 million, 32.6 million, 39 million and 48.3 million passengers in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively. In 2014, an impressive period of growth saw this number rise to around 55 million. The number of passengers carried in 2015 was 61.2 million, and this increased to 62.8 million by the end of 2016. While the number of passengers carried by the flag carrier reached to 68.6 million in 2017, Turkish Airlines’ total Load Factor improved by 4.7 points up to 79.1%, while international Load Factor increased by 5 points, up to 78.4%, during January-December 2017 period. During January-April 2018, increase in demand and total number of passengers was 21% and 24%, respectively, over the same period of last year, and the total number of passengers reached to 23 million.” 

A member of Star Alliance: 

“The Star Alliance network was established in 1997 as the first truly global airline alliance to offer worldwide reach, recognition and seamless service to the international traveller. Its acceptance by the market has been recognized by numerous awards, including the Air Transport World Market Leadership Award and Best Airline Alliance by both Business Traveller Magazine and Skytrax. The member airlines are: Adria Airways, Aegean Airlines, Air Canada, Air China, Air India, Air New Zealand, ANA, Asiana Airlines, Austrian, Avianca, Avianca Brasil, Brussels Airlines, Copa Airlines, Croatia Airlines, EGYPTAIR, Ethiopian Airlines, EVA Air, LOT Polish Airlines, Lufthansa, Scandinavian Airlines, Shenzhen Airlines, Singapore Airlines, South African Airways, SWISS, TAP Air Portugal, THAI, Turkish Airlines and United. Overall, the Star Alliance network currently offers more than 18,800 daily flights to 1,317 airports in 193 countries. Further connecting flights are offered by Star Alliance Connecting Partner, Juneyao Airlines.”

Tuesday Is Deadline For Next Libertad Act Decision By Trump Administration

Tuesday, 2 April 2019, is the statutory deadline for the Trump Administration to inform the United States Congress of its intention(s) for what-happens-next relating to the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Libertad Act) of 1996. 

If the Trump Administration decides to extend further the partial (although there is debate as to whether it was partial) implementation of Title III of the Libertad Act, reckless by opponents to believe that the Trump Administration is timid, is weak; that opponents within the United States Congress and advocacy groups are victorious.   

There is support within The White House and in the United States Congress for a Title III lawsuit to be filed, to be adjudicated, and for a plaintiff to receive monetary damages with Spain-based companies among the expected first targets.  There is a visceral need for an example to be established and the Trump Administration is patient and while what was announced on 4 March 2019 has yet to result in a legal filing, that does not mean that nothing will be filed. 

Title III of the Libertad Act authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim where the owner of the certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using the asset.   

Title IV of the Libertad Act restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims.  One company is currently subject to this provision. 

The Trump Administration’s decision on 4 March 2019 is not (yet) about creating an efficient timeline to negotiate a settlement with the Republic of Cuba for the 5,913 certified claims.   

The Trump Administration mantra is much about resolving what its predecessors failed to do; and the Trump Administration heralds its negotiating prowess.  To date, the mantra and the prowess are missing from the discussion- could The Honorable Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, not have been fully-briefed as to his options?  Negotiation is his preferred default position and thus far the Trump Administration has been devoid of negotiations (and negotiators) relating to the Republic of Cuba.    

Press Releases: Secretary Enacts 30-Day Suspension of Title III (LIBERTAD Act) With an Exception  

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

March 4, 2019  

Today, Secretary Pompeo reported to the appropriate Congressional committees his determination that an additional suspension for 30 days through April 17, 2019, of the right to bring an action under Title III of the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act is necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba, with the below exception. Beginning March 19, suspension shall not apply to:  

The right to bring an action against a Cuban entity or sub-entity identified by name on the State Department’s List of Restricted Entities and Sub-entities Associated with Cuba (known as the Cuba Restricted List), as may be updated from time to time. 

We will continue to study the impact of this suspension on the human rights situation in Cuba. The Cuba Restricted List identifies entities and sub-entities under the control of Cuban military, intelligence, or security services. These security services are directly responsible for the repression of the Cuban people. We encourage any person doing business in Cuba to reconsider whether they are trafficking in confiscated property and abetting the Cuban dictatorship.

Turkey's Karadeniz Holding Reports Electricity Contract With Cuba In October 2018; But, No Contract Signed Five Months Later

The February 2019 issue of The Turkish Perspective, distributed to passengers traveling on Istanbul, Turkey-based Turkish Airlines, included an article on page 20 about Istanbul, Turkey-based Karadeniz Holding and its “Karpowership” project in the Republic of Cuba. 

The title of the article was “The Floating Energy Hub Of The ‘One World’” Karadeniz Holding is taking Turkey’s technology to other countries with it’s global brand Karpowership.  As of 2018, it has become the company with the world’s largest floating power plant fleet with 15 energy ships with an installed capacity of 2,800 MW.” 

“Lastly, in October 2018, Karpowership expanded to South America and signed a contract with Energoimport, part of the Ministry of Energy of Cuba [Republic of Cuba government-operated Union Electrica], to provide electricity of 160 MW for 51-months.  This is a crucial step in the Power of Friendship project, as Karpowership continues to spread ability to access economical electricity around the world.”  

Unknowns: Is Energoimport paying the full cost of the service?  Why is the service contract for 51-months?  Why is the service contract for 160 MW?  Where will the vessel be docked in the Republic of Cuba? 

Response from Karadeniz Holding: “The details of our project are not fixed, still in the works, we will reach back out to you once our full project parameters are finalized.”  Karadeniz Holding had sought an employee to manage its operations in the Republic of Cuba. 

From the company’s Internet site: “Since 2010, 15 Powerships have been completed reaching 2,800 MW installed capacity. In addition, 18 Powerships with a total capacity of 5,000 MW will be added to the Karpowership fleet. Powerships have been supplying 25% of Lebanon, 23% of Ghana, 10% of Mozambique, 30% of Northern Sulawesi, Indonesia, 55% of East Nusa Tenggra, Indonesia, 80% of Ambon, Indonesia, 10% of Sudan, 33% of Gambia, and 33% of Sierra Leone’s total electricity generation. By 2018, it has met 15% of Iraq’s and 16% of Zambia’s energy needs.”  

PROJECT MANAGER, CUBA

Karadeniz Holding  

“Founded in 1948, Karadeniz Holding engages in various sectors, primarily energy, finance, tourism and real estate industries. The Group is the only owner, operator and builder of the first Powership™ (floating power plant) fleet in the world and plays an active role in medium to long-term investments with more than 1600 employees around the world in different 16 countries in Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America. We are looking for PROJECT MANAGER (Turkish citizen and/or expat) who will be working mainly for our Power Plant projects in Cuba. The candidate shall be based in the Head Quarter in Istanbul and responsible of the administrative and commercial part of Powership projects implementation. The successful candidate should have the following qualifications; Engineering degree, MBA or masters degree is a plus, At least 7 years experience required, preferably in international Project Management, Experience in Latin America electricity market and power generation sector in a project management capacity ideal, Preferably experienced in commercial management of international investment projects in the energy sector, Thorough knowledge of Project operations and financial processes, Native-level Spanish with excellent written and spoken is must, ideally with an additional language, preferably Portuguese, Very good command of MS Office Applications, High level of presentation skills, Financial understanding and business mindset, An outstanding eye for detail with a drive to provide exceptional administrative support, Ability to perform in a complex cross-functional business environment, Ability to work well as part of a strategic team in a fast-paced, deadline-oriented work environment, completing multiple complex tasks simultaneously, Excellent communication, negotiation & conflict management skills, Outstanding influencing, interpersonal and networking skills to drive collaborative culture at all level, Strong critical thinking and effective problem solving skills, Keen and effective team player, No restrictions for travelling inside of Turkey and across Africa and LatAm, No military obligation for male candidates.  

JOB DESCRIPTION- Typical responsibilities to include; Manage proactively all contractual matters related to the project, follow performance criteria within the scope of the contract and defend the company against any contractual breaches and preserve interests, Supervise the timely production, submission and reception of documents/reports and make sure appropriate follow-up is made by concerned parties, contribution to the evaluation process (cost, schedule, technical content, etc.) of identified development ideas during the Business Plan preparation, Responsible for coordination and follow up of project realization (control and supervision of project preparation and implementation incl. follow-up activities) during the entire lifecycle of the projects, Responsible for consulting/preparation of sales invoicing studies, Submission of periodical progress reports.  

The Foundations of Karadeniz Holding were laid in 1948 by Rauf Osman Karadeniz. Karadeniz Holding began in the machine and heavy industry trade and diversified its business interests over the years. In 1996, Karadeniz Holding Group saw the growth potential in the energy industry and decided to take step into that industry by founding the Karadeniz Energy Group. Karadeniz Energy Group became the first company to obtain more than one license throughout the energy value chain in Turkey ın 2002, with the liberalization of the Turkish Energy Industry. The production, wholesale and export licenses were obtained. Karadeniz Holding Group decided to diversify its business concerns, acquiring Pamuk Factoring, Pamuk Leasing, and Eti Yatırım, opening operations in the finance industryın 2007. The group plays an active role in all finance operations except banking In 2009, the Karadeniz Energy Group began designing and producing "Powership"​ in order to establish world's first floating energy ship fleet in keeping with its vision of global expansion. 5 ships sailed to Iraq and Pakistan and commenced energy production in 2010 – 2011. Continuing its activities in the energy, finance, tourism and real estate industries with 1.500 employees, Karadeniz Holding promotes Turkey and continues to contribute value added to the national economy with business activities and international investments for over 60 years. 

Black Sea Holding
Oil and Energy
1001-5000 employees

The Foundations of the Black Sea. Black Sea Business In 1996, Karadeniz Holding Group saw the growth potential of the Black Sea Energy Group. Black Sea Energy Group has become one of the top companies in the world in 2002, with the liberalization of the Turkish Energy Industry. The production, wholesale and export licenses were obtained. Karadeniz Holding Group decided to diversify its business concerns, acquiring Pamuk Factoring, Cotton Leasing, and Eti Investment, opening operations in the finance industry in 2007. The group plays an active role in all finance operations except banking In 2009, the Karadeniz Energy Group began designing and producing "Powership" in order to establish the world's first floating energy ship fleet in keeping with its vision of global expansion. 5 companies sailed in Iraq and Pakistan in 2011 - 2011 activities for over 60 years.”

Karpowership Brochure In PDF Format

The Unresolved Commercial, Economic And Political Issues In Venezuela Remain A Bilateral And Multilateral Contagion.

Until there is a resolution, or the perception of a resolution to Venezuela amongst impacted constituencies, challenging will be resolve by the Trump Administration to engage the Republic of Cuba in direct bilateral negotiations about the certified claims or any other issue of substance. 

There are decisions which could be implemented in Venezuela and in the Republic of Cuba that might prompt a shift in the political compass (and calculus) of the Trump Administration from directionally limited to normal activity.  For that to happen, the Trump Administration needs to be succinct in the logic and practicality of its strategy and its messaging. 

The Trump Administration must provide assurances to Russia and China that monies owed to them by Venezuela will be repaid and that the Trump Administration will not seek to prohibit or deter companies from Russia and China from bidding on, implementing, and receiving payment from contracts in the future.

First, H.E. Juan Guaido, President of the National Assembly of Venezuela and self-declared Interim President of Venezuela, should be unequivocal in stating he will not become a presidential candidate when the next election is scheduled.  By confirming that his role is solely guiding Venezuela to its next presidential election, he would assist, but not eliminate, perceptions that he is too influenced by and beholden to interests of the United States.  His not seeking higher office removes an impediment to resolving the problems of Venezuela. 

Interim-President Guaido has limited time within which to demonstrate a landscape of control of the government of Venezuela- especially relating to the provision of services and particularly with respect to the distribution of substantial quantities of United States Dollars and other currencies located outside of Venezuela which the Trump Administration and other governments have sequestered for his control and then use on behalf of the citizens of Venezuela.  There may be a moment where citizens of Venezuela, despite support for Interim-President Guaido, decide that too many of their county’s financial resources are inaccessible unless they support President Nicolas Maduro; and the international community generally has limited patience in maintaining potentially billions of United States dollars and other currencies in perpetuity for a Maduro-less or Maduro-light government of Venezuela.  

Second, the Trump Administration has increased its usage of the phrasing “recognizing the realities on the ground” to discuss territorial issues.  The reality on the ground in Venezuela is those serving in the armed forces of Venezuela will determine whether President Maduro departs, when he departs and how he departs.  Unless there is an amnesty which includes departure from the country, if desired, and a guarantee that the United States and other countries will not pursue individuals for additional criminal or civil actions, challenging will be creating an atmosphere where members of the armed forces will support meaningful- and permanent change in Venezuela. 

Third, President Maduro, should he decide to resign and remain in Venezuela or depart for another country, would require assurances that he and his family would not be pursued for criminal and civil charges.  Perhaps, an unsettling and unappetizing possibility, but lacking such “not-go-to-jail cards and get-of-of-jail cards” the process of crisis- and the pain inflicted upon the citizens of Venezuela will continue- as will a question for those opposing President Maduro:  What is most important- President Maduro becoming Mr. Maduro or holding President Maduro accountable when he becomes Mr. Maduro?  There may not be a reasonable option to pursue both- there might be a forced choice.  Is the goal solving the problem or maintaining the problem?     

Fourth, if President Maduro departs Venezuela and the Republic of Cuba agrees to provide him with temporary or permanent housing, what should be the conditions?  Other countries who might host President Maduro include Russia, Turkey or one of the other thirteen members of the Vienna, Austria-based Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).  

The Republic of Cuba would want guarantees from the United States, Organization of American States (OAS), European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) and International Criminal Court (ICC) among others that Mr. Maduro would not be sought for extradition and the Republic of Cuba would not be penalized for providing housing to Mr. Maduro.   

The United States would need to choose- the Trump Administration has defined President Maduro and what has happened within Venezuela as a [mostly] creation of the Republic of Cuba and has stated that if the Republic of Cuba withdrew its support (military and intelligence) for President Maduro, the problems of Venezuela would become those for Mr. Guaido (until a new president is elected) and supporters to repair.   

Political realities are often not binary and are multi-dimensional and lacking zero-sum definitions.  The Trump Administration will likely not inhabit the Venezuela it projects to seek in the short-term to medium-term unless there is an agreement with the Republic of Cuba- who will not agree to be blamed by the Trump Administration for what is happening in Venezuela while simultaneously being blamed if it takes a meaningful decision to change the equation to what is sought by the Trump Administration by providing safe harbor to Mr. Maduro.  Such self-imposed constraints on the Trump Administration would be challenging and equally so for members of the United States Congress.  

Fifth, if the Republic of Cuba were to agree to provide housing for Mr. Maduro, it would expectantly seek from the Trump Administration an agreement to reverse some decisions it has already taken or not implement what it has yet to do; perhaps including reinstatement to the OAS and lessening some international transaction restrictions.   

There is also logic for the Republic of Cuba to seek nothing from the Trump Administration and extract global goodwill for solving a problem which, by doing so, will result in economic pain for the Republic of Cuba.  The Republic of Cuba’s reliance on Venezuela has continued to decrease during the last four years; so, while painful, the Republic of Cuba could manage an elimination of its preferential commercial agreements.  If the Trump Administration were to then implement additional measures, they would be perceived by other countries as punitive- and the Republic of Cuba would gain leverage in the global marketplace- and in some constituencies throughout the United States.   

The primary question for the Trump Administration: President Maduro is willing to let his people suffer; is the Trump Administration willing to let his people suffer?  President Maduro has now survived past the presented expectations of the Trump Administration, so the distance between the Trump Administration obtaining everything that it wants and what is likely available continues to increase- that’s a problem for the Trump Administration. 

The likely predicted outcome for Venezuela will neither have a winner or a looser.  With President Maduro’s absence, all stakeholders will continue to endure pain while gaining or regaining what they want.

LINK To Analysis In PDF Format

Trump Administration May Have Done What It Said It Did Not Do.... Does It Solve The Problem?

Trump Administration May Have Done What It Said It Did Not Do

Does Decision Solve The Problem?

Why Weren’t The Largest Certified Claimants Consulted?

185 Words To Implement Title III, But Not One Of The Words Was “Claims”

Has Trump Administration Abandoned The Certified Claimants?

Use Of Title III Does Not Settle The US$1.9 Billion In Certified Claims

If A “Trafficker” Can Buy-Off A Claimant, Does That Hold Cuba Accountable?

Wouldn’t Mediation Be Preferred For The Certified Claimants?

Will EU Change Trump Administration Or Will Trump Administration Change EU?

EU In 1998 Had 15 Members; EU In 2019 Has 28 Members

One-Way Title III Train May Have Departed The Executive Branch Station

Courts May Determine If There Is “Tourism” And Who Can Sue

Seventy-Five Days For A Default Judgement?

What Happens In Thirty Days? Increasing Use Of Title IV

Trump Administration Punts; Or Was It A Field Goal Rather Than A Touchdown?

LINK To Complete Analysis In PDF Format

Who Will (Must) Be Trump Administration's Next Targets? Challenge For 7 Senators & 2 Governors

The Trump Administration May Have A Credibility Problem

Distance Between Rhetoric And Action

Is It A Problem It’s Willing To Endure?

Will Marriott Be The Trump Administration’s Next Target?

US$203 Billion In Revenues Is Powerful Motivation For Status Quo

Challenge For Seven Members Of The United States Senate

Challenge For Two Governors

Will The Courts Decide That Everyone Can Sue?  

A subsidiary of Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International, Inc. (2018 revenues approximately US$20 billion), Stamford, Connecticut-based Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide LLC, has a series of two-year licenses from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury in Washington DC to manage two (2) properties located in the Republic of Cuba. 

Marriott International also controls the second-largest certified claim against the government of the Republic of Cuba which it inherited in 2016 as a result of the purchase of Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide LLC.  

Both properties managed by Marriott International (through Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide LLC) are in the city of Havana, Four Points by Sheraton Havana and Hotel Inglaterra (delayed opening without explanation from December 2016 to December 2019) and owned by entities controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba (FAR). 

The OFAC licenses were first issued during the Obama Administration and were renewed during the Trump Administration, although there has been a reported delay by the OFAC in transferring the licenses from Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide LLC to Marriott International. 

Licenses issued by the OFAC may be rescinded at any time if their use no is no longer deemed in the interest of United States policy; and recipients of licenses have limited defense using the judicial concept of estoppel (we did it, we made decisions depending upon continuity, you can’t take it away) because the applicant willingly seeks a license, and thus acknowledges uncertainty since the Republic of Cuba is under statutory, regulatory, and policy sanctions.  What one administration does is not generally compelled upon a subsequent administration.   

There are, however, exceptions including the airlines, cruise lines and hotel management operations commenced during the Obama Administration and continuing (thus far) through the first nearing twenty-six (26) months of the forty-eight (48) month Trump Administration.  Another well-known example is the agreement by the Clinton Administration to license the U.S. Food & Agri-Business Exhibition, but the license was not issued prior to 20 January 2001.  The Bush Administration adhered to the previous agreement and the event was held in the Republic of Cuba in September 2002. 

Since 20 January 2017, no airline, cruise line, or hotel management company has had their license or authorization to operate in the Republic of Cuba rescinded by the OFAC. 

The credibility of the Trump Administration will continue to be challenged within the United States and other countries in terms of the level of impact it desires to inflict upon the Republic of Cuba and why United States companies are a protected class while non-United States companies are a hunted species.   

For example, the Trump Administration has prohibited “direct” transactions with entities in the Republic of Cuba who are controlled by the FAR rather than “direct and indirect” transactions.  Including “indirect” transactions could impact United States airlines, cruise lines and hotel management contracts in the Republic of Cuba.  Exempting “indirect” transactions protects United States airlines, cruise lines and hotel management contracts.   

The distinction has permitted individuals subject to United States jurisdiction who visit the Republic of Cuba within the twelve (12) categories of authorized travel purposes codified in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 to make indirect payments to entities listed on the Cuba Restricted List (CRL) maintained by the United States Department of State.  Visiting the Republic of Cuba for the purpose of tourism is specifically prohibited by the TSREEA. 

As long as Marriott International, Fort Worth, Texas-based American Airlines (2018 revenues approximately US$20 billion) and Miami, Florida-based Carnival Corporation (2018 revenues approximately US$19 billion) among others continue to operate throughout the Republic of Cuba, and do so directly and/or indirectly with entities controlled by the FAR, the correct interpretation will be the Trump Administration will want to do, and will likely say they want to do, more than they will do.  United States companies take solace in that space.    

Likely some of those who work in The West Wing of The White House and the adjacent Eisenhower Executive Office Building (EEOB) are supportive of an increased aggressiveness while those occupying offices on the 6th floor and 7th floor of the United States Department of State generally prefer a less confrontational profile. 

Challenge For Members Of Congress & Governors- US$203 Billion 

Members of the United States Congress representing Marriott International: The Honorable Benjamin Cardin (D- Maryland), The Honorable Chris Van Hollen (D- Maryland) and The Honorable Jamie Raskin (D- 8th District).  They are supportive of the hotel management licenses held by Marriott International for the Republic of Cuba. 

The Honorable Mitt Romney (R- Utah) remains a valuable asset to Marriott International, given his multi-decade relationship with the Marriott Family and longtime service as a member of the Board of Directors of Marriott International: https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/11/22/marriott-will-have-an-influential-friend-in-senator-mitt-romney-r-utah?rq=mitt%20romney 

There is a challenge for seven (7) members of the United States Senate and two (2) Governors as they generally or fully support Trump Administration policies toward the Republic of Cuba, including Title III (law suits against traffickers) and Title IV (visa restrictions for traffickers) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Libertad Act).   

Members of the United States Senate: The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida), The Honorable Rick Scott (R- Florida), The Honorable Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey), The Honorable Ted Cruz (R- Texas), The Honorable John Cornyn (R- Texas), The Honorable Johnny Isakson (R-Georgia), The Honorable David Perdue (R- Georgia; his first cousin is The Honorable Sonny Perdue, United States Secretary of Agriculture) and two governors: The Honorable Ron DeSantis (R- Florida) and The Honorable Greg Abbott (R- Texas) have to align the short-term (to 3 November 2020) political calculus with longer-term commercial constituent interests.

The question: Do they support the Trump Administration when that support is detrimental to the commercial interests of companies located (operating) within their states?  And, in the cases of the airlines, the majority of their passengers are individuals subject to United States jurisdiction who are of Cuban descent and reside in the politically significant State of Florida?   

Eventually, judges of United States District Courts may determine who can sue, who can’t sue, who can be sued, and who can’t be sued; the politicians may be biding their time.  Then, politicians can feign blamelessness.  

Companies in the states of Florida, Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey and Texas with commercial operations in the Republic of Cuba: 

Atlanta, Georgia-based Delta Air Lines (2018 revenues approximately US$44 billion); Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International (2018 revenues approximately US$20 billion); Chicago, Illinois-based United Airlines (2018 revenues approximately US$41 billion; operates flights from Newark Liberty International Airport in New Jersey); Dallas, Fort Worth, Texas-based American Airlines (2018 revenues approximately US$42 billion); Dallas, Texas-based Southwest Airlines (2018 revenues approximately US$22 billion); Miami, Florida-based Carnival Corporation & plc (2018 revenues approximately US$19 billion); Miami, Florida-based Norwegian Cruise Line (2018 revenues approximately US$6 billion); Miami, Florida-based Royal Caribbean International (2018 revenues approximately US$9.5 billion). 

The Certified Claims 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC- https://www.justice.gov/fcsc) at the United States Department of Justice which are valued at US$1,902,202,284.95.  The USFCSC permitted interest to be accrued in the amount of 6% per annum; with the current value of the 5,913 certified claims approximately US$8,521,866,156.95.  

The first asset to be expropriated by the government of the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery in 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement.   

“The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States (FCSC) is a quasi-judicial, independent agency within the Department of Justice which adjudicates claims of U.S. nationals against foreign governments, under specific jurisdiction conferred by Congress, pursuant to international claims settlement agreements, or at the request of the Secretary of State. Funds for payment of the Commission's awards are derived from congressional appropriations, international claims settlements, or liquidation of foreign assets in the United States by the Departments of Justice and the Treasury.”

Certified claimants with current or recent activity within the Republic of Cuba include: New York, New York-based Colgate-Palmolive, Moline, Illinois-based Deere & Company, Atlanta, Georgia-based Delta Air Lines, Boston, Massachusetts-based General Electric, Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International, Chicago, Illinois-based University of Chicago, Denver, Colorado-based Western Union and New Haven, Connecticut-based Yale University.

LINK To Complete Text In PDF Format

Trump Administration Decision About B2 Visa For Cuban Nationals Has Business Focus

According to a senior-level official of the Trump Administration, goals of the decision to alter the B2 Visa also include 1) increase pressure upon the Republic of Cuba to permit the operation of wholesale product marketplaces and service marketplaces for use by the self-employed by lessening the ability of the self-employed to cost-effectively visit the United States to purchase inputs, even though a result is lessening revenues to Florida-based and New Jersey-based merchants and 2) increase attention to the decisions by the Republic of Cuba to encourage the self-employed to travel outside of the country (United States, Panama, Mexico, Costa Rica, etc.) to purchase inputs for their activities: https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/10/24/cyz3n0mzekqojcj7nrwnk93m7c5gww?rq=panama

 Media Note

U.S. Embassy Havana

Havana, Cuba 

March 15, 2019 

Decreasing B2 Visa Validity for Cuban Nationals

Effective March 18, 2019, the United States will reduce the B2 visa validity for Cuban nationals to three months with a single entry.  U.S. immigration law requires that U.S. visa fees and validity periods be reciprocal, insofar as practicable, with the treatment accorded to U.S. citizens. Cuba allows U.S. citizen tourists a single entry for a stay of two months, with a possible 30-day extension to three months total, for $50.  Before the validity change, we allowed Cuban B2 applicants a 60-month, multiple-entry visa for a fee of $160.  The Department of State is decreasing B2 visa validity to three months, single entry for Cuban nationals to match the Government of Cuba’s shorter validity for U.S. citizens in similar categories. 

The B2 visa category is for tourism, family visits, medical treatment, and similar travel purposes.  No other visa categories are being changed for Cuban nationals.  Existing five year multiple entry B2 visas remain valid until their date of expiration. 

Please visit our website at cu.usembassy.gov for additional information about consular services, our Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/USEmbCuba/, and follow us on Twitter @USEmbCuba

Juan Guaido Says Venezuela Should End Subsidized Oil Exports To Cuba

H.E. Juan Gerardo Guaido Marquez, is President of the National Assembly of Venezuela and was recognized, beginning in January 2019, by the United States and then more than fifty other countries as the Interim President of Venezuela. 

11 March 2019

Reuters 

Excerpts (including other reporting references): 

During the legislative session, Guaido called for a halt in shipments of oil to Maduro’s political ally Cuba, which has received discounted crude from Venezuela for nearly two decades. The deals have drawn scrutiny from the opposition and its allies abroad as Venezuela’s economic crisis worsened. 

"We have decreed no more oil shipments to Cuba, they are not going to continue chuleando the money of the people of Venezuela (...), not only we decree, but we request international cooperation to make this measure effective," said Guaidó  

“We ask for the international community’s cooperation to make this measure effective, so that the oil the Venezuelan people urgently need to attend to this national emergency is not given away,” Guaido said. 

U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton backed the measure, writing on Twitter that, “insurance companies and flag carriers that facilitate these give-away shipments to Cuba are now on notice.” He did not specify any measures the U.S. government may take. 

Earlier on Monday, the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on a Russian bank over its dealings with Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo criticized Russia’s Rosneft for buying PDVSA oil. 

LINK To Video Of Statement By Mr. Guaido: https://twitter.com/i/status/1105170876922703873

U.S. Secretary Of State Mike Pompeo Discusses Cuba's Role In Venezuela

Remarks

Michael R. Pompeo 
Secretary of State

Press Briefing Room
Washington, DC
March 11, 2019

SECRETARY POMPEO: Good afternoon, everyone. Thanks for being here. I want to make some brief remarks about the situation, an update on the situation in Venezuela, an update on U.S. activity related to Venezuela. Over the past few days, Venezuelans have been thrown literally into darkness thanks to a massive electrical blackout. Patients awaiting treatment in hospitals are dying, food is rotting, telecommunication networks are entirely collapsing.

It’s worth spending just a minute on how we got here. Nicolas Maduro promised Venezuelans a better life in a socialist paradise, and he delivered on the socialism part, which has proved time and time again is a recipe for economic ruin. The paradise part, not so much. Just consider the facts. The World Bank ranks Venezuela’s business environment 188th out of 190 countries. Only Somalia and Eritrea are worse. The United States did not do that. The expropriations of land and industry and an end to the rule of law did that. Agriculture production is down 70 percent since 2006, manufacturing down by 75 percent, oil production down by half since Maduro took power in 2013. The United States didn’t do all that. Maduro did that.

One month of food today for an average Venezuelan costs a family more than 100 times the monthly minimum wage. Nearly 70 percent of Venezuelan hospital lack basic medicines. More than 90 percent of Venezuelans live below the poverty line. All of this brought to you by the socialism of Maduro.

But this story – this story is not complete without acknowledging the central role Cuba and Russia have played and continue to play in undermining the democratic dreams of the Venezuelan people and their welfare.

First, Cuba. No nation has done more to sustain the death and daily misery of ordinary Venezuelans, including Venezuela’s military and their families, than the communists in Havana. Cuba is the true imperialist power in Venezuela. The Cuban government of Miguel Diaz-Canel provides political cover for Maduro and his henchmen so that they may stay in power. It’s Cuba that has offered Maduro its unwavering solidarity. It’s Cuba that calls Venezuela’s true government, led by Interim President Juan Guaido, which 54 of the world’s democratic nations recognize as a legitimate government – the Cubans call this a puppet government of the United States.

Yet it’s Cuba that’s trained Venezuelans’ secret police and torture tactics, domestic spying techniques, and mechanisms of repression the Cuban authorities have wielded against their own people for decades. Members of the Cuban military and intelligence services are deeply entrenched in the Venezuelan state. Cuban security forces have displaced Venezuelan security forces in a clear violation of Venezuelan sovereignty. I even hear that Maduro has no Venezuelans around him. Many of his personal security and closest advisors are acting not at the direction of the Venezuelan people, and frankly, perhaps not even at the direction of Maduro, but rather at the direction of the Cuban regime. They provide physical protection and other critical material and political support to Maduro and to those around him. So when there’s no electricity, thank the marvels of modern Cuban-led engineering. When there’s no water, thank the excellent hydrologists from Cuba. When there’s no food, thank the Cuban communist overlords.

Why is Cuba asserting so much influence in Venezuela? What’s in it for them? Follow the ideology, follow the corrupt elites, and perhaps most importantly, follow the money. Cuba’s communist revolutionaries share a natural affinity with Maduro’s socialists. They both disdain private property rights, the rule of law, and free and fair elections. The very same economic theories that have decimated the Cuban economy since 1959 have now turned Venezuela’s economy, one of the richest in Latin America, into a case of decline that economists study with amazement and horror. Both of these countries routinely violate the basic human rights of their peoples.

The two nations also share a feature: a deeply corrupt ruling class. Maduro learned from the Castros that the best way to stay in power is to buy enough generals to protect you and make sure that the only way to be rich, or even to avoid poverty, is to feed off the regime and stay in its good graces.

Lastly, there’s an economic relationship between Cuba and Venezuela as well. The Maduro regime sends up to 50,000 barrels of oil to Cuba per day, and Cuba needs this cheap Venezuelan energy to prop up its tottering socialist economy, while Maduro needs Cuban expertise in repression to keep his grip on power. That’s a match made in hell.

Russia, too, has created this crisis. It, too, for its own reasons is thwarting the Venezuelan people’s legitimate democratic hopes and their dreams. Moscow, like Havana, continues to provide political cover to the Maduro regime while pressuring countries to disregard the democratic legitimacy of the Interim President Guaido.

It’s Russia – it’s Russia that vetoed the UN-sponsored resolution on Venezuela in the Secretary Council on February 28th. This UN Security Council resolution called for unhindered access in delivery of assistance to all those in need and supported the restoration of democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela. It’s Russia that chose, rather than supporting this noble goal, it instead put forward its own resolution that served no purpose other than to bolster the illegitimate Maduro regime.

Fortunately, the international community sharply rebuked Russia for this critical circus. Russia scrounged only four votes from the 15-member UN Security Council. Russia claimed at the UN that humanitarian aid deliveries were merely an attempted illegal border crossing for the delivery of unknown cargo. The world knows what was really going on that day.

Russia has also used its state-sponsored disinformation organs like Russia Today and Sputnik to divert attention from the humanitarian disaster of the Maduro regime. Russia has spent an enormous amount of money in Venezuela to support close ties with the regime. Russian loans and investments in Venezuela total more than $17 billion. Russian companies continue to this day to try to help the Maduro regime turn the country’s gold reserves into cash, further squandering the assets of the Venezuelan people, assets they will need to rebuild their future.

Russia’s state-owned oil company Rosneft continues to purchase crude oil cargoes from PDVSA, Venezuela’s state-owned oil company in defiance of U.S. sanctions. And Rosneft’s CEO, Igor Sechin, continues to throw a lifeline to the regime. Recently, Sechin ordered Rosneft to sell even more oil to the Maduro regime. You’ll recall that PDVSA was once known as the crown jewel of the Venezuelan people. PDVSA is today now a personal ATM for the Maduro regime and for Russian oligarchs and kleptocrats. And Russia too has provided the Chavez and Maduro regimes with large quantities of arms, including 5,000 portable air defense systems, and other forms of lethal assistance. The Kremlin is standing with its Venezuelan cronies against the will of the people of a sovereign nation to protect a Moscow-friendly regime.

It’s worth taking just a moment to compare Cuba and Russia’s malign actions with what the United States has done. The United States has recognized Juan Guaido as the legitimate president of Venezuela and used diplomacy to convince other countries to do the same. Today, over 50 nations have made this proper choice and formally recognized Juan Guaido.

We’ve given more than 195 million to help Venezuelan refugees, including $152 million worth of humanitarian assistance and $43 million in economic and development assistance. We’ve made sure that wealth derived from Venezuela’s precious resources goes to the people instead of lining the pockets of the Maduro mafia.

The United States has revoked more than 250 visas for individuals responsible for undermining Venezuela’s democracy and those who benefit from the regime’s corruption. And just today, we sanctioned a Moscow-based bank jointly owned by Russian and Venezuelan state-owned companies that is helping perpetuate the misery in Venezuela by doing business with PDVSA.

The nations that support Maduro are, by the nature of this illegitimate regime, carrying out the very foreign interventionism of which they accuse others. Today, the United States is drawing a clear line between those who aid the forces of repression and those who give life to the Venezuelan people’s democratic dreams. There is no ambiguity here about the truth. Thank you.

Happy to take a couple questions.

MR PALLADINO: Okay, so we have time for two questions. Let’s go to Associated Press. Matt Lee.

QUESTION: Thank you, Robert. Mr. Secretary, I hope you have a good trip to Texas tomorrow.

SECRETARY POMPEO: Thank you.

QUESTION: You – so you mentioned that Russia was able to get only four out of 15 – four votes in favor of this resolution at the Security Council. But there – other people would point out that you’ve only gotten 54, or Interim President Guaido has only got 54 countries out of 195 or so at the – in the General Assembly. We’re talking roughly about the same. So are you satisfied with the pace of the momentum behind Guaido and his leadership? And secondly, you said “follow the money” when you were talking about Cuba, follow the ideology, and then mentioned oil. But there are a lot of people – you would probably call them conspiracy theorists – out there who say “follow the oil,” right, and say that this is all the U.S. trying to get Venezuela’s oil. And so I want to ask you: Is this about the U.S. getting Venezuela’s oil? And did the U.S. have anything to do with the power outage?

SECRETARY POMPEO: So let me try and take those in reverse chronological order. With respect to the power outages, those are a direct result of years and years of neglect to the Venezuelan energy system. You can talk to any international energy expert; they’ve seen it. The system has had problems for an awfully long time. Their ability to get it back online has always proven difficult, and over the past several years it’s gotten worse. That was the cause of the blackouts that are – that have taken place, and my guess, knowing a little bit of engineering, will continue to take place.

Second question was – what – Matt, remind me what the second one was? The first one was about were you satisfied with --

QUESTION: Oil.

SECRETARY POMPEO: Oil.

QUESTION: Can you --

SECRETARY POMPEO: We’re trying to get the Venezuelan people.

QUESTION: Not for you, the U.S.

SECRETARY POMPEO: For the Venezuelan people. We are attempting to restore basic rule of law, transparency, democracy, and the wealth that sits in the property basin of Venezuela is for the Venezuelan people.

QUESTION: And then the pace of the --

SECRETARY POMPEO: And then the pace of – yeah, the first question’s the pace of change. We always wish things could go faster, but I’m very confident that the tide is moving in the direction of the Venezuelan people, and will continue to do so. It doesn’t take – Matt, it doesn’t take much for you to see what’s really going on there. The circle is tightening. The humanitarian crisis is increasing by the hour. I talked with our senior person on the ground there in Venezuela last night at 7:00 or 8:00 last night. You can see the increasing pain and suffering that the Venezuelan people are suffering from. It is democracy and the rule of law and the Interim President Juan Guaido that offer the best opportunity for the Venezuelan people to turn the tide and regain the greatness of Venezuela. And the OAS, the Lima Group, with the United States in support, aim to help them achieve that.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR PALLADINO: New York Times, David Sanger.

QUESTION: Your support of Juan Guaido was early, and I’m wondering if you could talk to us a little bit about what you’ve been doing since that time. First of all, are you providing him with any personal protection? I know that Mr. Bolton issued a warning when Guaido went back into Venezuela about his personal safety. I’m wondering if you’re doing for him what the United States did in past years in Afghanistan and elsewhere, where the U.S. was central to providing their protection. I’m wondering if you’re doing any other steps that could be viewed as ways of consolidating his power.

SECRETARY POMPEO: I think your question – I’m not going to talk about particular actions that we may or may not be taking with respect to the security situation for the leadership in Venezuela, just like I don’t talk about the security situation for any leader around the world.

QUESTION: You certainly talked about it in the Afghan case.

SECRETARY POMPEO: Well, we’re not going to in this State Department. Maybe other administrations chose to do that; we’re not going to do that.

As for actions we’ve taken to support Juan Guaido, I think we’ve been very transparent about the activities we’re taking. We’re supporting every country who’s willing to get on the team and help us get to the right place. The American people have been enormously generous. If you looked at our budget, we’ve asked for up to $500 million to help Venezuela in the year ahead if we get to the right place where that kind of level of resources need a very significant level of American resources. We’re beginning to build out a coalition that will provide its resources as well, because it won’t be an America-alone proposition to restore the economy of the Venezuelan nation. And then we’ve done our best to help Juan Guaido build his team out as well by our team on the ground providing the same kind of services that we provide in every country to help other governments be successful. And we’ll continue – we’ll continue to do that as long as our team is there inside of Venezuela.

MR PALLADINO: Wrap it up there, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY POMPEO: I’ll take – I’ll take one more.

QUESTION: One more?

MR PALLADINO: Lesley Wroughton with Reuters.

QUESTION: Thanks. Hello, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY POMPEO: Hi, how are you?

QUESTION: A couple of questions. One is, which other countries in the world are hiding Venezuelan assets? Number two, you met with the Indian foreign secretary today. Did he agree to stop buying – buying oil from Maduro’s government? They said they were going – they’ve told us that they were going to talk to you about this very issue. So what exactly are you asking of them and have they agreed?

SECRETARY POMPEO: Yeah, so we’re asking the same thing of India as we are of every country: Do not be the economic lifeline for the Maduro regime. So we talked about – I certainly won’t characterize the conversations; they’re private conversations. But I’m very confident – in the same way that India has been incredibly supportive of our efforts on Iran, I’m confident that they too understand the real threat to the Venezuelan people. And so we had a good conversation around that.

And in terms of which other countries are hiding assets, I assure you that those countries will know. But I’m not going to share that with you today because if I mention them here today, goodness knows how many of them will end up inside of Russia. We do not want assets that are around the world taken and transferred to Russia, where they’ll be hidden in the very way that I described in my opening remarks today. We have a handful of countries that are providing aid and comfort to the Maduro regime at enormous expense to the people of Venezuela, and we want to make sure that the resources – resources that the Venezuelan people are going to need after Maduro leaves – we want to make sure those resources are available for the Venezuelan people and not shipped off to Cuba or to Russia or to Iran.

Great. Thanks, everybody.

MR PALLADINO: Thank you, everybody.

U.S. Department Of State Publishes New Cuba Restricted List

BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS
March 11, 2019

Below is the U.S. Department of State’s list of entities and subentities under the control of, or acting for or on behalf of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba. For information regarding the prohibition on direct financial transactions with these entities, please see 31 CFR 515.209. All entities and subentities were listed effective November 9, 2017, unless otherwise indicated.

*** Entities or subentities owned or controlled by another entity or subentity on this list are not treated as restricted unless also specified by name on the list. ***

MINISTRIES

MINFAR — Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias

MININT — Ministerio del Interior

HOLDING COMPANIES

CIMEX — Corporación CIMEX S.A.

Compañía Turística Habaguanex S.A.

GAESA — Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A.

Gaviota — Grupo de Turismo Gaviota

UIM — Unión de Industria Militar

HOTELS IN HAVANA AND OLD HAVANA

Aparthotel Montehabana

Gran Hotel Manzana Kempinski

H10 Habana Panorama

Hostal Valencia

Hotel Ambos Mundos

Hotel Armadores de Santander

Hotel Beltrán de Santa Cruz

Hotel Conde de Villanueva

Hotel del Tejadillo

Hotel el Bosque

Hotel el Comendador

Hotel el Mesón de la Flota

Hotel Florida

Hotel Habana 612

Hotel Kohly

Hotel Los Frailes

Hotel Marqués de Prado Ameno

Hotel Palacio del Marqués de San Felipe y Santiago de Bejucal

Hotel Palacio O'Farrill

Hotel Park View

Hotel Raquel

Hotel San Miguel

Hotel Telégrafo

Hotel Terral

Iberostar Grand Packard Hotel Effective November 15, 2018

Memories Miramar Havana

Memories Miramar Montehabana

SO/ Havana Paseo del Prado Effective November 15, 2018

HOTELS IN SANTIAGO DE CUBA

Villa Gaviota Santiago

HOTELS IN VARADERO

Blau Marina Varadero Resort

also Fiesta Americana Punta Varadero Effective November 15, 2018

also Fiesta Club Adults Only Effective March 12, 2019

Grand Memories Varadero

Hotel Las Nubes Effective November 15, 2018

Hotel Oasis Effective November 15, 2018

Iberostar Bella Vista Effective November 15, 2018

Iberostar Laguna Azul

Iberostar Playa Alameda

Meliá Marina Varadero

Meliá Peninsula Varadero

Memories Varadero

Naviti Varadero

Ocean Varadero El Patriarca

Ocean Vista Azul

Paradisus Princesa del Mar

Paradisus Varadero

Sol Sirenas Coral

HOTELS IN PINAR DEL RIO

Hotel Villa Cabo de San Antonio

Hotel Villa Maria La Gorda y Centro Internacional de Buceo

HOTELS IN BARACOA

Hostal 1511

Hostal La Habanera

Hostal La Rusa

Hostal Rio Miel

Hotel El Castillo

Hotel Porto Santo

Villa Maguana

HOTELS IN CAYOS DE VILLA CLARA

Angsana Cayo Santa María Effective November 15, 2018

Dhawa Cayo Santa María

Golden Tulip Aguas Claras Effective November 15, 2018

Hotel Cayo Santa María

Hotel Playa Cayo Santa María

Iberostar Ensenachos

Las Salinas Plana & Spa Effective November 15, 2018

La Salina Noreste Effective November 15, 2018

La Salina Suroeste Effective November 15, 2018

Meliá Buenavista

Meliá Cayo Santa María

Meliá Las Dunas

Memories Azul

Memories Flamenco

Memories Paraíso

Ocean Casa del Mar

Paradisus Los Cayos Effective November 15, 2018

Royalton Cayo Santa María

Sercotel Experience Cayo Santa María Effective November 15, 2018

Sol Cayo Santa María

Starfish Cayo Santa María Effective November 15, 2018

Valentín Perla Blanca Effective November 15, 2018

Villa Las Brujas

Warwick Cayo Santa María

also Labranda Cayo Santa María Hotel Effective November 15, 2018

HOTELS IN HOLGUÍN

Blau Costa Verde Beach & Resort

also Fiesta Americana Holguín Costa Verde Effective November 15, 2018

Hotel Playa Costa Verde

Hotel Playa Pesquero

Memories Holguín

Paradisus Río de Oro Resort & Spa

Playa Costa Verde

Playa Pesquero Premium Service

Sol Rio de Luna y Mares

Villa Cayo Naranjo

Villa Cayo Saetia

Villa Pinares de Mayari

HOTELS IN JARDINES DEL REY

Grand Muthu Cayo Guillermo Effective November 15, 2018

Hotel Playa Coco Plus

Iberostar Playa Pilar

Meliá Jardines del Rey

Memories Caribe

Pestana Cayo Coco

HOTELS IN TOPES DE COLLANTES

Hostal Los Helechos

Kurhotel Escambray Effective November 15, 2018

Los Helechos

Villa Caburni

TOURIST AGENCIES

Crucero del Sol

Gaviota Tours

MARINAS

Marina Gaviota Cabo de San Antonio (Pinar del Rio)

Marina Gaviota Cayo Coco (Jardines del Rey)

Marina Gaviota Las Brujas (Cayos de Villa Clara)

Marina Gaviota Puerto Vita (Holguín)

Marina Gaviota Varadero (Varadero)

STORES IN OLD HAVANA

Casa del Abanico

Colección Habana

Florería Jardín Wagner

Joyería Coral Negro – Additional locations throughout Cuba

La Casa del Regalo

San Ignacio 415

Soldadito de Plomo

Tienda El Navegante

Tienda Muñecos de Leyenda

Tienda Museo El Reloj Cuervo y Sobrinos

ENTITIES DIRECTLY SERVING THE DEFENSE AND SECURITY SECTORS

ACERPROT — Agencia de Certificación y Consultoría de Seguridad y Protección

Alias Empresa de Certificación de Sistemas de Seguridad y Protección Effective November 15, 2018

AGROMIN — Grupo Empresarial Agropecuario del Ministerio del Interior

APCI — Agencia de Protección Contra Incendios

CAHOMA — Empresa Militar Industrial Comandante Ernesto Che Guevara

CASEG — Empresa Militar Industrial Transporte Occidente

CID NAV — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo Naval

CIDAI — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de Armamento de Infantería

CIDAO — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo del Armamento de Artillería e Instrumentos Ópticos y Ópticos Electrónicos

CORCEL — Empresa Militar Industrial Emilio Barcenas Pier

CUBAGRO — Empresa Comercializadora y Exportadora de Productos Agropecuarios y Agroindustriales

DATYS — Empresa Para El Desarrollo De Aplicaciones, Tecnologías Y Sistemas

DCM TRANS — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo del Transporte

DEGOR — Empresa Militar Industrial Desembarco Del Granma

DSE — Departamento de Seguridad del Estado

EMIAT — Empresa Importadora Exportadora de Abastecimientos Técnicos

Empresa Militar Industrial Astilleros Astimar

Empresa Militar Industrial Astilleros Centro

Empresa Militar Industrial Yuri Gagarin

ETASE — Empresa de Transporte y Aseguramiento

Ferretería TRASVAL

GELCOM — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo Grito de Baire

Impresos de Seguridad

MECATRONICS — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de Electrónica y Mecánica

NAZCA — Empresa Militar Industrial Granma

OIBS — Organización Integración para el Bienestar Social

PLAMEC — Empresa Militar Industrial Ignacio Agramonte

PNR — Policía Nacional Revolucionaria

PROVARI — Empresa de Producciones Varias

SEPSA — Servicios Especializados de Protección

SERTOD — Servicios de Telecomunicaciones a los Órganos de la Defensa Effective November 15, 2018

SIMPRO — Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de Simuladores

TECAL — Empresa de Tecnologías Alternativas

TECNOPRO — Empresa Militar Industrial "G.B. Francisco Cruz Bourzac"

TECNOTEX — Empresa Cubana Exportadora e Importadora de Servicios, Artículos y Productos Técnicos Especializados

TGF — Tropas de Guardafronteras

UAM — Unión Agropecuaria Militar

ULAEX — Unión Latinoamericana de Explosivos

XETID — Empresa de Tecnologías de la Información Para La Defensa

YABO — Empresa Militar Industrial Coronel Francisco Aguiar Rodríguez

ADDITIONAL SUBENTITIES OF CIMEX

ADESA/ASAT — Agencia Servicios Aduanales (Customs Services)

Cachito (Beverage Manufacturer)

Contex (Fashion)

Datacimex

ECUSE — Empresa Cubana de Servicios

Inmobiliaria CIMEX (Real Estate)

Inversiones CIMEX

Jupiña (Beverage Manufacturer)

La Maisón (Fashion)

Najita (Beverage Manufacturer)

Publicitaria Imagen (Advertising)

Residencial Tarara S.A. (Real Estate / Property Rental) Effective November 15, 2018

Ron Caney (Rum Production)

Ron Varadero (Rum Production)

Telecable (Satellite Television)

Tropicola (Beverage Manufacturer)

Zona Especializada de Logística y Comercio (ZELCOM)

ADDITIONAL SUBENTITIES OF GAESA

Almacenes Universales (AUSA)

ANTEX — Corporación Antillana Exportadora

Compañía Inmobiliaria Aurea S.A. Effective November 15, 2018

Dirección Integrada Proyecto Mariel (DIP)

Empresa Inmobiliaria Almest (Real Estate)

GRAFOS (Advertising)

RAFIN S.A. (Financial Services)

Sociedad Mercantin Inmobiliaria Caribe (Real Estate)

TECNOIMPORT

Terminal de Contenedores de la Habana (TCH)

Terminal de Contenedores de Mariel, S.A.

UCM — Unión de Construcciones Militares

Zona Especial de Desarrollo Mariel (ZEDM)

Zona Especial de Desarrollo y Actividades Logísticas (ZEDAL)

ADDITIONAL SUBENTITIES OF GAVIOTA

AT Comercial

Gaviota Hoteles Cuba Effective March 12, 2019

Hoteles Habaguanex Effective March 12, 2019

Hoteles Playa Gaviota Effective March 12, 2019

Manzana de Gomez

Marinas Gaviota Cuba Effective March 12, 2019

PhotoService

Plaza La Estrella Effective November 15, 2018

Plaza Las Dunas Effective November 15, 2018

Plaza Las Morlas Effective November 15, 2018

Plaza Las Salinas Effective November 15, 2018

Plaza Las Terrazas del Atardecer Effective November 15, 2018

Plaza Los Flamencos Effective November 15, 2018

Plaza Pesquero Effective November 15, 2018

Producciones TRIMAGEN S.A. (Tiendas Trimagen)

ADDITIONAL SUBENTITIES OF HABAGUANEX

Sociedad Mercantil Cubana Inmobiliaria Fenix S.A. (Real Estate)

**Activities in parentheticals are intended to aid in identification, but are only representative. All activities of listed entities and subentities are subject to the applicable prohibitions.**

U.S. Department Of State To Update Cuba Restricted List On 12 March 2019

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

March 11, 2019 

The State Department has made several updates to the Cuba Restricted List, including adding five sub-entities owned by the Cuban military and one explanatory footnote. The Department also simplified some entries by removing references to parent companies. The changes take effect Tuesday, March 12, 2019. 

The Cuba Restricted List contains entities and sub-entities controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, and security services or personnel. In accordance with the June 2017 National Security Presidential Memorandum-5, “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba, the U.S. government generally prohibits direct financial transactions with listed entities and sub-entities because they would disproportionately benefit the Cuban military, intelligence, and security services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba. The Department will continue to update the list as needed. For more information on the regulations prohibiting direct financial transactions with entities and sub-entities on the Cuba Restricted List, please refer to the November 2017 regulatory amendments by the Departments of the Treasury (31 CFR part 515) and Commerce (15 CFR parts 730-774). 

These additions to the Cuba Restricted List occur as the Cuban government further consolidated the regime’s one-party dictatorship through a flawed, undemocratic constitutional referendum on February 24. We also denounce Cuba’s role in propping the failed regime of former Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro. Cuban military and security forces have abetted Maduro in his quest to remain in power, contributing to the Venezuelan crisis, human rights abuses against Venezuelans, and to the untold suffering of the Venezuelan people.

LINK To Current Cuba Restricted List

U.S. Ag/Food Exports Cuba Decreased 16.3% In 2018; Healthcare Product Exports Decreased 38.3%

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©

February/March 2019

December 2018 Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Increase 6.7%- 1

2018 Exports- US$224.9 Million

16.3% Decrease For Year-5

Cuba Ranked 66th of 226 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets In 2018- 2

2018 Healthcare Product Exports Decrease 38.3%- 2

December 2018 Humanitarian Donations US$481,416.00- 3

Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase- 3

2018 Port Rankings: Louisiana, Virginia, Florida, Alabama & Texas- 15

343,250 Metric Tons In 2018 Compared To 490,012 Metric Tons In 2017- 15

U.S. Port Export Data- 15

DECEMBER 2018 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 6.7%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in December 2018 were US$12,775,779.00 compared to US$11,963,399.00 in December 2017 and US$29,992,937.00 in December 2016.

Exports of agricultural commodities and food products in 2018 under provisions of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, were US$224,910,413.00 compared to US$268,800,005.00 in 2017 and US$232,064,645.00 in 2016.

LINK To Complete Report In PDF Format