President-Elect Biden Announces 27-Member Agency Review Team For Department Of The Treasury

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
November 10, 2020

Biden-Harris Transition Team Announces Members of Agency Review Teams
Formation of Agency Review Teams Among the First Steps to Building a Successful Administration

WASHINGTON – Today, the Biden-Harris Transition announced key members of the agency review teams (ARTs), which are responsible for evaluating the operations of the federal agencies so that the incoming Biden-Harris administration is prepared to lead our country on Day One. The ARTs are composed of highly experienced and talented professionals with deep backgrounds in key policy areas across the federal government. The teams possess a diversity of perspectives critical to addressing America’s most urgent and complex challenges.

“Our nation is grappling with a pandemic, an economic crisis, urgent calls for racial justice, and the existential threat of climate change. We must be prepared for a seamless transfer of knowledge to the incoming administration to protect our interests at home and abroad. The agency review process will help lay the foundation for meeting these challenges on Day One,” said Senator Ted Kaufman, Co-Chair, Biden-Harris Transition. “The work of the agency review teams is critical for protecting national security, addressing the ongoing public health crisis, and demonstrating that America remains the beacon of democracy for the world.”

The transition’s work continues full steam ahead. The agency review teams will proceed by meeting with former agency officials and experts who closely follow federal agencies, and with officials from think tanks, labor groups, trade associations, and other NGOs. Further, many of the ART members have had long careers in the federal agencies they will now help prepare for the incoming Biden-Harris administration.

Once the GSA Administrator ascertains the results of the election, the ART members will work directly with staff in federal agencies to ensure that the incoming Biden-Harris administration is able to effectively achieve the policy goals of the President and Vice President-elect.

Finally, President-elect Biden and Vice President-elect Harris are proud to have one of the most diverse agency review teams in presidential transition history. Of the hundreds of ART members to be announced, more than half are women, and approximately 40 percent represent communities historically underrepresented in the federal government, including people of color, people who identify as LGBTQ+, and people with disabilities. The President-elect and Vice President-elect are committed to building an administration that looks like America.

Agency review teams are responsible for understanding the operations of each agency, ensuring a smooth transfer of power, and preparing for President-elect Biden and Vice President-elect Harris and their cabinet to hit the ground running on Day One. These teams are composed of highly experienced and talented professionals with deep backgrounds in crucial policy areas across the federal government. The teams have been crafted to ensure they not only reflect the values and priorities of the incoming administration, but reflect the diversity of perspectives crucial for addressing America’s most urgent and complex challenges.

The Presidential Transition Act requires presidential transitions to disclose the “most recent employment” and “sources of funding” for all agency review team members. The Transition Team has three types of agency review team members:

• Volunteers: Individuals who are volunteering for the Transition in their personal capacity. For these team members, their current or most recent employer is listed (for informational purposes only), and their source of funding is listed as “Volunteer.”

• Full-Time Transition Employees: Individuals who are full-time paid Transition employees, funded by the Transition entity itself (PT Fund, Inc.). For these team members, their most recent employer prior to joining the Transition is listed (for informational purposes only), and their source of funding is listed as “Transition — PT Fund, Inc.”

• Detailees: Individuals on detail who will be funded through an appropriation administered by the General Services Administration. For these team members, their current employer is listed, and their source of funding is listed as “Transition — Appropriation.”

Department of the Treasury
Name
Most Recent Employment
Source of Funding

Don Graves, Team Lead
KeyBank
Transition
PT Fund, Inc.
Mehrsa Baradaran
University of California, Irvine School of Law
Volunteer
Michael Barr
University of Michigan, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy
Volunteer
Lily Batchelder
New York University, School of Law
Volunteer
John Bentivoglio
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
Volunteer
Chris Brummer
Georgetown University
Volunteer
Liyan David Chang
Devoted Health
Volunteer
Heidi Crebo-Rediker
International Capital Strategies, LLC
Volunteer
Will Fields
Sidewalk Labs
Volunteer
Suzanna Fritzberg
Birmingham Strong
Volunteer
Andy Green
Center for American Progress
Volunteer
David Hinson
Ategra Capital Management
Volunteer
Nicole Isaac
LinkedIn Corporation
Volunteer
Simon Johnson
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Volunteer
Helen Kanovsky
Mortgage Bankers Association
Volunteer
Marisa Lago
New York City, Department of City Planning
Volunteer
Nancy Lee
Center for Global Development
Volunteer
Sarah Miller
American Economic Liberties Project
Volunteer
Sophie Raseman
Brightside Benefit, Inc.
Volunteer
Rosie Rios
Self-employed
Volunteer
Buzz Roberts
National Association of Affordable Housing Lenders
Volunteer
Elizabeth Rosenberg
Center for a New American Security
Volunteer
Javier Saade
Impact Master Holdings
Volunteer
Damon Silvers
AFL-CIO Volunteer
Betsey Stevenson
University of Michigan
Volunteer
Jay Williams
Hartford Foundation for Public Giving
Volunteer
Charles Yi
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, LLP
Volunteer

President-Elect Biden Announces 30-Member Agency Review Team For Department Of State

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
November 10, 2020

Biden-Harris Transition Team Announces Members of Agency Review Teams
Formation of Agency Review Teams Among the First Steps to Building a Successful Administration

WASHINGTON – Today, the Biden-Harris Transition announced key members of the agency review teams (ARTs), which are responsible for evaluating the operations of the federal agencies so that the incoming Biden-Harris administration is prepared to lead our country on Day One. The ARTs are composed of highly experienced and talented professionals with deep backgrounds in key policy areas across the federal government. The teams possess a diversity of perspectives critical to addressing America’s most urgent and complex challenges.

“Our nation is grappling with a pandemic, an economic crisis, urgent calls for racial justice, and the existential threat of climate change. We must be prepared for a seamless transfer of knowledge to the incoming administration to protect our interests at home and abroad. The agency review process will help lay the foundation for meeting these challenges on Day One,” said Senator Ted Kaufman, Co-Chair, Biden-Harris Transition. “The work of the agency review teams is critical for protecting national security, addressing the ongoing public health crisis, and demonstrating that America remains the beacon of democracy for the world.”

The transition’s work continues full steam ahead. The agency review teams will proceed by meeting with former agency officials and experts who closely follow federal agencies, and with officials from think tanks, labor groups, trade associations, and other NGOs. Further, many of the ART members have had long careers in the federal agencies they will now help prepare for the incoming Biden-Harris administration.

Once the GSA Administrator ascertains the results of the election, the ART members will work directly with staff in federal agencies to ensure that the incoming Biden-Harris administration is able to effectively achieve the policy goals of the President and Vice President-elect.

Finally, President-elect Biden and Vice President-elect Harris are proud to have one of the most diverse agency review teams in presidential transition history. Of the hundreds of ART members to be announced, more than half are women, and approximately 40 percent represent communities historically underrepresented in the federal government, including people of color, people who identify as LGBTQ+, and people with disabilities. The President-elect and Vice President-elect are committed to building an administration that looks like America.

Agency review teams are responsible for understanding the operations of each agency, ensuring a smooth transfer of power, and preparing for President-elect Biden and Vice President-elect Harris and their cabinet to hit the ground running on Day One. These teams are composed of highly experienced and talented professionals with deep backgrounds in crucial policy areas across the federal government. The teams have been crafted to ensure they not only reflect the values and priorities of the incoming administration, but reflect the diversity of perspectives crucial for addressing America’s most urgent and complex challenges.

The Presidential Transition Act requires presidential transitions to disclose the “most recent employment” and “sources of funding” for all agency review team members. The Transition Team has three types of agency review team members:

• Volunteers: Individuals who are volunteering for the Transition in their personal capacity. For these team members, their current or most recent employer is listed (for informational purposes only), and their source of funding is listed as “Volunteer.”

• Full-Time Transition Employees: Individuals who are full-time paid Transition employees, funded by the Transition entity itself (PT Fund, Inc.). For these team members, their most recent employer prior to joining the Transition is listed (for informational purposes only), and their source of funding is listed as “Transition — PT Fund, Inc.”

• Detailees: Individuals on detail who will be funded through an appropriation administered by the General Services Administration. For these team members, their current employer is listed, and their source of funding is listed as “Transition — Appropriation.”

Department of State
Name
Most Recent Employment
Source of Funding
Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Team Lead
Albright Stonebridge Group
Volunteer
Hady Amr
Brookings Institution
Volunteer
Susan Biniaz
United Nations Foundation
Volunteer
Oni Blair
LINK Houston
Volunteer
Derek Chollet
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Volunteer
Frances Colon
Self-employed
Volunteer
Bathsheba Crocker
CARE
Volunteer
Sarah Cross
Open Society Foundations
Volunteer
Michael Guest
Self-employed
Volunteer
Sumona Guha
Albright Stonebridge Group
Volunteer
Peter Harrell
Self-employed
Volunteer
Owen Herrnstadt
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
Volunteer
Roberta Jacobson
Albright Stonebridge Group
Volunteer
Bonnie Jenkins
Women of Color Advancing Peace and Security
Volunteer
Alexandra Kahan
Boston Consulting Group
Volunteer
Jeremy Konyndyk
Center for Global Development
Volunteer
Ellison Laskowski
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Volunteer
Allison Lombardo
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited
Volunteer
Raphael Majma
Alloy
Volunteer
Nancy McEldowney
Georgetown University
Volunteer
Amber McIntyre
HWC, Inc.
Volunteer
Emily Mendrala
Center for Democracy in the Americas
Volunteer
Jane Rhee
The Estee Lauder Companies
Volunteer
Fouad Saad
Self-employed
Volunteer
Gentry Smith
Self-employed
Volunteer
Dana Stroul
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Volunteer
Tom Sullivan
Amazon.com, Inc.
Volunteer
Puneet Talwar
Self-employed
Volunteer
Margaret Taylor
Brookings Institution
Volunteer
Ramin Toloui
Stanford University
Volunteer

UK's Imperial Brands Among Increasing Number Of EU-Based Defendants In Libertad Act Lawsuits Seeking Guidance From EC

LUIS MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, MARIA TERESA RODRIGUEZ, a/k/a MARIA TERESA LANDA, ALFREDO RAMON FORNS, RAMON ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ, RAUL LORENZO RODRIGUEZ, CHRISTINA CONROY, and FRANCISCO RAMON RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiffs, v. IMPERIAL BRANDS PLC, CORPORACIÓN HABANOS, S.A., WPP PLC, YOUNG & RUBICAM LLC, and BCW LLC, a/k/a BURSON COHN & WOLFE LLC [1:20-cv-23287; Southern Florida District].

Berenthal & Associates (plaintiff)
Rodriguez Tramont & Nunez (plaintiff)
Nelson Mullins (defendant)
Allen & Overy (defendant)
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr (defendant)
Broad & Cassel (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

LINKS:

Defendant Imperial Brands PLC’s First Status Report
Defendant Imperial Brands PLC’s Opposition To Motion To Strike The Declaration Of Andrew Rhys Davies

Excerpts:

Defendant Imperial Brands plc (“Imperial”) respectfully submits this status report pursuant to the Court’s September 23, 2020 Order [D.E. 49] granting Imperial’s motion for a limited stay of proceedings and directing Imperial to submit monthly status reports on its application to the European Commission (the “Commission”) for authorization to defend this lawsuit or, at a minimum, to file and litigate a motion to dismiss. By way of update, Imperial states as follows:

1. As Imperial previously advised the Court [D.E. 14, D.E. 15-1], on August 27, 2020, Imperial submitted an application to the Commission under Article 5 paragraph 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96, Protecting Against the Effects of the Extra-Territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third County, and Actions Based Thereon or Resulting Therefrom, 1996 O.J. (L. 309) 1 (EC) (“Regulation 2271/96”), for authorization to defend this lawsuit or, at a minimum, authorization in the first instance to file and litigate a motion to dismiss (the “Application”).

2. The Commission has acknowledged receipt of Imperial’s Application, and has cautioned Imperial that unless and until the Commission provides authorization Imperial is prohibited from appearing before this Court pursuant to the summons in this action under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act.

3. Imperial notified the Commission of the requirement to file a status report and requested that the Commission therefore provide Imperial an update on the status of its application ahead of the October 23, 2020 due date. On October 21, 2020, the Commission informed Imperial that the Commission is currently analyzing Imperial’s application and will do its utmost to ensure that a decision is made in due course.

What The Biden Administration May Do With Cuba (And Venezuela Has A Role)

Nine Cuban-Americans In United States Congress
Biden Policies Center-Rights Rather Than Center-Left
Cuba Policy Based Upon Conditionality
Condition Remittance Level Increase To A Non-Military Partner
Whiplash Unlikely At State Department And Department Of The Treasury
Biden Is Not Obama- Restoring Diplomatic Relations Was Done
United States Congress Divisions Will Be 2% To 3%
2022 And 2024 Will Be Relevant

The Biden Administration will not soon return to the United States-Republic of Cuba bilateral commercial, economic, and political landscape that existed prior to 20 January 2017.   

The Biden Administration will encounter a larger, less-porous, and media-savvy Congressional Firewall that may limit, perhaps consistently or intermittently during his four-year term, robust re-engagement with the Republic of Cuba.  

The 535 members of the 117th United States Congress (House of Representatives and Senate) convene on 3 January 2021. 

Potentially interrupting the imperviousness of opposition to Pre-Trump Administration re-engagement would be unilateral and permanent changes implemented by the Republic of Cuba- particularly those relating to its commercial, economic and political infrastructure and, most importantly, lessening its connectivity with the [Nicolas] Maduro Administration in Caracas, Venezuela. 

If the Republic of Cuba were to exit Venezuela, the Biden Administration would have a relatively free rein to make changes to Trump Administration decisions relating to the Republic of Cuba.  Conditionality would remain, but it would flexible rather than rigid.  

The United States House of Representatives will remain in control of the Democratic Party, although with a meaningfully narrower majority- perhaps 2% to 3%.  The United States Senate, based upon a bipartisan consensus of analysts, may become a 51-49 majority for the Republican Party after two concurrent elections in the State of Georgia on 5 January 2021.   

Nine (9) Cuban-American members of the United States Congress, three (3) in the United States Senate and six (6) in the United States House of Representatives, consisting of two (2) members of the Democratic Party and seven (7) members of the Republican Party, will likely oppose most efforts by the Biden Administration to alter Trump Administration policies impacting the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela.    

United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Cruz (R- Texas)
The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida)
The Honorable Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey)
United States House of Representatives
The Honorable Albio Sires (New Jersey; D- 8th)
The Honorable Alex Mooney (West Virginia; R- 2nd)
The Honorable Anthony E. González (Ohio; R- 16th)
The Honorable Mario Díaz-Balart (Florida; R-25th)
The Honorable Carlos Gimenez (Florida; R- 26th)
The Honorable Maria Elvira Salazar (Florida; R- 27th)

Most significant to developing decisions will be the post-election analyses by the Democratic Party and the Republican Party- what were the reasons for President Donald Trump to win the state of Florida, particularly areas located in the southern portions of the state.   

The Democratic Party, Biden Administration, presumed Biden/Harris Re-Election Committee, individuals who want to run for office in Florida in 2022, and individuals who want the 2024 Democratic Party presidential nomination should President Joseph Biden choose not to seek the nomination, will not want to take any decision to overtly further disrupt electoral opportunities.   

The Biden Administration upon taking office will focus upon the 2022 mid-term elections for the United States Congress, where the political party in control of The White House typically loses seats in each chamber of the United States Congress.  

The Biden Administration will be a single term.  As such, intra-Democratic Party positioning, particularly within the office of Vice President Kamala Harris, will be disruptive to deciding Republic of Cuba-related decisions as any decision will impact Florida. 

The Biden Administration will also be hamstrung by then-candidate Joseph Biden’s statements during the 2020 campaign about the ineffectiveness of Trump Administration policies towards the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela: 

“We have to vote for a new Cuba policy as well,” Biden said. “Trump is the worst possible standard-bearer for democracy in places like Cuba, Venezuela, North Korea. Cuba is no closer to freedom and democracy today than it was four years ago. Trump loves to talk tough, but he doesn’t care about the Cuban and Venezuelan people. He won’t even grant Temporary Protected Status to Venezuelans fleeing the oppressive Maduro regime. I will, but we have to vote.”  The Miami Herald (29 October 2020)  

“Cuba is no closer to freedom and democracy today than it was four years ago.”  “President Trump can’t advance democracy and human rights for the Cuban people or the Venezuelan people, for that matter, when he has praised so many autocrats around the world.”  The New York Times (29 October 2020) 

Despite expectations to the contrary, the Biden Administration will gravitate and navigate an international policy framed by the center-right rather than the center-left.  “Human rights” will be the topic sentence when describing policies towards the Republic of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua among other countries.  The debate among policymakers and those who vote in the United States Congress will be how to define “human rights” and how to rank the list of priorities. 

The Biden Administration will find a Republic of Cuba again chronically, severely, and negatively self-impacted by its commercial, economic and political decisions which continue to result in a shortage of foreign exchange to make payment for imports, provide inputs to support exports, repay debt, and invest in the redevelopment of infrastructure.   

The Biden Administration will also find a Republic of Cuba that continues to recoil from conditionality, from quid pro quo, as it did throughout the Obama Administration and through the Trump Administration.  The Republic of Cuba believes it a victim- and thus does not need to do anything to get anything.  

The Biden Administration will return to established processes, inter-agency deliberations including career employees and appointees.  Impulsiveness will define the Biden Administration.  The Republic of Cuba will continue to know, as it did with the Trump Administration, that there will be changes to regulations and changes to policies, but the Biden Administration may provide conditionality with options more easily accepted by the Republic of Cuba.   

Outside pressures adding to the less than optimized landscape for the Republic of Cuba include United States statutes, regulations, and policies; the commercial and economic implosion of Venezuela from which the Republic of Cuba has obtained for more than two decades subsidized oil products, loans, grants, and payments for personnel; the impact of the pandemic upon the tourism sector; continued decrease in the number of governments willing to provide financial support to the Republic of Cuba; and lessening tolerance by governments and financial institutions to provide support to the Republic of Cuba when the Republic of Cuba is not implementing permanent structural commercial, economic and political changes which it maintains rather than awaits to undo. 

The Biden Administration will likely witness the impact of how the Republic of Cuba implements the cessation of the dual currencies and many currency exchange rates that exist within the country of 11.2 million citizens.  The process will be acute- inflicting pain upon most of the population.  Remittances from abroad will be important for many to absorb the devaluation of their earnings and savings.  The Biden Administration may find an opportunity for leverage by maintaining or changing existing restrictions upon remittances (US$1,000.00 per quarter versus unlimited during the Obama Administration) sent to the Republic of Cuba. 

The Biden Administration will also be pressured by members of the United States Congress and particularly by Cuban-American members of the United States Congress to leverage any changes to statutes, regulations and policies impacting the Republic of Cuba with assistance from the Republic of Cuba to develop a pathway for the resolution of commercial, economic, and political issues in Venezuela. 

For any cooperation, the Republic of Cuba may require from the United States and Venezuela a multi-year glidepath for decreasing the level of subsidies/discounts provided by Venezuela.  One proposal includes a 25% annual reduction of subsidies which would end in 2024 (the end of the current presidential term in Venezuela) when transactions would become market-based.  A four-year transition would permit the Republic of Cuba to restructure its energy portfolio while maintaining payment schedules.  During this four-year period, the provisions of the bilateral agreement signed with Venezuela in 2000 would remain operational.  There is one immensely critical benefit the Biden Administration will have with the Republic of Cuba that the Trump Administration did not have- absence of a lack of trust.  Any lack of trust will need be earned.   

Will the career employees at the United States Department of State and at the United States Department of the Treasury have whiplash from consequential changes to their “mission set” where they continue to espouse Trump Administration policy decisions until 12:00 pm on Wednesday, 20 January 2021, and then at 12:01 pm on Wednesday, 20 January 2021, they espouse a Biden Administration policy which contradicts what they have enforced and supported during the last four years?  Some will.  

Biden Administration Do Or Not 

·       Legislation to demonstrably alter (expand) the commercial, economic, and political relationship with the Republic of Cuba introduced in either chamber of the United States Congress would likely be defeated with bipartisan participation.  This is particularly true given the closeness of the Democratic Party-Republican Party divisions in each chamber which may be 2% to 3%.  

·       Would the Biden Administration eliminate or modify the Cuba Restricted List maintained by the United States Department of State and again permit individuals subject to United States jurisdiction to use hotels and restaurants and other facilities affiliated with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba?  Unlikely. 

·       Resume the operation of cruise lines?  Unlikely. 

·       Renew the license for hotel management contracts?  Unlikely. 

·       Re-authorize regularly-scheduled commercial flights to cities other than to Havana?  Likely.  The flights may be restricted initially to individuals subject to United States jurisdiction who are of Cuban descent visiting family and friends. 

·       Require the Republic of Cuba to permit United States companies to directly export inputs to any registered self-employed for use in their operations including restaurants, Airbnb residences, and service-focused enterprises.  Possible. 

·       Authorize direct correspondent banking which would permit United States-based financial institutions and Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions to maintain respective accounts so that funds could be electronically transferred transparently and efficiently for use with authorized transactions, particularly supporting the export from the United States of agricultural commodities, food products, healthcare products, and inputs for the self-employed in the Republic of Cuba.  Possible.  The Obama Administration authorized United States-based financial institutions to have accounts with Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions, but without explanation did not permit Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions to have accounts with United States-based financial institutions.   

·       Increase limits on remittances?  Likely.  However, unlikely that Western Union will again be permitted to engage with Fincimex as its partner unless it is decoupled from affiliation with the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba.  The Trump Administration has been effective in communicating the rationale for and obtaining support for its efforts to decouple the FAR from its role in the economy.  Leadership of United States companies will not publicly oppose a continuation of that policy.  The Biden Administration may condition an increase on limits on remittances, or to removing limits entirely, upon the Republic of Cuba separating Fincimex from the FAR.  With remittances a critical source of foreign exchange for the Republic of Cuba, the Biden Administration may find success that did not materialize during the Trump Administration.   

·       Permit expanded opportunities for individuals subject to United States jurisdiction who are not of Cuban descent to travel to the Republic of Cuba?  Unlikely initially. 

·       Add consular staff at the United States Embassy in Havana specifically for the purpose of processing visas.  Likely. 

·       Return to full staffing levels at the United States Embassy in Havana.  Unlikely.  There remain unanswered questions as to the source(s) of illnesses impacting United States diplomats at the end of the Obama Administration and into the Trump Administration.  Many career employees of the United States Department of State oppose any return of staffing levels until the health issues are resolved. 

·       Appoint a United States Ambassador to The Republic of Cuba.  Unlikely initially.  If the United States Senate is in control of the Democratic Party, then likelihood increases.  Rationale would be that having an Ambassador in Havana, along with the return of a United States Ambassador to Venezuela, may create more useful atmospherics for a resolution of issues. 

·       Again, suspend Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”)?  Unlikely.  Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.  A suspension of Title III is unlikely because there is 1) nothing to gain from suspending as the European Union (EU), where most of the non-United States defendants are located, has not taken any meaningful measures, so the Biden Administration would not have a quid pro quo opportunity 2) no compelling reason not to await the final dispositions of the twenty-nine lawsuits filed, some of which have moved to Courts of Appeals  3) as long as Title III is active, it is a bargaining tool for the Biden Administration, so why loose it prematurely 4) there is no meaningful domestic political pressure to re-suspend it and 5) there would be vocal bipartisan opposition by members of the United States Congress. 

·       Lessen or cease use of Title IV of the Libertad Act that restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims in the Republic of Cuba.  One Canada-based company and one Spain-based company are currently known to be subject to this provision based upon a certified claim and non-certified claim.  Unlikely. 

·       A re-energized focus upon negotiating a settlement for the certified claims by individuals and companies against the Republic of Cuba, which the Obama Administration did not chose to connect with its regulatory and policy decisions relating to the Republic of Cuba.  Likely.  There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims US$8.7 billion.  The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (valued at US$56,196,422.73).   

LINK TO COMPLETE TEXT IN PDF FORMAT

Previous Posts:  

Cuba Advocates Shouldn't Be So Confident About President Biden 

Biden And Harris Discuss Their (Potential) Policies For Cuba... Many Questions Remain. Should Cruise Lines Rejoice? 

Former U.S. Secretary Of State Kerry Shares A Biden Administration Approach To Cuba- And Cuba Won't Like It 

Biden Criticizes Trump For "Approach" Towards Cuba; Echo Of Kerry Comments Last Month 

Does New Charge d’Affaires in Havana Have An Unspoken Goal? Get Thrown Out By 3 November 2020

U.S. Agricultural Commodity/Food Product Exports To Cuba Decline By 43.9% In September; Down 48.8% Year-To-Year

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
November 2020

September 2020 Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Decrease 43.9%- 1
57th Of 224 September U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Decrease 48.8%- 2
Cuba Ranks 58th Of 224 Ag/Food Export Markets- 2
September 2020 Healthcare Product Exports US$10,463.00- 2
September 2020 Humanitarian Donations US$143,309.00- 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 16

SEPTEMBER 2020 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 43.9%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in September 2020 were US$16,117,329.00 compared to US$28,779,856.00 in September 2019 and US$12,226,970.00 in September 2018.

Agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba thus far in 2020 are US$126,262,312.00 compared to US$255,360,721.00 in 2019, representing a decrease of 48.8%.

Since December 2001, agricultural commodity and food product exports reported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba is US$6,259,135,008.00

This report contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

Complete Report In PDF Format

President Biden Suspending Title III of the Libertad Act? Might Clarence Thomas Supreme Court Nomination Hearing Provide Clues

Might President Joseph Biden suspend Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”)?

The Trump Administration on 2 May 2019 made operational Title III of the Libertad Act. Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.

Thus far, twenty-nine lawsuits have been filed- eleven certified claimants (there are 5,913 certified claimants) and eighteen non-certified claimants (estimates as high as 200,000). Four of the lawsuits are at Courts of Appeals. There are nearing two hundred attorneys from sixty-seven law firms representing more than one hundred plaintiffs and defendants; and nearing sixty defendants are located in twenty-eight countries. LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Statistics

The U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council interacts with a larger number of attorneys on Republic of Cuba-related matters than does any organization in the United States. There does not exist a consensus from Libertad Act lawsuit attorneys representing plaintiffs and defendants who believe that Title III would again be suspended by a Biden Administration.

The most consistent reasoning by the attorneys includes 1) nothing to gain from suspending as the European Union (EU), where most of the non-United States defendants are located, has not taken any meaningful measures as of yet, so a Biden Administration would not have a quid pro quo opportunity 2) no compelling reason not to await the final dispositions of the twenty-nine lawsuits filed 3) as long as Title III is active, it is a bargaining tool for a Biden Administration, so why loose it prematurely and 4) there is no meaningful domestic political pressure to re-suspend it.

Is Joseph Biden hostile to property rights? Could be. However, not outlandish to believe him saying: “Come on man, Castro stole those folks’ property. Here’s the deal: Not on my watch. Not OK with a guy like me who got up as a kid every morning and hustled to help my family keep a roof over their heads. Not OK to take the house or business of a hard-working family.”

Biden on Property Rights
By Michael M. Berger
Senior Counsel- Appellate
Manatt LLP
August 25, 2020

Manatt appellate senior counsel Michael Berger authored an article for Daily Journal about Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden’s historical stance on property rights. In particular, Berger analyzed Biden’s questioning during a hearing to determine whether presidential nominee Clarence Thomas should be confirmed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which concerned the protection afforded property owners by the 5th Amendment's guarantee that private property will not be taken for public use without the payment of just compensation and the 14th Amendment's guarantee that no state can deprive anyone of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Berger also noted the importance of this line of questioning, saying, “the ascent of Joe Biden to the top spot on a presidential ticket has caused many people to review the half-century of Biden's public life for possible clues as to future actions.” LINK TO COMPLETE ARTICLE

Joe Biden and Limited Government
By David Boaz
Cato Institute
24 August 2008

Barack Obama and Joe Biden both get a perfect 100 from the big-government liberal Americans for Democratic Action, which probably tells you all you need to know. But I remember a dramatic moment back in 1991 when Biden made his commitment to unlimited government clear and dramatic. Clarence Thomas had been nominated for the Supreme Court, and Biden, then chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, was questioning him. Biden bore in on the possibility that Thomas might believe in "natural law," the idea, as Tony Mauro of USA Today summarized it, that "everyone is born with God-given rights - referred to in the Declaration of Independence as 'inalienable rights' to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' - apart from what any law or the Constitution grants." Biden singled out Cato adjunct scholar Richard Epstein and Cato author Stephen Macedo and demanded to know if Thomas agreed with them that the Constitution protects property rights. Waving Epstein's book Takings in the air like Joe McCarthy with a list of communists, Biden demanded to know, as we very loosely paraphrased it in Cato's 25-year Annual Report (pdf; page 14), "Are you now or have you ever been a libertarian?" As most judicial nominees do when pursued by a senator roused to defend his power like a mama bear, Thomas assured Senator Biden that he wouldn't take the Constitution too seriously.

Was Biden right to worry? Well, as we said in the Annual Report, four years later Thomas joined the Court in declaring, "We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of limited powers." But ten years later the Court finally considered whether the Constitution protects property rights and said, "Ehh, not so much." Thomas protested, "Something has gone seriously awry with this Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. Though citizens are safe from the government in their homes, the homes themselves are not." Biden was right to worry that Thomas's understanding of individual rights and the Constitution just might put some limits on the power of government.

Title III Suspension History 

Title III has been suspended every six months since the Libertad Act was enacted in 1996- by President William J. Clinton, President George W. Bush, President Barack H. Obama and President Donald J. Trump.  

• On 16 January 2019, The Honorable Mike Pompeo, United States Secretary of State, reported a suspension for forty-five (45) days. 

• On 4 March 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a suspension for thirty (30) days. 

• On 3 April 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a further suspension for fourteen (14) days through 1 May 2019. 

• On 17 April 2019, the Trump Administration reported that it would no longer suspend Title III. 

• On 2 May 2019 certified claimants and non-certified claimants were permitted to file lawsuits in United States courts. 

Certified Claims Background 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims US$8.7 billion.  

The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

From the certified claim filed by Texaco: “The Cuban corporation was intervened on June 29, 1960, pursuant to Resolution 188 of June 28, 1960, under Law 635 of 1959.  Resolution 188 was promulgated by the Government of Cuba when the Cuban corporation assertedly refused to refine certain crude oil as assertedly provided under a 1938 law pertaining to combustible materials.  Subsequently, this Cuban firm was listed as nationalized in Resolution 19 of August 6, 1960, pursuant to Cuban Law 851.  The Commission finds, however, that the Cuban corporation was effectively intervened within the meaning of Title V of the Act by the Government of Cuba on June 29, 1960.” 

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International; the certified claim also includes land adjacent to the Jose Marti International Airport in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  The third-largest certified claim valued at US$97,373,414.72 is controlled by New York, New York-based North American Sugar Industries, Inc.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement.   

Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 requires that an asset had a value of US$50,000.00 when expropriated by the Republic of Cuba without compensation to the original owner.  Of the 5,913 certified claims, 913, or 15%, are valued at US$50,000.00 or more.  Adjusted for inflation, US$50,000.00 (3.70% per annum) in 1960 has a 2019 value of approximately US$427,267.01.  The USFCSC authorized 6% per annum, meaning the 2019 value of US$50,000.00 is approximately US$1,649,384.54.  

The ITT Corporation Agreement 

In July 1997, then-New York City, New York-based ITT Corporation and then-Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based STET International Netherlands N.V. signed an agreement whereby STET International Netherlands N.V. would pay approximately US$25 million to ITT Corporation for a ten-year right (after which the agreement could be renewed and was renewed) to use assets (telephone facilities and telephone equipment) within the Republic of Cuba upon which ITT Corporation has a certified claim valued at approximately US$130.8 million.  ETECSA, which is now wholly-owned by the government of the Republic of Cuba, was a joint venture controlled by the Ministry of Information and Communications of the Republic of Cuba within which Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based Telecom Italia International N.V. (formerly Stet International Netherlands N.V.), a subsidiary of Rome, Italy-based Telecom Italia S.p.A. was a shareholder.  Telecom Italia S.p.A., was at one time a subsidiary of Ivrea, Italy-based Olivetti S.p.A.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International. 

Cuba Libertad Act Defendants Differ To Court Of Appeals: Booking.com Says No Oral Arguments Required; Expedia Entites Say Otherwise

MARIO DEL VALLE, ENRIQUE FALLA, MARIO ECHEVARRIA V. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, ORBITZ, LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING HOLDINGS INC. Initial defendants were: TRIVAGO GMBH, BOOKING.COM B.V., GRUPO HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE I-5, AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22619 Southern Florida District; 20-12407 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]

Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie, LLP (defendant)
Scott Douglass & McConnico (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

Notice Of Incorrect Statement Of Related Case (10/6/20)
Brief Of Defendants-Appellees Booking.Com B.V. And Booking Holdings Inc. (11/2/20)
Supplemental Appendix Of Defendants- Appellees Booking.com B.V. And Booking Holdings Inc. (11/2/20)
Brief Of Appellees Expedia Group, Inc., Hotels.com, L.P., Hotels.com GP, LLC, And Orbitz, LLC (11/2/20)

LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

Excerpts From Filings:

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellees Booking.com B.V. and Booking Holdings Inc. submit that oral argument is unnecessary in this case because it is a straightforward appeal concerning personal jurisdiction. This Court should affirm the district court’s judgment without argument.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue I: The first issue, reviewed de novo, is whether personal jurisdiction can be maintained over foreign defendants based on the accessibility of a website in Florida, under Sections 48.193(1)(a)(1) (the “doing business” section) and 48.193(1)(a)(2) (the “committing a tort” section) of the Florida long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause.

Issue II: The second issue is whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint without granting a conditional request for jurisdictional discovery contained solely in the plaintiffs’ response in opposition to a motion to dismiss.

Issue III: The third issue is whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend where plaintiffs did not move the district court for leave to amend.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The Expedia Entities respectfully submit that oral argument would be helpful to the Court in deciding this appeal. While the personal jurisdiction issue does not in-volve any novel or unusual questions, the issues regarding standing and failure to state a claim present issues of first impression regarding the proper interpretation of the Helms-Burton Act. Though the Act was adopted in 1996, the private right of action in Title III was suspended until May 2019. As such, most courts have not yet ad-dressed or resolved fundamental aspects of the statute’s enforcement. This appeal presents one of the first opportunities for this Court to address certain of those is-sues.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether the second amended complaint contains factual allegations as to each of the Expedia Entities sufficient to make out a prima facie case of specific per-sonal jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause.

2. Whether Plaintiffs lack standing under Article III of the Constitution and, thus, the federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.

3. As an alternative ground for affirmance, whether Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) because Plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing that a. Plaintiffs own “the claim[s]” to the allegedly confiscated properties and acquired ownership of those claims before March 12, 1996, as required by 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B); b. the Expedia Entities “knowingly and intentionally” engaged in or profit-ed from commercial activity concerning confiscated property, as required by the Act’s definition of traffics, 22 U.S.C. § 6023(A); c. the Expedia Entities engaged in conduct that falls outside the lawful-travel clause in the Act’s definition of traffics, 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(B)(iii); d. the allegedly confiscated properties meet the Act’s definition of property, which excludes most “real property used for residential purposes.”

Might Cuba And Venezuela Participate In 2021 Summit Of The Americas? Might They Be Required To Participate?

Will Trump and Biden invite the Republic of Cuba and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to participate in the 2021 Summit of the Americas? 

The Counter-intuitive Strategy?  Condition Cuba And Venezuela Participation To Changes In United States Policies. 

In 2021, the Washington DC-based Organization of American States (OAS)-affiliated Summit of the Americas will be held in the United States, and the host will be the President of the United States. 

There are arguments that by including President Miguel Diaz-Canel of the Republic of Cuba (population 11.3 million) and President Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela (estimated population 26 million-28.4 million; 30 million in 2015), the United States would create legitimacy for the manner by which each head of state manages their respective countries- and thus less urgency for seeking changes to the behavior of those two countries. 

There are arguments that inclusion for both leaders could create collective pressure- and present collective opportunities for each country should they embrace decisions required by the other participants at the Summit of the Americas.  Basically, shining a spotlight upon the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela to show distinctly how each county lags glaringly behind its neighbors in terms of commercial, economic and political institutional successes. 

The arguments for continued exclusion of the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela from the 2021 Summit of the Americas reflect the disagreement, though not with unanimity, by participants with the behavior of each country.  The current message- participation requires change.  

There is an undeniable attractiveness for some participants to view President Diaz-Canel and President Maduro seated amongst other heads of state and heads of government and having to listen to a litany of grievances from Brazil, Colombia and United States.  Or, heightening the optic- both presidents could rise from their seats and defiantly depart the venue.  However, a departure would deny them a global platform from which to confront their accusers and defend their policies. 

If President Trump is re-elected, he will no longer believe a need to subscribe to the interests of desired constituencies; he would feel unshackled by political and ethical norms.  Thus, the likely venue for the 2021 Summit of the Americas would be Miami, Florida.  Given his previously and oft-stated desire to “make deals” and bring to conclusion issues impacting the United States, he could gravitate towards hosting President Diaz-Canel and President Maduro at his Mar-a-Lago Club in Palm Beach, Florida, or Trump National Doral in Miami, Florida, where he previously wanted to host the 2020 G7 Leaders’ Summit.   

A twist might be for President Trump to require their participation as a condition for changes to Trump Administration policies impacting each country.    

If there is [Joseph] Biden Administration, he might too look at Miami, Florida, as host for the 2021 Summit of the Americas.  He may also look to Houston, Texas, and New Orleans, Louisiana.  Regardless, he and his newly-installed foreign policy team would probably be more cautious about extending invitations to President Diaz-Canel and President Maduro unless there are perceived opportunities, particularly relating to Venezuela.   

A twist might be for President Biden to require their participation as a condition for changes to Trump Administration policies impacting each country.   

United States Department of State
Washington DC
10 July 2020

The United States will host the Ninth Summit of the Americas in 2021. The Summit takes place once every three years and is the only meeting of all leaders from the countries of North, South, and Central America and the Caribbean. This will be the first time the United States has hosted the Summit since the inaugural meeting in Miami in 1994. The Inukshuk, a stone landmark used by the Inuit and other peoples of the Arctic region of North America, is also a symbol of the Summits of the Americas and passes to the host country. This Inukshuk was first presented by the Government of Canada, host of the Third Summit, to the Government of Argentina, host of the Fourth Summit and has since then, been used to mark the transfer of leadership from one Summit host to the next.

Acting Assistant Secretary Ambassador Michael Kozak, from the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, and Director General Luis Chavez, from the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, officially transferred the chair of the Summit of the Americas process from Peru to the United States in a formal ceremony on July 10, 2020. The Department of State looks forward to initiating substantive policy discussions with other governments, institutions, and stakeholders to inform the agenda of our democratically elected leaders and advance freedom, prosperity, and security in our hemisphere.

Why Does the Summit of the Americas Matter?

Since the United States launched the Summit of the Americas, this meeting of the region’s leaders has become the highest-level process for promoting regional cooperation and addressing the most pressing issues in the Americas. Each Summit focuses on a critical area of cooperation that all countries in the Americas can support, and allows the region as a whole to work together on such issues as increasing economic competitiveness, catalyzing development, enhancing access to energy and communication technology, strengthening regional security, countering trafficking, and promoting democracy and human rights. Most recently, leaders committed to fight the corruption epidemic undermining our region’s democracies when they met at the Eighth Summit of the Americas in Lima, Peru in 2018.

U.S. efforts in the Summit of the Americas process, led by the Department of State but encompassing a whole-of-government approach, have strengthened our partnerships with the governments and peoples of the Western Hemisphere region to help keep the Americas safe and prosperous.

Who Participates in the Summit of the Americas?

Heads of state and government, foreign ministers, and other senior officials from the governments of the Americas attend the Summit of the Americas and associated forums. The President or Vice President of the United States has attended all of the Summits of the Americas.

People of the Americas, including:

Civil society: Civil society representatives regularly participate in the Summit, but their role is often informal. The United States works closely with such representatives and the country hosting the summit to ensure they have a meaningful, formal role in the summit process. The Civil Society Forum is often the only opportunity for many civil society representatives from the region to engage leaders and elevate their concerns. Foro Ciudadano de las Americas and the Organization of American States (OAS) coordinate civil society’s participation in the Summit.

Business leaders: The CEO Summit of the Americas is the highest-profile business forum of the Americas, bringing together leading CEOs with heads of government to identify polices and transparent partnerships that advance economic growth and investment, including through the efforts of the private sector-led Americas Business Dialogue. The CEO Summit coordinated by the Inter-American Development Bank became a formal part of the Summit process in 2012.

Youth: The Young Americas Forum is a permanent, open, and inclusive channel for youth to help define priorities and coordinate action in the region. Youth at each Summit prepare concrete recommendations to governments and adopt a hemispheric agenda for follow-up activities. The Young Americas Business Trust has organized the Young Americas Forum on the margins of five regular Summits.

Other stakeholders: Summits have included forums for parliamentarians, indigenous groups, labor leaders, and university rectors, among others.

The host nation of the Summit of the Americas determines who participates in the Summit. Leaders established in the Declaration of Quebec City in 2001 that “the maintenance and strengthening of the rule of law and strict respect for the democratic system” are essential conditions for participation.

Who Has Hosted the Summit of the Americas?

Miami, United States of America (1994)
Santa Cruz, Bolivia (1996)*
Santiago, Chile (1998)
Quebec City, Canada (2001)
Monterrey, Mexico (2004)*
Mar del Plata, Argentina (2005)
Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago (2009)
Cartagena, Colombia (2012)
Panama City, Panama (2015)
Lima, Peru (2018)
*Special Summits

Summit Organization

National Summit Coordinators from the governments of the Americas work together as part of the Summit’s managing body, the Summit Implementation Review Group (SIRG), to inform and implement their leaders’ agenda. The SIRG is chaired by the Summit host. The Summits of the Americas Secretariat, which is housed at the Organization of American States, and the 12 international organizations that comprise the Joint Summit Working Group (JSWG) support the SIRG and the Summit process.

LINK To U.S. Department Of State Reference: https://www.state.gov/summit-of-the-americas/

Transfer Ceremony of the Chairmanship of the Summits of the Americas Process
10 July 2020

The Summits of the Americas Secretariat is pleased to report on the Transfer Ceremony of the Chairmanship of the Summits of the Americas Process, from the Government of the Republic of Peru, host of the VIII Summit of the Americas, to the Government of the States United of America, host of the upcoming IX Summit of the Americas, to be held in 2021. During this ceremony, the Government of Peru made an official presentation to the Government of the United States of the Inukshuk, symbol of the indigenous people of North America and of the Summits Process, which represents "The orientation and unity of our people towards common goals." This ceremony was held virtually on July 10, 2020, having been disseminated among the various actors of the Summit Process.

LINK To Summit Of The Americas Ceremony: http://www.summit-americas.org/chairIX.html

From The Organization Of American States (OAS)
Participants

The participants of the Summits of the Americas Process are the Heads of State and Government of the hemisphere and their delegations. In addition, the heads of the member institutions of the Joint Summit Working Group (JSWG) participate as observers.

The institutions comprising the JSWG are: the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the World Bank (WB), the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Special guests include social actor representatives (civil society organizations, youth, indigenous peoples, workers etc.) academia, the private sector and the media among others.

Biden And Harris Discuss Their (Potential) Policies For Cuba... Many Questions Remain. Should Cruise Lines Rejoice?

The Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
29 October 2020

Biden also made direct appeals to Cubans and Venezuelans, many of whom live in South Florida after fleeing their countries. “We have to vote for a new Cuba policy as well,” Biden said. “Trump is the worst possible standard-bearer for democracy in places like Cuba, Venezuela, North Korea. Cuba is no closer to freedom and democracy today than it was four years ago. Trump loves to talk tough, but he doesn’t care about the Cuban and Venezuelan people. He won’t even grant Temporary Protected Status to Venezuelans fleeing the oppressive Maduro regime. I will, but we have to vote.”

The New York Times
New York, New York
29 October 2020

Mr. Biden, appearing in the afternoon in Broward County, a Democratic stronghold, delivered a tailored message intended to motivate Latinos. "Cuba is no closer to freedom and democracy today than it was four years ago," Mr. Biden, in shirt sleeves and sunglasses, said at Broward College's North Campus in Coconut Creek. “President Trump can’t advance democracy and human rights for the Cuban people or the Venezuelan people, for that matter, when he has praised so many autocrats around the world,” he said.

The Hill
Washington DC
28 April 2020

“In large part, I would go back,” Biden said in an interview with a CBS affiliate in Miami. “I’d still insist they keep the commitments they said they would make when we, in fact, set the policy in place.”

EFE
Madrid, Spain
27 October 2020

Interview with Senator Kamala Harris (D- California)
CONTINUATION OF THE BLOCKADE TO CUBA

Q: What would a future government of yours and that of the Democratic candidate Joe Biden do to reverse the policies that Trump has adopted towards Cuba? Would you personally advocate for an end to the blockade?

A: The policy of a Biden and Harris Administration towards Cuba would be governed by two principles: first, Americans, especially Cuban-Americans, are the best ambassadors of freedom in Cuba. Second, empowering the Cuban people to determine their own future is vital to America's national security interests. Trump is deporting hundreds of Cubans back to dictatorship and back to a regime crackdown that has only increased under his presidency. There are nearly 10,000 Cubans languishing in tent camps along the Mexican border due to Trump's anti-immigrant agenda. And it is separating Cuban families through restrictions on family visits and remittances. We will backtrack on Trump's failed policies. And as he did previously as vice president, Joe Biden will also demand the release of political prisoners and will make human rights a centerpiece in the diplomatic relationship. The embargo is the law; you need an act of Congress to lift it or you need the president to determine that a democratically elected government is in power in Cuba. We don't expect any of these things to happen anytime soon.

Q: From the US foreign policy perspective, what role do you think Spain can play in relations with Cuba and, in general, with Latin America?

A: Under a Biden and Harris Administration, the US will work with members of the international community, including Spain, to support the Cuban people, as well as promote Joe Biden's vision of the need to work for a safe hemisphere, middle class and democratic.

Washington, 27 oct (EFE).- Kamala Harris, que en solo una semana podría convertirse en la primera vicepresidenta de EE.UU., reconoció en una entrevista con Efe que romper barreras a veces duele y te hace sangrar, pero aseguró que siempre "valdrá la pena, todas y cada una de las veces".

Harris siente una gran responsabilidad para hablar con “voz firme” en nombre de aquellos que aún viven excluidos y prometió que si llega a la Casa Blanca luchará por la igualdad de "todos" los estadounidenses. En una entrevista por escrito con Efe, la senadora reflexionó sobre su carrera y la influencia de su madre y también reveló qué políticas adoptará una nueva Administración demócrata en asuntos como el asilo a refugiados centroamericanos y las relaciones con Cuba, España, la Unión Europea (UE) y la OTAN.

CONTINUACIÓN DEL BLOQUEO A CUBA

P: ¿Qué haría un futuro Gobierno suyo y del candidato demócrata Joe Biden para revertir las políticas que Trump ha adoptado hacia Cuba? ¿Abogaría usted personalmente por el fin del bloqueo?

R: La política de una Administración de Biden y Harris hacia Cuba estaría gobernada por dos principios: primero, los estadounidenses, especialmente los cubano-estadounidenses, son los mejores embajadores de la libertad en Cuba. Segundo, dar poder al pueblo cubano para que determine su propio futuro es vital para los intereses de seguridad nacional de EE.UU. Trump está deportando a cientos de cubanos de vuelta a la dictadura y de vuelta a una represión del régimen que solo ha aumentado bajo su Presidencia. Hay casi 10.000 cubanos que están languideciendo en campamentos de tiendas de campaña a lo largo de la frontera con México debido a la agenda antiinmigrante de Trump. Y está separando a familias cubanas mediante restricciones a las visitas familiares y las remesas. Nosotros daremos marcha atrás en las políticas fallidas de Trump. Y como hizo anteriormente como vicepresidente, Joe Biden, también exigirá la liberación de los presos políticos y hará de los derechos humanos una pieza central en la relación diplomática. El embargo es la ley; se necesita una ley del Congreso para levantarlo o se necesita que el presidente determine que un Gobierno elegido democráticamente está en el poder en Cuba. No esperamos que ninguna de estas cosas ocurra pronto.

P: Desde la perspectiva de política exterior de EE.UU., ¿qué papel cree que España puede jugar en las relaciones con Cuba y, en general, con Latinoamérica?

R: Bajo una Administración de Biden y Harris, EE.UU. trabajará con miembros de la comunidad internacional, incluida España, para apoyar al pueblo cubano, así como para promover la visión de Joe Biden sobre la necesidad de trabajar por un hemisferio seguro, de clase media y democrático.

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
5 October 2020

Excerpts....

In his first visit to Miami in more than a year, Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden on Monday attacked President Donald Trump’s hard-line policies in the Americas, saying his opponent’s tough talk and steep sanctions have only entrenched Cuba’s Communist government.

“The administration’s approach is not working. Cuba is no closer to democracy than it was four years ago,” the former vice president said from a mostly empty gymnasium at José Martí Park in Little Havana, the historic heart of Miami’s Cuban exile community. “There’s more political prisoners. The secret police are as brutal as ever. And Russia is once again a presence in Cuba and Havana.”

Biden also criticized Trump for failing to topple Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro and for refusing to grant undocumented exiles in the U.S. Temporary Protected Status from deportation back to a country suffering from crippling hyperinflation. “Maduro, who I’ve met, is a dictator, plain and simple,” said Biden. “And he’s caused incredible suffering among the Venezuelan people to maintain his grip on power.”

LINK To Former U.S. Secretary Of State Kerry Shares A Biden Administration Approach To Cuba- And Cuba Won't Like It (9 September 2020)

Cuba Says Western Union's 407 Distribution Points Will Close; Western Union Not Giving Up- 2016 Seems So Long Ago...

Western Union Statement
27 October 2020

“Our goal is to continue providing essential money transfer services to customers, many of whom rely on remittances from loved ones to meet day-to-day needs. Western Union is committed to adhering to all government regulations. We are exploring ways to comply with the new rules and regulations on Cuba. We will provide additional information as we formalize those plans. In the meantime, Western Union services between the U.S. and Cuba remain operational. U.S. customers can send money directly to family members in Cuba from our retail locations, or digitally via westernunion.com or the Western Union mobile app, for payout at more than 400 retail locations in Cuba.”

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Havana, Republic of Cuba
27 October 2020

”The inclusion of Fincimex in the list of restricted entities of the US State Department in June last, as well as the Treasury Department’s modifications to the regulations for the control of Cuban assets announced on Friday, October 23, will prevent remittances to Cuba through US companies with general licenses, which will directly harm the Cuban people and their relatives in the US. Doing so in the middle of a pandemic corroborates the US government’s cynicism, opportunism and contempt for the Cuban people.

For more than 20 years, with professionalism and respect, Financiera Cimex S.A. has guaranteed commercial relations with companies from the US and elsewhere in the world to manage remittances to Cuba. In all these years, never has this company had to account for a single cent missing. Quite on the contrary, all its services have continued to grow, despite the pressures and aggressions against banking transactions. Family remittances to Cuba have been continuously politicized by the anti-Cuban extreme right. As from September, 2019, the US government has been applying coercive measures to restrict remittances.

The recently announced measures are a direct attack against family remittances. Washington spokespersons are lying when trying to pretend that the aforementioned restrictions will only affect one specific entity. Fincimex, which is part of the Cuban financial system, is the entity designated by a sovereign decision of the Cuban government, to guarantee the remittances to Cuba from the United States, which will be completely discontinued. Among the US counterparts is Western Union, an entity whose 407 outlets in Cuba, scattered all around the country, will be shut down as a result of the implementation of these brutal measures, which will also hamper the negotiations that, at the request of Fincimex, had been taking place for some months now, in preparation for the launching of the hard currency bank accounts remittances service. It falls upon the US government the full responsibility for the interruption of the remittances service between both countries. Most of the Cuban émigrés in the United States support the existence of stable relations with their families, and the US government is deliberately acting to damage those relations. Fincimex reiterates its commitment to the Cuban people in the interest of identifying and establishing safe and orderly remittances to Cuba.”

Corporacion CIMEX S.A. Post To Twitter
30 October 2020

Western Union Expands in Cuba: Connects the World
March 21, 2016

For the first time Western Union to move money into Cuba from beyond U.S. borders

ENGLEWOOD, Colo.--(BUSINESS WIRE)-- The Western Union Company (NYSE: WU), a leader in global payments services, announced today that it will launch remittance services from across the world into Cuba following U.S. regulatory and policy changes that allow Cubans and non-Cubans to send remittances via Western Union to this island nation.

This Smart News Release features multimedia. View the full release here: http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160321005381/en/ Western Union Expands in Cuba: Connects the world (Graphic: Business Wire)

For the first time, Cubans and other citizens worldwide will join their U.S. counterparts to send remittances into Cuba within minutes* using Western Union’s cross-border payments platform. The Company expects to activate services in a phased approach by end of second quarter 2016. “As the first U.S. Company with scale to move money from across the world to Cuba, we welcome the regulatory and policy changes put in place by the U.S. government that allow us to offer these services,” said Odilon Almeida, President of the Americas and European Union. Remittances can be sent to family members and other Cuban nationals for family expenses and personal support for private economic activity.

“It is a privilege to connect Cubans from almost anywhere in the world in a matter of moments to their home community, and it is even more historic to be associated with the anticipated economic multiplier that will come with new injection of remittance flows into Cuba,” Almeida lauded. “As we have found in other parts of the world, expanding remittances will provide a vital opportunity to improve the standard of living for Cuban people, contribute to savings and eventually investment towards small-businesses.” Funds moved by Western Union go directly from the sender to the receiver with no middle intervention. “This represents a powerful catalyst for empowerment and innovation. Our current movement of remittances from the U.S. to Cuba funds regular expenses and micro businesses, driving entrepreneurism, innovation and employment opportunities,” Almeida explains.

Western Union’s global experience has shown that when customers have formalized and convenient access, remittance flows thrive from established and new corridors. Access to convenient financial services in a globalized financial arena is important to the world’s increasingly mobile-workforce and it has proven to be as important to the economic advancement of a nation. Remittance senders from across the world can expect the same in-minutes money transfer speed into Cuba with local currency payout. They can use Western Union’s omni-channel send options -- retail, digital, mobile or bank, where available -- to send money, and in Cuba receivers can pick-up their funds from more than 490 Agent locations across each of Cuba’s 16 provinces and 168 municipalities. This is a significant presence and it is represented by multiple classes of trade – from retail stores to exchange houses.

Background

The Cuban population outside of Cuba is pegged at 1.4 million as of 2015. They reside across North, South and Central America, the Caribbean, EU and CIS countries. Nearly 96% are concentrated in five countries including U.S., Spain, Italy, Mexico, and Canada. However, Cubans reside in as many as 72 countries. Cash remittances to Cuba in 2013 reached US$2.8 billion with 90% originating from the US. Remittances reach 62% of Cuban households, sustain about 90% of the retail market and provide thousands of jobs.

About Western Union

The Western Union Company (NYSE: WU) is a leader in global payment services. Together with its Vigo, Orlandi Valuta, Pago Facil and Western Union Business Solutions branded payment services, Western Union provides consumers and businesses with fast, reliable and convenient ways to send and receive money around the world, to send payments and to purchase money orders. As of December 31, 2015, the Western Union, Vigo and Orlandi Valuta branded services were offered through a combined network of over 500,000 agent locations in 200 countries and territories and over 100,000 ATMs and kiosks, and included the capability to send money to over a billion accounts. In 2015, The Western Union Company completed 262 million consumer-to-consumer transactions worldwide, moving $82 billion of principal between consumers, and 508 million business payments. For more information, visit www.westernunion.com.

https://ir.westernunion.com/news/archived-press-releases/press-release-details/2016/Western-Union-Expands-in-Cuba-Connects-the-World/default.aspx

U.S. Secretary Of State Pompeo: "Cuba is the only country in the hemisphere where the military takes a cut of remittances"

United States Department of State
Washington DC
24 October 2020

Removing Cuba’s Military from the Remittance Process

Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State

Yesterday, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action to remove Cuba’s military from the process of sending remittances to Cuba. Once these changes to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) are effective, persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction will no longer be authorized to process remittances to or from Cuba involving any entity or sub-entity on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. These changes provide for a 30-day period before they are effective in order to allow for technical implementation. U.S. remittances to Cuba can still flow, but they will not flow through the hands of the Cuban military, which uses those funds to oppress the Cuban people and to fund Cuba’s interference in Venezuela.

The United States supports the principle that Cubans should be able to prosper and support their families without the Cuban military utilizing their hard currency earnings as it wishes. The Cuban government and military have created a system that seizes hard currency through military-operated financial mechanisms, such as FINCIMEX and AIS, and takes a cut from the remittances ordinary Cubans receive from abroad, including from the United States. Cuba is the only country in the hemisphere where the military takes a cut of remittances. Furthermore, the Cuban regime forces ordinary Cubans to use the remittances they have remaining to buy goods at marked-up prices from government-controlled stores.

Yesterday’s action demonstrates the United States’ long-standing commitment to ending economic practices that disproportionately benefit the Cuban government or its military, intelligence, and security agencies or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people.

The military of General Raul Castro will not profit from the well-intentioned, generous funds families send to the Cuban people.

The United States will continue to stand up for the Cuban people, who desire a democratic government and who deserve to have their human rights respected. As long as General Castro’s military apparatus denies freedom of religion, expression, association and so much more to the Cuban people, we will deny the regime its misappropriated resources. The Cuban people deserve the maximum benefit from their families.

Western Union Receives A Message From OFAC- Don't Work With Generals, Work With Civilians

The new OFAC regulation relating to Fincimex could be referenced as the "Western Union Regulation"

The Trump Administration's strategy continues to be singular- lessen commerce with entities controlled by the military.

From The Trump Administration- would a U.S. company rather do business with general or with a civilian?

Previous Post: AIS Financial Services In Cuba Sanctioned By U.S. Department Of State Due To Connection With Military

LINK To OFAC Complete Text

LINK To Federal Register Rule

Excerpts:

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of Foreign Assets Control

31 CFR Part 515

Cuban Assets Control Regulations

AGENCY: Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury. ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is amending the Cuban Assets Control Regulations to further implement portions of the President’s foreign policy toward Cuba to deny the Cuban government access to funds in connection with remittances to Cuba.

DATES: This rule is effective [INSERT DATE 30 DAYS AFTER DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER].

Background

The Department of the Treasury issued the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 CFR part 515 (the “Regulations”), on July 8, 1963, under various authorities, including the Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. 4301–41). OFAC has amended the Regulations on numerous occasions, including to implement the President’s foreign policy toward Cuba as set forth in National Security Presidential Memorandum-5, “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba,” signed by the President on June 16, 2017.

This document is scheduled to be published in the Federal Register on 10/27/2020 and available online at federalregister.gov/d/2020-23725, and on govinfo.gov

Today, OFAC, in consultation with the State Department, is taking additional action to implement the Administration’s foreign policy toward Cuba, as set forth in more detail below. This rule provides for a 30-day implementation period before it is effective in order to allow for technical implementation of these additional restrictions.

OFAC is amending the Regulations to remove from the scope of certain remittance related general authorizations any transactions involving entities or subentities identified on the Cuba Restricted List, as maintained by the State Department and published in the Federal Register. This action is intended to restrict such entities’ and subentities’ access to funds obtained in connection with remittance-related activities, including in their role as intermediaries or in their receipt of fees or commissions from processing remittance transactions. Specifically, OFAC is amending three general licenses in Subpart E of the Regulations to exclude from the scope of such authorizations any transaction involving any entity or subentity identified on the Cuba Restricted List: (i) § 515.570, which relates to remittances from persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction or from blocked accounts; (ii) § 515.572(a)(3), which relates to the provision of remittance forwarding services; and (iii) § 515.587, which relates to remittances from Cuban nationals to persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction. OFAC is also amending § 515.421, which provides interpretative guidance with respect to transactions ordinarily incident to a licensed transaction, to make clear that a transaction relating to the collection, forwarding, or receipt of remittances involving any entity or subentity identified on the Cuba Restricted List is not authorized as an ordinarily incident transaction where the terms of the general or specific license expressly exclude any such transactions. Because the amendments to §§ 515.570, 515.572(a)(3), and 515.587 expressly exclude these remittance-related transactions involving any entity or subentity on the Cuba Restricted List, upon the effective date of this rule, such transactions will not be authorized as ordinarily incident to licensed transactions under those provisions. OFAC is also adding a clarifying note in § 515.209 consistent with the amended § 515.421.

A transaction relating to the collection, forwarding, or receipt of remittances involving an entity or subentity identified on the Cuba Restricted List is not authorized as a transaction ordinarily incident to a licensed transaction where the terms of the applicable general or specific license expressly exclude any such transactions. See §§ 515.570, 515.572(a)(3), and 515.587.

The addition reads as follows: § 515.421 Transactions ordinarily incident to a licensed transaction. (a) * * * (7) A transaction relating to the collection, forwarding, or receipt of remittances involving any entity or subentity identified on the Cuba Restricted List, as published in the Federal Register and maintained by the State Department and available at https://www.state.gov/cuba-sanctions/cuba-restricted-list/, where the terms of the applicable general or specific license expressly exclude any such transactions.

The addition reads as follows: § 515.570 Remittances. * * * * * (j) Remittance transactions with entities or subentities on the Cuba Restricted List prohibited. Nothing in paragraphs (a) through (i) authorizes a transaction relating to the collection, forwarding, or receipt of remittances involving any entity or subentity identified on the Cuba Restricted List, as published in the Federal Register and maintained by the State Department and available at https://www.state.gov/cuba-sanctions/cuba-restricted-list/.

Nothing in this paragraph (a)(3) authorizes a transaction relating to the collection, forwarding, or receipt of remittances involving any entity or subentity identified on the Cuba Restricted List, as published in the Federal Register and maintained by the State Department and available at https://www.state.gov/cuba-sanctions/cuba-restricted-list/.”

Amend § 515.587 by adding a sentence at the end of the section to read as follows: § 515.587 Remittances from Cuban nationals to persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction. *** Nothing in this paragraph authorizes a transaction relating to the collection, forwarding, or receipt of remittances involving any entity or subentity identified on the Cuba Restricted List, as published in the Federal Register and maintained by the State Department and available at https://www.state.gov/cuba-sanctions/cuba-restricted-list/.”

EU Prefers Companies Obtain Approval Prior To Appearing In United States Courts

A communication from the European Commission…

European Commission

Brussels, Belgium

20 October 2020

The EU’s Blocking Statute is designed to protect EU companies and persons from the extraterritorial application of foreign laws and regulations specified therein. Specifically, it covers certain U.S. sanctions vis-a-vis Iran and Cuba. The EU considers the extra-territorial application of unilateral coercive measures as contrary to international law.

First, the Blocking Statute nullifies the effect in the EU of any foreign decision, including court rulings, giving effect to those sanctions. Second, it allows EU persons to recover damages for the losses they incurred because of those sanctions. Third, it prohibits EU operators from complying with such sanctions.

However, EU persons can request from the European Commission an authorisation to comply with such sanctions. If there is sufficient evidence that non-compliance would seriously damage their interests or those of the European Union, the European Commission can grant such authorisation.

As a general rule, EU companies summoned before US courts must obtain a prior authorisation from the European Commission before appearing in court.

The authorisation process is confidential. Hence, the Commission cannot comment on any specific case. Suffice it to say that all decisions on authorisation applications are taken after careful deliberations – appreciating fully all arguments and evidence concerning the possible serious damage to the interests of the applicants or the EU.

The Commission decides on such authorisations with the agreement of Member States, through the comitology procedure.

Cuba Was First Customer For U.S. Export-Import Bank; Still Owes US$36.3 Million. Will It Ever Be Repaid? Is U.S. Government Trying?

“President Franklin Roosevelt created a Second Export–Import Bank of Washington with Executive Order 6638 on March 9, 1934, with the specific goal of aiding trade with Cuba. The Bank's first transaction was a $3.8 million loan to Cuba in 1935 for the purchase of U.S. silver ingots…. The fist of five loans extended for Cuban coinage over a five-year period.”

Export-Import Bank Of The United States (EXIM Bank)
Washington DC

22 September 2020: “This is the final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM Bank). We received your request in our FOIA Office via E-mail on July 31, 2020. You requested the following information: “The exposure by EXIM to the Republic of Cuba. This includes: 1) total debt 2) total interest 3) total including interest 4) why EXIM does not show interest calculation in the 2019 report data and 5) the EXIM exposure by company.”

We conducted a comprehensive search of the files within the Office of the CFO, Division of the Treasurer and the Office of the Chief Risk Officer for records that would be responsive to your request. These are the components within EXIM Bank in which responsive records could reasonably be expected to be found. The search produced the attached record. After carefully reviewing the responsive document, we have determined that it is releasable in its entirety; no deletions or exemptions have been claimed. For your convenience, we are attaching the documents to this message as a PDF file. For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. §552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all of our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.”

“EXIM’s Cuba portfolio:
1) Total Debt: $36.3 million
2) Total Interest: $18.0 million
3) Total Debt Including Interest: $54.3 million
4) EXIM does not count interest due toward its exposure. Exposure amount includes only undisbursed and outstanding principal balances.
5) The breakdown of exposure by primary borrower- Primary Borrower Exposure (USD Millions): Cia Cubana Primadera Sa $1.20 Cuban Electric Co $18.74 Cuban Telephone Co $16.29 Juan Segismundo Pons Cuesta $0.01 Trafico Y Transporte Sa $0.03”

From Other Research:

As of 2019, the Republic of Cuba exposure to the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) is US$36,266,581.00

As Of 1982 “List Of Major U.S. Suppliers Under Delinquent Credits To Cuba”

Credit No. 493- Cuba
Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co.
American Meter Co.
Anaconda Wire & Cable Co.
Babcock & Wilcox
Canada Wire & Cable Co.
Combustion Engineering-Superheater Co.
Ebasco International Corp.
Esambia Treating Co.
Hall Mark Electric Sales Co.
International General Electric
International Standard Electric Co.
National Valve & Manufacturing
Rockwell Manufacturing Co.
United Fruit Co.
U.S. Pipe & Foundry
Westinghouse Electric International Corp.
Worthington Pump & Manufacturing

Credit No. 791- Cuba
Butler Pan-America Co.
Combustion Engineering Inc.
International General Electric
Jackson & Church Co.
Wallboard Dryer Co.

Credit No. 828- Cuba
Brown Trailers, Inc.
Clark Equipment Co.

Credit No. 960- Cuba
International Standard Electric Corp.
Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co.

Credit No. 1021- Cuba
Crown Machine & Tool Co.

14 July 1982
United States House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations
Committee on the Judiciary
Washington DC

Hearing- Debt Collection Act of 1981

The Honorable Sam Hall (chairman)
Mr. Charles E. Lord, Vice Chairman and First Vice President, Export-Import Bank of the United States
Mr. Warren Glock, General Counsel, Export-Import Bank of the United States
Mr. James Hess, Acting Treasurer-Controller, Export-Import Bank of the United States

Mr. Glick: Loans that were made to Cuba were pre-Castro loans. There were made between the period of 1951 and 1958. There is no dispute about those debts being due, but when the revolution occurred, those properties were expropriated by the Castro government and they have refused to pay that debt. We still harbor hopes of some day collecting that debt.

Mr. Hess: The Cuba debt today is US$36.3 million in principal, and the delinquent interest is currently US$44.2 million, for a total of US$80.5 million.

Mr. Hall: US$80.5 million. Is that a transaction that occurred identical to the procedures as we mentioned in the Boeing transactions? Was there some local or domestic corporation that sought to do business with Cuba?

Mr. Glick: The loans were made in the same way, directly to purchasers in Cuba. What we were financing were exports of U.S. manufactured goods from the United States, but the loans were made to Cuba entities.

Mr. Hall: Were they made to the country or to private entities in Cuba?

Mr. Glick: One loan was made to Compania Cubana de Electicidad, which was a government entity, and electricity operation in Cuba; one was made to the Cuban Telephone Company; and another was made to a wholly private company, Compania Cubana Premadera S.A., which is a private paper manufacturing company. Then there are a few smaller ones.

Mr. Hall: What domestic corporation was involved in that”

Mr. Glick: I do not have with me the names of the U.S. suppliers. We can furnish that.

*******

Mr. Hall: Did the government guarantee that loan?
Mr. Lord: The Cuban Government”
Mr. Hall: Yes.
Mr. Lord: Two of the entities were government entities, government-owned corporations, so it was the credit of the government.

25 March 1968
Subcommittee on the Committee on Appropriations
United States House of Representatives
Washington DC

Harold F. Linder, President and Chairman of the Board of Directors, Export-Import Bank of the United States

Mr. [Otto] Passman (Chairman): None of the loans is being repaid.
Mr. Linder: None.
Mr. Passman: I suppose it is the policy of the Castro government that the people not pay on these loans?
Mr. Linder: I think it is. He has taken over these properties. Mr. Sauer has been down there and tried to persuade him to make payments. He simply is not going to do it. At least he is not going to do it at this point. Maybe the day will come when he is out and there will be recognition by the United States and we will have a chance of getting some of our money back.

Annual Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, for the period July 1, 1970, to June 30, 1971

Cuban debt- about US$45 million- represents mainly delinquent installments on loans made by Eximbank in the 1950’s to U.S. subsidiaries which were subsequently expropriated by the Cuban Government.

EXIM was organized originally as a District of Columbia banking corporation by Executive Order 6581 from Franklin D. Roosevelt on February 2, 1934, under the name Export–Import Bank of Washington. The stated goal was "to aid in financing and to facilitate exports and imports and the exchange of commodities between the United States and other Nations or the agencies or nationals thereof", with the immediate goal of making loans to the USSR and Latin America.

Roosevelt created a Second Export–Import Bank of Washington with Executive Order 6638 on March 9, 1934, with the specific goal of aiding trade with Cuba. The Bank's first transaction was a $3.8 million loan to Cuba in 1935 for the purchase of U.S. silver ingots. The First and Second Export–Import Banks were combined in 1936 when Congress transferred the obligations of the Second Export–Import Bank to the first. Congress continued the bank as a government agency, using a series of laws between 1935 and 1943 to make it subordinate to various government departments.

The Export–Import Bank of the United States (abbreviated as EXIM or known as the Bank) is the official export credit agency (ECA) of the United States federal government. Operating as a wholly owned federal government corporation, the Bank "assists in financing and facilitating U.S. exports of goods and services". EXIM intervenes when private sector lenders are unable or unwilling to provide financing, equipping American businesses with the financing tools necessary to compete for global sales. EXIM's aim is to promote U.S. goods and services at no cost to U.S. taxpayers, protecting “made in America” products against foreign competition in overseas markets and encouraging the creation of American jobs. Its current chairman and president, Kimberly A. Reed, was nominated by President Donald J. Trump on January 16, 2019, and sworn in on May 9, 2019.

Founded in 1934, the Export–Import Bank was established by an executive order organized by President Franklin D. Roosevelt under the name Export–Import Bank of Washington. The stated goal was "to aid in financing and to facilitate exports and imports and the exchange of commodities between the United States and other Nations or the agencies or nationals thereof." The Bank's first transaction was a $3.8 million loan to Cuba in 1935 for the purchase of U.S. silver ingots. In 1945, it was made an independent agency in the Executive Branch by Congress. It was last chartered for a three-year term in 2012 and in September 2014 was extended through June 30, 2015.

Congressional authorization for the bank lapsed as of July 1, 2015. As a result, the bank could not engage in new business, but it continued to manage its existing loan portfolio. Five months later, after the successful employment of the rarely used discharge petition procedure in the House of Representatives, the U.S. Congress reauthorized the bank until September 2019 via the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act signed into law on December 4, 2015, by President Barack Obama. In December of 2019, President Donald Trump signed the Export-Import Bank Extension into law as part of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94) which authorized the bank until December 31st, 2026.

Over the years, the Export–Import Bank helped finance several historic projects including the Pan-American Highway, the Burma Road, and post-WWII reconstruction.

Port Mariel Handles 2 millionth TEU Since Opening In 2014; Can Process 800,000 TEU Annually

Seatrade Maritime News
Colchester, United Kingdom
12 October 2020

Cuba’s Mariel Container Terminal achieves 2m teu handled

By Michele Labrut 

PSA-managed Mariel Container Terminal (TC Mariel) has achieved the milestone of handling 2m teu since its inauguration on 27 January 2014. 

The MV Julius, from the shipping line Melfi Marine Corp, transport the container that would become the two millionth teu handled by the terminal. This vessel operates on a regular service between the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. 

This milestone is part of the contribution made by TC Mariel in the modernisation and economic development project of Cuba, as a key link of Mariel Special Development Zone (ZEDM).  The ZEDM was inaugurated in November 2013 and provides a production and logistics platform. 

TC Mariel offers berthing in protected waters and cargo operations with a 702 m long berth and four super post-panamax dock cranes. The terminal has an annual capacity of 800,000 teu and in 2019 it handled 322,000 teu. 

PSA-operated TC Mariel’s modern infrastructure and equipment, qualified personnel, advanced technology and its access channel for panamax ships, which is the process of being dredged to receive neo-panamax ships, has positioned the terminal as a strategic logistics hub with great potential within the region. 

Copyright © 2020. All rights reserved.  Seatrade, a trading name of Informa Markets (UK) Limited.

Six Months Since EU Asked By Defendant In Libertad Act Lawsuit To Provide Guidance; 2nd Defendant Asked In August. EU Responds It's "actively accessing application" Where Are EU Attorneys?

France, Spain, UK
EU-Domiciled Companies Are Defendants In Libertad Act Lawsuits; Two Await Instructions From EC- One Defendant Waiting Six Months; Where Are EU Attorneys?

Bristol, United Kingdom-based Imperial Brands plc
(2019 revenues approximately US$34 billion)*
Paris, France-based BNP Paribas S.A.
(2019 revenues approximately US$49 billion)
Palma, Spain-based Iberostar Group
(2019 revenues approximately US$2.5 billion)
Paris, France-based Pernod Ricard
(2019 revenues approximately US$10.4 billion)
Paris, France-based Société Générale S.A.
(2019 revenues approximately US$25 billion)
London, United Kingdom-based WWP plc
(2019 revenues approximately US$14 billion)*

*(until 31 December 2020 when the United Kingdom departs the European Union, then United Kingdom statutes relevant) 

There are two (2) Libertad Act lawsuits where the defendant(s) have requested guidance from the Brussels, Belgium-based European Commission (EC).   

Iberostar Group sent its letter to the EC on 15 April 2020.  Imperial Brands sent its letter to the EC on 27 August 2020. 

From The EU: The EC is the European Union’s (EU) “politically independent executive arm.  It is alone responsible for drawing up proposals for new European legislation, and it implements the decisions of the European Parliament and the Council of the EU.”   

TEMPLATE FOR APPLICATIONS FOR AUTHORISATIONS- under Article 5 paragraph 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom ('Regulation').  Criteria for assessing possible applications for such an authorisation are laid down in the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1101. This template aims to help EU operators consider and submit a possible application, by providing the basic elements to be taken into account in such an application. LINK

In the third quarter of 2019, the then twenty-eight, now twenty-seven member EC confirmed its intention to issue a Request For Proposal (RFP) to law firms in the United States.  The law firm(s) would be retained to file “amicus curiae” (friend-of-the-court) motions and other motions on behalf of each Libertad Act Title III lawsuit defendant who is domiciled in the EC.  To date, no RFP has been published. 

Excerpt From Judge’s Order Granting Iberostar’s Motion To Stay (4/24/20): ”This requirement comes from a European Union blocking statute enacted to counteract the effects of the Helms-Burton Act, and Iberostar faces EUR 600,000 in sanctions for failure to first obtain authorization. (ECF No. 16 at ¶ 3.) Iberostar’s request for authorization has already been filed and is currently pending before the European Commission. (Id. at ¶ 18.) In the interest of international comity, this Court has determined that it is appropriate to stay this case pending the Iberostar’s request for authorization from the European Commission.  The Court grants Iberostar’s motion for a stay (ECF No. 16), and the case is stayed until the European Union grants Iberostar’s request for authorization.  Iberostar shall submit status reports on its request for authorization every 30 days. In the interim, the Court directs the Clerk to administratively close this case.” 

On 23 September 2020, Iberostar Hoteles Y Apartamentos, S.L. filed a “Defendant’s Status Report” with the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.   

Excerpts:  

Defendant IBEROSTAR HOTELES Y APARTAMENTOS, S.L.U. (“Iberostar”) submits 1(Iberostar reserves all its rights and will move to dismiss based on its Rule 12 defenses when it receives authorization to do so from the European Commission.)  this status report pursuant to this Court’s Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Stay Proceedings dated April 24, 2020 (D.E. 17), directing Defendant to submit status reports every 30 days on its request for authorization to the European Union Commission. Defendant states as follows: 

1. Since the last update filed on May 26, 2020, Iberostar continues to await a decision on its application for authorization to the European Commission to respond to the Complaint in this action which was filed with the European Commission on April 15, 2020 (the Application”).  Defendant’s Motion to Stay, ¶ 2. (D.E. 16). 

2. The European Commission acknowledged receipt of Defendant’s Application on May 19, 2020. 

3. On June 15, 2020, Iberostar requested the European Commission to provide an update on the status of the Application. 

4. On June 22, 2020, the European Commission confirmed that it is “currently assessing [Defendant’s] application,” and that the Commission does “[its] utmost to ensure that a decision is taken in due course.” 

5. On August 10, 2020, the European Commission informed Iberostar regarding the procedures involved in the consideration of the pending Application. They explained that it requires “extensive consultation of both the Commission’s services and Member States’ authorities.” 

6. On September 21, 2020, Iberostar requested an update from the European Commission regarding the status of Iberostar’s Application. 

7. This morning, on September 23, 2020, the Commission replied that its “services are actively assessing [Iberostar’s] application.” The Commission highlighted that the “complexity of [Iberostar’s] request requires careful consideration, including extensive consultation of both the Commission services and Member States’ authorities.” Finally, the Commission confirmed that, “[d]espite the challenges presented by the current health situation, [they] do [their] utmost to ensure that a decision is taken in due course.” 

8. Defendant will keep this Court duly updated of any developments on the request for authorization from the European Commission. 

The Lawsuits 

LUIS MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, MARIA TERESA RODRIGUEZ, a/k/a MARIA TERESA LANDA, ALFREDO RAMON FORNS, RAMON ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ, RAUL LORENZO RODRIGUEZ, CHRISTINA CONROY, and FRANCISCO RAMON RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiffs, v. IMPERIAL BRANDS PLC, CORPORACIÓN HABANOS, S.A., WPP PLC, YOUNG & RUBICAM LLC, and BCW LLC, a/k/a BURSON COHN & WOLFE LLC [1:20-cv-23287; Southern Florida District].

Berenthal & Associates (plaintiff)
Rodriguez Tramont & Nunez (plaintiff)
Nelson Mullins (defendant)
Allen & Overy (defendant)
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr (defendant)
Broad & Cassel (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

SUCESORES DE DON CARLOS NUNEZ Y DONA PURA GALVEZ, INC., BDA BANO NUNEZ V. SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE, S.A., D/B/A SG AMERICAS, INC.; THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA, D/B/A SCOTIA HOLDINGS (US) INC., A/K/A THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA, MIAMI AGENCY; THE NATIONAL BANK OF CANADA, D/B/A NATIONAL BANK OF CANADA FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.; AND BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA, S.A., D/B/A BBVA, USA., [1:19-cv-22842; Southern Florida District]. NOTE: Case transferred to New York Southern District On 2 February 2020 [1:20-cv-00851]. Current defendants Societe Generale, S.A. and BNP Paribas, S.A.

Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, LLP (plaintiff)
Law Offices Of Paul Sack P.A. (plaintiff)
MoloLamken LLC (plaintiff)
Mayer Brown LLP (defendant)
ReedSmith LLP (defendant)
Astigarraga Davis Mullins & Grossman (defendant)

MARLENE CUETO IGLESIAS AND MARIAM IGLESIAS ALVAREZ V. PERNOD RICARD [1:20-cv-20157; Southern Florida District]

IPS Legal Group, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Offices of Andre G. Raikhelson LLC (plaintiff)
Ainsworth & Clancy PLLC (plaintiff)
Carlton Fields P.A. (defendant)
Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A. (defendant)

MARIA DOLORES CANTO MARTI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATES OF DOLORES MARTI MERCADE AND FERNANDO CANTO BORY V. IBEROSTAR HOTELES Y APARTAMENTOS SL [1:20-cv-20078; Southern Florida District]

Zumpano Patricios P.A. (plaintiff)
Bird & Bird (defendant)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

NOTE: Iberostar Hoteles has two properties in the United States: 70 Park Avenue in New York City and Berkeley in Miami Beach, Florida.  Iberostar Hoteles manages eighteen properties in the Republic of Cuba. 

Excerpts From Defendant’s Motion To Stay Proceedings (4/23/20)  

1. Iberostar is caught between the conflicting demands of two legal systems: that of the United States and that of the European Union (“EU”). On the one hand, Iberostar must respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint by May 8, 2020. On the other hand, the European Commission requires an EU-based company to obtain authorization before it can file a response to any lawsuit brought under the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act (the “Helms-Burton Act” or the “Act”). This requirement arises from the EU blocking statute enacted to counteract the effects of the Helm-Burton Act, expressly prohibiting a Spanish entity such as Iberostar1 from complying “whether directly or through a subsidiary or other intermediary person, actively or by deliberate omission, with any requirement or prohibition, including requests of foreign courts, based on or resulting, directly or indirectly, from the laws specified in the Annex [which expressly includes the Act] or from actions based thereon or resulting therefrom.” See Council Regulation 2271/96, Protecting Against the Effects of the Extra-Territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third Country, and Actions Based Thereon or Resulting Therefrom, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 1 (EC) (the “Council Regulation 2271/96”) attached as Exhibit A.  

2. On April 15, 2020, Iberostar filed an application for authorization from the European Commission to respond to the Complaint in this action. See Exhibit B.2 Iberostar has also requested the expedited consideration of its application to the European Commission.  Iberostar does not know how long it will take to obtain a response to its application given that the applicable European legislation establishes no specific deadline for the European Commission to answer the request. Iberostar will be prepared to respond promptly after it receives a response on or after May 8, 2020. To avoid a protracted delay, this request for a stay is limited to no more than 75 days.  

3. Should Iberostar ignore the European Commission’s mandate and actively participate in this action without the Commission’s authorization, each breach would be subject to a penalty of up to EUR 600,000 by the Spanish government pursuant to Spanish Law 27/1998, of July 13, on Sanctions Applicable to Infringements of the Rules Established in Council Regulation 2271/96 (“Law 27/1998”).  See Law 27/1998, art. 5. The potential for sanctions is elevated given the Spanish government’s overt repudiation of Title III of the Act.   

4. However, if Iberostar fails to timely respond to the Complaint, it risks the possibility of not only waiving certain Rule 12(b) defenses, but also the potential entry of a default judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55.  

5. Therefore, as it awaits a response from the European Commission on its application, Iberostar respectfully requests a brief stay of proceedings based on the principle of international comity that counsels recognition and accommodation by U.S. courts of a foreign jurisdiction’s interests in a matter involving its nationals.  A temporary stay will also conserve the parties’ and the Court’s scarce judicial resources.  If the motion is granted, Iberostar will provide status reports on the progress of its application every thirty (30) days, or as otherwise directed by the Court. Iberostar further warrants that it will continue to press for an expeditious disposition of its pending application before the European Commission.  To that end, Iberostar has already asked the Secretariat of State for Commerce of the Kingdom of Spain to bring to the attention of the European Commission the need to timely address the request for authorization filed by Iberostar.   

Defendant has conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel about the request to stay the proceedings in accordance with Local Rule 7.1(a)(3), and Plaintiff’s counsel does not agree to the requested relief.   

Court Document Links:
Template For Applications For Authorisations To EU (9/18/20)
Defendant's Status Report Maria Delores Canto Marti v. Iberostar Hoteles y Apartamentos S.L. (9/23/20)
Order Denying Motion To Vacate Stay In Maria Delores Canto Marti v. Iberostar Hoteles y Apartamentos S.L. (9/17/20)
Reply In Further Support Of Defendant Imperial Brands PLC’s Motion For A Limited Stay (9/18/20)
Defendant Imperial Brands PLC's Opposition To Motion To Strike The Declaration Of Andrew Rhys Davies (9/22/20)
Defendant Imperial Brands PLC’s Motion For A Limited Stay (8/28/20)
Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

LINK To Posts

Iberostar Hotels Of Spain Sued By Former Property Owners Using Libertad Act

EC Now Has To Decide What It Perhaps Doesn’t Want To Decide- Iberostar Of Spain Libertad Act Lawsuit Is First To Report U.S. Court Recognizing EC’s Interest In Title III Lawsuits  April 26, 2020  

Libertad Act Lawsuit Update: 4 Of 29 Cases On Appeal... Is U.S. Supreme Court The Eventual Destination?

JAVIER GARCIA-BENGOCHEA V. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINE, A FOREIGN CORPORATION [1:19-cv-21725 Southern Florida District; 20-12960 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Creed & Gowdy (plaintiff- appellate)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

ROBERT M. GLEN V. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., [1:19-cv-23994 Southern Florida District; 4:20-cv-00482-A Transferred To Northern Texas District; 5th Circuit Court of Appeals 20-10903]

Reid Collins & Tsai (plaintiff)
Ewusiak Law, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Day (defendant)
Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP (defendant)

DANIEL A. GONZALEZ VS. AMAZON.COM, INC., AND SUSSHI INTERNATIONAL, INC., D/B/A/ FOGO CHARCOAL [1:19-cv-23988; Southern Florida District; 20-12113-F 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]

Cueto Law Group, P.L. (plaintiff)
Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford (defendant- Susshi International)
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius (defendant- Amazon)

MARIO DEL VALLE, ENRIQUE FALLA, MARIO ECHEVARRIA V. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, ORBITZ, LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING HOLDINGS INC. Initial defendants were: TRIVAGO GMBH, BOOKING.COM B.V., GRUPO HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE I-5, AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22619 Southern Florida District; 20-12407 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]

Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie, PPL (defendant)
Scott Douglass & McConnico (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

Might A Libertad Act Lawsuit Reach The United States Supreme Court? The United States Supreme Court accepts approximately one hundred to one hundred-fifty of approximately 7,000 cases it is requested to review each year. The United States Supreme Court accepts cases decided in either a United States Court of Appeals or highest State Court (if the state court decided a United States Constitutional issue). Senior law clerks for the nine United States Supreme Court Justices are often the first layer to determine which cases are reviewed.

Supreme Court Procedures

Background: Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution establishes the Supreme Court of the United States. Currently, there are nine Justices on the Court. Before taking office, each Justice must be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Justices hold office during good behavior, typically, for life.

The Constitution states that the Supreme Court has both original and appellate jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction means that the Supreme Court is the first, and only, Court to hear a case. The Constitution limits original jurisdiction cases to those involving disputes between the states or disputes arising among ambassadors and other high-ranking ministers. Appellate jurisdiction means that the Court has the authority to review the decisions of lower courts. Most of the cases the Supreme Court hears are appeals from lower courts.

Writs of Certiorari: Parties who are not satisfied with the decision of a lower court must petition the U.S. Supreme Court to hear their case. The primary means to petition the court for review is to ask it to grant a writ of certiorari. This is a request that the Supreme Court order a lower court to send up the record of the case for review. The Court usually is not under any obligation to hear these cases, and it usually only does so if the case could have national significance, might harmonize conflicting decisions in the federal Circuit courts, and/or could have precedential value. In fact, the Court accepts 100-150 of the more than 7,000 cases that it is asked to review each year. Typically, the Court hears cases that have been decided in either an appropriate U.S. Court of Appeals or the highest Court in a given state (if the state court decided a Constitutional issue).

The Supreme Court has its own set of rules. According to these rules, four of the nine Justices must vote to accept a case. Five of the nine Justices must vote in order to grant a stay, e.g., a stay of execution in a death penalty case. Under certain instances, one Justice may grant a stay pending review by the entire Court.

Law Clerks: Each Justice is permitted to have between three and four law clerks per Court term. These are individuals who, fairly recently, graduated from law school, typically, at the top of their class from the best schools. Often, they have served a year or more as a law clerk for a federal judge. Among other things, they do legal research that assists Justices in deciding what cases to accept; help to prepare questions that the Justice may ask during oral arguments; and assist with the drafting of opinions.

While it is the prerogative of every Justice to read each petition for certiorari himself/herself, many participate in what is informally known as the "cert pool." As petitions for certiorari come in on a weekly basis, they are divided among the participating Justices. The participating Justices divide their petitions among their law clerks. The law clerks, in turn, read the petitions assigned to them, write a brief memorandum about the case, and make a recommendation as to whether the case should be accepted or not. The Justice provides these memoranda and recommendations to the other Justices at a Justices' Conference.

Briefs: If the Justices decide to accept a case (grant a petition for certiorari), the case is placed on the docket. According to the Supreme Court's rules, the petitioner has a certain amount of time to write a brief, not to exceed 50 pages, putting forth his/her legal case concerning the issue on which the Court granted review. After the petitioner's brief has been filed, the other party, known as the respondent, is given a certain amount of time to file a respondent's brief. This brief is also not to exceed 50 pages.

After the initial petitions have been filed, the petitioner and respondent are permitted to file briefs of a shorter length that respond to the other party's respective position. If not directly involved in the case, the U.S. Government, represented by the Solicitor General, can file a brief on behalf of the government. With the permission of the Court, groups that do not have a direct stake in the outcome of the case, but are nevertheless interested in it, may file what is known as an amicus curiae (Latin for "friend of the court") brief providing their own arguments and recommendations for how the case should be decided.

Oral Arguments: By law, the U.S. Supreme Court's term begins on the first Monday in October and goes through the Sunday before the first Monday in October of the following year. The Court is, typically, in recess from late June/early July until the first Monday in October.

The Court hears oral arguments in cases from October through April. From October through December, arguments are heard during the first two weeks of each month. From January through April, arguments are heard on the last two weeks of each month. During each two-week session, oral arguments are heard on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays only (unless the Court directs otherwise).

Oral arguments are open to the public. Typically, two cases are heard each day, beginning at 10 a.m. Each case is allotted an hour for arguments. During this time, lawyers for each party have a half hour to make their best legal case to the Justices. Most of this time, however, is spent answering the Justices' questions. The Justices tend to view oral arguments not as a forum for the lawyers to rehash the merits of the case as found in their briefs, but for answering any questions that the Justices may have developed while reading their briefs.

The Solicitor General usually argues cases in which the U.S. Government is a party. If the U.S. Government is not a party, the Solicitor still may be allotted time to express the government's interests in the case.

During oral arguments, each side has approximately 30 minutes to present its case, however, attorneys are not required to use the entire time. The petitioner argues first, then the respondent. If the petitioner reserves time for rebuttal, the petitioner speaks last. After the Court is seated, the Chief Justice acknowledges counsel for the petitioner, who already is standing at the podium. The attorney then begins: "Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court . . . ."

Only the Chief Justice is addressed as Mr. Chief Justice. Others are addressed as "Justice Scalia," "Justice Ginsburg," or "Your Honor." The title "Judge" is not used for Supreme Court Justices.

Courtroom/Classroom Simulations: Modifications of Procedure: Justices, typically, ask questions throughout each presentation. However, in courtroom or classroom simulations, to put student attorneys at ease, student Justices do not ask questions for the first two minutes of each side's argument. When the student Marshal holds up a five-minute warning card, the student attorney at the podium should conclude his/her argument and be ready to end when the Marshal holds up the STOP card.

Before leaving the podium after making the initial presentation, counsel for the petitioner may reserve some time for rebuttal after the respondent's counsel has presented. The petitioner — not the Court — is responsible for keeping track of the time remaining for rebuttal. In typical program simulations, more than one student attorney argues each side. In that instance, they should inform the student Marshal before the court session begins how they wish to divide their time. Usually, the first student attorney to speak also handles the rebuttal.

Conference: When oral arguments are concluded, the Justices have to decide the case. They do so at what is known as the Justices' Conference. When Court is in session, there are two conferences scheduled per week – one on Wednesday afternoon and one on Friday afternoon. At their Wednesday conference, the Justices talk about the cases heard on Monday. At their Friday conference, they discuss cases heard on Tuesday and Wednesday. When Court is not in session, no Wednesday conference is held.

Before going into the Conference, the Justices frequently discuss the relevant cases with their law clerks, seeking to get different perspectives on the case. At the end of these sessions, sometimes the Justices have a fairly good idea of how they will vote in the case; other times, they are still uncommitted.

According to Supreme Court protocol, only the Justices are allowed in the Conference room at this time—no police, law clerks, secretaries, etc. The Chief Justice calls the session to order and, as a sign of the collegial nature of the institution, all the Justices shake hands. The first order of business, typically, is to discuss the week's petitions for certiorari, i.e., deciding which cases to accept or reject.

After the petitions for certiorari are dealt with, the Justices begin to discuss the cases that were heard since their last Conference. According to Supreme Court protocol, all Justices have an opportunity to state their views on the case and raise any questions or concerns they may have. Each Justice speaks without interruptions from the others. The Chief Justice makes the first statement, then each Justice speaks in descending order of seniority, ending with the most junior justice—the one who has served on the court for the fewest years.

When each Justice is finished speaking, the Chief Justice casts the first vote, and then each Justice in descending order of seniority does likewise until the most junior justice casts the last vote. After the votes have been tallied, the Chief Justice, or the most senior Justice in the majority if the Chief Justice is in the dissent, assigns a Justice in the majority to write the opinion of the Court. The most senior justice in the dissent can assign a dissenting Justice to write the dissenting opinion.

If a Justice agrees with the outcome of the case, but not the majority's rationale for it, that Justice may write a concurring opinion. Any Justice may write a separate dissenting opinion. When there is a tie vote, the decision of the lower Court stands. This can happen if, for some reason, any of the nine Justices is not participating in a case (e.g., a seat is vacant or a Justice has had to recuse).

Opinions: All opinions of the Court are, typically, handed down by the last day of the Court's term (the day in late June/early July when the Court recesses for the summer). With the exception of this deadline, there are no rules concerning when decisions must be released. Typically, decisions that are unanimous are released sooner than those that have concurring and dissenting opinions. While some unanimous decisions are handed down as early as December, some controversial opinions, even if heard in October, may not be handed down until the last day of the term.

A majority of Justices must agree to all of the contents of the Court's opinion before it is publicly delivered. Justices do this by "signing onto" the opinion. The Justice in charge of writing the opinion must be careful to take into consideration the comments and concerns of the others who voted in the majority. If this does not happen, there may not be enough Justices to maintain the majority. On rare occasions in close cases, a dissenting opinion later becomes the majority opinion because one or more Justices switch their votes after reading the drafts of the majority and dissenting opinions. No opinion is considered the official opinion of the Court until it is delivered in open Court (or at least made available to the public).

On days when the Court is hearing oral arguments, decisions may be handed down before the arguments are heard. During the months of May and June, the Court meets at 10 a.m. every Monday to release opinions. During the last week of the term, additional days may be designated as "opinion days."

Libertad Act Lawsuit Update: MSC Cruises Receives Second Amended Complaint

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. MSC CRUISES SA CO, AND MSC CRUISES (USA) INC. [1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable (defendant)

LINK To Second Amended Complaint (10/8/20)

Amazon Libertad Act Lawsuit Update: Next Stop To 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals- Plaintiff Appearing Pro Se

DANIEL A. GONZALEZ VS. AMAZON.COM, INC., AND SUSSHI INTERNATIONAL, INC., D/B/A/ FOGO CHARCOAL [1:19-cv-23988; Southern Florida District; 20-12113-F 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]

Cueto Law Group, P.L. (plaintiff)
Daniel Gonzalez (plaintiff Pro Se- appeal)
Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford (defendant- Susshi International)
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius (defendant- Amazon)

LINK To Appellant Reply Brief (9/3/20)

LINK To Notice Of Appeal (6/8/20)

LINK To Notice To Parties (6/11/20)