European Union Member France's CMA CGM S.A. Is 41st Company Sued Using Libertad Act- Shipping To Cuba Through Jamaica And Using Port Mariel

Marseille, France-based CMA CGM S.A. (2020 revenues approximately US$31.5 billion) has “a presence in 160 countries through 755 offices, 750 warehouses, 110,000 employees and a wide fleet of 566 vessels, CMA CGM serves 420 of the world’s 521 commercial ports and operates 285 shipping lines.” CMA CGM S.A. has served the Republic of Cuba marketplace since 2000 and was “the first international company to sign such a logistics development agreement in Cuba.” The company is represented in the Republic of Cuba by Havana, Republic of Cuba-based Navemar S.A.

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL; EMMA RUTH BLANCO, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF ALFREDO BLANCO ROSELL, JR; HEBE BLANCO MIYARES, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF BYRON BLANCO ROSELL; SERGIO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, in his personal capacity, and as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF ENRIQUE BLANCO ROSELL; EDUARDO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF FLORENTINO BLANCO ROSELL; LIANA MARIA BLANCO; SUSANNAH VALENTINA BLANCO; LYDIA BLANCO BONAFONTE; JACQUELINE M. DELGADO; BYRON BLANCO, JR.; MAGDALENA BLANCO MONTOTO; FLORENTINO BLANCO DE LA TORRE; JOSEPH E. BUSHMAN; CARLOS BLANCO DE LA TORRE; and GUILLERMO BLANCO DE LA TORRE; Plaintiffs, v. CMA CGM S.A. (a/k/a CMA CGM THE FRENCH LINE; a/k/a CMA CGM GROUP); CMA CGM (AMERICA) LLC. [1:21-cv-22778]

Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Horr, Novak & Skipp P.A. (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe P.A. (plaintiff)

LINK To Complaint (7/30/21)
LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

Excerpts

As discussed more fully below (infra at ¶¶ 97 - 136), CMA CGM has trafficked and continues to traffic in the Confiscated Property, the claims to which are owned by Plaintiffs, since the opening of the Port of Mariel, more than 6 years ago. According to the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”), a specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for regulating shipping, vessels operated and directed by CMA CGM have repeatedly trafficked in the Confiscated Property by “calling” at the Terminal de Contenedores del Mariel (“TCM” or “Container Terminal”), which is part of the Port of Mariel within the Zona Especial de Desarrollo Mariel (“ZEDM”) (a/k/a Mariel Special Economic Zone) and within the Bay of Mariel,8 and while calling at the Container Terminal, engaged in commercially beneficial transactions and other commercial activities with the Container Terminal, Almacenes Universales S.A. (also known as “AUSA”),9 and/or the ZEDM. CMA CGM profits by, from and through the business activities of the CMA CGM operated vessels that call at the Port of Mariel.

As discussed more fully below (infra at ¶¶ 117 – 126), Defendant’s trafficking includes Defendant acting as the carrier for cargo shipments from multiple U.S. Ports, including PortMiami in Miami-Dade County, Florida, to the Port of Mariel. According to Bills of Lading on file with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Defendant has served as the carrier for at least 602 cargo shipments from various U.S. Ports to the Port of Mariel, the final destination declared. Defendant first carries the containers to Kingston, Jamaica, where the containers are off-loaded and then loaded onto other ships (including some ships owned by Defendant) and are then carried to the Port of Mariel, the declared final destination.

CMA CGM Group
Marseille, France
10 May 2015

The CMA CGM Group is pleased to announce that Rodolphe Saadé, CMA CGM Group’s Vice-Chairman, signed in Cuba in the presence of President François Hollande and of Mr Matthias Fekl the French Minister of State for Foreign Trade, on May 11th, an unprecedented agreement. This agreement covers the operation and development of a logistics platform on the port of MARIEL, in cooperation with the major Cuban logistics company: AUSA. CMA CGM, [is] the first international company to sign such a logistics agreement. CMA CGM LOG, the CMA CGM Group’s subsidiary dedicated to logistics, will contribute to the operations of this new area. The platform will be part of MARIEL ZEDM – Zona Especial de Desarrollo Mariel, Cuba Special Economic Zone project. ZEDM is a strategic 4,600 ha logistics and industrial project area for Cuba. This agreement is symbolic regarding Cuba’s goods and services development. CMA CGM LOG will operate a 17 ha logistics platform with AUSA, including: 12,000 square meters warehouses, 5,000 cubic meters of reefer warehouses. CMA CGM LOG will be in charge of: the goods unbundling and distribution on the island the exports consolidation; the import and export goods warehousing; containers distribution; empty and full containers storage. CMA CGM has been present in Cuba since 2000 and is one of the only three shipping companies to call the country. It is the first international company to sign such a logistics development agreement in Cuba.

Created in 2001, CMA CGM LOG is the CMA CGM Group’s subsidiary specialized in freight forwarding and logistics solutions. Its 1,000 experts offer logistics solutions that are complementary to maritime services in 36 countries, including air freight, multimodal transport, custom clearance, warehousing and distribution… After a sustained growth in 2014 and the opening of offices in 6 new countries, CMA CGM LOG accelerates its development in 2015.

American Airlines Survives: Judge Quotes John Adams. Libertad Act Lawsuit Dismissed- Plaintiff Has Standing, But Inheritance Came Too Late.

On 2 August 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans, Louisiana, issued a published opinion in the Glen vs. American Airlines Libertad Act Title III lawsuit. The Court held that there is Article III standing for a Libertad Act plaintiff, and vacated the portion of the opinion of the District Court for the Northern District of Texas finding that Glen lacked Article III standing. As support for the Court’s holding, it cited to the opinions of Judge Bloom in the Havana Docks vs. Norwegian Cruise Lines litigation in the Southern District of Florida and Judge Stark in the Glen vs. Trip Advisor litigation in the District of Delaware. The Court, however, ultimately held that Glen inherited his claim too late to bring suit, and therefore entered judgment for the defendant. This is the first appellate opinion addressing the Article III standing issue and the first precedential (published) opinion addressing the inheritance issue.

The Plaintiff may choose to seek a further review by the full Fifth Circuit and/or may seek review from the United States Supreme Court.

ROBERT M. GLEN V. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., [1:19-cv-23994 Southern Florida District; 4:20-cv-00482-A Transferred To Northern Texas District; 5th Circuit Court of Appeals 20-10903]

Reid Collins & Tsai (plaintiff)
Ewusiak Law, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Day (defendant)
Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP (defendant)

LINK To Opinion (8/2/21)
LINK To Libertad Act Title III Lawsuit Statistics

Excerpts From Opinion

“The Founders recognized that the protection of private property is indispensable to the promotion of individual freedom. As John Adams tersely put it, ‘[p]roperty must be secured, or liberty cannot exist.’” Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2071 (2021) (quoting Discourses on Davila, in 6 Works of John Adams 280 (C. Adams ed. 1851)). Channeling that spirit, Congress responded to Fidel Castro’s widespread confiscation of property in Cuba by enacting the Helms-Burton Act into law in 1996. See 22 U.S.C. § 6021 et seq. The Act allows any United States national with a claim to property confiscated by the Cuban Government to sue any person who traffics in such property. Id. § 6082(a)(1)(A).

In that same spirit, we disagree with the district court’s decision to dismiss Robert Glen’s claim under the Act for lack of standing. We side instead with courts that have held that “the legally cognizable right provided by the Helms-Burton Act to the ‘rightful owners’ of properties” confiscated by Castro “allows [those property owners] to assert a concrete injury based on Defendants’ alleged ‘trafficking’ in the [those] [p]roperties.” Glen v. Trip Advisor LLC, 2021 WL 1200577, at *6 (D. Del. Mar. 30, 2021). See also Havana Docks Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1227–27 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (same).

But Glen’s claim ultimately fails on the merits because it does not satisfy certain statutory requirements under the Act. If the property giving rise to suit was confiscated before March 12, 1996, a United States national may not bring an action under the Act unless he acquired ownership of the claim before March 12, 1996. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B). We agree with the district court’s alternative conclusion that this time limit is fatal to this suit, because the property in which Glen claims an ownership interest was confiscated before 1996—yet he did not inherit his claim to that property until after 1996. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of the case for lack of standing and render judgment for the defendant.

Glen has standing to sue. But he acquired ownership of the properties through inheritance after 1996, so his claim fails on the merits. Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal of the case for lack of standing and render judgment for the defendant.

Because this issue is dispositive, we need not address the district court’s alternative rationale for dismissal on the merits—Glen’s purported failure to plead that American acted with the requisite knowledge and intent.

Judge In Libertad Act Lawsuit Against Seaboard Marine Dismisses 17 Plaintiffs; Remaining Plaintiff Wins Rulings- They Own The Property. Seaboard Trafficked And Knew It Was Trafficking. Settlement?

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD MARINE, LTD., Defendant. [1:20-cv-25176; Southern Florida District].

Horr, Novak & Skipp, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields (plaintiff)
Barakat Law (plaintiff)
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (defendant)

Order On Motion To Dismiss (7/27/21)
LINK TO LIBERTAD ACT TITLE III LAWSUITS STATISTICS

Excerpts From Ruling:

There are eighteen Plaintiffs in this action, including Odette Blanco de Fernandez (“Ms. Fernandez”), the estates of her four deceased siblings Alfredo Blanco Rosell, Byron Blanco Rosell, Enrique Blanco Rosell, and Florentine Blanco Rosell (“Estates”), and the descendants of the Blanco Rosell Siblings (“Inheritors”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). See ECF No. [45] ¶¶ 16-33.

For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

On September 29, 1960, the Cuban Government announced the confiscation without compensation of all assets owned by the Blanco Rosell Siblings, including: Maritima Mariel, Central San Ramón, Azucarera Mariel, along with their property, rights, and shares—i.e., the 70-Year Concession and land owned by these entities (“Confiscated Property”). Id. ¶¶ 74-75 (quoting Cuban Official Gazette, Resolution No. 436, at 23406 (Sept. 29, 1960) (English Translation)). Following the Cuban Government’s confiscation, the Blanco Rosell Siblings fled Cuba and became United States citizens before March 12, 1966. Id. ¶ 5.

Defendant is an ocean transportation company that operates vessels between the United States and the Caribbean Basin. Id. ¶ 34. The Amended Complaint alleges that beginning on or about May 9, 2019, Defendant operated approximately twenty-four voyages where its vessels sailed from the Port of New Orleans to the Port of Mariel in Cuba.

Defendant now moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint, arguing that the Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege that: (1) Defendant trafficked in the Confiscated Property; (2) Defendant “knowingly and intentionally” trafficked in the Confiscated Property; and (3) Plaintiffs, other than Ms. Fernandez, have an actionable ownership interest in the Confiscated Property. See ECF No. [52]. In their Response, Plaintiffs take the opposing position on each of Defendant’s bases for dismissal.

Upon review, the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant engaged in “commercial activity using or otherwise benefited from” the Port of Mariel and the container terminal without Plaintiffs’ authorization, thereby trafficking in Plaintiffs’ Confiscated Property.

Defendant maintains that Plaintiffs’ allegation regarding trafficking must fail because it “merely tracks the statutory definition[.]” ECF No. [52] at 14 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A)(ii)). The Court is not persuaded.

Defendant further contends that “the container terminal is not property to which Plaintiffs[] own a claim that could provide a basis for their Title III claims” because the Port of Mariel and its container terminal were constructed in March of 2009 and, therefore “decades after the Cuban Government confiscated the property in 1960.” ECF No. [52] at 14. However, the Amended Complaint sufficiently sets forth that in constructing the Port of Mariel and its container terminal in ZEDM, the Cuban Government exploited the same rights that were granted to the Blanco Rosell Siblings in the 70-Year Concession.

Additionally, the Court is not convinced that Plaintiffs should somehow be precluded from asserting a Title III claim because the Cuban Government enhanced and/or changed the nature of the Confiscated Property following its illegal confiscation. Holding as such would certainly undermine Congress’ stated goal of protecting the claims of United States nationals whose property was wrongfully confiscated by the Cuban Government. See 22 U.S.C. § 6022(6) (one reason for passing Title III was “to protect United States nationals against confiscatory takings and the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime.”).

The Amended Complaint also plausibly alleges that Defendant trafficked in the Confiscated Property through the acts of the ZEDM.

At this stage of the proceedings, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled an ownership interest in the Confiscated Property.

Thus, the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges that Defendant participated in, and profited from, the Cuban Government’s confiscation and possession of the Confiscated Property without Plaintiffs’ authorization.

Lastly, Defendant seeks dismissal of the Inheritors and Heirs from this action, arguing that they do not have an actionable ownership interest in the Confiscated Property because they acquired their claims after March 12, 1996.6 The relevant provision of the LIBERTAD Act provides: “In the case of property confiscated before March 12, 1996, a United States national may not bring an action under this section on a claim to the confiscated property unless such national acquires ownership of the claim before March 12, 1996.” 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The unambiguous language of § 6082(a)(4)(B) instructs that a United States national cannot bring an action under Title III “unless such national” acquires an interest to the confiscated property before March 12, 1996. Id. The statutory language also makes clear that the United States national who acquired ownership of the claim must be the same United States national who brings the Title III action.

The Court agrees that the Inheritors have not plausibly alleged that they acquired claims to the Confiscated Property before March 12, 1996. Indeed, because each of the deceased Blanco Rosell Siblings died after March 12, 1996, the Inheritors could not have acquired a claim to the Confiscated Property before the statutory cutoff. ECF No. [45] ¶¶ 17-20. In their Response, Plaintiffs effectively urge the Court to disregard the plain language of Title III, as well as the clear guidance from every court that has addressed this precise issue—including the Eleventh Circuit. See Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., 835 F. App’x 1011, 1012 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).7 The Court declines to do so. Accordingly, because the Inheritors did not acquire their claims to the Confiscated Property until after the statutory cutoff, they cannot maintain an action under Title III.

Similarly, the Estates do not have an actionable ownership interest in the Confiscated Property and cannot maintain a Title III action on behalf of the deceased Blanco Rosell Siblings. The Eleventh Circuit has instructed that “[i]n the absence of an expression of contrary intent, the survival of a federal cause of action is a question of federal common law.”

While there is no dispute that the deceased Blanco Rosell Siblings acquired their claims to the Confiscated Property before March 12, 1996, ECF No. [45] ¶¶ 17-20, the Court disagrees that “the estates and personal representatives ‘stepped into the shoes’ of the decedents [and] maintain[ed] the original acquisition date of the Confiscated Property[.]”

Indeed, it is well-settled that upon the death of the four Blanco Rosell Siblings, their assets became property of their respective estates and no longer belonged to them individually.

The following Plaintiffs are dismissed from this action: (1) Estate of Alfredo Blanco Rosell; (2) Estate of Byron Blanco Rosell; (3) Estate of Enrique Blanco Rosell; (4) Estate of Florentino Blanco Rosell; (5) Emma Ruth Blanco; (6) Liana Maria Blanco; (7) Susannah Valentina Blanco; (8) Hebe Blanco Miyares; (9) Lydia Blanco Bonafonte; (10) Jacqueline M. Delgado; (11) Byron Diaz Blanco, Jr.; (12) Magdelena Blanco Montoto; (13) Sergio Blanco; (14) Florentino Blanco de la Torre; (15) Joseph E. Bushman; (16) Carlos Blanco de la Torre; and (17) Guillermo Blanco De La Torre.

President Biden Meets With Individuals Of Cuban Descent To Discuss Policy And Regulatory Options; Background Call Provides Details; White House Press Briefing Mentions Cuba

The White House
Washington DC
30 July 2021

Remarks by President Biden Before Marine One Departure- South Lawn

Q Mr. President, do you want to open travel with Cuba again? Do you want to open travel with Cuba, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: I just had a long --

The White House
Washington DC
30 July 2021

Remarks by President Biden at Meeting with Cuban American Leaders

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I’m honored to welcome members of the Cuban American community, and Senator Menendez, Senator [Congressman] Meeks to discuss how the United States is going to continue to stand with the Cuban people, who have suffered for decades and decades under a failed communist regime.

Earlier this month, Cubans took to the street in a historic demonstration of the will of the people of Cuba. The regime responded with violence and repression, mass detentions, sham trials, and people disappearing who — who have spoken out. Just disappearing. Family members, I’m told, are not able — have no idea where their family members are back in Cuba. And — in a brazen violation of the rights of the Cuban people. The Cuban Americans are hurting. They’re hurting because their loved ones are suffering. And it’s, quite frankly, intolerable. So, I want the Cuban Americans to know that we — all around this table and myself included — see your pain, we hear your voices, and we hear the cries of freedom coming from the island.

The United States is taking concerted action to bolster the cause of the Cuban people. We’ve brought to bear the strength of our diplomacy, rallying nations to speak out and increase pressure on the regime. And we’re holding the regime accountable.

Last week, we sanctioned the head of Cuban armed forces and the government — a government entity called the “Black Berets” for their involvement in suppressing protesters. And, today, we are adding sanctions against the Revolutionary National Police, as well as individual sanctions against the chief and deputy chief — the chief and deputy chief. And we’re going to continue to add sanctions on individuals that carry out — that carry out the regime’s abuses. At the same time, we’re increasing direct support for the Cuban people by pursuing every option available to provide Internet access to help the Cuban bypass — the Cuban people bypass the censorship that’s being mandatorily imposed. You always know something is not going well when the — a country will not allow — will not allow their people to be engaged in — be on the Internet and being able to make their case known around the world. And we’re expanding our assistance to political prisoners and dissidents.

And the direct State — and I’ve directed the State Department and the Treasury Department to provide me, within one month, recommendations of how to maximize the flow of remittances to the Cuban people, without the Cuban military taking their cut. And we’re working to increase U.S. staffing at our embassy while prioritizing the safety of our personnel.

So, we’ve got a lot to discuss with this group. So, we got — and mostly, I’m here to listen. I want to know what their ideas are. And you are some of the best experts on the issue. The first person to bring this to my attention and to make sure that we were on top of this was Senator Menendez. And we think that — you know, the American — the Cuban American people are actually the best ambassadors for the Cuban people. And so, my administration is going to make sure that their voices are included and uplifted at every step of the way. And we’re gong to get down to business. So, thank you all for bothering to come in. I appreciate it.

Q Will there be more sanctions coming up, Mr. President? Or is that it, today?
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon?
Q I said: Will there be more sanctions against Cuba coming up or are you stopping with what you did today?
THE PRESIDENT: We are — there will be more, unless there’s some drastic change in Cuba, which I don’t anticipate. Thank you.

In attendance for the President’s meeting:
Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ)
Representative Gregory Meeks (NY-5), Chair, House Foreign Affairs Committee
Maria Carla Chicuen, Executive Director, CasaCuba at Florida International University
Manny Diaz, Chair, Florida Democratic Party
Emilio Estefan, Grammy Award Winning Artist, Activist
L. Felice Gorordo, CEO, eMerge Americas & Co-Founder, Roots of Hope
Ricardo Herrero, Executive Director, Cuba Study Group
Ana Sofia Pelaez, Founder, Miami Freedom Project
Carmen Pelaez, Playwright, Activist
Marley Pulido, Co-founder, La Luchita Project & Cubanos Pa'Lante
Yotuel Romero, Grammy Award Winning Artist & Activist
Cedric Richmond, Assistant to the President & Senior Advisor & Director of the White House Office of Public Engagement
Jake Sullivan, Assistant to the President & National Security Advisor
Julie Rodriguez, Moderator, Deputy Assistant to the President and Director for Intergovernmental Affairs
Emmy Ruiz, Deputy Assistant to the President & Director of Political Strategy & Outreach
Juan Gonzalez, Special Assistant to the President & Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere for the National Security Council
Ernie Apreza, Senior Advisor for Public Engagement

The White House
Washington DC
30 July 2021

Background Press Call by a Senior Administration Official on Cuba

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks so much, and good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for joining us this afternoon. And welcome to an on-background conference call where we’ll be -- we’ll be discussing Cuba. For your reference, today we are joined by [senior administration official]. And from this point on, we'll be referring to them as a “senior administration official,” per the ground rules of the call. We'll start with some quick remarks, and then we'll open it up for question-and-answer. The contents of today's briefing will be embargoed until 3:45 p.m. this afternoon. And as always, if you have follow-up questions, feel free to email me or the NSC press team distro at DL.NSC.Press@NSC.eop.gov. And with that, I’ll turn the floor over to [a senior administration official].

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you, [senior administration official]. It's been a busy week at the White House and the administration in general on Latin America.

You all saw on Monday that Secretary Blinken -- the State Department released a joint statement with 20 countries condemning the crackdown on peaceful protesters in -- that came out into the streets all over Cuba on July 11th. We also rolled out this week, as you saw, the Central America collaborative migration and root causes strategy. On Thursday, we met with the Mexican delegation to think really strategically about how we can look at migration management beyond the bilateral relationship and looking at a, kind of, hemispheric approach to migration management.

You saw that we put up the Federal Register notice on Haiti temporary protected status and it marked the date to -- you know, to reflect since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. And we have rolled out the President’s intention to nominate a well-respected academic and former policymaker at the Defense Department, Frank Mora, as the U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States.

What the President is doing today is -- is part of what has been a very active period of engagement in response to the July 11th protests. And he is doing -- he's going to take the time to meet with members of the Cuban American community, as well as Senator Robert Menendez, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Greg Meeks, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

And basically, the President wants to hear directly from the community on not just the goings on and -- but, frankly, what the President has said, which is how to hold the Cuban regime accountable for its violations of human rights, but also, at the same time, focusing on responding to the needs of the Cuban people. So, what we are -- in addition to that conversation, we have Treasury Department, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, is going to have sanctions that are going to be coming out today. I can't get into specifics except to say that-- except that one entity and two Cuban individuals are going to be designated pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act for their role in human rights abuses.

You know, I already mentioned Frank Mora, that we are in talks with private sector providers about the possibility of providing wireless LTE communications to the Cuban people, which we consider to be a right. We're including all options, but we're also looking at other ways to make sure that the Cuban people have the right to information, the right to communicate with each other, and the international community can really see the abuses that are taking place.

We are also going to be talking about humanitarian support for the Cuban people. And we're going to have a few points to mention with regard to explaining the way forward for the remittance working group and just plans for the embassy staffing going forward.

So, but again, really the focus here is to hear from members of Congress that have been active on this issue from -- from members of the Cuban American community. And it follows on engagements by Congressman Cedric Richmond, senior advisor to the President, meeting with a much larger group of members of the community, but also meetings that I have had, at the request of Senator Menendez, with the Cuban American National Foundation, but also Cuba Decide, to hear all points of views on Cuba and really to try to do what's best to provide the President and the Secretary of State with our best objective analysis and recommendations on the way forward following the July 11th protests in Cuba. So, I'll leave it there. I'm happy to enter into any -- answer any questions.

Q Thank you. And thank you, [senior administration official], for doing this. And thank you, [senior administration official]. One question regarding to the team at the State Department that is studying the possibilities and measures in order to help Cubans with the remittances and Internet without helping or providing support, if I can say that in that way, to the regime: Is there any specific measure that you can advance or tell us about these two possibilities? I mean, sending remittances without using the Cuban bank system is quite difficult. There is no other bank system in Cuba that is not controlled by the regime. And providing Internet, it seems that it would be a kind of activity that the -- it would violate the Cuban sovereignty of the territory, and it could create maybe a counterproductive situation. I mean, what are the real options besides just repeating that you are studying that and you're studying and trying to identify technical solutions? Is there anything concrete that you can tell us today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah, thanks. I'm not going to get out ahead of the President. I think anything that's discussed at the meeting will -- will be rolled out afterward. But, you know, you hit two very -- two, you know, very real challenges when it comes to Internet connectivity, but also the issue of remittances. On the latter, look, I'll say that technology is advancing every day. And in the example of Venezuela, for example, we've actually been able to roll out licenses that have allowed, you know, the interim government to send money directly to people in Venezuela. And so, what I think is really important here is we have looked at recommendations that even came out under the previous administration. They put together a Internet communications working group that issued a series of recommendations. We looked at those. But then, what we want to do is, we put together a U.S. government group together. They're going to consult with, you know, members of Congress, with the experts, and try to make some recommendations on how -- on what's the best way to go forward. The point here is -- again, is maximizing the benefit to the Cuban people, and that really has to be the focus of everything that we do in this situation.

With regard to Internet connectivity, there are no silver bullets. If it's something that could be done easily, it would have been done already in places like Iran and in other closed regimes. You know, but -- we see the access to -- we see the censorship of information as a violation of human rights. And so we're going to explore every option possible to be able to guarantee that access to that information. But also, in a -- you know, in a transparent manner, what our Cuban democracy programs and our Google programs do is -- is actually support, you know, civil society, artists, musicians to be able to do what they do without any sort of ideological objective, but just to do -- practice their craft and -- but that also includes access to information, the ability to communicate with each other, but also the importance of making sure that that the international community is not blind to the abuses and the crackdown that's being perpetrated by the Cuban regime.

Q Hello. Thank you for taking my question. Here at the White House, we've seen massive protests lately that included thousands of Cuban Americans who are asking for more action from this administration -- that includes Republican legislators, as well. I have two questions. The first one is: Is this administration -- or the President, for that matter -- meeting with any Republican legislators -- not necessarily today, but maybe in the following days or in the previous days? And also, can you give us full -- not a full, but maybe like some -- a list of the participants that are going to be taking part in this meeting with the President later on today? And is the administration -- has the administration a set plan towards Cuba? Or is it open to new ideas that might come out either from the participants today or from legislators in Congress? Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah, thanks for the question. So, look, we've been -- we've been listening to the protesters, you know, when -- I'm here on the weekends. And, you know, we've been listening to them and we've been talking to members of the community. And I will say that, when I say “we,” I mean the administration. The State Department has been regularly briefing members of Congress from the House and the Senate. And, of course, we -- I think the dialogues that Congressman Richmond, that I have engaged in, but also at the State Department and others have been engaging in are to he- -- are to listen to Cuban Americans.

It's important to really listen to their voices and what they're calling for, and -- but also to -- really to make sure that we keep the focus not on the United States or the conflict with the United States and Cuba, but rather on the Cuban people and the rights that they're demanding. And the focus the international community needs to be to stand up for them, to stand up for their rights, and to make sure that we're doing everything to support them, including, by any means, to prov- -- you know, provide -- efforts to provide humanitarian assistance. As you know, those who are political dissidents are be -- are abandoned by the government. They don't have access to basic necessities. They don't have access to hospital services. They're cut off -- they and their families are cut off. And so, I think it's important for the international community to stand up for these people.

So, I mean, I guess -- you asked if the President had already made up his mind on Cuba policy or if he's willing to hear more from the community. My response to that is that that's why he's holding these meetings, but also why he's receiving daily updates on the situation and why the State Department primarily has been engaging regularly with members of Congress to hear their views. And that's why, for example, the remittance working group is one that is going to be engaging with members of Congress to try to get, you know, as much guidance as possible. I mean, I don't know -- I think that answers your question.

Q Hi, good afternoon. Thanks for doing this call. Just to clarify, should we expect an announcement today on Internet access or on remittances or not? And secondly, on the sanctions, I know you don't want to give information in advance of the OFAC release, but just a general question: How effective do you think that these sanctions on Cuban officials can be, since 50 years of embargo and sanctions have not succeeded in changing their (inaudible) behavior?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah, no, on the second question, that's an important question. Look, what we're doing through these individual sanctions, as the President has said, is that we are focusing on individuals and entities that are involved in the crackdown and the violation of human rights by the regime. Part of it is to layer on sanctions, but the other one is to make sure that we are keeping these individuals in the spotlight not just on the international community, but that the Cuban people know that the United States is supporting them and is trying to defend them. So, we're going to -- as the President said, the sanctions are rolled out that -- last week were just the beginning. And we're going to try to keep -- we're going to do everything we can to keep Cuba on the front burner so that they can talk about -- keep the conversation on the -- on the rights of the Cuban people and their -- and their right to manifest peacefully. And so the other -- sorry, what was the other question you had? I didn’t get the first question.

Q Oh, okay. Sorry. My question was whether we can expect an announcement today on --(inaudible) remittances.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah, thank you. So, look, we are going to be -- we're going to be announcing a series of things. And, you know, those include efforts to improve Internet connectivity and other means to make sure that we are supporting the ability of the Cuban people to communicate with each other. And we see information as something that should be treated as a human right.

Q Thank you very much. To follow up on that: Are you going to be announcing anything on remittances? Are you going to be announcing anything on our diplomats going back to Havana and theirs coming back to Washington? And if the President wanted to hear from all points of view -- at least you haven't mentioned any Republicans who are going to be present -- is Senator Rubio or any other Republican members or senators going to be present?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Great, thank you. So, he is going to be making -- he is going to be making announcements on both. Either in the meeting or afterward, I think he’s going to be -- some of it he’ll mention, you know, at the camera spray at the top. Some of it may come up at the meeting. I think the focus is going to be on hearing from members of the community. And -- but we do have plans to provide more information on the Remittance Working Group that he directed the U.S. government to form and plans for U.S. Embassy augmentation. What I'll say is it that, look -- given the protests of July 11th, it is important for U.S. diplomats to engage directly with the Cuban people. And if we can do that in a way that is -- that ensures the safety of U.S. personnel, that is something that -- that we will undertake. But we'll be able to say something more about that -- the meeting. So, what the focus of the meeting today -- and the participants, and I can mention some of them -- is -- are members of the Cuban American community. They are going to be the ones that are going to be the main speakers here. And we invited the respective Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to join the conversation as well. But we're going to have individuals like Felice Gorordo, who is the CEO of eMerge Americas and has worked for Republican and Democratic administrations. We're going to also be hearing from Yotuel Romero, who is the Grammy Award winning artist and activist that wrote the song “Patria y Vida.” We have, also, members of the religious community -- Father Fernando Eduardo Heria, Director of the National Shrine of Our Lady of Charity of Cuba. And actually, several other people have been -- have been invited. But again, in the conversations that we've been having, we've been meeting with people across the political spectrum and folks that have a range of views. And so, I think it’s going to be only the beginning of a regular engagement with the Cuban American community so that we can develop the right policies to support the Cuban people. Thank you.

Q Hi. This is Anne Gearan with the Post. It -- following on a couple of questions about the Internet connectivity: I mean, can you give us some specifics here, please, about what might be possibilities? I mean, one thing that's been reported is the potential to do balloons off the island. Other things that have been reported have been ways for the United States to direct Internet toward Cuba. Are those what's under discussion here? Can you help us out a little bit so that we have something that we can actually report at 3:45? And secondly, on the Internet, is there anything that you all could do in terms of connectivity that could not be blocked by the regime? Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So, I can't offer you many details on what we're doing or what we're going to be announcing because I don't want to get ahead of the President. But what I'm saying is we've been -- we heard, you know, the -- Governor Ron DeSantis wrote a letter to the President. Senator Marco Rubio wrote a letter. We've been hearing also in our consultations with -- the administration's consultations with members of Congress, and we've been exploring all those options.

So, the administration, (inaudible) the Department of Commerce, Department of Treasury, the FCC have been looking at what rulemaking authorizations, licenses we can provide that would allow any of those options to work. But we're looking at -- when we're talking to private sector companies and looking at all the legal and technical restrictions to doing that, it's challenging because whether you're looking at satellite technology or balloons or anything, a lot of those signals are fairly easy to block. But we have to explore any and all options to -- exhaust any and all options to provide Internet connectivity.

The other point I'll mention, just in terms of -- and this is, obviously, open source information -- is that the regime actually cut Internet for, I think, between 30 minutes and an hour, maybe a little bit more, and after that was involved in selective blocking of websites and areas where there were specific protests. In that regard, there are tools and there's technology that civil society actors are able to use to circumvent censorship. There's been a dramatic increase in their use of VPN technology, (inaudible) proxies. And so all of those are -- you know, it's all unclassified, it's all out there. And it's really about making sure that the Cuban American people have -- or the Cuban people have the training and have the technical know-how and the tools to be able to do that.

And obviously, the goal is to support it so that the Cuban people can communicate with each other. And that information about the regime’s abuses can make it out into the -- and be seen by the international community. So we have funds in the Open Technology Fund. There's work that we have with international partners. And so there are a lot of different options, and we're trying to exhaust all of them to make sure that we're doing everything possible to support those Cubans that are out in the streets -- that were out in the streets demanding their rights.

The White House
Washington DC
30 July 2021

Press Briefing by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre

Q And a question with respect to Cuba and the ongoing policy review. I know there's a meeting today, but has there been any movement on actionable steps? Specifically, does the President plan to lift travel restrictions between the U.S. and Cuba, and make it easier for Cuban Americans to send money to their relatives on the island, both of which are issues he campaigned on?

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Yeah, no, and both important issues that we understand to the Cuban people. So we're not going to preview any specific actions here. That is not something that I'm going to do from the podium.
I will say that on the remit- -- remittances, this is a complex issue that requires coordination with experts that will help to inform the administration's policy. So, at the President's direction, the Department of Treasury and State will form a remittance working group to review available options to establishing those channels.

Q Karine, may I follow up, please, on Cuba? Right -- right back here. May I follow up on Cuba, please? Thank you so much. You may have noticed those protests last week across the street from the White House. I don't know if you or anybody from the White House happened to speak to those protesters, but I did. And it’s anecdotal, of course, but they say they see no difference between the policy of President Biden towards Cuba and the policy of former President Obama towards Cuba. Is the approach the same of those two Presidents -- of President Biden currently and the former President, President Obama?

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: So, I'm going to be really clear here. So, since day one, we have said many times -- many, many times -- that the Cuban Americans are the best ambassadors for freedom and prosperity in Cuba, is what I said at the beginning. Today, the President is going to sit down and -- to meet with Cuban Americans, leaders at the White House -- that's what he's going to do in just a few hours -- to discuss the demonstrations and the administration's response. And so -- including applying new sanctions on Cuba -- on Cuban leaders and establishing Internet access for the Cuban people. So, we want to lift up the Cuban people, and that is going to be our focus. On July 22nd, The Treasury -- the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assistant [Assets] Control sanctioned one of the Cuban individuals and one Cuban entity for serious human rights abuses and the repression of peaceful pro-democratic protests in Cuba that began on July 11th. So we are going to continue to lift up the Cuban American people that -- I'm sorry, the Cuban people -- and we're going to have a conversation. As I just mentioned, the President will have one today, and we'll probably have more to read out from that.

U.S. Secretary Of State Speaks With Foreign Ministers Of Mexico And Spain. Cuba Does Not Come Up For Mexico Given Acts By Mexico's President? And Spain Does Not Confirm Cuba Was Discussed.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
29 July 2021

Secretary Blinken’s Call with Mexican Foreign Secretary Ebrard

The below is attributable to Spokesperson Ned Price: Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke with Mexican Foreign Secretary Marcelo Ebrard today. Secretary Blinken and Foreign Secretary Ebrard discussed coordinated efforts between the United States and Mexico to address the root causes of irregular migration and to promote fair, orderly, and humane migration in the region. The United States and Mexico share an interest in sustainable solutions to reduce irregular migration in, from, and through the region and to advance the economic security and prosperity of our region. Secretary Blinken thanked Foreign Secretary Ebrard for Mexico’s efforts that contribute to coordinated migration management, including its extensive support at the federal, state, and local levels. Secretary Blinken and Foreign Secretary Ebrard also discussed efforts to promote democracy and human rights in the region.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mexico City, Mexico
29 July 2021

Please refer to the following sources of information regarding today’s call between Secretaries Ebrard and Blinken and the topics they discussed:

Tweet by Sec. Ebrard: https://twitter.com/m_ebrard/status/1420833419974545414?s=20

Tweets and readouts by the DoS:
https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-mexican-foreign-secretary-ebrard-2/
https://twitter.com/secblinken/status/1420799002887475205?s=24
https://twitter.com/statedeptspox/status/1420799079244836868?s=24

United States Department of State
Washington DC
29 July 2021

Secretary Blinken’s Call with Spanish Foreign Minister Albares

The below is attributable to Spokesperson Ned Price: Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke today with Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares and congratulated him on his new position. The Secretary thanked Spain for the enduring alliance and deep friendship between our two countries. Recognizing the strong ties between the United States and Spain, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister committed to further developing the Transatlantic relationship and jointly confronting shared challenges. The Secretary outlined U.S. support for Cuban citizens’ rights to peaceful assembly, free speech, and democracy. He advocated for comprehensive negotiations leading to free and fair elections in Venezuela, outlined concerns regarding Nicaragua, and affirmed our focus on promoting safe, orderly, and humane migration. The two ministers also discussed our shared interest in addressing the root causes of irregular migration from Central America.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Madrid, Spain
29 July 2021

Minister Albares highlights close alliance between Spain and United States in talks with Secretary of State Blinken

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation, José Manuel Albares Bueno, held his first conference call with the US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken. During the call, they addressed the state of bilateral relations between two close allies and the need to defend the fundamental values that we share against a more complicated international backdrop than in recent decades. The Minister for Foreign Affairs highlighted that “the United States is a fundamental ally in defending our shared values”.

Minister Albares also expressed his satisfaction at the proposed appointment of the new ambassador in Madrid and expressed his interest in this being confirmed shortly so that she can begin her work. They also discussed the global situation and the role of the main international players. The minister congratulated his counterpart on the return by the USA to the Paris Agreements and explored areas of joint collaboration on shared priorities on the global agenda. They also discussed issues relating to mutual security and exchanged first impressions on the upcoming NATO Summit in Madrid. They also spoke about the situation in Latin America – a region particularly hard hit by COVID-19, both at a health and an economic level. In this regard, they agreed to explore opportunities for cooperation between the two countries in the region, particularly in Central America.

Cuba Suspends Tariffs And Fees For Non-Commercial (SME's Next?) Solar Systems. Another Opportunity For Biden-Harris Administration To Support U.S. Exporters And Florida Companies Should Benefit.

NOTE: The exemption scheduled to expire on 31 December 2021 has been extended to 22 June 2022.

On 28 July 2021, the Ministry of Finances and Prices of the Republic of Cuba reported  individuals subject to Republic of Cuba jurisdiction would be authorized to import, importantly  absent tariffs and fees, photovoltaic systems and parts for non-commercial use. LINK To Official Notice 

The resolution states that the individual is responsible the installation of the photovoltaic system and its maintenance.   The photovoltaic system must be compatible with and be connected to the national grid. 

Approximately 90% of the Republic of Cuba’s energy usage is fossil fuel-based with the remainder using a mixture of renewables.  Approximately 50% of fossil fuel usage is for the production of electricity. 

The decision by the Diaz-Canel Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) adds to recent decisions to promote the importation, at no cost to the government of the Republic of Cuba, for other products: 

The first is a suspension of import duties and fees for some products (hygiene, food, personal, cleaning products, etc.) in personal luggage and cargo on flights to the Republic of Cuba from 19 July 2021 through 31 December 2021.   

The second is an announcement on 14 July 2021 by H.E. Alejandro Gil, Minister of Economy and Planning of the Republic of Cuba, who reported that during the coming weeks regulations would be published for the operation of independent small and medium-size enterprises (SME’s).  The Biden-Harris Administration has during the last six months maintained that a focus of its Cuba Policy Review is how to provide support to cuentapropistas (self-employed), non-government-controlled cooperatives, and to independent SME’s. 

Expect Miami, Florida-based manufacturers and distributors of low-cost residential photovoltaic systems to craft packages specifically for the Republic of Cuba market and to use both regularly-scheduled commercial airline flights from the United States to the Republic of Cuba along with sea-going container delivery services to deliver those systems. 

The government of the Republic of Cuba will likely expand the importation of photovoltaic systems to include the self-employed and SME’s. 

Previous Related Analyses 

Biden-Diaz-Canel Remittance Compromise: U.S. And Cuba Companies Suspend Transaction Fees Until 31 December 2021. Impact On 800 Publix Markets Jul 27, 2021  

U.S. Department Of State Memorandum: The 17 Company Members Of The CRWG- Moving Remittances And Using Remittances; Cuba Entities Need Be Part Of The Process Jul 26, 2021

Ministry of Transport of the Republic of Cuba (MINTRANS): Before 2030, MINTRANS plans for 45% of the total number of vehicles owned by Republic of Cuba government-operated companies will be electric vehicles.  A goal is to introduce more than 56,000 electric vehicles of which about 36,000 will be imported while 17,000 will be retrofitted from existing combustion engine vehicles.  A goal is to install 38,000 charging stations throughout the country with 16,000 fast charging stations and the remainder slow or semi-fast charging stations.  An additional 2,000 slow and fast charging stations will in public places while 180 50KV fast charging stations will be located to supply public services.  The first Cuban company to utilize electric vehicles in the Republic of Cuba was Republic of Cuba government-operated Aguas de la Habana.  The company operates a twenty-two Nissan e-NV200 vehicles.  LINK To YouTube Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uNhxN0aevXc

Congressional Research Service (CRS) Updates Its "Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview"

“The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for more than a century. CRS is well-known for analysis that is authoritative, confidential, objective and nonpartisan. Its highest priority is to ensure that Congress has 24/7 access to the nation’s best thinking.”

LINK To 22 July 2021 Three-Page Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview

U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken And Japan Foreign Minister Motegi Discussed Cuba. Why Did U.S. Department Of State Not Mention It?

United States Department of State
Washington DC
22 July 2021

Secretary Blinken’s Call with Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi
Office of the Spokesperson
The below is attributable to Spokesperson Ned Price:

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke today with Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu. Secretary Blinken and Foreign Minister Motegi emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance to peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world. Secretary Blinken thanked Foreign Minister Motegi for hosting Deputy Secretary Sherman for a successful U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea trilateral meeting in Tokyo. They also discussed concerns regarding the mass arrests and detentions of protestors in Cuba and agreed on the need for the Cuban regime to hear its people and serve their needs at this vital moment. In addition, Secretary Blinken conveyed his wishes to Japan for a safe and secure Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tokyo, Japan
23 July 2021

Japan-U.S. Foreign Ministers’ Telephone Talk (English Translation)

On July 23, commencing at 9:35 a.m. for 40 minutes, Mr. MOTEGI Toshimitsu, Minister for Foreign Affairs, held a Japan-U.S. Foreign Ministers’ telephone talk with the Honorable Antony Blinken, Secretary of State of the United States of America. The overview of the talk is as follows.

1. At the outset, Secretary Blinken wished for the success of the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games, whose opening ceremony was to be held soon. In response, Minister Motegi extended his heartfelt welcome to Dr. Jill Biden, First Lady of the United States of America, who he greeted at the airport, and the U.S. team.

2. The two ministers exchanged their views on a broad range of issues, such as the outcomes of Minister Motegi’s visit to Central American and Caribbean Countries, the situation in Cuba, regional issues including China, and global issues such as COVID-19. Furthermore, both sides confirmed that Japan and the U.S. would continue to take the lead and cooperate with like-minded countries in strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and realizing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”

Biden-Diaz-Canel Remittance Compromise: U.S. And Cuba Companies Suspend Transaction Fees Until 31 December 2021. Impact On 800 Publix Markets

How To Resume Electronic Remittance Transfers
Unilateral Decisions To Impact Respective Populations
No-Fees Until 31 December 2021
Link To Cuba Suspension of Duties And Fees On Imported Products
Western Union, Retail Agents, BFI, Fincimex, AIS Waive All Fees
Focus On Debit Cards & Bank Account-To-Bank Account Transfers
Temporary Reprieve From Cuba Restricted List
For The Greater Good Or Acceptable Faustian Bargain?
The Truth About Who-Gets-What From Each Transaction
Impact Upon 800 Publix Markets In Florida

The commercial, economic, and political impact of the COVID-19 pandemic upon the Republic of Cuba and the United States may provide each government to lessen the distance between them through unilateral regulatory decisions impacting longer-term the bilateral relationship.   

Each government can permit temporary regulatory accommodations that demonstrate empathy and humanitarianism for their respective populations while not furthering the divide between them.   

The Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) in Washington is seeking a politically viable means to re-establish efficient and transparent cost-effective direct electronic remittance transfers from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  It requires buy-in from the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) in Havana. 

There are two groups who oppose a re-establishment of electronic remittance transfers from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  The first group believes that until there is a means to deny the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba economic benefit, United States government policy constraining electronic remittance transfers should remain in place.  The second group believes until there is a means to deny all Republic of Cuba government-operated entities economic benefit, United States government policy constraining electronic remittance transfers should remain in place.   

Relevant conundrums for the above-referenced groups are 1) How to support regularly-scheduled commercial airline service from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, but condition implementation upon airlines not making payments to Republic of Cuba government-operated entities- nothing for landing fees, nothing for overflight fees, no ticket fees, no ground handling fees, nothing for fuel (if required), nothing for emergency maintenance, nothing for provisions (if necessary)?  2) How to support wireless (cellular device) connectivity through payments to Republic of Cuba government-operated Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba S.A. (ETECSA), but require payments (for example, from United States telecommunication carriers, from individuals subject to United States jurisdiction sending funds to the Republic of Cuba to make payments to ETECSA) do not benefit the government of the Republic of Cuba?      

The internal and external debates in the United States remain hampered (and distracted) by an inability to move from the reality that some want to the reality that exists; and implement a solution and move on to the next issue.  

Today’s choice (which some may define as a Faustian Bargain or “for the greater good”) is permitting the FAR to have an overt participation in the electronic remittance transfer process or a covert participation in the electronic remittance transfer process.   

All electronic remittance transfers arriving to the Republic of Cuba are processed by and create benefit to the government of the Republic of Cuba primarily through FAR-connected Republic of Cuba government-operated Banco Financiero Internacional S.A. (BFI), Republic of Cuba government-operated Financiera Cimex (Fincimex) and Republic of Cuba government-operated American International Services (AIS).   

Remember: The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration was not inclined in the fall of 2020 (during the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic) and is not thus far stimulated in summer of 2021 (during the continued impact of the COVID-19 pandemic) to permit the use of non-FAR-controlled entities for the receipt of electronic remittance transfers from the United States.   

However, the foundation for a viable solution may be two decisions announced by the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration.  The first is a suspension of import duties and fees for some products (hygiene, food, personal, cleaning products, etc.) in personal luggage and cargo on flights to the Republic of Cuba from 19 July 2021 through 31 December 2021.  The second is an announcement on 14 July 2021 by H.E. Alejandro Gil, Minister of Economy and Planning of the Republic of Cuba, who reported that during the coming weeks regulations would be published for the operation of independent small and medium-size enterprises (SME’s). 

The Biden-Harris Administration has during the last six months maintained that a focus of its Cuba Policy Review is how to provide support to cuentapropistas (self-employed), non-government-controlled cooperatives, and to independent SME’s. 

The Remittance Proposal 

Certain in-country events permit companies to operate non-conventionally for a certain period in support of relief efforts, provide support for human suffering, and in furtherance of other objectives.  Generally, the period is one month to ninety days and included in contracts.  Non-conventional operations for extended periods can stress company relationships with other countries who may believe they qualify for exceptional treatment.  Retail agents are also not particularly enthusiastic about losing a source of revenue. 

• What if Denver, Colorado-based Western Union Company (2019 revenues approximately US$5 billion), were to suspend its fees (the company fee and sender agent fee) through 31 December 2021 for electronic remittances transfers sent from any country to the Republic of Cuba, the same time-frame that the Republic of Cuba is waiving its fees and duties?  In 2019, Western Union Company processed approximately 2.88 million electronic remittance transfers to the Republic of Cuba. 

• What if independent of the offer by Western Union Company, the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration announced that BFI, Fincimex, and AIS would suspend their fees relating to electronic remittance transfers from any country to the Republic of Cuba for the period through 31 December 2021 to further support the 11.3 million citizens of the Republic of Cuba during the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic? 

There would be political indigestion from reversing temporarily a Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) inclusion of BFI, Fincimex, and AIS on the Cuba Restricted List maintained by the United States Department of State, but funds would arrive to the Republic of Cuba.  If the Republic of Cuba ends its import duties and fees waiver prior to 31 December 2021, then the temporary reversal could be reinstated. 

A Western Union Company customer has four choices when making an electronic remittance transfer to the Republic of Cuba where the recipient receives currency: 1) bank account 2) credit card 3) currency and 4) debit card.  Only the sender is charged a fee, which is disclosed prior to any transaction.  Globally and nationwide, electronic remittance commissions continue to decline as a percentage of each transaction due to customers using less currency and credit cards and more bank accounts and debit cards, including bank account-to-bank account transfers (not yet available for the Republic of Cuba) where there are sometimes no fees (the market-based foreign exchange conversion offering a source of revenue), but may take up to four days to reach the recipient bank account.  Bank account-to-bank account electronic remittance transfers would benefit immensely the self-employed and small and medium-size enterprises in the Republic of Cuba.   

For the sender of an electronic remittance transfer, the highest costs for the customer is using a credit card, then debit, then currency, and then in many countries, bank-to-bank.  In terms of who-gets-what, for example, with transaction fees ranging from approximately 3% to 7% the amount is divided between the remittance company, the remittance agent used by the sender, and the agent(s) used by the recipient in the receiving country.  The public domain narrative that BFI, Fincimex, and AIS were collectively receiving approximately 20% as their combined fee for each transaction is not true.   

The transaction fees BFI, Fincimex, and AIS were receiving from Western Union Company were not inconsistent with what non-government-controlled entities receive in other countries.  In 2019, BFI, Fincimex, and AIS were estimated to have received, combined, approximately 1%+ (approximately US$20 million) on an estimated US$1.5 billion in electronic remittance transfers from all companies in the United States.  The government of the Republic of Cuba establishes the exchange rate for the Cuban Peso (CUP) to the United States Dollar, currently US$1.00=24 CUP, which provides additional value to the government of the Republic of Cuba and the government of the Republic of Cuba controls product (domestic and imported) pricing decisions which provides an additional value to the government of the Republic of Cuba.  The current unofficial street-rate for the CUP is US$1.00=55.00 CUP.  The Central Bank of the Republic of Cuba is anticipated to devalue the CUP by the end of 2021. 

The Biden-Harris Administration could, as a condition of authorizing electronic remittance transfers, require the government of the Republic of Cuba to again permit United States currency to be deposited and exchanged absent any additional fees. 

From the United States to the Republic of Cuba, electronic remittance transfers are sent primarily from California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, and Texas.  The overwhelming majority are from Florida.  From outside of the United States, the countries with the largest percentage of electronic remittances to the Republic of Cuba include Canada, France, Germany, Mexico, and Spain.  

With the overwhelming percentage of electronic remittance transfers to the Republic of Cuba originating from Florida, retail agents given their interaction with the local communities, might be inclined to support the six-month program.  For example, Lakeland, Florida-based Publix Super Markets, Inc. (2019 revenues approximately US$38 billion) has more than 800 locations throughout Florida. 

For a six-month no-fee electronic global remittance transfer program to be managed efficiently and transparently, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury would need to 1) authorize direct correspondent banking accounts and 2) re-authorize U-turn financial transactions. 

• Direct correspondent banking provides for electronic funds transfers to arrive efficiently, transparently, and cost-effectively.  In 2015, the OFAC authorized Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank (2017 assets approximately US$2.9 billion) to have an account with Republic of Cuba government-operated Banco Internacional de Comercio S.A. (BICSA).  However, the Obama Administration would not authorize BICSA under a license from the OFAC to have an account with Stonegate Bank which would make fully-operational Direct Correspondent Banking, so funds to and from the United States were sent and received through Panama City, Panama-based Multibank, which had, but no longer has extensive dealings with the Republic of Cuba.  From Bogota, Colombia-based Grupo Aval on 16 June 2020: “On May 25th, Banco de Bogotá, through its subsidiary Leasing Bogotá S.A. Panamá, acquired 96.6% of the ordinary shares of Multi Financial Group.  As part of the acquisition process, MFG’s operation in Cuba was closed and as part of the transaction.  Grupo Aval complies with OFAC regulations and doesn't have transactional relationships with Cuba.”   

• U-turn financial transactions are essential for customers located outside of the United States to use Western Union Company for electronic remittance transfer to the Republic of Cuba.  For example, when a customer in Spain uses an online portal or visits a retail location to send funds to the Republic of Cuba, Western Union Company needs to have an operating account in Spain from which to send the funds to the Republic of Cuba.  Absent U-turn authorization, the remittance cannot be sent to the Republic of Cuba and cannon be sent to another financial institution.    

Supporting Self-Employed 

If the Biden-Harris Administration creates as expected a policy and regulatory framework whereby individuals subject to United States jurisdiction may deliver equity investments and provide loans to cuentapropistas (self-employed) and SME’s, then the existing financial transaction infrastructure throughout the Republic of Cuba will be woefully inadequate to manage what would likely be thousands of commercial checking and savings accounts with foreign exchange arriving (investments and loans), foreign exchange departing (investor dividends, loan repayments, input purchases) on a daily basis.  An efficient electronic remittance transfer infrastructure is essential for supporting the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.  Bank-to-Bank transfers are preferred. 

Debit Card Transfer Option 

AIS has introduced a Multi-Level Cell (MLC) Card.  In Spanish, MLC means “Moneda Libremente Convertible”- free convertible money.  Financial institutions in the Republic of Cuba accepting MLC Card include among others: Banco de Crédito y Comercio S.A. (BANDEC), Banco Popular de Ahorro S.A. (BPA), Banco Internacional de Comercio S.A. (BICSA), and Banco Metropolitano S.A. (BM).  Western Union Company could establish connectivity as a source for electronic remittance transfers to an MLC Card in position by a Republic of Cuba national.  The MLC Card would also be of value to the self-employed and for use by SME’s where non-currency transactions are preferred to currency transactions. 

The MLC is a no-fee debit product permitting funds to be used for retail transactions and provides for person-to-person fund transfers.  Funds may be withdrawn from any Automated Teller Machine (ATM) and through Casas de Cambio de Cuba S.A. (CADECA S.A.) offices.  The MLC Card can receive electronic transfers from outside of the Republic of Cuba from countries in the 27-member European Union (EU), Canada, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and United Kingdom among others.  An individual may also use currency to add value to an MLC Card.   

In July 2020, H.E. Alejandro Gil, Minister of Economy and Planning of the Republic of Cuba, announced that end of the 10% tax on the exchange of United States Dollars in the Republic of Cuba. 

In June 2021, the Central Bank of the Republic of Cuba reported that United States currency would temporarily no longer be accepted for deposit by financial institutions in the Republic of Cuba. 

Presently, the official exchange rate is US$1.00 equals 24.00 Cuban Pesos (CUP).   

The unofficial, street-rate is US$1.00 equals 50 CUP to 60 CUP.  In January 2021, after the Convertible Peso (CUC) was removed from circulation, US$1.00 peaked at 70 CUP.  The Republic of Cuba is anticipated to devalue the CUP by the end of 2021. 

LINK TO COMPLETE FIVE-PAGE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Previous Related Analyses 

U.S. Department Of State Memorandum: The 17 Company Members Of The CRWG- Moving Remittances And Using Remittances; Cuba Entities Need Be Part Of The Process July 26, 2021 

Is Biden-Harris Administration Nearing Decision To Reverse Trump-Pence Administration Prohibition On Cuba Military Earning Money From Remittances? July 15, 2021 

Cuba Central Bank May Provide Option For Western Union To Continue Services To Cuba: REDSA November 26, 2020 

Western Union Data For Transfers To Cuba: 2.88 Million Annually- 24% To Havana; Florida 1st, Texas 2nd, New Jersey 3rd; US$200,000+ Could Be Aboard Each Flight From Miami November 19, 2020 

If Western Union Ends Remittance Services To Cuba, That Means A Return Of “Mules On Steroids”- The Impact Could Cripple MIA November 16, 2020 

At 6:00 PM Today, Final [For Now] Western Union Transactions With Cuba Are [Temporarily Perhaps] Suspended November 23, 2020 

Will United States Airlines Now Post A Link To FinCEN Form 105 On Their Internet Sites For Passengers Traveling To Cuba? November 23, 2020 

Trump Administration Executive Order About China Military Will Impact Biden Administration Decisions About Cuba Military November 17, 2020 

Cuba Has Options To Retain Western Union Electronic Remittance Services- Transfer To A Bank? November 16, 2020 

Western Union Preparing To End Money Transfers To Cuba On 22 November 2020.... Will Cuba Permit It? November 13, 2020

U.S. Department Of State Memorandum: The 17 Company Members Of The CRWG- Moving Remittances And Using Remittances; Cuba Entities Need Be Part Of The Process

CRWG Seventeen Company Members
CRWG Focus: How To Move Remittances And How To Use Remittances
Does CRWG Want To Craft Solutions Or Look Like It Has Crafted Solutions?
Independent Cuba Businesses Need Remittance Infrastructure
Eight Cuba Entities Need Be Invited Into Decision Process
For Success, CRWG Solution Need Not Be Zero-Sum For Cuba Government

If issues relating to the Republic of Cuba have for the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) shifted from “not a priority” to “a priority” and the process for delivering electric remittance transfers and uses for those delivered electronic remittance transfers from the United States to the Republic of Cuba are essential to the implementation of Biden-Harris Administration policies focusing upon the Republic of Cuba, then the Cuba Remittance Working Group (CRWG) whose membership is convened by the United States Department of State must be focused first towards operational issues rather than political issues.  

The Biden-Harris Administration will err if the CRWG composition is focused upon individuals of Cuban descent, academics, and those like-minded and serve practically solely to reinforce opinions of those within and supporting the Biden-Harris Administration.  Pointless for the CRWG to be a forum for grievances, academic discourse, and lamenting as to what should be rather than what is doable. 

The focus should be: What are companies and financial institutions in the United States and the Republic of Cuba engaged in the delivery and distribution process and in the uses of delivered remittances prepared now to do and what regulations need to be changed.   

Crafting a politically-attractive recommendation that is not viable, implementable, or sustainable does nothing to solve the problem.  

The CRWG should include employees of the United States Government, but not be where careerists and political appointees discuss amongst themselves what they have heard from others and then craft recommendations.  The CRWG process needs to include representatives from financial institutions and companies who make operational decisions. 

Required Answer: How electronic remittance transfers can support the oft-stated component of Biden-Harris Administration thinking about the Republic of Cuba: Benefit cuentapropistas (self-employed), non-government-controlled cooperatives, and re-emerging independent small and medium-size enterprises (SME’s) and do so through direct investment and direct financing. 

Representatives of Republic of Cuba government-operated entities should be included in the CRWG- and if not possible to provide visas for a visit to the United States, then certainly invited to participate in Internet-based meetings.  Like it or not, they are a necessary component for a sustainable result.   

A schedule is essential, an end-date by which a recommendation(s) from the CRWG will be delivered to the Inter-Agency Review Group consisting of representatives from The White House, United States Department of State, United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Commerce, United States Department of Defense, United States Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and Central Intelligence Agency.  

Is the goal of the CRWG to forge a solution(s) acceptable for the political moment, to get through the political moment, or be consequential in terms of creating an implementable sustainable operational blueprint? 

For the CRWG to craft a recommendation(s), precedence need be about what changes companies and financial institutions require from United States regulations impacting electronic remittance transfers and the uses for those electronic remittance transfers.   

This knowledge is most efficiently gained from executives within the companies and financial institutions who have been, and are needed now to be participants in the process:  

CRWG Member Recommendations
(alphabetical order)

Seattle, Washington-based Amazon, Inc.
San Juan, Puerto Rico-based Banco Popular
Charlotte, North Carolina-based Bank of America
New York, New York-based Citibank
Denver, Colorado-based CoBank
Riverwoods, Illinois-based Discover Financial Services
Conway, Arkansas-based Home BancShares
New York, New York-based JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Purchase, New York-based Mastercard International
Dallas, Texas-based MoneyGram International
Pompano Beach, Florida-based Natbank
San Jose, California-based PayPal Holdings
Florida-based Publix Super Markets
Miami, Florida-based Va-Cuba, Inc.
Foster City, California-based Visa, Inc.
San Francisco, California-based Wells Fargo
Denver, Colorado-based Western Union Company

Republic Of Cuba-Based Financial Institutions
(alphabetical order)

American International Services S.A. (AIS)
Banco de Crédito y Comercio S.A. (BANDEC)
Banco Financiero Internacional S.A. (BFI)
Banco Internacional de Comercio S.A. (BICSA)
Banco Metropolitano S.A. (BM)
Banco Popular de Ahorro S.A. (BPA)
Central Bank Of Cuba
Financiera Cimex S.A. (Fincimex)

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Links To Previous Analyses

U.S. Department Of State Memorandum: The 17 Company Members Of The CRWG- Moving Remittances And Using Remittances; Cuba Entities Need Be Part Of The Process July 26, 2021 

Is Biden-Harris Administration Nearing Decision To Reverse Trump-Pence Administration Prohibition On Cuba Military Earning Money From Remittances? July 15, 2021 

Cuba Central Bank May Provide Option For Western Union To Continue Services To Cuba: REDSA November 26, 2020 

Western Union Data For Transfers To Cuba: 2.88 Million Annually- 24% To Havana; Florida 1st, Texas 2nd, New Jersey 3rd; US$200,000+ Could Be Aboard Each Flight From Miami November 19, 2020 

If Western Union Ends Remittance Services To Cuba, That Means A Return Of “Mules On Steroids”- The Impact Could Cripple MIA November 16, 2020 

At 6:00 PM Today, Final [For Now] Western Union Transactions With Cuba Are [Temporarily Perhaps] Suspended November 23, 2020 

Will United States Airlines Now Post A Link To FinCEN Form 105 On Their Internet Sites For Passengers Traveling To Cuba? November 23, 2020 

Trump Administration Executive Order About China Military Will Impact Biden Administration Decisions About Cuba Military November 17, 2020 

Cuba Has Options To Retain Western Union Electronic Remittance Services- Transfer To A Bank? November 16, 2020 

Western Union Preparing To End Money Transfers To Cuba On 22 November 2020.... Will Cuba Permit It? November 13, 2020

If A Product Costs At Least 2,500 Pesos (US$104.16), Customers In Cuba Now May Obtain Financing: Terms Are 2.5% Interest With 20% Down

OnCuba News
Miami, Florida
24 July 2021

Cuba approves sale on credit of products whose prices exceed 2,500 pesos

Published this Tuesday in the extraordinary Gaceta Oficial No. 66, the resolution establishes that Cuban citizens with permanent domicile in the country, who reside in the province where the sale is requested, and are over 18 years old, have legal and payment capacity, will have access to this service.

Cubans will be able to buy on credit goods whose prices exceed 2,500 pesos, such as furniture, mattresses, bicycles and electrical appliances, in accordance with Resolution 98/2021 of the Island’s Ministry of Domestic Trade (MINCIN).

Published this Tuesday in the extraordinary Gaceta Oficial Extraordinaria No. 66, the resolution establishes that Cuban citizens with permanent domicile in the country, who reside in the province where the sale is requested, and are over 18 years old, have legal and payment capacity, will have access to this service, the Agencia Cubana de Noticias (ACN) news agency reported.

Among other requirements to access payment in installments, buyers must have demonstrable, fixed and guaranteed regular income, and have honored or be honoring other debts contracted under this mode of sale, the source indicated. Likewise, they must present at the retail establishment their identity documents, personal data and the certification of the ability to pay of a guarantor. According to the resolution, to carry out this procedure, the client must also show a certification from the workplace with the salary earned, and in the case of self-employed workers, an affidavit of personal income taxes. For their part, pensioners or beneficiaries of social assistance will present a certification of their income endorsed by the Department of Labor or a subsidiary of the National Institute of Social Security.

According to the source, the regulation clarifies that people hired in a state entity can access installment sales through the payroll discount, provided that a prior agreement between the store is made with their workplace. The establishments that offer products on credit have up to 10 business days to corroborate the documentation presented and inform the client of its result.

In the contract between the store and the person who accesses the service, the purchase amount, surcharge rate, payment method, fees, payment terms, and consequences of non-compliance are determined; as well as the resolution of conflicts, obligations, terms and conditions of both parties, the ACN indicates. The interest rates to be charged by the establishments will not exceed 2.5% of the price of the product and the initial entry to acquire it will be negotiable, although never less than 20% of the total amount.

The resolution, which was made public along with another that regulates garage sales in Cuba, stipulates that the rest of the amount will be paid within the agreed terms, always within a term of up to one year. The legal text indicates that the customer will receive the sales voucher and the guarantee certificate when the purchase is made, but the certification of ownership is granted, if applicable, once the full amount has been paid. In addition, it warns that if the client breaches the terms established in the contract and the renegotiation, the retail establishment is empowered to withdraw the good, without refund of the cash paid.

Government Of Cuba May Financially Benefit From U.S. Effort To Bypass ETECSA Broadband Cellular Network. Less Urgency To Spend Funds

The Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) is evaluating the viability of providing alternative opportunities for the 11.3 million citizens residing within the 800-mile archipelago to access the Internet absent connectivity through Republic of Cuba government-operated Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba S.A. (ETECSA). 

The Republic of Cuba has a nationwide 3G broadband cellular network and an expanding 4G broadband cellular network.   

In 2013, Internet access in the Republic of Cuba began to expand with expensive cyber-salons.  In 2014, “Nauta Wi-Fi Service” was introduced.  In 2015, ETECA begin to install no-cost Wi-Fi Hot Spots throughout the country.  In 2016, “Nauta Hogar Service” was introduced to provide residence-access to Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) network.  In 2018, a 2G and 3G broadband network (with Internet access) was accessible throughout the Republic of Cuba.  In 2019, a 4G broadband network was introduced.  In 2019, Cubacel (a brand owned by ETECSA) introduced a Subscriber Identification Module (SIM) Card “Cubacel Tur” for non-Republic of Cuba nationals, focused upon tourists.  

Republic of Cuba nationals may access applications including Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and WhatsApp among others.  Republic of Cuba nationals have created accessible commercial applications including Uber-like Bajanda, La Nave, and Sube; and A La Mesa for restaurants among an increasing number of applications developed by Republic of Cuba nationals residing in the Republic of Cuba.

If the Biden-Harris Administration uses balloons, satellites, vessel-based, or roof-based (atop the United States Embassy in Havana) platforms to deliver access to Virtual Private Networks (VPN’s) or other connectivity products including a second broadband network/Internet access point for Republic of Cuba nationals, the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) may complain publicly; may consider such activity as another hostile act, nearing or meeting the threshold of an act of war; may seek condemnation at the New York, New York-based United Nations (UN)…

Given that whatever the Biden-Harris Administration decides to do would enhance the usefulness (accessibility) of the Republic of Cuba’s 3G broadband network, 4G broadband network, and yet-to-be implemented 5G broadband network, the government of the Republic of Cuba might not be too unappreciative if the Biden-Harris Administration spends United States taxpayer funds to provide additional broadband network capacity to citizens, visitors, and tourists, at no financial cost to the government of the Republic of Cuba, so ETECSA may lessen its capital outlays.  A zero-sum effort is not always what it may seem to be…   

Cuba Mentioned Briefly At Today's White House Briefing: Internet Yes. Remittances No.

The White House
Washington DC
23 July 2021

Q -- Congresswoman Salazar says that the administration could turn the Internet back on for Cubans within minutes. I guess there's this technology to allow high-tech balloons to float over Cuba to act as towers. What's being done? Or can you provide an update on restoring Internet services to Cuba?

MS. PSAKI: I wish it was that easy. We are exploring a range of options. We are quite focused and interested in restoring Internet access to the people of Cuba, which we actually -- which we absolutely believe, and agree, I would say, would provide information, would allow individuals to communicate. And we feel if we can get it done, that would be a great step forward and beneficial to the people of Cuba.

Quid Pro Quo: If U.S. Department Of State Wants To Return Diplomats To Havana, MINREX May Want To Return 15 Diplomats To Washington

The Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) has indicated a desire to re-populate (in-person or remotely) the United States Consulate operation within the United States Embassy in Havana, Republic of Cuba.   

There remains a possibility that visa process operations, including required in-person interviews, could be conducted remotely from rooms outfitted with cameras and body temperature measurement equipment to confirm veracity of statements while maintaining statutory requirements. 

If individuals subject to United States jurisdiction are returned to the Republic of Cuba for the purpose of processing visas, there remain unresolved health issues having impacted employees of the United States Government injured beginning in 2016 which resulted in the departure of employees- and ordered departures in October 2017 of fifteen Republic of Cuba nationals working at the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba, including within the Consulate of the Republic of Cuba, in Washington DC. Currently, there are approximately seventeen individuals subject to United States jurisdiction working at the Embassy of the United States in Havana.  

The other issue for the Biden-Harris Administration to resolve is if the United States Department of State wants to return up to fifteen individuals to Havana, then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINREX) of the Republic of Cuba may want to return up to fifteen individuals to the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in Washington.   

If the Republic of Cuba were to re-authorize visas for up to fifteen individuals subject to United States jurisdiction to return to Havana, a further issue is whether MINREX would place travel restrictions upon the individuals; and whether the United States Department of State would place travel restrictions upon the individuals in Washington, specifically commercial officers whose portfolio includes travel throughout the United States.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
3 October 2017

Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary of State: On October 3, the Department of State informed the Government of Cuba that it was ordering the departure of 15 of its officials from its embassy in Washington, D.C. The decision was made due to Cuba’s failure to take appropriate steps to protect our diplomats in accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention. This order will ensure equity in our respective diplomatic operations.  On September 29, the Department ordered the departure of non-emergency personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Havana, as well as all family members. Until the Government of Cuba can ensure the safety of our diplomats in Cuba, our embassy will be reduced to emergency personnel to minimize the number of diplomats at risk of exposure to harm.  We continue to maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba, and will continue to cooperate with Cuba as we pursue the investigation into these attacks.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
3 October 2017 

Special Briefing- Via Teleconference
State Department Official

MODERATOR: Good morning. And thanks, everyone, for joining us for our Cuba call. We’re joined again this week by [State Department Official]. But I’d like to remind you that this call is on background. It will be attributable to a State Department official. This call will also be embargoed until 11 a.m. Eastern Time today. I know you’re all anxious to get started, so with that, I’ll turn it over to [State Department Official]. 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thank you, [Moderator]. Good morning. This morning, the Department of State informed the Government of Cuba it was ordering the departure of 15 of its officials from its embassy in Washington, D.C. This move does not signal a change of policy or determination of responsibility for the attacks on U.S. Government personnel in Cuba. We are maintaining diplomatic relations with Havana. The decision on expulsions was taken due to Cuba’s inability to protect our diplomats in Havana, as well as to ensure equity in the impact on our respective operations.  As you know, on September 29th, the department ordered the departure of nonemergency personnel assigned to the U.S. embassy in Havana, as well as all family members. Investigations into the attacks are ongoing, as investigators have been unable to determine who or what is causing these attacks.  Regarding the attacks, there are now 22 persons medically confirmed to have experienced health effects due to the attacks on diplomatic personnel in Havana. This information was confirmed yesterday after the decision-making process for the expulsions was well underway. The Cuban Government has told us it will continue its investigation into these attacks, and we will continue to cooperate that – with them in this effort. We will also continue our own investigations into these attacks.  With that, I’m ready to take your questions. Thank you. 

QUESTION: Yes. Thank you very much. Just a couple of quick questions. What would it take in terms of Cuban action to return the U.S. diplomats to Cuba and to allow Cubans back – these 15 to return to the U.S.? Do you have an estimate of the percentage that these 15 make up of the Cuban diplomatic staff in the U.S.? And how much time are you giving the Cubans to leave? 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We’re giving the Cubans seven days for their personnel to depart. Are we doing more than one question? Should I ask the last one or the first one? 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: With regard to what it will take to restore operations, we have underscored repeatedly to the Cuban Government its responsibility for the safety, well-being, security, and protection of our diplomatic staff under the Vienna Convention in Havana. We will need full assurances from the Cuban Government that these attacks will not continue before we can even contemplate returning personnel. 

QUESTION: Hey. Thanks for doing this. Two quick ones: One, can you say what the specific diplomatic action that you’re taking are? Are you PNGing these people? Are you asking the Cubans to pull them, and if they don’t’ pull them then you will PNG them? How precisely is that going to work? And then just second, on this thing, you’re talking about needing full assurances from the Cuban Government. That presupposes that you think the Cuban Government has the ability to put a stop to this if they wanted to. Can you explain – can you square how you’re saying you don’t know who or what is causing this, yet you believe it is within Cuba’s ability to stop it? Thank you. 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: No. Our position on assurances does not presume Cuban culpability. What it does is require the Cuban Government to be able to fulfill its treaty obligations for the safety, well-being, and protection of foreign diplomats in their country. And until they can give that assurance, our personnel, we have judged, are not safe and secure in the country. We are expelling the 15 Cubans today. They are not being declared persona non grata. And we expect them to leave within seven days. 

QUESTION: Good morning, guys. The latest attack was still in August – can you confirm that? Are all the U.S. diplomats who are required to leave Havana and Cuba, have they left? And just a bit on – follow up on what Josh was asking. If these attacks just stop and it’s six months, a year down the road, there’s no determination, would then the United States consider increasing its diplomatic presence in Cuba? 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Rich, I’m not going to talk about hypothetical conditions or timeframes. It just – it’s just not productive at this point. The first question was, again? 

QUESTION: (Inaudible) saying are medically affected. Was the latest attack still in August? And are – the U.S. diplomats leaving Cuba, are they all gone? 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. Yeah. So we are in the process of the ordered departure of our staff. It will take us a few days to get everyone out. But we expect everyone to be out by the end of the week. We have given the Cuban Government seven days to depart. 

QUESTION: Can you clarify if the 22nd person affected – you mentioned was in August or September. And is the 22 just American government personnel, or does this include any dependents or family members, and have they been affected? 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The 22nd person was – yeah – was a person who suffered an attack in January of this year and who was subsequently re-evaluated based on symptoms and conditions the person was experiencing. 

QUESTION: Hi. Thank you. So if you don’t know what caused it, who did it, and the symptoms are different among victims, how do you know it’s an attack? Why are you calling it an attack? And to go back to a previous question someone had asked, asked what percentage this represents of the staff at the Cuban Embassy. Thank you. 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The attacks reflect an ongoing series of incidents that are affecting our diplomatic personnel, and they have persisted over a long period of time now that has made it very clear that our people are suffering and are suffering these attacks from some unknown means and method. And the decision to call them attacks reflects that there’s been a consistent pattern of our people being affected, and there’s no other conclusion that we could draw.  I think the issue with regard to the number of Cubans departing is that it ensures that we have equitable staffing levels to allow our embassies to operate. I’m not going to get into the specifics of what the specific percentage is. I don’t know that we have a specific figure. 

QUESTION: Hi. Thanks for doing this. Like many other reporters here, I’ve been getting phone calls from people, including physicians, speculating on what the causes were. A couple of physicians have suggested there might be some degree of psychosomatic mass hysteria going on. I was wondering if you’ve ruled that out. 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Again, I’m not a medical professional. I know that the medical teams are looking at all of the symptoms and are considering all of the possibilities. But they have been able to confirm the symptoms that we’ve previously described are occurring and our people are demonstrating physical symptoms. 

QUESTION: Yeah. Hi. Do you have specific names of Cubans who you want – who you’re expelling? Or are you leaving that decision up to the Cuban Government on how they should downsize? 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I spoke with the Cuban ambassador this morning at 9 o’clock. We provided a diplomatic note that did provide a list of Cubans. He had some questions as to how this might affect their embassy operations, but yes, we did give them a list. 

QUESTION: Is it true that the Cubans, Bruno Rodriguez, told Secretary of State Tillerson the other day that the Cubans are aware that this was a rogue operation by people inside Cuba, inside its own government services? 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I’m not going to comment on diplomatic conversations. I would refer you to the Secretary’s readout that we issued. 

QUESTION: Hi, this is actually Lucia Leal. I wanted to see if you – if the possibility of closing the U.S. embassy in Cuba is out of the table now. And these announcements have come in waves. Why not announce this on Friday, last Friday? Thank you. 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I want to – I want to reiterate what I said in my earlier statement. This does not signal a change of policy or a determination of responsibility for the attacks. We are maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba at this time. 

QUESTION: Hi. After this measure, the Cuban embassy will probably also cut its consular services and the family reunification program and visas in Havana are suspended, so family reunification would be severely impacted. What’s the message to Cuban Americans that will not be able to see their families because of this crisis? 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I think we are evaluating the impact our reduction of staff will have on those issues, but the Secretary has made clear first and foremost is the safety, security, and well-being of our diplomatic personnel overseas. There will be emergency services that will remain available. 

QUESTION: Hi, thanks for doing this. Just a quick follow-up on a previous question. Why didn’t you announce your decision last Friday when you announced the recall of your diplomats? Because don’t you feel that this will be taken as an escalation by Cuba if there are more steps and more steps? Thank you. 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I think this reflects a deliberate process to work through the issues related to this incident. I think first and foremost the Secretary wanted to focus on the safety and well-being of our personnel. Once having made that decision, we then moved on to consider ensuring that there would be an equitable impact in our two embassies’ ability to operate. 

QUESTION: Thank you. Hi, [State Department Official]. You said you gave a list of your 15 names to the Cubans. Could you describe generically who these people are? Are these political officers, security officers, anything like that? And you said you didn’t want to give a percentage, but if the U.S. is bringing back, what, half of its staff, was this half of the Cuban staff?

And finally, just the same question that everyone has asked is it’s hard to square expelling Cubans with not blaming the Cubans for these attacks. Thanks. 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So again, the – we provided a list of personnel across the Cuban embassy to reflect the fact that we are only leaving emergency personnel in Havana to ensure that both embassy – there’s an equitable impact on both embassies’ operations. I think the percentages are very – roughly very close to each other. And then finally, again, we’re not assigning culpability. This is to ensure that there’s an equitable impact on our embassies’ ability to operate and to underscore to the Cubans that they must take more action to protect our people on the ground if we’re going to have a full range of embassy operations in both capitals. 

QUESTION: Hi, I’m just going to try again that other people have tried – you all said in the Russia tit-for-tat this specific number of embassy personnel and consulate personnel that would be allowed by both countries. Is it that Cuba is now going to be down to 27 people in the United States just like the United States is down to 27 people in Havana? Thanks. 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: First, the Russia situation is very distinct from this situation. This is related to the safety and security and well-being of our embassy. We made a decision to move to ordered departure to ensure that only emergency personnel in Havana would remain, and I’m just not going to comment on the exact numbers that will remain in either post. 

QUESTION: Hey, thanks very much for holding the call. I just want to jump back to something you said in response to Tracy’s question. You said the Cubans must take more action. What specifically are you asking them to do if you don’t still know what the cause of these incidents are? Thank you. 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Again, I think the conversations focus on the Cuban Government’s responsibility to ensure the safety and well-being of diplomatic personnel that they host in their country. It’s not for us to outline a set of criteria for them to ensure that environment. But we are making it clear that the safety and well-being of our people is being affected by these health attacks and we can no longer expose them to the environment down there. 

QUESTION: Hi, thank you. My question is whether you have any indications this is happening in any other embassies either in the region or around the world, or if you’re taking steps to ensure that doesn’t happen. 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. I’m [State Department Official]. I am not aware of any other incidents in our region that have been reported to us. I can’t comment globally. 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I just don’t know. 

QUESTION: Hi, good morning. Can you tell us whether any posts from Cuban diplomats besides Washington and the United States are being affected by this move? And just quickly, Scott Hamilton, the head of the U.S. mission to Cuba, in a farewell message said he and his family are leaving this week from Cuba. Who has the State Department placed in charge of the U.S. mission to Cuba? 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: At this point, Scott Hamilton remains the charge. I don’t have any announcement on whether he’s departing or who would be replacing him. 

United States Department of State
Washington DC
29 September 2017

Special Briefing- Via Teleconference
Senior State Department Official

MODERATOR: All right. Good morning, everyone. Thanks so much for joining us for this background call on Cuba. We are pleased today to have [Senior State Department Official One] join us. He will be known as Senior State Department Official One, and then [Senior State Department Official Two] joins us as well. He’s Senior State Department Official Two.

A reminder: This call is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time today. And with that, I’ll let the briefers start. [Senior State Department Official One]? 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Yeah, good morning. On September 29th, the Department ordered the departure of nonemergency personnel assigned to the U.S. embassy in Havana, as well as all family members. Over the past several months, at least 21 U.S. embassy employees have been targeted in specific attacks. The health, safety, and well-being of our embassy community are our greatest concerns. Investigations into the attacks are ongoing, as investigators have been unable to determine who or what is causing these attacks. 

Until the Government of Cuba can assure the safety of U.S. Government personnel in Cuba, our embassy will be reduced to emergency personnel so as to minimize the number of U.S. Government personnel at risk of exposure. The remaining personnel will carry out core diplomatic and consular functions, including providing emergency assistance to U.S. citizens in Cuba. Routine visa operations are suspended indefinitely. Short-term travel by U.S. Government officials to Cuba will also be limited to those involved with the ongoing investigation or who have a need to travel related to the U.S. national security or crucial embassy operations. The United States will not send official delegations to Cuba or conduct bilateral meetings in Cuba for the time being. Meetings may continue in the United States. 

The Department will issue a Travel Warning for U.S. citizens not to travel to Cuba, and informing them of our decision to draw down our diplomatic staff. The Travel Warning will note that over the past several months, numerous U.S. embassy employees have been targeted in specific attacks. These employees have suffered significant injuries as a consequence of these attacks. Affected individuals have exhibited a range of physical symptoms, including ear complaints, hearing loss, dizziness, tinnitus, balance problems, visual complaints, headache, fatigue, cognitive issues, and difficulty sleeping. 

The governments of the United States and Cuba have not yet identified the responsible party, but the Government of Cuba is responsible for taking all appropriate steps to prevent attacks on our diplomatic personnel in Cuba. Because our personnel’s safety is at risk and we are unable to identify the source of the attacks, we believe that U.S. citizens may also be at risk and warn them not to travel to Cuba. The Travel Warning will advise U.S. travelers the reduction of staffing at the embassy would impact its ability to offer many routine services to U.S. citizens. Emergency services will still be provided. 

I want to stress that the decision to reduce our diplomatic presence in Havana was made to ensure the safety of our personnel. We maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba and our work in Cuba continues to be guided by the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. We are continuing our investigation into the attacks and the Cuba – the Cuban Government has told us they will continue their efforts as well. We acknowledge the efforts the Cuban Government has made to investigate and its cooperation in facilitating the U.S. investigation, but we have members of our embassy community who have suffered physical harm due to these ongoing attacks in Havana, most recently in late August. The Cuban Government is obligated under the Vienna Convention to take all appropriate steps to protect our diplomats in Cuba.  With that, I’m happy to answer your questions. 

QUESTION: Thanks very much for doing this call. Two questions. First of all, I know you said that you do not know who is responsible. Have you ruled out that possibly a third country could be involved? Specifically, the Russians have had some experience with these type of incidents over the – over history and have maintained a very close relationship with Cuba, so I know that there’s been some suspicion. But are you ruling out a third country?  And then, secondly, you said that Americans could be at risk. It doesn’t seem as if the ambassador or maybe like the very top people in the embassy were targeted. So why do you think that Americans are at risk, and what would you say to – obviously, you need to protect your personnel, but what would you say to those who are concerned that by warning Americans not to go there, this is more of a political – politicization of it? 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: We have not ruled out the possibility of a third country as a part of the investigation, but that investigation continues and will continue irrespective of the ordered departure. We will continue to investigate this – these attacks and to get to the bottom of them.  With regard to the threat to American citizens, the – there’s no more important mission for the State Department or a U.S. embassy overseas than to protect and advise Americans on potential threats to their safety, health, and well-being. The fact that some of these attacks have occurred in hotels where American citizens could be at and that we have no way of advising American citizens on how they could mitigate such attacks, we felt we must warn them on not to travel to Cuba until we understand and know more about the source and means and ways to mitigate these attacks that are occurring. 

QUESTION: When you say that the Cuban Government is cooperating, can you give us any more information about whether or not their offer to have the FBI go has been responded to, whether the FBI is on the ground in Havana? Who is investigating this for the U.S. Government in Havana and how far along has the investigation come? What – how would you describe the status of the investigation? 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I would describe the cooperation that the Cuban Government has given to our efforts to understand what is happening in this – these attacks to have been ongoing, and we expect it to continue. With respect to questions related to the investigation, I would refer you to the Department of Justice. 

QUESTION: Good morning. Was the Secretary seriously considering closing the embassy? And are there any reports of non-government employees affected? Any sense that the attackers know specifically who they are attacking? Are they targeting senior employees or intelligence personnel over others? 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: The first question – the evaluation to go to ordered departure took a look at our entire embassy operation and we are moving to an ordered departure that retains emergency staff so that we can provide basic services to American citizens and fulfill our diplomatic mission. With respect to whether there are any reports to American citizens, we are not aware of any American citizens; reports have been made to us, the Department of State. But nonetheless, given the significance of these attacks and the fact that they’ve occurred in hotels, we believe without any means to mitigate them we must warn American citizens not to travel to Cuba. 

QUESTION: Yeah, hi. I’m wondering if you can give us a sense of how big the ordered departure is. Is it more than half of the embassy? And then is the U.S. also expelling any Cubans, or is there any follow-up on that? Is there – are you satisfied with the Cuban assurances that they haven’t carried out these attacks? 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: The ordered departure will result in more than half of the embassy footprint being reduced. The – I’m sorry, could you repeat the second part of that question? 

QUESTION: Are you asking Cubans to send anybody home? 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I have nothing to report on that – on that issue at this time. 

QUESTION: Hi. Thanks for doing this call. My question is you pointed out that these attacks appeared to have stopped in August. Do you see that in some way as a success that after you have raised concerns and shown that you have knowledge of what’s going on that these attacks appeared to have stopped? And can you explain why you use the word “targeted” in describing these attacks? You haven’t really said who was targeted, but why do you think that this is, in fact, intentional, and who has been targeted? 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: First, I don’t believe I said the attacks have stopped. I believe I said that the last reported attacks were in August. I think because of our concern for the safety and well-being of our staff, that is why we’re going to ordered departure. We don’t know the means, the methods, or how these attacks are being carried out, and so I could not characterize them as having stopped in August.

Separately, targeted in the sense – only in the sense that 21 of our diplomats have suffered from these different attacks, and it does appear that U.S. embassy personnel are most at risk. But we cannot rule out, given the nature of these attacks, that the American public traveling in Cuba might not also be at risk as well. 

QUESTION: Hey, thanks very much for holding the call. Previously we’ve referred to what’s going on in Cuba as “incidents,” and now you’re using the term “attacks.” I’m wondering why the change in terminology. And among the many injuries that you had listed you didn’t mention traumatic brain injury, which the American Foreign Service Union has mentioned. So are you denying that TBI is one of the symptoms that American diplomats have had? Thank you. 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: The Secretary of State has said very clearly that these are health attacks and they are affecting the health and safety and well-being of our staff. I’ve listed out the physical symptoms that have been present – presented. I don’t think it’s in my competence to describe a medical diagnosis or specific syndromes or conditions. 

QUESTION: Thanks for holding the call. Can you talk a little bit more about the meeting that Secretary Tillerson had with his Cuban counterpart earlier this week? Did the Secretary tell him that this would be coming? Did the Cuban foreign minister try to convince the Secretary otherwise? Did he try to guarantee the safety of American diplomats? Were you not satisfied with those conversations? 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I’d refer you both to our readout of the conversation and the Cuban readout of those conversations, which I think actually captured both sides’ conversation. 

QUESTION: Hi. Thanks for doing this. Say, so you mentioned this happened in hotels. I’m wondering if anyone other than diplomats has been affected, like any other guests that you’re aware of and maybe some of the diplomats who have been living in the hotels, if that’s possible. If you could give us some idea of whether it’s only diplomats in hotels and if they’ve been living there, and if any Cuban staff at the embassy have been injured. Thank you. 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: The staff who were affected at hotels were temporary duty staff at the embassy. I will let my colleague answer as to whether we have any staff resident at the hotel. I do think there are times when people are arriving and leaving that they may be out of living quarters, that they might be in the hotel, so I don’t want to say definitively people don’t live there, because there’s transition periods. But there have been attacks at the hotel. They have been – they have involved our U.S. personnel, and that’s what I know. 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: I would just add we’re not aware of any hotel staff or other individuals who have been attacked or suffered these systems beyond the U.S. Government personnel at the hotel. And in terms of our Cuban staff at the embassy, we’re not aware of any incidents involving them or attacks involving them. The victims that we’re aware of are the 21 U.S. Government personnel. 

QUESTION: Hi, thanks for doing this. Can you tell us when and how the Cuban authorities were informed of your decision, and even if you say that you maintain relation with Cuba, don’t you feel that there could be consequences given they say they will respond to that decision while withdrawing some personnel from Cuban embassy in the States? Thank you? 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: We have repeatedly throughout this process had conversations with the Cuban Government at different levels, both in Havana and in Washington, and communicated our concerns to them. I want to clarify perhaps this characterization on my part. The accurate readout is the readout we issued of the meeting. The Cuban – I refer you to the Cuban statement for their characterization of the meeting, which reflects their views and may not – which we may not necessarily agree with in total. But we have – we do have areas of disagreement with the statement. 

MODERATOR: Okay. [Senior State Department Official One], you have to go with — 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Yeah, I do. 

MODERATOR: Okay. So [Senior State Department Official One] needs to run. Our [Senior State Department Official Two] will take over. [Senior State Department Official One], thank you so much. I know you have a lot of calls and a lot of work to do today. 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Yep, thank you. 

QUESTION: Hey guys, thanks for doing this. Maybe you can clarify the – what you think the Cuban Government’s role or not role or have you ruled out the idea that – in other words, do you know definitively that this is a Cuban Government operation? Do you have reason to suspect that it’s not a Cuban Government operation? That would help us explain why you’re not kicking out Cuban Government officials in the United States and you’re not taking more sort of punitive actions against the Cuban Government. 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Yeah, no, no, thanks. As [Senior State Department Official One] mentioned, the investigation continues, but at this moment we don’t have definitive answers on the source or cause of the attacks. And so I really can’t speculate on engagement or not by Cubans or others parties. The investigation’s ongoing and we will see where the facts lead us in terms of cause or source. 

QUESTION: Thanks for doing this. If American diplomats have been at risk, why aren’t you removing everyone? 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: There was a careful analysis of both the risk and the estimate of what would be needed to reduce that risk, and one of the measures that was considered prudent was to considerably resist – reduce the number of people present, thereby reducing the exposure – individuals who could be subject to these attacks. And so this was seen as a major step towards addressing some of our vulnerabilities and reducing our exposure. 

QUESTION: Hey, good morning. Thanks for hosting this call. You say that you’re going to be suspending routine visa operations at the embassy in Havana. How many of those procedures would you typically be carrying out in a month? I’m just trying to get a sense of how many – how many people, how many Cubans, I guess, this affects. And is there anything more you’re doing on the U.S. side besides the warning to limit U.S. citizen travel to Cuba? 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: I mean, the travel warning is to advise Americans on the risk if they travel to Cuba, and that’s what we’re putting out at this time. We can get you the numbers on a monthly basis in terms of the number of visas that were issued at post. I don’t have that with me right here today. 

QUESTION: Thanks for taking my question. I just want to protest why this call isn’t on the record considering there’s no State Department on-camera briefing today. I do want to ask what measures on the ground in Cuba the State Department is taking besides the withdrawal of staffers from the embassy. Is there more security? Are they being placed in different residences? What other measures are being taken? 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Yeah, no, we don’t discuss our security postures or security measures. 

QUESTION: Hi, thanks for doing the call. I wanted to ask you, is there any more information that you can provide on what is – is this a device? What is the technology that you guys are researching that could produce some of this? Also, I was hoping you could provide a little bit more information on what jobs or what position will be staying in Havana. I know non-emergency will be leaving, so what – what are the roles that will be staying and how will those people be protected? 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: As I mentioned, we continue to investigate the attacks in Havana. At this stage, we still do not have definitive answers on source or cause of the attacks. I don’t want to get into speculating about types of technology or research or get into the details of our investigation at this point, so can’t go into that details. 

QUESTION: Hi, thanks. Just following up on that, there’s obviously been a lot of speculation about the sonic device or acoustic device. Is that – and some audio experts have been brought in in the public to sort of address the plausibility of that. Do investigators still believe that that would be a plausible device related to these illnesses? 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: As I mentioned, the investigation continues and we don’t have any definitive conclusions regarding cause, source, or any kind of technologies that might be engaged or might not have been used. 

QUESTION: Hi. I’m wondering what kind of visas you’ll still be processing in Havana and how Cubans will be able to seek visas for the U.S. generally. 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: (Inaudible) is make available – and we’re looking at the possibility of people being able to apply for visas at embassies or consulates outside of Cuba in other countries. But we haven’t actually made definitive arrangements yet. We’re continuing to look at that. But all of the kind of regular visas or ordinary visas would not be issued through Havana. 

QUESTION: Hi, thank you. I know you don’t want to speculate, but I’m just wondering your change in terminology from “incidents” to “attacks” in a day’s time. Does that rule out, then, that this was something related to surveillance equipment, which would be an – having unintentional consequences of hurting these staffers? And also, the people who are left in Cuba, are they not at risk or are they at risk? Thanks. 

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Yeah, no, in terms of technology, again, I would say the investigation’s not reached definitive conclusions on any, again, source, cause, type of technology that may or may not have been employed. So I’m not going to comment or speculate on what’s been ruled out or ruled in. I think the investigators are looking at the whole range of possibilities.  The purpose of the ordered departure is to reduce the numbers of Americans who are vulnerable to exposure from these possible – from further attacks or possible future attacks. The individuals at post – it does not mean that they are not risk, but by reducing the overall numbers of people, we have substantially reduced the number of people at risk and therefore reduced the exposure of the U.S. Government personnel.

U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken On MSNBC Mentions Internet In Cuba, But Does Not Mention Remittances To Cuba

United States Department of State
Washington DC
23 July 2021

QUESTION: I want to move on to Cuba, which has seen protests over the past few weeks. And yesterday the White House announced new sanctions against Cuba’s defense minister and special forces brigade for the suppression of peaceful protests. What are those sanctions, and what happens if there is not the result the United States would like to see in reaction, in response to those sanctions?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Well, Mika, I think what we saw just a little over a week ago is quite extraordinary. Thousands of people, tens of thousands of people taking to the streets across Cuba – not just in Havana but in dozens of cities and towns across Cuba – to say they’re fed up – fed up with the repression, fed up with the lack of freedom, fed up with the fact that they don’t have food and medicines, that they have a government that is not providing for them, and making their voices heard. And I think it’s evidence of a government that – and a regime that certainly lacks confidence in itself when it has to try to stifle the voices of its own people.

The smartest thing the regime in Cuba can do is to listen to its own people instead of repress them. But unfortunately, they are – they continue to repress them, they took violent action against those who were speaking up. We went ahead and sanctioned the leaders of the military, the leaders of something called the Black Berets. They were on the front lines of taking violent action against people speaking out for their freedom, speaking out for their needs. We’ll continue to do that.

And also it’s very important that the Cuban people have an ability to communicate, and one of the things we’re very focused on now, working with the private sector, working with others, is doing everything we can to make sure that they have internet access so they can speak to one another, so they can have contact and communication with folks off the island. That is a very active effort.

QUESTION: And is the regime responding, showing any signs of improvement, of responding to what the United States is requiring for the sanctions to either be pulled back or for more sanctions not to come their way?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: No. We haven’t seen that kind of response. The regime tends to double down in these situations. But again, this is not about us. This is about the Cuban people. And I think one of the big mistakes the regime makes is to try to point the finger at the United States, saying we’re responsible for these protests. We’re not. These are the Cuban people. They are speaking up. They are standing – they’re speaking out. They’re standing up. And a regime that doesn’t understand that and that has – lacks the confidence to allow the voices of its own people to be heard I think is making a very, very big mistake.

Cuba Sanctions & Remittances Topics Today At The White House And Department Of State Briefings

The White House
Washington DC
22 July 2021

Q Two, it's being reported that President Biden plans to impose sanctions on Cuban officials because of the attacks on protesters. Can you outline the administration's goals with regard to those sanctions?

MS. PSAKI: Sure. Well, I can confirm for all of you that there will be more from the Department of Treasury and the Department of State later this afternoon on sanctions. And the announcement will be coming from then -- from them. But I -- in terms of our approach to Cuba and what we're trying to accomplish, we have, of course, condemned mass detention, sham trials, and disappearances that are attempts to threaten the Cuban people into silence. We continue to call for swift -- the swift release of peaceful protesters who have unjustly been detained. We've made clear over the last week that addressing this moment was a priority for the administration and for President Biden, and that he has -- he had asked his team to look into a range of options that would both help the Cuban people, help provide humanitarian assistance, help look into addressing issues like the lack of Internet access, and that also sanctions authority was a part of those considerations. So this is an announcement that will be coming later this afternoon. I'd also note that we'll continue to engage closely and coordinate with our international partners, from the OAS to the U.N. and others, to collectively condemn the actions of the Cuban government.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
22 July 2021

Sanctioning Cuban Security Forces in Response to Violent Repression of Protests
Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

Starting on July 11, tens of thousands of Cubans in dozens of cities and towns throughout their country took to the streets to peacefully demand respect for their fundamental freedoms and a better future. In response, the Cuban regime violently repressed the protests, arresting hundreds of demonstrators simply for exercising their human rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. The actions of Cuban security forces and violent mobs mobilized by Cuban Communist Party First Secretary Miguel Diaz-Canel lay bare the regime’s fear of its own people and unwillingness to meet their basic needs and aspirations.

Today, the United States is imposing sanctions on Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba Álvaro López Miera and the Cuban Ministry of the Interior’s Special National Brigade or “Boinas Negras” (Black Berets). López Miera and the Special National Brigade have been involved in suppressing the protests, including through physical violence and intimidation. We take this action pursuant to Executive Order 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. We stand with every Cuban seeking a government that respects the human rights and dignity of the Cuban people. We will continue to take action to promote accountability for the Cuban government’s human rights abuses, including through additional sanctions pursuant to Global Magnitsky, as appropriate.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
22 July 2021

MR PRICE: I expect you all have seen the statement from the President, the statement from Secretary Blinken, the statement from the Department of the Treasury, regarding our latest action to hold to account the Cuban regime for its abuses in the aftermath of the protests, the peaceful protests in Cuba. And so, with that, I have nothing but my eagerness and happiness to take your questions.
QUESTION: Okay. Well, let’s start with Cuba, then.
MR PRICE: Okay.
QUESTION: You designated one person and an entity that was already covered by Global Magnitsky sanctions that were imposed by the Trump administration in January. So, I don’t understand why you think that this is such a big deal.
MR PRICE: Well, Matt, let me first give you a bit of context to make sure this is understood in the right light. As we have said, since the onset of the peaceful protests across the island of Cuba, we will stand with the Cuban people, who are exercising their universal rights of peaceful protest, peaceful assembly, freedom of speech. We will look at additional ways we can support them. We have spoken to the formation of a remittance working group. We have spoken about the ways in which we are seeking to expand internet access so that the Cuban people can practice that freedom of expression and have the free flow of information to which they are entitled. We have spoken to our review of how we might augment our staffing at our embassy in Havana.
But we have also said that we are going to hold to account those Cuban individuals and entities responsible for the crackdown on this peaceful protest. And I said yesterday that the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control is exploring designating Cuban officials, Cuban entities, responsible for violence, repression, human rights violations against those who are perpetrating this in Cuba.
So, you are right; we designated through the Global Magnitsky sanctions regime one individual and one entity today. This I do not expect will be the sum total of our actions. We’re going to continue to review what more we can do not only to support the Cuban people, but also, again, importantly to hold to account those who would be so brazen in their efforts and attempts to violate the human rights of the Cuban people. So —
QUESTION: Okay. But I mean, the special brigade of the interior ministry was already covered by Global Magnitsky sanctions. So, you – so you’ve – you’ve added another designation on – I just don’t – the impact of this seems to me whatever the impact would have been – it seems to have been – it seems to be negligible, since they were already covered. So, I don’t quite understand how it is that you are presenting this as some grand new initiative to support the Cuban people, when in fact it’s simply adding another layer, which was really unnecessary, since they already were covered by the sanctions.
MR PRICE: I would make a couple points. Number one, the Global Magnitsky sanctions regime is an important tool we have that is applicable —
QUESTION: It is. But they were already under it.
MR PRICE: — that is – Alvaro Lopez Miera was?
QUESTION: No, I’m talking about the – that’s one person, okay, who most likely doesn’t have any assets or any dealings with American citizens.
MR PRICE: Just – just so – just so no —
QUESTION: So, let’s talk about what the real impact would be, would be if you designated the whole entity of the – a part of the interior ministry, like with the Iran sanctions, okay? That would have a much bigger impact, whatever that impact would be. But the fact of the matter is that they were already covered by Global Magnitsky sanctions. The exact same sanction, the exact same executive order was used to do this, and it doesn’t have any – it doesn’t do anything new.
MR PRICE: Just so we’re not having a conversation just with each other, let me just level set with everyone.
QUESTION: Well, I’ll be – I’m done after that.
MR PRICE: Well, so as Matt alluded to, we have imposed sanctions on the minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba, Alvaro Lopez Miera, as well as the Ministry of the Interior’s Special National Brigade. These – this individual, this entity, we have targeted them as part of our effort – that is not over, to be sure – to hold to account those actors in Cuba who have been responsible for the crackdown, for the repression, for the human rights abuses on those in Cuba who are doing nothing more than exercising their universal rights.
Now, we obviously do have a well-developed sanctions regime in place that covers different elements and entities in Cuba. That said, the embargo and the other sanctions tools – they do have carveouts. They have carveouts for a number of reasons. It is absolutely true that by sanctioning this individual and this entity some of those carveouts are closed, that there will be repercussions and implications for this individual and this entity. And it’s an important signal of our determination to hold accountable those responsible for this.
QUESTION: Specifically what carveouts are closed in that case? What are they not going to get that they were getting before? Just to follow up on Matt’s question, what’s the practical impact of this, or is it largely symbolic?
MR PRICE: Well, there is an important messaging element to this. The Global Magnitsky regime is a valuable tool we have that, again, is not applicable solely in the context of Cuba but the world over, and we’ve used it to good effect, the world over. Now with the Global Magnitsky regime, there are a number of implications, some of which do apply to this individual and this entity, some of which may not, given the rather unique circumstances.
QUESTION: Like weapons, money, food? I mean —
MR PRICE: So, let me give you a couple examples. And now obviously we’re not able to detail specific holdings of entities or individuals, but under this regime all property, and interest in property, in any of the entities that are owned directly or indirectly or with other designated persons that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC, unless authorized otherwise. In addition, these persons and all property and interest in property of these persons are blocked pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. These prohibitions further include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
So, there are a number of implications. Some of this is highly technical, especially given the intersection with the broader sanctions tools we have applied in the context of Cuba. But this is a meaningful and important step.
QUESTION: I want to also ask you about remittances. Because the President said that he’s looking for ways to get remittances directly to the people, not to the regime, as well as looking at the internet being restored, if there was some technical way that that could be done. On remittances, I interviewed Marco Rubio today, and he said it’s just not possible, because – unless the regime changes its policy of requiring that all remittances be deposited in government banks, be converted into pesos, which are useless in terms of any value, even on the island, compared to dollars. So, he said there’s no point in trying to do that, unless the regime changes its policy.
MR PRICE: What the President said earlier this week is that the administration would form a remittance working group to study this very issue. It’s namely to identify the most effective way possible or potentially to get those remittances directly into the hands of the Cuban people. This is a concern we share. The – this administration shares this concern with many in Congress that remittances would find their way into Cuban Government coffers. This is precisely why we are looking closely at the issue, to determine tools, tactics, procedures that might be possible to allow us to push forward with our goals, and that is, in the first instance, supporting the Cuban people, providing them with the much-needed humanitarian relief that so, clearly, they are calling for and desperate for, without buttressing the regime.
So, this working group was just announced earlier this week. Don’t have any more updates to share, at this time. But this concern about funds potentially going into Cuban Government coffers, but also this ultimate objective, supporting the Cuban people, supporting their needs, supporting their aspirations – it’s also something we share with members of Congress, and so we’ll continue to work closely with them.
QUESTION: And anything – has anything been advanced on the internet?
MR PRICE: Well, this is also something that the President spoke to for the first time, at least in detail, this week. And what we said is that we will work closely with two entities, really – the private sector, as well as with Congress – to identify viable options to make the internet more accessible to the Cuban people. This is a goal that’s important, in its own right. Freedom of expression, the ability of people anywhere and everywhere to freely communicate is something the United States always stands for, always supports. But it’s especially important now because the Cuban regime, we have seen in recent days, has enacted these blackouts, these internet shutdowns, precisely in an effort to stifle the protest, to silence the Cuban people.
And, of course, this does nothing to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Cuban people. This is a sign of a government that, in some ways, is scared of its own people. And so, it’s especially important to us, given the actions that the Cuban regime has undertaken in recent days, to explore again with Congress and the private sector ways we can support the ability of the Cuban people to do what people, the world over, are entitled to do: exercise their freedom of expression, to share ideas without these sort of technical impediments.
Yes.
QUESTION: Thanks. On the remittances, are you saying we will find a way to allow remittances and to get this money in the Cuban hands, or are you still saying that there is a chance that this won’t work and there is no way to make that money – doesn’t go in the regime coffers?
And also, on – on the embassy staffing, do you have any timing, any date for when it will happen? Will it happen in the next days or weeks or month?
MR PRICE: Well, on your first question, we’re forming a working group precisely to find out. We know that the underlying goal is something that certainly has the support of this administration; it has the support of other key stakeholders, including Congress, including many Americans, including Cuban Americans. And that is the objective of supporting the Cuban people, supporting their needs, also helping them to achieve their broader aspirations. We’re studying it because, again, we want to make sure or we want to test the proposition, I should say, that this is something we can do consistent with a countervailing priority, and that is to ensure that we don’t do anything that buttresses or strengthens the regime. So, we’re taking a close look at the issue. The – again, the working group was just announced this week, so as we have more details to share, we will.
Similarly, with our staffing plan for the embassy, we are – that plan was just announced this week. We’re taking a close look at a couple things: what our needs are, and what we could do with additional resources and additional people from our embassy in Havana, but also taking a close look at a number of factors, including the safety and security of people who may be going to Havana, some people who may be returning to Havana. That’s obviously a top priority for us around the world. It’s, as we talked about in this room the other day, certainly something we’re taking a close look at in the context of Cuba given one of the reasons for our drawdown in the first place.
So as soon as we have —
QUESTION: Is that a matter of weeks or a month?
MR PRICE: I wouldn’t want to put a timeframe on it. Obviously, the – our ability to engage directly with the Cuban people, to support the Cuban people, to hear directly from them, to engage in consular activity – it’s a priority for us. We’re working as fast as we can, but we are also doing it consistent with other priorities I laid out.
QUESTION: And deliver visa to Cuban people is one of the goals?
MR PRICE: I’m sorry?
QUESTION: To deliver visas to Cuban people is one of the goals?
MR PRICE: We are looking at a number of ways we might be able to support the Cuban people and to hold the regime to account. We’ve spoken to several of them, including the new designations today, but I wouldn’t want to get ahead of that.

United States Department of the Treasury
Washington DC
22 July 2021

SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS LIST UPDATE

The following individual has been added to OFAC's SDN List: LOPEZ MIERA, Alvaro (Latin: LÓPEZ MIERA, Álvaro), Cuba; DOB 26 Dec 1943; POB Havana, Cuba; nationality Cuba; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG].

The following entity has been added to OFAC's SDN List: BRIGADA ESPECIAL NACIONAL DEL MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR, Cuba; Target Type Government Entity [GLOMAG].

Statement By U.S. Department Of The Treasury About Sanctions On Cuba

United States Department of the Treasury
Washington DC
22 July 2021

Treasury Sanctions Cuban Minister of Defense and Special Forces Brigade for Abuses Against Protestors

WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned one Cuban individual and one Cuban entity pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world. Today’s action targets the Cuban Minister of Defense, ALVARO LOPEZ MIERA (LOPEZ MIERA), and the BRIGADA ESPECIAL NACIONAL DEL MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR (SNB) of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior (MININT) in connection with the repression of peaceful, pro-democratic protests in Cuba that began on July 11.

“The Cuban people are protesting for the fundamental and universal rights they deserve from their government,” said Secretary Janet L. Yellen. “Treasury will continue to enforce its Cuba-related sanctions, including those imposed today, to support the people of Cuba in their quest for democracy and relief from the Cuban regime.”

SANCTIONS ON CUBA

In addition to the sanctions imposed today under the Global Magnitsky program, OFAC continues to enforce the Cuba sanctions program, which is the most comprehensive sanctions program administered by OFAC. With exceptions to ensure that certain categories of economic activity are allowed that directly benefit the Cuban people, OFAC administers an economic embargo on Cuba that prohibits U.S. persons (and entities owned or controlled by U.S. persons) from engaging in transactions and providing services that may sustain the Cuban regime. In addition, all Cuban nationals are blocked — regardless of whether they appear on Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List). The Treasury Department will continue to enforce these prohibitions consistent with applicable statutes and regulations.

ABUSE AGAINST PROTESTORS IN CUBA

Cuba’s Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR), which is led by, LOPEZ MIERA, has played an integral role in the repression of ongoing protests in Cuba, in which Cuban citizens are calling for an end to the 62-year old regime and deteriorating living conditions across the island, as well as demanding access to basic goods and services and medical attention. MINFAR and the Cuban government’s security services have attacked protesters and arrested or disappeared over 100 protesters in an attempt to suppress these protests.

LOPEZ MIERA is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 for being a foreign person who is the leader or official of MINFAR, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, serious human rights abuse, relating to his tenure. MINFAR is blocked pursuant to OFAC’s Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 515 (CACR).

The SNB, also known as the Boinas Negras or Black Berets, is a special forces unit under the Cuban Ministry of the Interior (MININT), which was previously designated by OFAC under E.O. 13818 on January 15, 2021. During the July 2021 protests, the Cuban government deployed the SNB to suppress and attack protesters.

SNB is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 for being owned or controlled by, or for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, MININT, which, as noted above, was previously designated by OFAC pursuant to the Global Magnitsky program for being a foreign person who is responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

All property and interests in property of these persons that are blocked pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 515 (CACR), continue to be blocked. The CACR prohibits persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction from dealing in property in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest, unless authorized or exempt. Additionally, pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 583, all property and interests in property of the persons above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked, and all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or otherwise exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

From The White House- "Biden-Harris Administration Measures On Cuba"

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
July 22, 2021

FACT SHEET:
Biden-Harris Administration Measures on Cuba
“The United States stands with the brave Cubans who have taken to the streets to oppose 62 years of repression under a communist regime.” – President Biden

The world watched on July 11 as tens of thousands of Cuban citizens marched in cities across Cuba to demand freedom from both the pandemic and from the decades of repression and economic suffering to which they have been subjected by Cuba's authoritarian regime. The United States stands with the Cuban people, and therefore addressing the moment and the ongoing situation in Cuba is a top priority for the Biden-Harris Administration. At President Biden’s direction, the United States is actively pursuing measures that will both support the Cuban people and hold the Cuban regime accountable.

Holding the Cuban Regime Accountable
On July 22, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned one Cuban individual and one Cuban entity for serious human rights abuse, pursuant to Executive Order 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world. This action targets the Cuban Minister of Defense and the Brigada Especial Nacional del Ministerio del Interior of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior for their role in facilitating the repression of peaceful, pro-democratic protests in Cuba that began on July 11.

Engaging the International Community
The Administration remains deeply concerned about the welfare of the hundreds of protestors who have been unjustly detained and disappeared simply for demanding their most fundamental rights. The President continues to call for the swift release of those peaceful protestors who have been unjustly detained. The Administration is also actively engaged with the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations, and our international partners to collectively condemn the violence and repression upon the Cuban people for demanding freedom.

Ensuring Cuban Citizens Have Internet Access
The Administration is actively collaborating with the private sector to identify creative ways to ensure that the Cuban people have safe and secure access to the free flow of information on the Internet. The President continues to call on Cuba’s leaders to reinstate and to maintain access to all Internet and telecommunications services for all people within its border, and condemns the use of partial or complete Internet shutdowns and network restrictions imposed by the Cuban Government, which restricts the exercise of human rights and disrupts access to essential services. The intentional blocking of access to the Internet should be strongly condemned by the international community.

Listening to Cuban American Leaders
The Administration has been consistent in its belief that Cuban-Americans are the best ambassadors for freedom and prosperity in Cuba. The Administration will continue to meet with Cuban American leaders and stakeholders as they work to help elevate the voices of demonstrators in Cuba, and provide their recommendations for how the U.S. government can help.

Reviewing the Remittances Policy
The Administration is focused on letting families support one another, by maximizing the flow of remittance payments to the Cuban people. This is a complex issue that requires a measured and thoughtful approach in coordination with experts that will help to inform the Administration’s policy. The Administration’s guiding principle is ensuring that funds, to the greatest extent possible, get to the Cuban people without a portion of the proceeds being siphoned off by the regime. The President remains concerned that remittances do not reach their intended recipients, including some of the most vulnerable populations on the island, and instead are being used as a stopgap to treat their government's failures.

Restaffing U.S. Embassy Havana
The Administration is working to enhance our ability to provide Consular services to the Cuban people given their dire circumstances under an oppressive authoritarian regime. The re-staffing of our Embassy in Havana will serve to enhance our diplomatic, civil society, and Consular service engagement all of which are part of our demonstrated effort to support the Cuban people and their desire for freedom. The Administration is also mindful of the fact that USG personnel have suffered grave injuries while posted to Cuba. Before augmenting our staff in Havana we must do our utmost to ensure that they can safely and securely serve in Cuba.

"Statement by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. on Continuing Crackdown in Cuba" & OFAC Sanction Updates

The White House
Washington DC
22 July 2021

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Statement by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. on Continuing Crackdown in Cuba

I unequivocally condemn the mass detentions and sham trials that are unjustly sentencing to prison those who dared to speak out in an effort to intimidate and threaten the Cuban people into silence. The Cuban people have the same right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly as all people. The United States stands with the brave Cubans who have taken to the streets to oppose 62 years of repression under a communist regime.

Today, my Administration is imposing new sanctions targeting elements of the Cuban regime responsible for this crackdown—the head of the Cuban military and the division of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior driving the crackdown—to hold them accountable for their actions. This is just the beginning–the United States will continue to sanction individuals responsible for oppression of the Cuban people.

As we hold the Cuban regime accountable, our support for the Cuban people is unwavering and we are making sure Cuban Americans are a vital partner in our efforts to provide relief to suffering people on the Island. We are working with civil society organizations and the private sector to provide internet access to the Cuban people that circumvents the regime’s censorship efforts. We are reviewing our remittance policy to determine how we can maximize support to the Cuban people. And we are committed to restaffing our embassy in Havana to provide consular services to Cubans and enhance our ability to engage with civil society, while ensuring the safety of U.S. diplomats serving in Cuba.

Advancing human dignity and freedom is a top priority for my Administration, and we will work closely with our partners throughout the region, including the Organization of American States, to pressure the regime to immediately release wrongfully detained political prisoners, restore internet access, and allow the Cuban people to enjoy their fundamental rights.

United States Department of the Treasury
Washington DC
22 July 2021

SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS LIST UPDATE

The following individual has been added to OFAC's SDN List: LOPEZ MIERA, Alvaro (Latin: LÓPEZ MIERA, Álvaro), Cuba; DOB 26 Dec 1943; POB Havana, Cuba; nationality Cuba; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG].

The following entity has been added to OFAC's SDN List: BRIGADA ESPECIAL NACIONAL DEL MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR, Cuba; Target Type Government Entity [GLOMAG].