February 03, 2024

USAID Administrator Samantha Power, A Former Journalist, Expected To Promote Transparency. For 17 Months, USAID Refuses To Provide Information About PPE Deliveries To Cuba In 2022.

February 03, 2024/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

USAID Administrator Samantha Power, A Former Journalist, Is Expected To Promote Transparency.

However, Now Nearing Seventeen Months And USAID Administrator Samantha Power Continues To Refuse To Provide Information About PPE Deliveries To Cuba In 2022.

FOIA Filed 14 October 2022. What Is USAID Hiding?

USAID Did Permit Photograph For Media Promotion, But Refuses To Provide Details

The lack of transparency by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) which operates under the auspice of the United States Department of State, is both destructive and malignant for the United States business community. Executives equate transparency with guidance and support. When the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) decides to provide Made-In-America (although origin has yet to be confirmed by USAID) firefighting equipment (PPE- Personal Protective Equipment) to the government of the Republic of Cuba, executives interpret the motivation in a positive manner. The United States Embassy in Havana, Republic of Cuba, published images of the delivery presentation. However, when USAID then refuses for seventeen (17) months to provide basic information about the delivered PPE- manufacturer, quantity, price, and critically the source of funding, the result is destructive because United States-based companies look to the transparency of the United States government as a primary indicator of whether engagement with the Republic of Cuba makes sense. Lack of transparency equates to a STOP sign. The malignancy develops because executives speak with one another- and in this instance share a cautionary tale rather than an opportunity for engagement.

26 January 2024: “My apologies; the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) regrets the delay in responding to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Please be advised that FOIA No. X-XXXXX-XX has been escalated and is still being processed. Unfortunately, USAID is experiencing a backlog of FOIA requests. The FOIA office will provide you with another status update and an estimated time of completion on or before March 29, 2024. Thank you for your continued patience.”
6 December 2023: “The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) regrets the delay in responding to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Please be advised that FOIA No. X-XXXXX-XX has been escalated and is still being processed. Unfortunately, USAID is experiencing a backlog of FOIA requests. The FOIA office will provide you with another status update and an estimated time of completion on or before December 29, 2023. Thank you for your continued patience.”
24 August 2023: “Thank you for your continued patience while we process your FOIA request. Unfortunately, USAID is experiencing a backlog of FOIA requests. Please know that USAID management is very committed to providing responses to FOIA requests and remedying the FOIA backlog. I will provide you with an update on or before September 5, 2023.”
16 August 2023: “Thank you for your continued patience while we process your FOIA request. Unfortunately, USAID is experiencing a backlog of FOIA requests. Please know that USAID management is very committed to providing responses to FOIA requests and remedying the FOIA backlog. I will provide you with an update on or before August 23, 2023.”
17 July 2023: “Thank you for your continued patience. Additional search time is needed to complete your request. I will provide you with an update on or before July 31, 2023.”
16 June 2023: “Greetings, Thank you for your continued patience. Additional search time is needed to complete your request. I will provide you with an update on or before June 30, 2023.”
24 May 2023: “Greetings, We are still working on your FOIA request and should have a response for you by June 14, 2023.”

“This acknowledges receipt of your October 14, 2022, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Specifically, you requested all information about the following delivery in August 2022/September 2022/October 2022 from USAID of PPE to Cuba: 1) How was the donation delivered- air, vessel? 2) What is the brand/manufacturer of the PPE? 3) Was the delivery directly to a Republic of Cuba government-operated entity or through first the U.S. Embassy in Havana? 4) What was the U.S. Dollar value of the delivered 43 sets of PPE? 5) What is the U.S. Dollar value of the 57 sets of PPE to be delivered? 6) Did USAID use its government funding for the purchase(s)? (Date Range for Record Search: From 08/01/2022 To 10/14/2022). You also requested expedited processing and a fee waiver.

Expedited Processing

The FOIA provides that expedited processing is warranted if the request involves circumstances in which the lack of expedited processing could (1) reasonably be expected to pose an imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual, or (2) an urgency to inform the public about an actual or alleged federal government activity, if made by a person primarily engaged in disseminating information. You indicated you requested expedited processing "because the public has an urgent and compelling need for information about the all information about the following delivery in August 2022/September 2022/October 2022 from USAID of PPE to Cuba: 1) How was the donation delivered- air, vessel? 2) What is the brand/manufacturer of the PPE? 3) Was the delivery directly to a Republic of Cuba government-operated entity or through first the U.S. Embassy in Havana? 4) What was the U.S. Dollar value of the delivered 43 sets of PPE? 5) What is the U.S. Dollar value of the 57 sets of PPE to be delivered? 6) Did USAID use its government funding for the purchase(s)? (Date Range for Record Search: From 08/01/2022 To 10/14/2022). After review of your justification, your request for expedited processing is denied. Your rationale does not articulate an imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual, nor is it an urgency to inform the public. Below is information on how to submit an appeal for this expedited processing denial.

Fee Waiver

The FOIA provides that fees should be waived or reduced if disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations and activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester. As a member of the media, the only applicable fee is duplication. Duplication is $0.10 per page, but the first 100 pages are free. After review of the fee waiver criteria, your fee waiver request is moot. Since the only applicable fee is duplication, and USAID routinely furnishes responsive records to FOIA requesters in electronic format, it's most likely there will be no duplication fees to assess.

Appeal rights

You have a right to appeal the denial of expedited processing. Your appeal must be received by USAID no later than 90 days from the date of this communication. To protect its workforce from COVID-19, USAID is implementing maximum telework. Our FOIA professionals are therefore working from home and do not have access to postal mail and fax machine. Please send your appeal to foia@usaid.gov, and address it to the Deputy Director of the Bureau for Management, Office of Management Services. In addition, please include your tracking number in your email.

Extending the FOIA’s Time Limits due to Unusual Circumstances

The FOIA provides that an agency may extend its time limits when “unusual circumstances” occur in the processing of a request. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B)(i) (2016). Those “unusual circumstances” are set forth in the statute, 5 U.S.C § 552(a)(6)(B)(iii), and are described as: 1) The need to search for records from field facilities or other locations separate from the office processing the request; 2) The need to search, collect and examine voluminous records; and 3) The need for consultation with another agency.

Based upon the records you have requested, we have determined that one or more unusual circumstances will occur during the processing of your request. Accordingly, your response time-limit has been extended beyond the 20 days required by statute; therefore, 10 additional processing days have been added to your request. To mitigate this action, you may limit the scope of the request so that it can be processed more quickly or to arrange an alternative time to respond.”

LINK: In Controversial Decision, Biden-Harris Administration Directs (Indirectly) US$2 Million In U.S. Taxpayer Funds To Cuba For Hurricane Ian Support. Some Members Of Congress Irate. October 18, 2022

United States Department of State
Washington DC
18 October 2022

U.S. Support for Hurricane Ian Recovery Efforts in Cuba
Ned Price, Department Spokesperson

“Following the devastating impact of Hurricane Ian, the United States is providing to the Cuban people critical humanitarian aid to trusted international partners working directly with Cubans whose communities were devastated by the storm. The United States, through the U.S. Agency for International Development, will provide $2 million in funding for emergency relief to those in need in Cuba. The United States will work with trusted, independent organizations operating in the country who have a long presence in hurricane-affected communities. We are currently reviewing applications from organizations such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to provide this assistance. We stand with the Cuban people as they work to recover from this disaster. The United States will continue to monitor and assess humanitarian needs in coordination with our trusted partners and the international community, and we will continue to seek ways to provide meaningful support to the Cuban people, consistent with U.S. laws and regulations.”

Bruno Rodriguez, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba, using Twitter (X): "We appreciate humanitarian assistance offer made by the US. This material contribution that is worth 2 million USD, channelled through the International Federation of Red Cross, will add up to our recovery efforts in support of the victims of the ravages caused by #HurricaneIan."

United States Department of State
Washington DC
19 October 2022

Question Posed: “Prior to today's announcement that USAID was spending US$2 million in taxpayer funds for indirect assistance to Cuba, when was the last time that taxpayer funds were directed, directly or indirectly, by the United States government to Cuba?”

United States Department of State
Washington DC
21 October 2022

“Thanks for the question and your patience. The following is offered on background and should be attributable to a State Department spokesperson:

"Each year since 1996, USAID and the Department of State have funded democracy programs that support human rights, fundamental freedoms, and democratic values in Cuba. In September 2022, USAID provided personal protective equipment in response to diminished fire-fighting capacity following the large-scale oil fire at the Matanzas Oil Terminal.

In 2008, USAID provided $1.6 million to non-governmental organization (NGO) partners for emergency relief supplies in response to the impact of Hurricane Gustav. USAID also funded emergency relief commodities through a disaster response cable for damages caused by hurricanes in 2004-2006. USAID provided $50,000 for Hurricane Charley in 2004, $100,000 for Hurricane Dennis in 2005, and $100,000 for Hurricane Wilma in 2006.

Since early 2021, we have prioritized review of license applications to export privately sourced or donated goods to the Cuban people, focusing specifically on U.S. agricultural and medical exports to Cuba.”

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

LINKS To Related Analysis

Why Is USAID Administrator Samantha Power Risking Lawsuit For Failing To Disclose Data Sought By FOIA Request Filed In 2022 About PPE Deliveries In 2022 To Cuba. August 08, 2023

In Controversial Decision, Biden-Harris Administration Directs (Indirectly) US$2 Million In U.S. Taxpayer Funds To Cuba For Hurricane Ian Support. Some Members Of Congress Irate. October 18, 2022

February 02, 2024

Diario ABC (Spain): El régimen cubano aplasta el florecimiento del sector privado. El primer estadounidense en lograr una licencia para invertir en un negocio en la isla revela...

February 02, 2024/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

El régimen cubano aplasta el florecimiento del sector privado

El primer estadounidense en lograr una licencia para invertir en un negocio en la isla revela a ABC que lleva en el limbo casi dos años

02/02/2024

Cubanos hacen cola para entrar en la embajada de EEUU en La Habana

El régimen cubano ha frustrado el plan de Joe Biden de dinamizar el sector privado en la isla. Según revela a ABC el inversor que obtuvo la primera licencia del Departamento del Tesoro de EE.UU. para invertir en una empresa privada en Cuba, el Gobierno cubano no la ha autorizado en más de un año y medio. Esta negativa refleja el rechazo práctico a que la inversión extranjera expanda el sector privado. Las declaraciones contradictorias de la Administración Biden y del Gobierno cubano han llevado a los republicanos en el Capitolioa denunciar que la mayoría de estas empresas están vinculadas informalmente a la dictadura, y piden un cambio de rumbo a la Casa Blanca.

El 10 de mayo de 2022, John Kavulich obtuvo la primera licencia concedida por el departamento del Tesoro de EE.UU. a un ciudadano norteamericano para invertir en una empresa privada en Cuba. El trámite de la licencia en EE.UU. duró 11 meses, y para ello creó una sociedad limitada. Planeaba una primera inversión de 25.000 dólares, como una prueba para abrir un camino del que podrían beneficiarse otros inversores. Era un cálculo con grandes implicaciones, según él cuenta a ABC: de algún modo, incipiente, el régimen cubano podía permitir una vía para introducir dinero extranjero a entidades privadas y dinamizar la economía.

Más de un año y medio después de haber obtenido la licencia, el Gobierno cubano aún tiene que autorizarla. Esto, para Kavulich, refleja una negativa práctica a que la inversión extranjera pueda expandir el sector privado cubano. Kavulich preside el Consejo Económico y Comercial EE.UU.-Cuba, una organización con sede en Washington que analiza los negocios con Cuba en el influyente blog Cubatrade.

Kavulich explica que la licencia buscaba legitimar el proceso de inversión para que los bancos lo consideraran, pero esto no ha ocurrido. El gobierno no permite la inversión, dice, lo que refleja su verdadero rechazo al sector privado. «El sector privado mostrará diferencias. Algunas personas ganarán más, otras ganarán menos, algunas se enriquecerán, otras no. Devuelve todo lo que la revolución intentaba eliminar. Y eso es muy difícil de digerir para ellos. Es como si estuvieran comiendo una piedra», afirma.

En realidad el sector privado en Cuba tiene solo tres décadas de existencia. La dictadura promulgó un decreto en 1993 que autorizó la creación y operación de los llamados cuentapropistas, trabajadores por cuenta propia y no funcionarios. Las regulaciones sobre ellos son descomunales. En 2021 el régimen aplicó una reforma del sector privado y autorizó las micro, pequeñas y medianas empresas, llamadas mipymes, que pueden operar en diversos sectores de la economía y en principio pueden generar empleo. De momento, se han dado unas 10.000 licencias a esas entidades privadas. Algunas son ya destacadas importadoras de alimentos y otros bienes esenciales en un contexto de escasez y carestía.

Empresas vinculadas al régimen

Por su parte, los republicanos en el Capitolio de EE.UU. denuncian que en realidad la gran mayoría de esas empresas están vinculadas informalmente al régimen: pertenecen, denuncian, a allegados de la estructura oficial. Para ello mantuvieron una audiencia el 18 de enero en el Capitolio en la que pidieron explicaciones a la Administración Biden sobre sus supuestas ayudas al sector privado y la posibilidad de que la dictadura esté violando el embargo.

María Elvira Salazar, diputada republicana que preside la subcomisión de América Latina en la Cámara de Representantes, denuncia que estas empresas, son «una artimaña del Gobierno», y que el desarrollo y crecimiento del sector privado en Cuba es un plan del Gobierno cubano para violar el embargo estadounidense. «Sólo los hijos de los líderes cubanos lo tienen fácil para ser se propietarios en esas empresas», afirma. «El régimen cubano es un maestro del disfraz, y una vez más, este es otro ardid… Esto huele a un nuevo plan del régimen que está desesperado por millones de dólares para violar el embargo».

«Esto huele a un nuevo plan del régimen que está desesperado por millones de dólares para violar el embargo»

María Elvira Salazar

Diputada republicana

Las políticas de Biden hacia Cuba, destinadas a respaldar al sector privado, también buscan detener la migración masiva de cubanos en los últimos años. Casi el 4% de la población total de Cuba, 425.000 personas, ha abandonado la isla y ha entrado en EE.UU. en los años fiscales 2022 y 2023. Estas cifras no incluyen otros miles de cubanos emigrados a otros países como Colombia, Brasil o España. Desde 2017, por decisión de Barack Obama, EE.UU. no ofrece residencia inmediata a los cubanos exiliados, por lo que muchos de esos huidos de la dictadura son repatriados en vuelos masificados del servicio de inmigración. Otros son deportados a México.

La lentitud de procesar estas licencias en Cuba tiene implicaciones también para quienes tengan interés en invertir desde España. Es cierto que grandes empresas como Meliá hacen negocios en Cuba, pero siempre con el régimen, que controla el sector del turismo a través de empresas estatales como Gaviota.

Las políticas de Biden hacia Cuba, destinadas a respaldar al sector privado, también buscan detener la migración masiva de cubanos en los últimos años

Según explica Kavulich, su plan era oficializar la inversión en Cuba, algo sin precedentes. Aunque en los últimos años millones de dólares han sido ingresados en Cuba, principalmente desde el sur de Florida y España, no es algo que haya sido autorizado por el gobierno cubano. «Obtuvimos una licencia para hacerlo público y accesible a empresas e inversores internacionales, ya que sin legitimación, parece peligroso e ilegítimo invertir en la isla», dice Kavulich. «Tenemos la licencia para que todos lo sepan, empresas en España, inversores en España, Canadá, la UE, EE.UU., en todas partes, porque todos estamos en la misma posición. Una persona en España no puede proporcionar inversión o financiamiento a una empresa privada en Cuba, al igual que yo no puedo», añade.

Levantamiento parcial de sanciones

En mayo de 2022, la Administración Biden levantó parcialmente sanciones sobre Cuba, con la expansión de vuelos más allá de La Habana y la reactivación de un programa para reunificar familias cubanas en EE.UU. La restricción impuesta durante la presidencia de Donald Trump que limitaba las remesas familiares a 1.000 dólares cada tres meses fue levantada y ahí es cuando se anunció que se flexibilizaba la prohibición de remesas a no familiares para permitir el pago a emprendedores cubanos independientes. Fue entonces cuando el Departamento del Tesoro emitió la primera licencia para permitir la inversión directa en acciones en una empresa privada cubana.

Biden llegó a la Casa Blanca con la intención, dijo en campaña, de revertir muchas de las restricciones impuestas al régimen cubano durante la era Trump. Sin embargo, en julio de 2021, apenas cinco meses después de que asumiera el cargo, estallaron protestas contra la dictadura en la isla, las más significativas en décadas. Fueron impulsadas por el descontento por la situación económica, la escasez de alimentos y medicinas, los apagones eléctricos y las restricciones a la libertad de expresión. El régimen respondió con una ola represora. Grupos de derechos cubanos informan de que más de 1.400 personas fueron detenidas, de las cuales al menos 380 fueron condenadas.

Desde 1960, el embargo de Estados Unidos restringe el comercio y las relaciones con Cuba, con el objetivo de presionar al Gobierno cubano para promover cambios políticos y económicos. La Administración de Obama trató de revertirlo, dando el embargo por fallido. Trump impidió más aperturas.

Google Translate

The Cuban regime crushes the flourishing of the private sector

The first American to obtain a license to invest in a business on the island reveals to ABC that he has been in limbo for almost two years

02/02/2024 Cubans queue to enter the US embassy in Havana

The Cuban regime has frustrated Joe Biden's plan to boost the private sector on the island.

According to what the investor who obtained the first license from the US Treasury Department to invest in a private company in Cuba reveals to ABC, the Cuban Government has not authorized it in more than a year and a half. This refusal reflects the practical rejection of foreign investment expanding the private sector.

The contradictory statements of the Biden Administration and the Cuban Government have led Republicans on Capitol Hill to denounce that the majority of these companies are informally linked to the dictatorship, and ask the White House for a change of course.

On May 10, 2022, John Kavulich obtained the first license granted by the US Treasury Department to a North American citizen to invest in a private company in Cuba. The licensing process in the US lasted 11 months, and for this he created a limited company. He planned a first investment of $25,000, as a test to open a path from which other investors could benefit. It was a calculation with great implications, according to what he tells ABC: in some incipient way, the Cuban regime could allow a way to introduce foreign money to private entities and boost the economy.

More than a year and a half after obtaining the license, the Cuban Government has yet to authorize it. This, for Kavulich, reflects a practical refusal to allow foreign investment to expand the Cuban private sector.

Kavulich chairs the US-Cuba Economic and Trade Council, a Washington-based organization that analyzes business with Cuba on the influential Cubatrade blog.

Kavulich explains that the license sought to legitimize the investment process so that banks would consider it, but this has not happened. The government does not allow investment, he says, reflecting his true rejection of the private sector.

«The private sector will show differences. Some people will earn more, some will earn less, some will get richer, some will not. It returns everything that the revolution tried to eliminate. And that is very difficult for them to digest. "It's like they are eating a stone," he says.

In reality, the private sector in Cuba has only three decades of existence. The dictatorship promulgated a decree in 1993 that authorized the creation and operation of so-called self-employed workers, self-employed workers and non-civil servants.

The regulations on them are enormous.

In 2021, the regime applied a reform of the private sector and authorized micro, small and medium-sized companies, called MSMEs, which can operate in various sectors of the economy and in principle can generate employment. At the moment, about 10,000 licenses have been given to these private entities. Some are already prominent importers of food and other essential goods in a context of scarcity and famine.

Companies linked to the regime

For their part, Republicans in the US Capitol denounce that in reality the vast majority of these companies are informally linked to the regime: they belong, they denounce, to those close to the official structure.

To this end, they held a hearing on January 18 at the Capitol in which they asked the Biden Administration for explanations about its alleged aid to the private sector and the possibility that the dictatorship is violating the embargo. María Elvira Salazar, Republican representative who chairs the Latin America subcommittee in the House of Representatives, denounces that these companies are "a government ruse," and that the development and growth of the private sector in Cuba is a plan of the Cuban Government to violate the US embargo.

"Only the children of Cuban leaders have it easy to be owners in these companies," she says. "The Cuban regime is a master of disguise, and once again, this is another ruse... This smacks of a new plan by the regime that is desperate for millions of dollars to violate the embargo." "This smells like a new plan by the regime that is desperate for millions of dollars to violate the embargo"

Maria Elvira Salazar Republican representative Biden's policies toward Cuba, aimed at supporting the private sector, also seek to stop the mass migration of Cubans in recent years. Almost 4% of Cuba's total population, 425,000 people, have left the island and entered the US in fiscal years 2022 and 2023. These figures do not include thousands of other Cubans who emigrated to other countries such as Colombia, Brazil or Spain.

Since 2017, by decision of Barack Obama, the US does not offer immediate residence to Cuban exiles, which is why many of those fleeing the dictatorship are repatriated on overcrowded immigration service flights. Others are deported to Mexico. The slowness of processing these licenses in Cuba also has implications for those interested in investing from Spain. It is true that large companies like Meliá do business in Cuba, but always with the regime, which controls the tourism sector through state companies like Gaviota. Biden's policies towards Cuba, aimed at supporting the private sector, also seek to stop the mass migration of Cubans in recent years

Biden's policies toward Cuba, aimed at supporting the private sector, also seek to stop the mass migration of Cubans in recent years. Almost 4% of Cuba's total population, 425,000 people, have left the island and entered the US in fiscal years 2022 and 2023.

These figures do not include thousands of other Cubans who emigrated to other countries such as Colombia, Brazil or Spain. Since 2017, by decision of Barack Obama, the US does not offer immediate residence to Cuban exiles, which is why many of those fleeing the dictatorship are repatriated on overcrowded immigration service flights. Others are deported to Mexico.

The slowness of processing these licenses in Cuba also has implications for those interested in investing from Spain. It is true that large companies like Meliá do business in Cuba, but always with the regime, which controls the tourism sector through state companies like Gaviota. Biden's policies towards Cuba, aimed at supporting the private sector, also seek to stop the mass migration of Cubans in recent years

As Kavulich explains, his plan was to make the investment in Cuba official, something unprecedented. Although millions of dollars have been brought into Cuba in recent years, mainly from southern Florida and Spain, it is not something that has been authorized by the Cuban government.

“We obtained a license to make it public and accessible to international companies and investors, since without legitimation, it seems dangerous and illegitimate to invest in the island,” says Kavulich.

«We have the license so that everyone knows, companies in Spain, investors in Spain, Canada, the EU, the US, everywhere, because we are all in the same position. A person in Spain cannot provide investment or financing to a private company in Cuba, just as I cannot," he adds.

Partial lifting of sanctions

In May 2022, the Biden Administration partially lifted sanctions on Cuba, with the expansion of flights beyond Havana and the reactivation of a program to reunify Cuban families in the United States.

The restriction imposed during the presidency of Donald Trump that limited family remittances of $1,000 every three months was lifted and that is when it was announced that the ban on remittances to non-family members would be made more flexible to allow payment to independent Cuban entrepreneurs.

It was then that the Treasury Department issued the first license to allow direct investment in shares in a private Cuban company. Biden arrived at the White House with the intention, he said during the campaign, of reversing many of the restrictions imposed on the Cuban regime during the Trump era.

However, in July 2021, just five months after he took office, protests against the dictatorship broke out on the island, the most significant in decades. They were driven by discontent over the economic situation, food and medicine shortages, electrical blackouts, and restrictions on freedom of expression.

The regime responded with a wave of repression. Cuban rights groups report that more than 1,400 people were detained, of whom at least 380 were convicted. Since 1960, the United States embargo has restricted trade and relations with Cuba, with the aim of pressuring the Cuban Government to promote political and economic changes. The Obama Administration tried to reverse it, considering the embargo failed. Trump prevented further openings.

February 01, 2024

Nearing Decision? Updates From U.S. Court Of Appeals In Exxon Mobil Corporation V. Corporacion Cimex (Cuba), et al.

February 01, 2024/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

Court of Appeals Docket #: 21-7127   Docketed: 11/03/2021
Nature of Suit: 3890 Other Statutory Actions
Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), et al
Appeal From: United States District Court for the District of Columbia
Fee Status: Fee Paid
Case Type Information: 1) Civil Private 2) Private 3)
Originating Court Information:
District: 0090-1 : 1:19-cv-01277-APM
Lead: 1:19-cv-01277-APM

Trial Judge: Amit Priyavadan Mehta, U.S. District Judge
Date Filed: 05/02/2019
Date Order/Judgment: 10/08/21
Date NOA Filed: 10/31/21
Prior Cases: None

PRIVATE CIVIL CASE docketed. [21-7127] [Entered: 11/03/2021 02:36 PM]

73 pg, 98.05 MB NOTICE OF APPEAL [1920820] seeking review of a decision by the U.S. District Court in 1:19-cv-01277-APM filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba). Appeal assigned USCA Case Number: 21-7127. [21-7127] [Entered: 11/03/2021 02:41 PM]

2 pg, 45.92 KB CLERK'S ORDER [1920823] filed directing party to file initial submissions: APPELLANT docketing statement due 12/03/2021. APPELLANT certificate as to parties due 12/03/2021. APPELLANT statement of issues due 12/03/2021. APPELLANT underlying decision due 12/03/2021. APPELLANT deferred appendix statement due 12/03/2021. APPELLANT entry of appearance due 12/03/2021. APPELLANT transcript status report due 12/03/2021. APPELLANT procedural motions due 12/03/2021. APPELLANT dispositive motions due 12/20/2021; directing party to file initial submissions: APPELLEE certificate as to parties due 12/03/2021. APPELLEE entry of appearance due 12/03/2021. APPELLEE procedural motions due 12/03/2021. APPELLEE dispositive motions due 12/20/2021 [21-7127] [Entered: 11/03/2021 02:45 PM]

1 pg, 64.56 KB ENTRY OF APPEARANCE [1923813] filed by Steven K. Davidson and co-counsel Shannen W. Coffin and Michael J. Baratz on behalf of Appellee Exxon Mobil Corporation. [21-7127] (Davidson, Steven) [Entered: 11/23/2021 03:19 PM]

4 pg, 98.51 KB   CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS AND RELATED CASES [1923815] filed by Exxon Mobil Corporation [Service Date: 11/23/2021 ] [21-7127] (Davidson, Steven) [Entered: 11/23/2021 03:21 PM]

3 pg, 95.83 KB   STATEMENT [1923818] with Disclosure Listing filed by Exxon Mobil Corporation [Service Date: 11/23/2021 ] [21-7127] (Davidson, Steven) [Entered: 11/23/2021 03:24 PM]

4 pg, 353.68 KB   CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS AND RELATED CASES [1924513] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) [Service Date: 11/30/2021 ] [21-7127] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 11/30/2021 10:18 AM]

2 pg, 91.33 KB   DOCKETING STATEMENT [1924535] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) [Service Date: 11/30/2021 ] [21-7127] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 11/30/2021 10:55 AM]

1 pg, 1.12 MB   ENTRY OF APPEARANCE [1924539] filed by Michael Krinsky and co-counsel Lindsey Frank on behalf of Appellant Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba). [21-7127] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 11/30/2021 10:59 AM]

2 pg, 270.46 KB   STATEMENT OF INTENT REGARDING APPENDIX DEFERRAL [1924542] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) [Service Date: 11/30/2021 ] Intent: AppxDeferred [21-7127] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 11/30/2021 11:01 AM]

3 pg, 517.82 KB   STATEMENT OF ISSUES [1924545] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) [Service Date: 11/30/2021 ] [21-7127] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 11/30/2021 11:03 AM]

1 pg, 476.09 KB   TRANSCRIPT STATUS REPORT [1924547] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) [Service Date: 11/30/2021 ]. Status of Transcripts: Final - All transcripts needed for the appeal have been completed and received. [21-7127] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 11/30/2021 11:08 AM]

62 pg, 1.22 MB   UNDERLYING DECISION IN CASE [1924548] submitted by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) [Service Date: 11/30/2021 ] [21-7127] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 11/30/2021 11:10 AM]

1 pg, 38.8 KB   CLERK'S ORDER [1935721] filed consolidating cases 22-7019, 22-7020 (Cross-appeal started 02/18/2022) with 21-7127 [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] [Entered: 02/18/2022 09:12 AM]

15 pg, 1.1 MB   NOTICE [1936492] received from the Clerk of the U.S. District Court for payment of docketing fee [Case Number 22-7019: Fee Paid] [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] [Entered: 02/24/2022 12:05 PM]

1 pg, 1.12 MB   ENTRY OF APPEARANCE [1937132] filed by Michael Krinsky and co-counsel Lindsey Frank; Nathan Yaffe on behalf of Appellant Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Appellees Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 21-7127, Appellee Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Appellants Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7019, Appellees Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7020. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Frank, Lindsey) [Entered: 03/01/2022 11:41 AM]

3 pg, 80.11 KB   CLERK'S ORDER [1937852] filed setting briefing schedule: APPELLANT Brief due 04/13/2022. APPELLEE & CROSS-APPELLANT Brief due 05/13/2022. APPELLANT REPLY & CROSS-APPELLEE Brief due 06/13/2022. CROSS-APPELLANT Reply Brief due 07/05/2022. DEFERRED APPENDIX due 07/12/2022. Final Briefs due 07/26/2022. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] [Entered: 03/04/2022 04:51 PM]

8 pg, 705.16 KB   JOINT UNOPPOSED MOTION [1938298] to extend time to file brief filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 21-7127, 22-7019, Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7020 Length Certification: 1,218. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 03/08/2022 05:59 PM]

2 pg, 493.87 KB   CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMITS [1938338] for motion [1938298-2] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 21-7127, 22-7019, Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7020. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 03/09/2022 10:04 AM]

1 pg, 40.85 KB   CLERK'S ORDER [1938494] filed granting joint motion to extend time [1938298-2], The following revised briefing schedule will now apply: APPELLANT Brief due 05/11/2022. APPELLEE & CROSS-APPELLANT Brief due 07/11/2022. APPELLANT REPLY & CROSS-APPELLEE Brief due 09/12/2022. CROSS-APPELLANT Reply Brief due 10/12/2022. DEFERRED APPENDIX due 10/19/2022. Final Briefs due 11/02/2022. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] [Entered: 03/09/2022 05:55 PM]

177 pg, 63.68 MB   APPELLANT BRIEF [1946354] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) in 21-7127, Union Cuba-Petroleo and Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) in 22-7019 [Service Date: 05/11/2022 ] Length of Brief: 12,856. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 05/11/2022 02:23 PM]

1403 pg, 18.63 MB   APPELLEE & CROSS-APPELLANT BRIEF [1954417] filed by Exxon Mobil Corporation in 21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020 [Service Date: 07/11/2022 ] Length of Brief: 15,201 words. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Davidson, Steven) [Entered: 07/11/2022 07:14 PM]

56 pg, 394.37 KB   MOTION [1955514] to participate as amicus curiae [Disclosure Listing: Attached] filed by EarthRights International [Service Date: 07/18/2022 ] [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020]--[Edited 07/19/2022 by TAM] (Simons, Marco) [Entered: 07/18/2022 10:06 PM]

47 pg, 265.9 KB   AMICUS FOR APPELLEE BRIEF [1955546] lodged by EarthRights International [Service Date: 07/18/2022 ] Length of Brief: 6,478 words. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] [Entered: 07/19/2022 09:58 AM]

47 pg, 251.74 KB   CORRECTED AMICUS FOR APPELLEE BRIEF [1955620] lodged by EarthRights International in 21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020 [Service Date: 07/19/2022 ] Length of Brief: 6,478. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020]--[Edited 07/19/2022 by LMM] (Simons, Marco) [Entered: 07/19/2022 12:49 PM]

8 pg, 1.6 MB   RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION [1956818] to motion [1955514-2] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 21-7127, 22-7019, Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7020 [Service Date: 07/28/2022 by CM/ECF NDA] Length Certification: 771 Words. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 07/28/2022 12:36 PM]

7 pg, 98.95 KB   REPLY [1957565] filed by EarthRights International in 21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020 to response [1956818-2] [Service Date: 08/02/2022 by CM/ECF NDA] Length Certification: 596 words. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Simons, Marco) [Entered: 08/02/2022 04:04 PM]

1 pg, 38.9 KB   PER CURIAM ORDER [1958882] filed granting motion to participate as amicus curiae [1955514-2]. The Clerk is directed to file the lodged corrected amicus brief. Before Judges: Pillard and Katsas. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] [Entered: 08/11/2022 10:57 AM]
08/11/2022          PER ABOVE ORDER lodged Amicus brief [1955620-2] is filed [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] [Entered: 08/11/2022 11:01 AM]

15 pg, 380.95 KB   UNOPPOSED MOTION [1959617] to exceed word limits in memo of law filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) in 21-7127, Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7019 [Service Date: 08/16/2022 ] Length Certification: 2,202 Words. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 08/16/2022 04:40 PM]

1 pg, 39.24 KB   PER CURIAM ORDER [1960396] filed granting motion to exceed word limits [1959617-2]. Corporación CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), Corporación CIMEX, S.A. (Panama), and Unión Cuba-Petróleo may file an Appellants’ Reply / Cross-Appellees’ Brief not to exceed 17,000 words. Before Judges: Pillard, Rao and Walker. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] [Entered: 08/23/2022 11:19 AM]

1135 pg, 48.02 MB   APPELLANT REPLY & CROSS APPELLEE BRIEF [1963216] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 21-7127, 22-7019, Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama), Union Cuba-Petroleo and Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) in 22-7020 [Service Date: 09/12/2022 ] Length of Brief: 16,933. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 09/12/2022 09:04 PM]

1 pg, 98.91 KB   ENTRY OF APPEARANCE [1967455] filed by Steven K. Davidson and co-counsel Michael G. Scavelli on behalf of Appellee Exxon Mobil Corporation in 21-7127, 22-7019, Appellant Exxon Mobil Corporation in 22-7020. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Scavelli, Michael) [Entered: 10/04/2022 02:42 PM]

9 pg, 135.57 KB   UNOPPOSED MOTION [1967462] to exceed word limits in reply filed by Exxon Mobil Corporation in 21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020 [Service Date: 10/04/2022 ] Length Certification: 1,085 words. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Davidson, Steven) [Entered: 10/04/2022 02:56 PM]

1 pg, 39.38 KB   PER CURIAM ORDER [1968383] filed granting motion to exceed word limits [1967462-2]. Exxon Mobil Corporation may file a Cross-Appellant’s Reply Brief not to exceed 8,500 words. Before Judges: Wilkins and Pan. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] [Entered: 10/11/2022 04:23 PM]

708 pg, 16.01 MB   CROSS-APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF [1968692] filed by Exxon Mobil Corporation in 21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020 [Service Date: 10/12/2022 ] Length of Brief: 8,216 words. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Davidson, Steven) [Entered: 10/12/2022 07:56 PM]

2172 pg, 47.44 MB   JOINT APPENDIX [1969641] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama), Exxon Mobil Corporation and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 21-7127, Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), Exxon Mobil Corporation and Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7019, Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama), Union Cuba-Petroleo and Exxon Mobil Corporation in 22-7020 [Volumes: 4] [Service Date: 10/19/2022 ] [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 10/19/2022 10:32 AM]

55 pg, 4.98 MB   MOTION [1970167] to strike the brief, Strike Section II(C) of Exxon Mobil Corporation's Reply Brief and, in the alternative, for leave to file a Sur-Reply to the Reply Brief filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 21-7127, 22-7019, Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7020 (Service Date: 10/23/2022 by CM/ECF NDA) Length Certification: 2,862 words. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 10/23/2022 12:28 PM]

39 pg, 3.41 MB   APPELLANT & CROSS APPELLEE SURREPLY BRIEF [1970391] lodged by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo [Service Date: 10/23/2022] Length of Brief: 4,881 words. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] [Entered: 10/25/2022 10:09 AM]

177 pg, 28.59 MB   APPELLANT FINAL BRIEF [1971794] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) in 21-7127, Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7019 [Service Date: 11/02/2022 ] Length of Brief: 12,892 Words. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 11/02/2022 01:51 PM]

1152 pg, 55.7 MB   APPELLANT REPLY & CROSS APPELLEE FINAL BRIEF [1971798] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 21-7127, 22-7019, Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7020 [Service Date: 11/02/2022 ] Length of Brief: 16,926 Word. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 11/02/2022 02:06 PM]

8 pg, 157.14 KB   RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION [1971900] to motion to strike document [1970167-2], motion for other relief [1970167-3] filed by Exxon Mobil Corporation in 21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020 [Service Date: 11/02/2022 by CM/ECF NDA] Length Certification: 1,322. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Davidson, Steven) [Entered: 11/02/2022 07:07 PM]

1403 pg, 18.79 MB   APPELLEE & CROSS-APPELLANT FINAL BRIEF [1971901] filed by Exxon Mobil Corporation in 21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020 [Service Date: 11/02/2022 ] Length of Brief: 15,088. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Davidson, Steven) [Entered: 11/02/2022 07:13 PM]

708 pg, 16.05 MB   CROSS-APPELLANT FINAL REPLY BRIEF [1971902] filed by Exxon Mobil Corporation in 22-7020 [Service Date: 11/02/2022 ] Length of Brief: 8,184. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Davidson, Steven) [Entered: 11/02/2022 07:16 PM]

15 pg, 1.69 MB   REPLY [1972434] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 21-7127, 22-7019, Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7020 to response and RESPONSE IN SUPPORT filed to Cross Motion [1970167-2], [1970167-3] [Service Date: 11/07/2022 by CM/ECF NDA] Length Certification: 2,486 Words. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 11/07/2022 12:54 PM]

1415 pg, 20.95 MB   CORRECTED APPELLEE & CROSS-APPELLANT FINAL BRIEF [1972774] filed by Exxon Mobil Corporation in 21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020 [Service Date: 11/08/2022 ] Length of Brief: 15,088. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Davidson, Steven) [Entered: 11/08/2022 05:24 PM]

712 pg, 16.74 MB   CORRECTED CROSS-APPELLANT FINAL REPLY BRIEF [1972775] filed by Exxon Mobil Corporation in 21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020 [Service Date: 11/08/2022 ] Length of Brief: 8,184. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Davidson, Steven) [Entered: 11/08/2022 05:39 PM]

1 pg, 40.74 KB   CLERK'S ORDER [1973385] filed scheduling oral argument on Thursday, 01/19/2023. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] [Entered: 11/14/2022 10:15 AM]

12 pg, 2.56 MB   ERRATA [1979679] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 21-7127, 22-7019, Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7020 to Appellant/Cross-Appellee final brief [1971798-2], Appellant/Petitioner final brief [1971794-2] . Reason for errata: need to correct miscite for a referenced document and correct pin cites to cited authority.. [Service Date: 12/31/2022 ] [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 12/31/2022 08:34 PM]

99 pg, 3.66 MB   CORRECTED APPELLANT REPLY & CROSS APPELLEE FINAL BRIEF [1979859] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 21-7127, 22-7019, Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7020 [Service Date: 01/03/2023 ] Length of Brief: 16,927 words.. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 01/03/2023 02:24 PM]

2 pg, 42.91 KB   PER CURIAM ORDER [1980426] filed allocating oral argument time as follows: Appellant/Cross-Appellee Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. - 15 Minutes, Appellee/Cross-Appellant Exxon Mobil Corporation - 15 Minutes. One counsel per side to argue, Form 72 notice of arguing attorney [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] [Entered: 01/06/2023 10:51 AM]
01/09/2023          FORM 72 submitted by arguing attorney, Steven K. Davidson, on behalf of Appellee Exxon Mobil Corporation in 21-7127, 22-7019, Appellant Exxon Mobil Corporation in 22-7020 (For Internal Use Only: Form is restricted to protect counsel's personal contact information). [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Davidson, Steven) [Entered: 01/09/2023 09:46 AM]

FORM 72 submitted by arguing attorney, Michael R. Krinsky, on behalf of Appellant Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Appellees Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 21-7127, Appellee Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Appellants Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7019, Appellees Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7020 (For Internal Use Only: Form is restricted to protect counsel's personal contact information). [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 01/10/2023 07:32 AM]

1 pg, 41.37 KB   ORAL ARGUMENT HELD before Judges Srinivasan, Pillard and Randolph. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] [Entered: 01/19/2023 12:18 PM]
02/06/2023          TRANSCRIPT [1984708] of oral argument (For Internal Use Only: Transcript is only available to court staff). [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] [Entered: 02/06/2023 01:09 PM]

28 pg, 360.83 KB   LETTER [1996644] pursuant to FRAP 28j advising of additional authorities filed by Exxon Mobil Corporation in 21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020 [Service Date: 04/26/2023 ] [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Davidson, Steven) [Entered: 04/26/2023 05:52 PM]

2 pg, 555.86 KB   RESPONSE [1997675] to letter [1996644-2], letter [1996644-3] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 21-7127, 22-7019, Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7020 [Service Date: 05/03/2023 by CM/ECF NDA] Length Certification: 339 words. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 05/03/2023 11:33 AM]

21 pg, 279.97 KB   LETTER [1999278] pursuant to FRAP 28j advising of additional authorities filed by Exxon Mobil Corporation in 21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020 [Service Date: 05/15/2023 ] [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Davidson, Steven) [Entered: 05/15/2023 05:22 PM]

2 pg, 437.93 KB   RESPONSE [1999802] to letter Rule 28j authorities [1999278-2], letter [1999278-3] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 21-7127, 22-7019, Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7020 [Service Date: 05/18/2023 by CM/ECF NDA] Length Certification: 257 words. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 05/18/2023 11:31 AM]

42 pg, 577.34 KB   LETTER [2004475] pursuant to FRAP 28j advising of additional authorities filed by Exxon Mobil Corporation in 21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020 [Service Date: 06/21/2023 ] [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Davidson, Steven) [Entered: 06/21/2023 10:45 PM]

2 pg, 435.45 KB   RESPONSE [2005018] to letter Rule 28j authorities [2004475-2], letter [2004475-3] filed by Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba) and Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 21-7127, 22-7019, Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Panama) and Union Cuba-Petroleo in 22-7020 [Service Date: 06/26/2023 by CM/ECF NDA] Length Certification: 326 words.. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020] (Krinsky, Michael) [Entered: 06/26/2023 12:30 PM]

LINKS TO RELATED COURT DOCUMENTS

06/26/23- LETTER FROM DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY
01/03/23- CORRECTED REPLY AND RESPONSE BRIEF FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
12/03/21- PETITIONERS CORPORACIÓN CIMEX, S.A. (PANAMA) AND UNIÓN CUBA-PETRÓLEO’S PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1292(B)

January 25, 2024

8% Commission? New Private Company Financial Regulations Add Further Stress To Re-Emerging Private Sector In Cuba.

January 25, 2024/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

The Central Bank of the Republic of Cuba exchange rate is 24 Pesos per US$1.00. For visitors to the Republic of Cuba and when available for Republic of Cuba nationals the Central Bank of the Republic of Cuba exchange rate is 120 Pesos per US$1.00. The unofficial, “street rate” in the Republic of Cuba is approximately 280 Pesos per US$1.00.

Prensa Latina News Agency
Havana, Republic of Cuba
23 January 2024

BANDEC To Expand E-Credit Facilities

Havana, Jan 23 (Prensa Latina) Cuba's Banco de Crédito y Comercio (BANDEC) will be expanding the credit facilities for the use of its prepaid card in USD, the bank institution informed on Tuesday. According to BANDEC, this is an e-payment strategy for national territory use only and valid for a five-year time.

As from January 24, those interested people may acquire the new USD prepaid cards by paying in cash in any of authorized circulating currencies nationwide. Minimum value will be USD 50. A USD$4 commission will be deducted for its purchase. These cards will be available at certain BANDEC branches and Currency Exchange Offices.

The cards can be recharged in cash deposits with currencies authorized to circulate in the country and by transfers from abroad. There will be no limit of amount. This new strategy will make possible the purchase of goods and services in retail and wholesale networks, as well as the purchase of fuel at CUPET Gas Stations that will be authorized to pay in USD.

According to BANDEC, the USD prepaid cards may be acquired by foreign and national people resident or not in Cuban territory; micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MIPYMES); non-agricultural cooperatives; self-employed workers; individual farmers and other forms of non-state management, as well as the whole population in general.

The card holder, at the time of his/her departure from the country, may be reimbursed, of the unused amount, a maximum up to USD$100 or its equivalent in another available currency, always presenting his boarding pass, detailed the informative note published by the Facebook social network.

Agencia Cubana de Noticias (ACN)
Havana, Republic of Cuba
24 January 2024

Cuban Credit and Commerce Bank expands use of prepaid cards in USD

HAVANA, Cuba, Jan 23 (ACN) Cuban Credit and Commerce Bank (Bandec by its Spanish acronym) announced today that as of January 24, prepaid cards in U.S. dollars (USD) can be purchased at selected branches and Cadeca's network of offices, with cash in any of the currencies authorized to circulate in the country.

Bandec specified that these electronic means of payment may be acquired by foreign and national individuals resident or not in the country, as well as micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), non-agricultural cooperatives, self-employed workers, individual farmers and other forms of non-State management.

In an informative statement published in its official Facebook page, the entity explained that the minimum value of the prepaid card is USD 50.00, from which a commission of USD 4.00 will be deducted for its purchase. For exclusive use in the national territory and valid for five years, they can be recharged by means of cash deposits with the foreign currencies authorized to circulate and by transfers from abroad, with no limit on the amount.

Bandec emphasized that the prepaid cards allow the purchase of goods and services in the retail and wholesale network, and of fuel in the service centers to be set up in USD. It added that the cardholder, at the time of leaving the country, may be reimbursed for the unused amount, up to a maximum of 100.00 USD or its equivalent in another available currency, always presenting his/her boarding pass. Bandec had previously launched prepaid cards, aimed at international travelers not residing in the country, as a way for them to access goods and services in establishments that only accept electronic payments.

BreakingLatestNews.News
25 January 2024

The Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) has announced its exchange rates for the dollar and other foreign currencies circulating in the country. The official exchange rates in relation to the Cuban peso (CUP) have been published by the BCC. The exchange rates for various currencies are as follows:

– Australian Dollar (AUD) – 15.73920 to 78.69600 CUP
– New Mexican Peso (MXN) – 1.38340 to 6.91698 CUP
– Pound Sterling (GBP) – 30.37680 to 151.88400 CUP
– Norwegian Kron (NOK) – 2.27929 to 11.39644 CUP
– Swedish Crown (SEK) – 2.28615 to 11.43075 CUP
– US Dollar (USD) – 24.00000 to 120.00000 CUP
– Canadian Dollar (CAD) – 17.79887 to 88.99436 CUP
– Japanese Yen (JPY) – 6.19083 to 1.23817 CUP
– Danish Crown (DKK) – 3.48721 to 17.43603 CUP
– Swiss Franch (CHF) – 27.54821 to 137.74105 CUP
– Euro (EUR) – 25.99200 to 129.96000 CUP

The BCC reminds the public that exchange and resale actions can be carried out at bank branches, as well as at Exchange Houses (CACEDA).

In the informal market in Cuba, the sale price of the Freely Convertible Currency (MLC) has increased to $251.00 CUP, a rise of $1.00 CUP in the last 24 hours. Meanwhile, the euro is quoted at $285.00 CUP and the USD at $280.00 CUP in the informal market. Despite the upcoming end of January, there have been no details offered about new exchange rates that will govern in Cuba soon. The price of currencies in the market continues its upward trend, and the dollar is influencing retail prices more and more in the country.

HAVANA, Cuba, Jan 26 (ACN) As part of the actions announced by the Cuban government to correct deformations in the economy and boost its development in 2024, the Official Gazette of the Republic published two resolutions modifying prices for the import of raw materials and inputs, as well as cigarettes, tobacco, rum and other alcoholic beverages.

Resolution 7/2024 of the Ministry of Finance and Prices (MFP) was published in the 8th Ordinary Edition of this year's Official Gazette, which establishes the rebate in the payment of the customs tax on imports of raw materials, inputs and intermediate goods, destined to productive processes, with special focus on the production of food and agricultural production, consisting in the reduction of its tax rate by 50 %.

Said bonus, the resolution added, will be implemented by the MFP on a timely basis, as from the date of the application for said benefit. On the other hand, Joint Resolution 1/2024 of the MFP and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Investment establishes the increase of the tariff rates for the import of tobacco, cigars, rum and other alcoholic beverages.

The measure, which is aimed at protecting the national production of these items, announces that the tariff will be increased by 30%, but it will only be 15% when the products come from "most favored" countries, based on signed bilateral agreements.

LINK TO OFFICIAL GAZETTE DOCUMENT IN PDF FORMAT

January 20, 2024

Where Might President Biden Next Discuss His Views About Engagement With Cuba? At Fundraiser In Miami On 30 January 2024.

January 20, 2024/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

Politico
Arlington, Virginia
19 January 2024

Biden to visit Miami for campaign fundraiser
The trip, his sixth to the state as president, could invite chatter about the campaign’s intent to compete in the state.

By Lauren Egan

President Joe Biden is scheduled to travel to Miami on Jan. 30 for a fundraiser hosted at the home of Chris Korge, the national finance chair of the Biden Victory Fund, according to an invitation shared with POLITICO. Ticket prices start at $3,300 and go as high as $250,000 for a co-chair ticket.

While the trip is designed to pad campaign coffers, it will likely invite chatter about whether the president is looking to compete in Florida, which had been a traditional swing state up until its recent rightward drift.

The trip will be Biden’s sixth visit to Florida as president. He last visited the Sunshine State in September to survey damage caused by Hurricane Idalia. Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis skipped out on meeting Biden during that trip.

Biden lost Florida to Trump in the 2020 election by more than three percentage points and his campaign has been clear-eyed about the difficulty of winning the state in 2024. They see a clearer path to victory through the Rust Belt states that Biden took back from Trump as well as the Sun Belt states of Georgia, Arizona and Nevada.

The Biden campaign entered the new year on the heels of a successful fourth quarter fundraising stretch. Biden, the Democratic National Committee and their joint-fundraising committees brought in more than $97 million in the final three months of 2023 — putting the president ahead of his recent Democratic predecessor. The campaign, which has been slow to staff up and relatively frugal, announced on Monday that it had $117 million cash on hand.

Former President Donald Trump has not yet announced how much he raised in the fourth quarter of 2023. But Biden’s fundraising numbers trail behind what Trump was able to bring in at the end of his third year in office, when he and the Republican National Committee collected more than $154 million.

In the email invitation to donors, Korge wrote that he hoped the Miami reception would be the largest fundraiser for a presidential candidate ever hosted in Florida and said the “excitement around this event has been amazing.”

The Hill
Washington DC
21 January 2024

Rick Scott’s pitch to Florida Hispanics: Kitchen table issues with a side of Latin America
by Rafael Bernal

Sen. Rick Scott (R-Fla.) says Hispanic voters have the same concerns as the general population, with added focus on conditions in Central and South America. “[Hispanics] generally care about the same thing as everybody else. But they also do care about democracy and freedom in Latin America. So while they care about jobs, they care about education, they care about law enforcement, they also care about that,” Scott told The Hill. That view is central to Scott’s reelection campaign approach in Florida, a state where a quarter of the population is Hispanic.

“In my campaigns, if I’m gonna run an ad, I generally run an ad in English and in Spanish. If I’m doing events, I’m doing events, like in the Panhandle and I’m also at same time doing events in Miami. Or if I’m in Tampa, I might do an event with the Chamber [of Commerce], then also do it with the Hispanic Chamber,” he said. “So I’ve always reached out to everybody, because I represent everybody.”

That approach stands in contrast to mainstream thinking in national Hispanic-focused campaigns, where apples-to-apples bilingual outreach is slowly being replaced by tailor-made messages for individual cultural subsets. Scott’s more traditional approach in part responds to the large number of different Hispanic groups in Florida. “Hispanics in the way it works in Florida — we have Cubans, Venezuelans, Colombians, Puerto Ricans, Nicaraguans — they’re all different communities but it’s a good melting pot, but I reach out to each one of them and I do things with every group. I just never — I never stopped talking to them,” said Scott.

His confident approach — he has won three straight statewide elections — also relies on his constituent services, which in 2022 were awarded the Congressional Management Foundation’s Democracy Award. “I’m running on my record and so, you know, the I’m very — I’m very comfortable that I’m going to continue to do my job and you know, my constituent services team won for the best constituent service team in the country,” said Scott.

But Scott’s statewide wins have not been by large margins: In 2010 he won the governorship by about 1.2 percentage points, he was reelected in 2014 by a single percentage point margin and he won his Senate seat in 2018 against then-incumbent Sen. Bill Nelson (D) by less than two-tenths of a percentage point — about a 10,000 vote difference out of more than 8 million votes cast. And Scott, along with Sen. Ted Cruz (Texas), is the closest thing Republicans have to a vulnerable incumbent in 2024. Both senators’ races are ranked as “likely Republican” by the Cook Political report, as opposed to the “solid Republican” rankings of the other nine GOP-held seats up for renewal. Scott is also facing a GOP primary opponent, Keith Gross, who pledged to spend copiously to unseat the incumbent, though as of September Gross had spent just under a million dollars compared to Scott’s $12 million already spent in the 2024 cycle.

Throughout his political career, Scott has successfully fended off attacks on the source of his fortune, a 2003 settlement after a complex fraud case involving the company he ran, Columbia/HCA, once the country’s largest health care company. Those attacks have continued in the GOP primary, and from challengers across the aisle, including Democratic front-runner former Rep. Debbie Mucarsel-Powell (Fla.), who called the events leading to the settlement “the largest Medicare fraud ever committed in the history of this country.” Mucarsel-Powell, who was born in Ecuador, is playing full-court press on Hispanic media in Florida, doing nearly daily Spanish-language interviews on influential radio stations in an attempt to outflank Scott through cultural competence and Spanish-language fluency. “The problem she has it’s not the language she speaks, it’s her positions,” said Scott.

Attack lines in the general election — likely to be between Scott and Mucarsel-Powell — are forming along predictable fronts. “She runs around with people that are anti-police; I don’t know Hispanics that are anti-police. She basically is, you know, she runs around with people that are anti-Israel. In my experience with Hispanics, they’re not anti-Israel. You know, she basically is a socialist. My experience with Hispanics is they’re not socialists,” said Scott. Mucarsel-Powell, meanwhile, is attacking Scott as a political extremist for his support of former President Trump, whom she equates to authoritarian strongmen in Latin America.

Both candidates converge, however, in the importance that Florida Hispanics put in their representatives understanding Western Hemisphere politics. “With Cubans, I mean, they care about the freedom and democracy in Cuba, generally, or Venezuelans, they care about what [President Nicolás] Maduro is doing or the Nicaraguans, they care about what [President Daniel] Ortega is doing, or if they’re Colombians, they care about what [President Gustavo] Petro is doing or you know, if they’re Argentines, they care about what [President Javier] Milei is doing,” said Scott.

Though U.S. citizens of Latin American and Caribbean origin are a powerful voting group, particularly in South Florida, Puerto Ricans in central Florida have changed the state’s political dynamics.Puerto Ricans are statutory U.S. citizens if they’re born in the territory, so even recent arrivals from the island are eligible to vote. In 2019 Florida became the state with the largest Puerto Rican diaspora, now more than a million strong.Like Hispanics with non-U.S. national origins, Scott is pitching kitchen table issues to Puerto Ricans, but he’s also diverging — with caveats — from the Republican Party mainstream on an issue that polls particularly well with Florida’s Puerto Rican community: statehood.“First off, what they want to do is they want to take care of their families. No. 2, their futures, their kids, so they care about education. And the other thing is they want to have a low crime rate.”

“It’s important to talk about the issues and work with the issues that impact Puerto Ricans and, and acknowledge, I think — I think Puerto Rico eventually will be a state. I think they have to get their fiscal house in order and whether everybody agrees with me here, I’m one vote.”

January 18, 2024

U.S. Representative Salazar's Hearing Today About Cuba's Re-Emerging Private Sector Is Legitimate. The "Mythology" Premise Of The Hearing Is Knowingly Hollow. Hitting Political Cannon Fodder.

January 18, 2024/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

Congressional “Hearing” Today Is Not Designed To Inform, Not About Fixes To Problems. Is Focused Upon Leveling Criticism At Political Cannon Fodder.

Are 10,000 Republic Of Cuba Nationals A “Myth”? They Don’t Exist?

Members Of The United States Congress Who Supported Seeking Of Authorization From The Biden-Harris Administration To Provide Direct Investment And Direct Financing To A Privately-Owned Company Located In The Republic Cuba, Criticized The Authorization Once It Was Provided.

When An Idea, Support It. When A Reality, Oppose It.

Yes, The Government Of The Republic Of Cuba Does Not Embrace The Re-Emerging Private Sector. It’s Tolerated. That Should Not Mean The United States Congress Should Dismiss It. Or Worse, Work Against It.

Today at 2:00 pm, the United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs will hold a hearing entitled “The Myth of the New Cuban Entrepreneurs: An Analysis of the Biden Administration’s Cuba Policy.”

A congressional hearing about any issue relating to the Republic of Cuba can be of value, but for there to be value, the premise of the hearing must be honest, and the witnesses invited to the hearing must have credibility- meaning practical first-hand knowledge of the issue.

NOTE: In the 435-member United States House of Representatives, there are 220 Republicans and 213 Democrats. There are two vacancies. Including those vacancies (using the previous party affiliation), the Republican party has a 51.03% majority to the Democratic Party 48.97%.

However, there are six Republicans and four Democrats on the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. With ten members, the proportionality of the subcommittee is 60% Republicans: Chairwoman Maria Elvira Salazar (Florida-R, 27th District),Mark Green (Tennessee- R, 7th District), Bill Huizenga (Michigan- D, 4th District), Warren Davidson (Ohio- R, 8th District), Keith Self (Texas- R, 3rd District), John James (Michigan- R, 10th District) to 40% Democrats: (Ranking Member- Joaquin Castro (Texas- D, 20th District), Greg Stanton (Arizona- D, 4th District), Jared Moskowitz (Florida- D, 23rd District), Sydney Kamlager-Dove (California- D, 37th District). So much for democratic proportionality among the elected- what the subcommittee would not hesitate to criticize, and rightly so, when implemented by other country government legislative bodies.

For the hearing scheduled today, Chairwoman Salazar has (yet) neither provided a valid premise nor witnesses of value.

Wrong to define those approximately 10,000 Republic of Cuba nationals who have created and who manage micro, small, and medium-size enterprises (“MSME” or “PYMES” by their Spanish acronym) as participants in a myth, as dupes of the government of the Republic of Cuba, and as complicate co-conspirators rather than instruments of change within the Republic of Cuba. They are not tools (stooges) for maintaining, unwittingly or deliberately, the status quo within the Republic of Cuba, the hearing premise is established on a falsehood.

Absolutely justifiable to criticize decisions of the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) and decisions by the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) relating to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba. Not justified is indiscriminate targeting and thoughtless context to by bank shot excoriate those individuals of Cuban descent, many of whom reside in the State of Florida, for their support of and interest in the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.

For example: Why hasn’t the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration issued regulations as to how direct investment and direct financing may be delivered into a privately-owned company located in the Republic of Cuba- nearing twenty-one months after the Biden-Harris Administration approved the first license authorizing direct investment and direct financing may be delivered into a privately-owned company located in the Republic of Cuba? Why the disconnect between what officials of the government of the Republic of Cuba have said, publicly and privately, during the last three years and decisions implemented by the government of the Republic of Cuba?

During the late Twentieth Century and at the beginning of the Twenty-First Century, most committee and subcommittee hearings in the United States Congress, both in the United States House of Representatives and in the 100-member United States Senate, would seek to provide balance and provide insight when selecting witnesses. The goal of most hearings would be to educate- both members of the United States Congress and the public. The chairman (or chairwoman) of a committee would have an agenda, but would simultaneously recognize the importance of balance and, critically, for witnesses to have a capacity to provide value.

For the two listed witnesses at today’s subcommittee hearing, Eric Jacobstein, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs at the United States Department of State, and Enrique Roig, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor at the United States Department of State, they are political cannon fodder.

Neither individual can provide, nor should they be expected to provide to the ten members of the subcommittee an immersive conversation about the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba. They will read from carefully vetted statements. They will attempt to defend what the Biden-Harris Administration has done since 20 January 2021 and what the Biden-Harris Administration has not done since 20 January 2021. These two gentlemen can only provide to members of the subcommittee what they in turn have been briefed to share with members of the subcommittee. Link to Jacobstein Statement. Link to Roig Statement.

Missing from the witness list for the subcommittee hearing? 1) The owner, manager, employee of a privately-owned company located in the Republic of Cuba to share their real-time experiences. 2) The owner, manager, employee of a privately-owned company located in the State of Florida which engages directly with one or mor privately-owned companies in the Republic of Cuba. 3) An attorney, for example, Washington DC-based Robert L. Muse, who has negotiated and received from Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury approval for a financing and investment contract between a United States-based company and a privately-owned company located in the Republic of Cuba. 4) Executives from United States-based financial institutions to discuss how monies currently move between the United States and the Republic of Cuba and to discuss what policies and regulations in both the United States and the Republic of Cuba remain problematic.

The subcommittee hearing could be a venue of value by focusing upon questions where the answers can be helpful. The title of the subcommittee hearing not only suggests, but loudly magnifies the predetermined outcome- criticism about what was, what is, what is desired, and what is not desired. Then, gavel, end of show. Post to Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram, Twitter (X), etc.

There are questions whereby subcommittee members both in the majority party and in the minority party could gain- by discussing what works and what does not. For example:

· Should any of the policies and regulations implemented during the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), during the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021), and thus far during the Biden-Harris Administration by the OFAC and by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce be reviewed for efficacy?

Should any of the policies and regulations implemented during the Obama-Biden Administration, during the Trump-Pence Administration, and thus far during the Biden-Harris Administration by the OFAC and by the BIS be conditioned upon decisions by the government of the Republic of Cuba?
Would the establishment of direct correspondent banking provide increased transparency, accountability, and efficiency for moving authorized funds from the United States to the Republic of Cuba and from the Republic of Cuba to the United States? Would the government of the Republic of Cuba accept it?
What Biden-Harris Administration policy and regulatory changes might be appropriate to better assist the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba re-engage with the private sector in the United States?
An article (see further in this analysis) published on 10 January 2024 by the Miami Herald provided a narrative of impediments facing the re-emerging private sector within the Republic of Cuba. Was the narrative accurate? What can be and what should the Biden-Harris Administration do to mitigate those impediments? Should anything be done?

On 10 May 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration directed the OFAC to issue the first license authorizing an entity subject to United States jurisdiction (which is not affiliated directly or indirectly with an individual of Cuban descent) to deliver a direct equity investment to and authorizing direct financing for an officially registered privately-owned company (in the service sector) located in the Republic of Cuba and owned by a Republic of Cuba national. Neither entity in the transaction is connected with the other in terms of commercial relationships or family relationships. The parties did not have connectivity prior to the transaction. The license application was submitted to the OFAC on 10 June 2021and was issued by the OFAC in the late afternoon of 10 May 2022.

Why Has Investment And Financing Licensed In 2022 By OFAC Not Yet Been Delivered?
Yes, Funds Could Have Been Delivered In A Paper Bag.
That Would Have Destroyed The Objective- To Legitimize The Illegitimate

On 10 June 2021, Washington DC-based attorney Robert L. Muse delivered what would become a precedent-setting license application to the OFAC.

On 10 May 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration did what was requested- although the process required eleven months.

The OFAC was directed to issue a license authorizing the first direct investment in and the first direct financing to a privately-owned company located in the Republic of Cuba owned by a Republic of Cuba national. Such an authorization had not been issued since the United States government commenced sanctions upon the Republic of Cuba in 1960.

Despite three years of public and private indications, the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration has yet to do what was indicated would be authorized.

Nearing twenty-one (21) months since 10 May 2022 and the government of the Republic of Cuba has yet to publish regulations as to the process for MSMEs to receive from abroad direct investment and direct financing.

Both the direct investment and direct financing could have been delivered on 11 May 2022- an envelope filled with currency; a bank transfer through a third country; a United States-based remittance forwarder- though would have required many small denomination transactions given transfer limitations. However, doing so would have only served to reinforce the present rather than promote the future.

Important to reiterate the objective of seeking the license from the OFAC. The intention was never to quietly, secretly, implement its provisions. The intention was to actively publicize the existence of the license from the OFAC so everyone would know about it- not only within the State of Florida, but throughout the Republic of Cuba. That intention was achieved.

But, there was a failure. The government of the Republic of Cuba did not respond as expected. Given the chronic commercial, economic, and financial undesirable results from decisions by the government of the Republic of Cuba, along with continuing changes to laws and regulations impacting MSMEs, there was an expectation of an immediate embrace for what the license from the OFAC could mean in terms delivering desperately required foreign exchange along with desperately required capital goods to redevelop manufacturing and assembly infrastructure.

During the last twenty-one months, many individuals and delegations of individuals of Cuban descent have traveled from the United States to the Republic of Cuba. They meet with senior-level officials. They report a consistent message- they do not know when or if the government of the Republic of Cuba will publish regulations as to the process for MSMEs to receive from abroad direct investment and direct financing.

Quietly delivered messages from senior-level officials of the government of the Republic of Cuba conveyed that regulations are probable by the end of 2023. That possibility too has passed unfulfilled.

The MSME for whom the license from the OFAC authorizes the delivery of direct investment and direct financing continues to wait for the delivery of funds. Its management is frustrated. The source of the funding and financing is frustrated.

Both appreciate, however, that implementing any decision absent specific regulatory compliance- required by the OFAC license and required by the government of the Republic of Cuba would only serve to reinforce the status quo: Where funds are delivered directly from the United States and from the United States through third countries to the Republic of Cuba. Thus far, the United States government does nothing to physically prevent it and the government of the Republic of Cuba does nothing to institutionalize, regulate it.

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
10 January 2024

Relevant excerpts highlighted.

“Cubans will soon face another turn of the screw, this time at the pump: a gas price hike of 528% starting in February.

At a crossroads between broadening market reforms that could imperil its grip on power or doubling down on efforts to salvage the centrally planned socialist economy that has impoverished Cuba for six decades, the Cuban government chose the most familiar script. Amid the worst economic crisis in several decades, the Cuban leadership has announced an austerity plan that includes cuts on ration card food subsidies and increases in the prices of fuel, transportation, electricity and cooking gas.

The measures will be paired with further restrictions on small and medium private businesses, in the latest signal the government is resisting calls to open up the economy significantly. The new price of gasoline was announced Tuesday evening by Cuban officials on live television, along with a 180% increase fares for trains and interprovincial buses. Because state salaries and pensions are abysmally low in Cuba, with average monthly wages at $15 and pensions even lower, any cuts in subsidies or price hikes are particularly worrying for the large portion of the population that does not receive remittances from family abroad or have other ways to get access to dollars.

Several measures will also affect the new private businesses, known as mipymes in Spanish. These include a 25% raise for electricity the largest consumers, the ending of tax benefits, and higher import fees on final goods that would likely raise food prices even higher among record triple-digit inflation. These and other measures to “stabilize” the economy were first announced in the last session of the National Assembly in late December by Prime Minister Manuel Marrero.

Marrero said the government wants the private sector to import more raw materials that state enterprises could then use in local production. The prime minister also mentioned the intention to create more mixed enterprises between the state and the mipymes and use the private sector’s better position to seek capital or credit abroad to negotiate financing for businesses involving state enterprises.

All would occur even as the government imposes tighter fiscal controls on the private sector and eliminates tax incentives. “We have taken steps so that the government opens the economy and that this process is not concentrated on small businesses but on the socialist state enterprises,” Marrero said. Amid widespread criticism from economists and on social media, Cuba’s appointed president, Miguel Díaz-Canel, defended the measures and vigorously denied during the same National Assembly session that the government was trying to implement a “neoliberal [policy] package nor a crusade against the mipymes.”

Without providing complete details, Marrero also spoke about implementing changes so more of the money Cubans abroad send to their relatives would go through the Cuban official financial system. If successful, those efforts could further damage the private sector, which has been tapping into remittances entering the country through alternative channels to finance their businesses.

The prime minister also said the government wants to control the cost of dollars — which is exchanged at 120 pesos for a dollar at a restricted official market but is sold on the street for 275 pesos— but didn’t say how it would do it. The announced plan followed a presentation by Cuban Economy Minister Alejandro Gil, who painted a bleak picture of the country’s economy in 2023, which he said contracted by as much as 2%.

But Gil insisted the government was not considering “more privatization. We are talking about strengthening the state-owned socialist enterprises, regulating prices, all to preserve the social achievements of the revolution.” Marrero also said the government would prioritize foreign investment, especially in food production, but did not preview any changes to foreign investment legislation. Several Cuban economists believe the measures will worsen the struggles Cubans face to find food and get essential services, and will not fix the country’s several woes: a steep drop in productivity in almost every sector of the economy but most worryingly in agriculture; skyrocketing inflation; a foreign debt that is estimated at 20% of Cuba’s GDP; food, medicine and gas shortages, and a crumbling infrastructure unable to provide regular electricity and other services, including quality healthcare.

“No one should expect anything about the effectiveness of the measures… because they will continue to be based on the communist economic model,” Elias Amor, a Cuban economist based in Spain, wrote in his blog Cuba Economía. The generation of wealth, employment and productivity, he wrote, cannot be achieved by merely “making adjustments in the distribution of resources, but with a focus on production, private activity, human rights, property rights and the market as an instrument of resource allocation.” In a stark rebuke of the government’s plan, Juan Triana, an economist living on the island, wrote in the news site OnCuba on Wednesday that the measures would likely contribute to “the rise in inflation, the increase in dollarization and a greater devaluation of the Cuban peso”.

He also questioned the restrictions on the private sector and why the government did not include other needed corrective measures, like the reduction in the billions of dollars spent on building new hotels for tourists, many of which remain empty, or reducing the state bureaucracy. Blaming the United States Unsurprisingly, in speeches at the National Assembly and on Jan. 1, during the celebrations of 65 years of the Cuban Revolution, Cuban leaders blamed the economic debacle on the U.S. embargo, a narrative they have hammered through decades of economic mismanagement.

While not the main reason for the island’s economic troubles, most economists agree that U.S. sanctions have aggravated the crisis, and a group of Democratic lawmakers, led by Rep. James P. McGovern (D-MA), wrote a letter to President Biden earlier this month asking him to remove Cuba from the U.S. list of countries that sponsor terrorism. The inclusion of Cuba on the list carries financial “restrictions and penalties” that are a “significant contributing factor” of the current crisis, they wrote. Other activists and academics have called on the Biden administration to cooperate with international organizations to increase humanitarian aid to the island, especially food and healthcare supplies.

But experts agree that nothing short of broader reforms can pull the island and its people out of the dire situation. Among those pushing against such changes are some of the country’s most senior leaders, a power dynamic most clearly shown in the Communist Party newspaper Granma’s Jan. 2 edition. A photo display of Díaz-Canel, surrounded by Gen. Raúl Castro, who is formally retired but still the ultimate authority in the country, and two old-guard commanders in their 90s, Ramiro Valdes and José Ramón Machado Ventura, dominated the newspaper’s front page with the headline: “Unity is our best strategic weapon.” Castro, 93, gave the main speech on Jan. 1, in which he urged those gathered in the ceremony in Santiago de Cuba to cherish political unity “more than the apples of our eyes.”

The Herald recently reported on the divisions in the Cuban government about how far to open the country up to the market. But Castro quoted his brother, Fidel Castro, to deny that there were “generational contradictions within the Revolution” or that the older generation of leaders were “clinging to power.” Wrapped in the convoluted rhetoric usual in such speeches, he threw a last reminder: that the military and security forces were loyal to the communist government and ready to act when threatened. “Today, I can affirm that in the face of any threat or weakness, its combatants will not renounce continuing to be, together with the [Communist] Party, the soul of the Revolution,” he said.”

The Wall Street Journal
New York, New York
19 May 2022

Biden’s Strange Help for Cuba: Why aid the struggling anti-American regime in Havana now?

By The Editorial Board

Excerpts: “The new policy allows U.S. financing for “independent” Cuban entrepreneurs, but no such thing exists. Reality isn’t stopping Team Biden, which on May 10 issued a license—from the Office of Foreign Assets Control—authorizing a U.S. company to invest and provide financing to a Cuban company…. The license likely violates the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, which prohibits the extension of credit to Cuba.”

The government of the Republic of Cuba is criticized for not trusting its 11.3 million citizens to make good decisions. Those who criticize the decision by the OFAC are engaging in the same distrust- the message is the self-employed and owners and managers of micro, small, and medium-size enterprises (MSMEs) cannot be trusted not to be victimized by the government of the Republic of Cuba; that their efforts to create, to maintain, and expand their nascent businesses are nothing but a sham, a Potemkin Village from which the government of the Republic of Cuba is the sole beneficiary. Are the 20,000+ Republic of Cuba nationals who have registered their properties with Airbnb dimwitted? Are the owners of paladars (restaurants) engaging in fraud? All these people are stupid? 11.3 million victims of the Depleting Gene Pool Theory? That is insulting.

There are thousands of Republic of Cuba nationals who have, according to the Editorial Board of The Wall Street Journal, taken the time and have not given up or given in despite obstacles, to shift from being a one-person operation to employing five, ten, twenty, or one hundred employees to maintain and grow their business.. but these efforts are for nothing, they are wasted time

The Washington Times
Washington DC
25 May 2022

Biden’s easing of sanctions on Cuba helps a cruel regime hurt its people
The administration is falsely claiming it will benefit Cubans

By Editorial Board

Excerpt: “Second, the notion of entrepreneurs or independent contractors conducting business freely under the Cuban military dictatorship is a myth. No one on the island gets to conduct any business without regime approval or connections, which makes the notion of independent business ownership both a legal and factual impossibility. On May 10 the U.S. issued a license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control permitting a U.S. company to finance a Cuban company- an act which almost certainly violates the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, which outlawed U.S. credit to Cuba.”

Links To Related Analyses

Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022

With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details. About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022

Replying To A Wall Street Journal Editorial From Those Who Were Attacked And On Behalf Of Those Who Were Attacked. May 22, 2022

Response To A Washington Times Editorial From Those Criticized And On Behalf Of Those Criticized. May 26, 2022

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

January 17, 2024

Congressional Hearing On Thursday: "The Myth of the New Cuban Entrepreneurs: An Analysis of the Biden Administration’s Cuba Policy"

January 17, 2024/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Maria Salazar (R-FL), Chairwoman
January 11, 2024

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held at 2:00 p.m. in room 2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building. The hearing is available by live webcast on the Committee website at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/.

DATE: Thursday, January 18, 2024
TIME: 2:00 p.m.
LOCATION: 2200 RHOB
SUBJECT: The Myth of the New Cuban Entrepreneurs: An Analysis of the Biden Administration’s Cuba Policy
WITNESSES: Mr. Eric Jacobstein, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and Mr. Enrique Roig, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State

NOTE: Witnesses may be added.

By Direction of the Chair: The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202 -226-8467 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

LINK TO HEARING NOTIFICATION IN PDF FORMAT

LINK TO LIVE STREAM OF HEARING

January 16, 2024

Will Deere, SpaceX (Starlink), BIS, And OFAC Permit SATCOM Service To Farmers In Cuba Who Use Authorized Deere Products?

January 16, 2024/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

Since 2017, Deere & Company has delivered approximately US$1 million in equipment from the United States to the Republic of Cuba. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce has approved these transactions.
If Deere & Company makes operational globally the Starlink service, will the company, the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ), and the government of the Republic of Cuba authorize the service for equipment exported to the Republic of Cuba?

“John Deere Announces Strategic Partnership with SpaceX to Expand Rural Connectivity to Farmers through Satellite Communications

MOLINE, Illinois (January 16, 2024) — Deere & Company (NYSE: DE) announced it has entered into an agreement with SpaceX to provide cutting-edge satellite communications (SATCOM) service to farmers. Utilizing the industry-leading Starlink network, this solution will allow farmers facing rural connectivity challenges to fully leverage precision agriculture technologies. This partnership, an industry first, will enable John Deere customers to be more productive, profitable, and sustainable in their operations as they continue to provide food, fuel, and fiber for their communities and a growing global population.

“The value of connectivity to farmers is broader than any single task or action. Connectivity unlocks vast opportunities that were previously limited or unavailable,” said Aaron Wetzel, Vice President of Production and Precision Ag Production Systems at John Deere. “For example, throughout the year, farmers must complete tasks within extremely short windows of time. This requires executing incredibly precise production steps while coordinating between machines and managing machine performance. Each of these areas are enhanced through connectivity, making the entire operation more efficient, effective, and profitable.”

The SATCOM solution will connect both new and existing machines through satellite internet service and ruggedized satellite terminals. This will fully enable technologies such as autonomy, real-time data sharing, remote diagnostics, enhanced self-repair solutions, and machine-to-machine communication, all of which help farmers work more efficiently while minimizing downtime.

“John Deere has led the agriculture equipment industry for more than two decades with satellite-based precision guidance technology,” said Jahmy Hindman, Senior Vice President & Chief Technology Officer at John Deere. “Now, we are bringing satellite communications service to the farm at scale so farmers with cellular coverage challenges can maximize the value of connectivity to their operations. The SATCOM solution unlocks the John Deere tech stack so every farmer can fully utilize their current precision agriculture technology in addition to the new innovative solutions they will deploy in the future. We initiated this process with a fierce focus on delivering value to our customers, and this partnership ensures we have a solution that meets their needs today and in the future.”

John Deere’s SATCOM solution will leverage SpaceX’s Starlink satellite internet constellation. To activate this solution, John Deere dealers will install a ruggedized Starlink terminal on compatible machines, along with a 4G LTE JDLink modem to connect the machine to the John Deere Operations Center. The SATCOM solution will initially be available through a limited release in the United States and Brazil starting in the second half of 2024.

About Deere & Company

Deere & Company (www.JohnDeere.com) is a global leader in the delivery of agricultural, construction, and forestry equipment. We help our customers push the boundaries of what’s possible in ways that are more productive and sustainable to help life leap forward. Our technology-enabled products including John Deere Autonomous 8R Tractor, See & Spray™, and E-Power Backhoe are just some of the ways we help meet the world's increasing need for food, shelter, and infrastructure. Deere & Company also provides financial services through John Deere Financial.”

Cuba Background Data

OBAMA-BIDEN ADMINISTRATION INITIATIVES EXPORTS CONTINUE TO INCREASE- In 2015 and in 2016, the OFAC and BIS expanded the list of products and services authorized for export from the United States and from third countries to the Republic of Cuba. The Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) did not demonstrably interfere with the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) initiatives relating to product exports, but did relating to service exports. The Obama-Biden Administration focus was upon products (non-durable, durable, and consumable) to entities not affiliated with the government of the Republic of Cuba, while the government of the Republic of Cuba generally prohibited these exports and when permitted substantially restricted their activities. There was one United States company with two hotel management contracts, United States airlines servicing United States-Republic of Cuba routes, a company with a power generation contract, and two United States companies with agricultural equipment distribution centers.

In 2017, Deere & Company (2023 revenues approximately US$61.3 billion) established a distribution center in the Republic of Cuba, joining San Juan, Puerto Rico-based RIMCO, the Republic of Cuba distributor for Irving, Texas-based Caterpillar Inc. (2023 revenues US$66.5 billion) established the same year. At the time, neither Deere & Company nor Caterpillar issued media releases or posted information on their respective Internet sites.

Since November 2017, Deere & Company delivered more than US$800,000.00 in agricultural equipment to the Republic of Cuba for use at its distribution center. Antioch, Tennessee-based Wirtgen America, Inc., a subsidiary of Windhagen, Germany-based Wirtgen Group (2020 revenues approximately US$3 billion), a construction equipment machinery subsidiary (acquired in 2017) of Deere & Company has also delivered products to the Republic of Cuba. RIMCO continues to deliver equipment for use at its distribution center in the Republic of Cuba, including excavators, backhoes, graders, scrapers, bulldozers, railway fixtures, and signaling equipment, valued at more than US$4 million since December 2018. John Deere Financial Services was to provide payment terms/financing for the exports, primarily Series 5000 (price range US$25,000.00 to US$80,000.00) with a limited quantity of Series 7000 (price range US$219,000.00 to US$280,000.00). According to the company, several hundred tractors, parts and accessories may be exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba during the next four years, with the first deliveries (for testing and evaluation) scheduled for mid-November 2017. The potential value of the several hundred products exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba that would be financed could range from US$9 million to US$30 million. John Deere Financial Services has not commented as to whether the product sales goals have been achieved or if there have been issues relating to the receipt of payments. Caterpillar has not disclosed if the company has provided payment terms for its products exported to the Republic of Cuba.

Links To Related Analyses

John Deere Could Provide US$30 Million In Financing For U.S. Exports To Cuba November 03, 2017

Competition From Donations And Long Term Government Financing Are Hurdles To John Deere And Caterpillar February 27, 2018

Obstacles In Cuba For Caterpillar And John Deere Continue As Cuba Promotes Sale Of Tractors From Other Countries To Cuba Farmers May 12, 2021

Liebherr Of Austria, Womy of Germany, Peinemann Of The Netherlands, Bouygues Of France Link For Hotel Construction Equipment To Cuba. Competition For Caterpillar And Deere. April 27, 2021

Belarus And Cuba: Trucks, Harvesters, Loaders, Motorcycles, Tractors. Financing Always An Issue. Donations From India's Sonalika. Caterpillar, Deere Delivered US$1+ Million In Product Since 2017 October 11, 2022

Will Caterpillar And Deere Disclose Use Of Payment Terms And Financing For Exports To Cuba? January 29, 2021

Related Article

The Wall Street Journal
New York, New York
15 January 2024

John Deere, Meet Elon Musk: SpaceX Satellites to Link Farm Giant’s Equipment
Farm machinery maker hires SpaceX’s Starlink service to provide satellite internet connections for tractors, harvesters and crop sprayers in remote areas

By Bob Tita and Micah Maidenberg

Deere said it would tap SpaceX’s satellite fleet to propel the tractor maker’s digital farming push and help automate planting and harvesting in remote locations.

The world’s largest farm machinery manufacturer signed a deal with SpaceX’s Starlink business to connect tractors, seed planters, crop sprayers and other equipment in areas that lack adequate internet service, allowing them to use Deere’s digital products.

“This takes us a step closer to ubiquitous connectivity anywhere in the world,” said Jahmy Hindman, Deere’s chief technology officer. “The biggest opportunity for us is to expose existing technologies to more customers.”

Illinois-based Deere has been investing billions of dollars in building out computer-assisted services for farmers, including software that allows herbicide sprayers to distinguish crops from weeds and driverless tractors to plow fields.

The agreement shows the growing influence of Starlink, a division of Elon Musk’s SpaceX that uses satellites blasted off by the company to provide high-speed internet. Starlink’s impact stretches from the war in Ukraine to connecting natural disaster-struck communities, relying on the world’s biggest satellite fleet, with nearly 5,300 working satellites in orbit. Hawthorne, Calif.-based SpaceX didn’t respond to requests for comment. Starlink noted the deal with Deere in a post on X, and said the service is ideal for rural locations.

Deere tested satellites for about eight months before settling on Starlink. The company chose Starlink in part because of the speed at which its low-orbiting satellites transmit signals, Deere’s Hindman said. SpaceX’s ability to build satellites and launch them with its own rockets makes it easier for Starlink to expand its fleet than some of its competitors, Hindman said. “That’s a unique distinction in the satellite industry,” he said.

Deere, which sells around 60% of high-horsepower tractors used in the U.S. and Canada, wants to generate 10% of its annual revenue by the end of the decade from software service fees. The company reported $55.6 billion in equipment sales in its most recent fiscal year. Deere’s digital farming offerings enable farmers to monitor equipment remotely in their fields, troubleshoot problems without hauling tractors to repair shops and receive real-time data on soil, seeds and planting. Many farmers rely on wireless signals from land-based towers to use these digital services.

But about 30% of the acres farmed in the U.S. lack sufficient Wi-Fi service, according to Deere. Elsewhere in the world, the wireless deficit is even bigger. In Brazil, one of the world’s largest producers of soybeans, sugar cane, fruit and other farm commodities, more than 70% of the acres farmed lack adequate connectivity.

JC Schemper, who owns a Nebraska-based combining business, said his fleet of combines, grain carts and trucks is susceptible to the vagaries of rural cell service as it harvests wheat on farms stretching from Texas to Montana. Two of Schemper’s combines were outfitted with Starlink antennas in the summer as part of Deere’s testing program. “We never had any problems in the areas we went to,” Schemper said. “With the satellite, you’re always connected whether you’re at the bottom of a hill or the top of a hill or 50 miles away.”

Deere said Starlink service will debut in Brazil and unconnected parts of the U.S. later this year, with more countries to follow. The company added that the SpaceX-made antennas, which dealers will install on top of vehicle cabs, will be customized for dusty, rugged conditions.

Farmers’ costs for the pizza-box-size antennas and software service haven’t been determined yet, Deere said. Farmers that have adequate land-based cellular service gain access to data, monitoring services and software when they buy Deere equipment. The company is working toward charging software fees based on farmers’ usage of the programs and updating the software without requiring farmers to buy new equipment.

The Deere deal is a boost for Starlink which, like rivals, needs customers to pay for internet capacity while satellites fly over remote regions and oceans. Otherwise, satellites may not be used to their full potential, analysts say. Starlink and other satellite operators are also hunting for subscribers outside of densely populated areas where internet service derived from ground infrastructure, such as fiber-optic cable, costs less than satellite service.

At a recent SpaceX event, Musk described Starlink as supplemental to terrestrial internet service, not something that would replace it. “Starlink does really well for, like, low population density areas,” he said, according to a video of the talk SpaceX posted to X. “But it is really not going to be competitive in high-density cities.”

Starlink said in a recent report it had more than 2.3 million customers, covering households and businesses that range from containerships to smaller airlines. Revenue at Starlink jumped to $1.4 billion for 2022 from $222 million the year prior, The Wall Street Journal has reported.

Starlink beat out satellite operator Intelsat for the Deere contract, according to people familiar with the matter. Intelsat, which recently won an agreement to provide satellite internet for hundreds of American Airlines regional jets, has also been competing with Starlink to provide a similar service to some United Airlines planes, according to people familiar with the discussions.
Some SpaceX investors say Starlink is the primary driver of the company’s valuation because demand for internet service is larger than the market for rocket launches. The company was recently valued at $180 billion, according to people familiar with the matter. That valuation, reported earlier by Bloomberg, was up from a mid-2023 valuation of $150 billion.

January 12, 2024

Cuba Passport Ranks 78th With 64 Visa-Free Destinations. United States Passport Ranks 7th With 188 Visa-Free Destinations.

January 12, 2024/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

“The Henley Passport Index is the original, authoritative ranking of all the world’s passports according to the number of destinations their holders can access without a prior visa. The index is based on exclusive data from the International Air Transport Association (IATA) – the largest, most accurate travel information database – and enhanced by Henley & Partners’ research team. Expert insights regarding the latest ranking are available in the Global Mobility Report 2024.”

Global Passport Ranking

“With historical data spanning 19 years, the Henley Passport Index is the only one of its kind based on exclusive data from the International Air Transport Authority (IATA). The index includes 199 different passports and 227 different travel destinations. Updated monthly, the Henley Passport Index is considered the standard reference tool for global citizens and sovereign states when assessing where a passport ranks on the global mobility spectrum.”

https://www.henleyglobal.com/passport-index/ranking

January 10, 2024

U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba In November Decline 13.4%; Remains Up 2.8% Year-To-Year. Surprise? US$1 Million In Eggs; Ambulance; Motorcycles; Passenger Vehicles; Trucks.

January 10, 2024/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
January 2024

November 2023 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 13.4%- 1
50th Of 227 November 2023 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 2.8%- 2
Cuba Ranked 53rd Of 227 2023 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets- 2
November 2023 Healthcare Product Exports US$0.00- 2
November 2023 Humanitarian Donations US$2,917,805.00- 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 19

NOVEMBER 2023 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 13.4%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in November 2023 were US$28,643,992.00 compared to US$33,085,677.00 in November 2022 and US$27,699,046.00 in November 2021.

November 2023 exports included: Chicken Meat (Frozen), Chicken Leg Quarters (Frozen), Chicken Legs (Frozen), Meat Of Swine (Fresh), Preserved Chicken Meat, Meat Of Swine, Processed (Frozen), Meat Of Swine (Frozen), Pig Fat (Frozen), Preserved Chicken Meat (Paste), Crustaceans, Eggs (US$1,049,102.00), Black Beans, Cocoa, Coffee Roasted Decaffeinated, Fresh Cheese, Rice, Waffles, Infant Preparations, Juices (Unfermented), Ice Cream, Popcorn (Microwavable), Soy Sauce, Gelatin, Pet Food, Mineral Water, Detergents, Soap, Bidets, Toilet Paper, Towels, Equipment Scaffolding, Electric Cooking Stoves, Ambulance (US$78,590.00), Air Conditioners, Used Vehicles (US$1,935,107.00), Trucks (US$212,938.00), Motocycles (US$100,000.00), Front-End Shovel Loaders, AC Generators.

January 2023 through November 2023 TSREEA exports were US$297,377,457.00 compared to January 2022 through November 2022 exports of US$289,143,160.00. Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed: US$7,201,103,823.00

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

December 29, 2023

Government Of Cuba Revenues, Shareholders In Canada's Sherritt International Corporation Will Suffer From Low Nickel, Cobalt, Lithium Prices Expected In 2024. Cuba Consistently Owes Sherritt Money.

December 29, 2023/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

The Wall Street Journal
New York, New York
29 December 2023

Sustainable Business

Low Battery Metal Prices Set to Persist in 2024, Adding Friction to Energy Transition Oversupply and weak Chinese demand are likely to peg back prices for another year

By Yusuf Khan

Prices for metals used in batteries swooned in 2023, as rising supply and weak demand drove lithium to its cheapest level in two years, cobalt to its lowest point in four and nickel to its pandemic-era nadir. Next year looks likely to bring more of the same.

Lower battery metal prices have made electric vehicles and electrical grid storage cheaper in the near term, but persistently low prices could delay the investment required to ramp up supply of these key energy-transition materials, ultimately making the shift to a green economy slower and more expensive.

What happened?

Mining companies and battery investors had bet on EV sales growing faster than projected in 2023, while analysts had expected a rebound in the purchase of battery metals for EVs in the year as China came out of Covid-19 induced lockdowns. But slow economic growth in China and globally, combined with rising interest rates, put a damper on both.

Global EV sales in 2023 are now expected to reach 14 million, with about 63% in China, according to Bloomberg NEF, an energy-focused research service. “Expectations across the industry may have been too high,” Bloomberg NEF said.

More than 20 lithium mines opened in 2023, according to commodity data provider Fastmarkets. Miners have also been expanding production with an eye on the long term because new mines on average take 10 to 15 years to come online. With supply increasing and demand falling short of expectations, prices have fallen. The price of lithium carbonate—a raw material in batteries—fell 70% this year, Benchmark Mineral Intelligence data shows. Prices for cobalt are down 25%, according to the research firm and price provider, while nickel prices on the London Metal Exchange are down 45%.

“Pre-Covid there were supply concerns,” said Kwasi Ampofo, head of metals and mining at Bloomberg NEF. Producers in China and Australia ramped up their supplies as economies reopened, but demand hasn’t kept up, he said. “We did not come out of Covid with a bang as expected,” Ampofo said.

What’s in the cards for 2024?

Supply of all three battery metals is expected to outpace demand in the year ahead. “The outlook is quite bearish,” Ampofo said. Lithium prices are likely nearing the bottom because producers are now selling close to or below their cost of production, according to Jordan Roberts, battery raw materials analyst at Fastmarkets. “Producers [will] consider further production cuts to balance the market and stem further losses,” he said.

Roberts forecasts a 30% jump in lithium supply in 2024, but lithium-demand expectations are mixed. He projects a 30% increase in lithium demand for next year, which could help lift prices, but “Chinese market participants expect downstream demand to remain weak, with demand only expected to increase 10-15% year-on-year,” Roberts said. In the latter case, the outcome would be a considerable surplus in the market, he said. Benchmark Mineral Intelligence projects a 30,000 metric ton surplus in the global lithium market for next year.

Cobalt prices look likely to remain under pressure too. Jack Bedder, founder and director of critical-minerals consulting firm Project Blue, said the cobalt market is currently very oversupplied due to sluggish demand and high inventories. “All of this is bad news for cobalt prices,” Bedder said, adding that he expects more of the same in 2024 as producers run down stocks. Benchmark forecasts worldwide supply of cobalt to outstrip demand by 20,000 tons in 2024. And nickel is no different. “There’s not much positive movement and we’re not expecting this oversupply to change,” Benchmark analyst Spencer Ingall said. A number of producers in Indonesia have halted production on the low prices, he said. The global surplus of nickel is projected to far exceed that of lithium and cobalt next year, according to Benchmark, which puts it at 200,000 tons.

Why does this matter?

Demand is expected to soar for both electric vehicles and the minerals that go into them. Bloomberg NEF is forecasting global battery demand of 3.6 terawatt hours in 2030, up from 0.95 terawatt hours in 2023. The market for lithium-ion batteries alone is expected to surpass $300 billion by 2031, more than double what it is today.

But the supply of battery metals is determined largely by market conditions, including prices high enough to motivate miners to dig and explore. Persistently low prices for cobalt, lithium and nickel could delay the development of needed new sources, creating shortfalls and driving up battery prices in the longer term, thereby slowing decarbonization efforts.

While lower prices aren’t good news for miners, they can help cell makers cut the cost of a battery pack, making it cheaper to buy an electric car. Battery pack prices are forecast to fall further in 2024, to $133 per kilowatt-hour, after sliding to $139 per kWh this year from $161 per kWh in 2022, according to Bloomberg NEF. Prices are sharply lower than the $780 per kWh in 2013, but some of that cost reduction has come from scaling up production and reducing the amount of battery materials used, rather than a drop in commodity prices.

“The long-term [demand] prospect still remains…[so] supply is going to have to go faster than in the last few years if we are to keep up,” Ampofo said. “There has to be a sweet spot for miners and battery manufacturers.”

LINK: Toronto, Canada-based Sherritt International Corportaion Internet Site

“Sherritt is a world leader in the mining and refining of nickel and cobalt -- metals essential for the growing adoption of electric vehicles. Its Technologies Group creates innovative, proprietary solutions for oil and mining companies around the world to improve environmental performance and increase economic value. Sherritt is also the largest independent energy producer in Cuba.”

December 19, 2023

U.S. Department Of State Issues "U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Outer Limits" But Reports U.S. And Cuba Have ECS Agreement.

December 19, 2023/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

United States Department Of State
Washington DC
19 September 2023

Announcement of U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Outer Limits
Fact Sheet

What is the ECS? The continental shelf is the extension of a country’s land territory under the sea. The continental shelf holds many resources (e.g., corals, crabs) and vital habitats for marine life. The portion of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the coast is known as the “extended continental shelf,” or ECS. The ECS includes the seabed and subsoil, but not the water column.

Where is the U.S. ECS? The United States has ECS in seven regions: the Arctic, Atlantic (east coast), Bering Sea, Pacific (west coast), Mariana Islands, and two areas in the Gulf of Mexico. The U.S. ECS area is approximately one million square kilometers – an area about twice the size of California. The geographic coordinates and maps of the seven U.S. ECS regions are available in the Executive Summary posted on the U.S. ECS website at state.gov/shelf.

Why determine the ECS limits? The United States, like other countries, has an inherent interest in knowing, and declaring to others, the extent of its ECS and thus where it is entitled to exercise sovereign rights. Defining our ECS outer limits in geographical terms provides the specificity and certainty necessary to allow the United States to conserve and manage the resources of the ECS.

What are U.S. rights in the ECS? Like other countries, the United States has exclusive rights to conserve and manage the living and non-living resources of its ECS.The United States also has jurisdiction over marine scientific research relating to the ECS, as well as other authorities provided for under customary international law, as reflected in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

What’s down there? Much of the ocean – especially the deep ocean – remains unexplored. Continued mapping and exploration of the ECS will be important to gaining a better understanding of its habitats, ecosystems, biodiversity, and resources.
How are ECS limits determined? The continental shelf is defined in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the ECS outer limits are determined using the complex rules found in Article 76. Applying these rules requires knowledge of the geophysical and geological characteristics of the seabed and subsoil.

What information is needed to determine ECS outer limits? Two primary datasets are needed to determine the outer limits of the ECS. The first is bathymetric data, which provide a three-dimensional map of the surface of the seafloor. The second is seismic data, which provide information on the depth, thickness, and other characteristics of the sediments beneath the seafloor. Geological samples and other geophysical techniques, where available, are used to augment these primary data types. U.S. data collection began in 2003 and constitutes the largest offshore mapping effort ever conducted by the United States.

Who did the work? The ECS Task Force, an interagency body of the U.S. Government, coordinated the delineation of the outer limits of the U.S. ECS. The Department of State chairs the Task Force, leads the ECS Project Office, and manages the project’s diplomatic and legal aspects. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) leads the effort to collect, process, and interpret the seismic and geologic data. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) leads the effort to collect, process, and analyze the bathymetric data. Many other Federal and academic partners collaborated to complete the work over the course of more than 20 years.

Is the United States extending its exclusive economic zone (EEZ)? No. The ECS is not an extension of the EEZ. The continental shelf includes only the seabed and subsoil, whereas the EEZ also includes the water column. In addition, while the maximum extent of the EEZ is 200 nautical miles from the coast, the continental shelf may extend beyond 200 nautical miles. Some of the rights that a country has in its EEZ, especially sovereign rights over water column resources (such as fish), do not apply to the ECS.

Does the U.S. ECS overlap with the ECS areas of any neighboring countries? Yes. The U.S. ECS partially overlaps with ECS areas of Canada, The Bahamas, and Japan. In these areas, the United States and its neighbors will need to establish maritime boundaries in the future. In other areas, the United States has already established ECS boundaries with its neighbors, including with Cuba, Mexico, and Russia.

Does the Administration still support joining the Law of the Sea Convention? Yes. Like past Administrations, both Republican and Democratic, this Administration supports the United States joining the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The announcement of the U.S. ECS limits in no way changes the Administration’s position toward the Convention.

More information: Visit the U.S. ECS website at state.gov/shelf.

Key graphics:
S. ECS areas – Map showing the seven U.S. ECS regions
Maritime zones – Diagram showing maritime zones under the international law of the sea, including the extended continental shelf

December 18, 2023

After Almost Seven Years... Biden-Harris Administration "Transmitting Two Maritime Treaties" One With Cuba To The United States Senate

December 18, 2023/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

The White House
Washington DC
18 December 2023

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith two bilateral maritime boundary Treaties: the Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico beyond 200 Nautical Miles (the "United States-Cuba Treaty"), and the Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States on the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico (the "United States-Mexico Treaty") (together, the "Treaties"), both of which were signed at Washington on January 18, 2017.

I also transmit, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Treaties. The purpose of the Treaties is to establish our continental shelf boundaries in the eastern Gulf of Mexico with Cuba and Mexico in areas beyond 200 nautical miles from shore. The United States-Cuba Treaty establishes a maritime boundary of approximately 30 nautical miles in length, and the United States-Mexico Treaty establishes a maritime boundary of approximately 79 nautical miles in length. The boundaries define the limit within which each country may exercise maritime jurisdiction with respect to its portion of the continental shelf.

The boundaries address the only remaining area in the Gulf of Mexico where the maritime boundaries between the United States and its neighbors had not been agreed.The United States-Cuba Treaty also establishes procedures for addressing the possibility of oil and gas reservoirs that extend across the continental shelf boundary, which will help protect related United States interests.

With respect to Mexico, such procedures were developed and set forth in a separate agreement that is already in force, as described in the report of the Department of State accompanying this message.I believe the Treaties to be fully in the interest of the United States.

In light of the relevant coastal geography, the Treaties allocate approximately two-thirds of the area in question to the United States, and they provide legal certainty with respect to United States sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the continental shelf.I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Treaties, and give its advice and consent to ratification.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.
THE WHITE HOUSE, December 18, 2023.

December 14, 2023

U.S. Department Of State Discusses Cuba's Inclusion On List Of State Sponsors Of Terrorism.

December 14, 2023/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
14 December 2023

Briefing excerpts:

QUESTION: Matt, follow-up. Question on Cuba. At the end of the Trump administration, they designated Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terror. Last week in a briefing with Congress, the State Department told members of Congress that they have not even begun a review of whether Cuba should be removed from the State Sponsor of Terror list. As you know, there’s been 450,000 migrants that have flown out of Cuba over the last two years. The economy has been decimated as a result of this designation. Why hasn’t the review begun?

MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to either an internal deliberative process here inside the State Department or our conversations with members of Congress, though they of course are —

QUESTION: Matt, follow-up.

MR MILLER: I’m in the middle of answering someone else’s question right now. You might – maybe hold for just a second. As we have said previously, should there be any rescission of the State Sponsor of Terrorism status, it would need to be consistent with a specific statutory criteria for rescinding that determination. Any review of Cuba’s status on the list, should one ever happen, would be based on the law and the criteria established by Congress, but the President and Secretary Blinken remain committed to the policies that we have advanced that will advance the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people.

QUESTION: There’s a six-month statutory requirement, as you know. Is the administration nervous that you will run out of time in this term in order to make a decision if you haven’t started the review yet?

MR MILLER: So again, I don’t think I can answer that with violating what I said I wasn’t going to do at the outset, which is comment on internal deliberations.

December 13, 2023

Another Reason From OFAC For Financial Institutions To Avoid Cuba- The Range Of A Penalty: US$1.2 Million Settlement With US$327.3 Million Potentiality.

December 13, 2023/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

“Enforcement Release: December 13, 2023 OFAC Settles with CoinList Markets LLC for $1,207,830 Related to Apparent Violations of the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations CoinList Markets LLC (“CLM”), a San Francisco, California-based virtual currency exchange, has agreed to pay $1,207,830 to settle its potential civil liability arising from processing 989 transactions on behalf of users ordinarily resident in Crimea between April 2020 and May 2022, in apparent violation of OFAC’s Russia/Ukraine sanctions. The settlement amount reflects OFAC determination that CLM’s apparent violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed and were nonegregious.”

“Penalty Calculation and General Factors Analysis The statutory maximum civil monetary penalty applicable in this matter is $327,306,583. OFAC determined that the Apparent Violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed and were non-egregious. Accordingly, under OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines (“Enforcement Guidelines”), the base civil monetary penalty amount applicable in this matter equals the applicable schedule amount, which in this case is $3,097,000. The settlement amount of $1,207,830 reflects OFAC’s consideration of the General Factors under the Enforcement Guidelines.”

LINK TO DECISION IN PDF FORMAT

December 10, 2023

U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 26.3% In October 2023; Remain Up 4.95% Year-To-Year. US$1.1 Million In "Aerial Reflectors" And US$30 Million In Donated Goods Already Exceeds Full Year 2022.

December 10, 2023/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
December 2023

October 2023 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 23.6%- 1
59th Of 228 October 2023 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 4.95%- 2
Cuba Ranked 54th Of 228 2023 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets- 2
October 2023 Healthcare Product Exports US$65,173.00- 2
October 2023 Humanitarian Donations US$2,745,566.00- 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 19

OCTOBER 2023 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 23.6%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in October 2023 were US$15,928,609.00 compared to US$20,852,560.00 in October 2022 and US$22,271,632.00 in October 2021.

October 2023 exports included: Chicken Meat (Frozen), Chicken Leg Quarters (Frozen), Chicken Legs (Frozen), Meat Of Swine (Fresh), Preserved Chicken Meat, Meat Of Swine, Processed (Frozen), Meat Of Swine (Frozen), Pig Fat (Frozen), Preserved Chicken Meat (Paste), Coffee Roasted Decaffeinated, Fresh Cheese, Rice, Confectioner Sugar, Infant Preparations, Juices, Ice Cream, Gelatin, Mineral Water, Detergents, Toilet Paper, Sweaters, Brace Overalls, Footwear, Hair Nets, Umbrellas, Turbochargers, Air Conditioners, Weighing Machinery, Electric Self-Propelled Work Trucks, Machine For Working Hard Materials, Cooking Stove/Range/Oven Parts, Aerial Reflectors (US$1,135,439.00), Used Vehicles (US$476,625.00), Passenger Motor Vehicles (US$288,955.00).

January 2023 through October 2023 TSREEA exports were US$268,733,465.00 compared to January 2022 through October 2022 exports of US$256,057,483.00. Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed: US$7,172,459,831.00.

COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

December 07, 2023

Bacardi Spent Approximately US$690,000.00 And 251 Days Later Its Cuba Trademark Legislation Moved From House To Senate- With No Objection. Where Were Pernod Ricard Lobbyists? NGO's? Members?

December 07, 2023/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

Rocket Docket For Cuba-Related Legislation?

Bacardi Spent Wisely US$690,000.00 Thus Far In 2023

How Did Cuba Trademark Legislation Designed To Protect Hamilton, Bermuda-Based Bacardi Limited Move Through United States House Of Representatives Absent Any Opposition From Members Who Have Advocated For An Expansion Of Commercial, Economic, Financial, And Political Relations Between The United States And The Republic Of Cuba?

Surprise Jarrold Nadler (D- 12th District, New York), Ranking Member Of The Judiciary Committee Of The United States House Of Representatives, Supported The Legislation Given His Previous Positions On Republic Of Cuba-Related Issues.

No Objections? Not One Member

Where Were Lobbyists And NGO’s?

Bacardi North America Reports 2023 Thus Far Spending US$570,000.00 On Various Issues And The Cormac Group LLC Reports Spending US$120,000.00 Lobbying On Various Issues For Bacardi North America.

From Hamilton, Bermuda-Based Bacardi Limited (2022 Revenue Approximately US$4.6 Billion) Through Coral Gables, Florida-Based Bacardi North America (Formerly Bacardi USA, Inc.) 2023 United States Congress Lobbying Reports. Lobbying Focuses Include:

“Bacardi Limited, the ultimate parent of Bacardi North America, has an indirect general interest in U.S. trademark laws.”
“HR 1505 and S 746, No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act, amending Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1999 to protect the original owners of confiscated Cuban trademarks in America.”
“Issues related to the economic embargo of Cuba.”

From Hamilton, Bermuda-Based Bacardi Limited (2022 Revenue Approximately US$4.6 Billion) Through Coral Gables, Florida-Based Bacardi North America (Formerly Bacardi USA, Inc.) 2023 United States Congress Lobbying Reports By Washington DC-Based The Cormac Group, LLC Which References Up To Five Lobbyists Servicing Bacardi North America. Lobbying Focuses Include:

“Cuban Trademark Protection Legislation and US-Cuba relations”
“Cuban Trademark Protection Legislation and US-Cuba relations. H.R. 1505/S.746 - No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act.”

Who Represents Paris, France-Based Pernod Ricard (2022 Revenue Approximately US$11.6 Billion) To The United States Congress (United States Senate And United States House of Representatives)? From 2023 Lobbying Disclosures: ABI Associates, Arent Fox Schiff LLP, Ballard Partners, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck LLP, Crossroads Strategies LLC, Ernst & Young LLP, And Miller Strategies LLC.

A Few Too Many Havana Club Mojito Cocktails… And Fell Asleep?

What May Happen In The United States Senate? Will Marco Rubio (R- Florida) Seek To Attach An Amendment To The New Farm Bill- As He Successfully Attached Republic Of Cuba-Related Amendment To Previous Farm Bill In 2018?

U.S. House Of Representatives Legislation Background

5. H.R.1505 — 118th Congress (2023-2024) No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act of 2023 Sponsor: Issa, Darrell E. [Rep.-R-CA-48] (Introduced 03/09/2023) Cosponsors: (18) Committees: House - Judiciary | Senate - Judiciary Committee Report: H. Rept. 118-232 Latest Action: Senate - 11/14/2023 Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. (All Actions)

11/14/2023- Senate; Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
11/13/2023-4:41pm- House; Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.
11/13/2023-4:41pm- House; On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, as amended Agreed to by voice vote. (text: CR H5676)
11/13/2023-4:32pm- House; DEBATE - The House proceeded with forty minutes of debate on H.R. 1505.
11/13/2023-4:32pm- House; Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H5676-5677)
11/13/2023-4:31pm- House; Mr. Issa moved to suspend the rules and pass the bill, as amended.
09/29/2023- House; Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 188.
09/29/2023- House; Reported (Amended) by the Committee on Judiciary. H. Rept. 118-232.
05/24/2023- House; Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by Voice Vote. Action By: Committee on the Judiciary
05/24/2023- House; Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held Action By: Committee on the Judiciary
03/09/2023- House; Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
03/09/2023- House; Introduced in House

Page H5676- 13 November 2023
1. PLEDGE OF   ALLEGIANCE; Congressional Record Vol. 169, No. 187 | PDF (257KB)
2. COMMUNICATION   FROM THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE; Congressional Record Vol. 169, No. 187 | PDF (245KB)
3. COMMUNICATION   FROM CHIEF OF STAFF, THE HONORABLE NANCY PELOSI, MEMBER OF CONGRESS; Congressional Record Vol. 169, No. 187 | PDF (245KB)
4. RECESS;   Congressional Record Vol. 169, No. 187 | PDF (245KB)
5. AFTER RECESS;   Congressional Record Vol. 169, No. 187 | PDF (245KB)
6. ANNOUNCEMENT   BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE; Congressional Record Vol. 169, No. 187 | PDF (245KB)
7. NO STOLEN   TRADEMARKS HONORED IN AMERICA ACT OF 2023; Congressional Record Vol. 169, No. 187 | PDF (259KB)

https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/volume-169/issue-187/house-section/page/H5676

[Pages H5676-H5677] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

NO STOLEN TRADEMARKS HONORED IN AMERICA ACT OF 2023
13 November 2023

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1505) to modify the prohibition on recognition by United States courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, trade names, or commercial names, as amended. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The text of the bill is as follows: H.R. 1505

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act of 2023''.

SEC. 2. MODIFICATION OF PROHIBITION.

Section 211 of the Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 (as contained in section 101(b) of division A of Public Law 105-277; 112 Stat. 2681- 88) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(2)-- (A) by inserting ``or entity of the executive branch'' after ``U.S. court''; (B) by striking ``by a designated national''; and (C) by inserting before the period ``that was used in connection with a business or assets that were confiscated unless the original owner of the mark, trade name, or commercial name, or the bonafide successor-in-interest has expressly consented''; (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) by inserting ``or entity of the executive branch'' after ``U.S. court''; and (B) by striking ``by a designated national or its successor-in-interest''; (3) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); (4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following: ``(d) Subsections (a)(2) and (b) of this section shall apply only if the person or entity asserting the rights knew or had reason to know at the time when the person or entity acquired the rights asserted that the mark, trade name, or commercial name was the same as or substantially similar to a mark, trade name, or commercial name that was used in connection with a business or assets that were confiscated.''; and (5) in subsection (e), as so redesignated, by striking ``In this section:'' and all that follows through ``(2) The term'' and inserting ``In this section, the term''.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California (Mr. Issa) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) each will control 20 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

General Leave

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and to insert extraneous material on H.R. 1505.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California? There was no objection.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, it is hard for the American people to believe, but it is true that foreign actors--foreign countries--have, in fact, stolen trademarks, absconded with the actual factories and the ability to produce various items and then had the gall to, in fact, use American law to sell America products that they in reality had already stolen. This is no more truer than in the case of the communist nation of Cuba. Under Fidel Castro, Cuba took everything. They took Coca-Cola. They took every possible item they could take, and then they took trade names. In some cases, like Coca-Cola, Coke continued to be produced in the United States, so it had no rights. In the case of Bacardi, Bacardi moved to Puerto Rico and began making it there and selling it in the United States. In the case of, for example, Havana Club, they found themselves without any factories, so they worked together with other producers to continue their brand. While their brand was, in fact, being produced in America, the Castro regime--and now the Cuban Government--continued to apply year after year until eventually, due to what we would consider to be a wrongful act by the United States Patent and Trademark Office, awarded this country, who had stolen and still to this day uses the factories and the lands belonging to the family that produced Havana Club, they continue to sell Havana Club. Now, to make matters worse, we are only talking about the United States because most of the world, in fact, took that brand name and was able to sell it in other countries. So the family that owned worldwide rights lost all but the United States, and if not for this piece of legislation, they and others would lose even their right here. I am delighted to join with my colleague, Ms. Wasserman Schultz of Florida, to introduce this bill. It has 17 cosponsors, and it passed through the Judiciary Committee on a bipartisan basis. We all agree that the U.S. Government should not award those who steal and exploit trademarks or any other intellectual property from its legitimate owners to then benefit from U.S. law. Allowing Cuba to propagate its misappropriations would be and is currently a travesty. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan legislation, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1505, the No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act. H.R. 1505 would build on existing law to ensure that executive agencies do not recognize, enforce, or otherwise validate the assertion of trademark rights used in connection with a business whose assets were confiscated by the Cuban regime unless the original owner expressly consented to the transfer of that mark. It also makes technical amendments to ensure that we are in compliance with certain international obligations. This legislation largely involves a long-running dispute over the rightful ownership of a specific trademark that has played out over the course of many decades. It is a tale with more twists and turns than a John Grisham novel. This bill is really about a much larger principle--that we stand with the Cuban people whose property was seized by the Castro regime, and we will not give the protection and benefits of the U.S. trademark system to the holders of stolen property. Our trademark system must not be allowed to be a vehicle for the perpetrators of stolen property to profit from their theft. I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Issa) and the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz) for bringing this legislation forward. Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members to support it, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz), the cosponsor of this legislation.

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding and for his longstanding support of this important legislation that really reflects the values that we stand for here in the United States of America. I particularly thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Issa) for the back and forth--depending on who is in the majority in our Chamber in each successive Congress--as we sort of trade responsibility for who leads this bill. In addition, I have also previously co-led this legislation with our former colleague, Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, and Mr. Diaz-Balart also joins us, as well. There is really broad bipartisan support for this bill, and I am so proud to lead this legislation on the Democratic side of the aisle. This legislation would ensure that our government is never complicit in theft and expropriation ordered by autocracies. By prohibiting U.S. recognition of illegally confiscated trademarks, this bill stands strongly against attempts by the Cuban regime to profit from hijacked intellectual property. Representing a diaspora community as I do, I have heard countless constituents recount how their home countries stripped them of hard-earned wealth. Many Cuban families had to start from scratch when they arrived. They had property and their businesses confiscated. Our Nation has benefited immeasurably from their cultural contributions and entrepreneurial spirit. We are not just a nation of immigrants. We are a nation of innovators. We should always reward creativity and punish piracy. Our most fundamental responsibility is protecting Americans and those living in our country from being victimized by our adversaries. Our failure to do so would only embolden global despots who seek to target their exiles. I hope my colleagues join us in refusing to tolerate trademarks being held hostage, as this one is in particular, and the many others that are held hostage by the Cuban regime and other regimes, as well. I am hopeful that our friends on the other side of the Capitol, once we send this bill to them, will send it to the President of the United States for his signature.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, this legislation makes a minor clarification to our trademark laws while serving notice to corrupt regimes across the world that America's intellectual property system must not be used to further their efforts to steal property from their own people. Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members to support this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, in closing, I will make it very clear, if this product's trademark becomes available to its rightful owners again, the well-known company Bacardi will, in fact, have this product on the shelves again. If it is not passed, Cuba will not be able to sell under this name. In fact, these products would be prohibited if they came from Cuba. The only purpose of Cuba trying to take this was to deny Cuban Americans the ability to sell a product that they owned before it was taken from the country. There was an injustice that occurred before many in this room were born. We can only cure that injustice now by, in fact, passing this legislation. I join with the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz) in urging all to vote for this bill as they have in this body, and then we will work on the people across the dome. Mr. Speaker, I urge passage of this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Issa) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1505, as amended. The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

U.S. Senate Legislation Background

S. 746 was introduced on 9 March 2023 by Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey), then Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. S. 746 was referred to the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

Co-sponsors include Marco Rubio (R- Florida), Catherine Cortez Masto (D- Nevada), Mike Braun (R- Indiana), Thomas Tillis (R- North Carolina), Robert Marshall (R- Kansas), Mazie Hirono (D- Hawaii), and Todd Young (R- Indiana).

Co-sponsors who are members of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary include: Senators Rubio, Hirono, and Tillis. Ted Cruz (R- Texas) is a member of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary and likely to co-sponsor S. 746.

Senators Cruz, Menendez, and Rubio are of Cuban descent.

The language in S. 746 is identical to the language in H.R. 1505, meaning a promising candidate for moving successfully through any bicameral (United States Senate and United States House of Representatives) conference committee.

S. 746

“To modify the prohibition on recognition by United States courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, trade names, or commercial names.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

9 March 2023

Mr. Menendez (for himself, Mr. Rubio, Ms. Cortez Masto, Mr. Braun, Mr. Tillis, Mr. Marshall, Ms. Hirono, and Mr. Young) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To modify the prohibition on recognition by United States courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, trade names, or commercial names. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. Short title.

This Act may be cited as the “No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act”.

SEC. 2. Modification of prohibition.

Section 211 of the Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 (as contained in section 101(b) of division A of Public Law 105–277; 112 Stat. 2681–88) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(2)— (A) by inserting “or entity of the executive branch” after “U.S. court”; (B) by striking “by a designated national”; and (C) by inserting before the period at the end the following: “that was used in connection with a business or assets that were confiscated unless the original owner of the mark, trade name, or commercial name, or the bona fide successor-in-interest has expressly consented”; (2) in subsection (b)— (A) by inserting “or entity of the executive branch” after “U.S. court”; and (B) by striking “by a designated national or its successor-in-interest”; (3) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); (4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following: “(d) Subsections (a)(2) and (b) of this section shall apply only if the person or entity asserting the rights knew or had reason to know at the time when the person or entity acquired the rights asserted that the mark, trade name, or commercial name was the same as or substantially similar to a mark, trade name, or commercial name that was used in connection with a business or assets that were confiscated.”; and (5) in subsection (e), as so redesignated, by striking “In this section:” and all that follows through “(2) The term” and inserting the following: “In this section, the term”.”

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Links To Related Analyses

Bacardi Condemns Decisions By Government Of Cuba, And Companies Operating In Cuba, Robustly Uses U.S. Political Process, But Defends Its US$474 Million Business In Russian Federation. Consistency? Nov 18, 2023

The Kyiv Independent: Ukraine designates Bacardi as 'international sponsor of war' 10 August 2023

U.S. Federal Court Rules Bacardi Must Use USPTO Rules For "Havana Club" Trademark Issue. April 08, 2022

Eight Senators, Two Representatives Supporting Trademark Legislation To Benefit Bacardi. But, Does Legislation Help Resolve 5,913 Certified Claims Against Cuba? March 12, 2023

With Three Days Remaining In 2021, Bacardi Sues United States Patent And Trademark Office For In 2016 Authorizing The Registration Of "Havana Club" Rum December 29, 2021

Irony: Bacardi Assets Seized In 1960 By Cuba. Venezuela And Cuba Are Allies. Venezuela Seizes U.S. Company Assets. Bacardi Marketing Venezuela Rum Benefits Venezuela Financially & Politically November 03, 2021

December 01, 2023

U.S. Department Of State Explains Again Why Cuba Is A "State Sponsor Of Terrorism"

December 01, 2023/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

United States Department of State
Washington CC
30 November 2023

On the Release of the 2022 Country Reports on Terrorism

Matthew Miller, Department Spokesperson

“The Department of State issued the 2022 Country Reports on Terrorism (CRT). Each year, the CRT provides insight on important issues in the fight against terrorism and helps the United States make informed decisions about policies, programs, and resource allocations as we seek to build counterterrorism capacity and resilience around the globe. As the United States confronts a diverse and dynamic range of national security challenges, the U.S. government is deploying the full range of CT tools to ensure a sustainable whole-of-government and whole-of-society CT approach with allies and partners around the world. The 2022 CRT is available on the Department’s website.

Chapter 2 -- State Sponsors of Terrorism

This report provides a snapshot of events during 2022 relevant to countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. It does not constitute a new announcement regarding such designations.

To designate a country as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the Secretary of State must determine that the government of such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. Once a country is designated, it remains a State Sponsor of Terrorism until the designation is rescinded in accordance with statutory criteria requiring the President to certify either that a) a designated country has not provided any support for acts of international terrorism during the previous six months and has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future, or 2) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the designated country, that the country is not supporting acts of international terrorism, and that the country has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. A wide range of sanctions is imposed because of a State Sponsor of Terrorism designation, including the following:

A ban on arms-related exports and sales;
Controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list country’s military capability or ability to support terrorism;
Restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance;
Visa processing requirements;
Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.

CUBA

On January 12, 2021, the Department of State designated Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The Secretary determined that the Cuban government repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism in granting safe harbor to terrorists.

Cuba was previously designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1982 because of its long history of providing advice, safe haven, communications, training, and financial support to guerrilla groups and individual terrorists.

Cuba’s designation was rescinded in 2015 after a thorough review found that the country met the statutory criteria for rescission. In 2021 the Secretary of State determined that Cuba had repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism in the six years since its designation had been rescinded. Citing peace negotiation protocols, Cuba refused Colombia’s request to extradite 10 ELN leaders living in Havana after that group claimed responsibility for the 2019 bombing of a Bogotá police academy that killed 22 people and injured 87 others.

The Cuban government did not formally respond to the extradition requests for ELN leaders Victor Orlando Cubides (aka “Pablo Tejada”) and Ramírez Pineda (aka “Pablo Beltrán”) filed by Colombia.

In November, pursuant to an order from Colombian President Petro, the Attorney General announced that arrest warrants would be suspended against 17 ELN commanders, including those whose extradition Colombia had previously requested.

Cuba also continues to harbor several U.S. fugitives from justice wanted on charges related to political violence, many of whom have resided in Cuba for decades.”

November 30, 2023

First Tesla Model Y Vehicle Authorized By Biden-Harris Administration Scheduled For Delivery To A Cuban National. Maryland-Based Company Received First BIS License.

November 30, 2023/ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

2021 Tesla Model Y Long Range 4-Door Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV) With All Wheel Drive (AWD) With 317 Mile Range And One Tesla Wall Connector Gen 3 (208/240V)

Landed 2021 Tesla Model Y Cost US$38,850.00

Transported From Port Everglades, Florida, By Crowley Shipping

The Tesla Will Reside At A Private Residence In Havana

On 22 November 2023 at Port Everglades in the State of Florida, a 2021 Tesla Model Y was loaded onto a container vessel operated by Jacksonville, Florida-based Crowley Holdings, Inc. (2022 revenue US$2.2 billion) for its journey to Port Mariel, approximately thirty miles from the City of Havana, Republic of Cuba.

Import duty for an electric vehicle to the Republic of Cuba is based upon the value of the landed electric vehicle. If the purchaser is a Micro, Small, or Medium-size Enterprise (MSME), the duty is 21%. If the purchaser is an individual, the duty is 42%.
Import duty for a gasoline-powered vehicle to the Republic of Cuba is based upon difference between the value of the landed vehicle and the resale value of the landed vehicle in the Republic of Cuba marketplace, with the difference multiplied by 32%. For example, if the gasoline-powered vehicle landed valued of US$20,000.00 and the resale value in the Republic of Cuba marketplace is US$70,000.00, then the purchaser in the Republic of Cuba would pay 32% on the difference of US$50,000.00, which is US$16,000.00. Thus, the import duty equates in this example to 80% of the vehicle landed value. The resale value of the landed vehicle is determined by La Aduana General de la Republica de Cuba.

This purchase represented the first delivery of a vehicle manufactured by Austin, Texas-based Tesla, Inc. (2022 revenue US$81 billion) from the United States to the Republic of Cuba authorized by a license issued to Colombia, Maryland-based Premier Automotive Export, Ltd. (PAE) from the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The Special Event Invitation: “John Felder, Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Colombia, Maryland-based Premier Automotive Export, Ltd. (PAE) has the honor of inviting you to a documentary premier “Driving Towards Change” that tells the story of my fifteen-year journey to become the first recipient of a license from the United States government to sell electric vehicles to Cuba. At the event, we will also showcase the first Tesla vehicle delivered to Cuba from the United States. This two-hour event will be at 2:00 pm on Friday, 1 December 2023, at the 2.45 Bar-Restaurante (Calle 46 & 5ta A La Hababa, Cuba). International Jazz Artist, Chuck Holden will be performing at the event with a trio of Cuban musicians.”

During the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) and then during the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) PAE was awarded the first two licenses from the BIS to export electric vehicles and electric vehicle charging stations from the United States to the Republic of Cuba. Exports to the United States Embassy in the city of Havana, Republic of Cuba, were specifically authorized by the second license. PAE has received five BIS licenses since 2017 including the first BIS license to export an electric vehicle to an embassy located in the Republic of Cuba.

On 17 November 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) approved a license application submitted on 22 October 2022 by PAE to the BIS to export electric vehicles and chargers to republic of cuba nationals with the “ULTIMATE CONSIGNEE: Privately owned companies in the Republic of Cuba owned by Cuba Nationals.” The BIS license is valid until 30 November 2026.

“1. The items must be used to meet the needs of the Cuban people. 2. The items are not for resale to the Cuban government, or Cuban Government officials. 3. The items may not be reexported from Cuba to any other destination. 4. The items may not be used to enable or facilitate the export of goods or services from Cuba that primarily generate revenue for the Cuban government.”

On 28 September 2022, the BIS issued a license to PAE for the export of electric scooters and electric bicycles to Republic of Cuba nationals and to MSMEs.

On 15 December 2021, the BIS denied a license application submitted on 30 September 2021 by PAE to export electric vehicles and chargers to republic of cuba nationals. From the license application: “Specific End Use- Ordinary Cuban Nationals would be the specific End User and purchasing electric vehicle for their own personal transportation.”

From BIS: “There is a general policy of denial for exports and reexports to Cuba of items subject to the EAR, as described in Section 746.2(b) of the EAR. However, there are exceptions to the general policy of denial, some of which are listed below: … Items necessary for the environmental protection of U.S. and international air quality, waters and coastlines, including items related to renewable energy or energy efficiency, are generally approved.”
A license exception is a general authorization to export or reexport certain items without a license under stated conditions. Only the license exceptions, or portions thereof, listed Section 746.2(a)(1) of the EAR are available for Cuba…. Support for the Cuban People: License Exception Support for the Cuban People (SCP) “§ 740.21 Support for the Cuban People (SCP). (a) Introduction. This License Exception authorizes certain exports and reexports to Cuba that are intended to support the Cuban people by improving their living conditions and supporting independent economic activity; strengthening civil society in Cuba; and improving the free flow of information to, from, and among the Cuban people. (b) Improving living conditions and supporting independent economic activity.…. (1) Items for use by the Cuban private sector for private sector economic activities… (2) Items sold directly to individuals in Cuba for their personal use or their immediate family's personal use,” LINK

NOTE: On 24 January 2022, John Felder wrote to Brian Nichols, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, United States Department of State. Excerpts: “I am writing you today to obtain authorization for my company to donate to the United States Department of State four (4) electric vehicle (EV) chargers for use at the Embassy of the United States in the city of Havana, Republic of Cuba, and for use at the Residence of the United States Ambassador in the city of Havana, Republic of Cuba. My company would also coordinate the installation if beneficial to expediting the process…. I previously received from the Embassy of the United States in the Republic of Cuba an inquiry about sourcing an electric vehicle.” There has yet to be a response from the United States Department of State despite several follow-up communications.

Eleven Months After Denial, Biden-Harris Administration Approves Four-Year License To Export Electric Vehicles To Micro, Small & Medium-Size Enterprises (MSME's) In Cuba

Original BIS License Application Background

United States Department of Commerce- Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance- Foreign Policy Division, Washington DC- 10 November 2021

“The Department of Commerce intends to deny the application referenced above. We are taking this action pursuant to Section 1756(a)(2) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) and in accordance with Part 750.6(a) of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The Department of Commerce believes that denial of this application furthers the United States policy in Section 1752(1)(B) of the ECRA, “to restrict the export of items if necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States.” We have reviewed your license application to export electric vehicles to Empresa Logistica Palco for resale to the general population in Cuba. Interagency reviewers have determined that your proposed transaction would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests due to an unacceptable risk of diversion to unauthorized end uses and/or end users that primarily generate revenue for the state (including uses in the tourism industry).”

“The attached application is rejected pursuant to Section 1756(a)(2) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), as amended, and paragraph 750.6 of the Export Administration Regulations. The U.S. Government has concluded that the export would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests. Please refer to the attached official intent to deny letter dated November 10, 2021 for details regarding this denial. If you wish to rebut the intent to deny, a work item has been sent via SNAP-R that will allow you provide a rebuttal.”

United States Department of Commerce- Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance- Foreign Policy Division, Washington DC- 15 December 2021

“This application [500- Nissan Leaf Electric Vehicle value US$17,500,000.00] is denied pursuant to Section 1756(a)(2) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 and Section 750.6 of the Export Administration Regulations. The Department of Commerce, in consultation with other U.S. Government agencies, has concluded that this export would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests. Refer to the formal intent to deny letter for details regarding this denial.”

Recent Administration Policy Changes Background And Issue With Payments

The Biden-Harris Administration policies and regulations have, thus far, focused upon providing connective and re-connective opportunities to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.

The remaining challenge to transition Biden-Harris Administration policies from aspirational to operational is recreating a cost-efficient, timely, transparent, and secure mechanism to move funds from the United States to the Republic of Cuba and from the Republic of Cuba to the United States through the authorization of direct correspondent banking.

On 10 May 2022, the OFAC issued a license authorizing direct investment in and direct financing to a privately-owned company located in the Republic of Cuba owned by a Republic of Cuba national. Investment funds and dividends, and financing funds and interest/interest/principal payments must currently be transferred through financial institutions located in third countries.

The issuance of the licenses in May 2022, September 2022, and November 2022 by the OFAC and BIS will result in two-way transfers that are small in value but consistent. Privately-owned companies located in the Republic of Cuba sending dividend (profit sharing) payments to the source(s) of direct investment and sending interest and principal payments for direct financing. Republic of Cuba nationals and privately-owned companies located in the Republic of Cuba sending payment(s) for the purchase of an electric vehicle.

From John Felder, Founder and Chief Executive Officer of PAE, “Essential for the OFAC to authorize direct correspondent banking so payments for electric vehicles may be transferred by citizens of Cuba with the least amount of cost, least amount of effort, least amount of time, most amount of security, and most amount of transparency. Payments should not need to move through third-country banks. Support two-way transactions rather than three-way transactions.”

Potential customers of PAE have inquired about installment payments for the purchase of EVs. As monthly payments would be minimal in value, the cost for sending the funds through a third country financial institution would be larger than the installment amount. Flexibility to provide installment payments will further enhance the cashflow of an MSME and further connect the MSME with the United States-based company.

A significant transaction hurdle remains receiving payments in the United States from Republic of Cuba nationals residing in the Republic of Cuba who are restricted in the amount of Cuban Pesos they may exchange for convertible currencies, including United States Dollars and Euros.

The OFAC authorizes United States financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with Cuba-based financial institutions.

The decision by the Obama-Biden Administration not to authorize Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions never made sense- the marketplace, meaning United States-based financial institutions and their customers should determine if they want to engage in direct correspondent banking. As written, the OFAC regulations today do not provide United States companies with a viable mechanism to avoid the use (and delay and expense) of third-country financial institutions to send or receive authorized payments. Why one way, but not both ways?

The use of correspondent accounts is particularly critical to the re-emerging private sectors in Cuba as represented by MSMEs.

The current requirement to move funds from the Republic of Cuba and to the Republic of Cuba through third-country financial institutions is inefficient, not transparent, and expensive- especially when considering that MSME transactions are often small which makes the fees far more onerous as a percentage of the total transaction. This is true for vehicles and vehicle parts.

There are discussions within the BIS, OFAC, and United States Department of State to authorize Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions which would then permit the efficient, transparent, and cost-effective movement of funds for authorized transactions.

PAE BIS License History

PAE has received five licenses from the BIS for the export of vehicles (gasoline and electric) to the Republic of Cuba, including for use by embassies. The first BIS license was issued during the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), the second BIS license was issued during the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021), and the third, fourth, and fifth BIS licenses were issued during the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ).

From the BIS: “There is a general policy of denial for exports and reexports to Cuba of items subject to the EAR, as described in Section 746.2(b) of the EAR. However, there are exceptions to the general policy of denial, some of which are listed below: … Items necessary for the environmental protection of U.S. and international air quality, waters and coastlines, including items related to renewable energy or energy efficiency, are generally approved.”

BIS License D1297862 (11/17/22- 11/30/26)- Electric vehicles and chargers to republic of cuba nationals with the “ULTIMATE CONSIGNEE: Privately owned companies in the Republic of Cuba owned by Cuba Nationals.”
BIS License D1290656 (9/28/22-9/30/26)- Electric scooters and electric bicycles to individuals of Cuban descent and to Micro, Small and Medium-Size Enterprises (MSMEs) in the Republic of Cuba owned by Republic of Cuba nationals.
BIS License D1267261 (1/24/22-1/31/26)- Sales only to embassies. Automobiles: Gasoline powered, Pickup trucks with ICE, Electric or Hybrid Engines. Options to include 4x4, 2 or 4 door cab.
BIS License D1166163 (7/3/19-7/31/23)- Sales only to embassies. Forty-one (41) different parts for gasoline powered vehicles.
BIS License D1076571 (1/9/17-1/31/21)- To export Nissan Leaf electric vehicle and Clipper Creek level II 40-amp electric charger with J-1772 universal charging connector to embassy of Guyana in Havana, Republic of Cuba.
BIS License Exception (2017/2018)- Four (4) electric scooters. A license exception is a general authorization to export or reexport certain items without a license under stated conditions. Only the license exceptions, or portions thereof, listed Section 746.2(a)(1) of the EAR are available for Cuba…. Support for the Cuban People: License Exception Support for the Cuban People (SCP) “§ 740.21 Support for the Cuban People (SCP). (a) Introduction. This License Exception authorizes certain exports and reexports to Cuba that are intended to support the Cuban people by improving their living conditions and supporting independent economic activity; strengthening civil society in Cuba; and improving the free flow of information to, from, and among the Cuban people. (b) Improving living conditions and supporting independent economic activity.…. (1) Items for use by the Cuban private sector for private sector economic activities… (2) Items sold directly to individuals in Cuba for their personal use or their immediate family's personal use,”

PAE-Related Analyses Links

Biden-Harris Administration Re-Engagement With Cuba’s Re-Emerging Private Sector Brings Urgency To Re-Authorization Of Direct Correspondent Banking, U-Turn Transactions. One-Way Does Not Work. October 06, 2022

Ten Months After Denial, Biden-Harris Administration Approves Exports Of Electric Motorcycles, Electric Scooters To Cuba Nationals And To Privately-Owned Companies In Cuba October 05, 2022

BIS "Returned Without Action" License Application To Donate EV Chargers To U.S. Embassy In Havana Because "Ultimate Consignee" Cancelled Transaction March 07, 2022

U.S. Department Of State Appoints "Chief Sustainability Officer"- Mandate Text Includes Focus On "Electrifying Fleet" And "Host Partners" Does This Mean EVs For Cuba? President Biden Supports? February 10, 2022

While Promoting EV Use In The United States, Biden-Harris Administration Refuses To Permit Exports Of EVs To Cuba For Use By Re-Emerging Private Sector- And U.S. Embassy In Havana Does Not Want One. February 08, 2022

Surprise Decision: Biden-Harris Administration Renews Trump-Pence Administration License To Export EVs To Embassies In Cuba. Company Offers To Donate EV Chargers To U.S. Embassy/Ambassador Residence January 25, 2022

President Biden Rejects BIS License Application To Export Electric Vehicles/Chargers To Cuba's Self-Employed, MSME's. Reversal Of "General Policy Of Approval." President Trump Authorized EV Exports. December 20, 2021

Beginning Today Residents Of Cuba May Purchase And Install Residential Solar Systems. Cost 55,000.00 Pesos (US$2,300.00). Call 7833-3333. November 04, 2021

Cuba Has Nickel And Cobalt. Vehicle Electric Batteries Use Nickel And Cobalt. Cuba Should Benefit. September 25, 2021

Cuba Owes Partner Canada's Sherritt International Corporation Tens Of Millions Of US Dollars. But, Both Cuba & Patient Company (And Shareholders) Anticipate Profitable Role With Electric Vehicles. July 03, 2021

Restriction On Sale Of Premium Gasoline May Benefit Electric Vehicles & Solar Panels; Embassies Concerned. April 07, 2017

Florida Company Receives License To Export Electric Vehicles To Cuba; Charging Stations From New Jersey-Based Company. January 25, 2017

Florida Company Receives License To Export Electric Vehicles To Cuba; Charging Stations From New Jersey-Based Company January 25, 2017

LINKS TO RELATED ANALYSES

Is EV Data Really SCI? If U.S. Department Of State Wants U.S. Companies To Shift From Incredulousness To Embracing, Then Be Practical And Transparent Rather Than Secretive And Woefully Unprepared May 29, 2023

State Department, NSC, OFAC, BIS, USDA Don't Understand Requirements For Financial Plumbing To Function Efficiently. They Excel In Creating, Maintaining, And Defending Clogs. May 16, 2023

Biden-Harris Administration Issues Third Known BIS/OFAC License Authorizing Vehicle Exports From U.S. To Cuba. Payments Still Must Move Through Third Countries. May 12, 2023

Cuba Reports Creation Of 294 New MSMEs. 3.7% Are Government-Operated Companies Becoming "Private" Companies. May 10, 2023

Why Is One-Year Anniversary Of Biden-Harris Administration Approving First Investment/Financing To Private Company In Cuba A Disappointment? Cuba Has Not Published Regulations For Delivering It. May 9, 2023

Why Do U.S.-Based Financial Institutions Avoid Cuba? OFAC Uses 54 Pages To Describe "De-Risking" Reasons. Irony? They Lament The Impact Of Their Decisions. Then Why Create Them? May 7, 2023

Logic From U.S. Department Of State: If We Permit It, Cuba Might Not Use It, So We Won’t Permit It. And, Yes, No One Asked Cuba. And, No One Asked U.S. Banks, Companies. May 1, 2023

Biden-Harris Administration Approves Second Known License For A U.S. Company To Export Vehicles And Equipment To Private Companies In Cuba. Payment? That Remains A Problem. OFAC Doesn't Care. Apr 29, 2023

Cuba "Streamlining" Approval Process For Agriculturally-Focused Economic Associations With Foreign Capital. Still No Regulations For U.S.-Sourced MSME Private-Sector Foreign Investment/Financing Apr 27, 2023

Cuba Seeking Investors, Financing For State-Owned Companies. U.S. Entrepreneurs Waiting Since May 2022 For Cuba Regulations To Deliver Investment And Financing To Private Companies In Cuba Apr 27, 2023

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Economic Eye On Cuba

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U.S. Representative Salazar's Hearing Today About Cuba's Re-Emerging Private Sector Is Legitimate. The "Mythology" Premise Of The Hearing Is Knowingly Hollow. Hitting Political Cannon Fodder.

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Will Deere, SpaceX (Starlink), BIS, And OFAC Permit SATCOM Service To Farmers In Cuba Who Use Authorized Deere Products?

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U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba In November Decline 13.4%; Remains Up 2.8% Year-To-Year. Surprise? US$1 Million In Eggs; Ambulance; Motorcycles; Passenger Vehicles; Trucks.

Government Of Cuba Revenues, Shareholders In Canada's Sherritt International Corporation Will Suffer From Low Nickel, Cobalt, Lithium Prices Expected In 2024. Cuba Consistently Owes Sherritt Money.

U.S. Department Of State Issues "U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Outer Limits" But Reports U.S. And Cuba Have ECS Agreement.

After Almost Seven Years... Biden-Harris Administration "Transmitting Two Maritime Treaties" One With Cuba To The United States Senate

U.S. Department Of State Discusses Cuba's Inclusion On List Of State Sponsors Of Terrorism.

Another Reason From OFAC For Financial Institutions To Avoid Cuba- The Range Of A Penalty: US$1.2 Million Settlement With US$327.3 Million Potentiality.

U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 26.3% In October 2023; Remain Up 4.95% Year-To-Year. US$1.1 Million In "Aerial Reflectors" And US$30 Million In Donated Goods Already Exceeds Full Year 2022.

Bacardi Spent Approximately US$690,000.00 And 251 Days Later Its Cuba Trademark Legislation Moved From House To Senate- With No Objection. Where Were Pernod Ricard Lobbyists? NGO's? Members?

U.S. Department Of State Explains Again Why Cuba Is A "State Sponsor Of Terrorism"

First Tesla Model Y Vehicle Authorized By Biden-Harris Administration Scheduled For Delivery To A Cuban National. Maryland-Based Company Received First BIS License.

U.S. - Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.