Attorneys Suing Expedia, Hotels.com, Orbitz, Booking.com Reply To Cruise Lines Association Appellete Brief; Case Has 84 "Interested Persons"
/MARIO DEL VALLE, ENRIQUE FALLA, MARIO ECHEVARRIA V. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, ORBITZ, LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING HOLDINGS INC. Initial defendants were: TRIVAGO GMBH, BOOKING.COM B.V., GRUPO HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE I-5, AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22619 Southern Florida District; 20-12407 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]
Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie, LLP (defendant)
Scott Douglass & McConnico (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit: MARIO DEL VALLE, ENRIQUE FALLA, AND ANGELO POU, AS INDIVIDUALS AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED Plaintiffs — Appellants, V. EXPEDIA GROUP, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, ORBITZ, LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING HOLDINGS INC., Defendants — Appellees. On Appeal from a Final Order of Dismissal by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No. 19-cv-22619-RNS APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF AND RESPONSE TO CRUISE LINES INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION’S AMICUS CURIAE
LINK To Filing (6 January 2021)
Excerpts:
Appellees’ briefs could not and did not blink away the Order’s erroneous misapplication of Florida’s long-arm statute, or its manifest abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend and dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Appellees fail to note that the complaint contained legally sufficient, unrebutted (and unrebuttable) factual allegations making out a prima facie case for specific jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause.
Moreover, although the Order did not address standing, appellees’ and the Amicus briefs grossly mischaracterize appellants’ claims as if they were based on the Cuban government’s confiscation of their properties, and not appellees’ trafficking, which is plainly and expressly what the Act targets.
The complaint adequately alleged that appellees do business in Florida to which this action relates, under Fla. Stat § 48.193(1)(a)(1). That is all the Florida long-arm statute requires to trigger a minimum contacts analysis, unless a defendant can rebut the “doing business” allegations. Appellees never could have done so, and didn’t even try.
Instead appellees argued below, and here, that merely maintaining a website accessible in Florida is insufficient. So what? This misdirection play relies on cases where defendants’ “passive” websites provided only information, and no sales were made on those websites. That is plainly not what was alleged below, nor what actually is going on. Appellees’ entire business is based on their sale of hotel reservations on their websites. If it weren’t for sales on their websites, appellees would have no businesses at all.
To exclude property that ever was used for residential purposes prior to confiscation would be inconsistent with the Act’s language and history and would undermine congressional intent to deter trafficking in confiscated property. Thus, even if 22 U.S.C. § 6023(12) did not unambiguously carve out only property currently used for residential purposes, Title III’s findings and stated purpose would require it to be so construed.
Conclusion: The order on appeal erroneously dismissed without leave to amend on the first motion to dismiss submitted for decision below. The unrebutted allegations in the complaint demonstrated that the exercise of “doing business in Florida” and “tort in Florida” personal jurisdiction over appellees was (and is) proper. The complaint also adequately alleged a legally sufficient Title III claim for appellees’ unlawful trafficking of the Properties in Florida through the solicitation and sale of reservations at the Resorts to Floridians in Florida. Even if the order on appeal had not erroneously denied personal jurisdiction, it would have been (and was) an abuse of discretion to deny appellants answers to their pending discovery requests before ruling, and to preemptively bar a motion for leave to amend.
16 December 2020
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
CRUISE LINES INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES AND URGING AFFIRMANCE OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL
LINK To Filing (16 December 2020)
Excerpts:
In the instant case, plaintiffs are individuals who claim interests in parcels of real property in Cuba, which they allege were confiscated by the Fidel Castro regime in the early 1960s, after the Cuban Revolution. They are suing two travel booking companies, Expedia and Booking.com, for three times the value of the real property itself, plus interest over decades, based on the allegation that these companies made reservations available on the Internet to stay at structures subsequently built on the properties.
Nowhere in the complaint is there any allegation that defendants’ actions caused any concrete harm to plaintiffs, that defendants owe any funds to plaintiffs, or that defendants’ actions decreased any property values. The only concrete harm alleged in the complaint is that of the Cuban government in the 1960s, not defendants. Thus, plaintiffs lack Article III standing as against these defendants.
Plaintiffs’ sole cause of action is based on a highly unusual and internationally controversial statute, Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§6021-91) (the “Helms-Burton Act”), passed in 1996 but only allowed to become effective twenty-three years later, in 2019. The heart of the statute is its allowance, with certain enumerated exceptions, of a claim against “any person” who “traffics” in property confiscated by the Castro regime—a term which is defined to include, for instance, “using or otherwise benefitting from” the property, with no requirement that any plaintiff be injured. 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A) (emphasis added).
Rather than a determination by Congress that plaintiffs under the statute would suffer a “concrete, particularized” injury “caused by the defendant” in a Title III claim (Thole, 140 S.Ct. at 1618), the statute and its findings instead offer the converse of a well-known rule of Constitutional standing. Citizens or taxpayers generally have no standing to challenge government actions or expenditures if their interest is “shared with millions of taxpayers” or “comparatively minute and indeterminable.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343–44, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1862, 164 L. Ed. 2d 589 (2006). With Helms-Burton, however, Congress has seemingly made the opposite determination: having found the Cuba embargo represents sound U.S. policy, it decided that individual defendants can, in fact, be drafted into paying penalties to individual plaintiffs who do not claim to have been harmed in a way that is discernible, concrete, or individualized—or even recognized by a prior law adjudicated in our nation’s Article III courts. Tellingly, Congress did not even attempt to explain how a Title III private cause of action satisfied Article III’s standing requirements. So, while Congress’ judgment should be considered, its statements weigh against plaintiffs’ assertions of standing.
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
Appellants Mario Del Valle, Enrique Falla, and Angelo Pou, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and Eleventh Circuit Rules 26.1-1, 26.1-2, and 26.1-3, certify that the following persons and entities may have an interest in the outcome of this case:
1. AAE Travel Pte. Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
2. Agoda.com (Subsidiary of Appellee)
3. Aguila, M. Paula, Esq. (counsel for Appellants)
4. Akerman LLP (counsel for Appellees)
5. Analytical Systems Pty Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
6. Baker McKenzie (counsel for Appellees)
7. Booking Holdings Treasury Company (Subsidiary of Appellee)
8. Booking Holdings, Inc. (Appellee) [BKNG]
9. Booking.com B.V. (Appellee)
10. Booking.com Holding B.V. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
11. Booking.com Holdings B.V. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
12. Booking.com Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
13. BookingSuite (USA) Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
14. Classic Vacations, LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
15. Coronado Pte Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
16. Cruise, LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
17. Del Valle, Mario (Appellant)
18. Dohop Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
19. Duffy, Michael A., Esq. (counsel for Appellees)
20. EAN.com, LP (Subsidiary of Appellee)
21. Ebookers Limited (Subsidiary of Appellee)
22. Egencia France SAS (Subsidiary of Appellee)
23. Egencia LLP (Subsidiary of Appellee)
24. Egencia UK Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
25. EXP Global Holdings, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
26. EXP Holdings Luxembourg S.A. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
27. Expedia Asia Holdings Mauritius (Subsidiary of Appellee)
28. Expedia do Barsil Agencia de Viagens e Turismo Ltda. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
29. Expedia Group, Inc. (Appellee) [EXPE]
30. Expedia Lodging Partner Services Sárl (Subsidiary of Appellee)
31. Expedia Southeast Asia Pte. Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
32. Expedia.com Limited (Subsidiary of Appellee)
33. Falla, Enrique (Appellant)
34. FareHarbor Holdings, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
35. Home Away Spain SL (Subsidiary of Appellee)
36. HomeAway Holding, Inc., (Subsidiary of Appellee)
37. HomeAway Netherlands Holdings B.V. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
38. HomeAway Sarl (Subsidiary of Appellee)
39. HomeAway UK Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
40. HomeAway.com, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
41. HotelClub Pty Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
42. Hotels.com GP (Appellee)
43. Hotels.com L.P. (Appellee)
44. Hotwire, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
45. HRN 99 Holdings, LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
46. Interactive Affiliate Network, LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
47. Kayak (Subsidiary of Appellee)
48. Law Office of Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (co-counsel for Appellants)
49. Lowestfare.com LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
50. Malave, Ana C. (counsel for Appellants)
51. Mathy, Patricia, Esq. (counsel for Appellees)
52. McCutcheon, Michael C., Esq. (counsel for Appellees)
53. Mestre, Jorge, Esq. (counsel for Appellants)
54. Olson, Kyle R. (counsel for Appellees)
55. OpenTable (Subsidiary of Appellee)
56. Orbitz Travel Insurance Services, LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
57. Orbitz Worldwide (UK) Limited (Subsidiary of Appellee)
58. Orbitz Worldwide, Inc., (Subsidiary of Appellee)
59. Orbitz Worldwide, LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
60. Orbitz, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
61. Orbitz, LLC (Appellee)
62. Pou, Angelo (Appellant)
63. Priceline.com (Subsidiary of Appellee)
64. Priceline.com Europe Holdco Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
65. Priceline.com Europe Holdings N.V. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
66. Priceline.com Mauritius Co. Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
67. Priceline.com Agoda Holdco LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
68. Riccio, Andrew S., Esq. (counsel for Appellees)
69. Rivero Mestre LLP (counsel for Appellants)
70. Rivero, Andres, Esq. (counsel for Appellants)
71. Scola, Hon. Robert N., Jr. (United States District Court Judge)
72. Rocket Travel, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
73. Rolnick, Alan H., Esq., (counsel for Appellants)
74. Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP (counsel for Appellees)
75. Shank, David, Esq. (counsel for Appellees)
76. SilverRail Technologies, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
77. Travelscape, LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
78. Travelweb LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
79. Trip Network, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
80. Trivago N.V. (Subsidiary of Appellee) [TRVG]
81. Vazquez, Manuel, Esq. (counsel for Appellants)
82. Venga, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
83. Webre, Jane, Esq. (counsel for Appellees)
84. WWTE Travel S.á.r.l. (Subsidiary of Appellee)