For Anyone Expecting Washington Rapprochement With Havana, Biden Administration Answers To Question About Status Of Cuba Ambassador To U.S. Shows Chill & Toxicity
/For Anyone Expecting Washington Rapprochement With Havana, Biden Administration Answers To Question About Status Of Cuba Ambassador To U.S. Shows Chill & Toxicity
QUESTION- 31 March 2021
H.E. Lianys Torres Rivera, former Ambassador of the Republic of Cuba to Vietnam, arrived to the United States in early January 2021 during the Trump Administration. Ambassador Torres has been designated by the government of the Republic of Cuba as its Ambassador of the Republic of Cuba to the United States. When will the Biden Administration accept the credentials of Ambassador Torres as Ambassador of the Republic of Cuba to the United States?
ANSWERS- 1 April 2021
State Department Spokesperson: “The U.S. and Cuba continue to maintain diplomatic relations. We refer questions about the status of Cuban diplomats to the Cuban government. We have no comment beyond that.”
White House Spokesperson: No Response.
As of 17 February 2021, the Order of Precedence Reported to the Office of the Chief of Protocol at the United States Department of State lists H.E. Lianys Torres Rivera as Charge d’Affaires ad Interim For Bilateral Missions with a date 1/14/21- the last entry prior to the end of the Trump Administration. Ambassador Torres is not included among those identified as Ambassador Extraordinary And Plenipotentiary. Since 20 January 2021, there are listed three (3) Charge d’Affaires Ad Interim For Bilateral Missions: Montenegro (2/4/21), Estonia (2/9/21), and Mexico (2/17/21).
According to the United States Department of State, since 20 January 2021, there are seven (7) individuals who have presented (in-person or virtually) their credentials to the President of the United States- all on the same day. Thailand (2/17/21), Tajikistan (2/17/21), Bangladesh (2/17/21), Oman (2/17/21), Japan (2/17/21), Israel (2/17/21), and Nepal (2/17/21).
The Republic of Cuba has not in public shared comments as to the status of Ambassador Torres. Perhaps the Miguel Diaz-Canel Administration believes it gains goodwill from the Biden Administration by not creating an issue relating to the status of Ambassador Torres- to the relief of the Biden Administration which appreciates the presentation of her credentials would likely result in criticism from at least one governor (The Honorable Ron DeSantis, R-Florida) and probably the ten members of the 117th United States Congress who are of Cuban descent.
United States Senate: The Honorable Ted Cruz (R- Texas), The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida), The Honorable Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey). Senator Menendez is Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
United States House of Representatives: The Honorable Albio Sires (New Jersey; D- 8th), The Honorable Alex Mooney (West Virginia; R- 2nd), The Honorable Anthony E. González (Ohio; R- 16th), The Honorable Mario Díaz-Balart (Florida; R-25th), The Honorable Carlos Gimenez (Florida; R- 26th), The Honorable Maria Elvira Salazar (Florida; R- 27th) and The Honorable Nicole Malliotakis (New York; R- 11th). Representative Sires is Chairman of the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, Migration And International Economic Policy Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives.
What may be instructive is the greater importance to the Biden Administration towards those who will likely criticize any reversal of Trump Administration (2017-2021) decisions relating to the Republic of Cuba rather than support those decisions may receive from Democratic Party members of the United States Congress.
For the Biden Administration which has legislative initiatives, nominations, a budget, and increase in the debt ceiling among items requiring approval during 2021 from the United States Congress, the safe track is to do nothing relating to the Republic of Cuba. In addition, there are the 2021 mid-term elections where redistricting due to the 2020 Census will result in the creation of Republican-leaning Congressional Districts in the State of Florida and State of Texas, among others. The Republican Party could control the 118th United States Congress, or at least one of the two legislative chambers. This forecast means the Biden Administration will require votes for its legislative agenda and inserting the Republic of Cuba into the calculus could become problematic, or even toxic.
Due to the pandemic, since 2020 the Republic of Cuba has restricted entry and the United States has restricted entry; so, the pandemic remains a perfect excuse for both countries to move cautiously. Since August 2020, the United States Department of State has a Level 4: Do Not Travel Advisory for the Republic of Cuba. The Biden Administration could permit limited changes- removing monetary level constraints for remittances and again permit United States air carriers to service cities other than Havana. However, there is no constituency with clout demanding changes, and remittances are making their way to the Republic of Cuba and airlines are operating flights. Another choice is to return to what was permitted prior to 20 January 2017. There is no indication the Biden Administration is considering this pathway. Whatever the Biden Administration decides to do, it has already and repeatedly shared what will be the core of its decisions- how “Cuban-Americans” will lead whatever is decided.
Thus far, nearing three months in, the Biden Administration has not disturbed Trump Administration (2017-2021) policies relating to the Republic of Cuba and has embraced or left in place a meaningful number of Trump Administration policies relating to other countries. The Republic of Cuba is rarely referenced in read-outs of communications between the Biden Administration and other country leadership.
Advocates continue to market in an increasingly circular (and recirculating) manner that the Biden Administration is “under pressure” to alter Trump Administration policies relating to the Republic of Cuba. They are correct there is pressure. However, the sources of pressure to move slowly, if at all, is of far more consequence to the Biden Administration than are statements from those seeking swift changes. The Miguel Diaz-Canel Administration in Havana could create opportunities from which the Biden Administration could then respond; that is unlikely. The United States business community continues to wait, silently, for the Republic of Cuba to provide access to opportunities whereby the silence could translate into public, and sustained interest.
The Biden Administration has neither a visceral need nor an ideological desire to resurrect the totality of Obama Administration (2009-2017) policies related to the Republic of Cuba. The Republic of Cuba is not of consequence now to the Biden Agenda. Not being in the spotlight may not at this time be a negative for the Republic of Cuba. Advocates need to position their advocacy accordingly.
