Libertad Act Lawsuit Dismissed Against Tech Resources Of Canada; Plaintiffs May Appeal
/HEREDEROS DE ROBERTO GOMEZ CABRERA, LLC v. TECK RESOURCES LIMITED [1:20-cv-21630; Southern Florida District]
Hirzel Dreyfuss & Dempsey, PLLC (plaintiff)
Roig & Villarreal, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Office of David A. Villarreal, P.A. (plaintiff)
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman (defendant)
Link To Order Granting Motion To Dismiss (27 April 2021)
Link To Plaintiff’s Second Unopposed Motion For Extension Of Time To File Motion To Compel Responses To Plaintiff’s First Set Of Requests For Production (22 April 2021)
Excerpts From Motion To Dismiss
In its motion to dismiss, Teck argues that the amended complaint should be dismissed because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it, the complaint fails to allege that HRGC has an actionable ownership interest or that Teck intentionally trafficked on the confiscated property. In response, the Plaintiff argues that the Court has jurisdiction over Teck under the federal long-arm statute and that the amended complaint has sufficiently stated a claim for relief under Title III of the Act.
Here, it is undisputed that Teck is not a Florida resident as it is incorporated in Canada and has its principle place of business there. Accordingly, the Court finds that Teck is not subject to the Court’s general personal jurisdiction.
The Plaintiff fails to explain how its claim for unlawful trafficking in Cuba is related to Teck’s activities in Florida, which at this point appear to be nonexistent. Indeed, the amended complaint alleges that Teck is a Canadian corporation with its principle place of business in Canada, with subsidiaries in Washington and Alaska, and is otherwise silent as to whether Teck has any contacts with Florida. For these reasons, HRGC has failed to plead specific personal jurisdiction over Teck.
In this case, the Plaintiff has known that Teck would argue that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the matter since the filing of the subject motion to dismiss in September 2020.
Additionally, the Plaintiff’s request is procedurally improper.
The Court agrees that HRGC did not sufficiently allege that it had an actionable ownership interest because it did not allege that it obtained the interest prior to March 12, 1996. The relevant provision of the Helms-Burton Act provides: In the case of property confiscated before March 12, 1996, a United States national may not bring an action under this section on a claim to the confiscated property unless such national acquires ownership of the claim before March 12, 1996.
The Court also agrees that HRGC has not sufficiently alleged that Teck knowingly and intentionally trafficked in the confiscated property.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Teck’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 14) and dismisses HRGC claims without prejudice. HRGC alternatively seeks permission to file a second amended complaint. (ECF No. 23 at 23.) This request is improper and is therefore denied.
