Data Reference Errors To Media Continue To Inhabit U.S. Department Of State; It's Neither Necessary, Nor Helpful For Credibility

El Nuevo Herald
Miami, Florida
20 November 2020

Dr. Mara Tekach, Coordinator- Office of Cuban Affairs, United States Department of State:

”“Gracias a los Estados Unidos volúmenes masivos de productos agrícolas, medicinas, equipos médicos y bienes humanitarios llegan a Cuba. Desde 1992 Estados Unidos ha autorizado la exportación de $1,000 millones a Cuba. En 2019 Estados Unidos exportó $3,7 millones de suministros médicos a Cuba para apoyar al pueblo cubano”, dijo Tekach.”

Google Translate: “Thanks to the United States massive volumes of agricultural products, medicines, medical equipment and humanitarian goods arrive in Cuba. Since 1992, the United States has authorized the export of $1 billion to Cuba. In 2019 the United States exported $3.7 million of medical supplies to Cuba to support the Cuban people,” said Tekach.

Uncertain from the Spanish language text as published or the English language Google-created translation if Dr. Tekach was suggesting that the government of the United States had provided (donated) US$1 billion to the Republic of Cuba and suggesting that the government of the United States had provided (donated) US$3.7 million in healthcare products to the Republic of Cuba.

Irrespective of the use of either language versions, the references are incorrect.

First, since December 2001, more than US$6,259,135,008.00 in agricultural commodities and food products have been exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, on a cash-in-advance basis as required by United States law. Unknown is the source of the data for a value of US$1 billion from 1992 to 2020 referenced by Dr. Tekach.

Second, healthcare product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba on a commercial basis in 2019 were US$1,096,505.00 compared to US$3,492,553.00 in 2018. Thus far in 2020, healthcare product exports are US$656,697.00.

The following contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

HEALTHCARE PRODUCT EXPORTS- Exports of healthcare products (medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals) to the Republic of Cuba are subject to provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, which require end use-verification, but are not subject to cash-in-advance payment requirements. Exports have included: Medicaments (penicillin and insulin); Dentifrices (toothpastes); Laboratory regents; Ultrasonic scanning equipment; Artificial limbs; Medical appliances; Surgical appliances (dental); Opthalmic (eye); Cannulae (tubing) and gelatin capsules.

HUMANITARIAN DONATIONS- Donated items are neither included in TSREEA nor CDA calculations. These items are generally delivered to the Republic of Cuba using air carriers or containers on vessels; do not include personal deliveries (by travelers on flights and through third countries). A substantial quantity and U.S. Dollar value of items categorized as “humanitarian” are transported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba using air carriers; thus, the information is not documented.

Western Union Data For Transfers To Cuba: 2.88 Million Annually- 24% To Havana; Florida 1st, Texas 2nd, New Jersey 3rd; US$200,000+ Could Be Aboard Each Flight From Miami

“Every month, Cubans in the U.S. send more than 240,000 unique transfers into Cuba using formal money transfer channels.“- Western Union Company

2.88 million annual transfers will cease on 22 November 2020 unless the Republic of Cuba shifts control of the in-country partner of Western Union Company, Fincimex, to a non-military-controlled entity.

If each transfer is US$300.00 (Western Union Company’s published global average for all C2C sends), then the total annual value of transfers would be US$864 million- or US$72 million per month or US$2.4 million per day. There are unofficial estimates suggesting an average transfer of nearer to US$500.00. The U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council estimates Western Union Company transfers annually to the Republic of Cuba of approximately US$900 million to US$1.5 billion.

Absent Western Union Company services, the US$2.4 million per day would likely be transported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba using paid “mules” aboard regularly-scheduled commercial flights. With a current approximately twelve daily 150-passenger aircraft flights from Miami International Airport (MIA) to Jose Marti International Airport (HAV), that would suggest a possible US$200,000.00 or more aboard each flight.

From Western Union: “The closure of airports and the termination of flights in a pandemic world limits these methods of transfer through these mules. The current formal channels provide a safe, secure, and guaranteed method to deliver much-needed dollars directly into the hands of Cubans.”

Western Union Company
Denver, Colorado
19 November 2020

U.S. CUBA MONEY TRANSFER FACTS – AS NOVEMBER 18, 2020
US to Cuba Flows

In the absence of Cuban Central Bank data, independent researchers estimate total remittances sent from the U.S. to Cuba between US$2 billion to US$4 billion per annum. An estimated equal amount is reportedly channeled through informal channels, some carrying it on behalf of family and friends and others surcharging premium rates to assure safe passage. vi Approximately 50% of transactions are estimated to flow through formal channels and 50% through informal channels.

Every month, Cubans in the U.S. send more than 240,000 unique transfers into Cuba using formal money transfer channels. vii Unique transfers do not equate to customers; a single customer may send multiple transactions in a month. vii On an annual basis, there are more than 2,880,000 transfers from the United States to Cuba. vvi Western Union has previously reported the global average for transfers is US$300.00. vii For each pay-in-store transaction, the outlet receives a percentage of the fee and the in-country distribution partner receives a percentage of the fee.

Top U.S. States sending to Cuba
1. Florida
2. Texas
3. New Jersey
4. Nevada
5. New York
6. California
7. Kentucky
8. Nebraska
9. Arizona
10. Georgia

Major Receive Provinces and % of Formal Remittances Received viii
Artemisa- 6%
Camaguey- 6%
Ciego de Avila- 7%
Cienfuegos- 4%
Granma- 3%
Guantanamo- 3%
Holguin- 6%
Isla de la Juventud- 1%
La Habana- 24%
Las Tunas- 3%
Matanzas- 7%
Mayabeque- 4%
Pinar del Rio- 6%
Sancti Spiritus- 4%
Santiago de Cuba- 7%
Villa Clara- 7%

Western Union 407 Agent Location Breakdown by Province ix
Artemisa- 26
Camaguey- 25
Ciego de Avila- 29
Cienfuegos- 17
Granma- 13
Guantanamo- 14
Holguin- 23
Isla de la Juventud- 5
La Habana- 96
Las Tunas- 14
Matanzas- 29
Mayabeque- 18
Pinar del Rio- 26
Sancti Spiritus- 16
Santiago de Cuba- 27
Villa Clara

Demographics

U.S. Cuban Senders i Nearly half (48%) of all Cuban American families send remittances to relatives in Cuba. The most recent arrivals are the most likely to send remittances while the older population group and the pre-1995 migrants are the least likely to send money to relatives on the island.

Age
Cuban Americans aged 40-59 are most likely to send remittances to relatives in Cuba.

Cuban Receivers ii
Approximately 70% of Cubans living in South Florida have relatives living in Cuba. Unsurprisingly, a higher percentage of those who migrated since 1995 (84%) have relatives left behind. The South Florida Cuban-American community is developing into a true transnational diaspora. Despite the recent travel restrictions, many families have experienced the migration of one or more of their members.

Reasons for Sending Money to Cuba

The economy and health care remain the two most important issues for Cuban Americans. iii
Additionally: food, rent, and other expenses or supports micro-businesses iv Regardless of when the respondents left Cuba, the economy edges out health care as the most important issue for Cuban Americans in South Florida. v

i Source: pg. 28 FIU Study, 2020, Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
ii (Source: pg. 24 FIU Study, 2020, Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs)
iii (Source: pg. 4 FIU Study, 2020, Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs)
iv (Source: Western Union internal data used on blog/customer letter, 11/13/20)
v (Source: pg. 30, FIU Study, 2020, Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs)
vi FIU 2016
vii Western Union
viii Western Union
ix Western Union

LINKS TO PREVIOUS RELATED POSTS

Cuba Has Options To Retain Western Union Electronic Remittance Services- Transfer To A Bank?

If Western Union Ends Remittance Services To Cuba, That Means A Return Of “Mules On Steroids”- The Impact Could Cripple MIA

U.S. Department Of Transportation Denies Cuba Cargo Flight Charter Requests; Two Companies Oppose

“U.S. Department of Transportation Denies Exemptions for Cuba Cargo Flights
Wednesday, November 18, 2020

Effective October 13, DOT suspended the authority of U.S. and foreign carriers to provide charter flights between the United States and Cuba. DOT’s suspension order provided for certain limited exceptions, specifically for “authorized charter flights for emergency medical purposes, search and rescue, and other travel deemed to be in the interest of the United States” (DOT Order 2020-8-4). DOT took this suspension action at the express request of the Department of State, in a letter to DOT from Secretary Pompeo, and DOT’s language as to the permitted exceptions was taken verbatim from Secretary Pompeo’s letter.

Two U.S. air taxi operators have requested exemptions from DOT’s Cuba charter suspension order, to operate small-aircraft all-cargo charter flights between Miami and Havana. The applicants, Skyway Enterprises, Inc. (Skyway) and IBC Airways, Inc. (IBC), each assert that their proposed flights are humanitarian in nature and therefore should be permitted under the exceptions provided for under DOT’s charter suspension order. Given that the language of those exceptions originated with the Department of State, DOT consulted with the Department of State to determine whether they regard the proposed Skyway and IBC flights as coming within the specified exceptions. We received guidance from the Department of State that the applications did not fall within the specified exceptions, and that grant of the requested authority would not be in the foreign policy interests of the United States. Accordingly, DOT has issued an order denying the requested exemptions. This order can be viewed on regulations.gov by entering “DOT-OST-2020-0129” in the search field.”

LINKS
DOT Final Order
DOT Order Denying Exemptions
Objection By Attorney For Cuba Charter Services LLC
Objection By Attorney For Viajehoy LLC
DOT Order For Suspension Of U.S.-Cuba Charter Authorizations

In SEC IPO Documents, Airbnb Discloses Potential Violation Of OFAC's Cuba Regulations

As filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 16, 2020.
Registration No. 333-

UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549

FORM S-1 REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

Airbnb, Inc.

Brian Chesky
Chief Executive Officer
Airbnb, Inc.
888 Brannan Street
San Francisco, California 94103
(415) 510-4027

We are subject to governmental economic and trade sanctions laws and regulations that limit the scope of our offering. Additionally, failure to comply with applicable economic and trade sanctions laws and regulations could subject us to liability and negatively affect our business, results of operations and financial condition.

We are required to comply with economic and trade sanctions administered by governments where we operate, including the U.S. government (including without limitation regulations administered and enforced by OFAC and the U.S. Department of State), the Council of the European Union, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation of Her Majesty’s Treasury in the United Kingdom (“OFSI”) and the Ministry of Finance and Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier of Luxembourg. These economic and trade sanctions prohibit or restrict transactions to or from or dealings with certain specified countries, regions, their governments and, in certain circumstances, their nationals, and with individuals and entities that are specially-designated, such as individuals and entities included on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals (“SDN List”), subject to EU/UK asset freezes, or other sanctions measures. Any future economic and trade sanctions imposed in jurisdictions where we have significant business could materially adversely impact our business, results of operations, and financial condition. Our ability to track and verify transactions and otherwise to comply with these regulations require a high level of internal controls. We maintain policies and procedures to implement these internal controls, which we periodically assess and update to the extent we identify compliance gaps. We routinely report to OFAC on payments we have rejected or blocked pursuant to OFAC sanctions regulations and on any possible violations of those regulations. We have also reported to OFSI on dealings with persons subject to EU/UK sanctions. There is a risk that, despite the internal controls that we have in place, we have engaged in dealings with persons sanctioned under applicable sanctions laws. Any non-compliance with economic and trade sanctions laws and regulations or related investigations could result in claims or actions against us and materially adversely affect our business, results of operations, and financial condition. As our business continues to grow and regulations change, we may be required to make additional investments in our internal controls or modify our business.

Since July 2019, we conducted an internal review and have been holding related discussions with OFAC regarding certain user activity on our platform that may have been inconsistent with our policies and the requirements of U.S. sanctions laws. The scope of this review included activity by users in certain countries and territories that were or are the target of U.S. sanctions laws. In July 2020, OFAC issued to us a cautionary letter and no administrative penalty with respect to certain aspects of that review concerning the Crimea region of Ukraine. The internal review also covered certain other issues concerning our compliance with OFAC’s sanctions program, focusing in particular on our business in Cuba, and as to our compliance with restrictions on transactions with specially designated nationals. We submitted the results of that internal review in final Voluntary Self Disclosures to OFAC in September 2020. In October 2020, OFAC issued to us cautionary letters and a no action letter, and no administrative penalties, with respect to the disclosed matters involving specially designated nationals. OFAC’s review of our voluntary self disclosure regarding Cuba is ongoing and we remain in close contact with OFAC. Depending upon OFAC’s assessment of the Cuba review, we could be subject to potentially significant monetary civil penalties and litigation, and our brand and reputation could be materially adversely affected.

Trump Administration Executive Order About China Military Will Impact Biden Administration Decisions About Cuba Military

The Trump Administration decision on 12 November 2020 to prohibit individuals subject to United States jurisdiction from investing in military-controlled companies in the People’s Republic of China will impact the ability of the Biden Administration to alter the Trump Administration’s 2017 policy changes which prohibit individuals subject to United States jurisdiction from engagement with companies controlled by the military in the Republic of Cuba.

With the addition of the People’s Republic of China, the Trump Administration has created a sustainable and transferable and non-Republic of Cuba-centric narrative which will be challenging for the Biden Administration to change without impactful bipartisan criticism from members of the United States Congress.

With the political party divisions narrow in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, there will be little incentive for the Biden Administration to be perceived as “supporting military control of the China and Cuba economies.”

The Trump Administration’s message to the Biden Administration is separating the military from control of country economies is not being punitive, it’s about who would, and who should a United States company want to engage- with a general or with a civilian.

While United States companies would prefer to self-determine whether to engage with military-controlled companies in the Republic of Cuba, executives from United States companies will not be engaging publicly to oppose Trump Administration policy as it transforms into Biden Administration policy.

The White House
Washington DC
12 November 2020

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13959

ADDRESSING THE THREAT FROM SECURITIES INVESTMENTS THAT FINANCE COMMUNIST CHINESE MILITARY COMPANIES

Excerpts

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly exploiting United States capital to resource and to enable the development and modernization of its military, intelligence, and other security apparatuses, which continues to allow the PRC to directly threaten the United States homeland and United States forces overseas, including by developing and deploying weapons of mass destruction, advanced conventional weapons, and malicious cyber-enabled actions against the United States and its people.

I therefore further find that the PRC's military-industrial complex, by directly supporting the efforts of the PRC's military, intelligence, and other security apparatuses, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. To protect the United States homeland and the American people, I hereby declare a national emergency with respect to this threat.

The White House
Washington DC
16 June 2017

Fact Sheet On Cuba Policy
Summary of Key Policy Changes:

Excerpts

The new policy channels economic activities away from the Cuban military monopoly, Grupo de Administración Empresarial (GAESA), including most travel-related transactions, while allowing American individuals and entities to develop economic ties to the private, small business sector in Cuba. The new policy makes clear that the primary obstacle to the Cuban people’s prosperity and economic freedom is the Cuban military’s practice of controlling virtually every profitable sector of the economy. President Trump’s policy changes will encourage American commerce with free Cuban businesses and pressure the Cuban government to allow the Cuban people to expand the private sector.

Cuba Has Options To Retain Western Union Electronic Remittance Services- Transfer To A Bank?

Cuba Has Options To Retain Western Union Electronic Remittance Services
GASEA Transfers Or Sells Assets Of Fincimex to BICSA Or Another Bank
Cuba Banks Have A History With Transferring Operations

The Trump Administration prohibits United States-based companies from engagement with entities controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba.   

There is no indication from the Trump Administration that the prohibition will be rescinded or revised.   

The United States Department of State added to the Cuba Restricted List Republic of Cuba government-operated American International Services (AIS) and Republic of Cuba government-operated Financiera Cimex (Fincimex), a Panama-registered subsidiary of Republic of Cuba government-operated Corporacion Cimex which is a subsidiary of Grupo de Administracion Empresarial S.A. (GAESA) and controlled by the FAR.  Fincimex is the distribution partner in the Republic of Cuba for Western Union Company.   

There is also no indication the incoming Biden Administration would make changes to the Cuba Restricted List.  There is expectation the Biden Administration will change the current US$1,000.00 per quarter limitation for remittances from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  

The Republic of Cuba continues to evaluate options relating to Fincimex, including the sale or transfer of the subsidiary to a non-FAR-controlled Republic of Cuba government-operated entity, such as a financial institution (Banco de Crédito y Comercio S.A. (BANDEC), Banco Popular de Ahorro S.A. (BPA), Banco Financiero Internacional S.A. (BFI), Banco Internacional de Comercio S.A. (BICSA), and Banco Metropolitano S.A.(BM)) each of which could seamlessly absorb and maintain Fincimex operations.   

There is history for one Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institution transferring operations to another Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institution. 

From Banco Metropolitano S.A.: “(“BM”) is a Cuban commercial bank that has presence only in Havana.  Its corporate object is the pursuit of banking businesses, including but not limited to financial intermediation activities.  BM started its operations in 1996 with a Havana branch office specialized in the provision of banking services solely to the diplomatic community, as well as the foreign natural and legal persons who were residents in Cuba.  By resolution of Banco Central de Cuba (the Cuban Central Bank of “BCC,” for its Spanish acronym), BM’s corporate object, customer base, product portfolio and services were expanded effectively 2004 when BM acquired 30 offices hitherto held by Banco de Crédito y Comercio (“BANDEC,” for its Spanish acronym) and more than 50 offices hitherto held by Banco Popular de Ahorro (“BPA,” for its Spanish acronym), all located in Havana.  As a result, BM established a representative presence in every municipality of the province of Havana.” 

In 2015, BICSA, a member of Republic of Cuba government-operated Grupo Nuevo Banca SA, created by Corporate Charter No. 49 on 29 October 1993 and commenced operation on 3 January 1994, was vetted by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and approved for a correspondent banking relationship with Conway, Arkansas-based Home BancShares (2019 assets approximately US$14 billion) through its subsidiary Centennial Bank which in 2017 purchased Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank.  

Stonegate Bank 

In 2015, the OFAC authorized Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank (2017 assets approximately US$2.9 billion) to have an account with BICSA.  In 2017, Home BancShares through its Centennial Bank subsidiary purchased Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank. 

However, because the Obama Administration would not authorize BICSA under a license from the OFAC to have an account with Stonegate Bank, United States export-related funds were sent and received through Panama City, Panama-based Multibank, which had, but no longer has extensive dealings with the Republic of Cuba.   

From Bogota, Colombia-based Grupo Aval on 16 June 2020: “On May 25th, Banco de Bogotá, through its subsidiary Leasing Bogotá S.A. Panamá, acquired 96.6% of the ordinary shares of Multi Financial Group.  As part of the acquisition process, MFG’s operation in Cuba was closed and as part of the transaction.  Grupo Aval complies with OFAC regulations and doesn't have transactional relationships with Cuba.”  

From 2017 Home BancShares Annual Report 

U.S. persons, including U.S. banks, are restricted in their ability to establish relationships and engage in transactions with Cuba and Cuban persons pursuant to the existing U.S. embargo and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. However, we maintain a customer relationship to handle the accounts for Cuba’s diplomatic missions at the United Nations and for the Cuban Interests Section (now the Cuban Embassy) in Washington, D.C. This relationship was established in May 2015 pursuant to a special license granted to Stonegate Bank by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) in connection with the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba. In July 2015, Stonegate Bank established a correspondent banking relationship with Banco Internacional de Comercio, S.A. (“BICSA”) in Havana, Cuba.  Cross-border correspondent banking relationships pose unique risks because they create situations in which a U.S. financial institution will be handling funds from a foreign financial institution whose customers may not be transparent to the U.S. financial institution. Moreover, Cuban financial institutions are not subject to the same or similar regulatory guidelines as U.S. banks; therefore, these foreign institutions may pose a higher money laundering risk to their respective U.S. bank correspondent(s). Investigations have determined that, in the past, foreign correspondent accounts have been used by drug traffickers and other criminal elements to launder funds. Shell companies are sometimes used in the layering process to hide the true ownership of accounts at foreign correspondent financial institutions. Because of the large amount of funds, multiple transactions, and the U.S. bank’s potential lack of familiarity with a foreign correspondent financial institution’s customer, criminals and terrorists can more easily conceal the source and use of illicit funds. Consequently, we may have a higher risk of noncompliance with the Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money Laundering (“BSA/AML”) rules due to its new correspondent banking relationship with BICSA and will likely need to more closely monitor transactions related to correspondent accounts in Cuba, potentially resulting in increased compliance costs. Our failure to strictly adhere to the terms and requirements of our OFAC license or our failure to adequately manage our BSA/AML compliance risk in light of our new correspondent banking relationship with BICSA could result in regulatory or other actions being taken against us, which could significantly increase our compliance costs and materially and adversely affect our results of operations.

LINK TO COMPLETE POST IN PDF FORMAT

If Western Union Ends Remittance Services To Cuba, That Means A Return Of “Mules On Steroids”- The Impact Could Cripple MIA

If Western Union Ends Remittance Services To Cuba, That Means A Return Of “Mules On Steroids”- Impact Could Cripple MIA 

Impacting DHS, CBP, TSA, OFAC, FinCEN, Miami-Dade Police Department
Seeking Those With US$10,000.00; Including When Divided Among Travelers
Add 1-2 Minutes Per Passenger Could Result Additional 30+ Hours Of Screening
Might Airlines Decrease Or Decline Services To Cuba?

This scenario could unfold on 22 November 2020 at Miami International Airport (MIA) as the months of November, December and January have an increase in passengers traveling for the holidays:   

There are twelve (12) flights depart throughout the day to Jose Marti International Airport (HAV) from Concourses D, E and J, for a total of approximately 1,800 passengers.   

Because Denver, Colorado-based Western Union Company no longer provides electronic remittance services from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, what was the norm more than twenty years ago has returned- individual passengers serving as “mules” to carry onboard (with lesser amounts in checked luggage) United States currency, for a fee, to their families, friends, colleagues, acquaintances, and customers in the Republic of Cuba.  The “mules” can often carry US$10,000.00 or more.  

A result of the electronic remittance disruption could be an increase in airport security line wait times as secondary-screening for each passenger becomes more likely.  One possibility would be a separate security line for passengers at all airports with services to the Republic of Cuba. 

The 1,800 passengers traveling on a typical day from MIA to HAV could require one minute to two minutes of additional screening- that is 1,800 minutes to 3,600 minutes per day.  There are sixty minutes in an hour.  That means an overall increase in screening time of 30 hours or more.   

This increase in screening times for passengers on flights to Republic of Cuba then also impacts passengers using the same concourses who are not traveling to the Republic of Cuba.  For other airports with services to the Republic of Cuba, they would encounter similar, though less impactful operational obstacles.   

The operational disruptions will impact members of the Washington, DC-based Airlines for America, the organization representing the ten largest United States air carriers.  Unknown is to what extent an increase in “mule” traffic will impact their schedules and budgets.  The impact could result in airlines choosing not to provide services to the Republic of Cuba or decrease services to the Republic of Cuba if airlines are unable to consistently schedule departures and arrivals.  

Previously, most flights to the Republic of Cuba operated from MIA.  There were additional flights from Boston Logan International Airport, Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, George Bush Intercontinental Airport (Houston), Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport, Newark Liberty International Airport, and Tampa International Airport.  Airlines operating schedules have included American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Jet Blue Airways, Southwest Airlines, and United Airlines. 

When transporting more than US$10,000.00, a passenger is required to file a report declaring the exact amount of funds to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  An increasing number of United States-based financial institutions have instituted requirements for customers to also file disclosure forms when obtaining less than US$10,000.00 in currency from their bank branch.  

Now, officers of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) who manage the security lanes along with CBP officers might need be detailed specifically to identify violators of DHS/CBP/FinCEN regulations.  Screening procedures would include the use of devices and specially-trained canines.  There may also be required additional officers from the Airport District Police of the Miami-Dade Police Department to monitor passengers prior to screening as there could be an increase in criminal activities inside and outside of MIA terminals as becomes known that passengers using certain concourses and checking-in for certain flights may be carrying large sums of United States currency. 

There may also be required representation at MIA and other airports of the FinCEN (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network) and Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury).   

There could be a meaningful impact and upon the already-stressed budgets and already-stressed staffing schedules of the DHS, TSA, CPB, Miami-Dade Police Department, FinCEN, and OFAC.  

Cuba Airline Operations 

• In December 2019, the Trump administration restricted United States regularly-scheduled commercial flights and authorized charter flights to HAV.  The decision ended regularly-scheduled flights by Delta Air Lines, Jet Blue Airways, and United Airlines to cities including Camaguey, Holguin, Santa Clara, and Santiago de Cuba. 

• Regularly-scheduled commercial flights from MIA represent the majority of all regularly-scheduled commercial flights from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  

• Regularly-scheduled commercial flight and authorized charter flight passengers departing MIA for HAV primarily use Concourses D (American Airlines), E (American Airlines, Swift Air) and J (Swift Air) at MIA. 

• After a hiatus due to the impact of COVID-19, HAV resumed its international flight operations on 15 November 2020. 

• On 4 November 2020, Fort Worth, Texas-based American Airlines reported that three flights daily would operate from MIA to HAV. 

Trump Administration Decisions 

The Trump Administration prohibits United States-based companies from engagement with entities controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba.  There is no indication the prohibition will be rescinded or revised.  The United States Department of State added to the Cuba Restricted List Republic of Cuba government-operated American International Services (AIS) and Financiera Cimex (Fincimex), a Panama-registered subsidiary of Republic of Cuba government-operated Corporacion Cimex which is a subsidiary of Grupo de Administracion Empresarial S.A. (GAESA) and controlled by the FAR.  Fincimex is the distribution partner in the Republic of Cuba for Western Union Company.  There is no indication the incoming Biden Administration would make changes to the Cuba Restricted List.  The Republic of Cuba continues to evaluate options relating to Fincimex, including the sale or transfer of the subsidiary to a non-FAR-controlled Republic of Cuba government-operated entity, such as a financial institution (Banco de Crédito y Comercio S.A. (BANDEC), Banco Popular de Ahorro S.A. (BPA), Banco Financiero Internacional S.A. (BFI), Banco Internacional de Comercio S.A. (BICSA), and Banco Metropolitano S.A. (BM)) which could seamlessly absorb and maintain Fincimex operations.  BICSA has already been vetted by the OFAC and has a correspondent banking relationship with Conway, Arkansas-based Home BancShares through its subsidiary Centennial Bank which in 2017 purchased Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank.  

In 2015, the OFAC authorized Stonegate Bank (2017 assets approximately US$2.9 billion) to have an account with BICSA, a member of Republic of Cuba government-operated Grupo Nuevo Banca SA, created by Corporate Charter No. 49 on 29 October 1993 and commenced operation on 3 January 1994.  

From Western Union  

“We informed our customers they have limited time to send money to their loved ones from the U.S. to Cuba, due to a new U.S. Government rule that will take effect on November 26, 2020.  The U.S. Government published the new rule on October 27, 2020, and provided 30 days for technical implementation of the new restrictions. Unfortunately, we have not found a solution in the limited timeframe.  The critical deadlines for money transfers to be collected from more than 400 Agent locations in Cuba are outlined below. These deadlines will enable us to pay out transfers in Cuba before the rule takes effect on November 26, 2020.  November 22, 2020, at 11:00 PM U.S. EST: The final opportunity to send money from the U.S. to Cuba.  November 23, 2020, at 6:00 PM Cuba Time: The deadline to pick up money at Western Union retail agent locations in Cuba.” 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

“There is no limit on the amount of money that can be taken out of or brought into the United States. However, if a person or persons traveling together and filing a joint declaration (CBP Form 6059-B) have more than $10,000 in currency or negotiable monetary instruments, they must fill out a "Report of International Transportation of Currency and Monetary Instruments" FinCEN [Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the United States Department of the Treasury] United States 105 (former CF 4790).  Please be aware, if persons/family members traveling together have more than $10,000, they cannot divide the currency between each other to avoid declaring the currency.  For example, if one person is carrying $5,000 and the other has $6,000, they have a total of $11,000 in their possession and must report it on a FinCEN 105 form. If a person or family fails to declare their monetary instruments in amounts more than $10,000 their monetary instrument(s) may be subject to forfeiture and could result in civil and or criminal penalties.  The FinCEN 105 form can be obtained prior to traveling or when going through U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). If assistance is required, a CBP officer can help with filling out the form.” 

LINK To FinCEN 105 Form

LINK TO COMPLETE POST IN PDF FORMAT

Western Union Preparing To End Money Transfers To Cuba On 22 November 2020.... Will Cuba Permit It?

13 de noviembre de 2020

DECLARACIÓN DE WESTERN UNION A LOS MEDIOS

Hoy informamos a nuestros clientes que tienen un límite de tiempo para enviar dinero a sus seres queridos desde los Estados Unidos a Cuba, debido a una nueva norma del gobierno de los Estados Unidos que entrará en vigor el 26 de noviembre del 2020.

Hemos estado trabajando fuertemente para explorar todas las posibles alternativas para mantener abiertos nuestros servicios entre los Estados Unidos y Cuba mientras reorganizamos este canal vital para nuestros clientes. El gobierno de los Estados Unidos publicó la nueva norma el 27 de octubre del 2020, otorgando un plazo de gracia de 30 días para implementar las nuevas técnicas de las restricciones. Desafortunadamente, no hemos encontrado una solución en este plazo reducido.

Por más de 20 años, Western Union ha estado enviando dinero a Cuba de parte de nuestros clientes a sus familiares y seres queridos para cubrir sus gastos de alimentos, renta y demás, incluyendo microempresas. Lamentamos profundamente esta situación y su impacto para nuestros clientes.

Nuestros clientes cuentan con nuestro compromiso de que seguiremos explorando todas las alternativas posibles en busca de una solución. Si hay alguna novedad, informaremos de inmediato a nuestros clientes.

A continuación, se indican las fechas críticas para que los envíos de dinero sean cobrados en los más de 400 puntos de Agentes en Cuba. Estas fechas límite nos permitirán pagar las transferencias en Cuba antes de que entre en vigor la nueva norma el 26 de noviembre del 2020.

• 22 de noviembre del 2020, a las 11:00 PM hora del Este de los Estados Unidos: Última oportunidad para realizar envíos de dinero desde los Estados Unidos a Cuba.

• 23 de noviembre del 2020 a las 6:00 PM hora de Cuba. Fecha límite para cobrar envíos en los centros de Western Union en los puntos de venta de nuestros agentes en Cuba.

  • Estamos invitando a los receptores a recoger su dinero en los centros de Western Union en los puntos de venta de nuestros agentes en Cuba de inmediato.

• Reembolsos: Las transacciones que no sean cobradas en Cuba antes de la fecha límite del 23 de noviembre del 2020, los clientes recibirán un reembolso íntegro a través de su forma de pago original.

Encontrará información adicional aquí

Carta en inglés: https://www.westernunion.com/blog/a-letter-to-our-cuba-customers/

Preguntas frecuentes en inglés: https://www.westernunion.com/blog/sending-money-to-cuba-from-the-united-states/

Carta en español: https://www.westernunion.com/blog/es/cuba-una-carta-a-nuestros-clientes/

Preguntas frecuentes en español: https://www.westernunion.com/blog/es/enviar-dinero-a-la-republica-de-cuba-desde-estados-unidos/

---------------------

November 13, 2020

WESTERN UNION MEDIA STATEMENT

Today we informed our customers they have limited time to send money to their loved ones from the U.S. to Cuba, due to a new U.S. Government rule that will take effect on November 26, 2020.

We have been working around the clock to explore every possible option to keep our services open between the U.S. and Cuba as we recognize this is a vital channel for our customers. The U.S. Government published the new rule on October 27, 2020, and provided 30 days for technical implementation of the new restrictions. Unfortunately, we have not found a solution in the limited timeframe.

For more than 20 years, Western Union has been moving money to Cuba on behalf of our customers. to family and loved ones to pay for food, rent, and other expenses including micro-businesses. We sincerely regret this situation and its impact on our customers.

Our customers have our commitment that we will continue to explore every possible option to find a solution. If there are any developments, we will inform our customers immediately.

The critical deadlines for money transfers to be collected from more than 400 Agent locations in Cuba are outlined below. These deadlines will enable us to pay out transfers in Cuba before the rule takes effect on November 26, 2020.

• November 22, 2020, at 11:00 PM U.S. EST: The final opportunity to send money from the U.S. to Cuba.

• November 23, 2020, at 6:00 PM Cuba Time: The deadline to pick up money at Western Union retail agent locations in Cuba.

  • We are encouraging receivers to pick up at Western Union retail agent locations in Cuba immediately.

• Refunds: For transactions that are not picked up in Cuba by the November 23 deadline, customers will be refunded in full through their original payment method.

Additional information is available here

English letter: https://www.westernunion.com/blog/a-letter-to-our-cuba-customers/

English FAQs: https://www.westernunion.com/blog/sending-money-to-cuba-from-the-united-states/

Spanish letter: https://www.westernunion.com/blog/es/cuba-una-carta-a-nuestros-clientes/

Spanish FAQs: https://www.westernunion.com/blog/es/enviar-dinero-a-la-republica-de-cuba-desde-estados-unidos/  

Statement By Fincimex Posted To Facebook

And Now The United States Congress Will Have Ten Members Focusing Upon Cuba Issues

On 3 November 2020, New York State Assemblywoman Nicole Malliotakis (64th District) defeated Representative Max Rose (D- 11th, New York). The following exchange using Twitter confirmed her connectivity with issues relating to the Republic of Cuba.

Gabriella Hoffman
@Gabby_Hoffman
Nov 4
There are two new GOP members who grew up under socialism. Cuban-born @CarlosGimenezFL and Ukrainian-born @Victoria_Spartz . And two children of Cuban immigrants — @NMalliotakis and @MaElviraSalazar. Us descendants of folks who fled socialism have much to rejoice. Love it

Nicole Malliotakis
@NMalliotakis
Nov 12
US House candidate, NY-11
An anti-socialist squad is forming...

From The New York State Assembly Biography: Nicole Malliotakis was first elected to the New York State Assembly on November 2, 2010, defeating a two-term incumbent. She is the daughter of immigrants, her father from Greece and her mother a Cuban exile of the Castro dictatorship. Nicole currently represents a district spanning the boroughs of Brooklyn and Staten Island. She was the first Hispanic-American elected from Richmond County. She was re-elected to her third term in November 2014 with an overwhelming 73 percent of the vote.

From the office of the Representative-elect: “Her mother is Cuban and fled the country in 1959..her father emigrated from Greece in the early 60's ..the Congresswoman-elect refers to herself as an American of Greek & Cuban parents....” and the Representative-elect “has spoken about a being a member of [the]” Congressional Cuba Democracy Caucus.

Representative-elect Malliotakis is expected to seek membership in the Congressional Cuba Democracy Caucus, Congressional Hispanic Conference, and Congressional Hispanic Caucus among others.

Ten (10) Cuban-American members of the United States Congress, three (3) in the United States Senate and seven (7) in the United States House of Representatives, consisting of two (2) members of the Democratic Party and eight (8) members of the Republican Party, will likely oppose most efforts by the Biden Administration to alter Trump Administration policies impacting the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela.

United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Cruz (R- Texas)
The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida)
The Honorable Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey)

United States House of Representatives
The Honorable Albio Sires (New Jersey; D- 8th)
The Honorable Alex Mooney (West Virginia; R- 2nd)
The Honorable Anthony E. González (Ohio; R- 16th)
The Honorable Mario Díaz-Balart (Florida; R-25th)
The Honorable Carlos Gimenez (Florida; R- 26th)
The Honorable Maria Elvira Salazar (Florida; R- 27th)
The Honorable Nicole Malliotakis (New York; R- 11th)

Previous Post:
What The Biden Administration May Do With Cuba (And Venezuela Has A Role)
November 09, 2020

President-Elect Biden Announces 27-Member Agency Review Team For Department Of The Treasury

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
November 10, 2020

Biden-Harris Transition Team Announces Members of Agency Review Teams
Formation of Agency Review Teams Among the First Steps to Building a Successful Administration

WASHINGTON – Today, the Biden-Harris Transition announced key members of the agency review teams (ARTs), which are responsible for evaluating the operations of the federal agencies so that the incoming Biden-Harris administration is prepared to lead our country on Day One. The ARTs are composed of highly experienced and talented professionals with deep backgrounds in key policy areas across the federal government. The teams possess a diversity of perspectives critical to addressing America’s most urgent and complex challenges.

“Our nation is grappling with a pandemic, an economic crisis, urgent calls for racial justice, and the existential threat of climate change. We must be prepared for a seamless transfer of knowledge to the incoming administration to protect our interests at home and abroad. The agency review process will help lay the foundation for meeting these challenges on Day One,” said Senator Ted Kaufman, Co-Chair, Biden-Harris Transition. “The work of the agency review teams is critical for protecting national security, addressing the ongoing public health crisis, and demonstrating that America remains the beacon of democracy for the world.”

The transition’s work continues full steam ahead. The agency review teams will proceed by meeting with former agency officials and experts who closely follow federal agencies, and with officials from think tanks, labor groups, trade associations, and other NGOs. Further, many of the ART members have had long careers in the federal agencies they will now help prepare for the incoming Biden-Harris administration.

Once the GSA Administrator ascertains the results of the election, the ART members will work directly with staff in federal agencies to ensure that the incoming Biden-Harris administration is able to effectively achieve the policy goals of the President and Vice President-elect.

Finally, President-elect Biden and Vice President-elect Harris are proud to have one of the most diverse agency review teams in presidential transition history. Of the hundreds of ART members to be announced, more than half are women, and approximately 40 percent represent communities historically underrepresented in the federal government, including people of color, people who identify as LGBTQ+, and people with disabilities. The President-elect and Vice President-elect are committed to building an administration that looks like America.

Agency review teams are responsible for understanding the operations of each agency, ensuring a smooth transfer of power, and preparing for President-elect Biden and Vice President-elect Harris and their cabinet to hit the ground running on Day One. These teams are composed of highly experienced and talented professionals with deep backgrounds in crucial policy areas across the federal government. The teams have been crafted to ensure they not only reflect the values and priorities of the incoming administration, but reflect the diversity of perspectives crucial for addressing America’s most urgent and complex challenges.

The Presidential Transition Act requires presidential transitions to disclose the “most recent employment” and “sources of funding” for all agency review team members. The Transition Team has three types of agency review team members:

• Volunteers: Individuals who are volunteering for the Transition in their personal capacity. For these team members, their current or most recent employer is listed (for informational purposes only), and their source of funding is listed as “Volunteer.”

• Full-Time Transition Employees: Individuals who are full-time paid Transition employees, funded by the Transition entity itself (PT Fund, Inc.). For these team members, their most recent employer prior to joining the Transition is listed (for informational purposes only), and their source of funding is listed as “Transition — PT Fund, Inc.”

• Detailees: Individuals on detail who will be funded through an appropriation administered by the General Services Administration. For these team members, their current employer is listed, and their source of funding is listed as “Transition — Appropriation.”

Department of the Treasury
Name
Most Recent Employment
Source of Funding

Don Graves, Team Lead
KeyBank
Transition
PT Fund, Inc.
Mehrsa Baradaran
University of California, Irvine School of Law
Volunteer
Michael Barr
University of Michigan, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy
Volunteer
Lily Batchelder
New York University, School of Law
Volunteer
John Bentivoglio
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
Volunteer
Chris Brummer
Georgetown University
Volunteer
Liyan David Chang
Devoted Health
Volunteer
Heidi Crebo-Rediker
International Capital Strategies, LLC
Volunteer
Will Fields
Sidewalk Labs
Volunteer
Suzanna Fritzberg
Birmingham Strong
Volunteer
Andy Green
Center for American Progress
Volunteer
David Hinson
Ategra Capital Management
Volunteer
Nicole Isaac
LinkedIn Corporation
Volunteer
Simon Johnson
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Volunteer
Helen Kanovsky
Mortgage Bankers Association
Volunteer
Marisa Lago
New York City, Department of City Planning
Volunteer
Nancy Lee
Center for Global Development
Volunteer
Sarah Miller
American Economic Liberties Project
Volunteer
Sophie Raseman
Brightside Benefit, Inc.
Volunteer
Rosie Rios
Self-employed
Volunteer
Buzz Roberts
National Association of Affordable Housing Lenders
Volunteer
Elizabeth Rosenberg
Center for a New American Security
Volunteer
Javier Saade
Impact Master Holdings
Volunteer
Damon Silvers
AFL-CIO Volunteer
Betsey Stevenson
University of Michigan
Volunteer
Jay Williams
Hartford Foundation for Public Giving
Volunteer
Charles Yi
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, LLP
Volunteer

President-Elect Biden Announces 30-Member Agency Review Team For Department Of State

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
November 10, 2020

Biden-Harris Transition Team Announces Members of Agency Review Teams
Formation of Agency Review Teams Among the First Steps to Building a Successful Administration

WASHINGTON – Today, the Biden-Harris Transition announced key members of the agency review teams (ARTs), which are responsible for evaluating the operations of the federal agencies so that the incoming Biden-Harris administration is prepared to lead our country on Day One. The ARTs are composed of highly experienced and talented professionals with deep backgrounds in key policy areas across the federal government. The teams possess a diversity of perspectives critical to addressing America’s most urgent and complex challenges.

“Our nation is grappling with a pandemic, an economic crisis, urgent calls for racial justice, and the existential threat of climate change. We must be prepared for a seamless transfer of knowledge to the incoming administration to protect our interests at home and abroad. The agency review process will help lay the foundation for meeting these challenges on Day One,” said Senator Ted Kaufman, Co-Chair, Biden-Harris Transition. “The work of the agency review teams is critical for protecting national security, addressing the ongoing public health crisis, and demonstrating that America remains the beacon of democracy for the world.”

The transition’s work continues full steam ahead. The agency review teams will proceed by meeting with former agency officials and experts who closely follow federal agencies, and with officials from think tanks, labor groups, trade associations, and other NGOs. Further, many of the ART members have had long careers in the federal agencies they will now help prepare for the incoming Biden-Harris administration.

Once the GSA Administrator ascertains the results of the election, the ART members will work directly with staff in federal agencies to ensure that the incoming Biden-Harris administration is able to effectively achieve the policy goals of the President and Vice President-elect.

Finally, President-elect Biden and Vice President-elect Harris are proud to have one of the most diverse agency review teams in presidential transition history. Of the hundreds of ART members to be announced, more than half are women, and approximately 40 percent represent communities historically underrepresented in the federal government, including people of color, people who identify as LGBTQ+, and people with disabilities. The President-elect and Vice President-elect are committed to building an administration that looks like America.

Agency review teams are responsible for understanding the operations of each agency, ensuring a smooth transfer of power, and preparing for President-elect Biden and Vice President-elect Harris and their cabinet to hit the ground running on Day One. These teams are composed of highly experienced and talented professionals with deep backgrounds in crucial policy areas across the federal government. The teams have been crafted to ensure they not only reflect the values and priorities of the incoming administration, but reflect the diversity of perspectives crucial for addressing America’s most urgent and complex challenges.

The Presidential Transition Act requires presidential transitions to disclose the “most recent employment” and “sources of funding” for all agency review team members. The Transition Team has three types of agency review team members:

• Volunteers: Individuals who are volunteering for the Transition in their personal capacity. For these team members, their current or most recent employer is listed (for informational purposes only), and their source of funding is listed as “Volunteer.”

• Full-Time Transition Employees: Individuals who are full-time paid Transition employees, funded by the Transition entity itself (PT Fund, Inc.). For these team members, their most recent employer prior to joining the Transition is listed (for informational purposes only), and their source of funding is listed as “Transition — PT Fund, Inc.”

• Detailees: Individuals on detail who will be funded through an appropriation administered by the General Services Administration. For these team members, their current employer is listed, and their source of funding is listed as “Transition — Appropriation.”

Department of State
Name
Most Recent Employment
Source of Funding
Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Team Lead
Albright Stonebridge Group
Volunteer
Hady Amr
Brookings Institution
Volunteer
Susan Biniaz
United Nations Foundation
Volunteer
Oni Blair
LINK Houston
Volunteer
Derek Chollet
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Volunteer
Frances Colon
Self-employed
Volunteer
Bathsheba Crocker
CARE
Volunteer
Sarah Cross
Open Society Foundations
Volunteer
Michael Guest
Self-employed
Volunteer
Sumona Guha
Albright Stonebridge Group
Volunteer
Peter Harrell
Self-employed
Volunteer
Owen Herrnstadt
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
Volunteer
Roberta Jacobson
Albright Stonebridge Group
Volunteer
Bonnie Jenkins
Women of Color Advancing Peace and Security
Volunteer
Alexandra Kahan
Boston Consulting Group
Volunteer
Jeremy Konyndyk
Center for Global Development
Volunteer
Ellison Laskowski
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Volunteer
Allison Lombardo
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited
Volunteer
Raphael Majma
Alloy
Volunteer
Nancy McEldowney
Georgetown University
Volunteer
Amber McIntyre
HWC, Inc.
Volunteer
Emily Mendrala
Center for Democracy in the Americas
Volunteer
Jane Rhee
The Estee Lauder Companies
Volunteer
Fouad Saad
Self-employed
Volunteer
Gentry Smith
Self-employed
Volunteer
Dana Stroul
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Volunteer
Tom Sullivan
Amazon.com, Inc.
Volunteer
Puneet Talwar
Self-employed
Volunteer
Margaret Taylor
Brookings Institution
Volunteer
Ramin Toloui
Stanford University
Volunteer

UK's Imperial Brands Among Increasing Number Of EU-Based Defendants In Libertad Act Lawsuits Seeking Guidance From EC

LUIS MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, MARIA TERESA RODRIGUEZ, a/k/a MARIA TERESA LANDA, ALFREDO RAMON FORNS, RAMON ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ, RAUL LORENZO RODRIGUEZ, CHRISTINA CONROY, and FRANCISCO RAMON RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiffs, v. IMPERIAL BRANDS PLC, CORPORACIÓN HABANOS, S.A., WPP PLC, YOUNG & RUBICAM LLC, and BCW LLC, a/k/a BURSON COHN & WOLFE LLC [1:20-cv-23287; Southern Florida District].

Berenthal & Associates (plaintiff)
Rodriguez Tramont & Nunez (plaintiff)
Nelson Mullins (defendant)
Allen & Overy (defendant)
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr (defendant)
Broad & Cassel (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

LINKS:

Defendant Imperial Brands PLC’s First Status Report
Defendant Imperial Brands PLC’s Opposition To Motion To Strike The Declaration Of Andrew Rhys Davies

Excerpts:

Defendant Imperial Brands plc (“Imperial”) respectfully submits this status report pursuant to the Court’s September 23, 2020 Order [D.E. 49] granting Imperial’s motion for a limited stay of proceedings and directing Imperial to submit monthly status reports on its application to the European Commission (the “Commission”) for authorization to defend this lawsuit or, at a minimum, to file and litigate a motion to dismiss. By way of update, Imperial states as follows:

1. As Imperial previously advised the Court [D.E. 14, D.E. 15-1], on August 27, 2020, Imperial submitted an application to the Commission under Article 5 paragraph 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96, Protecting Against the Effects of the Extra-Territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third County, and Actions Based Thereon or Resulting Therefrom, 1996 O.J. (L. 309) 1 (EC) (“Regulation 2271/96”), for authorization to defend this lawsuit or, at a minimum, authorization in the first instance to file and litigate a motion to dismiss (the “Application”).

2. The Commission has acknowledged receipt of Imperial’s Application, and has cautioned Imperial that unless and until the Commission provides authorization Imperial is prohibited from appearing before this Court pursuant to the summons in this action under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act.

3. Imperial notified the Commission of the requirement to file a status report and requested that the Commission therefore provide Imperial an update on the status of its application ahead of the October 23, 2020 due date. On October 21, 2020, the Commission informed Imperial that the Commission is currently analyzing Imperial’s application and will do its utmost to ensure that a decision is made in due course.

What The Biden Administration May Do With Cuba (And Venezuela Has A Role)

Nine Cuban-Americans In United States Congress
Biden Policies Center-Rights Rather Than Center-Left
Cuba Policy Based Upon Conditionality
Condition Remittance Level Increase To A Non-Military Partner
Whiplash Unlikely At State Department And Department Of The Treasury
Biden Is Not Obama- Restoring Diplomatic Relations Was Done
United States Congress Divisions Will Be 2% To 3%
2022 And 2024 Will Be Relevant

The Biden Administration will not soon return to the United States-Republic of Cuba bilateral commercial, economic, and political landscape that existed prior to 20 January 2017.   

The Biden Administration will encounter a larger, less-porous, and media-savvy Congressional Firewall that may limit, perhaps consistently or intermittently during his four-year term, robust re-engagement with the Republic of Cuba.  

The 535 members of the 117th United States Congress (House of Representatives and Senate) convene on 3 January 2021. 

Potentially interrupting the imperviousness of opposition to Pre-Trump Administration re-engagement would be unilateral and permanent changes implemented by the Republic of Cuba- particularly those relating to its commercial, economic and political infrastructure and, most importantly, lessening its connectivity with the [Nicolas] Maduro Administration in Caracas, Venezuela. 

If the Republic of Cuba were to exit Venezuela, the Biden Administration would have a relatively free rein to make changes to Trump Administration decisions relating to the Republic of Cuba.  Conditionality would remain, but it would flexible rather than rigid.  

The United States House of Representatives will remain in control of the Democratic Party, although with a meaningfully narrower majority- perhaps 2% to 3%.  The United States Senate, based upon a bipartisan consensus of analysts, may become a 51-49 majority for the Republican Party after two concurrent elections in the State of Georgia on 5 January 2021.   

Nine (9) Cuban-American members of the United States Congress, three (3) in the United States Senate and six (6) in the United States House of Representatives, consisting of two (2) members of the Democratic Party and seven (7) members of the Republican Party, will likely oppose most efforts by the Biden Administration to alter Trump Administration policies impacting the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela.    

United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Cruz (R- Texas)
The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida)
The Honorable Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey)
United States House of Representatives
The Honorable Albio Sires (New Jersey; D- 8th)
The Honorable Alex Mooney (West Virginia; R- 2nd)
The Honorable Anthony E. González (Ohio; R- 16th)
The Honorable Mario Díaz-Balart (Florida; R-25th)
The Honorable Carlos Gimenez (Florida; R- 26th)
The Honorable Maria Elvira Salazar (Florida; R- 27th)

Most significant to developing decisions will be the post-election analyses by the Democratic Party and the Republican Party- what were the reasons for President Donald Trump to win the state of Florida, particularly areas located in the southern portions of the state.   

The Democratic Party, Biden Administration, presumed Biden/Harris Re-Election Committee, individuals who want to run for office in Florida in 2022, and individuals who want the 2024 Democratic Party presidential nomination should President Joseph Biden choose not to seek the nomination, will not want to take any decision to overtly further disrupt electoral opportunities.   

The Biden Administration upon taking office will focus upon the 2022 mid-term elections for the United States Congress, where the political party in control of The White House typically loses seats in each chamber of the United States Congress.  

The Biden Administration will be a single term.  As such, intra-Democratic Party positioning, particularly within the office of Vice President Kamala Harris, will be disruptive to deciding Republic of Cuba-related decisions as any decision will impact Florida. 

The Biden Administration will also be hamstrung by then-candidate Joseph Biden’s statements during the 2020 campaign about the ineffectiveness of Trump Administration policies towards the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela: 

“We have to vote for a new Cuba policy as well,” Biden said. “Trump is the worst possible standard-bearer for democracy in places like Cuba, Venezuela, North Korea. Cuba is no closer to freedom and democracy today than it was four years ago. Trump loves to talk tough, but he doesn’t care about the Cuban and Venezuelan people. He won’t even grant Temporary Protected Status to Venezuelans fleeing the oppressive Maduro regime. I will, but we have to vote.”  The Miami Herald (29 October 2020)  

“Cuba is no closer to freedom and democracy today than it was four years ago.”  “President Trump can’t advance democracy and human rights for the Cuban people or the Venezuelan people, for that matter, when he has praised so many autocrats around the world.”  The New York Times (29 October 2020) 

Despite expectations to the contrary, the Biden Administration will gravitate and navigate an international policy framed by the center-right rather than the center-left.  “Human rights” will be the topic sentence when describing policies towards the Republic of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua among other countries.  The debate among policymakers and those who vote in the United States Congress will be how to define “human rights” and how to rank the list of priorities. 

The Biden Administration will find a Republic of Cuba again chronically, severely, and negatively self-impacted by its commercial, economic and political decisions which continue to result in a shortage of foreign exchange to make payment for imports, provide inputs to support exports, repay debt, and invest in the redevelopment of infrastructure.   

The Biden Administration will also find a Republic of Cuba that continues to recoil from conditionality, from quid pro quo, as it did throughout the Obama Administration and through the Trump Administration.  The Republic of Cuba believes it a victim- and thus does not need to do anything to get anything.  

The Biden Administration will return to established processes, inter-agency deliberations including career employees and appointees.  Impulsiveness will define the Biden Administration.  The Republic of Cuba will continue to know, as it did with the Trump Administration, that there will be changes to regulations and changes to policies, but the Biden Administration may provide conditionality with options more easily accepted by the Republic of Cuba.   

Outside pressures adding to the less than optimized landscape for the Republic of Cuba include United States statutes, regulations, and policies; the commercial and economic implosion of Venezuela from which the Republic of Cuba has obtained for more than two decades subsidized oil products, loans, grants, and payments for personnel; the impact of the pandemic upon the tourism sector; continued decrease in the number of governments willing to provide financial support to the Republic of Cuba; and lessening tolerance by governments and financial institutions to provide support to the Republic of Cuba when the Republic of Cuba is not implementing permanent structural commercial, economic and political changes which it maintains rather than awaits to undo. 

The Biden Administration will likely witness the impact of how the Republic of Cuba implements the cessation of the dual currencies and many currency exchange rates that exist within the country of 11.2 million citizens.  The process will be acute- inflicting pain upon most of the population.  Remittances from abroad will be important for many to absorb the devaluation of their earnings and savings.  The Biden Administration may find an opportunity for leverage by maintaining or changing existing restrictions upon remittances (US$1,000.00 per quarter versus unlimited during the Obama Administration) sent to the Republic of Cuba. 

The Biden Administration will also be pressured by members of the United States Congress and particularly by Cuban-American members of the United States Congress to leverage any changes to statutes, regulations and policies impacting the Republic of Cuba with assistance from the Republic of Cuba to develop a pathway for the resolution of commercial, economic, and political issues in Venezuela. 

For any cooperation, the Republic of Cuba may require from the United States and Venezuela a multi-year glidepath for decreasing the level of subsidies/discounts provided by Venezuela.  One proposal includes a 25% annual reduction of subsidies which would end in 2024 (the end of the current presidential term in Venezuela) when transactions would become market-based.  A four-year transition would permit the Republic of Cuba to restructure its energy portfolio while maintaining payment schedules.  During this four-year period, the provisions of the bilateral agreement signed with Venezuela in 2000 would remain operational.  There is one immensely critical benefit the Biden Administration will have with the Republic of Cuba that the Trump Administration did not have- absence of a lack of trust.  Any lack of trust will need be earned.   

Will the career employees at the United States Department of State and at the United States Department of the Treasury have whiplash from consequential changes to their “mission set” where they continue to espouse Trump Administration policy decisions until 12:00 pm on Wednesday, 20 January 2021, and then at 12:01 pm on Wednesday, 20 January 2021, they espouse a Biden Administration policy which contradicts what they have enforced and supported during the last four years?  Some will.  

Biden Administration Do Or Not 

·       Legislation to demonstrably alter (expand) the commercial, economic, and political relationship with the Republic of Cuba introduced in either chamber of the United States Congress would likely be defeated with bipartisan participation.  This is particularly true given the closeness of the Democratic Party-Republican Party divisions in each chamber which may be 2% to 3%.  

·       Would the Biden Administration eliminate or modify the Cuba Restricted List maintained by the United States Department of State and again permit individuals subject to United States jurisdiction to use hotels and restaurants and other facilities affiliated with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba?  Unlikely. 

·       Resume the operation of cruise lines?  Unlikely. 

·       Renew the license for hotel management contracts?  Unlikely. 

·       Re-authorize regularly-scheduled commercial flights to cities other than to Havana?  Likely.  The flights may be restricted initially to individuals subject to United States jurisdiction who are of Cuban descent visiting family and friends. 

·       Require the Republic of Cuba to permit United States companies to directly export inputs to any registered self-employed for use in their operations including restaurants, Airbnb residences, and service-focused enterprises.  Possible. 

·       Authorize direct correspondent banking which would permit United States-based financial institutions and Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions to maintain respective accounts so that funds could be electronically transferred transparently and efficiently for use with authorized transactions, particularly supporting the export from the United States of agricultural commodities, food products, healthcare products, and inputs for the self-employed in the Republic of Cuba.  Possible.  The Obama Administration authorized United States-based financial institutions to have accounts with Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions, but without explanation did not permit Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions to have accounts with United States-based financial institutions.   

·       Increase limits on remittances?  Likely.  However, unlikely that Western Union will again be permitted to engage with Fincimex as its partner unless it is decoupled from affiliation with the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba.  The Trump Administration has been effective in communicating the rationale for and obtaining support for its efforts to decouple the FAR from its role in the economy.  Leadership of United States companies will not publicly oppose a continuation of that policy.  The Biden Administration may condition an increase on limits on remittances, or to removing limits entirely, upon the Republic of Cuba separating Fincimex from the FAR.  With remittances a critical source of foreign exchange for the Republic of Cuba, the Biden Administration may find success that did not materialize during the Trump Administration.   

·       Permit expanded opportunities for individuals subject to United States jurisdiction who are not of Cuban descent to travel to the Republic of Cuba?  Unlikely initially. 

·       Add consular staff at the United States Embassy in Havana specifically for the purpose of processing visas.  Likely. 

·       Return to full staffing levels at the United States Embassy in Havana.  Unlikely.  There remain unanswered questions as to the source(s) of illnesses impacting United States diplomats at the end of the Obama Administration and into the Trump Administration.  Many career employees of the United States Department of State oppose any return of staffing levels until the health issues are resolved. 

·       Appoint a United States Ambassador to The Republic of Cuba.  Unlikely initially.  If the United States Senate is in control of the Democratic Party, then likelihood increases.  Rationale would be that having an Ambassador in Havana, along with the return of a United States Ambassador to Venezuela, may create more useful atmospherics for a resolution of issues. 

·       Again, suspend Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”)?  Unlikely.  Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.  A suspension of Title III is unlikely because there is 1) nothing to gain from suspending as the European Union (EU), where most of the non-United States defendants are located, has not taken any meaningful measures, so the Biden Administration would not have a quid pro quo opportunity 2) no compelling reason not to await the final dispositions of the twenty-nine lawsuits filed, some of which have moved to Courts of Appeals  3) as long as Title III is active, it is a bargaining tool for the Biden Administration, so why loose it prematurely 4) there is no meaningful domestic political pressure to re-suspend it and 5) there would be vocal bipartisan opposition by members of the United States Congress. 

·       Lessen or cease use of Title IV of the Libertad Act that restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims in the Republic of Cuba.  One Canada-based company and one Spain-based company are currently known to be subject to this provision based upon a certified claim and non-certified claim.  Unlikely. 

·       A re-energized focus upon negotiating a settlement for the certified claims by individuals and companies against the Republic of Cuba, which the Obama Administration did not chose to connect with its regulatory and policy decisions relating to the Republic of Cuba.  Likely.  There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims US$8.7 billion.  The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (valued at US$56,196,422.73).   

LINK TO COMPLETE TEXT IN PDF FORMAT

Previous Posts:  

Cuba Advocates Shouldn't Be So Confident About President Biden 

Biden And Harris Discuss Their (Potential) Policies For Cuba... Many Questions Remain. Should Cruise Lines Rejoice? 

Former U.S. Secretary Of State Kerry Shares A Biden Administration Approach To Cuba- And Cuba Won't Like It 

Biden Criticizes Trump For "Approach" Towards Cuba; Echo Of Kerry Comments Last Month 

Does New Charge d’Affaires in Havana Have An Unspoken Goal? Get Thrown Out By 3 November 2020

U.S. Agricultural Commodity/Food Product Exports To Cuba Decline By 43.9% In September; Down 48.8% Year-To-Year

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
November 2020

September 2020 Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Decrease 43.9%- 1
57th Of 224 September U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Decrease 48.8%- 2
Cuba Ranks 58th Of 224 Ag/Food Export Markets- 2
September 2020 Healthcare Product Exports US$10,463.00- 2
September 2020 Humanitarian Donations US$143,309.00- 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 16

SEPTEMBER 2020 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 43.9%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in September 2020 were US$16,117,329.00 compared to US$28,779,856.00 in September 2019 and US$12,226,970.00 in September 2018.

Agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba thus far in 2020 are US$126,262,312.00 compared to US$255,360,721.00 in 2019, representing a decrease of 48.8%.

Since December 2001, agricultural commodity and food product exports reported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba is US$6,259,135,008.00

This report contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

Complete Report In PDF Format

President Biden Suspending Title III of the Libertad Act? Might Clarence Thomas Supreme Court Nomination Hearing Provide Clues

Might President Joseph Biden suspend Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”)?

The Trump Administration on 2 May 2019 made operational Title III of the Libertad Act. Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.

Thus far, twenty-nine lawsuits have been filed- eleven certified claimants (there are 5,913 certified claimants) and eighteen non-certified claimants (estimates as high as 200,000). Four of the lawsuits are at Courts of Appeals. There are nearing two hundred attorneys from sixty-seven law firms representing more than one hundred plaintiffs and defendants; and nearing sixty defendants are located in twenty-eight countries. LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Statistics

The U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council interacts with a larger number of attorneys on Republic of Cuba-related matters than does any organization in the United States. There does not exist a consensus from Libertad Act lawsuit attorneys representing plaintiffs and defendants who believe that Title III would again be suspended by a Biden Administration.

The most consistent reasoning by the attorneys includes 1) nothing to gain from suspending as the European Union (EU), where most of the non-United States defendants are located, has not taken any meaningful measures as of yet, so a Biden Administration would not have a quid pro quo opportunity 2) no compelling reason not to await the final dispositions of the twenty-nine lawsuits filed 3) as long as Title III is active, it is a bargaining tool for a Biden Administration, so why loose it prematurely and 4) there is no meaningful domestic political pressure to re-suspend it.

Is Joseph Biden hostile to property rights? Could be. However, not outlandish to believe him saying: “Come on man, Castro stole those folks’ property. Here’s the deal: Not on my watch. Not OK with a guy like me who got up as a kid every morning and hustled to help my family keep a roof over their heads. Not OK to take the house or business of a hard-working family.”

Biden on Property Rights
By Michael M. Berger
Senior Counsel- Appellate
Manatt LLP
August 25, 2020

Manatt appellate senior counsel Michael Berger authored an article for Daily Journal about Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden’s historical stance on property rights. In particular, Berger analyzed Biden’s questioning during a hearing to determine whether presidential nominee Clarence Thomas should be confirmed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which concerned the protection afforded property owners by the 5th Amendment's guarantee that private property will not be taken for public use without the payment of just compensation and the 14th Amendment's guarantee that no state can deprive anyone of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Berger also noted the importance of this line of questioning, saying, “the ascent of Joe Biden to the top spot on a presidential ticket has caused many people to review the half-century of Biden's public life for possible clues as to future actions.” LINK TO COMPLETE ARTICLE

Joe Biden and Limited Government
By David Boaz
Cato Institute
24 August 2008

Barack Obama and Joe Biden both get a perfect 100 from the big-government liberal Americans for Democratic Action, which probably tells you all you need to know. But I remember a dramatic moment back in 1991 when Biden made his commitment to unlimited government clear and dramatic. Clarence Thomas had been nominated for the Supreme Court, and Biden, then chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, was questioning him. Biden bore in on the possibility that Thomas might believe in "natural law," the idea, as Tony Mauro of USA Today summarized it, that "everyone is born with God-given rights - referred to in the Declaration of Independence as 'inalienable rights' to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' - apart from what any law or the Constitution grants." Biden singled out Cato adjunct scholar Richard Epstein and Cato author Stephen Macedo and demanded to know if Thomas agreed with them that the Constitution protects property rights. Waving Epstein's book Takings in the air like Joe McCarthy with a list of communists, Biden demanded to know, as we very loosely paraphrased it in Cato's 25-year Annual Report (pdf; page 14), "Are you now or have you ever been a libertarian?" As most judicial nominees do when pursued by a senator roused to defend his power like a mama bear, Thomas assured Senator Biden that he wouldn't take the Constitution too seriously.

Was Biden right to worry? Well, as we said in the Annual Report, four years later Thomas joined the Court in declaring, "We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of limited powers." But ten years later the Court finally considered whether the Constitution protects property rights and said, "Ehh, not so much." Thomas protested, "Something has gone seriously awry with this Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. Though citizens are safe from the government in their homes, the homes themselves are not." Biden was right to worry that Thomas's understanding of individual rights and the Constitution just might put some limits on the power of government.

Title III Suspension History 

Title III has been suspended every six months since the Libertad Act was enacted in 1996- by President William J. Clinton, President George W. Bush, President Barack H. Obama and President Donald J. Trump.  

• On 16 January 2019, The Honorable Mike Pompeo, United States Secretary of State, reported a suspension for forty-five (45) days. 

• On 4 March 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a suspension for thirty (30) days. 

• On 3 April 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a further suspension for fourteen (14) days through 1 May 2019. 

• On 17 April 2019, the Trump Administration reported that it would no longer suspend Title III. 

• On 2 May 2019 certified claimants and non-certified claimants were permitted to file lawsuits in United States courts. 

Certified Claims Background 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims US$8.7 billion.  

The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

From the certified claim filed by Texaco: “The Cuban corporation was intervened on June 29, 1960, pursuant to Resolution 188 of June 28, 1960, under Law 635 of 1959.  Resolution 188 was promulgated by the Government of Cuba when the Cuban corporation assertedly refused to refine certain crude oil as assertedly provided under a 1938 law pertaining to combustible materials.  Subsequently, this Cuban firm was listed as nationalized in Resolution 19 of August 6, 1960, pursuant to Cuban Law 851.  The Commission finds, however, that the Cuban corporation was effectively intervened within the meaning of Title V of the Act by the Government of Cuba on June 29, 1960.” 

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International; the certified claim also includes land adjacent to the Jose Marti International Airport in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  The third-largest certified claim valued at US$97,373,414.72 is controlled by New York, New York-based North American Sugar Industries, Inc.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement.   

Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 requires that an asset had a value of US$50,000.00 when expropriated by the Republic of Cuba without compensation to the original owner.  Of the 5,913 certified claims, 913, or 15%, are valued at US$50,000.00 or more.  Adjusted for inflation, US$50,000.00 (3.70% per annum) in 1960 has a 2019 value of approximately US$427,267.01.  The USFCSC authorized 6% per annum, meaning the 2019 value of US$50,000.00 is approximately US$1,649,384.54.  

The ITT Corporation Agreement 

In July 1997, then-New York City, New York-based ITT Corporation and then-Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based STET International Netherlands N.V. signed an agreement whereby STET International Netherlands N.V. would pay approximately US$25 million to ITT Corporation for a ten-year right (after which the agreement could be renewed and was renewed) to use assets (telephone facilities and telephone equipment) within the Republic of Cuba upon which ITT Corporation has a certified claim valued at approximately US$130.8 million.  ETECSA, which is now wholly-owned by the government of the Republic of Cuba, was a joint venture controlled by the Ministry of Information and Communications of the Republic of Cuba within which Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based Telecom Italia International N.V. (formerly Stet International Netherlands N.V.), a subsidiary of Rome, Italy-based Telecom Italia S.p.A. was a shareholder.  Telecom Italia S.p.A., was at one time a subsidiary of Ivrea, Italy-based Olivetti S.p.A.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International. 

Cuba Libertad Act Defendants Differ To Court Of Appeals: Booking.com Says No Oral Arguments Required; Expedia Entites Say Otherwise

MARIO DEL VALLE, ENRIQUE FALLA, MARIO ECHEVARRIA V. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, ORBITZ, LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING HOLDINGS INC. Initial defendants were: TRIVAGO GMBH, BOOKING.COM B.V., GRUPO HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE I-5, AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22619 Southern Florida District; 20-12407 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]

Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie, LLP (defendant)
Scott Douglass & McConnico (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

Notice Of Incorrect Statement Of Related Case (10/6/20)
Brief Of Defendants-Appellees Booking.Com B.V. And Booking Holdings Inc. (11/2/20)
Supplemental Appendix Of Defendants- Appellees Booking.com B.V. And Booking Holdings Inc. (11/2/20)
Brief Of Appellees Expedia Group, Inc., Hotels.com, L.P., Hotels.com GP, LLC, And Orbitz, LLC (11/2/20)

LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

Excerpts From Filings:

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellees Booking.com B.V. and Booking Holdings Inc. submit that oral argument is unnecessary in this case because it is a straightforward appeal concerning personal jurisdiction. This Court should affirm the district court’s judgment without argument.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue I: The first issue, reviewed de novo, is whether personal jurisdiction can be maintained over foreign defendants based on the accessibility of a website in Florida, under Sections 48.193(1)(a)(1) (the “doing business” section) and 48.193(1)(a)(2) (the “committing a tort” section) of the Florida long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause.

Issue II: The second issue is whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint without granting a conditional request for jurisdictional discovery contained solely in the plaintiffs’ response in opposition to a motion to dismiss.

Issue III: The third issue is whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend where plaintiffs did not move the district court for leave to amend.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The Expedia Entities respectfully submit that oral argument would be helpful to the Court in deciding this appeal. While the personal jurisdiction issue does not in-volve any novel or unusual questions, the issues regarding standing and failure to state a claim present issues of first impression regarding the proper interpretation of the Helms-Burton Act. Though the Act was adopted in 1996, the private right of action in Title III was suspended until May 2019. As such, most courts have not yet ad-dressed or resolved fundamental aspects of the statute’s enforcement. This appeal presents one of the first opportunities for this Court to address certain of those is-sues.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether the second amended complaint contains factual allegations as to each of the Expedia Entities sufficient to make out a prima facie case of specific per-sonal jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause.

2. Whether Plaintiffs lack standing under Article III of the Constitution and, thus, the federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.

3. As an alternative ground for affirmance, whether Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) because Plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing that a. Plaintiffs own “the claim[s]” to the allegedly confiscated properties and acquired ownership of those claims before March 12, 1996, as required by 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B); b. the Expedia Entities “knowingly and intentionally” engaged in or profit-ed from commercial activity concerning confiscated property, as required by the Act’s definition of traffics, 22 U.S.C. § 6023(A); c. the Expedia Entities engaged in conduct that falls outside the lawful-travel clause in the Act’s definition of traffics, 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(B)(iii); d. the allegedly confiscated properties meet the Act’s definition of property, which excludes most “real property used for residential purposes.”

Might Cuba And Venezuela Participate In 2021 Summit Of The Americas? Might They Be Required To Participate?

Will Trump and Biden invite the Republic of Cuba and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to participate in the 2021 Summit of the Americas? 

The Counter-intuitive Strategy?  Condition Cuba And Venezuela Participation To Changes In United States Policies. 

In 2021, the Washington DC-based Organization of American States (OAS)-affiliated Summit of the Americas will be held in the United States, and the host will be the President of the United States. 

There are arguments that by including President Miguel Diaz-Canel of the Republic of Cuba (population 11.3 million) and President Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela (estimated population 26 million-28.4 million; 30 million in 2015), the United States would create legitimacy for the manner by which each head of state manages their respective countries- and thus less urgency for seeking changes to the behavior of those two countries. 

There are arguments that inclusion for both leaders could create collective pressure- and present collective opportunities for each country should they embrace decisions required by the other participants at the Summit of the Americas.  Basically, shining a spotlight upon the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela to show distinctly how each county lags glaringly behind its neighbors in terms of commercial, economic and political institutional successes. 

The arguments for continued exclusion of the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela from the 2021 Summit of the Americas reflect the disagreement, though not with unanimity, by participants with the behavior of each country.  The current message- participation requires change.  

There is an undeniable attractiveness for some participants to view President Diaz-Canel and President Maduro seated amongst other heads of state and heads of government and having to listen to a litany of grievances from Brazil, Colombia and United States.  Or, heightening the optic- both presidents could rise from their seats and defiantly depart the venue.  However, a departure would deny them a global platform from which to confront their accusers and defend their policies. 

If President Trump is re-elected, he will no longer believe a need to subscribe to the interests of desired constituencies; he would feel unshackled by political and ethical norms.  Thus, the likely venue for the 2021 Summit of the Americas would be Miami, Florida.  Given his previously and oft-stated desire to “make deals” and bring to conclusion issues impacting the United States, he could gravitate towards hosting President Diaz-Canel and President Maduro at his Mar-a-Lago Club in Palm Beach, Florida, or Trump National Doral in Miami, Florida, where he previously wanted to host the 2020 G7 Leaders’ Summit.   

A twist might be for President Trump to require their participation as a condition for changes to Trump Administration policies impacting each country.    

If there is [Joseph] Biden Administration, he might too look at Miami, Florida, as host for the 2021 Summit of the Americas.  He may also look to Houston, Texas, and New Orleans, Louisiana.  Regardless, he and his newly-installed foreign policy team would probably be more cautious about extending invitations to President Diaz-Canel and President Maduro unless there are perceived opportunities, particularly relating to Venezuela.   

A twist might be for President Biden to require their participation as a condition for changes to Trump Administration policies impacting each country.   

United States Department of State
Washington DC
10 July 2020

The United States will host the Ninth Summit of the Americas in 2021. The Summit takes place once every three years and is the only meeting of all leaders from the countries of North, South, and Central America and the Caribbean. This will be the first time the United States has hosted the Summit since the inaugural meeting in Miami in 1994. The Inukshuk, a stone landmark used by the Inuit and other peoples of the Arctic region of North America, is also a symbol of the Summits of the Americas and passes to the host country. This Inukshuk was first presented by the Government of Canada, host of the Third Summit, to the Government of Argentina, host of the Fourth Summit and has since then, been used to mark the transfer of leadership from one Summit host to the next.

Acting Assistant Secretary Ambassador Michael Kozak, from the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, and Director General Luis Chavez, from the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, officially transferred the chair of the Summit of the Americas process from Peru to the United States in a formal ceremony on July 10, 2020. The Department of State looks forward to initiating substantive policy discussions with other governments, institutions, and stakeholders to inform the agenda of our democratically elected leaders and advance freedom, prosperity, and security in our hemisphere.

Why Does the Summit of the Americas Matter?

Since the United States launched the Summit of the Americas, this meeting of the region’s leaders has become the highest-level process for promoting regional cooperation and addressing the most pressing issues in the Americas. Each Summit focuses on a critical area of cooperation that all countries in the Americas can support, and allows the region as a whole to work together on such issues as increasing economic competitiveness, catalyzing development, enhancing access to energy and communication technology, strengthening regional security, countering trafficking, and promoting democracy and human rights. Most recently, leaders committed to fight the corruption epidemic undermining our region’s democracies when they met at the Eighth Summit of the Americas in Lima, Peru in 2018.

U.S. efforts in the Summit of the Americas process, led by the Department of State but encompassing a whole-of-government approach, have strengthened our partnerships with the governments and peoples of the Western Hemisphere region to help keep the Americas safe and prosperous.

Who Participates in the Summit of the Americas?

Heads of state and government, foreign ministers, and other senior officials from the governments of the Americas attend the Summit of the Americas and associated forums. The President or Vice President of the United States has attended all of the Summits of the Americas.

People of the Americas, including:

Civil society: Civil society representatives regularly participate in the Summit, but their role is often informal. The United States works closely with such representatives and the country hosting the summit to ensure they have a meaningful, formal role in the summit process. The Civil Society Forum is often the only opportunity for many civil society representatives from the region to engage leaders and elevate their concerns. Foro Ciudadano de las Americas and the Organization of American States (OAS) coordinate civil society’s participation in the Summit.

Business leaders: The CEO Summit of the Americas is the highest-profile business forum of the Americas, bringing together leading CEOs with heads of government to identify polices and transparent partnerships that advance economic growth and investment, including through the efforts of the private sector-led Americas Business Dialogue. The CEO Summit coordinated by the Inter-American Development Bank became a formal part of the Summit process in 2012.

Youth: The Young Americas Forum is a permanent, open, and inclusive channel for youth to help define priorities and coordinate action in the region. Youth at each Summit prepare concrete recommendations to governments and adopt a hemispheric agenda for follow-up activities. The Young Americas Business Trust has organized the Young Americas Forum on the margins of five regular Summits.

Other stakeholders: Summits have included forums for parliamentarians, indigenous groups, labor leaders, and university rectors, among others.

The host nation of the Summit of the Americas determines who participates in the Summit. Leaders established in the Declaration of Quebec City in 2001 that “the maintenance and strengthening of the rule of law and strict respect for the democratic system” are essential conditions for participation.

Who Has Hosted the Summit of the Americas?

Miami, United States of America (1994)
Santa Cruz, Bolivia (1996)*
Santiago, Chile (1998)
Quebec City, Canada (2001)
Monterrey, Mexico (2004)*
Mar del Plata, Argentina (2005)
Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago (2009)
Cartagena, Colombia (2012)
Panama City, Panama (2015)
Lima, Peru (2018)
*Special Summits

Summit Organization

National Summit Coordinators from the governments of the Americas work together as part of the Summit’s managing body, the Summit Implementation Review Group (SIRG), to inform and implement their leaders’ agenda. The SIRG is chaired by the Summit host. The Summits of the Americas Secretariat, which is housed at the Organization of American States, and the 12 international organizations that comprise the Joint Summit Working Group (JSWG) support the SIRG and the Summit process.

LINK To U.S. Department Of State Reference: https://www.state.gov/summit-of-the-americas/

Transfer Ceremony of the Chairmanship of the Summits of the Americas Process
10 July 2020

The Summits of the Americas Secretariat is pleased to report on the Transfer Ceremony of the Chairmanship of the Summits of the Americas Process, from the Government of the Republic of Peru, host of the VIII Summit of the Americas, to the Government of the States United of America, host of the upcoming IX Summit of the Americas, to be held in 2021. During this ceremony, the Government of Peru made an official presentation to the Government of the United States of the Inukshuk, symbol of the indigenous people of North America and of the Summits Process, which represents "The orientation and unity of our people towards common goals." This ceremony was held virtually on July 10, 2020, having been disseminated among the various actors of the Summit Process.

LINK To Summit Of The Americas Ceremony: http://www.summit-americas.org/chairIX.html

From The Organization Of American States (OAS)
Participants

The participants of the Summits of the Americas Process are the Heads of State and Government of the hemisphere and their delegations. In addition, the heads of the member institutions of the Joint Summit Working Group (JSWG) participate as observers.

The institutions comprising the JSWG are: the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the World Bank (WB), the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Special guests include social actor representatives (civil society organizations, youth, indigenous peoples, workers etc.) academia, the private sector and the media among others.

Biden And Harris Discuss Their (Potential) Policies For Cuba... Many Questions Remain. Should Cruise Lines Rejoice?

The Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
29 October 2020

Biden also made direct appeals to Cubans and Venezuelans, many of whom live in South Florida after fleeing their countries. “We have to vote for a new Cuba policy as well,” Biden said. “Trump is the worst possible standard-bearer for democracy in places like Cuba, Venezuela, North Korea. Cuba is no closer to freedom and democracy today than it was four years ago. Trump loves to talk tough, but he doesn’t care about the Cuban and Venezuelan people. He won’t even grant Temporary Protected Status to Venezuelans fleeing the oppressive Maduro regime. I will, but we have to vote.”

The New York Times
New York, New York
29 October 2020

Mr. Biden, appearing in the afternoon in Broward County, a Democratic stronghold, delivered a tailored message intended to motivate Latinos. "Cuba is no closer to freedom and democracy today than it was four years ago," Mr. Biden, in shirt sleeves and sunglasses, said at Broward College's North Campus in Coconut Creek. “President Trump can’t advance democracy and human rights for the Cuban people or the Venezuelan people, for that matter, when he has praised so many autocrats around the world,” he said.

The Hill
Washington DC
28 April 2020

“In large part, I would go back,” Biden said in an interview with a CBS affiliate in Miami. “I’d still insist they keep the commitments they said they would make when we, in fact, set the policy in place.”

EFE
Madrid, Spain
27 October 2020

Interview with Senator Kamala Harris (D- California)
CONTINUATION OF THE BLOCKADE TO CUBA

Q: What would a future government of yours and that of the Democratic candidate Joe Biden do to reverse the policies that Trump has adopted towards Cuba? Would you personally advocate for an end to the blockade?

A: The policy of a Biden and Harris Administration towards Cuba would be governed by two principles: first, Americans, especially Cuban-Americans, are the best ambassadors of freedom in Cuba. Second, empowering the Cuban people to determine their own future is vital to America's national security interests. Trump is deporting hundreds of Cubans back to dictatorship and back to a regime crackdown that has only increased under his presidency. There are nearly 10,000 Cubans languishing in tent camps along the Mexican border due to Trump's anti-immigrant agenda. And it is separating Cuban families through restrictions on family visits and remittances. We will backtrack on Trump's failed policies. And as he did previously as vice president, Joe Biden will also demand the release of political prisoners and will make human rights a centerpiece in the diplomatic relationship. The embargo is the law; you need an act of Congress to lift it or you need the president to determine that a democratically elected government is in power in Cuba. We don't expect any of these things to happen anytime soon.

Q: From the US foreign policy perspective, what role do you think Spain can play in relations with Cuba and, in general, with Latin America?

A: Under a Biden and Harris Administration, the US will work with members of the international community, including Spain, to support the Cuban people, as well as promote Joe Biden's vision of the need to work for a safe hemisphere, middle class and democratic.

Washington, 27 oct (EFE).- Kamala Harris, que en solo una semana podría convertirse en la primera vicepresidenta de EE.UU., reconoció en una entrevista con Efe que romper barreras a veces duele y te hace sangrar, pero aseguró que siempre "valdrá la pena, todas y cada una de las veces".

Harris siente una gran responsabilidad para hablar con “voz firme” en nombre de aquellos que aún viven excluidos y prometió que si llega a la Casa Blanca luchará por la igualdad de "todos" los estadounidenses. En una entrevista por escrito con Efe, la senadora reflexionó sobre su carrera y la influencia de su madre y también reveló qué políticas adoptará una nueva Administración demócrata en asuntos como el asilo a refugiados centroamericanos y las relaciones con Cuba, España, la Unión Europea (UE) y la OTAN.

CONTINUACIÓN DEL BLOQUEO A CUBA

P: ¿Qué haría un futuro Gobierno suyo y del candidato demócrata Joe Biden para revertir las políticas que Trump ha adoptado hacia Cuba? ¿Abogaría usted personalmente por el fin del bloqueo?

R: La política de una Administración de Biden y Harris hacia Cuba estaría gobernada por dos principios: primero, los estadounidenses, especialmente los cubano-estadounidenses, son los mejores embajadores de la libertad en Cuba. Segundo, dar poder al pueblo cubano para que determine su propio futuro es vital para los intereses de seguridad nacional de EE.UU. Trump está deportando a cientos de cubanos de vuelta a la dictadura y de vuelta a una represión del régimen que solo ha aumentado bajo su Presidencia. Hay casi 10.000 cubanos que están languideciendo en campamentos de tiendas de campaña a lo largo de la frontera con México debido a la agenda antiinmigrante de Trump. Y está separando a familias cubanas mediante restricciones a las visitas familiares y las remesas. Nosotros daremos marcha atrás en las políticas fallidas de Trump. Y como hizo anteriormente como vicepresidente, Joe Biden, también exigirá la liberación de los presos políticos y hará de los derechos humanos una pieza central en la relación diplomática. El embargo es la ley; se necesita una ley del Congreso para levantarlo o se necesita que el presidente determine que un Gobierno elegido democráticamente está en el poder en Cuba. No esperamos que ninguna de estas cosas ocurra pronto.

P: Desde la perspectiva de política exterior de EE.UU., ¿qué papel cree que España puede jugar en las relaciones con Cuba y, en general, con Latinoamérica?

R: Bajo una Administración de Biden y Harris, EE.UU. trabajará con miembros de la comunidad internacional, incluida España, para apoyar al pueblo cubano, así como para promover la visión de Joe Biden sobre la necesidad de trabajar por un hemisferio seguro, de clase media y democrático.

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
5 October 2020

Excerpts....

In his first visit to Miami in more than a year, Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden on Monday attacked President Donald Trump’s hard-line policies in the Americas, saying his opponent’s tough talk and steep sanctions have only entrenched Cuba’s Communist government.

“The administration’s approach is not working. Cuba is no closer to democracy than it was four years ago,” the former vice president said from a mostly empty gymnasium at José Martí Park in Little Havana, the historic heart of Miami’s Cuban exile community. “There’s more political prisoners. The secret police are as brutal as ever. And Russia is once again a presence in Cuba and Havana.”

Biden also criticized Trump for failing to topple Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro and for refusing to grant undocumented exiles in the U.S. Temporary Protected Status from deportation back to a country suffering from crippling hyperinflation. “Maduro, who I’ve met, is a dictator, plain and simple,” said Biden. “And he’s caused incredible suffering among the Venezuelan people to maintain his grip on power.”

LINK To Former U.S. Secretary Of State Kerry Shares A Biden Administration Approach To Cuba- And Cuba Won't Like It (9 September 2020)

Cuba Says Western Union's 407 Distribution Points Will Close; Western Union Not Giving Up- 2016 Seems So Long Ago...

Western Union Statement
27 October 2020

“Our goal is to continue providing essential money transfer services to customers, many of whom rely on remittances from loved ones to meet day-to-day needs. Western Union is committed to adhering to all government regulations. We are exploring ways to comply with the new rules and regulations on Cuba. We will provide additional information as we formalize those plans. In the meantime, Western Union services between the U.S. and Cuba remain operational. U.S. customers can send money directly to family members in Cuba from our retail locations, or digitally via westernunion.com or the Western Union mobile app, for payout at more than 400 retail locations in Cuba.”

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Havana, Republic of Cuba
27 October 2020

”The inclusion of Fincimex in the list of restricted entities of the US State Department in June last, as well as the Treasury Department’s modifications to the regulations for the control of Cuban assets announced on Friday, October 23, will prevent remittances to Cuba through US companies with general licenses, which will directly harm the Cuban people and their relatives in the US. Doing so in the middle of a pandemic corroborates the US government’s cynicism, opportunism and contempt for the Cuban people.

For more than 20 years, with professionalism and respect, Financiera Cimex S.A. has guaranteed commercial relations with companies from the US and elsewhere in the world to manage remittances to Cuba. In all these years, never has this company had to account for a single cent missing. Quite on the contrary, all its services have continued to grow, despite the pressures and aggressions against banking transactions. Family remittances to Cuba have been continuously politicized by the anti-Cuban extreme right. As from September, 2019, the US government has been applying coercive measures to restrict remittances.

The recently announced measures are a direct attack against family remittances. Washington spokespersons are lying when trying to pretend that the aforementioned restrictions will only affect one specific entity. Fincimex, which is part of the Cuban financial system, is the entity designated by a sovereign decision of the Cuban government, to guarantee the remittances to Cuba from the United States, which will be completely discontinued. Among the US counterparts is Western Union, an entity whose 407 outlets in Cuba, scattered all around the country, will be shut down as a result of the implementation of these brutal measures, which will also hamper the negotiations that, at the request of Fincimex, had been taking place for some months now, in preparation for the launching of the hard currency bank accounts remittances service. It falls upon the US government the full responsibility for the interruption of the remittances service between both countries. Most of the Cuban émigrés in the United States support the existence of stable relations with their families, and the US government is deliberately acting to damage those relations. Fincimex reiterates its commitment to the Cuban people in the interest of identifying and establishing safe and orderly remittances to Cuba.”

Corporacion CIMEX S.A. Post To Twitter
30 October 2020

Western Union Expands in Cuba: Connects the World
March 21, 2016

For the first time Western Union to move money into Cuba from beyond U.S. borders

ENGLEWOOD, Colo.--(BUSINESS WIRE)-- The Western Union Company (NYSE: WU), a leader in global payments services, announced today that it will launch remittance services from across the world into Cuba following U.S. regulatory and policy changes that allow Cubans and non-Cubans to send remittances via Western Union to this island nation.

This Smart News Release features multimedia. View the full release here: http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160321005381/en/ Western Union Expands in Cuba: Connects the world (Graphic: Business Wire)

For the first time, Cubans and other citizens worldwide will join their U.S. counterparts to send remittances into Cuba within minutes* using Western Union’s cross-border payments platform. The Company expects to activate services in a phased approach by end of second quarter 2016. “As the first U.S. Company with scale to move money from across the world to Cuba, we welcome the regulatory and policy changes put in place by the U.S. government that allow us to offer these services,” said Odilon Almeida, President of the Americas and European Union. Remittances can be sent to family members and other Cuban nationals for family expenses and personal support for private economic activity.

“It is a privilege to connect Cubans from almost anywhere in the world in a matter of moments to their home community, and it is even more historic to be associated with the anticipated economic multiplier that will come with new injection of remittance flows into Cuba,” Almeida lauded. “As we have found in other parts of the world, expanding remittances will provide a vital opportunity to improve the standard of living for Cuban people, contribute to savings and eventually investment towards small-businesses.” Funds moved by Western Union go directly from the sender to the receiver with no middle intervention. “This represents a powerful catalyst for empowerment and innovation. Our current movement of remittances from the U.S. to Cuba funds regular expenses and micro businesses, driving entrepreneurism, innovation and employment opportunities,” Almeida explains.

Western Union’s global experience has shown that when customers have formalized and convenient access, remittance flows thrive from established and new corridors. Access to convenient financial services in a globalized financial arena is important to the world’s increasingly mobile-workforce and it has proven to be as important to the economic advancement of a nation. Remittance senders from across the world can expect the same in-minutes money transfer speed into Cuba with local currency payout. They can use Western Union’s omni-channel send options -- retail, digital, mobile or bank, where available -- to send money, and in Cuba receivers can pick-up their funds from more than 490 Agent locations across each of Cuba’s 16 provinces and 168 municipalities. This is a significant presence and it is represented by multiple classes of trade – from retail stores to exchange houses.

Background

The Cuban population outside of Cuba is pegged at 1.4 million as of 2015. They reside across North, South and Central America, the Caribbean, EU and CIS countries. Nearly 96% are concentrated in five countries including U.S., Spain, Italy, Mexico, and Canada. However, Cubans reside in as many as 72 countries. Cash remittances to Cuba in 2013 reached US$2.8 billion with 90% originating from the US. Remittances reach 62% of Cuban households, sustain about 90% of the retail market and provide thousands of jobs.

About Western Union

The Western Union Company (NYSE: WU) is a leader in global payment services. Together with its Vigo, Orlandi Valuta, Pago Facil and Western Union Business Solutions branded payment services, Western Union provides consumers and businesses with fast, reliable and convenient ways to send and receive money around the world, to send payments and to purchase money orders. As of December 31, 2015, the Western Union, Vigo and Orlandi Valuta branded services were offered through a combined network of over 500,000 agent locations in 200 countries and territories and over 100,000 ATMs and kiosks, and included the capability to send money to over a billion accounts. In 2015, The Western Union Company completed 262 million consumer-to-consumer transactions worldwide, moving $82 billion of principal between consumers, and 508 million business payments. For more information, visit www.westernunion.com.

https://ir.westernunion.com/news/archived-press-releases/press-release-details/2016/Western-Union-Expands-in-Cuba-Connects-the-World/default.aspx