Chairman Of U.S. Senate Finance Committee Introduces Legislation To "Normalize Trade Relations" With Cuba

“(620)(a)(1) No assistance shall be furnished under this Act to the present government of Cuba. As an additional means of implementing and carrying into effect the policy of the preceding sentence, the President is authorized to establish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade between the United States and Cuba. (2) 867 Except as may be deemed necessary by the President in the interest of the United States, no assistance shall be furnished under this Act to any government of Cuba, nor shall Cuba be entitled to receive any quota authorizing the importation of Cuban sugar into the United States or to receive any other benefit under any law of the United States, until the President determines that such government has taken appropriate steps according to international law standards to return to United States citizens, and to entities not less than 50 per centum beneficially owned by United States citizens, or to provide equitable compensation to such citizens and entities for property taken from such citizens and entities on or after January 1, 1959, by the Government of Cuba.”

United States Senate
Washington DC
4 February 2021

Wyden Introduces Bill to End Cuba Embargo and Establish Normal Trade Relations

Washington, D.C. – [4 February 2021] Senate Finance Committee Chair Ron Wyden, D-Ore., last night introduced the U.S.-Cuba Trade Act of 2021 to repeal outdated sanctions on Cuba and establish normal trade relations with the island nation.

“Our nation’s embargo on Cuba is an artifact from the 1960s. To continue this outdated, harmful policy of isolation would be a failure of American leadership. While Trump increased tensions with Cuba during his disastrous time in office, I am optimistic about President Biden’s new diplomatic course,” Wyden said. “Regardless, Congress has a moral and economic obligation to the American people to improve U.S.-Cuban relations as swiftly and safely as possible.”

The U.S.-Cuba Trade Act of 2021 would repeal the major statutes that codify sanctions against Cuba, including the Helms-Burton Act and the Cuban Democracy Act, as well as other provisions that affect trade, investment and travel with Cuba. It would also establish normal trade relations with the country. Joining Wyden on the bill were U.S. Sens. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., Richard Durbin, D-Ill., and Jeff Merkley, D-Ore.

LINK To Legislation

Four Republican Cuban-American Members Of The U.S. House Of Representatives Voted To Remove Rep. Taylor Greene. Did The Vote Also Reflect 2020 Census, Florida & New York Politics?

Coincidence that four of the seven members of the United States House of Representatives who define themselves as of Cuban descent, three of whom are from Florida, were among the eleven members of the Republican Party who voted on 4 February 2021 to remove The Honorable Marjorie Taylor Greene (R- Georgia 14th) from her assignments to the Education & Labor Committee and the Committee on the Budget? 

Their votes could solely reflect their disagreement(s) with Mrs. Taylor Greene.  Or is there more than a convergence of appreciation that statements by Mrs. Taylor Greene were offensive to the country, to the United States Congress, and to the Republican Party?  Might the 2020 Census results be a consideration? 

In the United States House of Representatives the Democratic Party has 221 members and the Republican Party has 211 members.  The United States Senate is divided 50/50. 

Roll Call 25. Bill Number: H. Res. 72
4 February 2021
117th Congress, 1st Session
Vote Question: On Agreeing to the Resolution. Removing a certain Member from certain standing committees of the House of Representatives
Yea: 230. Nay: 199. Present: 0. Not voting: 2

Yea- The Honorable Mario Diaz-Balart (R- Florida 25th)
Yea- The Honorable Carlos Gimenez (R- Florida 26th)
Yea- The Honorable Maria Salazar (R- Florida 27th)
Yea- The Honorable Nicole Malliotakis (R- New York 11th)
Yea- The Honorable Chris Smith (R- New Jersey 4th)

Among the eleven members was The Honorable Chris Smith (R- New Jersey 4th) who while not of Cuban descent, has supported constraints upon the bilateral relationship between the United States and the Republic of Cuba.  The State of New Jersey has a sizable population of individuals of Cuban descent. 

None of the five Republican members of the United States House of Representatives who voted Yea on H. Res. 72 are assigned to Education and Labor Committee or to the Budget Committee. 

Might reasons for the vote by the three members from Florida include a) showing political moderation and support for a Democratic Party initiative may have benefits when they seek support for or provide opposition to a Republic of Cuba-focused initiative and b) Florida expecting to gain two seats in the United States House of Representatives due to the 2020 Census and a belief that a unified position for ideological moderation will assist with how the districts are crafted by the Republican Party controlled Florida Legislature- with two more members of the Republican Party elected on Tuesday, 2 November 2020 to serve in the 118th Congress.  

For the member from the State of New York, with the 2020 Census expected to result in a loss of two seats in the United States House of Representatives, and the New York State Legislature and Executive Mansion controlled by the Democratic Party, perhaps the reasonable calculation was to project ideological moderation as a means of attempting to preserve the seat for the Republican Party. 

The United States Congress 

Ten (10) Cuban-American members of the United States Congress, three (3) in the United States Senate and seven (7) in the United States House of Representatives, consisting of two (2) members of the Democratic Party and eight (8) members of the Republican Party, will likely oppose most efforts by the Biden Administration to alter Trump Administration policies impacting the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela.  

They are expected to act as a voting bloc to oppose most efforts by the Biden Administration to alter Trump Administration policies impacting the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela where the perception, if not reality, may benefit either country.

United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Cruz (R- Texas)
The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida)
The Honorable Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey)

United States House of Representatives
The Honorable Albio Sires (New Jersey; D- 8th)
The Honorable Alex Mooney (West Virginia; R- 2nd)
The Honorable Anthony E. González (Ohio; R- 16th)
The Honorable Mario Díaz-Balart (Florida; R-25th)
The Honorable Carlos Gimenez (Florida; R- 26th)
The Honorable Maria Elvira Salazar (Florida; R- 27th)
The Honorable Nicole Malliotakis (New York; R- 11th) 

The United States Congress And Florida 

Unhelpful for the legislative, policy and regulatory change landscape narrative when a college professor in an interview links “more freedom and more private businesses” in the Republic of Cuba to the final twenty-five months of the Obama Administration and less freedom and less private businesses in the Republic of Cuba during the Trump Administration (2017-2021).   

Certainly, the bilateral relationship was robust during the final two years of the eight year in duration Obama Administration and the substantial increase from 17 December 2014 to 20 January 2017 in visitors from the United States to the Republic of Cuba resulted in an increase in the creation of visitor-dependent commercial activities throughout the Republic of Cuba, but “less freedom” today in the Republic of Cuba is not a result of the Trump Administration.  

The Biden Administration and Democratic Party will continue to appease the State of Florida and its 2020 population of 21.48 million residents (14.5 million registered voters) where the Republican Party has 5,219,015 and the Democratic Party has 5,335,965; and 3,790,478 have no party affiliation.  In the 2020 Presidential Election, Florida voted 51.2% Republican to 47.9% Democratic; in 2016, 49.0% Republican to 47.8% Democratic; in 2012, 50.0% Democratic to 49.1% Republican; and in 2008, 51.0% Democratic to 48.2% Republican.  That data does not suggest a red state.  These are the changes from the 116th United States Congress to the 117th United States Congress:   

116th Congress
Senate- 2 R
House- 13 R and 14 D

117th Congress
Senate- 2 R
House- 15 R and 12 D

The Biden Administration will remain concerned about the 435-member United States House of Representatives where the Democratic Party has a ten-seat majority in the 117th United States Congress.  

The 2020 Census is expected to deliver to Florida two (2) additional seats in the United States House of Representatives- which increases the electoral prominence of the state in the 2022 and 2024 elections (24 votes of the required 270 votes for victory in the Electoral College).    

The state legislature in Florida is controlled by Republican Party.  In 2021, the Florida Senate (24- R and 16- D) and the Florida House of Representatives (78- R and 42- D) will expectantly seek to craft favorably the two new districts for the United States House of Representatives and recraft existing districts to lessen the number of Democrats.  There will likely too be court challenges. 

One result will be current Democratic Party members of the United States House of Representatives from Florida will tact right, meaning against Republic of Cuba initiatives in their primaries or general election. 

There will also be Democratic Party members of the United States House of Representatives and United States Senate from other states who will oppose perceived lessening of pressures upon the Republic of Cuba.

What some advocates will promote as a vote of legislative courage others will decry as a shortcut to the unemployment line.

Efforts to request the Biden Administration suspend Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”) made operational on 2 May 2019 by the Trump Administration risks antagonizing an important constituency in Florida and conflicting with President Biden’s appreciation of not interrupting the judicial process from his tenure as Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary (1987-1995).  There have been thirty-two lawsuits filed since 2019 and some are at Courts of Appeals.  Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.   

And there are the many unknowns which can influence the 2022 and 2024 elections in Florida and other states: H.E. Nicolas Maduro, President of Venezuela, is removed from office.  H.E. Daniel Ortega, President of Nicaragua, is removed from office.  The government of the Republic of Cuba decides to robustly engage with the Biden Administration; the 5,913 certified claims are resolved.   

Neither the Biden Administration nor the Democratic Party headquarters in Washington DC will abandon Florida and policies relating to the Republic of Cuba will reflect the electoral realities of Florida.  

This means any legislative effort should be targeted, as in rifle, rather than scattered, as in shotgun.  Be incrementalistic rather than desirous of making a point. 

Better yet, focus upon changes to regulations for financial transactions which are practical and serve to increase efficiencies and opportunities for United States-based companies while providing increased transparency alongside prodding the Republic of Cuba to simultaneously engage. 

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Univision Interviews Senior Director For Western Hemisphere Affairs At The National Security Council- Cuba On The Agenda

Univision
Mexico City, Mexico
5 February 2021

Pressure on Venezuela, changes with Cuba, aid to Central America: Biden's strategy for Latin America

In an exclusive interview with Univision Noticias, Juan González, director of Latin America at the National Security Council, said that Biden is "working quickly to give TPS" to Venezuelans, in addition to relaxing travel restrictions to Cuba.

By: Janet Rodriguez

Juan González, director of Latin America in the US National Security Council, affirmed that the government of Joe Biden will continue to recognize Juan Guaidó as the interim president of Venezuela and that the National Assembly of Venezuela elected in 2015 is the only one that has democratic legitimacy.

In an exclusive interview with Univision Noticias, González pointed out that Biden's policy remains the same as during his campaign, which is why he maintains that Nicolás Maduro is a dictator and "responsible for the suffering of the Venezuelan people."

After being asked if Biden will continue with the suspension of deportations to Venezuelans for 18 months, ordered on the last day of his government by Donald Trump, González recalled that one of Biden's first executive orders when he arrived at the White House was to declare a 100-day moratorium on deportations for all undocumented immigrants who do not have criminal records for crimes.

"Biden's priority is the commitment he made during the campaign, which is to give Temporary Protected Status to Venezuelans who are already in the United States," added González to point out that the aforementioned Trump order is still in force, although the current government " works quickly to give TPS as soon as possible (to Venezuelans). "

The National Security Council official stressed that the Biden administration is also trying to "redouble international efforts" to get greater humanitarian support and move towards a lasting multilateral policy in support of a democratic solution to the critical situation in the South American country.

"We are going to review the sanctions that are already in place. It should be noted that when Biden was vice president he was the one who initiated the individual sanctions process; he is someone who is not afraid of imposing sanctions as a form of pressure," González said, warning that sanctions alone, in the absence of a much broader diplomatic strategy, "do not work and have not worked anywhere in the world to change a regime." Asked about the possibility of a military action such as an invasion, as suggested by the previous government when it warned that "all options are on the table", González pointed out that "one thing is to make false promises to play politics and another is seek a democratic future for Venezuelans. "

"If the Maduro regime is ready to enter into a real dialogue with the opposition that seeks that democratic end, excellent. If not, the route that the international community and the United States will take will be to increase pressure to try to push and develop a consensus. with the Lima Group and the other allies to ensure that we are all working towards that end, "he explained. Cuba and Nicaragua, migration and corruption

The director of Latin America of the National Security Council was also consulted about the political approach that the Biden government will have towards Cuba. In this regard, he said that the president "is also very clear that he seeks to lift the limits on remittances and also the possibility of Americans being able to travel to Cuba."

González criticized the hardening of the policy towards the island that the previous government maintained, noting that "they only penalize Cuban Americans and the Cuban people in the middle of a pandemic", because many families were prevented from sending money to his relatives and Trump "did nothing to try to advance a democratic future in Cuba."

"President Biden and the spokesperson (Jen) Psaki have made it clear that his policy is based on two things: what are the national interests of the United States and number two, what is the policy that will help to put Cubans as owners of his own future."

González also stressed that "the situation in Nicaragua is very worrying" where "it has been seen that the government of Daniel Ortega has even used snipers against its own people, something inconceivable."

The official affirms that Ortega "is trying to manipulate the process in his favor in these elections and the Biden administration will work to empower civil society and work for human rights and try to improve democratic processes" in the Central American country. . Regarding what Biden's policy towards Central America, specifically towards the countries of the so-called Northern Triangle, and the continuous migratory movements towards the United States, González said that "the only sustainable way to prevent migration

Regarding what Biden's policy towards Central America, specifically towards the countries of the so-called Northern Triangle, and the continuous migratory movements towards the United States, González said that "the only sustainable way to prevent irregular migration is to invest in the root causes, which are the poverty and insecurity ".

He recalled that President Biden has promised to dedicate 4,000 million dollars during 4 years of his mandate to strengthen the region, but that "this will have no impact if there is no political will in those countries and a commitment against corruption."

As for Mexico, he said that the bilateral talks "started very early" on how to manage migration responsibly, how to work together to invest in southern Mexico and in the northern triangle to combat the root causes of immigration. González warned people who are thinking of migrating to the United States not to do so because President Biden's policies will only benefit people who have been in the country since January 1.

"Human traffickers who are manipulating people who are desperate for an opportunity or have suffered losses in their homes from the hurricanes, now is not the time to come to the United States because the border is not ready to process individuals and not they would benefit from immigration reform, "González stressed.

Univision
Mexico City, Mexico
5 February 2021

Presión a Venezuela, cambios con Cuba, ayuda a Centroamérica: la estrategia de Biden para América Latina

En entrevista exclusiva con Univision Noticias, Juan González, director de Latinoamérica en el Consejo de Seguridad Nacional afirmó que Biden está "trabajando rápidamente para dar TPS" a los venezolanos, además de relajar las restricciones de viaje a Cuba.

Por: Janet Rodriguez

Juan González, director de Latinoamérica en el Consejo de Seguridad Nacional de EEUU, afirmó que el gobierno de Joe Biden seguirá reconociendo a Juan Guaidó como el presidente interino de Venezuela y que la Asamblea Nacional de Venezuela elegida en 2015 es la única que tiene legitimidad democrática.

En entrevista exclusiva con Univision Noticias, González señaló que la política de Biden sigue siendo la misma que durante su campaña, por lo que sostiene que Nicolás Maduro es un dictador y “responsable del sufrimiento del pueblo venezolano”.
Publicidad

Tras ser preguntado sobre si Biden continuará con la suspensión de deportaciones a venezolanos durante 18 meses, ordenada en el último día de su gobierno por Donald Trump, González recordó que una de las primeras órdenes ejecutivas de Biden al llegar a la Casa Blanca fue declarar una moratoria por 100 días de las deportaciones de todos los inmigrantes indocumentados que no tienen expedientes criminales por delitos.

"La prioridad de Biden es el compromiso que hizo durante la campaña, que es darle Estatus de Protección Temporal a los venezolanos que ya están en Estados Unidos", añadió González para señalar que la referida orden de Trump sigue vigente, aunque el actual gobierno "trabaja rápidamente para dar TPS lo antes posible (a los venezolanos)".
Relacionados

El funcionario del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional recalcó que la administración Biden también intenta "redoblar los esfuerzos internacionales" para conseguir mayor apoyo humanitario y avanzar hacia una política multilateral duradera en apoyo de una salida democrática a la situación crítica del país suramericano.

"Vamos a revisar las sanciones que están ya. Hay que resaltar que cuando Biden fue vicepresidente él fue quien inició el proceso de sanciones individuales; él es alguien que no tiene miedo de poner sanciones como una forma de presión", manifestó González, advirtiendo que las sanciones por sí mismas, en ausencia de una estrategia diplomática mucho más amplia, "no funcionan y no han funcionado en ninguna parte de mundo para cambiar un régimen".

Consultado sobre la posiiblidad de una acción militar como una invasión, tal como lo sugirió el anterior gobierno cuando advertía que "todas las opciones están sobre la mesa", González apuntó que "una cosa es hacer promesas falsas por jugar a la política y otra es buscar un futuro democrático para los venezolanos".

"Si el régimen de Maduro está listo para entrar a un diálogo real con la oposición que busca ese fin democrático, excelente. Si no, la ruta que tomará la comunidad internacional y Estados Unidos será incrementar la presión para tratar de empujar y desarrollar un consenso con el Grupo Lima y los otros aliados para asegurarse que todos estemos trabajando hacia ese fin", explicó.

Cuba y Nicaragua, migraciones y corrupción

El director de Latinoamérica del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional además fue consultado sobre el enfoque político que tendrá el gobierno de Biden hacia Cuba. Al respecto, dijo que el presidente "también tiene muy claro que busca levantar los límites a las remesas y también la posibilidad de estadounidenses de poder viajar a Cuba".

González criticó el endurecimiento de la política hacia la isla que mantuvo el anterior gobierno, al señalar que "solo penalizan a los cubanos estadounidenses y al pueblo cubano en la mitad de una pandemia", debido a que muchas familias se vieron impedidas de enviar dinero a sus familiares y Trump "no hizo nada para tratar de avanzar un futuro demorático en Cuba".

"El presidente Biden y la vocera (Jen) Psaki han dejado claro que la política de él se basa en dos cosas: cuáles son los intereses nacionales de EEUU y numero dos, cómo es la política que ayudará a poner a los cubanos como dueños de su propio futuro".

González subrayó además que "es muy preocupante" la situación en Nicaragua donde "se ha visto es que el gobierno de Daniel Ortega el que ha usado hasta francotiradores en contra de su propio pueblo, algo inconcebible".

El funcionario afirma que Ortega "está tratando de manipular el proceso a su favor en estas elecciones y la administración de Biden va a trabajar para empoderar a la sociedad civil y trabajar por los derechos humanos y tratar de mejorar los procesos demócráticos" en el país centroamericano.

Sobre cuál la política de Biden hacia Centroamérica, en específico hacia los países del llamado Triángulo Norte, y los contínuos movimientos migratorios hacia EEUU, González dijo que "la única forma sostenible de prevenir la migración irregular es invertir en las causas raíces, que son la pobreza y la inseguridad".

Recordó que el presidente Biden se ha comprometido dedicar 4,000 millones de dólares durante 4 años de su mandato al fortalecimiento de la región, pero que "eso no tendrá impacto si no hay voluntad política en esos países y un compromiso en contra de la corrupción".

En cuanto a México, refirió que las conversaciones bilaterales "comenzaron muy temprano" sobre cómo manejar la migración de forma responsable, cómo trabajar juntos para invertir en el sur de México y en el triangulo norte para combatir las causas raíces de la inmigración.

González alertó a las personas que están pensando en migrar a Estados Unidos que no lo hagan porque las políticas del presidente Biden solo beneficiarán a las personas que estuvieron en el país desde el primero de enero.

"Los traficantes de personas que están manipulando a personas que están desesperadas en busca de una oportunidad o han sufrido pérdidas en sus hogares por los huracanes, ahora no es el tiempo para venir a Estados Unidos porque no está lista la frontera para procesar individuos y no se beneficiarían de la reforma migratoria", recalcó González.

At State Department Briefing, Asked About Cuba, Spokesperson Answers Without Anything New

United States Department of State
Washington DC
5 February 2021

Mr. Ned Price, Department Spokesperson:

QUESTION: Oh, great, thanks. The EU’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, called on the Biden administration to reverse Trump’s redesignation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terror. I’m wondering, has the State Department made a decision to do so yet? Or if not, and it’s still under review, what does that review entail, and do you have a timeline on when that review might be wrapped up? Thanks.

MR PRICE: Well, let me speak a little bit about our overall overarching policy when it comes to Cuba, and it’s a policy that will be governed by two principles. First is the support for democracy and human rights. It will be at the core of our efforts through empowering the Cuban people to determine their own future. And second, we believe that Americans, and especially Cuban Americans, are the best ambassadors for freedom and prosperity in Cuba. We’re committed to making human rights a core pillar of our U.S. foreign policy. That certainly applies to Cuba, just as you’ve heard me reference it across the board, and includes redoubling our dedication to human rights throughout our own hemisphere.

Despite, human rights defenders around the world continue to look to the United States to – for support against authoritarian regimes. This is one of those issues that we will continue to rally our allies and partners against. And in the administration we’ve also committed to carefully reviewing policy decisions made in the prior administration, including the decision by the outgoing administration to designate Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism. I wouldn’t want to go into any further details. But as we take a look at this issue into our broader policy with Cuba, those principles will continue to be front of mind.

The White House
Washington DC
28 January 2021

Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki
James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

”Q And if I may ask one more on Cuba: Do you guys plan on starting -- walking back all of those restrictions that were put into place under the Trump administration after the Obama administration had opened things up with Cuba?”

”MS. PSAKI: Well, our Cuba policy is governed by two principles. First, support for democracy and human rights. That will be at the core of our efforts. Second is Americans, especially Cuban Americans, are the best ambassadors for freedom in Cuba. So we'll review the Trump administration policies, as we are in a number of other areas of national security, with an eye to assure -- ensuring that our approach is aligned with that. But, you know, we will take our own path. I don't I don't have anything to predict for you at this point in time.”

United States Department of State
Washington DC
1 February 2021

Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Andrea Mitchell of MSNBC Andrea Mitchell Reports

QUESTION: Will you revoke the terror designation on Cuba?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: So there were a series of actions that the outgoing administration took, including that one, that were – that it took it in the very last days of the administration, steps it could have taken presumably over four years that it took in the last basically four weeks. We’re looking at all of them.

CiberCuba
Valencia, Spain
11 February 2020

CiberCuba interview with Democratic candidate Joe Biden CiberCuba:  

What will be your first step regarding the current policy towards Cuba if you become president of the United States?  

Joe Biden: Trump's policies toward Cuba have been a total failure. The repressions by the regime have only increased under him. As president, my policy will be governed by two principles: first that Americans, Cuban Americans in particular, are the best ambassadors for freedom in Cuba. Second, empowering the Cuban people to determine their own future is critical to the national security of the United States. The situation in Cuba today is not the same as the situation four years ago and I will follow policies that recognize today's environment, starting with the elimination of Trump's restrictions on remittances and travel, which harm the Cuban people and maintain to separated families. I will also address the backlog of more than 20,000 visas that has increased under the Trump administration, demand the release of political prisoners, and defend human rights in Cuba, just as I did when I was vice president.  

CiberCuba: One of the most severe sanctions decreed by Trump has been the prohibitions of regular and chartered flights, and the limitation of remittances to Cuba. What is his plan to reverse both measures?  

Joe Biden: In the midst of a global pandemic, when so many families are deeply shocked, President Trump is denying Cuban Americans the right to support their families on the island. Once again, he makes it clear that his alleged "support" of the Cuban people is nothing more than empty political rhetoric. 

The Trump administration is deporting hundreds of Cubans back to dictatorship. There are nearly 10,000 Cubans languishing in tent camps along the border with Mexico because of Trump's anti-immigrant agenda. And he is separating Cuban families through increasingly severe restrictions on family visits and remittances. None of this helps the Cuban people. None of this has advanced democracy in Cuba. Donald Trump is the worst possible standard-bearer to achieve democracy in Cuba, because he has indulged autocrats around the world, like Vladimir Putin in Russia. Throughout my career I have defended democracy and human rights, freedom of the press, of assembly and religion, and I have fought against dictators on both the left and the right.  

Limitations on remittances in particular only harm Cuban families, especially the elderly and the most vulnerable, both on the island and in our country. Both Americans and Cubans cannot afford four more years of weak leadership, empty words and broken promises from Trump.  

CiberCuba: Changes in immigration policy have led to a concentration of Cubans awaiting an asylum hearing in Mexico, while dozens of others remain arrested in US immigration jails under questionable treatment and the threat of deportation. What would you do in this situation?  

Joe Biden: What the Trump Administration is doing is inconceivable: deporting hundreds of Cubans to a dictatorship and forcing nearly 10,000 Cubans to languish in tent camps along the Mexican border, all to advance the anti-crusade. immigrant from this administration. The United States can defend both the security of our border and our values ​​as a nation of immigrants. We must restore our historic commitment to asylum seekers and refugees. My immigration plan will end Trump's damaging asylum policies, starting with Trump's Migrant Protection Protocols [PPM], and reinstate our asylum laws to do what they should do: protect people fleeing from persecution and that they are unable to return home safely. We will end prolonged detention and for-profit detention centers and reinvest in case management programs, which allow migrants to live in dignity and safety while awaiting their court hearings, and which are the best way to ensure that asylum seekers attend all required immigration hearings. In addition, we will restore sensible enforcement priorities so that hard-working people who have never committed a serious crime are not subject to deportation.  

CiberCuba: One of the fundamental complaints of the Cuban community in the United States is the paralysis of the Family Reunification Program for three years. What can you say to the families who demand the reactivation of this immigration benefit?  

Joe Biden: A Biden and Harris administration will reopen pathways for safe and legal migration from the island, including the Cuban Family Reunification Permit Program (CFRP) and the Cuban refugee program as soon as possible. The oppressive Cuban regime should not prevent Americans - and Cuban Americans in particular - from helping their families and friends in Cuba.  

CiberCuba: The current administration has justified its sanctions against Cuba with the criteria of punishing the military spheres that control tourism and businesses in the country and limiting its support for the Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela. What do you think about these sanctions? Would you raise them or negotiate them?  

Joe Biden: Trump's policies have not been successful. Dictators remain entrenched in power in both Cuba and Venezuela. Sanctions are an important tool, but they are not our only tool and must be part of a larger strategy to achieve the results we want. The goal is more freedom for people living under oppressive regimes. If sanctions help advance that goal, I will use them. And unlike Trump, I will protect people fleeing the oppression of these dictatorships. Trump has made it nearly impossible for asylum seekers to even make the legal claim to which they are entitled. President Trump and Senate Republicans have repeatedly refused to grant Temporary Protected Status [TPS] to Venezuelans fleeing the Maduro regime. I will grant them. In Cuba, empowering the Cuban people will be the centerpiece of my approach. And I will ensure that all asylum seekers, including those from Cuba and Nicaragua, are given fair consideration.

Ambassador Brian Nichols Expected To Be Nominated As Assistant Secretary Of State For Western Hemisphere Affairs

Brian A. Nichols presented his credentials on July 19, 2018, as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Zimbabwe.

Ambassador Nichols previously served as the Ambassador to Peru from 2014 to 2017. He pioneered strategies against illegal gold mining, illegal logging, wildlife trafficking, and environmental degradation. He supported American trade and investment in Peru, increasing agricultural sales to over $1 billion annually, defending the rights of American investors, and building the Hemisphere’s largest public-private partnership—the U.S.-Peru Cacao Alliance.

Brian Nichols was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) from 2011 to 2013. In that capacity, he oversaw the full range of rule of law programs, counter-narcotics and multilateral issues managed by the bureau. From 2007 to 2010, he served as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Colombia, where he managed day-to-day U.S. diplomatic activities in Colombia including overseeing over $500 million in annual assistance. Ambassador Nichols previously served as the Director of the Office of Caribbean Affairs, coordinating U.S. policy toward 14 Caribbean countries. He also served as Counselor for Political Affairs at the American Embassy in Indonesia from 2001 to 2004. Ambassador Nichols has also served in Mexico and El Salvador during major democratic transitions. He began his Foreign Service career as a Consular Officer in Lima in 1989.

Ambassador Nichols has earned over 20 awards during his diplomatic career, including the 2016 Charles E. Cobb, Jr. Award for Initiative and Success in Trade Development. He is married to Foreign Service Officer Geri Kam. They have two daughters.

LINK: Emily Mendrala Appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary In The Bureau Of WHA; Focus On Cuba

Crowley Maritime Libertad Act Lawsuit Refiled 158 Miles South To Same District As Seaboard Marine Lawsuit; A Chess Move?

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. CROWLEY MARITIME CORPORATION, Defendant. [3:20-cv-01426 Middle District Florida]

Murphy & Anderson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable LLP (defendant)

Amended Complaint 2/2/2021)
Notice Of Pending, Refiled, Related Or Similar Action (2/4/2021)

PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE: Plaintiff Odette Blanco De Fernandez, née Blanco Rosell, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby dismisses the action against defendant Crowley Maritime Corporation (“Crowley) without prejudice. Crowley has filed neither an answer to the complaint nor a motion for summary judgment. Dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) is therefore appropriate. Dated: February 2, 2021

LINK To Plaintiff's Notice Of Dismissal Without Prejudice (2/2/2021)

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD MARINE, LTD., Defendant. [1:20-cv-25176; Southern Florida District]

Horr, Novak & Skipp, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields (plaintiff)
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (defendant)

LINK To Defendant Seaboard Marine, Ltd.'s Notice Of Pending, Refiled, Related, Or Similar Action (1/26/2021)

Reference Posts:
Crowley Maritime Corporation Is 32nd Libertad Act Lawsuit- Plaintiffs Target Use Of ZEDM Port
Seaboard Marine Is 31st Libertad Act Lawsuit- Plaintiff Targets Mariel Special Economic Zone Operations
If Biden Suspends Title III, Attorney May Scramble To File Lawsuits

In Surprise Move, Plaintiff Dismisses Libertad Act Lawsuit Against Crowley Maritime; Concern About Biden Administration Suspending Title III?

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. CROWLEY MARITIME CORPORATION, Defendant. [3:20-cv-01426 Middle District Florida]

Murphy & Anderson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable LLP (defendant)

PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE: Plaintiff Odette Blanco De Fernandez, née Blanco Rosell, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby dismisses the action against defendant Crowley Maritime Corporation (“Crowley) without prejudice. Crowley has filed neither an answer to the complaint nor a motion for summary judgment. Dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) is therefore appropriate. Dated: February 2, 2021

LINK To Plaintiff's Notice Of Dismissal Without Prejudice (2/2/2021)

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD MARINE, LTD., Defendant. [1:20-cv-25176; Southern Florida District]

Horr, Novak & Skipp, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields (plaintiff)
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (defendant)

LINK To Defendant Seaboard Marine, Ltd.'s Notice Of Pending, Refiled, Related, Or Similar Action (1/26/2021)

Reference Posts:
Crowley Maritime Corporation Is 32nd Libertad Act Lawsuit- Plaintiffs Target Use Of ZEDM Port
Seaboard Marine Is 31st Libertad Act Lawsuit- Plaintiff Targets Mariel Special Economic Zone Operations
If Biden Suspends Title III, Attorney May Scramble To File Lawsuits

Implementation Of Libertad Act Suggests More Important To Spain Than To Leadership Of EC Or Members Of EU; EU Defendants Waiting Ten Months For Authorization; What If Cuba Says "No"?

Implementation Of Libertad Act Suggests At Present More Important To Spain Than To Leadership Of EC Or Members Of EU 

Lawsuit Defendants In United States Waiting Ten Months For Authorization From EC 

What Does Biden Administration Do If Cuba Says It Owes Nothing To Certified Claimants?

Perhaps, the correspondence level from Madrid to Brussels was due to protocol, the pandemic, and a requirement for member consensus, but if Title III and Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”) remain so provocative, so injurious, so impactful for Spain-based companies- and potentially for United States-based companies, why not begin the public discourse in 2021 with the most senior government representatives?   

A letter signed on 28 January 2021 by the government of Spain to the Brussels, Belgium-based European Commission (EC), the executive branch for the twenty-seven (27) member Brussels, Belgium-based European Union (EU), was not from the head of government, Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, to President Ursula von de Leyen of the EC, but rather from a minister in Spain to the executive vice president of the EC. LINK To Media Release 

An unintended message to the Biden Administration could be the Libertad Act is not yet so detrimental to the United States-EC/EU relationship as to reach the highest levels of EC leadership and EU-member government. 

The thirty-two filed Libertad Act lawsuits will remain in the United States court system until judges rule, juries rule, or plaintiffs withdraw their lawsuits regardless of what Spain, the EC/EU, and Biden Administration may prefer.  Another suspension of Title III of the Libertad Act does nothing to impact the existing lawsuits.  New lawsuits may continue until there is another suspension of Title III of the Libertad Act. LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Statistics   

The Trump Administration on 2 May 2019 made operational Title III of the Libertad Act.  Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.   

The last public correspondence from the EC to the United States was a two-page jointly-signed letter on 10 April 2019 from the High Representative/Vice President of the EC and Member of the EC for Trade to the United States Secretary of State with a copies to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the United States Trade Representative.  LINK To Letter 

The Trump Administration received expressions of displeasure from the EC/EU as an individual might receive the Legion d’Honneur from the government of France.  The Biden Administration may be circumspect, but will need to be viewed as not abandoning the sanctity of property rights and the matter of the 5,913 certified claimants in the United States; members of the United States Congress will make certain of it.   

If the Biden Administration is perceived as permitting EU members (and other countries) to escape accountability by a second suspension of Title III of the Libertad Act and further use of Title IV of the Libertad Act arguing that the statue is an ineffective means to resolve the certified claims and unnecessarily impacts bilateral relationships, then the Biden Administration need pivot to direct negotiations with the Republic of Cuba- and the EC/EU and other countries will need to assist the United States.   

Title IV of the Libertad Act restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims.  One Canada-based company and one Spain-based company are currently known to be subject to this provision based upon a certified claim and non-certified claim. 

Thirty-two Libertad Act Title III lawsuits (certified claimants and non-certified claimants) have been filed in United States District Courts.  Some remain before the original judge, some have been dismissed, some have been restructured, and others are at Courts of Appeals.  Plaintiffs include 2nd, 9th, 31st, 38th, 73rd, 88th, 182nd, 183rd, 188th, and 3,954th largest certified claimants and other non-certified claimants.   

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims US$8.8 billion.  

Why have EU-based defendants in Libertad Act Title III lawsuits filed in the United States await nearing ten months for the EC to issue a response to “Application for Authorisation under Article 5 paragraph 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996.”   

The distance between the request and the response may be interpreted as a lack of importance by the EC/EU to the Libertad Act despite an importance to at least one member of the EU, Spain.  

However, one United States-based attorney offered the following: “I do not think a conclusion of uninterest, indifference or unnecessary delay by the EU is warranted in assessing its processing of, for example, the Iberostar [Group] application in the context of Title  III [of the Libertad Act].  It is a complex question of law/extraterritoriality/sovereign foreign policy never before put to the EC.  And it matters because any precedent will extend into future United States EC/EU interactions over the permissibility of United States extraterritorial laws aimed at Europe’s corporate sector.  Consultation across the EU membership is required.  This is time-consuming.  The Pandemic has interfered with the EC/EU’s ability to decide delicate and important matters in physical meetings.  The delay is not analogous to The White House asking the United States Department of State for its response to an application - here there’s not one United States Department of State, but twenty-seven.”  

The Biden Administration has an opportunity for at least one quid pro quo or a series of quid pro quos with Spain, EC, EU, individual members of the EU and other countries.   

The question for the Biden Administration will be how Spain, the EC, EU, individual members of the EU, and other countries will assist in obtaining resolution for the 5,913 certified claims against the Republic of Cuba absent the use of the Libertad Act.  

Members of the United States Congress will expectantly insist upon direct and verifiable assistance from the EC, EU, individual members of the EU and other countries to resolve the issue of the certified claims. 

Complicating decisions for the Biden Administration are Libertad Act Title III lawsuit District Court filings in Washington DC on behalf of the Republic of Cuba.  Within the motions are statements supporting the expropriation of United States assets without compensation are references to should circumstances again be similar, the Republic of Cuba would again take the same decision- expropriate without compensation.  Their position suggests- We took it, We will not give it back.  We will not pay for it now.  We will do it again.  Move on.   

How then does the Biden Administration engage with the Spain, EC, EU, individual members of the EU and other countries to obtain its support for assistance with obtaining a settlement for the certified claimants when the Republic of Cuba is maintains in court documents that no settlement is forthcoming?  

For the Spain, EC, EU, individual members of the EU and other countries, how important is a second suspension of Title III of the Libertad Act?  The first lasted from 1996 to 2019.  Is the United States any nearer to resolving the issue of the 5,913 certified claims?  No. 

The Biden Administration will not suspend Title III of the Libertad Act to solely accommodate the interests of Spain, EC, EU, individual members of the EU and other countries.  The Biden Administration will not suspend Title III of the Libertad Act and lessen the use of Title IV of the Libertad Act if doing so solely assists the Republic of Cuba with shoring-up its economy and attracting direct foreign investment and increasing the number of tourists visiting the 800-mile-long archipelago located ninety-three miles south of Key West, Florida.   

For The Honorable Joseph Biden, President of the United States, who served in the United States Senate as Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary (1987-1995) and Ranking Minority Member (1981-1987 and 1995-1997) may be loath to interrupt court cases in advance of their natural conclusion. 

The 28 January 2021 letter from Spain to Brussels shared that suspension of the Libertad Act is “one of Spain’s main priorities…” and is “seriously affecting our trade and investment in Cuba, particularly regarding tourism, in which Spanish companies are market leaders.”   

Large Spain-based companies are among defendants in Libertad Act Title III lawsuits and executives of at least one large Spain-based company have been subject to Title IV.  These are not lawsuits against small companies without a global presence- most are publicly-held companies and have operations in the United States.

Bristol, United Kingdom-based Imperial Brands plc (2019 revenues approximately US$34 billion; member of EU when trafficking alleged)

Dusseldorf, Germany-based Trivago GmbH (2019 revenues approximately US$941 million)

Madrid, Spain-based Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. (2019 assets exceed US$800 billion)

Madrid, Spain-based NH Hotel Group S.A. (2019 revenues approximately US$1.9 billion)

Palma de Mallorca, Spain-based Melia Hotels International S.A. (2019 revenues approximately US$1.98 billion)

Paris, France-based BNP Paribas S.A. (2019 revenues approximately US$49 billion)

Palma de Mallorca, Spain-based Iberostar Group (2019 revenues approximately US$2.5 billion)

Paris, France-based Pernod Ricard (2019 revenues approximately US$10.4 billion)

Paris, France-based Société Générale S.A. (2019 revenues approximately US$25 billion)

London, Kingdom-based WWP plc (2019 revenues approximately US$14 billion; member of EU when trafficking alleged)

However, for now nearing ten months, EU-based defendants in Title III Libertad Act lawsuits filed in the United States await responses from the EC as to how the defendants should proceed relating to the lawsuits as the EU and members of the EU have in place regulations governing responses to the Libertad Act.  The delay suggests a lack of urgency.   

Mr. Hermenegildo, Altozano, attorney with Madrid, Spain-based Bird & Bird, informed the court that “On April 15, 2020, I filed an Application for Authorisation under Article 5 paragraph 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom, on behalf of the Spanish company Iberostar Hoteles y Apartamentos S.L.U. ("Iberostar").” 

Excerpt From 24 April 2020 United States District Court Judge’s Order Granting Iberostar’s Motion To Stay: ”This requirement comes from a European Union blocking statute enacted to counteract the effects of the Helms-Burton Act, and Iberostar faces EUR 600,000 in sanctions for failure to first obtain authorization. (ECF No. 16 at ¶ 3.) Iberostar’s request for authorization has already been filed and is currently pending before the European Commission. (Id. at ¶ 18.) In the interest of international comity, this Court has determined that it is appropriate to stay this case pending the Iberostar’s request for authorization from the European Commission.  The Court grants Iberostar’s motion for a stay (ECF No. 16), and the case is stayed until the European Union grants Iberostar’s request for authorization.  Iberostar shall submit status reports on its request for authorization every 30 days. In the interim, the Court directs the Clerk to administratively close this case.”  

On 23 September 2020, the [European] Commission replied that its “services are actively assessing [Iberostar’s] application.” The Commission highlighted that the “complexity of [Iberostar’s] request requires careful consideration, including extensive consultation of both the Commission services and Member States’ authorities.” Finally, the Commission confirmed that, “[d]espite the challenges presented by the current health situation, [they] do [their] utmost to ensure that a decision is taken in due course.”  

“On December 20, 2020, the European Commission sent a new communication to Iberostar in which they confirmed the Commission has “been actively liaising to complete the required consultations of both the Commission Services and Member States’ authorities, as required.” The Commission “trust[s] any such assessments and investigations will shortly be completed and the authorisation process will pursue its course.”  There have been no further developments since December 20, 2020. Defendant will keep this Court duly apprised of any further developments regarding the request for authorization from the European Commission. Filed this 19th day of January, 2021.” 

European Commission
Brussels, Belgium
20 October 2020

“The EU’s Blocking Statute is designed to protect EU companies and persons from the extraterritorial application of foreign laws and regulations specified therein. Specifically, it covers certain U.S. sanctions vis-a-vis Iran and Cuba. The EU considers the extra-territorial application of unilateral coercive measures as contrary to international law.  First, the Blocking Statute nullifies the effect in the EU of any foreign decision, including court rulings, giving effect to those sanctions. Second, it allows EU persons to recover damages for the losses they incurred because of those sanctions. Third, it prohibits EU operators from complying with such sanctions.  

However, EU persons can request from the European Commission an authorisation to comply with such sanctions. If there is sufficient evidence that non-compliance would seriously damage their interests or those of the European Union, the European Commission can grant such authorisation.

As a general rule, EU companies summoned before US courts must obtain a prior authorisation from the European Commission before appearing in court.  The authorisation process is confidential. Hence, the Commission cannot comment on any specific case. Suffice it to say that all decisions on authorisation applications are taken after careful deliberations – appreciating fully all arguments and evidence concerning the possible serious damage to the interests of the applicants or the EU.  The Commission decides on such authorisations with the agreement of Member States, through the comitology procedure.” 

Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism
Madrid, Spain
28 January 2021

Letter from Minister for Industry to Vice-President of European Commission
Reyes Maroto urges European Commission to call for Joe Biden to suspend Helms-Burton Act and customs duties on Spanish products

“The Minister for Industry, Trade and Tourism, Reyes Maroto, sent a letter to the [Executive] Vice-President of the European Commission, Valdis Dombrovskis, urging him to start talks with the new United States (US) Administration to call to suspend the Helms-Burton Act and the customs duties on Spanish products being applied by the US. 

The minister urged the Vice-President of the European Commission to start talks with the new US Administration, since the Helms-Burton Act prejudices Spanish trade and investment in Cuba, particularly the tourism sector, and also to call for the suspension of customs duties on Spanish products being applied by the US, which prejudice the export of olive oil, wine and table olives, among others. 

"The restoration of mutual trust is clearly one of the key goals of our future trade policy. We need to identify the main areas of immediate action and base ourselves on mutual needs and common goals that we share in our respective foreign economic and trade policies. The resolution of our disputes would send out a message of confidence to the private sector, which is calling for a negotiated solution between the two parties", stated the minister in her letter. 

Reyes Maroto focused on four priorities in new trade relations between the EU and the US: the resolution of trade disputes; improved cooperation in areas of mutual interest for the future, fostering the highly necessary reform of the multilateral trade system and, finally, coordinating responses to avoid trade distortions while laying the foundations for resilient, fair and open international trade in the future. 

Specifically, the minister referred in her letter to stepping up contacts for a negotiated, balanced and mutually beneficial solution to the civil aviation dispute (Airbus-Boeing), the customs duties on Spanish table olives, the tax on certain digital services and safeguard measures on steel and aluminium. 

"Working on the suspension of the Helms-Burton Act is one of Spain's main priorities, to which end we call to step up diplomatic contacts underway between the European Commission and the United States to suspend this Act, which is seriously affecting our trade and investment in Cuba, particularly regarding tourism, in which Spanish companies are market leaders", concluded the minister.  Non official translation”

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Emily Mendrala Appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary In The Bureau Of WHA; Focus On Cuba

Emily Mendrala
Deputy Assistant Secretary- Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
United States Department of State
Washington DC
January 20, 2021 - Present

“Currently serves as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs covering Cuba and regional migration.

Emily was the Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, promoting U.S. policies of engagement toward the Americas, from 2017-2021. At the Center for Democracy in the Americas, Emily led educational travel delegations for Members of Congress, policy leaders, and other stakeholders to Cuba, Central America, and the U.S.-Mexico border.

Emily’s prior government service includes serving as a Director for Legislative Affairs in the National Security Council and working at the Department of State as a Special Advisor to the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs and, before that, as an advisor on Central America regional affairs. Before joining the Department,

Emily was a Professional Staff Member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Emily is from Raleigh, North Carolina. She has an M.A. in International Economics with a concentration in Latin American Studies from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a B.A. in Mathematics from the University of Virginia.”

USDA Updates Reporting On Usage In Cuba Of MAP/FMD Funding Authorized By 2018 Farm Bill

In 2018, legislative advocates maintained that inserting a Market Access Program (MAP) and Foreign Market Development (FMD) provision in the Farm Bill was critical to “laying the groundwork” for increasing exports of agricultural commodities and food products to the Republic of Cuba.  Statements from members of Congress included: “… an important first step to regaining our presence in Cuba.”  Yet, there was not one application to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 2018 or 2019.  

Most observers reasonably concluded that legislative advocates- within the United States Congress and organizations located in Washington DC and located outside of the beltway would have prominently teed-up at least one high-profile applicant to publicize in advance they would use the provision if it became law or at least one high-profile applicant to immediately and publicly request funding when the Farm Bill became law on 21 December 2018.  

The most significant impact of a shockingly low number of MAP/FMD requests in 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 is what the lack of interest portends for other legislative efforts in the United States Congress to rescind prohibitions upon the provision of payment terms for agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  

Use to date of USDA MAP/FMD Republic of Cuba-focused funding provisions in the 2018 Farm Bill has been anemic.  Since 2018, One entity has used MAP funding in the Republic of Cuba.  No entity has used FMD funding in the Republic of Cuba.  The USDA reported no applications were rejected. 

Since 2019, a total of eight applications were received by the USDA to use MAP and/or FMD.  According to the USDA, “Although the table indicated nine expressions of interest over two years, these represent fewer than nine organizations as some of the organizations applied in multiple years.  The earlier table only included those entities that expressed interest in Cuba directly, not anyone that sought to add Cuba to a regional program.”   

According to the USDA, at least one participant in 2021 and 2020 sought to add the Republic of Cuba to a regional program for MAP, but none for FMD.  No entity pursued or was rejected for activities in the Republic of Cuba through a regional program.  In some respects, that some entities applied more than once, but did not ultimately use MAP and/or FMD in the Republic of Cuba is more consequential because it begs the question- why did the entities apply, but not choose to use MAP and/or FMD in the Republic of Cuba? 

One entity received MAP funding (US$60,000.00) in the Republic of Cuba- Denver, Colorado-based Potatoes USA which in November 2020 delivered to the Republic of Cuba 33,118 pounds of potato seeds valued at US$44,760.00.  Sample costs are ineligible for MAP or FMD funding. 

In 2020, one (1) entity applied to use, but did not use FMD funding and four (4) entities applied to use MAP funding while one (1) entity (Potatoes USA) used MAP funding.  From the USDA, “… any unspent funds would normally remain in participants’ agreements, available for the agency to approve for plans a participant submits in a future year.”    

In 2021, no entity applied to use FMD funding and three entities applied to use MAP funding, but no entity has yet used MAP funding.  From the USDA, “Most MAP programs operate on a January to December year, however, some run on a July to June year.  The regulations allow groups to continue already approved activities up to thirty days after the end of the program year.  Thus, the latest a participant could continue an activity funded by MAP 21 would be July 30, 2022, if their MAP 21 program began June 1, 2021.  A participant would have until the end of January 2022, if their MAP program began January 1, 2021.  The MAP regulations allow a participant to file claims up to six months after the end of the program year.”  In 2021, sixty-seven (67) entities received funding for MAP and twenty-one (21) entities received funding for FMD.

USDA Accepting Applications for FY 2021 Export Programs

“The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Foreign Agricultural Service is accepting applications from eligible organizations for fiscal year 2021 funding for five export market development programs. FAS recently published the FY 2021 Notices of Funding Opportunity for the Market Access Program, Foreign Market Development Program, Technical Assistance for Specialty Crops Program, Quality Samples Program and Emerging Markets Program. The application deadline for the five programs is June 26, 2020.

Under the Market Access Program, USDA provides competitive, cost-share assistance to U.S. exporters and agricultural, fish, and forest product trade organizations for international marketing and promotion of U.S. commodities and products. More information about the program and the FY 2021 funding opportunity is available at: https://www.fas.usda.gov/programs/market-access-program-map.

Under the Foreign Market Development Program, USDA partners with nonprofit agricultural and forest product trade associations to build longer-term international demand for U.S. commodities. More information about the program and the FY 2021 funding opportunity is available at: https://www.fas.usda.gov/programs/foreign-market-development-program-fmd.”

What Is FMD & MAP?

The USDA does not provide any payments to selected applicants in advance of the applicant making disbursements. The USDA provides payment upon receipt of an invoice from the applicant. The invoices are audited by the USDA and a claw back of payments is permitted. Any Republic of Cuba-related invoice is likely to receive additional scrutiny due to an amendment to the Farm Bill submitted by The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida), a member of the United States Senate.

MAP: “Through the Market Access Program (MAP), FAS partners with U.S. agricultural trade associations, cooperatives, state regional trade groups and small businesses to share the costs of overseas marketing and promotional activities that help build commercial export markets for U.S. agricultural products and commodities.”

“MAP reaches virtually every corner of the globe, helping to build markets for a wide variety U.S. farm and food products. FAS provides cost-share assistance to eligible U.S. organizations for activities such as consumer advertising, public relations, point-of-sale demonstrations, participation in trade fairs and exhibits, market research and technical assistance. When MAP funds are used for generic marketing and promotion, participants must contribute a minimum 10-percent match. For promotion of branded products, a dollar-for-dollar match is required. Each year, FAS announces the MAP application period and criteria in the Federal Register. Applicants apply for MAP through the Unified Export Strategy (UES) process, which allows eligible organizations to request funding from multiple USDA market development programs through a single, strategically coordinated proposal. FAS reviews the proposals and awards funds to applicants that demonstrate the potential for effective performance based on a clear, long-term strategic plan.”

FMD: “The Foreign Market Development (FMD) Program, also known as the Cooperator Program, helps create, expand and maintain long-term export markets for U.S. agricultural products. Under the program, FAS partners with U.S. agricultural producers and processors, who are represented by non-profit commodity or trade associations called “cooperators,” to promote U.S. commodities overseas.”

“The FMD program focuses on generic promotion of U.S. commodities, rather than consumer-oriented promotion of branded products. Preference is given to organizations that represent an entire industry or are nationwide in membership and scope.

FMD-funded projects generally address long-term opportunities to reduce foreign import constraints or expand export growth opportunities. For example, this might include efforts to: reduce infrastructural or historical market impediments, improve processing capabilities, modify codes and standards, or identify new markets or new uses for the agricultural commodity or product.

Each year, FAS announces the FMD application period and criteria in the Federal Register. Organizations apply for the FMD program through the Unified Export Strategy (UES) process, which allows applicants to request funding from multiple USDA market development programs through a single, strategically coordinated proposal. FAS reviews the proposals and awards funds to applicants that demonstrate the potential for effective performance based on a clear, long-term strategic plan.”  

Value Of MAP/FMD  

For the United States business community, the MAP/FMD amendment to the Farm Bill was significant, but more likely to provide greater financial value to the government of the Republic of Cuba than to United States food product and agricultural commodity exporters using provisions of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000.  

The likelihood of a value to United States taxpayers, as members of the United States Senate have posited, of US$28.00 returned for every US$1.00 in expenditures of MAP/FMD throughout the world, and now including the Republic of Cuba, will be challenging to measure- but it will be important to measure and the USDA should focus upon the cost-benefit analysis.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. Secretary Of State Questions Legitimacy Of Returning Cuba To List Of State Sponsors Of Terrorism

United States Department of State
Washington DC
1 February 2021

Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Andrea Mitchell of MSNBC Andrea Mitchell Reports

QUESTION: Will you revoke the terror designation on Cuba?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: So there were a series of actions that the outgoing administration took, including that one, that were – that it took it in the very last days of the administration, steps it could have taken presumably over four years that it took in the last basically four weeks. We’re looking at all of them.

291 Days Since Spain-Based Iberostar Hotels & Resorts Requested Guidance From EC For Libertad Act Lawsuit In United States

MARIA DOLORES CANTO MARTI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATES OF DOLORES MARTI MERCADE AND FERNANDO CANTO BORY V. IBEROSTAR HOTELES Y APARTAMENTOS SL [1:20-cv-20078; Southern Florida District]

Zumpano Patricios P.A. (plaintiff)
Bird & Bird (defendant)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

19 January 2021: “DEFENDANT’S STATUS REPORT Defendant IBEROSTAR HOTELES Y APARTAMENTOS, S.L.U. (“Iberostar”) submits1this status report pursuant to this Court’s Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Stay Proceedings dated April 24, 2020 (D.E. 17), directing Defendant to submit status reports every 30 days on its request for authorization to the European Union Commission. Defendant states as follows:

Since the last update filed on December 21, 2020, Iberostar continues to await a decision on its application for authorization to the European Commission to respond to the Complaint in this action which was filed with the European Commission on April 15, 2020 (the “Application”). Defendant’s Motion to Stay, ¶ 2. (D.E. 16).

Iberostar reserves all its rights and will move to dismiss based on its Rule 12 defenses when it receives authorization to do so from the European Commission.

The European Commission acknowledged receipt of Defendant’s Application on May 19, 2020.

On June 15, 2020, Iberostar requested the European Commission to provide an update on the status of the Application.

On June 22, 2020, the European Commission confirmed that it is “currently assessing [Defendant’s] application,” and that the Commission does “[its] utmost to ensure that a decision is taken in due course.”

On August 10, 2020, the European Commission informed Iberostar regarding the procedures involved in the consideration of the pending Application. They explained that it requires “extensive consultation of both the Commission’s services and Member States’ authorities.”

On September 23, 2020, the Commission replied that its “services are actively assessing [Iberostar’s] application.” The Commission highlighted that the “complexity of [Iberostar’s] request requires careful consideration, including extensive consultation of both the Commission services and Member States’ authorities.” Finally, the Commission confirmed that, “[d]espite the challenges presented by the current health situation, [they] do [their] utmost to ensure that a decision is taken in due course.”

On November 19, 2020, the European Commission informed Iberostar regarding the status of its pending Application. They explained that “challenges presented by the current health situation [have] lengthened the process.” Further, it confirmed they “are doing [their]utmost to ensure a timely response.”

On December 20, 2020, the European Commission sent a new communication to Iberostar in which they confirmed the Commission has “been actively liaising to complete the required consultations of both the Commission Services and Member States’ authorities, as required.” The Commission “trust[s] any such assessments and investigations will shortly be completed and the authorisation process will pursue its course.”

There have been no further developments since December 20, 2020. Defendant will keep this Court duly apprised of any further developments regarding the request for authorization from the European Commission. Filed this 19th day of January, 2021.”

LINK To Court Filing In PDF Format

President Biden: A Special Presidential Representative For Cuba Negotiations- With Or Without An Ambassador

Appointing Special Presidential Representative For Cuba Negotiations
Feinberg As Department Of State Special Representative For Cuba Negotiations
Biden Administration Should Negotiate Deal That Eluded Twelve Predecessors
Aren’t Two Centuries, Seven Decades And Twelve Presidencies Enough To Wait?
Two Largest Claims Account For 24%; Thirty Account For 56% Of Total
Replacing Title III Lawsuits With Government-To-Government Negotiation
Settlement Possible Without Cuba Putting Up Cash
Every Country Cuba Owes Will Benefit From A Settlement
EU Should Be Supportive As Their Companies Benefit

To create a sphere of optimism and remove a multi-decade specter of recirculating omnipresence, the Biden Administration needs to install a negotiating team who reflect gravitas as viewed by the Republic of Cuba.  That means no careerist diplomats.  It means politicians or business executives who the Republic of Cuba has confidence can speak directly with the President of the United States.

Senior-level officials within and surrounding the Biden Administration confirm that resolution of the 5,913 certified claims, and only the certified claims, will be a focus for the United States Department of State, United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Commerce, and National Security Council (NSC) at The White House.   

Unfortunately, the same statements were provided by the Trump Administration (2017-2021), which did not engage with the Republic of Cuba and the Obama Administration (2009-2017) which did not effectively use the engagement it created.   

The United States government retains broad discretion to negotiate a settlement on behalf of the claims certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) within the United States Department of Justice.  There exists a pre-positioned constituency among the certified claimants in support of a prompt resolution. 

Unknown is whether within the Biden Administration exists a confidence that direct negotiations to resolve the certified claims can develop independent of a resolution for other bilateral issues with the Republic of Cuba. 

The issue of the certified claims has survived one century to the next century, seven decades, and twelve (12) presidencies: Eisenhower Administration, Kennedy Administration, Johnson Administration, Nixon Administration, Ford Administration, Carter Administration, Reagan Administration, G.H.W. Bush Administration, Clinton Administration, G.W. Bush Administration, Obama Administration, and Trump Administration.  Thirteen is considered by some an unlucky number. 

The Honorable Joseph Biden, President of the United States, has a varied reservoir of contacts from his service in the United States Senate (1973-2009) and Vice President of the United States (2009-2017).  Suggestions for Special Presidential Representative for Cuba Negotiations reporting to the President rather to the National Security Council or United States Department of State, in alphabetical order: 

Mr. G. Allen Andreas (Florida)
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer- ADM (1997-2006)

Mr. Micky Arison (Florida)
Chairman- Carnival Corporation & plc (2013-Present)

The Honorable Max Baucus (D- Montana)
United States Ambassador to China (2014-2017)
United States Senate (1978-2014)
United States House of Representatives (1975-1978)

Mr. Lloyd Blankfein (New York)
Senior Chairman- Goldman Sachs (2019-Present)
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer- Goldman Sachs (2006-2018)

The Honorable Bob Corker (R- Tennessee)
United States Senate (2007-2019)

The Honorable Christopher Christie (R- New Jersey)
Governor of New Jersey (2010-2018)

The Honorable Christopher Dodd (D- Connecticut)
Motion Picture Association of America (2011-2017)
United States Senate (1981-2011)
United States House of Representatives (1975-1981)

The Honorable Ted Kaufman (D- Delaware)
Head- Biden Transition (2020)
United States Senator (2009-2010)
Office of Senator Biden (1976-1995)

Mr. Oscar Munoz (Illinois)
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer- United Airlines (2015-2020)

Mr. Richard Parsons (New York)
President- Time Warner (1995-2002)
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer- AOL Time Warner (2002-2008)
Chairman- Citigroup (2009-2012)
Interim Chairman- Los Angeles Clippers (2014)
Interim Chairman- CBS (2018)

There is bipartisan political party support and bipartisan ideological support within the United States Congress for a robust and sustained effort to obtain a resolution to the certified claims, particularly from those who represent exporters whose commercial engagement with the Republic of Cuba remains infringed: agricultural commodities, food products, medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, healthcare products, artwork, and providers of travel-related services.  

The Obama Administration deemed resolution of the certified claims was a “top priority,” yet had only reported three (3) discussions (not bilaterally confirmed negotiations) with representatives of the Republic of Cuba in 2,923 days (766 days if calculated from 17 December 2014- the date upon which the United States and the Republic of Cuba announced an intention to re-establish diplomatic relations).  During a 20 July 2016 background briefing by a senior official of the United States Department of State the following exchange:  

REPORTER QUESTION (Miami Herald):  My question has to do with the property rights issue. I wonder if you could give us any details there.  And two, whether Cuba still has outstanding property rights issues with any other countries, and is there a target number we’re looking for, like settling on 20 cents on the dollar, 10 cents on the dollar, whatever?   

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:  As I mentioned, property claims is one of our top priorities.  We had an initial – or first-round meeting with the Cubans on this issue last December [2015] in Havana.  We will have a second round of talks here in Washington at the end of this month.  We certainly have not laid out any kind of – the details which you’ve described.  That will emerge from the negotiations, but we’re committed to pursuing all of the registered claims, as well as other claims that U.S. citizens have against Cuba.  So it’s a process.  We had a good round last December.  We hope to make further progress this month in moving forward on the issue. 

The Trump Administration did not disclose any direct dialogue with the Republic of Cuba relating to negotiating a settlement for the certified claims.  The Trump Administration on 2 May 2019 made operational Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).  Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset. 

To date, thirty-two Title III lawsuits (certified claimants and non-certified claimants) have been filed in United States District Courts.  Some remain before the original judge, some have been dismissed, some have been restructured, and others are at Courts of Appeals.  Plaintiffs include 2nd, 9th, 31st, 38th, 73rd, 88th, 182nd, 183rd, 188th, and 3,954th largest certified claimants and other non-certified claimants. LINK To Lawsuit Filing Statistics  

The Day-To-Day Guy 

Mr. Kenneth Feinberg is a Washington DC-based attorney (www.feinberglawoffices.com) specializing in mediation and alternative dispute resolution, who served as Special Master for the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund and TARP Executive Compensation; Administrator of the BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster Victim Compensation Fund; retained to assist in the General Motors recall response and compensation for Volkswagen owners.   

Mr. Feinberg, as United States Department Of State Special Representative (with rank of Ambassador) For Cuba Negotiations, would bring his known appreciation for deadlines to his tenure.  He would coordinate the day-to-day discussions and negotiations with the Republic of Cuba.  Since 2018, Mr. Feinberg has confirmed his interest in assisting with settlement negotiations. 

His goal would be to  conclude during the Biden Administration what the Trump Administration and Obama Administration failed to do- and what previous occupants of The White House failed to deliver on behalf of those 5,913 individuals and companies whose assets were expropriated without compensation by the Republic of Cuba, beginning with an oil refinery owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73). 

How to begin? A Lunch   

Mr. Feinberg’s importantly narrow mandate is to directly engage with representatives of the Republic of Cuba with the singular goal of obtaining a settlement of the 5,913 individual and company claims against the Republic of Cuba certified by the USFCSC- and only those claims. 

First, the Special Presidential Representative For Cuba Negotiations and Mr. Feinberg would convene a series of intimate briefings with representatives of the thirty-largest certified claimants and their respective legal counsels.  As two (2) certified claimants represent 24% of the total value of the certified claims and thirty (30) certified claimants represent 56% of the total value of the certified claims, briefings with each of the primary stakeholders would not be an unreasonable effort to undertake within a thirty (30) day period.   

Second, would be a lunch invitation from the Special Presidential Representative For Cuba Negotiations and Mr. Feinberg to the Ambassador of the Republic of Cuba to the United States.  The purpose of the lunch would be to establish a personal rapport and create a reasonable and measurable timeline towards resolving the issue of the certified claims; thirty (30) days to create a timeline should be adequate.   

Third, would be a visit by the Special Presidential Representative For Cuba Negotiations and Mr. Feinberg to the Republic of Cuba within thirty (30) days of completion of the timeline.   

Important that the negotiations have a timeline- a beginning and an end.  Six (6) months is more than adequate. 

Imperative there be no intermediaries between the governments; no third-parties arranging meetings or serving as couriers for messages.  Not a triangle.  A straight line of communication.  No meetings in third countries. 

Structure Of A Resolution 

A certified claims settlement should be based upon the payment of 100% of the value of each certified claim.  Even with a full settlement based upon principal and interest, the annual rate of inflation has substantially diminished the value of each certified claim.   

Opportunities for settlement include, but are not limited to, 100% compensation, debt-for-equity swaps, and substitution investments (one structure for another; one piece of land for another, etc.).  

Portions of monies owed could be transformed into tradable equity positions which a certified claimant could use or could redirect or could market to a third-party. 

In combination with or separately from compensation formats, the Republic of Cuba could provide transferable values to the certified claimants including: 

Income Tax Holidays
Import duty exemptions
Reduced energy rates
Property tax credits
Earned income tax credits
Issuance of commercial paper

Resolution is the means to the goal in whatever form such resolutions may take for the largest United States corporate claimants (e.g., debt-for-equity swaps for new direct foreign investment opportunities, or property restitution combined with re-investment in once-owned properties, or the sale of development rights to third parties, United States-based or non-United States-based).  The goal is closure. 

Importance For Diaz-Canel Administration 

H.E. Miguel Diaz-Canel, President of the Republic of Cuba, would need seriously consider the Biden Administration certified claims negotiating effort and should promptly dedicate members of his team to the negotiations. 

Resolving the issue of the certified claims would cement the Biden Administration and the Diaz-Canel Administration firmly into legacy territory. 

Resolving the issue of the certified claims is the foundation for more than six decades of United States laws, regulations, and policies. 

A re-normalized United States-Republic of Cuba bilateral commercial, economic, and political relationship would benefit the 11.3 million citizens of the 800-mile archipelago and the approximately two million individuals of Cuban descent residing in the United States, primarily in the State of Florida and State of New Jersey.  

For the Diaz-Canel Administration, resolving the issue of the certified claims would materially benefit the governments and the private sectors within those countries who have supported the Republic of Cuba- and in far too many instances, found their loans, rescheduling of loans, commercial credits, government-to-government assistance, and private sector investments habitually subject to multi-year and sometimes multi-decade disappointment.  Success in the Republic of Cuba has always strained to obtain enough oxygen to provide for consistent and positive performance. 

Not institutionally sustainable, nor fair for the Republic of Cuba to not to resolve the one issue with the United States that most negatively impacts those to whom it owes much: European Union (EU)-member countries, Brazil, China, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Venezuela, and Vietnam, among others. 

Absent the issue of the certified claims, the United States could remove the onerous, and for the commercial partners of the Republic of Cuba, extraterritorial financial sanctions infrastructure managed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and Office of Legal Advisor (OLA) of the United States Department of State.    

The OFAC, BIS, and OLA-administered sanctions against the Republic of Cuba inflict collateral damage to countries who directly engage with the Republic of Cuba and to countries which may tangentially engage with the Republic of Cuba.  All parties would be jubilant if the Diaz-Canel Administration would negotiate a settlement which resulted in an elimination of the sanctions. 

No government should build a long-term strategy of victimization when there exist means to remove a problem.  Both the United States and the Republic of Cuba have been guilty of such strategies with respect to their bilateral relationship.  The history may not be fair; the process for resolution may feel unjust.  Governments need weigh the cost of maintaining political pride against the impact upon their citizens (their shareholders) of not resolving an action taken by the government. 

The Republic of Cuba should not need to continue to define success by how much others will provide to it for the maintenance of commercial, economic, and political systems which are neither self-sufficient nor sustainable.  The Republic of Cuba must not be perceived as an exhibit in a museum; and as a symbol of what only functions if others continue to fund it and fuel it. 

Resolution of the certified claims will not, on their own, transform the commercial, economic, and political infrastructure of the Republic of Cuba.  However, it will remove a highly-visible pillar of resistance used to forestall provision of choice, of opportunities to its citizenry. 

There is in the United States and within other countries an increasing lack of empathy for the Republic of Cuba.   

There is a shift of accountability from all that is unsound in the Republic of Cuba is the fault of the United States to its primarily the fault of the Republic of Cuba.  A shift from the United States should repair it to the Republic of Cuba should repair it.  This dynamic may not be fair, but it is a reality.  And successful negotiations are about reality rather than wishful thinking. 

For the bilateral relationship with the Republic of Cuba to re-normalize, there must be a resolution of the certified claims; there are no reasons the Biden Administration and Diaz-Canel Administration cannot make it happen.  It is important for each government to exceed expectations. 

The Certified Claims 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims US$8.8 billion.  

The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

From the certified claim filed by Texaco: “The Cuban corporation was intervened on June 29, 1960, pursuant to Resolution 188 of June 28, 1960, under Law 635 of 1959.  Resolution 188 was promulgated by the Government of Cuba when the Cuban corporation assertedly refused to refine certain crude oil as assertedly provided under a 1938 law pertaining to combustible materials.  Subsequently, this Cuban firm was listed as nationalized in Resolution 19 of August 6, 1960, pursuant to Cuban Law 851.  The Commission finds, however, that the Cuban corporation was effectively intervened within the meaning of Title V of the Act by the Government of Cuba on June 29, 1960.” 

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International; the certified claim also includes land adjacent to the Jose Marti International Airport in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  The third-largest certified claim valued at US$97,373,414.72 is controlled by New York, New York-based North American Sugar Industries, Inc.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement.   

Certified claimants with current or recent activity within the Republic of Cuba include: New York, New York-based Colgate-Palmolive, Moline, Illinois-based Deere & Company, Atlanta, Georgia-based Delta Air Lines, Boston, Massachusetts-based General Electric, Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International, Chicago, Illinois-based University of Chicago, Denver, Colorado-based Western Union and New Haven, Connecticut-based Yale University, among others. 

The ITT Corporation Agreement 

In July 1997, then-New York City, New York-based ITT Corporation and then-Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based STET International Netherlands N.V. signed an agreement whereby STET International Netherlands N.V. would pay approximately US$25 million to ITT Corporation for a ten-year right (after which the agreement could be renewed and was renewed) to use assets (telephone facilities and telephone equipment) within the Republic of Cuba upon which ITT Corporation has a certified claim valued at approximately US$130.8 million.  ETECSA, which is now wholly-owned by the Republic of Cuba, was a joint venture controlled by the Ministry of Information and Communications of the Republic of Cuba within which Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based Telecom Italia International N.V. (formerly Stet International Netherlands N.V.), a subsidiary of Rome, Italy-based Telecom Italia S.p.A. was a shareholder.  Telecom Italia S.p.A., was at one time a subsidiary of Ivrea, Italy-based Olivetti S.p.A.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International.  

The Trump Administration on 2 May 2019 made operational Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).  

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.  Title III lawsuit statistics:   

32 Lawsuits Filed (11 Certified Claimants & 21 Non-Certified Claimants)
4 Of The Dismissed Lawsuits At Court Of Appeals
US$191,493.00+ Court Filing Fees (not including attorney court appearance fees)
72+ Law Firms
206+ Attorneys
10,600+ Filed Court Documents
US$5+ Million Law Firm Billable Hours (estimated 85% by defendants)
14 Countries Impacted
115 Plaintiffs (some in multiple cases)
4 Class Action Requests
60 Defendants (including corporate parent, subsidiaries; some sued in multiple lawsuits)
24 United States Defendants (not including subsidiaries)
6 Republic of Cuba Initial Defendants (three remaining)
27 Non-United States Defendants
8 European Union-Based Defendants
5 Companies Notified As Potential Defendants

Posts About Certified Claims & Trump Administration & Obama Administration 

31 August 2018

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/8/29/ouktsdg4gyrblq7zudchikvdd6abdo?rq=certified%20claims 

14 June 2018

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/6/14/trump-administration-may-be-focusing-upon-certified-claims-unlike-obama-administration?rq=certified%20claims 

17 July 2017

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/7/11/memo-from-nsc-to-potus-this-week-for-title-iii-suspension-capitulate-incapacitate-or-negotiate?rq=certified%20claims 

29 May 2017

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/5/29/0t6ts1bv3by20ot3mi9bydvdqv3e86?rq=certified%20claims 

1 January 2017

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/1/12/h2uudthnn6be8hfgxifqsrdo4aqpb0?rq=certified%20claims 

1 December 2016

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/12/1/zigs56x0gme3a9rqg7aecx9vf2gqgk?rq=certified%20claims 

13 September 2016

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/8/6/obama-administration-wont-seek-dismissal-of-civil-judgements-against-cuba-to-help-certified-claimants?rq=certified%20claims

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

"Spain Wants Biden To Suspend Helms-Burton Act And Customs Duties On Its Products"

Letter from Minister for Industry to Vice-President of European Commission

Reyes Maroto urges European Commission to call for Joe Biden to suspend Helms-Burton Act and customs duties on Spanish products

Thursday 28 January 2021
Madrid, Spain

“The Minister for Industry, Trade and Tourism, Reyes Maroto, sent a letter to the Vice-President of the European Commission, Valdis Dombrovskis, urging him to start talks with the new United States (US) Administration to call to suspend the Helms-Burton Act and the customs duties on Spanish products being applied by the US.

The minister urged the Vice-President of the European Commission to start talks with the new US Administration, since the Helms-Burton Act prejudices Spanish trade and investment in Cuba, particularly the tourism sector, and also to call for the suspension of customs duties on Spanish products being applied by the US, which prejudice the export of olive oil, wine and table olives, among others.

"The restoration of mutual trust is clearly one of the key goals of our future trade policy. We need to identify the main areas of immediate action and base ourselves on mutual needs and common goals that we share in our respective foreign economic and trade policies. The resolution of our disputes would send out a message of confidence to the private sector, which is calling for a negotiated solution between the two parties", stated the minister in her letter.

Reyes Maroto focused on four priorities in new trade relations between the EU and the US: the resolution of trade disputes; improved cooperation in areas of mutual interest for the future, fostering the highly necessary reform of the multilateral trade system and, finally, coordinating responses to avoid trade distortions while laying the foundations for resilient, fair and open international trade in the future.

Specifically, the minister referred in her letter to stepping up contacts for a negotiated, balanced and mutually beneficial solution to the civil aviation dispute (Airbus-Boeing), the customs duties on Spanish table olives, the tax on certain digital services and safeguard measures on steel and aluminium.

"Working on the suspension of the Helms-Burton Act is one of Spain's main priorities, to which
end we call to step up diplomatic contacts underway between the European Commission and the United States to suspend this Act, which is seriously affecting our trade and investment in Cuba, particularly regarding tourism, in which Spanish companies are market leaders", concluded the minister. Non official translation”

LINK To Media Release From Ministry

Eurasia Review
Albany, Oregon
29 January 2021

Spain Wants Biden To Suspend Helms-Burton Act And Customs Duties On Its Products

Spain’s Minister for Industry, Trade and Tourism, Reyes Maroto, sent a letter to the Vice-President of the European Commission, Valdis Dombrovskis, urging him to start talks with the new United States (US) Administration to call to suspend the Helms-Burton Act and the customs duties on Spanish products being applied by the US.

The Spanish minister urged the Vice-President of the European Commission to start talks with the new US Administration, since the Helms-Burton Act prejudices Spanish trade and investment in Cuba, particularly the tourism sector, and also to call for the suspension of customs duties on Spanish products being applied by the US, which prejudice the export of olive oil, wine and table olives, among others.

“The restoration of mutual trust is clearly one of the key goals of our future trade policy. We need to identify the main areas of immediate action and base ourselves on mutual needs and common goals that we share in our respective foreign economic and trade policies. The resolution of our disputes would send out a message of confidence to the private sector, which is calling for a negotiated solution between the two parties”, stated the minister in her letter.

Reyes Maroto focused on four priorities in new trade relations between the EU and the US: the resolution of trade disputes; improved cooperation in areas of mutual interest for the future, fostering the highly necessary reform of the multilateral trade system and, finally, coordinating responses to avoid trade distortions while laying the foundations for resilient, fair and open international trade in the future.

Specifically, the minister referred in her letter to stepping up contacts for a negotiated, balanced and mutually beneficial solution to the civil aviation dispute (Airbus-Boeing), the customs duties on Spanish table olives, the tax on certain digital services and safeguard measures on steel and aluminium.

“Working on the suspension of the Helms-Burton Act is one of Spain’s main priorities, to which end we call to step up diplomatic contacts underway between the European Commission and the United States to suspend this Act, which is seriously affecting our trade and investment in Cuba, particularly regarding tourism, in which Spanish companies are market leaders”, concluded the minister.

Will Caterpillar And Deere Disclose Use Of Payment Terms And Financing For Exports To Cuba?

Reporting On Activity Is Important For Market Credibility 

As the Biden Administration compares what worked during the Obama Administration (2009-2017) and Trump Administration (2017-2021) with what did not work during the Obama Administration and Trump Administration, important during the review include commercial activities, specifically focusing upon those exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba for which payment terms and financing are permitted.

Critical for members of the United States Congress to have before them evidence demonstrating that when United States exporters are permitted to provide payment terms and financing, Republic of Cuba-based entities a) make use of the payment terms and financing and b) maintain the terms of all payment terms and financing. Meaning, the United States exporters are being paid on time as expected.

In 2015 and in 2016, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce expanded the list of products authorized for export from the United States and from third countries to the Republic of Cuba with a focus upon products (non-durable, durable and consumable) to entities not affiliated with the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

In 2017, Deere & Company (2019 revenues approximately US$39.26 billion) established a distribution center in the Republic of Cuba, joining San Juan, Puerto Rico-based RIMCO, the Republic of Cuba distributor for Peoria, Illinois-based Caterpillar Inc. (2019 revenues approximately US$53.8 billion) established the same year.  At the time, neither Deere & Company nor Caterpillar issued media releases or posted information on their respective Internet sites. 

Since November 2017, Deere & Company delivered more than US$800,000.00 in agricultural equipment to the Republic of Cuba for use at its distribution center. Antioch, Tennessee-based Wirtgen America, Inc., a subsidiary of Windhagen, Germany-based Wirtgen Group (2020 revenues approximately US$3 billion), a construction equipment machinery subsidiary (acquired in 2017) of Deere & Company has also delivered products to the Republic of Cuba.  RIMCO continues to deliver equipment for use at its distribution center in the Republic of Cuba, including excavators, backhoes, graders, scrapers, bulldozers, railway fixtures, and signaling equipment, valued at more than US$4 million since December 2018. 

John Deere Financial Services was to provide payment terms/financing for the exports, primarily Series 5000 (price range US$25,000.00 to US$80,000.00) with a limited quantity of Series 7000 (price range US$219,000.00 to US$280,000.00).  According to the company, several hundred tractors, parts and accessories may be exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba during the next four years, with the first deliveries (for testing and evaluation) scheduled for mid-November 2017.  The potential value of the several hundred products exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba that would be financed could range from US$9 million to US$30 million.   

John Deere Financial Services has not commented as to whether the product sales goals have been achieved or if there have been issues relating to the receipt of payments.   

Caterpillar has not disclosed if the company has provided payment terms for its products exported to the Republic of Cuba. 

Without the provision of substantial discounts in conjunction with extended payment terms and low-interest financing, United States companies remain at a competitive disadvantage as Republic of Cuba government-operated companies prefer government-to-government transactions and government-to-government financing agreements. 

For example, the governments of the People's Republic of China, Russian Federation, Japan, Belarus, France and India among others provide substantial long-term financing for durable product exports to the Republic of Cuba; and those financing agreements are almost always extended when repayment is problematic, which is often. 

Due to inaction by the Obama Administration throughout its two terms in office despite repeated requests from representatives of the United States business community, payments from the Republic of Cuba to Deere & Company and Caterpillar, payments for agricultural commodities and food products authorized by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, and payments for medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, and healthcare products authorized by the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) and were routed through financial institutions located in third countries rather than directly through the use of Direct Correspondent Banking (DCB).

"Biden administration to review Trump policy on Cuba: White House"

The White House
Washington DC
28 January 2021

Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki
James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

”Q And if I may ask one more on Cuba: Do you guys plan on starting -- walking back all of those restrictions that were put into place under the Trump administration after the Obama administration had opened things up with Cuba?”

”MS. PSAKI: Well, our Cuba policy is governed by two principles. First, support for democracy and human rights. That will be at the core of our efforts. Second is Americans, especially Cuban Americans, are the best ambassadors for freedom in Cuba. So we'll review the Trump administration policies, as we are in a number of other areas of national security, with an eye to assure -- ensuring that our approach is aligned with that. But, you know, we will take our own path. I don't I don't have anything to predict for you at this point in time.”

Thomson Reuters
London, United Kingdom
28 January 2021

Biden administration to review Trump policy on Cuba: White House

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Biden administration will review U.S. policy on Cuba, the White House said on Thursday, after former President Donald Trump tightened the U.S. trade embargo on the Communist-run island and returned Cuba to the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism.

“Our Cuba policy is governed by two principles. First, support for democracy and human rights - that will be at the core of our efforts. Second is Americans, especially Cuban Americans, are the best ambassadors for freedom in Cuba. so we’ll review the Trump administration policies,” White House press secretary Jen Psaki said at a news briefing.

One Week For Biden Administration And No Read-Out Of Calls By President, National Security Advisor Or Secretary Of State Mention Cuba Or Venezuela

Today marks the first week of the Biden Administration. 

During the last seven days, The White House and United States Department of State have published “read-outs” of individual telephone conversations between heads of state, heads of government, and foreign government leadership with The Honorable Joseph Biden, President of the United States, The Honorable Jake Sullivan, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, The Honorable Antony Blinken, United States Secretary of State. 

While unwise to extract too much fortune telling from the absence of Republic of Cuba and/or Venezuela from the official distribution about the telephone calls, insightful nonetheless. 

Was the Republic of Cuba and/or Venezuela referenced by the United States in any of the telephone calls, but the Biden Administration believed not of enough consequence to be mentioned in the read-outs?  And, the other party agreed?   

Was the Republic of Cuba and/or Venezuela mentioned by a head of state, head of government, and foreign government leadership, but the Biden Administration believed not of enough consequence to be mentioned in the read-outs?  And, the other party agreed?   

One thought… Neither the Republic of Cuba nor Venezuela are now amongst the most pressing issues for the Biden Administration. 

Is it deliberate?

UPDATE: On 29 January 2021, the United States Department of State reported Venezuela discussed during a telephone call by Secretary of State Blinken and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia.

UPDATE: On 1 February 2021, The White House reported Vice President Kamala Harris spoke with Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada. Neither the Republic of Cuba nor Venezuela was reported as discussed.

UPDATE: On 16 February 2021, the United States Department of State reported Venezuela discussed during a telephone call by Secretary of State Blinken and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain.

Baseball Diplomacy? An Opportunity For Re-Engagement With Cuba, Biden Administration May Be Open To Revised MLB Agreement

1 April 2021 is “Opening Day” for Major League Baseball (MLB).  With a new starting pitcher on The White House political mound, might there be an opportunity for the Biden Administration to revisit a 2018 proposal from New York, New York-based Major League Baseball (2019 revenues US$10.7 billion) which was publicly denounced and disapproved by the Trump Administration? 

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr., President of the United States, has been invited to throw the ceremonial first pitch on 1 April 2021 at the home opener of the Washington Nationals (NL East) versus New York Mets (NL East).  He will likely accept that invitation. President Biden is a known fan of the Philadelphia Phillies (NL East).

Then Joe Biden attended Archmere Academy in Claymont, Delaware, where he was an outfielder (reportedly batting in the latter half of the lineup) on the high school baseball team. 

On 19 December 2018, MLB reported an agreement with Republic of Cuba-based Federacion Cubana de Beisbol (FCB).  Terms of the agreement include payments to FCB.  LINK To Document    

Members of the United States Congress, the most notable being The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida), a member of the United States Senate, and officials of the Trump Administration expressed displeasure with the agreement.  

The Trump Administration denied authorization for the agreement because of payments to the FCB which the Trump Administration believed would ultimately benefit the government of the Republic of Cuba. LINK OFAC Letter To MLB. There were then and remain now options to revise the agreement and resubmit as a license application to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury in Washington DC. 

MLB should not as it did in 2018 retain a consultant, outside counsel or lobbyist to engage with the Biden Administration.  Doing so would be counterproductive as MLB can make its case in a license application to the OFAC.  Why create a triangle when a straight line is more efficient.  The direct approach is preferred.  The application will certainly be subject to an inter-agency review process including departments and agencies to determine if issuance of an OFAC license is “consistent with United States policy” so the decision will not be immediate. 

Options Include: 

First.  MLB believed the agreement was permitted under OFAC general license provisions implemented during the Obama Administration.  Those who opposed the agreement believed the agreement was not permissible within the OFAC general license guidelines; and, even if it was permitted during the Obama Administration, such an agreement should not be permitted during the Trump Administration as the agreement was “not consistent with United States policy.”  MLB should reformat the agreement and seek a two-year (which is normal) license from the OFAC.   

Second.  The MLB agreement was for two years (ending on 31 October 2021).  The annual release fee payments to FCB have been speculated to be from US$2 million to US$25 million to US$50 million to US$100 million.  The lower value estimates seem reasonable.  Instead of MLB making payment to FCB in currency, FCB would provide MLB with a shopping list of equipment equal to the value of the payments due.  This may satisfy those who opposed the agreement- because the government of the Republic of Cuba would not have access to currency.  By using the purchasing power of MLB, the FCB would be receiving the lowest pricing for equipment- thus maximizing the value of every payment.  Members of the United States Congress and Biden Administration could be supportive of an agreement that provides benefits to United States sporting “Made in the USA” equipment-focused companies.  

From The original MLB agreement: “The Release Fee owed to the FCB by the MLB Club that signs an FCB Player is calculated using the same formula embodied in MLB's agreements with the NPB, KBO, and CPBL (i.e., between 15% and 20% of the total guaranteed value for Major League contracts, and 25% of the signing bonus for Minor League contracts). In addition, Supplemental Release Fees may be owed if a contract with an FCB Player contains bonuses, escalators, or options that are later triggered. The Release Fee (and any Supplemental Release Fee) paid by the MLB Club is in addition to the compensation agreed to by the MLB Club to the FCB Player in the player's contract, which will be paid by the MLB Club directly to the FCB Player.”  

One important benefit of using product as payment rather than currency as payment is avoiding the use of a third-country financial institution for MLB to send payments to FCB; currently there are not operational direct correspondent banking agreements which would permit direct electronic transfers from the United States to the Republic of Cuba or from the Republic of Cuba to the United States.  Thus, third-country financial institutions receive fees for every transaction.  Members of the United States Congress and Biden Administration should oppose third-countries unnecessarily benefiting from bilateral commercial transactions involving the United States.   

Third.  MLB would agree to publish real-time data as to when a payment is made to FCB, the value of payment, and what products have been purchased with the payments.   

LINKS To Previous Posts: 

Cuba Lobbyist Works? President Trump To Participate In Oval Office Meeting With MLB To Discuss "Human Trafficking" 

OFAC Responds To Major League Baseball Proposal For Players From Cuba 

New OFAC Regulation Benefits MLB Players; Performers & Teachers Too 

MLB Commissioner Plays Golf With President Trump; Renewed Life For Cuba Agreement? Second-Base For Lobbyist? 

MLB Might Consider Three Options To Obtain Support For Agreement With Cuba 

Another Obama (Ben Rhodes) Administration Legacy Decision Harms Major League Baseball 

Some Parallels Between President Obama's Baseball and President Nixon's Ping Pong

Norwegian Cruise Line To Court: "any defendant sued under any statute with an element of scienter would lose its right to assert privilege by merely denying liability.”

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [1:19-cv-23591; Southern Florida District]

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)

LINK: Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd.’S Response In Opposition To Havana Docks Corporation’s Motion To Compel Evidence Withheld Under The Attorney-Client Privilege And Work-Product Doctrines (22 January 2021)

Excerpt (BOLD not added):

“In breathtakingly sweeping fashion, via the Motion Plaintiff seeks to do away with nearly all aspects of the attorney-client privilege and work-product protections in this case by arguing that although Plaintiff is the one who brought a claim under the Helms Burton Act, Norwegian has purportedly injected Norwegian’s corporate “state of mind” into the case by denying that it violated the Act. But Norwegian has not asserted a single position or defense that relies on Norwegian’s subjective understanding or interpretation of the law. It simply has denied, in a variety of ways, that it objectively violated the law. If, on this basis, the Court were to find that Norwegian impliedly waived privilege, the result would be catastrophic: any defendant sued under any statute with an element of scienter would lose its right to assert privilege by merely denying liability.”

LINK: Havana Docks’ Opposition To Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd.’S Motion To Compel (D.E. 127) The Production Of Documents Withheld On The Basis Of The Work-Product Doctrine That Pre-Date January 16, 2019 (22 January 2021)

LINK: Declaration Of Jerry Johnson (22 January 2021)

LINK: Document (22 January 2021)

LINK: Norwegian’s Second Amended Responses And Objections To Havana Docks Corporation’s First Set Of Interrogatories (22 January 2021)