Cuba Has 1.42% Shareholding In Hungary-Based International Investment Bank

International Investment Bank (IIB)
Republic of Cuba Governor Of IIB
Mrs. Marta Sabina Wilson Gonzalez
Minister-President
Central Bank of Cuba
Havana, Republic of Cuba

As of 1 August 2020, the Republic of Cuba had a 1.42% share (5.361 million Euros) of Budapest, Hungary-based International Investment Bank (IIB), “a multilateral development institution” crafted by Russian Federation-based interests, compared with 1.6% as of 31 December 2018, 1.7% as of 31 December 2017, 1.713% (5.4 million Euros) as of 31 December 2016, and 1.769% as of 31 December 2015.  The total paid-in capital of IIB was 313.1 million Euros as of 31 December 2016 compared with 748.7 million Euros as of 1 August 2020.  As of 1 August 2020, the Republic of Cuba represented 4% of the IIB net loan portfolio. 

LINKS
2020 Investor Presentation
2019 Annual Report (not available)
2018 Annual Report
2017 Annual Report
2016 Annual Report

From 2018 Annual Report 

Technical Assistance Fund (ongoing projects): The main purpose of the Technical Assistance Fund (TAF) is to finance the provision of advisory services and technical assistance on the projects financed, or to be financed by IIB within its mandate. The target countries include Mongolia, Vietnam and Cuba. 

Client: Proxenta Cuban Investments, a.s. Country: Cuba Project description: the goal of the project is to provide technical expertise including: (1) verifying the assumptions of the project preparation and implementation; (2) obtaining knowledge about the market conditions, legal environment, risks, and regulation in Cuba; and (3) developing relevant project documentation. The project started in October 2018 and is expected to be completed in February 2019.  Consultant: Ernst & Young, s.r.o. Budget: EUR 91,745.00 

As of 31 December 2018, the Republic of Cuba (Proxenta Cuban Investments, a.s.) owed the IIB approximately 49.4 million Euros, representing approximately 7% of IBB loans then outstanding. 

From 2016 Annual Report 

We expect a substantial impact from developing direct cooperation with Cuba.  In the past year, the IIB approved the first Cuban project- a loan to Banco International de Comercio SA (BICSA). The funds are to be used for financing imports to Cuba from IIB member states and joint ventures between the Republic and companies from IIB member states. 

At the business forum Supporting Economic Growth in Hungary and the CEE Region, held during the 105th Meeting of the IIB Council in Budapest, the IIB and the Central Bank of Cuba signed the Agreement on Cooperation in the Arrangement of Financing providing for guarantees to be issued by the Central Bank of Cuba for IIB’s projects and programs in Cuba. In this context, the IIB ap­proved its first Cuban project, as part of a two-tier financing structure. The bor­rower, Banco International de Comercio SA (BICSA), will receive EUR 30 million for the purpose of financing imports to Cuba from IIB member states and support to joint ventures between Cuba and IIB member states.  

The deal with Sberbank CZ, A.S. (funding Czech exports to Cuba) became the pilot project within the country limit for Cuba as established by the Bank: IIB took over the risks from Cuba’s BICSA, by whose instruction an irrevocable reimbursement undertaking. 

As of 31 December 2016, IIB has Term deposits (amounts due to IIB) with the National Bank of the Republic of Cuba without credit rating of 34,967 Euros less an allowance for impairment of 34,967 Euros. 

Who Is The IIB 

What is IIB? International Investment Bank (IIB) is a multilateral development institution with headquarters in Budapest, Hungary.  It was established in 1970 and operates as an international organisation based on the intergovernmental Agreement Establishing the International Investment Bank dated 10 June 1970, registered with the United Nations Secretariat on 1 December 1971 under number 11417, as amended and restated from time to time.  The IIB’s mission is to facilitate connectivity and integration between the economies of the Bank’s member states in order to ensure sustainable and inclusive growth and the competitiveness of national economies, backed by the existing historical ties.  IIB specialises in medium- and long-term financing of projects aimed at supporting the economies of its members that would have a significant positive social, economic and environmental impact.  The Bank offers direct financing and provides loans in partnership with other financial institutions as well as through partner banks. 

Who are members of IIB?  The following countries are the Bank’s members: the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Cuba, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 

In which countries does IIB operate?  IIB operates in its member states and can also finance projects in other countries, if the implementation of such projects would have a significant positive impact on the Bank’s members. 

How does IIB differ from a commercial bank?  IIB is an international financial organisation. Its goal is to promote the economic development of the member states, develop export and import operations, and stimulate trade and economic ties between them. Unlike commercial banks, making profit is not the Bank’s main priority.  As an international organisation, the Bank is not subject to national banking and other regulations; it enjoys immunities and privileges and inter alia is exempt from paying taxes on the territories of its member states. The IIB’s activities are regulated by the Bank’s statutory documents, namely, the Agreement Establishing the International Investment Bank dated 10 June 1970, registered with the United Nations Secretariat on 1 December 1971 under number 11417, as amended and restated from time to time, together with the Bank’s Charter, which is an integral part of the Agreement, that constitutes an international treaty, bilateral agreements between the Bank and the member states, applicable international law, as well as other regulatory documents of the Bank. 

Where is IIB located?  The IIB’s headquarters is located in Budapest, Hungary. IIB has a branch in the Russian Federation, in Moscow. 

Who is the head of IIB?  The Chairperson of the Management Board, Mr Nikolay Kosov, has managed IIB since 2012. 

Who can become a member of IIB?  A distinguishing characteristic of IIB as an international organisation is its supranational status. The Bank has members from Asia, Europe and Latin America. International financial institutions from other countries that share the IIB’s aims and operating principles and assume the obligations arising out of the Agreement Establishing the IIB may be accepted as members of the Bank.  New members of the Bank shall be accepted upon a resolution of the Board of Governors. 

Are there other forms of participation in the activities of IIB?  States, international financial institutions, banking, economic and financial organisations and funds that share the IIB’s mission, aims, values and objectives may participate in the IIB’s activities as an associate member, associate partner or observer. 

Management structure of IIB  The Board of Governors is the Bank’s supreme collective governing body, consisting of representatives from the IIB’s member states. The Board of Directors is responsible for the general management of the Bank. The Bank’s executive body is the Management Board, whose members are appointed by the Board of Governors. The Bank’s activities are controlled by the Audit Committee, which is made up of representatives from the IIB’s member states appointed by the Board of Governors. The Bank’s financial statements are confirmed by a half-year compliance audit review and an annual audit conducted by international auditors EY. 

What are the advantages of working with IIB?  The Bank’s intergovernmental status and solid support from the public authorities of the member states; Wide geographical presence: IIB operates in EU countries and the Asian market; A tailor-made approach to deals and projects, considering regional specifics as well as integration projects between the member states; Flexibility in terms of financing terms and conditions; Priority participation in implementation of the Bank’s projects. 

How to apply for IIB financing?  Customer Relations Department; Tel.: + 36 1 727 89 11, +7 495 604 7416, e-mail: credit@iibbank.com 

Who can become a client of IIB?  Corporate clients and financial organisations that share the IIB’s principles and priorities and that meet the IIB’s general requirements and financial criteria, including: corporate clients, whose activities provide added value and ensure sustainable development of the member states, and who are implementing investment projects on the territories of the member states; international financial institutions; national development banks; banks with state ownership and /or ownership by national and international development banks; commercial banks focused on financing key areas of the economy in the member states and which are leading players in regional markets; leasing companies that lease products to key sectors of the economy in the member states; funds whose activities comply with the IIB’s principles and priorities. 

Which projects does IIB not finance?  Projects that do not promote the sustainable development of the IIB’s member states; Projects that do not comply with the Bank’s strategy, mission and priorities or that involve illegal practices. 

What is the IIB’s policy regarding corporate social responsibility?  IIB is guided by the principles of corporate social responsibility (CSR), which enable the Bank to effectively respond to the challenges of an international development institution. By giving priority to the financing of socially oriented, energy- and resource-efficient projects, IIB is pursuing the goals of sustainable development. This serves the national interests of the member states and promotes a high quality of life for their citizens. The Bank’s activities are aimed at helping to improve the environment and mitigate the impact of climate change.  The Bank’s aims, objectives and priority areas are determined by the Corporate Social Responsibility Policy, approved by the IIB Management Board. 

How to report corruption, fraud or other offenses?  The Bank operates in accordance with the international compliance standards (FATF, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, OECD).  According to the Procedure for Receiving and Handling Complaints in IIB, any person can contact IIB to report suspected or actual offenses associated with the activities of IIB. Such reports may concern corruption, fraud and money laundering by IIB or by its employees and counterparties.  Complaints can be sent to IIB through the following channels: By post to IIB marked “for the attention of the Compliance Department”; By email to compliance@iibbank.com; Using the online form Report abuse. 

Who regulates the Bank’s activities and which standards does it observe?  The Bank’s operations shall be governed by the Agreement Establishing the IIB, bilateral agreements between the Bank and the member states, as well as applicable international law. In accordance with Article 12 of the Agreement Establishing the International Investment Bank dated 10 July 1970, registered with the United Nations Secretariat on 1 December 1971 under number 11417, as amended and restated from time to time, the Bank’s activities are regulated by the above Agreement and the Bank’s Charter, which is an integral part of the Agreement, as well as other regulatory documents of the Bank. Based on the supranational nature of its legal personality, the Bank adheres to universally accepted principles and standards of international law. 

IIB top management held a working meeting with representatives of the international audit and consulting company EY (22 May 2019)  

On May 21, 2019, IIB top management held a working meeting with representatives of the international audit and consulting company EY, which was appointed as the Bank's auditor as a result of an international tender procedure. The company presented managers of EY Hungary, who will carry out ongoing cooperation with IIB after the relocation of the Bank’s headquarters from Moscow to Budapest. 

The IIB Chairperson of the Management Board Nikolay Kosov addressed the audience with a welcoming speech. He briefly described the progress of the implementation of the IIB “Growth Strategy” for 2018-2022, stressing that the Bank shows impressive performance in all key areas of activity and is developing ahead of plans agreed by the member states. Deputy Chairpersons of the Management Board also made brief presentations on the areas of their responsibility, presenting heads of key departments.  EY auditors gave a high assessment to the reform and current performance of International Investment Bank, emphasizing the long-term positive effect of the decision of the member states to relocate IIB headquarters to Europe. The parties noted with satisfaction the high level and effectiveness of joint work and expressed confidence in further fruitful cooperation between IIB and EY. 

High-level dialogue with Cuba (6 November 2018)  

As part of the official visit to the Russian Federation the Chairman of the State Council and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, Miguel Mario Díaz-Canel-Bermudes and key members of the Council of Ministers held a business meeting with leaders of major companies and financial institutions that implement strategic projects in Cuba. International Investment Bank (IIB) was represented by the Acting Chairman of the Management Board Georgy Potapov. 

Addressing the audience, Mr. Mikel Mario Díaz-Canel-Bermudez noted the great importance the country gives to attracting investment to local economy, stressed the fundamental role of foreign, in particular, Russian business participation in the context of a modernization program of the country's economic system aimed at further increase of its industrial and financial potential. 

Mr. Potapov in his speech expressed appreciation for the support provided to IIB, both in the search for new and in the implementation of projects already funded by the Bank in Cuba.  “IIB remains the only multilateral development bank with Cuba as a shareholder, which currently supports the country's economy through providing funds to Cuban financial institutions,” Georgy Potapov said, “the trade finance portfolio aimed at assistance of Cuban exports already exceeds 21 million euros, and is constantly growing. At present, IIB is considering its participation in several significant initiatives in the country, including major infrastructure projects.” 

IIB Acting Chairman of the Management Board also noted that in December this year, Cuba would host the inaugural meeting of the IIB Board of Governors, the first one since ratification of the new version of the Bank’s statutory documents, where strategically important decisions for IIB’s further development will be made.  In the framework of the dialogue, the participants of the meeting discussed a wide range of issues related to further expansion of economic interaction of Cuban enterprises with the leaders of Russian and international business, outlined specific steps for their practical implementation. 

Cuban direction: IIB charts route on location (3 November 2017)  

The implementation of projects involving Cuban companies and building of a potential for investment activity of the International Investment Bank (IIB) in Cuba was the main topic during the IIB’s working visit to Havana that took place on October 30 – November 2, 2017.  

The Bank’s delegation held a series of meetings and negotiations with high-ranking representatives of the Cuban government, and also with the CEOs of major Cuban banks, financial institutions, and investors from the IIB member states.  

The IIB granted credit facilities to leading Cuban banks this year, including the Banco Exterior de Cuba (BEC) and Banco Internacional de Comercio S.A. (BICSA), worth EUR 20 million and 30 million, respectively.During the visit, the BICSA President Mr. José Lázaro Alari Martínez and chief investment officer of BEC, Mrs. Elvia Graveran Pacheco, welcomed the IIB delegation and discussed ways how to promote cooperation. The parties discussed the implementation of previous deals with a view of expanding portfolio of export-import transactions between the IIB member states and Cuba, as well as setting up and funding joint ventures. During the negotiations, a number of technical issues were also examined, including those relevant to current and future lending cooperation.  

The meeting between the head of the IIB delegation, Deputy Chairman of the Board Denis Ivanov and Vice President of the Council of Ministers of Cuba, Mr. Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz, was used to explore the possibility of investment support for the construction, energy and processing sectors of the national economy. The meeting touched upon the implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects on the island, and further steps in lending to the banking sector.Mr Ruíz stressed that Cuba is interested in more active use of the IIB resources, including the funding of strategic and priority projects as part of the Programme of Socio-Economic Development of Cuba until 2030. He noted the importance of increased funding for foreign trade operations and development projects involving Cuban companies.  The Bank’s representatives also held negotiations with the Vice-President of the Central Bank of Cuba and head of the Cuban delegation to the IIB Council, Mr. Arnaldo Alayón Bazo.Business issues under current agreements were also discussed, as well as the outlook for future development of the entire range of mutually beneficial cooperation.  

As follow up of the visit additional information was requested for the investment support of a number of projects submitted to the IIB by the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba to the Russian Federation. The Bank expressed its interest in the construction project looking forward to expand the Havana Airport. The conditions were clarified for the formation of a joint venture by the Slovak company Proxenta with the Cuban government on producing confectionery products. Under this venture, the Slovak party would be keen to receive the IIB funding.   As part of the visit, the IIB also participated in events related to the 35th Havana International Fair (FIHAV 2017), which was attended by the investors from the IIB member states and which turned out to be a great success. 

Government delegation of the Republic of Cuba visited headquarters of the IIB (13 July 2017)  

On July 12, 2017, the delegation of the Republic of Cuba, led by the Minister of Construction, Mr. René Mesa Villafaña, payed a working visit to the headquarters of the International Investment Bank (IIB). During the meeting, the members of the IIB Board discussed with the Cuban partners a wide range of issues concerning the investment cooperation and the comprehensive expansion of the Cuban direction of the Bank’s activities. 

The delegation also included the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Cuba to the Russian Federation, Mr. Emilio Lozada Garcia, the Head of the Secretariat of the Minister, Mr. Ariel Pérez Ruiz, and other Cuban officials.  The parties discussed both the existing opportunities for the IIB to promote the sustainable development of the Cuban economy and economic cooperation of the member states, and the specific options to support the institution’s activities by its shareholders in the context of the Bank's Development Strategy for the period 2018-2022. 

The Deputy Chairman of the IIB Board, Jozef Kollár, presented an overview of the Bank's existing projects, related to Cuba, including under the Trade Finance Support Programme, and highlighted the activities of the Fund for Technical Support, managed by the IIB. He noted the importance to finance the programmes and to support the export-import operations that promote economic cooperation between the Republic of Cuba and other member states of the Bank. 

Whereas, Mr. René Mesa Villafaña, stressed Cuba's interest to attract foreign capital and marked a number of development projects for investments at the territory of the island. The Minister expressed hope for their implementation with the active use of resources provided by the IIB. 

During the past several years, the Cuban direction of the Bank’s activities has seen substantial positive developments. The Bank is the only multilateral development institution with Cuba as a member and effectively carries the status of a special creditor for the Republic. In 2016, the IIB signing of Memoranda on Cooperation with leading Cuban banks – Banco Exterior de Cuba (BEC) and Banco Internacional de Comercio S.A. (BICSA) and the Agreement on Cooperation the IIB and the Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of Cuba; and the pipeline includes a number of future deals.   

EUR 50 million in credit lines anticipated after signing of documents at IIB Day in Cuba (7 November 2016)  

On November 3, 2016, at the so-called IIB Day during the Havana International Fair, Deputy Chairman of the IIB Board, Vladimir Liventsev, gave a detailed presentation of the financial instruments of the Bank for supporting sustainable development projects in the country, emphasizing export/import and financing of SPVs set up jointly with companies from other IIB member states. In contrast with the past four years, when the renewed Bank supported the Cuban economy only indirectly, by financing its trade partners in the total amount of around EUR 50 million, today the IIB is ready to work directly on the Caribbean’s largest island. 

As a testimony, the event included the signing of Memoranda on Cooperation with leading Cuban banks – Banco Exterior de Cuba (BEC) and Banco Internacional de Comercio S.A. (BICSA), represented by their presidents, Manuel A. Vale Marrero and José Lázaro Alari Martínez. The subject of these documents is the support for, on one hand, Cuba’s trade with other member countries of the Bank and, on the other hand, development of joint ventures with foreign investors. Even more importantly, these memoranda shall bring a practical result already in the near future in the form of the anticipated signing of agreements, under which the IIB will provide BEC (EUR 20m) and BICSA (EUR 30m) with credit lines for a total of EUR 50 million. 

In addition, institutionalising relations between the IIB and the Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of Cuba, which provided significant support to the Bank in organising the IIB Day, on November 4 the parties concluded an Agreement on Cooperation to further develop their partnership and exchange of information between them with the aim of expanding collaboration in the area of trade and investments. 

Thus, the Cuban direction of the Bank’s activities has seen substantial positive developments during the past several years, on the background of geopolitical shifts around the island country. Today, the IIB as the only multilateral development institution with Cuba as a member effectively carries the status of a special creditor for the Republic, as confirmed by the Agreement on Cooperation in Organising Financing, signed between the IIB and the Central Bank of Cuba in June this year and guaranteeing the Bank’s activities on the island. 

IIB signs cooperation agreement with Central Bank of Cuba, confirming its status as a global development institution (24 June 2016)  

The International Investment Bank (IIB) and the Central Bank of Cuba (CBC) today signed the Agreement on Cooperation in Organising Financing. The document confirms a special status of the IIB as a global development finance institution represented on three continents and the only multilateral development bank with Cuba as a full member. The signing ceremony took place during the Business Forum “Supporting Economic Growth in Hungary and the CEE Region”, associated with the 105th IIB Council Meeting in Budapest. 

Under the terms of the Agreement, parties aim to support and contribute to economic and social development, as well as to improve the efficiency and the level of participation in projects and sectors that are of interest for the Republic of Cuba. The CBC guarantees the due and timely payment of financing, which is organised and implemented by the IIB in relation to projects and programmes in the country, in accordance with the Agreement Establishing the IIB and its Charter and their amended versions.  The parties agree to hold consultations and to exchange information in order to meet the Agreement’s aims. In addition, the CBC will assist the IIB in setting up bank accounts in authorised currencies within the Republic’s national banking system. 

The Agreement was concluded for a period of 5 years with the possibility of automatic renewal for a further five-year period. It is also important that, in respect of projects, implementation of which starts before the termination of this Agreement, its terms will remain in force until their completion.  “Given that the Agreement in fact confirms IIB’s status as a special lender for Cuba, as well as more than significant economic potential of the country with regard to foreign investments, the IIB may soon become an important investment channel to the Republic for its member countries, and, potentially, for non-member countries and other development institutions," – commented Chairman of the IIB Board, Nikolay Kosov, on the signing of the Agreement. He added that additional opportunities for potential investors and historical partners of Cuba stem from the ongoing legislative changes in the country in relation to foreign capital under the Conceptualisation of Cuba’s socio-economic model and the National development plan until 2030, as well as from the implementation of Act 118 of 2014 on foreign investments. 

The Agreement further confirms the intensification of the Cuban direction in IIB’s activities, which was relaunched in 2013 after the restructuring of Cuba's debt towards the Bank and the decision by the Cuban Government to remain among shareholders of the institution. In May 2014, the Cuban capital, Havana, hosted the 101st Meeting of the IIB Council, which was the first meeting of the Bank's highest governing body in its modern history on the American continent. At the Havana meeting, a crucial decision was adopted to make fundamental amendments to the statutory documents of the Bank for the first time since the foundation of the institution in 1970.

Twelve Days Later, The Designation Of Cuba As A State Sponsor Of Terrorism Is Published In The Federal Register

Federal Register
Washington DC
22 January 2020
4:24 am (EST)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice: 11332] Republic of Cuba Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) In accordance with section 6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), and as continued in effect by Executive Order 13222 of August 17,2001, section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 87–195, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2371(c)), and section 40(f) of the Arms Export Control Act, Public Law 90–629, as amended (22U.S.C. 2780(f), I hereby determine that the Republic of Cuba has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. This notice shall be published in the Federal Register. Dated: January 12, 2021. Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State. [FR Doc. 2021–01416 Filed 1–21–21; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4710–AD–P

LINK To Federal Register Notification

On 11 January 2021, the United States Department of State returned the Republic of Cuba to the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

Such designation would suggest an issue of significance and be important for the United States Department of State to publish changes, publish filings, and most critically make certain information is timely and accurate…

On 15 January 2021, the United States Department of State revised on its Internet site the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism to include the Republic of Cuba. LINK

As of 16 January 2021, the United States Federal Register did not show a new filing relating to including the Republic of Cuba on the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

NOTE: On 14 January 2021, an on-the-record statement was requested from the United States Department of State. The question was what, if any notification was made by the United States Department of State to the United States Congress prior to designating the Republic of Cuba on the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Despite repeated multi-day attempts, the United States Department of State would only provide off-the-record statements.

From The United States Department Of State

“Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated pursuant to three laws: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. Taken together, the four main categories of sanctions resulting from designation under these authorities include restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of dual use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions. 

Designation under the above-referenced authorities also implicates other sanctions laws that penalize persons and countries engaging in certain trade with state sponsors. Currently there are three countries designated under these authorities:  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) on 20 November 2017; Islamic Republic of Iran on 19 January 1984; Syrian Arab Republic on 29 December 1979.”

U.S. Announces Designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism
Press Statement
Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State
January 11, 2021

The State Department has designated Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism for repeatedly providing support for acts of international terrorism in granting safe harbor to terrorists.

The Trump Administration has been focused from the start on denying the Castro regime the resources it uses to oppress its people at home, and countering its malign interference in Venezuela and the rest of the Western Hemisphere.

With this action, we will once again hold Cuba’s government accountable and send a clear message: the Castro regime must end its support for international terrorism and subversion of U.S. justice.

For decades, the Cuban government has fed, housed, and provided medical care for murderers, bombmakers, and hijackers, while many Cubans go hungry, homeless, and without basic medicine.  Members of the National Liberation Army (ELN), a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, traveled to Havana to conduct peace talks with the Colombian government in 2017.  Citing peace negotiation protocols, Cuba has refused Colombia’s requests to extradite ten ELN leaders living in Havana after the group claimed responsibility for the January 2019 bombing of a Bogota police academy that killed 22 people and injured more than 87 others.

Cuba also harbors several U.S. fugitives from justice wanted on or convicted of charges of political violence, many of whom have resided in Cuba for decades.  For example, the Cuban regime has refused to return Joanne Chesimard, on the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists List for executing New Jersey State Trooper Werner Foerster in 1973; Ishmael LaBeet, convicted of killing eight people in the U.S. Virgin Islands in 1972; Charles Lee Hill, charged with killing New Mexico state policeman Robert Rosenbloom in 1971; and others.

Cuba returns to the SST list following its broken commitment to stop supporting terrorism as a condition of its removal by the previous administration in 2015.  On May 13, 2020, the State Department notified Congress that it had certified Cuba under Section 40A(a) of the Arms Export Control Act as “not cooperating fully” with U.S. counterterrorism efforts in 2019.

In addition to the support for international terrorism that is the basis for today’s action, the Cuban regime engages in a range of malign behavior across the region.  The Cuban intelligence and security apparatus has infiltrated Venezuela’s security and military forces, assisting Nicholas Maduro to maintain his stranglehold over his people while allowing terrorist organizations to operate.  The Cuban government’s support for FARC dissidents and the ELN continues beyond Cuba’s borders as well, and the regime’s support of Maduro has created a permissive environment for international terrorists to live and thrive within Venezuela.

Today’s designation subjects Cuba to sanctions that penalize persons and countries engaging in certain trade with Cuba, restricts U.S. foreign assistance, bans defense exports and sales, and imposes certain controls on exports of dual use items.

The United States will continue to support the Cuban people in their desire for a democratic government and respect for human rights, including freedom of religion, expression, and association.  Until these rights and freedoms are respected, we will continue to hold the regime accountable.

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On Background From Biden Administration: What To Expect For Cuba & Message To U.S. Companies

On Background comments about the Republic of Cuba from two senior-level officials of the Biden Administration foreign policy and national security offices:

“Venezuela is a priority and there will be a connection between what Cuba does to assist regional interests with a just resolution for the Venezuelan people and how we [Biden Administration] can engage with Cuba.” 

“Our approach to Venezuela and Cuba will seek to be based upon communication rather than isolation.” 

“Removal of Cuba from the Terrorism List [List of State Sponsors of Terrorism] will be reviewed in consultation with [the United States] Congress.” 

“The Biden Administration will not be rescuing Cuba from problems of its own making.  Then Vice President Biden’s beliefs while serving in the Obama Administration and later as a candidate, president-elect and now as president is about creating democracy where it may not exist and supporting democracy where it may be fragile and basing engagement upon a government respecting the human rights of its citizens.”   

“We don’t anticipate decisions to enhance the role of the Cuban government in supporting their tourism sector.  We are focused upon helping the Cuban people.” 

“The President will have announcements to make, but I remind there is a commitment and necessity to work closely with both sides of the aisles of [the United States] Congress.” 

“The role of the military in Cuba’s economy will remain a challenge for us as it did for the Trump Administration.  We do not discount the negative impact upon the Cuban people.  We appreciate the realities- the goal will be to promote change.” 

“There have been no decisions regarding Helms-Burton.  The EU [European Union] has for many years opposed the law.  We also recognize the importance of resolving the claims [corrected to reference certified claims].  Hopefully, we can work with the EU and other countries to find a solution that protects the rights of those who had properties expropriated by Cuba.” 

Background: The Trump Administration on 2 May 2019 made operational Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act” and “Helms-Burton”).  Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.    

“Yes, negotiating a resolution of the [certified] claims are a priority.”  

“And, yes, we are cognizant of what the Obama Administration did and did not do relating to [certified] claims.”  

“Given the sensitivity with members of [the United States] Congress about issues that include Cuba, unhelpful for U.S. companies to publicly now discuss changes to Trump [Administration] policies or returning to Obama [Administration] policies.”

Thomson Reuters
London, United Kingdom
19 January 2021

Mr. Rajesh K. Agrawal
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
Western Union Company (2019 revenues US$5.3 billion)
Denver, Colorado

“We’re hopeful that, putting aside any concerns that there may be from the administration standpoint, that they allow us to move the money for people who want to move money to their loved ones.”

Carnival Corporation & plc
Q4 Earnings Call
11 January 2021

James Hardiman
Managing Director- Leisure and Travel Analyst
Wedbush Securities
Beachwood, Ohio

“… And obviously, what was a nice benefit for you guys during the Obama administration was the availability of Cuba. Have you had any conversations on that front? It seems like it could be maybe an opportunity going forward.”

Mr. Arnold W. Arnold
President and Chief Executive Officer
Carnival Corporation & plc (2019 revenues US$20.83 billion)
Miami, Florida

”… With regard to other matters, obviously, Cuba was a focal point for the Obama administration, opening up Cuba, etc. We'll see what happens with the incoming administration. We obviously will be well prepared. We were very actively with the first ones to sail to Cuba. And we'll be well prepared to be able to operate in whatever -- the guidelines and rules and regulations are. But we'll be prepared to again help people really want to go to Cuba see as the best way we feel, which is arriving via cruise and then experiencing what Cuba has to offer when it opens.”

The Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
23 November 2020

Excerpts:

Rubio’s office wouldn’t answer questions Monday about the senator’s position on Blinken’s nomination. But Rubio, who is Cuban American, was plenty critical of Blinken’s answers in 2014 when Rubio pressed him during a confirmation hearing on whether Obama would “unilaterally” move to lift sanctions on Cuba.

“Anything that might be done in Cuba would have to be consistent with the law,” Blinken, at the time Obama’s deputy national security adviser, said while appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “And second, anything that in the future that might be done in Cuba would be done in real consultation” with the committee.

A few weeks later, Blinken was confirmed by the Senate as deputy secretary of state. And the very next day, Obama announced that he’d ordered the State Department to establish an embassy in Havana for the first time in more than a half-century. He also moved to ease restrictions on travel, remittances and commerce on the island. When Blinken appeared before the foreign relations committee again in 2015, Rubio reminded him of his commitment, reading aloud Blinken’s previous statement on Cuba.

“I did not live up to the standard I set during that hearing and in the remarks that you just quoted. I think that I could have done a better job in engaging with you and consulting with you in advance,” Blinken told Rubio. “And I regret that.”

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What Did U.S. Secretary Of State-Designate Antony Blinken Say About Cuba During His Confirmation Hearing? "Objectives... Makes Very Good Sense To Me"

Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington DC
19 January 2021


The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida)
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues of the Committee on Foreign Relations


As you are well aware in Cuba there is a very small, but not real large or substantial, small private businesses. The bulk of the economic activity in that country is controlled by a holding company named GAESA [Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A.] which controls basically anything that makes money.

And they actually, anytime they figure out something that might make money they pull it in. GAESA is controlled by the Cuban military and military officials. And the current administration, the Trump Administration, put in place a policy that prohibits financial transactions with any of those companies that are controlled by that holding company owned by the Cuban military.

So, theoretically if the Cuban Government would allow it you could, an independent Cuban could open a restaurant, a hotel, a business and do interact and have transactions, but not a company controlled by the Cuban military as identified through that holding company. Is that a policy you would recommend to the Biden Administration that we keep or not?

The Honorable Antony Blinken (D- New York)
Nominee
United States Secretary of State


Senator, I would propose to review that very very quickly. In terms of the objectives that you cite, that makes very good sense to me.

I think the question is and I don’t know enough to form a full judgement is to whether it is in fact achieving those objectives and are there any other costs or consequences we might want to look at. But, the, certainly, the objectives strike me as exactly the right one.

I would welcome an opportunity if confirmed to talk to you about that and by the way about our approach to Cuba more broadly.

Senator Rubio

On the issue of as a matter of theory, because obviously the Cuban Government can control, we can open-up whatever we want to them, but the Cuban Government controls what they allow and what they don’t allow.

So, as an example, if an individual Cuban decided to borrow money from a relative in the United States and open-up a business, they could do so under existing [United States] law potentially depending on how the transaction was structured, but the Cuban Government wouldn’t allow it, in fact they’ve cracked-down on that.

So, I think we could agree, could we not, that to the extent that it involves economic independence for Cubans, individuals or companies that they’re allowed to start, that’s one thing, but when it comes to these entities that are not state-controlled entities, there’re oligarchs that control it basically one individual largely because they want to be not just politically a totalitarian state but an economic totalitarian state that it would further the national interest of the United States to encourage more economic independence for the individual and less dependence on the state that gives them all this leverage over them?

So, I do sincerely hope that just because these were Trump [Administration] policies and I’m not claiming that’s what you’re saying, that we just don’t throw the whole thing out and say let’s go back to the Obama [Administration] policy that even some of the architects of it have since conceded could have been structured a little differently because they were unilateral and didn’t lead to some of results we thought.

I do think as you carefully review many of the steps that have been taken there is a logic and rationale behind each of them that I hope will be taken into account. I think it serves our national interest to do so.

The Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
23 November 2020

Excerpts:

Rubio’s office wouldn’t answer questions Monday about the senator’s position on Blinken’s nomination. But Rubio, who is Cuban American, was plenty critical of Blinken’s answers in 2014 when Rubio pressed him during a confirmation hearing on whether Obama would “unilaterally” move to lift sanctions on Cuba.

“Anything that might be done in Cuba would have to be consistent with the law,” Blinken, at the time Obama’s deputy national security adviser, said while appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “And second, anything that in the future that might be done in Cuba would be done in real consultation” with the committee.

A few weeks later, Blinken was confirmed by the Senate as deputy secretary of state. And the very next day, Obama announced that he’d ordered the State Department to establish an embassy in Havana for the first time in more than a half-century. He also moved to ease restrictions on travel, remittances and commerce on the island. When Blinken appeared before the foreign relations committee again in 2015, Rubio reminded him of his commitment, reading aloud Blinken’s previous statement on Cuba.

“I did not live up to the standard I set during that hearing and in the remarks that you just quoted. I think that I could have done a better job in engaging with you and consulting with you in advance,” Blinken told Rubio. “And I regret that.”

Background

The Trump Administration issued a 9 November 2017 deadline for United States companies to execute agreements with Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba-controlled Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), which has interests in the tourism, financial investment, import/export, and remittance sectors.  Agreements executed by 9 November 2017 would be permitted to remain in force.  

GAESA is on the State Department’s List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (“Cuba Restricted List” or “CRL”).  The CRL is a list of entities and subentities “under the control of, or acting for or on behalf of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba.” 

GAESA is on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons by the OFAC pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), 31 C.F.R. part 515. 

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What Is The Process For Removing Cuba From The List Of State Sponsors Of Terrorism?

In 1987, the Export Administration Act (EAA) included the requirement for an annual list of state sponsors of terrorism by the United States Department of State (U.S. Code, Title 22, Sec. 2656f). 

From Congressional Research Service (CRS): “In December 2014, the President announced he would proceed over the coming months to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cuba and ease those diplomatic and economic restrictions he could, while anticipating Congress could engage in a review of sanctions codified in permanent law. At the same time, the President announced that the State Department had begun a review of Cuba’s designation on the state sponsors of terrorism list.  On April 14, 2015, the President sent a message to Congress to certify that “the Government of Cuba has not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding 6-month period; and ... has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.” This met the requirements of the statutes that form the terrorist lists; Cuba’s designation was removed on the 45th calendar day following the announcement (May 29, 2015), as the laws provide.” 

“Removal from the Lists: Statutory Requirements.  Each of the three statutes has some unique aspects to its construction, but all three have in common two possible paths for removing a foreign government from designation. The first possible option is that the President certifies and reports to Congress that(i) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the government of the country concerned;(ii) that government is not supporting acts of international terrorism; and iii) that government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.  In the case of the ECA, the President notifies the Speaker of the House, Chairpersons of the House Committees on Foreign Affairs, and on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and Chairpersons of the Senate Committees on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and on Foreign Relations that such changes have occurred.  The FAA’61 and AECA require the President to notify only the Speaker and the Foreign Relations Committee Chairperson. The second possible option the statutes offer is that the President, 45 days before a rescission takes effect, certifies to congressional leadership (as identified in the first option) that(i) the government concerned has not provided any support for acts of international terrorism during the preceding 6-month period; and(ii) the government concerned has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.  There is no reporting requirement to notify Congress that the clock has started ticking on the six-month period of changed behavior of the designated government. In past instances of delisting a foreign government, the Secretary of State has published a notice that the designation is under review, but the law does not require this advance notice beyond the 45-day requirement prior to issuing a rescission.”

Congressional Research Service (CRS) 

State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism- Legislative Parameters: In Brief (30 November 2018) 

State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism- Legislative Parameters: In Brief (19 November 2015) 

Can Creditors Enforce Terrorism Judgements Against Cuba"? (29 September 2015)

Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism (8 August 2008) 

Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List (22 August 2006) 

Baker & McKenzie
Chicago, Illinois
12 January 2020

“On January 11, 2021, the US State Department published a press release announcing Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (“SST”) for allegedly providing support for acts of international terrorism in granting safe harbor to terrorists. Cuba was originally designated as an SST in 1982 but was delisted in 2015 by President Barack Obama. 

Legal Implications of the SST Designation  

Cuba’s SST designation triggers the following sanctions and restrictions: 

A licensing requirement for exports or reexports of goods or technology that could significantly enhance Cuba’s military capability or ability to support terrorism; 

A prohibition on exports and reexports to Cuba of defense articles and defense services and related technology under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations; 

A requirement for the United States to oppose loans to Cuba by the World Bank and other international financial institutions; 

A prohibition on any assistance to Cuba under the Food for Peace, Peace Corps, and Export-Import Bank programs; 

A prohibition on US Persons (i.e., entities organized under US laws and their non-US branches; individuals and entities physically located in the United States; and US citizens and permanent resident aliens, wherever located or employed) from engaging in financial transactions with the Cuban government without a license from the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, under the Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations; and 

An exception to sovereign immunity that would allow individual US Persons to bring claims against the Cuban government in US courts for personal injury and death resulting from terrorism or material support for terrorism. 

The legal implications of Cuba’s SST designation are likely to be limited. Many of the above activities have remained prohibited by US sanctions or export controls even after Cuba was delisted as an SST in 2015. For example, an SST designation normally triggers a change under the Export Administration Regulations to claim US jurisdiction over non-US items that incorporate more than 10% controlled US content rather than the 25% de minimis threshold used for most other countries. However, the Trump Administration imposed the 10% de minimis threshold on Cuba in October 2019 (see here) even though Cuba was not then an SST.

Cuba’s SST designation may lead to increased scrutiny for US-listed companies if they engage in dealings with Cuba. Specifically, the Office of Global Security Risk (“OGSR”) within the US Securities and Exchange Commission may periodically request information from US-listed companies regarding material dealings with SST countries if such dealings have not been previously disclosed in a company’s regular annual and quarterly filings. Accordingly, US-listed companies that receive OGSR inquiries can now expect them to ask about Cuba transactions.” 

50 U.S.C.
United States Code, 2009 Edition
Title 50 - WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
TITLE 50 - APPENDIX-WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
EXPORT REGULATION
Sec. 2405 - Foreign policy controls From the U.S. Government Publishing Office

§2405. Foreign policy controls (a) Authority

(1) In order to carry out the policy set forth in paragraph (2)(B), (7), (8), or (13) of section 3 of this Act [section 2402(2)(B), (7), (8), or (13) of this Appendix], the President may prohibit or curtail the exportation of any goods, technology, or other information subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to the extent necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations. The authority granted by this subsection shall be exercised by the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Treasury, the United States Trade Representative, and such other departments and agencies as the Secretary considers appropriate, and shall be implemented by means of export licenses issued by the Secretary.

(2) Any export control imposed under this section shall apply to any transaction or activity undertaken with the intent to evade that export control, even if that export control would not otherwise apply to that transaction or activity.

(3) Export controls maintained for foreign policy purposes shall expire on December 31, 1979, or one year after imposition, whichever is later, unless extended by the President in accordance with subsections (b) and (f). Any such extension and any subsequent extension shall not be for a period of more than one year.

(4) Whenever the Secretary denies any export license under this subsection, the Secretary shall specify in the notice to the applicant of the denial of such license that the license was denied under the authority contained in this subsection, and the reasons for such denial, with reference to the criteria set forth in subsection (b) of this section. The Secretary shall also include in such notice what, if any, modifications in or restrictions on the goods or technology for which the license was sought would allow such export to be compatible with controls implemented under this section, or the Secretary shall indicate in such notice which officers and employees of the Department of Commerce who are familiar with the application will be made reasonably available to the applicant for consultation with regard to such modifications or restrictions, if appropriate.

(5) In accordance with the provisions of section 10 of this Act [section 2409 of this Appendix], the Secretary of State shall have the right to review any export license application under this section which the Secretary of State requests to review.

(6) Before imposing, expanding, or extending export controls under this section on exports to a country which can use goods, technology, or information available from foreign sources and so incur little or no economic costs as a result of the controls, the President should, through diplomatic means, employ alternatives to export controls which offer opportunities of distinguishing the United States from, and expressing the displeasure of the United States with, the specific actions of that country in response to which the controls are proposed. Such alternatives include private discussions with foreign leaders, public statements in situations where private diplomacy is unavailable or not effective, withdrawal of ambassadors, and reduction of the size of the diplomatic staff that the country involved is permitted to have in the United States.

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Court In Spain Requires Government Of Cuba And Gaviota Tourism Company Be Included In "Unjust Enrichment" Lawsuit Against Melia Hotels International

On 29 May 2019, descendants of Mr. Rafael Lucas Sanchez Hill, acting as Central Santa Lucia L.C., filed a lawsuit in Spain seeking US$10 million from Palma de Mallorca, Spain-based Melia Hotels International S.A. (2019 revenues approximately US$2 billion) seeking damages for the use of land upon which a hotel is located in the Republic of Cuba. The lawsuit is not using provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”). 

On 24 November 2020, a judge in Palma de Mallorca, Spain, held a hearing to narrow the issues between the parties prior to the trial and determine how to proceed.

On 11 January 2021, the judge issued a ruling. Melia Hotels International requested the inclusion of the government of the Republic of Cuba, and Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba-controlled Gaviota S.A., and Panama City, Panama-based Gesmesol S.A. which is referenced as controlled by Melia Hotels International S.A. 

Gaviota S.A. is a subsidiary of Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA) which is controlled by the FAR.  GAESA has with interests in the tourism, financial investment, import/export, and remittance sectors and includes businesses incorporated in Panama. 

NOTE: GAESA is on the State Department’s List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (“Cuba Restricted List” or “CRL”).  The CRL is a list of entities and subentities “under the control of, or acting for or on behalf of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba.”  GAESA is on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons by the OFAC pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), 31 C.F.R. part 515.  

On 11 January 2021, the judge ordered the inclusion of the government of the Republic of Cuba and Gaviota S.A., but not Gesmesol S.A.  Plaintiff attorneys objected as the complaint alleges “unjust enrichment” only against Melia Hotels International S.A.  Plaintiff attorneys did not appeal the order to avoid the risk of a dismissal.  Plaintiff attorneys are serving the government of the Republic of Cuba and Gaviota S.A. through the required diplomatic channels.  The government of the Republic of Cuba may claim sovereign immunity, but Gaviota S.A. is subject to the jurisdiction of the court.  The government of the Republic of Cuba and Gaviota S.A. are not subject to plaintiff claim of “unjust enrichment,” but are deemed necessary parties by the judge since they are responsible for the initial expropriation and current operation of property of plaintiff. 

LINK To Providencia
LINK To Decreto

Mr. José Luis Iriarte, Of Counsel [to Madrid, Spain-based Lupicinio law firm] in an interview on Radio Marti: "The most likely thing, I would dare to say for sure, although in law to be sure is too bold, is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will say that no action can be taken against the Cuban State".

Lawsuit Background 

On 12 March 2002, Melia Hotels International reportedly offered US$5 million to the descendants of Mr. Rafael Lucas Sanchez Hill as payment to prevent the United States Department of State from using Title IV relating to the Sol Rio de Oro Hotel in response to enactment in 1996 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as "Libertad Act").  

Title IV of the Libertad Act restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims.  Employees of one Canada-based company is currently known to be subject to this provision based upon a certified claim.   

On 26 March 2002, Sol Melia International, reportedly believing the [George W. Bush Administration; 20 January 2001 to 20 January 2009] United States Department of State would neither implement Title III nor Title IV of the Libertad Act, Melia Hotels International withdrew the offer of US$5 million and proposed US$3,197.75 representing a value (.06%) based upon the twenty-nine (29) acres of land occupied by the Sol Rio de Oro Hotel of the approximately 120,000 acres of land claimed by the descendants of the owners of the property. The US$3,197.75 was determined by Melia Hotels International as the corresponding percentage of the US$5 million tax loss carry-forward amount with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the 1960's.     

On 29 May 2019, descendants of Mr. Rafael Lucas Sanchez Hill, acting as Central Santa Lucia L.C., filed a lawsuit in Spain seeking US$10 million from Meliá Hotels International seeking damages for the use of land upon which a hotel is located in the Republic of Cuba. The lawsuit is not using provisions of Title III of the Libertad Act.   

Title III of the Libertad Act authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset. 

LINK To Previous Posts About Lawsuit

Four Days Later, U.S. Department Of State Corrects Internet Site To Reflect Inclusion Of Cuba On List Of State Sponsors Of Terrorism; No Filing Yet In Federal Register

On 11 January 2021, the United States Department of State returned the Republic of Cuba to the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

Such designation would suggest an issue of significance and be important for the United States Department of State to publish changes, publish filings, and most critically make certain information is timely and accurate…

On 15 January 2021, the United States Department of State revised on its Internet site the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism to include the Republic of Cuba. LINK

UPDATE: As of 16 January 2021, the United States Federal Register does not show a new filing relating to including the Republic of Cuba on the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

NOTE: On 14 January 2021, an on-the-record statement was requested from the United States Department of State. The question was what, if any notification was made by the United States Department of State to the United States Congress prior to designating the Republic of Cuba on the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Despite repeated multi-day attempts, the United States Department of State would only provide off-the-record statements.

A question for individuals, companies, financial institutions, organizations, and governments:  When does the designation become effective?

From The United States Department Of State

“Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated pursuant to three laws: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. Taken together, the four main categories of sanctions resulting from designation under these authorities include restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of dual use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions. 

Designation under the above-referenced authorities also implicates other sanctions laws that penalize persons and countries engaging in certain trade with state sponsors. Currently there are three countries designated under these authorities:  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) on 20 November 2017; Islamic Republic of Iran on 19 January 1984; Syrian Arab Republic on 29 December 1979.”

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U.S. Department Of Commerce Adds Cuba To Military Control Regulations

UPDATE: LINK To Interim Final Rule Published On 9 April 2021

Commerce Tightens Controls to Prevent Support of Foreign Military-Intelligence and WMD Activities

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Thursday, January 14, 2021
Office of Public Affairs
(202) 482-4883
publicaffairs@doc.gov


Today, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) in the Department of Commerce (Commerce) imposed new controls on any U.S. technologies and specific activities of U.S. persons who may be supporting foreign military-intelligence end uses and end users in China, Cuba, Russia, and Venezuela, as well as in terrorist-supporting countries. BIS is also enhancing controls to prevent U.S. persons from supporting unauthorized weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, including weapons delivery systems and production facilities.

“We cannot allow the foreign military-intelligence organizations of our adversaries in China, Cuba, Russia, Venezuela, Iran, and other terrorist-supporting nations to benefit from U.S. technology or U.S. services to support their destabilizing activities,” said Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross. “We must ensure our controls prevent U.S. persons, wherever located, from supporting unauthorized WMD activities around the globe. Today’s important updates to the U.S. export control system achieve these two goals and enhance our national security.”

The new controls prevent U.S. persons from supporting certain foreign military-intelligence services, such as through brokering the sale of foreign-origin items or providing maintenance, repair, or overhaul services. BIS is also expanding the license requirement for exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) to military-intelligence end uses and end users in China, Russia, and Venezuela beyond enumerated items subject to existing military end-use and end-user (MEU) controls to apply to all items subject to the Export Administration Regulations. These controls will also apply to terrorist-supporting and embargoed countries.

“These new strict controls will inhibit China’s Intelligence Bureau and Russia’s GRU from leveraging U.S. technology and services to support espionage, intelligence collection and operations, and other activities contrary to U.S. national security interests,” added Ross.

Similarly, BIS is revising end-use controls related to chemical and biological weapons, rocket systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to ensure that any U.S. activity related to the operation, installation, maintenance, overhaul, repair, or refurbishing of such weapons, rocket systems, or UAVs triggers a catch-all license requirement, as outlined in the EAR. BIS also is establishing a framework for informing exporters, re-exporters, and transferors of items subject to the EAR that a license is required for specific transactions intended to circumvent Entity List-based license requirements, or for specific foreign parties assisting listed entities in circumventing such license requirements.

Both of these actions, which go into effect March 16, 2021, are directed by the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. The foreign military-intelligence organizations impacted by today’s action are:

Cuba’s Directorate of Military Intelligence (DIM) and Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (CIM)
China’s Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO) and Artesh Directorate for Intelligence (J2)
North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB)
Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)
Syria’s Military Intelligence Service
Venezuela’s General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM).

15 January 2021

AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.

ACTION: Interim final rule:

SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Department of Commerce, is issuing this interim final rule to implement the provisions of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 by: imposing additional license requirements under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) for exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country), as well as specific activities of U.S. persons, in connection with certain military-intelligence end uses and end users; clarifying that license requirements under the EAR for specific activities of U.S. persons apply even when the items at issue are not subject to the EAR; establishing restrictions on transactions intended to circumvent license requirements for listed entities; and expanding the scope of activities subject to chemical and biological weapons and rocket systems and unmanned aerial vehicles end-use controls.

DATES: Effective date: This rule is effective March 16, 2021. Comment date: Comments must be received by BIS no later than March 1, 2021.

“The mission of the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is to advance U.S. national security, foreign policy, and economic objectives by ensuring an effective export control and treaty compliance system and promoting continued U.S. strategic technology leadership. BIS activities include regulating the export of sensitive goods and technologies in an effective and efficient manner; enforcing export control, antiboycott, and public safety laws; cooperating with and assisting other countries on export control and strategic trade issues; assisting U.S. industry to comply with international arms control agreements; and monitoring the viability of the U.S. defense industrial base and seeking to ensure that it is capable of satisfying U.S. national and homeland security needs.”

Agency URL: https://www.bis.doc.gov/
Parent Agency Commerce Department

LINK To Federal Register Document

Screenshot_2021-01-14 Commerce Tightens Controls to Prevent Support of Foreign Military-Intelligence and WMD Activities.png

On Monday, U.S. Department Of State Returned Cuba To List Of State Sponsors Of Terrorism. 3 Days Later Internet Site And Federal Register Not Updated? What's The Message? Not That Important?

On 11 January 2021, the United States Department of State returned the Republic of Cuba to the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

Such designation would suggest an issue of significance and be important for the United States Department of State to publish changes, publish filings, and most critically make certain information is timely and accurate…

On 15 January 2021, the United States Department of State revised on its Internet site the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism to include the Republic of Cuba. LINK

UPDATE: As of 16 January 2021, the United States Federal Register does not show a new filing relating to including the Republic of Cuba on the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

NOTE: On 14 January 2021, an on-the-record statement was requested from the United States Department of State. The question was what, if any notification was made by the United States Department of State to the United States Congress prior to designating the Republic of Cuba on the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Despite repeated multi-day attempts, the United States Department of State would only provide off-the-record statements.

A question for individuals, companies, financial institutions, organizations, and governments:  When does the designation become effective?

From The United States Department Of State

“Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated pursuant to three laws: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. Taken together, the four main categories of sanctions resulting from designation under these authorities include restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of dual use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions. 

Designation under the above-referenced authorities also implicates other sanctions laws that penalize persons and countries engaging in certain trade with state sponsors. Currently there are three countries designated under these authorities:  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) on 20 November 2017; Islamic Republic of Iran on 19 January 1984; Syrian Arab Republic on 29 December 1979.”

Previous Posts

Statement Of U.S. Secretary Of State Mike Pompeo- Returning Cuba To List Of State Sponsors Of Terrorism (January 11, 2021

After 65 Months, Trump Administration Returns Cuba To List Of State Sponsors Of Terrorism (January 11, 2021

Statement Of U.S. Secretary Of State Mike Pompeo- Returning Cuba To List Of State Sponsors Of Terrorism

U.S. Announces Designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism
Press Statement
Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State
January 11, 2021

The State Department has designated Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism for repeatedly providing support for acts of international terrorism in granting safe harbor to terrorists.

The Trump Administration has been focused from the start on denying the Castro regime the resources it uses to oppress its people at home, and countering its malign interference in Venezuela and the rest of the Western Hemisphere.

With this action, we will once again hold Cuba’s government accountable and send a clear message: the Castro regime must end its support for international terrorism and subversion of U.S. justice.

For decades, the Cuban government has fed, housed, and provided medical care for murderers, bombmakers, and hijackers, while many Cubans go hungry, homeless, and without basic medicine.  Members of the National Liberation Army (ELN), a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, traveled to Havana to conduct peace talks with the Colombian government in 2017.  Citing peace negotiation protocols, Cuba has refused Colombia’s requests to extradite ten ELN leaders living in Havana after the group claimed responsibility for the January 2019 bombing of a Bogota police academy that killed 22 people and injured more than 87 others.

Cuba also harbors several U.S. fugitives from justice wanted on or convicted of charges of political violence, many of whom have resided in Cuba for decades.  For example, the Cuban regime has refused to return Joanne Chesimard, on the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists List for executing New Jersey State Trooper Werner Foerster in 1973; Ishmael LaBeet, convicted of killing eight people in the U.S. Virgin Islands in 1972; Charles Lee Hill, charged with killing New Mexico state policeman Robert Rosenbloom in 1971; and others.

Cuba returns to the SST list following its broken commitment to stop supporting terrorism as a condition of its removal by the previous administration in 2015.  On May 13, 2020, the State Department notified Congress that it had certified Cuba under Section 40A(a) of the Arms Export Control Act as “not cooperating fully” with U.S. counterterrorism efforts in 2019.

In addition to the support for international terrorism that is the basis for today’s action, the Cuban regime engages in a range of malign behavior across the region.  The Cuban intelligence and security apparatus has infiltrated Venezuela’s security and military forces, assisting Nicholas Maduro to maintain his stranglehold over his people while allowing terrorist organizations to operate.  The Cuban government’s support for FARC dissidents and the ELN continues beyond Cuba’s borders as well, and the regime’s support of Maduro has created a permissive environment for international terrorists to live and thrive within Venezuela.

Today’s designation subjects Cuba to sanctions that penalize persons and countries engaging in certain trade with Cuba, restricts U.S. foreign assistance, bans defense exports and sales, and imposes certain controls on exports of dual use items.

The United States will continue to support the Cuban people in their desire for a democratic government and respect for human rights, including freedom of religion, expression, and association.  Until these rights and freedoms are respected, we will continue to hold the regime accountable.

Baker & McKenzie
Chicago, Illinois
12 January 2020

“On January 11, 2021, the US State Department published a press release announcing Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (“SST”) for allegedly providing support for acts of international terrorism in granting safe harbor to terrorists. Cuba was originally designated as an SST in 1982 but was delisted in 2015 by President Barack Obama. Cuba’s SST designation follows increasingly stringent sanctions imposed by the US Government including restriction on remittances to Cuba and further restrictions on travel.

Legal Implications of the SST Designation- Cuba’s SST designation triggers the following sanctions and restrictions: A licensing requirement for exports or reexports of goods or technology that could significantly enhance Cuba’s military capability or ability to support terrorism; A prohibition on exports and reexports to Cuba of defense articles and defense services and related technology under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations; A requirement for the United States to oppose loans to Cuba by the World Bank and other international financial institutions; A prohibition on any assistance to Cuba under the Food for Peace, Peace Corps, and Export-Import Bank programs; A prohibition on US Persons (i.e., entities organized under US laws and their non-US branches; individuals and entities physically located in the United States; and US citizens and permanent resident aliens, wherever located or employed) from engaging in financial transactions with the Cuban government without a license from the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, under the Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations; and An exception to sovereign immunity that would allow individual US Persons to bring claims against the Cuban government in US courts for personal injury and death resulting from terrorism or material support for terrorism.

The legal implications of Cuba’s SST designation are likely to be limited. Many of the above activities have remained prohibited by US sanctions or export controls even after Cuba was delisted as an SST in 2015. For example, an SST designation normally triggers a change under the Export Administration Regulations to claim US jurisdiction over non-US items that incorporate more than 10% controlled US content rather than the 25% de minimis threshold used for most other countries. However, the Trump Administration imposed the 10% de minimis threshold on Cuba in October 2019 (see here) even though Cuba was not then an SST.

Increased Scrutiny for US-Listed Companies from the US Securities and Exchange Commission- Cuba’s SST designation may lead to increased scrutiny for US-listed companies if they engage in dealings with Cuba. Specifically, the Office of Global Security Risk (“OGSR”) within the US Securities and Exchange Commission may periodically request information from US-listed companies regarding material dealings with SST countries if such dealings have not been previously disclosed in a company’s regular annual and quarterly filings. Accordingly, US-listed companies that receive OGSR inquiries can now expect them to ask about Cuba transactions.”

LINK To Congressional Research Service (CRS) State Sponsors Of Terrorism Report

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After 65 Months, Trump Administration Returns Cuba To List Of State Sponsors Of Terrorism

Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated pursuant to three laws: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. Taken together, the four main categories of sanctions resulting from designation under these authorities include restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of dual use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions. 

Designation under the above-referenced authorities also implicates other sanctions laws that penalize persons and countries engaging in certain trade with state sponsors. Currently there are three countries designated under these authorities:  

Republic of Cuba added 1 March 1982 removed on 14 April 2015 returned on 11 January 2021
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) on 20 November 2017
Islamic Republic of Iran on 19 January 1984
Syrian Arab Republic on 29 December 1979

Baker & McKenzie
Chicago, Illinois
12 January 2020

“On January 11, 2021, the US State Department published a press release announcing Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (“SST”) for allegedly providing support for acts of international terrorism in granting safe harbor to terrorists. Cuba was originally designated as an SST in 1982 but was delisted in 2015 by President Barack Obama. Cuba’s SST designation follows increasingly stringent sanctions imposed by the US Government including restriction on remittances to Cuba and further restrictions on travel.

Legal Implications of the SST Designation- Cuba’s SST designation triggers the following sanctions and restrictions: A licensing requirement for exports or reexports of goods or technology that could significantly enhance Cuba’s military capability or ability to support terrorism; A prohibition on exports and reexports to Cuba of defense articles and defense services and related technology under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations; A requirement for the United States to oppose loans to Cuba by the World Bank and other international financial institutions; A prohibition on any assistance to Cuba under the Food for Peace, Peace Corps, and Export-Import Bank programs; A prohibition on US Persons (i.e., entities organized under US laws and their non-US branches; individuals and entities physically located in the United States; and US citizens and permanent resident aliens, wherever located or employed) from engaging in financial transactions with the Cuban government without a license from the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, under the Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations; and An exception to sovereign immunity that would allow individual US Persons to bring claims against the Cuban government in US courts for personal injury and death resulting from terrorism or material support for terrorism.

The legal implications of Cuba’s SST designation are likely to be limited. Many of the above activities have remained prohibited by US sanctions or export controls even after Cuba was delisted as an SST in 2015. For example, an SST designation normally triggers a change under the Export Administration Regulations to claim US jurisdiction over non-US items that incorporate more than 10% controlled US content rather than the 25% de minimis threshold used for most other countries. However, the Trump Administration imposed the 10% de minimis threshold on Cuba in October 2019 (see here) even though Cuba was not then an SST.

Increased Scrutiny for US-Listed Companies from the US Securities and Exchange Commission- Cuba’s SST designation may lead to increased scrutiny for US-listed companies if they engage in dealings with Cuba. Specifically, the Office of Global Security Risk (“OGSR”) within the US Securities and Exchange Commission may periodically request information from US-listed companies regarding material dealings with SST countries if such dealings have not been previously disclosed in a company’s regular annual and quarterly filings. Accordingly, US-listed companies that receive OGSR inquiries can now expect them to ask about Cuba transactions.”

LINK To Congressional Research Service (CRS) Terrorism Report

LINK To 2019 Country Reports on Terrorism 

Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Cuba  

Overview:  Cuba was designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1982 because of its long history of providing advice, safe haven, communications, training, and financial support to guerrilla groups and individual terrorists.  This designation was rescinded in 2015.  Cuba maintains close and collaborative ties with designated state sponsors of terror such as Iran and North Korea.  The Cuban regime continues to host ELN leaders associated with now-defunct peace talks to reside in Cuba, despite Colombia’s repeated requests for their extradition.  Cuba also continues to harbor multiple fugitives who committed or supported acts of terrorism in the United States.  The U.S. Department of State certified Cuba as “not cooperating fully” with U.S. counterterrorism efforts for 2019, the first such certification of Cuba since 2015. 

2019 Terrorist Incidents:  There were no terrorist attacks in Cuba in 2019. 

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:  Citing peace negotiation protocols, Cuba refused Colombia’s request to extradite 10 ELN leaders living in Havana after that group claimed responsibility for the January 2019 bombing of a Bogota police academy that killed 22 people and injured 87 others.  On October 11, Colombia filed extradition requests for ELN leaders Victor Orlando Cubides (aka “Pablo Tejada”) and Isreal Ramirez Pineda (aka “Pablo Beltran”) with the Cuban government, which has pointedly not responded.  Though Cuba’s government denies allowing ELN members to plan terrorist attacks from its territory, fugitive ELN terrorists continue to live in Havana, shielded by the Cuban regime, while ELN members continue to attack, kidnap, and murder in Colombia. 

In addition to ELN terrorists, there was credible reporting that FARC dissidents who abandoned the peace process in Colombia traveled to Havana to seek the regime’s support.  On July 28 during the closing remarks of the Sao Paolo Forum in Caracas, Nicolas Maduro stated that Iván Márquez and Jesús Santrich – former FARC leaders who fled Colombia after abandoning the peace process and announced a return to terrorist activities – were both welcome in Venezuela.  Cuba is a key supporter of Maduro’s narco-regime and is an active participant in maintaining Maduro’s authority. 

Cuba also harbors several U.S. fugitives from justice wanted on charges of political violence, many of whom have resided in Cuba for decades.  For example, the Cuban regime has refused to return Joanne Chesimard, aka Assata Shakur, a fugitive on the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists List, who was convicted of executing New Jersey State Trooper Werner Foerster.  Cuba also has refused to return William “Guillermo” Morales, a fugitive bomb maker for the Armed Forces for National Liberation (FALN), who is wanted by the FBI and escaped detention after being convicted of charges related to domestic terrorism; Ishmael LaBeet, aka Ishmael Muslim Ali, who received eight life sentences after being convicted of killing eight people in the U.S. Virgin Islands in 1972 and hijacking a plane to flee to Cuba in 1984; Charles Lee Hill, who has been charged with killing New Mexico state policeman Robert Rosenbloom in 1971; and Ambrose Henry Montfort, who used a bomb threat to hijack a passenger aircraft and fly to Cuba in 1983.  Cuba is also believed to host or have hosted U.S. fugitive terrorists Catherine Marie Kerkow and Elizabeth Anna Duke.  The Cuban government provides housing, food ration books, and medical care for all of the fugitives residing there. 

Countering the Financing of Terrorism:  Cuba is a member of the GAFILAT.  Its FIU, the Dirección General de Investigación de Operaciones Financieras, is a member of the Egmont Group.  There were no significant updates in 2019. 

Countering Violent Extremism:  Cuba conducted no CVE efforts in 2019. 

International and Regional Cooperation:  Cuba is an inactive member of the OAS and is not a member of NATO or the OSCE.

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U.S. Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Increase 282.3% In November; Decrease 41.0% Year-To-Year

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
January 2021

November 2020 Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Increase 282.3%- 1
69th Of 226 October U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Decrease 41.0%- 2
Cuba Ranks 62nd Of Ag/Food Export Markets- 2
November 2020 Healthcare Product Exports US$0.00- 2
November 2020 Humanitarian Donations US$27,749.00- 3
November Administration Initiatives Exports Continue- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 16

NOVEMBER 2020 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 282.3%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in November 2020 were US$11,339,843.00 compared to US$2,965,515.00 November 2019 and US$14,505,604.00 in November 2018.

Agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba thus far reported in 2020 are US$149,209,570.00 compared to US$253,288,353.00 in 2019, representing a decrease of 41.0%.

Since December 2001, agricultural commodity and food product exports reported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba is US$6,282,082,266.00.

This report contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

LINK To Complete Report In PDF Format

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On 20 January 2021, This Skilled Politician Will Be The Most Important Member Of Congress For Issues Relating To Cuba

On 20 January 2021, The Honorable Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey), a three-term member of the United States Senate and before that a seven-term member of the United States House of Representatives, will be 69th Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate.  Senator Menendez was previously Chairman (2013-2014).  The Honorable Joseph Biden (D- Delaware), President-elect of the United States, served three times as Chairman (2001; 2001-2003; 2007-2009).  

Possessing the gavel, Senator Menendez will become the most influential Member of the United States Congress for issues relating to the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela, replacing a colleague with whom he agreed often, The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida).   

A mistake for advocates to believe Chairman Menendez will not oppose the Biden Administration on issues relating to the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela as a gesture of political party unity.  And, to believe that Chairman Menendez and Senator Rubio will not align- and bring along others, against decisions by the Biden Administration relating to the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela. 

Senator Menendez’s primary challenge will be to navigate a Biden Administration inclined to adjust downward Trump Administration policies impacting the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela. 

There are three Trump Administration policies which the incoming Biden Administration has telegraphed are likely for de-escalation: 1) Removing the US$1,000.00 per quarter limit upon remittances 2) Easing the Havana-only restriction upon commercial airlines and 3) Restructuring consulate operations in Havana to better serve visa applicants.  Changes to Trump Administration restrictions/prohibitions upon transactions with entities controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba are expected to remain in place.

As did his colleague Senator Rubio during the Trump Administration, Chairman Menendez will do the opposite- leverage what the Biden Administration wants to lessen with increasing pressure somewhere else.  For example, during negotiations for the 2018 Farm Bill, as a condition for his support, Senator Rubio successfully attached an amendment to preclude transactions by United States organizations with FAR-related entities when implementing Foreign Market Development (FMD) and Market Access Program (MAP) taxpayer-provided funding in the Republic of Cuba.  Quid pro quo

There are ten (10) self-identified Cuban-American members of the 117th United States Congress: three (3) in the United States Senate and seven (7) in the United States House of Representatives, consisting of two (2) members of the Democratic Party and eight (8) members of the Republican Party. 

They are expected to act as a voting bloc to oppose most efforts by the Biden Administration to alter Trump Administration policies impacting the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela where the perception, if not reality, may benefit either country.

United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Cruz (R- Texas)
The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida)
The Honorable Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey)

United States House of Representatives
The Honorable Albio Sires (New Jersey; D- 8th)
The Honorable Alex Mooney (West Virginia; R- 2nd)
The Honorable Anthony E. González (Ohio; R- 16th)
The Honorable Mario Díaz-Balart (Florida; R-25th)
The Honorable Carlos Gimenez (Florida; R- 26th)
The Honorable Maria Elvira Salazar (Florida; R- 27th)
The Honorable Nicole Malliotakis (New York; R- 11th)

United States Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations (Current Republican Majority)
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/
Total Members: 19
Subcommittees (7)


Majority Members (10)
Risch, James E. (ID), Chairman
Rubio, Marco (FL)
Johnson, Ron (WI)
Romney, Mitt (UT)
Graham, Lindsey (SC)
Barrasso, John (WY)
Portman, Rob (OH)
Paul, Rand (KY)
Young, Todd (IN)
Cruz, Ted (TX)

Minority Members (9)
Menendez, Robert (NJ), Ranking Member
Cardin, Benjamin L. (MD)
Shaheen, Jeanne (NH)
Coons, Christopher A. (DE)
Murphy, Christopher (CT)
Kaine, Tim (VA)
Markey, Edward J. (MA)
Merkley, Jeff (OR)
Booker, Cory A. (NJ)

Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues

Total Members: 9
Majority Members
Rubio, Marco (FL), Chairman
Portman, Rob (OH)
Cruz, Ted (TX)
Barrasso, John (WY)
Risch, James E. (ID), Ex Officio

Minority Members
Cardin, Benjamin L. (MD), Ranking Member
Shaheen, Jeanne (NH)
Kaine, Tim (VA)
Menendez, Robert (NJ), Ex Officio

Attorneys Suing Expedia, Hotels.com, Orbitz, Booking.com Reply To Cruise Lines Association Appellete Brief; Case Has 84 "Interested Persons"

MARIO DEL VALLE, ENRIQUE FALLA, MARIO ECHEVARRIA V. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, ORBITZ, LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING HOLDINGS INC.  Initial defendants were: TRIVAGO GMBH, BOOKING.COM B.V., GRUPO HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE I-5, AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22619 Southern Florida District; 20-12407 11th Circuit Court of Appeals] 

Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie, LLP (defendant)
Scott Douglass & McConnico (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit: MARIO DEL VALLE, ENRIQUE FALLA, AND ANGELO POU, AS INDIVIDUALS AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED Plaintiffs — Appellants, V. EXPEDIA GROUP, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, ORBITZ, LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING HOLDINGS INC., Defendants — Appellees.  On Appeal from a Final Order of Dismissal by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No. 19-cv-22619-RNS APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF AND RESPONSE TO CRUISE LINES INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION’S AMICUS CURIAE 

LINK To Filing (6 January 2021) 

Excerpts: 

Appellees’ briefs could not and did not blink away the Order’s erroneous misapplication of Florida’s long-arm statute, or its manifest abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend and dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Appellees fail to note that the complaint contained legally sufficient, unrebutted (and unrebuttable) factual allegations making out a prima facie case for specific jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. 

Moreover, although the Order did not address standing, appellees’ and the Amicus briefs grossly mischaracterize appellants’ claims as if they were based on the Cuban government’s confiscation of their properties, and not appellees’ trafficking, which is plainly and expressly what the Act targets. 

The complaint adequately alleged that appellees do business in Florida to which this action relates, under Fla. Stat § 48.193(1)(a)(1). That is all the Florida long-arm statute requires to trigger a minimum contacts analysis, unless a defendant can rebut the “doing business” allegations. Appellees never could have done so, and didn’t even try.  

Instead appellees argued below, and here, that merely maintaining a website accessible in Florida is insufficient. So what? This misdirection play relies on cases where defendants’ “passive” websites provided only information, and no sales were made on those websites. That is plainly not what was alleged below, nor what actually is going on. Appellees’ entire business is based on their sale of hotel reservations on their websites. If it weren’t for sales on their websites, appellees would have no businesses at all

To exclude property that ever was used for residential purposes prior to confiscation would be inconsistent with the Act’s language and history and would undermine congressional intent to deter trafficking in confiscated property. Thus, even if 22 U.S.C. § 6023(12) did not unambiguously carve out only property currently used for residential purposes, Title III’s findings and stated purpose would require it to be so construed. 

Conclusion: The order on appeal erroneously dismissed without leave to amend on the first motion to dismiss submitted for decision below. The unrebutted allegations in the complaint demonstrated that the exercise of “doing business in Florida” and “tort in Florida” personal jurisdiction over appellees was (and is) proper.  The complaint also adequately alleged a legally sufficient Title III claim for appellees’ unlawful trafficking of the Properties in Florida through the solicitation and sale of reservations at the Resorts to Floridians in Florida.  Even if the order on appeal had not erroneously denied personal jurisdiction, it would have been (and was) an abuse of discretion to deny appellants answers to their pending discovery requests before ruling, and to preemptively bar a motion for leave to amend. 

16 December 2020
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
CRUISE LINES INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES AND URGING AFFIRMANCE OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL

LINK To Filing (16 December 2020) 

Excerpts: 

In the instant case, plaintiffs are individuals who claim interests in parcels of real property in Cuba, which they allege were confiscated by the Fidel Castro regime in the early 1960s, after the Cuban Revolution. They are suing two travel booking companies, Expedia and Booking.com, for three times the value of the real property itself, plus interest over decades, based on the allegation that these companies made reservations available on the Internet to stay at structures subsequently built on the properties. 

Nowhere in the complaint is there any allegation that defendants’ actions caused any concrete harm to plaintiffs, that defendants owe any funds to plaintiffs, or that defendants’ actions decreased any property values. The only concrete harm alleged in the complaint is that of the Cuban government in the 1960s, not defendants. Thus, plaintiffs lack Article III standing as against these defendants. 

Plaintiffs’ sole cause of action is based on a highly unusual and internationally controversial statute, Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§6021-91) (the “Helms-Burton Act”), passed in 1996 but only allowed to become effective twenty-three years later, in 2019. The heart of the statute is its allowance, with certain enumerated exceptions, of a claim against “any person” who “traffics” in property confiscated by the Castro regime—a term which is defined to include, for instance, “using or otherwise benefitting from” the property, with no requirement that any plaintiff be injured. 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A) (emphasis added). 

Rather than a determination by Congress that plaintiffs under the statute would suffer a “concrete, particularized” injury “caused by the defendant” in a Title III claim (Thole, 140 S.Ct. at 1618), the statute and its findings instead offer the converse of a well-known rule of Constitutional standing. Citizens or taxpayers generally have no standing to challenge government actions or expenditures if their interest is “shared with millions of taxpayers” or “comparatively minute and indeterminable.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343–44, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1862, 164 L. Ed. 2d 589 (2006). With Helms-Burton, however, Congress has seemingly made the opposite determination: having found the Cuba embargo represents sound U.S. policy, it decided that individual defendants can, in fact, be drafted into paying penalties to individual plaintiffs who do not claim to have been harmed in a way that is discernible, concrete, or individualized—or even recognized by a prior law adjudicated in our nation’s Article III courts. Tellingly, Congress did not even attempt to explain how a Title III private cause of action satisfied Article III’s standing requirements. So, while Congress’ judgment should be considered, its statements weigh against plaintiffs’ assertions of standing. 

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

Appellants Mario Del Valle, Enrique Falla, and Angelo Pou, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and Eleventh Circuit Rules 26.1-1, 26.1-2, and 26.1-3, certify that the following persons and entities may have an interest in the outcome of this case:

1. AAE Travel Pte. Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
2. Agoda.com (Subsidiary of Appellee)
3. Aguila, M. Paula, Esq. (counsel for Appellants)
4. Akerman LLP (counsel for Appellees)
5. Analytical Systems Pty Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
6. Baker McKenzie (counsel for Appellees)
7. Booking Holdings Treasury Company (Subsidiary of Appellee)
8. Booking Holdings, Inc. (Appellee) [BKNG]
9. Booking.com B.V. (Appellee)
10. Booking.com Holding B.V. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
11. Booking.com Holdings B.V. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
12. Booking.com Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
13. BookingSuite (USA) Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
14. Classic Vacations, LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
15. Coronado Pte Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
16. Cruise, LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
17. Del Valle, Mario (Appellant)
18. Dohop Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
19. Duffy, Michael A., Esq. (counsel for Appellees)
20. EAN.com, LP (Subsidiary of Appellee)
21. Ebookers Limited (Subsidiary of Appellee)
22. Egencia France SAS (Subsidiary of Appellee)
23. Egencia LLP (Subsidiary of Appellee)
24. Egencia UK Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
25. EXP Global Holdings, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
26. EXP Holdings Luxembourg S.A. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
27. Expedia Asia Holdings Mauritius (Subsidiary of Appellee)
28. Expedia do Barsil Agencia de Viagens e Turismo Ltda. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
29. Expedia Group, Inc. (Appellee) [EXPE]
30. Expedia Lodging Partner Services Sárl (Subsidiary of Appellee)
31. Expedia Southeast Asia Pte. Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
32. Expedia.com Limited (Subsidiary of Appellee)
33. Falla, Enrique (Appellant)
34. FareHarbor Holdings, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
35. Home Away Spain SL (Subsidiary of Appellee)
36. HomeAway Holding, Inc., (Subsidiary of Appellee)
37. HomeAway Netherlands Holdings B.V. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
38. HomeAway Sarl (Subsidiary of Appellee)
39. HomeAway UK Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
40. HomeAway.com, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
41. HotelClub Pty Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
42. Hotels.com GP (Appellee)
43. Hotels.com L.P. (Appellee)
44. Hotwire, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
45. HRN 99 Holdings, LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
46. Interactive Affiliate Network, LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
47. Kayak (Subsidiary of Appellee)
48. Law Office of Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (co-counsel for Appellants)
49. Lowestfare.com LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
50. Malave, Ana C. (counsel for Appellants)
51. Mathy, Patricia, Esq. (counsel for Appellees)
52. McCutcheon, Michael C., Esq. (counsel for Appellees)
53. Mestre, Jorge, Esq. (counsel for Appellants)
54. Olson, Kyle R. (counsel for Appellees)
55. OpenTable (Subsidiary of Appellee)
56. Orbitz Travel Insurance Services, LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
57. Orbitz Worldwide (UK) Limited (Subsidiary of Appellee)
58. Orbitz Worldwide, Inc., (Subsidiary of Appellee)
59. Orbitz Worldwide, LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
60. Orbitz, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
61. Orbitz, LLC (Appellee)
62. Pou, Angelo (Appellant)
63. Priceline.com (Subsidiary of Appellee)
64. Priceline.com Europe Holdco Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
65. Priceline.com Europe Holdings N.V. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
66. Priceline.com Mauritius Co. Ltd. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
67. Priceline.com Agoda Holdco LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
68. Riccio, Andrew S., Esq. (counsel for Appellees)
69. Rivero Mestre LLP (counsel for Appellants)
70. Rivero, Andres, Esq. (counsel for Appellants)
71. Scola, Hon. Robert N., Jr. (United States District Court Judge)
72. Rocket Travel, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
73. Rolnick, Alan H., Esq., (counsel for Appellants)
74. Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP (counsel for Appellees)
75. Shank, David, Esq. (counsel for Appellees)
76. SilverRail Technologies, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
77. Travelscape, LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
78. Travelweb LLC (Subsidiary of Appellee)
79. Trip Network, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
80. Trivago N.V. (Subsidiary of Appellee) [TRVG]
81. Vazquez, Manuel, Esq. (counsel for Appellants)
82. Venga, Inc. (Subsidiary of Appellee)
83. Webre, Jane, Esq. (counsel for Appellees)
84. WWTE Travel S.á.r.l. (Subsidiary of Appellee)

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Might Caterpillar/RIMCO Be Next Defendants In Title III Lawsuit? Cuba Distributor In Area As Crowley And Seaboard?

Might Caterpillar/RIMCO Be Next Defendant In Title III Lawsuit?
Cuba Distributor Located In Same Area As Defendants Crowley And Seaboard
Is what Crowley, Seaboard and Caterpillar doing “lawful” as defined by Libertad Act?

On 1 November 2017, during the 35th Havana International Fair (FIHAV), Peoria, Illinois-based Caterpillar Inc. (2019 revenues approximately US$53.8 billion) through privately-held San Juan, Puerto Rico-based RIMCO, its distributor for Caribbean Sea-area countries, announced a distribution center would be located within the Special Development Zone of Mariel (ZEDM).  The Republic of Cuba is not referenced in the 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 annual reports or 2020 Form 10-K filed by Caterpillar.   

RIMCO reported the company did not require a license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, but did obtain a license from the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce and authorization from the United States Department of State.  According to the ZEDM Internet site, RIMCO provides sales, service and rental of brands including Caterpillar and Duluth, Georgia-based AGCO Corporation (2019 revenues approximately US$9.3 billion). 

Since December 2018, RIMCO has delivered, not necessarily sold, to the Republic of Cuba more than US$4 million in excavators, backhoes, graders, scrapers, bulldozers, railway fixtures, and signaling equipment.  There are no United States government prohibitions upon Caterpillar or RIMCO from providing, directly or indirectly, payment terms and/or financing for equipment exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba. 

On 2 November 2017, Moline, Illinois-based John Deere (2019 revenues approximately US$39.2 billion) reported the company would establish a distribution center in the Republic of Cuba, but not located in the ZEDM.  The Republic of Cuba is not referenced in the 2016, 2017, 2018 or 2019 annual reports filed by John Deere.  In November 2017, and continuing through 2019, John Deere delivered, not necessarily sold, more than $800,000.00 in agricultural equipment to the Republic of Cuba.  Antioch, Tennessee-based Wirtgen America, Inc., a subsidiary of Windhagen, Germany-based Wirtgen Group (2019 revenues approximately US$3 billion), a construction equipment machinery subsidiary (acquired in 2017) of Deere & Company has also delivered products to the Republic of Cuba.  John Deere reported that the company would provide financing for equipment purchases by authorized Republic of Cuba entities.   

The Trump Administration issued a 9 November 2017 deadline for United States companies to execute agreements with Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba-controlled Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), which has interests in the tourism, financial investment, import/export, and remittance sectors.  ZEDM is managed by Republic of Cuba government-operated Almacenes Universales S.A., a subsidiary of GAESA.  Almacenes Universales S.A. focuses upon “professional, technical and skilled workers linked to logistics activities, warehousing, transportation and port activities.”  Agreements executed by 9 November 2017 would be permitted to remain in force.  

GAESA is on the State Department’s List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (“Cuba Restricted List” or “CRL”).  The CRL is a list of entities and subentities “under the control of, or acting for or on behalf of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba.” 

GAESA is on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons by the OFAC pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), 31 C.F.R. part 515. 

Since 2013, vessels from the United States and other countries have been calling at the port of Mariel, located approximately forty (road) miles from Havana.  The port of Mariel is managed by Singapore-based PSA International.  The container terminal at the port of Mariel sits within the 180-square-mile ZEDM.  The facility has 2,300 feet of jetty and four quay cranes which can accommodate 13,000 TEU Neo-Panamax vessels.   

Salvador, Brazil-based Odebrecht (2016 revenues approximately US$30 billion) was the primary contractor for the port of Mariel and ZEDM.  Approximately US$683 million in primary financing was provided by the National Bank of Economic and Social Development (BNDES) of Brazil.  Institutions in China and Venezuela also provided financing.   

Title III Lawsuits Against Crowley Maritime And Seaboard Marine 

On 2 May 2019, the Trump Administration made operational Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).  Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.  Thus far, thirty-two Title III lawsuits have been filed in jurisdictions throughout the United States.   

Libertad Act Title III exceptions to the definition of “trafficking” include “transactions and uses of property incident to lawful travel to Cuba, to the extent that such transactions and uses of property are necessary to the conduct of such travel; or transactions and uses of property by a person who is both a citizen of Cuba and a resident of Cuba, and who is not an official of the Cuban Government or the ruling political party in Cuba.”  There is no visible exception for non-travel-related activity. 

The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992.  For the period December 2001, the first exports using the TSREEA, through October 2020 (latest data), total exports using the TSREEA exceed US$6,270,742,423.00.  In twelve of nineteen years, poultry (transported in containers) was the largest U.S. Dollar value export.  

Currently, United States TSREEA exporters receive control of payment from the Republic of Cuba prior to product departing United States ports.  Previously, United States exporters received control of payment when the vessel arrived to the Republic of Cuba, but had not yet been unloaded. 

From the two recent (31st and 32nd) lawsuit filings: “The fact of the confiscation of the Blanco Rosell Siblings’ property in Cuba was so well known that, on April 18, 2019, the day after the Trump Administration announced that it would allow Helms-Burton Act lawsuits under Title III to go forward, stories published on both Radio Marti and TV Marti identified Plaintiff’s claims to the Mariel Special Development Zone as one of the top 10 potential Helms-Burton Claims: The Mariel Special Development Zone, the star Cuban project to attract investment, was built on nationalized land where the Carranza-Bernal, Carbonell-González and Blanco-Rosell families owned sugar and hemp processing plants.” 

For plaintiffs, there are three focuses:  Do they have standing to file a lawsuit.  Does the court have jurisdiction over the lawsuit.  Does the defendant have assets accessible using a court judgement.  

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. CROWLEY MARITIME CORPORATION, Defendant. [3:20-cv-01426]; Middle District Florida  

Murphy & Anderson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe P.A. (plaintiff)  

LINK To Complaint (12/20/20)
LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics
LINK To Mariel Special Economic Zone

Jacksonville, Florida-based Crowley Maritime Corporation (2019 revenues approximately US$2.5 billion).  “Crowley, founded in 1892, is a privately-held, U.S.-owned and operated logistics, government, marine and energy solutions company headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida. Services are provided worldwide by four primary business units – Crowley Logistics, Crowley (Government) Solutions, Crowley Shipping and Crowley Fuels.” 

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD   MARINE, LTD., Defendant. [1:20-cv-25176; Southern Florida District]  

Horr, Novak & Skipp, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe (plaintiff)
Fields (plaintiff) 

LINK To Complaint (12/20/20)
LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics
LINK To Mariel Special Economic Zone

Miami, Florida-based Seaboard Marine is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Merriam, Kansas-based Seaboard Corporation (2019 revenues of US$6.8 billion). Butterball Turkey is a subsidiary of Seaboard Corporation. Seaboard Corporation 2019 Annual Report: "At Seaboard Marine, our container line operating throughout the Americas surpassed $1 billion in revenues despite fierce competition for market share by both regional and global carriers. We run multiple routes from six U.S. ports to 26 countries in the Caribbean, Central and South America."   

Background

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
February 10, 2016
Caterpillar Names Rimco Official Dealer for Cuba

PEORIA, Ill. – Caterpillar Inc. (NYSE: CAT) today announced that it has selected Rimco, a privately owned Puerto Rico-based company, to be the Cat dealer for Cuba. Currently, Rimco serves as the Cat dealer for Puerto Rico and the Eastern Caribbean. Upon easing of trade restrictions, customers in Cuba will be able to purchase Cat products through Rimco in accordance with U.S. and Cuba regulations. 

“We’re pleased to take this important step with our longtime partner, Rimco,” said Philip Kelliher, vice president with responsibility for the Americas & Europe Distribution Services Division. “Cuba needs access to the types of products that Caterpillar makes and, upon easing of trade restrictions, we look forward to providing the equipment needed to contribute to the building of Cuba’s infrastructure. This momentous announcement is part of our preparations in anticipation of the United States lifting its 55-year-old trade embargo on Cuba.” 

Caterpillar, an advocate for change in policy toward Cuba for nearly two decades, will continue its work with the Administration and Congress to end the embargo.  “We’re exceptionally proud of our 34-year relationship with Caterpillar,” said Richard F. McConnie, President of Rimco. “There is great affinity between Cuba and Puerto Rico as a result of our shared language, culture and traditions. Rimco will be honored to serve the Cuba market once the United States and Cuba re-establish commercial relations.”  On December 17, 2014, President Obama announced that the United States would move to normalize relations with Cuba. Since that historic day, embassies have opened in each nation and there have been gradual steps to open diplomatic and economic ties between the two countries.  While steps remain until relations are fully normalized, including lifting the embargo, Rimco and Caterpillar will continue preparations to best serve the Cuban marketplace with construction and mining equipment, power systems, marine and industrial engines. 

About Caterpillar 

For 90 years, Caterpillar Inc. has been making sustainable progress possible and driving positive change on every continent.  Customers turn to Caterpillar to help them develop infrastructure, energy and natural resource assets.  With 2015 sales and revenues of $47.011 billion, Caterpillar is the world’s leading manufacturer of construction and mining equipment, diesel and natural gas engines, industrial gas turbines and diesel-electric locomotives.  The company principally operates through its three product segments - Construction Industries, Resource Industries and Energy & Transportation - and also provides financing and related services through its Financial Products segment.  For more information, visit caterpillar.com.  To connect with us on social media, visit caterpillar.com/social-media. 

About Rimco 

Rimco is the Caterpillar dealer for Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean Islands. It is a privately-held Puerto Rico company founded by the McConnie family in 1981. The company has built a strong reputation in the industry with its superior sales, rental and product support capabilities. Rimco sells construction equipment, power systems and engines to its customers in the construction, quarry & aggregates, waste, industrial, commercial and marine segments. Rimco also has a complete fleet of equipment and power systems available for rental through its 5 Cat Rental Stores located in Puerto Rico and Barbados. Additional information about the Rimco organization, its products and services can be found at www.rimcocat.com.   

Thomson Reuters
London, United Kingdom
1 November 2017

Caterpillar dealer to open shop in Cuba special development zone

“HAVANA (Reuters) - Rimco, Caterpillar Inc’s dealer for Cuba, said on Wednesday it would open a distribution center for the U.S. heavy equipment maker at Havana’s Mariel special development zone, making it the first U.S. company to open up shop there. 

The deal, signed this week, came as worsening U.S.-Cuban political relations are curbing U.S. business interest in the Communist-run island of 11 million inhabitants in the wake of the historic 2014 detente.  The United States has said it would vote against a U.N. General Assembly resolution on Wednesday calling for the lifting of the decades-old U.S. economic embargo against Cuba, reversing an abstention by Washington last year. 

“We are going to set up a warehouse and distribution center at Mariel and we will be distributing Caterpillar equipment,” Rimco Vice President Caroline McConnie said in a news conference at Cuba’s annual trade fair. “We have a license from the commerce department and other agencies.”

A license from the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which handles economic and trade sanctions, was not necessary, she said. 

Mariel Director Ana Teresa Igarza said at the news conference that Rimco hoped to open shop in 2018, and the deal was one of 30 projects, including 11 Mariel had signed off on this year.  Cuba created the zone three years ago to attract foreign capital with tax and customs breaks to boost its anemic economy.  It is controlled by Almacenes Universales, a company belonging to the Armed Forces Business Enterprises Group (GAESA), which could prove problematic for U.S. companies. U.S. President Donald Trump in June ordered a ban on business dealings with the military as part of a tightening of trade and travel restrictions.  The new regulations, including that ban, have yet to be unveiled. The Trump administration has said that any deals signed before then would be grandfathered in.”

COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Will Israel Shipping Company About To IPO In U.S. Become 33rd Libertad Act Lawsuit? Project For Jared Kushner?

Will Israel Shipping Company About To IPO In U.S. Become 33rd Libertad Act Lawsuit?
Will Trump Administration Intervene?
Jared Kushner’s Possible Final Project

Haifa, Israel-based ZIM Integrated Shipping Services Ltd. (2019 revenues US$3.3 billion) which owns one vessel and charters sixty-nine vessels, provides services from the United States to the Republic of Cuba including to Terminal de Contanedores de Mariel SA (TC Mariel).   

On 30 December 2020, ZIM Integrated Shipping Services Ltd. filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a registration statement on Form F-1 for an Initial Public Offering (IPO) in the United States.  The company expects to raise US$300 million to US$500 million providing the company with a market capitalization of US$1.5 billion.   

New York, New York-based Citigroup Inc., New York, New York-based Goldman Sachs & Co., LLC., and London, United Kingdom-based Barclays plc are global coordinators and New York, New York-based Jefferies Group LLC and Oslo, Norway-based Clarksons Platou Securities AS act as joint bookrunners for the proposed offering.  

Mr. Eyal Ofer, a member of the family that controls ZIM Integrated Shipping Services Ltd., has since 1995 served as a Director of Miami, Florida-based Royal Caribbean Group (2019 revenues US$10.9 billion).  Ofer family members have been major shareholders of Royal Caribbean Group.  From the 2019 Form 10-K filing: “On August 27, 2019, two lawsuits were filed against Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, also known as the Helms-Burton Act.”

On 20 December 2020, Jacksonville, Florida-based Crowley Maritime Corporation (2019 revenues approximately US$2.5 billion) and Miami, Florida-based Seaboard Marine, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Merriam, Kansas-based Seaboard Corporation (2019 revenues of US$6.8 billion) were named as defendants in separate lawsuits filed using Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).  Both companies provide services to the Republic of Cuba including to TC Mariel.   

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.  Thus far, thirty-two Title III lawsuits have been filed in jurisdictions throughout the United States. 

The Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba-controls Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), which has interests in the tourism, financial investment, import/export, and remittance sectors.  The Special Development Zone of Mariel (ZEDM) is managed by Republic of Cuba government-operated Almacenes Universales S.A., a subsidiary of GAESA.  Almacenes Universales S.A. focuses upon “professional, technical and skilled workers linked to logistics activities, warehousing, transportation and port activities.”   

GAESA is on the State Department’s List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (“Cuba Restricted List” or “CRL”).  The CRL is a list of entities and subentities “under the control of, or acting for or on behalf of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba.” 

GAESA is on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons by the OFAC pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), 31 C.F.R. part 515. 

Since 2013, vessels from the United States and other countries have been calling at TC Mariel, located approximately forty (road) miles from the city of Havana.  TC Mariel is managed by Singapore-based PSA International Pte Ltd (2019 revenues approximately US$4 billion).  The container terminal is within the 180-square-mile ZEDM.  The facility has 2,300 feet of jetty and four quay cranes which can accommodate 13,000 TEU Neo-Panamax vessels.   

Salvador, Brazil-based Odebrecht (2016 revenues approximately US$30 billion; now in bankruptcy) was the primary contractor for TC Mariel and ZEDM.  Approximately US$683 million in primary financing was provided by Brasilia, Brazil-based National Bank of Economic and Social Development (BNDES) of Brazil.  Institutions in China and Venezuela also provided financing.   

Companies servicing TC Mariel include: Brooklyn Park, Minnesota-based MM Shipping & Freight Forwarding LLC; Copenhagen, Denmark-based Maersk A/S; Geneva, Switzerland-based Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A.; Haifa, Israel-based ZIM Integrated Shipping Services Ltd.; Hamburg Germany-based Hamburg Sud; Hamburg, Germany-based Hapag-Lloyd AG Jacksonville, Florida-based Crowley Maritime Corporation; Marseille, France-based CMA CGM S.A.; Rotterdam, The Netherlands-based W.E.C. Lines B.V.; Shanghai, China-based China Shipping (Group) Company; Shanghai, China-based COSCO Shipping Lines Co.’ Ltd. South Holland, Netherlands-based Nirint Shipping B.V.; and Taipei, Taiwan-based Evergreen Marine Corporation. 

Title III Lawsuits Against Crowley Maritime And Seaboard Marine 

On 2 May 2019, the Trump Administration made operational Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).  Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.  Thus far, thirty-two Title III lawsuits have been filed in jurisdictions throughout the United States.   

Libertad Act Title III exceptions to the definition of “trafficking” include “transactions and uses of property incident to lawful travel to Cuba, to the extent that such transactions and uses of property are necessary to the conduct of such travel; or transactions and uses of property by a person who is both a citizen of Cuba and a resident of Cuba, and who is not an official of the Cuban Government or the ruling political party in Cuba.”  There is no visible exception for non-travel-related activity.

The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992.  For the period December 2001, the first exports using the TSREEA, through October 2020 (latest data), total exports using the TSREEA exceed US$6,270,742,423.00.  In twelve of nineteen years, poultry (transported in containers) was the largest U.S. Dollar value export.  

Currently, United States TSREEA exporters receive control of payment from the Republic of Cuba prior to product departing United States ports.  Previously, United States exporters received control of payment when the vessel arrived to the Republic of Cuba, but had not yet been unloaded. 

From the two recent (31st and 32nd) lawsuit filings: “The fact of the confiscation of the Blanco Rosell Siblings’ property in Cuba was so well known that, on April 18, 2019, the day after the Trump Administration announced that it would allow Helms-Burton Act lawsuits under Title III to go forward, stories published on both Radio Marti and TV Marti identified Plaintiff’s claims to the Mariel Special Development Zone as one of the top 10 potential Helms-Burton Claims: The Mariel Special Development Zone, the star Cuban project to attract investment, was built on nationalized land where the Carranza-Bernal, Carbonell-González and Blanco-Rosell families owned sugar and hemp processing plants.” 

For plaintiffs, there are three focuses:  Do they have standing to file a lawsuit.  Does the court have jurisdiction over the lawsuit.  Does the defendant have assets accessible using a court judgement.   

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. CROWLEY MARITIME CORPORATION, Defendant. [3:20-cv-01426]; Middle District Florida  

Murphy & Anderson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe P.A. (plaintiff)

LINK To Complaint (12/20/20)
LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics
LINK To Mariel Special Economic Zone

Jacksonville, Florida-based Crowley Maritime Corporation (2019 revenues approximately US$2.5 billion).  “Crowley, founded in 1892, is a privately-held, U.S.-owned and operated logistics, government, marine and energy solutions company headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida. Services are provided worldwide by four primary business units – Crowley Logistics, Crowley (Government) Solutions, Crowley Shipping and Crowley Fuels.” 

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD   MARINE, LTD., Defendant. [1:20-cv-25176; Southern Florida District]  

Horr, Novak & Skipp, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe (plaintiff)
Fields (plaintiff) 

LINK To Complaint (12/20/20)
LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics
LINK To Mariel Special Economic Zone

Miami, Florida-based Seaboard Marine is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Merriam, Kansas-based Seaboard Corporation (2019 revenues of US$6.8 billion). Butterball Turkey is a subsidiary of Seaboard Corporation. Seaboard Corporation 2019 Annual Report: "At Seaboard Marine, our container line operating throughout the Americas surpassed $1 billion in revenues despite fierce competition for market share by both regional and global carriers. We run multiple routes from six U.S. ports to 26 countries in the Caribbean, Central and South America."   

ZIM ANNOUNCES FILING OF F-1 REGISTRATION STATEMENT FOR THE ISSUANCE OF ITS ORDINARY SHARES 

31 December 2020: (Haifa, Israel) ZIM Integrated Shipping Services Ltd. (the "Company"), announces that it filed on December 30, 2020, a registration statement on Form F-1 with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for an initial public offering of its ordinary shares.  

The amount of ordinary shares to be offered and the price per share has not yet been determined. Citigroup, Goldman Sachs & Co., LLC., and Barclays act as global coordinators and Jefferies and Clarksons Platou Securities act as joint bookrunners for the proposed offering.  

The proposed offering will be made only by means of a prospectus. Copies of the preliminary prospectus relating to the proposed offering, when available, may be obtained from: Citigroup Global Markets Inc., c/o Broadridge Financial Solutions, 1155Long Island Avenue, Edgewood, New York 11717, by telephone at 1-800-831-9146; Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, Attention: Prospectus Department, 200 West Street, New York, NY 10282, by telephone at 1-866-471-2526 or by email at prospectus-ny@ny.email.gs.com; and Barclays Capital Inc., c/o Broadridge Financial Solutions, 1155 Long Island Avenue, Edgewood, NY 11717, by telephone at 1-888-603-5847 or by email at barclaysprospectus@broadridge.com. 

From The Company 

“ZIM was established in 1945 by the Jewish Agency, Histadrut labor federation, and the Israel Maritime League. The company's first ship, the Kedmah, was purchased in 1947. The early fleet included ships that were refitted to carry immigrants from Europe and to bring much-needed supplies during the 1948 War of Independence, and the difficult early years of statehood. 

In 1969, approximately 50% of ZIM was acquired by the Israel Corporation. By ZIM’s 25th anniversary in 1970, the company owned 77 ships, chartered 70 ships, and operated 19 major cargo lines, carrying 4.3 million tons of cargo annually.  Next, ZIM made the bold move into container shipping. ZIM was a pioneer in this area, one of the first carriers in the world to adopt the technology that was new at the time, yet destined to dominate the shipping industry in the decades to come. To this end, the company acquired six specialized container ships, in addition to containers and shore equipment 

In 1972, ZIM introduced the innovative ZCS. The “ZIM Container Service” was a three-continent line, with a scheduled 100-day journey that originated in Israel and included ports of call in the Far East, Asia, America and Europe. During this period, ZIM also deployed tankers to carry crude oil from Iran to Israel, and finished goods from Israel to Europe.  During the late 1980s, ZIM embarked on a massive fleet renovation and expansion project. From 1990 to 1997, ZIM built 15 modern ships, enabling the company to offer a weekly fixed-day sailing schedule, positioning ZIM among the world’s top-ranking shipping companies. 

In response to the global shipping crisis in 1997, a result of the financial crisis in Asia, ZIM launched a new effort to optimize the company’s operations through increased efficiency and focused expansion. The company added 13 new 5,000 TEU container ships to its fleet, increasing ZIM’s cargo capacity by a remarkable 50% within two years. 

In 1999, the Ofer Brothers Group became the controlling shareholder of the Israel Corporation. In 2004, the Israel Corporation acquired the remaining ZIM shares held by the government, completing ZIM's privatization process. The current ownership structure was established following a large-scale financial restructuring in 2014.  ZIM's shareholders include Kenon Holdings Ltd. (32%) as well as a number of financial institutions and ship owners (68%).  This stable backing constitutes a solid foundation from which to expand ZIM's activities, along with the strong support needed in order to take ZIM to new heights, as we continue to provide outstanding shipping services and solutions to diverse clients worldwide.

Facts & Figures
Annual turnover 2019: US$3,299.8 million
TEU's Carried in 2019: 2,821,000
Total TEU Capacity (owned and chartered vessels): about 384,000 TEU's
Containers: about 630,000 TEUs of various types
About 81 operated vessels
Ports of Call: 310 throughout the world, with 10 strategically located hubs
Services: Over 100 lines and services, mostly on a weekly, fixed-day basis, covering major trade routes with regional connections
Employees: ~3,800
Agents: ZIM has more than 200 offices and representatives in over 100 countries throughout the world
China: Strong presence in China with 20 offices and branches and hundreds of employees”

Maritime Executive
Fort Lauderdale, Florida
2 January 2021
Zim Files for Initial Stock Offering on the NYSE

Zim filed a preliminary prospectus with the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission on December 31, 2020, for its long-anticipated initial public offering. The container and logistics company plans to trade its shares on the New York Stock Exchange becoming only the second container line after Matson to be listed on the Big Board. 

Terms of the offering are not included in a preliminary filing, which is submitted to the SEC for review and approval, but the Israeli news outlet Globes reports that Zim is targeting raising between $300 and $500 million in the offering, which would give the company a market value of $1.5 billion. The offering, which is being led globally by Barclays, Goldman Sachs, and Citigroup, would provide Zim with funds to support long-term growth initiatives. The prospectus highlights that they do not have specific plans for the proceeds, but that its uses would include investing in vessels, containers, and other digital initiatives, strengthening the capital structure, fostering financial flexibility, or possibly to service or repay certain outstanding debt. 

Zim has been openly discussing its goal of running an IPO for months. The company had taken several steps to improve its financials, including the early repayment of $55 million in debt in September. The timing of the offer, which is expected to be completed by late January, is seen as a move to leverage the strength of the global container and logistics markets.  

Zim's most recent financial results show a strong performance with revenues up more than six percent in the first nine months of 2020 to over $2.6 billion. The adjusted net profit for the first nine months of the year was nearly $176 million versus a $10 million loss in 2019. 

The draft prospectus lays out the investment case for Zim highlighting what they call their “asset-light model,” along with a flexible structure focused on niche routes and markets. The global network includes 66 weekly lines calling at 310 ports in more than 80 countries.  

Zim highlights that it currently only owns one vessel while it charters 69 vessels, which they compare to competitors which they report own 44 percent of their fleets. Zim says that nearly 99 percent of its TEU capacity, which is approximately 359,00 TEU, is chartered. The majority of the vessels they operate are mid-sized with a capacity of between 3,000 and 10,000 TEUs, giving it the ability to service niche routes not fully serviced by competitors. In 2019, Zim reports it carried a total of 2.8 million TEU. 

By operating with a charter fleet, Zim contends that it can quickly adjust capacity in anticipation or in response to changing market conditions. Currently, nearly 80 percent of the fleet is under leases having a remaining charter duration of one year or less.  

Found in 1945, Zim says that it currently services five trade zones. The Transpacific is the largest, accounting for 39 percent of the TEUs carried, followed by the Atlantic, Cross Suez, Intra-Asia, and Latin America. Examples of the niche routes they highlight are the US East Coast and Gulf to the Mediterranean, the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea to the Far East, and the Far East to the US East Coast. They also highlight their new premium high-speed services which move freight from China to Los Angeles and Australia. Focused on time-sensitive cargo, they believe these services provide an alternative to airfreight. 

One area of growth that Zim highlights is on its Transpacific routes. The company says it is currently exploring long-term lease arrangements for vessels that could reach 15,000 TEU. They would replace smaller vessels on the route, expanding the capacity as well as being among the largest ships in Zim’s fleet.

LINK To Complete Analysis In PDF Format

U.S. Secretary Of State Pompeo Again Telegraphs Returning Cuba To List Of State Sponsors Of Terrorism

United States Department of State
Washington DC
5 January 2021

Secretary Michael R. Pompeo With David Rubenstein of Bloomberg News

Excerpts:

QUESTION: Okay. Let’s talk about some other things that have been in the news recently in your area of domain. It is said that you are considering labeling Cuba a terrorist nation on our State Department watchlist, I guess it is. Is that something you can comment on? Is that likely to happen?

SECRETARY POMPEO: We don’t get out in front of decisions that will be made on designations, but the world knows Cuba’s evil hand in so many places. I’ll give you the perfect example. We’ve been working to create democracy for the people of Venezuela for our entire four years, and it is Cuban efforts, Cuban security operations, Cubans controlling the security apparatus inside of Venezuela that has inflicted massive pain on the Venezuelan people. It is completely appropriate for us to consider whether Cuba is in fact sponsoring terrorism. And if so, just like any other nation that is providing material support to terrorists, they too should be designated such and treated in a way that’s consistent with that behavior that they’re undertaking.

QUESTION: I have been always wondering how Venezuela survives given the fact that its oil production is way down. It doesn’t seem to have an economy that’s – that’s very productive right now. How do you think Venezuela and the government in power there has been able to survive over all these years since Chavez died?

SECRETARY POMPEO: David, you’ve seen this – rogue regimes who inflict massive pain on their people can often survive well past their sell-by date. They do it by stealing. They do it by oppression. They do it by having control of the military or the capacity to inflict kinetic harm on people. They put their people in information fear as well – that is, they have the apparatus that can communicate to their people and impose real emotional burdens on them. They threaten them. Regimes often can survive far longer than the people who are being harmed by them would prefer.

And we’ve done everything we can to deliver for the Venezuelan people a better outcome. It’s tragic that Maduro continues to hang on and inflict so much harm. I think – I think now, David, we’re up to 12 to 15 percent of the Venezuelan people have fled their country. That’s a very telling statistic when that many people decide they just can’t hang in there. They can’t stay where they want to be; they can’t be home. We are very hopeful that the Venezuelan people under President – acting President – excuse me – President Guaido will see the light of day, and we hope that day comes soon.

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On New Years Day, Anniversary Of Defeat Of Batista, Trump Administration Sanctions Another Military-Controlled Bank In Cuba. More To Come?

United States Department of State
Washington DC

Removing the Cuban Military’s Grip from Cuba’s Banking Sector
01/01/2021 09:40 AM EST

Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State 

“Today, the Department of State is announcing the addition of Banco Financiero International S.A. (BFI) to the Cuba Restricted List, effective upon publication in early January. BFI is a Cuban military-controlled commercial bank that benefits directly from financial transactions at the expense of the Cuban people. The Cuban military uses BFI’s key role in foreign exchange to give military and state companies preferential access, secure advantageous exchange rates, and finance government-controlled projects that enrich the regime. The profits earned from these operations disproportionately benefit the Cuban military rather than independent Cuban entrepreneurs, furthering repression of the Cuban people and funding Cuba’s interference in Venezuela. President Trump has made it clear that he stands with the Cuban people in their longstanding struggle for freedom and against the communist regime in Havana. Adding BFI to the Cuba Restricted List furthers the Administration’s goal of preventing the Cuban military from controlling and benefiting from financial transactions that should instead benefit the Cuban people.” 

Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA) is a Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba-controlled umbrella enterprise with interests in the tourism, financial investment, import/export, and remittance sectors. GAESA’s portfolio includes businesses incorporated in Panama. 

Financiera Cimex S.A. (FINCIMEX) is a financial investment and remittance company owned by GAESA and incorporated in Panama.  FINCIMEX is authorized by the Central Bank of Cuba to finance export operations, conduct financial leasing operations, and handle commercial distribution of remittance cards.  FINCIMEX was the distribution partner in the Republic of Cuba for Denver, Colorado-based Western Union Company (2020 revenues approximately US$5.5 billion) which electronically delivered annually transfers of reportedly valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.   

GAESA and FINCIMEX are already listed on the State Department’s List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (“Cuba Restricted List” or “CRL”).  The CRL is a list of entities and subentities “under the control of, or acting for or on behalf of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba.” 

GAESA and FINCIMEX are already on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons by Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), 31 C.F.R. part 515. 

Credit Card Usage  

Purchase, New York-based Mastercard Incorporated removed its restriction for the Republic of Cuba on 1 March 2015.  Financial institutions which authorized their Mastercard products (credit card and debit card) for use in the Republic of Cuba: Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank (2017 assets approximately US$2.9 billion); San Juan, Puerto Rico-based Banco Popular of Puerto Rico; and Fort Lauderdale, Florida-based Natbank.  Unknown is how usage of Mastercard products within the Republic of Cuba have are impacted by United States government decisions relating to FINCIMEX and BFI. 

Cuba Government Decisions 

The Republic of Cuba will need to continue to evaluate options relating to FINCIMEX and now BFI, including the sale or transfer of the subsidiary to a non-FAR-controlled Republic of Cuba government-operated entity, such as a financial institution (Banco de Crédito y Comercio S.A. (BANDEC), Banco Popular de Ahorro S.A. (BPA), Banco Internacional de Comercio S.A. (BICSA), and Banco Metropolitano S.A.(BM)) each of which could seamlessly absorb and maintain Fincimex operations.    

There is history for one Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institution transferring operations to another Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institution. 

From Banco Metropolitano S.A.: “(“BM”) is a Cuban commercial bank that has presence only in Havana.  Its corporate object is the pursuit of banking businesses, including but not limited to financial intermediation activities.  BM started its operations in 1996 with a Havana branch office specialized in the provision of banking services solely to the diplomatic community, as well as the foreign natural and legal persons who were residents in Cuba.  By resolution of Banco Central de Cuba (the Cuban Central Bank of “BCC,” for its Spanish acronym), BM’s corporate object, customer base, product portfolio and services were expanded effectively 2004 when BM acquired 30 offices hitherto held by Banco de Crédito y Comercio (“BANDEC,” for its Spanish acronym) and more than 50 offices hitherto held by Banco Popular de Ahorro (“BPA,” for its Spanish acronym), all located in Havana.  As a result, BM established a representative presence in every municipality of the province of Havana.”  

In 2015, BICSA, a member of Republic of Cuba government-operated Grupo Nuevo Banca SA, created by Corporate Charter No. 49 on 29 October 1993 and commenced operation on 3 January 1994, was vetted by the OFAC and approved for a correspondent banking relationship with Conway, Arkansas-based Home BancShares (2020 assets approximately US$14 billion) through its subsidiary Centennial Bank which in 2017 purchased Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank.   

Stonegate Bank  

In 2015, the OFAC authorized Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank (2017 assets approximately US$2.9 billion) to have an account with BICSA.  In 2017, Home BancShares through its Centennial Bank subsidiary purchased Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank.  

However, because the Obama Administration would not authorize BICSA under a license from the OFAC to have an account with Stonegate Bank, United States export-related funds were sent and received through Panama City, Panama-based Multibank, which had, but no longer has extensive dealings with the Republic of Cuba.    

From Bogota, Colombia-based Grupo Aval on 16 June 2020: “On May 25th, Banco de Bogotá, through its subsidiary Leasing Bogotá S.A. Panamá, acquired 96.6% of the ordinary shares of Multi Financial Group. As part of the acquisition process, MFG’s operation in Cuba was closed and as part of the transaction. Grupo Aval complies with OFAC regulations and doesn't have transactional relationships with Cuba.”