Bormey srl Among The First 35 Newly-Constituted Medium-Sized Enterprises In Cuba, Exported 5,000 Peanut Bars To Italy. Is United States Next? U.S. Department Of State Regulations Would Approve.

Granma
Havana, Republic of Cuba
25 October 2021

Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises moving Cuba forward
Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises are now a reality in Cuba, a real possibility encouraged by the state to strengthen the country’s development of the country with its own resources


Authors: Julio Martínez Molina and Ángel Freddy Pérez Cabrera

The creation of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSME) are now a reality in Cuba, an option encouraged by the state to strengthen the country’s development with oue own resources.

Open since September 20, the call to register these businesses gives prevalence to activities such as food production, goods and services exports, local development, circular economy and recycling, science, technology and innovation, to which manufacturing and computer science services have been recently added. Experts believe that the constitution of these figures lead to a more flexible restructuring of the national economy, closer to the production activity and services of each territory in Cuba.

Alexander Brito Brito, president of the Cienfuegos branch of the National Association of Economists and Accountants of Cuba, thinks that the MSMEs nurtures from the economic environment of the territories by the emergence of new entities that will have an horizontal relationship. “It will favor productive chains and it will reinforce the strategic design of development. Likewise, it will promote the consolidation of part of the state sector that seeks higher productive levels and efficiency in their processes,” he added. He pointed out that the private actor now earns the level of entrepreneur because they are running a business with new responsibilities and obligations and, as part of its growth, it can go from micro to small to medium enterprise and have an impact at the national level.

NATIONAL OPPORTUNITY FOR LOCAL PROGRESS

In the province of Cienfuegos, for example, 245 self-employed workers and three local development projects with potential to transition to MSMEs or Non-Agricultural Cooperatives (NAC) have been identified. At the same time, assessments are being conducted of some state enterprises.

A business dedicated to the maintenance of green areas, SERVIMAV (Green Areas Maintenance Service), is the first MSME approved in the province, in the municipality of Palmira. “We immediately saw the opportunity to begin with an activity with high demand in the territory,” said Andrés Guerra Monzón, senior partner of this micro business.

He explained that the services of the enterprise (comprised of two partners and an expected personnel of 12 workers) will include the pruning and cutting down of trees, mowing and manual cutting of the lawn, waste collection and transportation and it will provide these services to sport fields, children parks, docks and airports, among others. “Once we have established, we will begin to look for possible clients such as the Power Company, Communal Services, Highway Maintenance Services, Radiocuba, among others,” Guerra Monzón added.

The advantages of the MSMEs made Osiel Gil Falcón, partner at the Numancia Carpenter’s Workshop, in Cienfuegos, to take the step of becoming a micro enterprise. Two mini-industries for fruit and vegetable processing (from the municipalities of Lajas and Aguada de Pasajeros), and Jovero Verde tourist office, in Cumanayagua, are weighing the benefits of becoming MSMEs. Yainelys González Menéndez, expert on Local Development Projects, said there are several incentives for the rest of the economic actors:

-The tax on earnings of only 15 %
-Sales tax of only 5 %
-Prices of goods and services are set by agreement among the parties
-No custom taxes for the import of equipment and technology
-Access to bank credits in freely convertible currency is available

Young entrepreneur Orelvis Bormey Torres never imagined that his idea to conquer the popular favor with a product like peanut would impose the way it did for the pleasure of thousands of people both in Cuba and abroad who prefer the taste of the various products created by him. His passion for that grain comes from the crib. His grandparents and parents used to make a living cultivating peanut among other crops in his hometown Quemado de Güines, where they used to make exquisite turrones. Later on, when Orelvis was a student at the Marta Abreu Central University of Las Villas (UCLV), he transformed that family passion into a source of income and started to make his own sweets in 2004.

That is how the idea of The house of peanut in Santa Clara came to life. The quality of this brand, with a 100 % Cuban product, goes beyond the national market and it has even gathered a following in the United States, Italy, Canada and Germany, among other countries. With such credentials and the first successful export of 5,000 bars of peanut to Italy last year, the approval of his business as one of the first 35 MSMEs has come to help Bormey’s dream of expanding his thriving business and appeal to other markets in Cuba and abroad.

The young industrial engineer, who runs a business that manufactures over 30 products, including turrones, grains, candies and confectionery, all based on the oilseed and other nuts and processed fruits, describes this step as transcendental for the individual and the country’s economy. “Becoming the medium-sized enterprise Bormey srl means that we now have legal personality which allows us to celebrate contracts both for the purchase of consumables and for the export to other parts of the country and abroad,” said the young man, who also speaks of the demand to optimize the quality in all processes.

The measure, he expressed, has been definite in the lifting of the hurdles that slowed down the development of the project and also give the business credit advantages derived from a better determination of the corporate assets of the enterprise. Another benefit is that they can enter contracts with the farmers who supply the raw material, and to whom they can pay in either national currency or freely convertible currency, once the exports have been made since they would be in conditions to buy consumables that will help them make their state grow.

For that purpose, he requested around one hundred hectares of land to the Agriculture Ministry. In that extension of land, he could harvest, in two crops a year, the 150 tons of peanut he needs to keep the level of production, the new entrepreneur explained, aware of the importance of the partnership with the farmers in Encrucijada and Quemado de Güines, main producers of the grain in Villa Clara.

This business has also made him established links with the UCLV, specifically the Interface Society, to manage and take part in the development of varieties of fruits and grains of higher quality and yield. He also has working ties with the Research Institute of the Food Industry, the Center for Fishing Research and its certified laboratory, the Territorial Office of Normalization and Vegetable Health, among others, with which he has negotiated at the institutional level. Convinced of the success lying ahead, he emphasizes, “If Bormey succeeds, the mediu-sized enterprises succeed too, and the province and the country, in another way to move Cuba forward.”

IN CONTEXT

-The Ministry of Economy and Planning has received over 550 requests to establish MSMEs.
-None has been declined thus far.
-Some 102 MSMEs and two non-agricultural cooperatives have been approved.
-In Cuba there are more than 2,000 state enterprises and more than 600,000 self-employed workers, 52,000 of which hire personnel and over 5,000 have more than three employees.
-The tendency is for self-employed workers to organize an MSME or cooperative.
-Given the impact of the pandemic, many self-employed workers have modified their activities.
- Only Cuban citizens residing in Cuba may establish a MSME or cooperative. (Translated by ESTI)

LINK To United States Department Of State Self-Employed From The Republic Of Cuba Import Regulations

Havana Times
Managua, Nicaragua
15 May 2014

Cuba: Turning Peanuts into a Thriving Small Business

By Alejandro Ulloa (Progreso Weekly)

HAVANA TIMES — “What I have done is to start the business, use professional tools and take advantage of the opportunities presented by ‘the opening’ and the institutions, in order to develop an enterprise,” explains Orelvis Bormey Torres.

An industrial engineer with a Master’s degree, Orelvis a man just over 30, has created a brand (by now well known) and a prosperous business in Santa Clara, using peanuts as the basic product. Orelvis Bormey Torres says 300 clients show up daily at the Bormey House of Peanuts.

About 300 customers show up daily at the “Bormey House of Peanuts,” where he sells 21 types of turrones [nougat, fudge], five varieties of panetelas [a form of pound cake] and about 10 varieties of snacks [small bags of peanuts.) Ten years ago, that was unthinkable. “I always saw my grandparents and my father growing peanuts in Quemado de Güines, where I was born,” he says. “They also processed them into nougat.”

After his second year at the Las Villas Central University (UCLV), Orelvis turned that family tradition into a source of income. Two years later, in 2004, he himself began to make turrones. For about eight years, he worked with only one kind of dough and a single style of nougat. After he opened his House of Peanuts in December 2012, he worked with four kinds of dough (with sugar, without sugar, with honey and in Alicante style) and nearly 10 varieties of products. [Translator’s Note: Turrones originated in the Spanish region of Alicante in the 15th Century.]

“After I graduated, I kept raising peanuts, even though I was working for the State. I made the bars and took them once a week to the homes of clients I knew. My clientele later expanded. Of course, I never announced that I was selling peanuts because at the time no licenses were issued [to entrepreneurs]. Selling turrones was illegal, even though the sugar came from the store and the peanuts from my father’s farm.”

While selling turrones “on the sly,” between 2005 and 2012, the young engineer was the head of the purchasing department at the university where he studied and supervised product quality and human resources in companies like Caracol, a construction firm in Caibarién, and the Villa Clara Graphics Enterprise. The seven years of experience he acquired he now utilizes for his own business.

“I devoted the entire year of 2013 to putting together the manufacture and sale of the products that distinguish and represent my brand. For the rest of 2014 and the coming years, I will organize the procurement of raw materials. I didn’t ignore this aspect of the business but first I needed to set up a portfolio of products with stability, with a consolidated image.”

The Bormey House of Peanuts

It all started with the brand. “I always liked the way my father signed his name and — beyond the Bormey family pride — I tried to mollify the old man, who didn’t want me to quit my job. I asked him to sign his name, we designed the logo, and I went to Havana to register the brand at the Cuban Trademarks Office (OCPI). At that time, I owed about 20,000 or 25,000 pesos.” [over $1,000 USD]

By December 2012, the business had become serious enough for Orelvis to launch his House of Peanuts, which today has eight salaried workers (five factory workers and three salespeople) and retains the services of a designer and an attorney and has contractual relations with several state-owned companies.

After opening “the little house,” the Bormeys began to label each product in a different fashion, according to the rules. “We followed the procedures dictated by the Public Health Dept. for the handling of foodstuffs, the recommendations of the Food Industries Department and had the advice of the UCLV’s School of Agriculture regarding the grain that we buy. Their latest suggestion was that we should say on our labels that our products have no food preservatives.”

“We have been going ahead without finding any problems, without plans for improvement, but considering where the deficiencies are and taking steps to eliminate them.”

The price structure of Bormey Peanuts is very local. “We are in Villa Clara, whose prices do not compare with those in Havana. That’s why we set them using the production cost and adding a profit margin that results in a sales price — in national pesos [CUP] — that is accessible to our clients. Comparatively speaking, our prices are above the average for Santa Clara.”

An entrepreneurial vision

Fifteen months after the factory started operations, the labels that once said “Made by Orelvis Bormey” now say “Made by the Bormey Group.” To Orelvis, to keep his business going, he needs two basic premises: a good relationship with his workers and with the state-owned institutions, companies and suppliers. “We are not a cooperative or a state-run business, but we’re not just Orelvis. We are a group of people intent on transforming the image of the Cuban peanut, from a paper cucurucho [funnel] to a portfolio of products. That way, each worker receives the credit he or she deserves and feels more committed” to the job.

Referring to the company’s expansion, “something that opened the doors for us was the creation of an account at the Bank of Credit and Services of Santa Clara,” he says. This enabled the firm to sign contracts with state-run companies that print the labels, promotions and bags or sell cups, cake boxes and storage labels. Last year, the Chamber of Commerce invited the Bormey House of Peanuts to participate in the Havana International Fair (FIHAV-2013).

To Orelvis and his group of peanut vendors (who do not sell peanut bags on the street), it is vital to have a good chain of suppliers. “They are the main link to minimize costs,” he says. Some people buy peanuts from the farmers, store it and then, after the harvest is over, sell it at a price higher than normal. Bromey does not always buy from intermediaries but does depend on them for part of the year. He has invested about 10,000 CUP [$500] in storage containers alone.

“In order to maintain the quality of the product, improve its presentation and maintain its variety to reach the most buyers, we need to organize the flow of raw materials. I have to deal with the farmers to shorten the [production] chain, and increase their profits and mine. Not to mention the intermediaries, who are necessary.”

“I turned to peanuts because you can process them and preserve them without the need for special conditions. Also, the potential for its cultivation in Cuba is great, because of the propitious climate, the type of earth, the availability of seeds and professional support, because [peanut farming] can eliminate imports and generate jobs.”

Everything has to work just right, starting from the furrows. “A good harvest means that, once the peanuts have been extracted, they’re left to dry on the field, then harvested, separated from the plant, sun dried to remove the moisture and kill any fungus, and stored away. When ready to process, a machine shells them, removes the skin, blows it away. Then I grind them and mix them with sugar. I do this by myself, because the uniqueness of the Bormey products depends on that.”

Orelvis has been doing this in the same supply house for the past 10 years. “My supplier has two mills, one for the peanuts, the other for the sugar, and a mixer that other manufacturers use. But I give him the most business. So, once a week I process the peanuts we’re going to use.”

We asked: Wouldn’t it be better to own those machines and not depend on anyone? “No. The machines are not expensive but I would have to find a space for them, transportation for the peanuts, and all that to use [the mills] once a week. Where I do it now, it’s strategic for me. The man has a license and guarantees the necessary hygienic conditions. His capacity for processing suits my needs. It works and I don’t have to start a cooperative or change my routine.”

Later, in another supply house, there is space for the storage of dough and the manufacture of the turrones, ice cream, panetelas and other products. “Now that we’re in the business, we’re going to use the tools we learned in our training and our own experience to keep making a quality product that is recognized by our clientele. We are proud of our product and our brand.”

Orelvis Bormey’s peanut candy project has become a medium-sized enterprise. Photo: Freddy Pérez Cabrera

Cuba Reported To Owe More Than US$2.1 Billion To Spain- And Expectation The Amount Will Increase In 2021, 2022, 2023. Cuba Companies Reported Seeking 365 Days To Pay Invoices.

Diario de Cuba
Madrid, Spain
26 October 2021

Spain indefinitely postpones the collection of the amount owed by the Cuban Government 

The Government of Spain would have indefinitely postponed the collection of the debt that Havana and Caracas have with Madrid, and amounting to 1,937.55 million euros and 213.37 million, respectively. 

According to a response published by the Ministry of Economic Affairs in the Transparency Portal, website dependent on the Spanish Ministry of Territorial Policy and Public Function, and cited by the local media OK Diary, “As of the closing date of the last full fiscal year (December 31, 2020), Spain had debt as creditor against Cuba for an amount of 1,937.55 million euros and against Venezuela for an amount of 213.37 million of euros”. 

In the response that appeared on that website, it would also be indicated that Madrid approved a moratorium on the debt.  “On June 10, 2021, in the context of the Covid-19 crisis, an addendum to the 2015 multilateral agreement of Cuba was signed. Said addendum, which was again negotiated and agreed at a multilateral level, supposes the rescheduling of certain debt maturities, without implying any reduction “, the document would specify, dated September 30. 

OK Diary He assured that in the case of Venezuela the negotiations do not even exist. “Since 2004 there has not been any type of negotiation for the relief of the debt held against that country, and therefore no multilateral or bilateral debt relief agreement has been signed,” the General Secretariat of the Treasury and Financing would have contributed International Ministry of Economic Affairs itself.  The entity would not have responded to other points of the request for information due to “confidentiality” issues, according to the Spanish media, after explaining that debts between countries are negotiated in the Paris Club. 

“Spain has been, since 1978, a member of the Paris Club (a forum in which most of the main sovereign creditors are integrated and whose main objective is to coordinate the negotiation of sovereign debt relief treatments)”, the answer would indicate.  “As a member of the Paris Club, Spain undertakes to respect its basic principles of operation. One of these principles refers to the confidentiality of deliberations, which also extends to the multilateral agreements reached by the members of the Club with debtor countries to the treatment of its external debt “, they would have added. 

Last week, The Reuters agency reported that Havana reached an agreement with the Paris Club to postpone until next year the annual payment of its debt, which expires next November., in what constitutes another sign of how empty the coffers of the Cuban regime are.  The Reuters agency spoke with diplomats from five of the creditor governments, who confirmed the agreement. Neither the Cuban government nor the Paris Club made comments on the matter. 

A historic agreement with the Paris Club in 2015 forgave $ 8.5 billion of the $ 11.1 billion in debt that Havana defaulted in 1986, when Fidel Castro unilaterally decided to declare it unpayable and uncollectible.  Following that agreement, Havana agreed to reimburse the remainder in annual installments until 2033, but only partially met its obligations in 2019 and defaulted last year.  The broad lines of an amended agreement, drawn up between the parties in June and not previously reported, call for the resumption of payments in 2022 and the adjustment of the payment schedule, diplomats who requested anonymity said. 

In June, the parties indicated in a statement that “this agreement gives the Republic of Cuba more time to meet various payments owed under the 2015 Agreement, while maintaining the current value of these amounts.”  Havana is now about $ 200 million behind in payments, including this year, estimated diplomats.  It is unclear whether sanctions will be applied, as the novel coronavirus pandemic crisis has prompted lenders to waive other debtor countries’ fees. 

During the last decade, Havana also restructured its debt with holders of commercial debt from Russia, China, Germany, Mexico and Japan.  “I understand that most of those payments are also on hold,” said another diplomat, and a colleague seconded that view. 

The Cuban government’s foreign exchange earnings fell by about $ 4 billion as of 2020 and the import of basic goods and inputs for agriculture and production in general plummeted almost 40% as a result of the sanctions approved by the Trump Administration. , assured Havana.   The island’s economy contracted 10.9% last year and another 2% through June, compared to the same period in 2020, resulting in a worsening shortage of food, medicine, and other basic goods. 

Under the original Paris Club agreement, as seen by Reuters, interest was forgiven until 2020, and after that only 1.5% of total outstanding debt remains. Part of that money owed was assigned to funds for investments in Cuba.  Diplomats who spoke to Reuters said they did not expect any significant changes to that part of the agreement. 

Cuban authorities last reported an external debt of $ 18.5 billion in 2018, and experts say it has risen since then, especially for providers and investment partners that reported serious payment problems as early as 2018. The country did not He is a member of the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. 

LINK To Original Source

Cuba Reported In New Agreement With Paris Club "Group Of Creditors Of Cuba" To Restructure Defaulted Payment Terms. Previously Forgave 75% Of Debt. Officials Expect Further Defaults.

NOTE: Individuals participating in the negotiations shared on background that the group of creditor countries have no expectation that the Republic of Cuba will maintain the terms of a newly-termed debt repayment agreement. The altering of debt repayment terms was pro forma as the Republic of Cuba continues to be in arrears for hundreds of millions of dollars of private sector commercial debt including to joint venture partners, and continues to seek debt foregiveness and debt restructuring of private sector commercial debt. There is an expectation that long-term government-to-government financing programs for infrastructure and durable products will become donations.

LINK To Paris Club Agreements With Republic Of Cuba

EXCLUSIVE Cuba, Paris Club reach deal to skip 2021 debt payment - diplomats

By Marc Frank

HAVANA, Oct 20 (Reuters) - Cuba has reached a deal with the Paris Club of creditor nations to postpone an annual debt payment due in November until next year, according to diplomats from five of the governments involved, the latest sign the Communist-run country is suffering a grave foreign exchange crisis.

The historic 2015 Paris Club agreement with Havana forgave $8.5 billion of $11.1 billion in sovereign debt Cuba defaulted on in 1986, plus charges. Cuba agreed to repay the remainder in annual installments through 2033, but only partially met its obligations in 2019 and defaulted last year.

The outlines of an amended deal, worked out between the parties in June and not previously reported, calls for resumption of payments in 2022 and adjustment of the payment schedule, the diplomats said, requesting anonymity to comment. The Cuban government and Paris Club had no comment on the matter.

The parties in June said in a statement that "this agreement provides more time to the Republic of Cuba to honor several payments due under the 2015 Arrangement, while maintaining the present value of these amounts."

Cuba has now fallen behind by around $200 million on payments, including this year, the diplomats estimated. It is not clear if penalties will apply as the pandemic crunch has led lenders to waive fees on other debtor nations.

Cuba said this week it had vaccinated 99.2% of its population with at least one dose of its locally developed COVID-19 vaccines, and plans to reopen its borders to international tourism by mid-November after nearly two years of coronavirus-induced stagnation.

The Caribbean island nation depends heavily on tourism to inject much-needed foreign exchange into its otherwise inefficient state-run economy, and for the cash it needs to repay lenders. "I expect a fairly robust return of tourists impacting other activities and that should improve the outlook somewhat for payment in 2022," one of the diplomats said.

Over the last decade, Cuba also restructured debt with Russia, China, Germany, Mexico and Japanese commercial debt holders. "Its my understanding most of those payments are also on hold," another diplomat said, with a colleague seconding that view.

Harsh U.S. sanctions on vital foreign exchange earners such as tourism, remittances and foreign investment, many implemented under then-U.S. President Donald Trump and maintained under his successor, Joe Biden, also complicate inflows.

Foreign exchange revenues fell by some $4 billion beginning in 2020 and the import of basic goods and inputs for agriculture and production in general plunged nearly 40% as a result, the government reported. The economy contracted 10.9% last year and another 2% through June, compared with the same period in 2020, resulting in shortages of food, medicine and other basic goods. The government this year predicts the economy to grow 2%, just barely beginning to recoup last year's downturn.

Under the original Paris Club agreement, seen by Reuters, interest was forgiven through 2020, and after that was just 1.5% of the total debt still due. Some of that money due was allocated to funds for investments in Cuba. The diplomats who spoke to Reuters said they did not expect any significant changes to that portion of the agreement.

Cuba last reported foreign debt of $18.5 billion in 2018, and experts believe it has risen since then, especially to suppliers and investment partners who reported serious payment issues as early as 2018. The country is not a member of the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.

The Cuba group of the 22-member Paris Club comprises Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

Cuba Increases Commercial Relationship With China; Expansion Of "One Belt One Road" Alliance. Increasing Debts To China.

Beijing, Oct 19 (Prensa Latina) Cuba considered today as an important opportunity to expand bilateral and multilateral cooperation, its integration to the OBOR [One Belt One Road] Alliance for Energy project.

[NOTE: The Republic of Cuba signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2018 to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).]  

Island's ambassador here, Carlos Miguel Pereira, told Prensa Latina that the initiative, designed by China, contains principles and concepts with which his country agrees, such as promoting a future with greater use of green sources.

He highlighted the possibilities of training, technical assistance and exchanges in the implementation of programs that contribute to the main objective of gradually transforming the energy matrix of his country.  The diplomat announced that an action plan will be signed shortly to materialize Cuba's immersion in the strategy, through mega projects to be developed in the coming years.

He also recalled that the energy sector is part of Beijing-Havana cooperation and joining the Alliance ratifies his country's commitment to the Belt and the Silk Road, called to build an international mega-platform for economic exchanges under the principle of shared profit.

Cuba officially entered this mechanism yesterday, and Pereira emphasized the relevance of the initiative to collectively overcome global challenges.

He also ratified the commitment of the Caribbean State to contribute to sustainable progress and invited Chinese companies and institutions and the rest of the members to work in fields such as the promotion of green energy and inclusive access to energy services.

Meanwhile, Minister of Energy and Mines of Cuba, Liván Arronte, referred to measures adopted by his Government to develop renewable sources, promote the efficient use of these resources and achieve independence in this area.

He called for promoting international cooperation and solidarity in favor of poor countries, so they can face the challenges of today's world and comply with the Sustainable Development Goals.  In this endeavor, Arronte denounced the impact of the economic, commercial and financial blockade of the United States, considered the main obstacle for the development of the Island.

China Daily
Beijing, China
28 December 2021

Victor Gao, chair professor at Soochow University in Jiangsu province, noted recently that China is a major power country in the world, especially in new and renewable energy like wind and solar. "And in this regard, China can definitely share its experience with Cuba in many ways, including very interestingly in oil and gas exploration and production," he told CGTN America. "Cuba is very geographically located in the middle of the Gulf of Mexico, and we believe that Cuba actually has large reserves in oil and in gas, but new and renewable energy will be more important because of the climate change impact." In May 2015 the Chinese Export-Import Bank approved a $60 million loan for Cuba to build a biomass plant, which Shanghai Electric took over in 2017. The plant is already connected to the national grid. It is just one small but significant step toward clean energy transition in the country. Shanghai Electric and its joint venture partner Hive Energy also received $160 million from the Export-Import Bank to salvage a photovoltaic park project in Cuba. Venezuela, Bolivia and Suriname have also joined the 31-member BREP.

LINK To Related Analysis

New Report Data Shows Cuba Owing China US$4.643 Billion In "sovereign and hidden debt exposure" For BRI And ODA September 29, 2021

Another Charter Company Obtains US Department Of Transportation Authorization For Flights To Cuba- 508 Through 31 May 2022

MIAMI, FLORIDA, October 12, 2021 – Global Crossing Airlines Group Inc. (JET: TSX-V; JET.B: TSX-V; JETMF: OTCQB) (the “Company” or “GlobalX”) and ViajeHoy, LLC, d/b/a Havana Air (“Havana Air”) are pleased to announce the allocation from the U.S Department of Transportation by Order DOT-OST-2020-001 for GlobalX to operate 508 round-trip charter flights through May 31, 2022. Flight schedules are subject to Cuban governmental approval, with flights targeted to begin in early November 2021.  

“We are grateful to the DOT for allocating these flights to GlobalX and honored to be working with Havana Air, the largest and most experienced OFAC approved charter air provider for Cuba flights. Our flight crews have extensive experience operating to Cuba, and we have the right aircraft in terms of seats and cargo capacity to effectively serve the market with our fleet of modern A320 and A321 aircraft,” said Ed Wegel, Chairman and CEO of GlobalX.  

“We are extremely pleased to partner with GlobalX, which has built an amazing team of airline professionals. We now have the ability to offer our customers enhanced service levels, heightened reliability, and the effectiveness of A321/320 aircraft,” said Mark Elias, President / COO of Havana Air.  

About Havana Air 

Miami-based Havana Air has over 12 years of experience in serving the Cuba travel market. Mark Elias, President/COO, has over 25 years of travel agency experience as a previous senior executive with TravelLeaders. David Nesslen, CEO, has extensive high volume, multiple location corporate experience as owner of one of the nation's largest healthcare companies. Havana Air has previously operated in excess of 35 flights a week, serving Havana, Holguin, Santiago de Cuba, Camaguey, and Santa Clara from both Miami and Tampa. They have been entrusted with such prestigious movements as the Tampa Bay Rays baseball team exhibition in Cuba, all support staff for the historic Rolling Stones concert, the film crews of Fast & Furious, and multiple Cuban artists visiting the USA. Havana Air’s highly experienced team has in-depth experience in all aspects of high-volume passenger travel, group travel, visa requirements, and U.S. documentation required for travel to Cuba. They hold long-term and invaluable relationships on the island. Havana Air is an authorized U.S. DOT Part 380 license holder as well as an OFAC General License to operate to Cuba. www.havanaair.com.  

About Global Crossing Airlines

GlobalX is a US 121 domestic flag and supplemental airline flying the Airbus A320 family aircraft. GlobalX flies as an ACMI and wet lease charter airline serving the US, Caribbean, and Latin American markets. For more information please visit www.globalxair.com.  

LINKS To Related Filings

Notification Of Cancellation of Swift Air, LLC d/b/a/ iAero Airways (10/19/21)

Swift Air Schedule For 2021-2022 Charter Pool Flights (10/18/21)

U.S.-Havana Charter Operation Report (10/12/21)

Objection of Motion for iAero Airways for a Modification of US-Havana Roundtrip Charter Flight Allotment Procedures (9/24/21)

3,545 Miles From Its Headquarters, Icelandair Seeks To Operate Orlando-Havana Charter Flights Using 182-Passenger B757-223 Aircraft. Icelandair Services MCO-KEF Market.

Reykjavik, Iceland-based Icelandair Group (2019 revenue approximately US$1.5 billion) is located approximately 3,545 miles from Orlando International Airport in the state of Florida.  Icelandair operates flights from its primary hub located at Keflavík International Airport (KEF) to/from Orlando International Airport (MCO) in Orlando, Florida.  Flight time is approximately eight hours. 

On 6 September 2021, Icelandair filed with the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) to operate a total of 13 roundtrip flights between Orlando, Florida, and Havana, Republic of Cuba.  The airline wants to operate once weekly service on Tuesdays for 13 successive weeks, between October 5 and December 28, 2021. 

These would be operated as charter flights on behalf of Anmart Superior Travel (Anmart Air). It would appear that these would be charter flights that would have passengers onboard, rather than cargo flights. 

APPLICATION FOR ALLOCATION TROM U.S. - HAVANA CEARTER POOL OF ICELAIIDAIR, ehf. 

Icelandair, ehf. (Icelandair), hereby applies for an allocation of 13 round-trip charter flights from the 2021-2022 U.S.-Cuba charter pool, established in Order 2O2O-5-7.  

Said flights will be operated by Icelandair on behalf of Anmart Superior Travel, LLC., d/b/a Anmart Air, LLC.  

1. Icelandair proposes to operate one (1) flight weekly, every Tuesday for 13 successive weeks, Orlando, Florida (MCO) - Havana (HAV) - Orlando, Florida (MCO), from October 5, 2O2l - December 28, 2027, inclusive. Scheduled departure /arrival times - TBD.  

2. A true copy of the charter agreement is being submitted to the Department under separate cover - subject to a request for confidentiality, under Rule L2 of the Department's procedural Regulations policy. See: 14 CER s 302. 12.  

3 This Application will be served on interested parties appearing on the annexed service list - by electronic mail.

WHEREFORE, Icelandair respectfully requests that the Department award it 13 round-trip charter flights from the 2027 - 2022 (June I, 2021 - May 31, 2022), charter pool, as set forth in Order 2020-5-7. 

LINK: Application For Allocation From U.S.-Havana Charter Pool Of Icelandair, EHF

LINK: Icelandair Schedule For Charter Pool Flights

OFAC Publishes 9-Page Report On Sanctions Usage... Cuba Included

United States Department of the Treasury
Washington DC
18 October 2021

U.S. Department of the Treasury Releases Sanctions Review


Report Emphasizes Need for Continued Multilateral Approach, Structured Policy Framework, and Enhanced Cost Mitigation

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today released the results of a broad review of the economic and financial sanctions that it administers and enforces, and issued recommendations to preserve and enhance their effectiveness in supporting national security and U.S. interests now and in the future.

“Sanctions are a fundamentally important tool to advance our national security interests,” said Deputy Secretary Adeyemo. “Treasury’s sanctions review has shown that this powerful instrument continues to deliver results but also faces new challenges. We’re committed to working with partners and allies to modernize and strengthen this critical tool.”

During Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen’s confirmation hearing, she committed to a comprehensive review of sanctions, which Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo led. Treasury’s review engaged hundreds of sanctions stakeholders, including former Treasury officials from both parties; key interagency partners including the Department of State, Department of Justice, and USAID; Members of Congress and their staffs; small and large commercial businesses and financial institutions; academics; non-governmental organizations; and the governments of our allies and partners abroad.

Treasury’s review found that while sanctions remain an essential and effective policy tool, they also face new challenges including rising risks from new payments systems, the growing use of digital assets, and cybercriminals, as well as situations where careful calibration can help limit the impact of sanctions on the flow of legitimate humanitarian aid to those in need. Key recommendations to mitigate those challenges and bolster the effectiveness of Treasury’s role in sanctions moving forward include:

Adoption of a structured policy framework that links sanctions to a clear policy objective. This framework asks whether a sanctions action: supports a clear policy objective within a broader strategy; has been assessed to be the right tool for the circumstances; incorporates economic and political implications for sanctions targets and others and has been calibrated to mitigate unintended impacts; includes a multilateral coordination and engagement strategy; and will be easily understood, enforceable, and, where possible, reversible. This policy framework is intended to cover key policy considerations in the sanctions implementation process and offer a standardized set of factors to be consistently used by sanctions professionals for both evaluating potential new actions and assessing the ongoing alignment of sanctions with evolving policy priorities. This framework also incorporates several of the recommendations which emerged from the sanctions review.

Multilateral coordination wherever possible. Sanctions are most effective when coordinated as an Administration and where possible with allies and partners who can magnify the economic and political impact. This coordination also enhances the credibility of U.S. international leadership and shared policy goals of the United States and its allies.

Calibration of sanctions to mitigate unintended economic, political, and humanitarian impact. Treasury should continue to seek ways to tailor sanctions to mitigate unintended economic, humanitarian, and political impacts on U.S. workers and businesses, allies, and non-targeted populations abroad. This will protect key constituencies and help preserve support for U.S. sanctions policy.

Ensuring sanctions are easily understood, enforceable, and, where possible, reversible. Treasury can build on existing outreach and engagement capabilities through enhanced communication with industry, financial institutions, allies, civil society, and the media, as well as new constituencies.

Investment in modernizing Treasury’s sanctions technology, workforce, and infrastructure. Treasury should invest in building its technological capabilities and deepening its institutional knowledge, especially in the evolving digital assets and services space, to support the full sanctions lifecycle of activities. Further investments in Treasury’s sanctions workforce and operational capabilities will sustain Treasury’s ability to execute a core tool of U.S. national security and foreign policy and protect the integrity of the U.S. financial system.

LINK To Complete Report In PDF Format

Iberostar Of Spain Files 19th Monthly Libertad Act Lawsuit Status Report- Continues To Await Decision By European Commission. Waiting For 549 Days. U.S. Court Patient.

MARIA DOLORES CANTO MARTI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATES OF DOLORES MARTI MERCADE AND FERNANDO CANTO BORY V. IBEROSTAR HOTELES Y APARTAMENTOS SL [1:20-cv-20078; Southern Florida District]

Zumpano Patricios P.A. (plaintiff)
Bird & Bird (defendant)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

Excerpt:

Defendant IBEROSTAR HOTELES Y APARTAMENTOS, S.L.U. (“Iberostar”) submits1 [1 Iberostar reserves all its rights and will move to dismiss based on its Rule 12 defenses when it receives authorization to do so from the European Commission.] this status report pursuant to this Court’s Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Stay Proceedings dated April 24, 2020 (D.E. 17), directing Defendant to submit status reports every 30 days on its request for authorization to the European Union Commission. Defendant states as follows: 1. Since the last update filed on September 14, 2021, Iberostar continues to await a decision on its application for authorization to the European Commission to respond to the Complaint in this action which was filed with the European Commission on April 15, 2020 (the “Application”). Defendant’s Motion to Stay, ¶ 2. (D.E. 16).

LINK To Defendant’s Status Report (10/15/21)

LINK: Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

LINK: Report From The Commission To The European Parliament And The Council Relating To Article 7(A) Of Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 (‘Blocking Statute’)

Related Analyses

US Subsidiary Requests 30-Day Court Delay In Libertad Act Lawsuit. Will US Court Approve? Other Requests Were From EU-Based Defendant Parent Companies. Iberostar Waiting 528 Days For EC Guidance September 27, 2021

European Commission (EC) Reports "Several" EU-Based "Persons and Companies" With Libertad Act Title III Engagement. Iberostar Of Spain Waiting 528 Days For EC Guidance 26 September 2021 

During United Nations Meetings, European Commission And United States Continue 2021 Theme For Cuba: Neither Party Wants To Discuss- So They Don’t. For EC, Title III Not As Important As Advertised 23 September 2021

At U.S.-EU Summit Will Cuba Be Mentioned By President Biden, President Michel, Or President von der Leyen? Trajectory Suggests Not. How Does Borrell Square Statements With Action? June 14, 2021 

After Four Meetings In Brussels, Representatives Of EC, EU, and United States Have Not Discussed Cuba Despite EC Commitment To Do So May 26, 2021  

Third Meeting In Two Months- EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Borrell Again Does Not Discuss Cuba With U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken. Confirms Cuba Not Important To EU-U.S. Relations. May 04, 2021 

EC Now Has To Decide What It Perhaps Doesn’t Want To Decide- Iberostar Of Spain Libertad Act Lawsuit Is First To Report U.S. Court Recognizing EC’s Interest In Title III Lawsuits April 26, 2020  

EC/EU May Today Find End Of “Comity” By United States Courts. After One Year Waiting, EC/EU May Have Run Out Of Time. April 15, 2021  

Second Visit In Three Weeks- U.S. Secretary Of State To Brussels. EC Writes It Will "Address" Cuba. Did Not Last Time. EU Defendants Waiting One Year For Guidance. April 13, 2021  

Lost In Translation- EP Member & Media Report EC Will “mediate” With Biden Administration About Cuba On Terrorism List. Problem- EC Wrote “we will address this issue” April 02, 2021 

Confusing Message By EC/EU Not Including Libertad Act In Agendas For Meetings With Secretary Of State Blinken. Not As Important As Advertised? March 25, 2021  

In Brussels Will U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken Discuss Cuba, Libertad Act And Venezuela With EC/EU Officials?  Will He Rebuff, Sway Or Be Swayed?  Quid Pro Quo? March 23, 2021  

EC Responds To European Parliament Inquiry About EU Ambassador To Cuba Letter To President Biden- Navarro "Committed Two Major... Failures..." March 12, 2021 

images.png

Cuba Again Subject For Reporters At White House And Department Of State Briefings- Continuing A Problematic Theme For Cuba

The White House
Washington DC
14 October 2021


Q Jen, last Friday when the President signed the HAVANA Act, he said that he was determined to get to the bottom of who is responsible --

MS. PSAKI: Yeah.

Q -- for these incidents. What is your message for those who are responsible?

MS. PSAKI: Well, our -- well, first, just so people understand, there's an assessment that's being done by our intelligence community, understanding fully that everybody wants that assessment to be completed. We want it to be thorough and people -- for people to have confidence in it once it's completed. Our message to the -- to the -- I'm not sure what your question is. Sorry.

Q Well, the administration has said that the victims of these anomalous health incidents -- AHIs -- need to be believed. And in the statement that the President put out on Friday, he said he wanted to get to the bottom of, quote, “who is responsible.”

MS. PSAKI: Absolutely, which is what we've been doing and working on in the intelligence community.

Q Right. So, on the assumption there is a “who,” which is what this President said, is there a determination for there to be consequences?

MS. PSAKI: Why don't we wait until there's an assessment made and then we can have a further discussion about what the consequences will be.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
14 October 2021


QUESTION: Thank you, Ned. I want to ask you about a letter from members of the Foreign Relations Committee, a bipartisan letter that was sent to the Secretary which says, among other things: “While there has been progress” – this is on Havana syndrome, as know – “we continue to have concerns that the department is not sufficiently communicating with or responding to diplomats who’ve been injured from these attacks. We’re also concerned that the department is insufficiently engaged in interagency efforts to find the cause of the attacks, identify those responsible, and develop a plan to hold them accountable. And we urge you to immediately announce a successor to Ambassador Spratlen to lead the department’s Health Incident Response Task Force. Critically, this must be a senior-level official that reports directly to you.”

I am well aware of the long list of improvements, the progress that you have reiterated and that has been made available by a number of officials. But this is subsequent to those improvements; this letter is still an expression of concern from, as you know, a bipartisan list. You’ve got Menendez, Shaheen, Cardin, Chris Coons, Tim Kaine, Cory Booker, Risch, Rubio, Romney, Hagerty, Schatz. So —

MR PRICE: Certainly understand the expression of concern. We also have expressed our concern over these anomalous health incidents. That is precisely why we have made it such a priority to get to the bottom of them, and importantly to provide care for our employees who have been subject to them. The Secretary, late last week – on Friday I believe it was – added his voice to the support for the recently passed Havana Act. The Secretary appreciates the interest that Congress has demonstrated in this issue. It is very consistent with the priority he himself has attached to this, as you know, Andrea, as we’ve had an opportunity to discuss.

I’ve made this point before, but one of the briefings that the Secretary proactively requested before he assumed this office was on so-called cases of Havana syndrome or anomalous health incidents, as we call them. He wanted to enter this job on day one with a firm understanding of where we were, what we had provided to our employees, subject to them, and what more we could do. And we have been quite clear that this department has not always done – had not always done a sufficient job in addressing these anomalous health incidents. That is why you have seen Secretary Blinken put such a premium on several areas.

One is communication, the issue – an issue that was raised in this letter. And the Secretary has had an opportunity to meet with members of our State Department team who have themselves reported these AHIs. Deputy Secretary McKeon and other senior officials have held town halls with overseas posts where a number of these incidents have been reported. We have sent out regular messages from the Secretary, from the Deputy Secretary, from our Health Incident Response Task Force to the work force as well. We have made clear the resources that our employees have available to them, in terms of training, in terms of to whom they should turn if and when they should feel that they are subject – they have been subject – to an anomalous health incident.

QUESTION: So with all due respect, with all that you say has been done, there has been criticism from a number of victims of what they don’t call anomalous health incidents, by the way, because they think that diminishes and disparages what they are suffering. They believe that the Secretary should have met with them sooner; he should have been more engaged. And clearly the bipartisan members of the Senate, of the Foreign Relations Committee believe that the communication is inadequate, and that the appointment of Ambassador Spratlen’s replacement should not report to the Deputy Secretary but should report directly to Secretary Blinken, and that there has not been enough attention at the top – that this is not – this is not perceived – what you say is being done is not perceived by many of the people who are viewing it from the outside and from the inside.

MR PRICE: What I can tell you, Andrea, is that the Secretary has no higher priority than the health and the safety and the security of our work force and their family members and dependents. And this is precisely what that issue is about. I want – also want to be very clear that we believe those who come forward. We take every single report of an anomalous health incident extraordinarily seriously. And we do that for a couple of reasons.

Number one, we want to make sure that those who have come forward are getting the care that they need. And I can give you quite a bit in terms of what our Bureau of Medical Services has done, including since January of this year, to ensure that those who come forward are getting that care.

On June 1st, for example, we launched a pilot program to collect from employees and eligible family members a pre-incident health baseline, as we call it, so that we can compare that information should one of these individuals later be subject to an anomalous health incident. Additionally, we’ve partnered with a number of Centers of Excellence where our department team members can seek care, can seek pre-incident baseline testing, can seek care in the aftermath of such an anomalous health incident.

But we also take these reports seriously so that we can ensure that we are doing everything we can to protect our workforce and our broader State Department community, their family members and dependents, going forward, and do what we can to prevent such anomalous health incidents. To that end, we have sent teams of security engineers and occupational safety experts to conduct surveys and inspections of locations where these incidents have been reported. We have supplied additional and enhanced inspection equipment to overseas engineering service centers so that in the event of report of an AHI we can quickly dispatch that – those resources.

So we have made improvements in terms of our communication. We have made improvements in terms of our inspections and our defensive measures. We have made improvements in terms of our training so that, again, our employees know how to respond should they become subject to one of these, that their family members also have the information they need. We have improved our protocols internally with the Health Incidents Response Task Force and then, of course, with our Medical and CARE. That is all a reflection of the fact that there is no higher priority to the Secretary, there is no higher priority for our Deputy Secretary Brian McKeon, when it comes to these health incidents, because we know this is precisely about the health, the safety, and security of our workforce.

Yes.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) Ned, can you just address the letter? I mean, it said they wanted the Secretary to immediately name a replacement for Ambassador Spratlen.

MR PRICE: I —

QUESTION: It doesn’t say soon or as soon as – as quickly as possible. It says immediately. Do you intend to do that?

MR PRICE: I expect we’ll be in a position to do that in the coming days.

QUESTION: And then – and then the other thing it said was that it wanted – it wanted to make sure that you guys have set up mechanisms to make sure that the benefits included in the Havana Act, the financial and the compensation and medical assistance, were available now to people who have – are suffering these injuries. Has that been done?

MR PRICE: The Secretary added his voice to support for —

QUESTION: Well, is there a mechanism now in place for people to get this additional money?

MR PRICE: This just passed through Congress, I believe it was on Friday, so it’s only been a few days. But absolutely, we support the goals of this legislation because this legislation is about the health, the safety, and security of our employees.

QUESTION: And then lastly, you mentioned these inspection teams. When did they start going out, and what have they found?

MR PRICE: So Matt, this is one where, unfortunately, we’re just not in a position to provide much additional detail because this gets to our investigative tactics, techniques, and procedures.

QUESTION: Well, have you found anything unusual?

MR PRICE: That’s just one we’ll not be able to get into. I’m sorry.

QUESTION: Well, can you say when they started going out to these places?

MR PRICE: I’m sorry. Please.

QUESTION: On that, Secretary Blinken is going to Colombia next week. Yesterday President Duque, Colombian president, confirmed these investigations on these cases of Havana syndrome. Could this investigation affect the incoming trip by the Secretary? And also there are rumors that Secretary Blinken is going as well to Ecuador. Can you confirm that?

MR PRICE: So we have not yet announced any travel for next week, so I’m not in a position to announce or speak to potential travel. But it is certainly possible that the Secretary will have an opportunity to visit with some of his South American counterparts in the coming days.

QUESTION: Yeah, thank you very much. A couple of random ones, but let me go back and ask a version of what Matt was asking: Have all of the steps that you detailed to Andrea delivered any more understanding of the source of the Havana incidents?

MR PRICE: So Nick, this is one of those questions that unfortunately we’re just not in a position to speak to publicly. We are doing everything we can as part of an NSC-led, interagency process to determine the cause of these incidents. We are doing that through any number of means and tactics, but we’re just not in a position to speak to that.

Recent Related Analysis:

HAVANA Act Signed Into Law Will Further Retain Distance Between United States And Cuba- Perhaps Regardless Of Decisions Taken By Cuba. U.S. Companies On Sidelines Again. October 10, 2021

ca-times.brightspotcdn.com.jpg

Could Be From Politicians In Washington: Cuba Highlights Private Sector Job Creation.

Ministry of Economy and Planning
Havana, Republic of Cuba
13 October 2021


The Ministry of Economy and Planning (MEP) approved this Wednesday 60 new private MSMEs and 4 cooperatives, with which the total number of authorized applications amounts to 168 and all the country's provinces already have at least one of these economic actors. In this sense, of the total, 39 have food production as their main economic activity and 34 manufacturing production, including the manufacture of construction materials. Due to their origin, 101 are reconversion of pre-existing businesses, while 67 are newly created. In this sense, the 162 MSMEs and the 6 cooperatives approved so far have created some 2377 new jobs in the economy. The process is going well. The MEP continues to review applications together with users. LINK To MEP List In PDF Format

Havana, Oct 13 (EFE) .- Another 60 new private micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and 4 cooperatives received the approval of the Cuban Ministry of Economy and Planning (MEP) on Wednesday, bringing the total to 168 authorized requests from these economic actors.

Of that total, 39 have food production as their main economic activity and another 34 belong to the manufacturing area, so far the most represented businesses in these companies, and this group includes the manufacture of construction materials. A note from the MEP specifies that, due to their origin, 101 of these are reconversion of pre-existing businesses, while 67 are of recent creation. It also adds that the 162 MSMEs and the 6 cooperatives approved so far have generated some 2,377 jobs. It was also known that today the first two medium-sized companies on the island were officially established in Havana, Dofleini Software, specialized in programming and computing activities, and another called Guajiritos.

Last August, the Cuban Government approved 8 decree-laws with which it recognizes and expands the management of MSMEs, non-agricultural cooperatives and self-employment (autonomous) as economic actors. Likewise, it identifies as economic actors in the country the socialist state enterprise (the main one), non-agricultural cooperatives, self-employment (private) and MSMEs.

Cuban MSMEs can have state, private or mixed ownership, they are – according to the regulations that govern their creation and operation – economic units with legal personality, which have their own dimensions and characteristics, and are intended to develop the production of goods, as well as the provision of services that meet the needs of society. They can be made up of one or more partners, they are constituted as mercantile companies and are classified depending on the number of employed persons as: micro-enterprise, whose range of employed is from one to 10 persons; small business, from 11 to 35; and medium-sized companies, from 36 to 100 people.

Ministry of Economy and Planning
Havana, Republic of Cuba
29 September 2021


On September 29, 2021, the first 35 micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MIPYMES) were approved, of which 32 are private and 3 are state-owned. The approval gives the green light to the creation of these new economic actors, who can now proceed to their constitution as legal entities to carry out their economic activities. In this first group, the prioritized activities stand out, with 13 MSMEs for food production, six for manufacturing, three related to recycling activities and another three incubated in the Science and Technology Park of Havana. These new companies are distributed in eleven of the fifteen provinces of the country. In addition, among the 35 new MSMEs, ten have previously carried out export operations and five belong to local development projects. Due to their origin, 20 of these businesses are a reconversion of TCP to the new form of non-state management, while the other 15 are newly created. The rest of the requests are in process. So far none have been denied. The creation of MIPYMES and CNA is part of the improvement of economic actors, a process aimed at putting in their right place all the forms of management that make up the Cuban economy, in order to unleash their potential and contribute to the socioeconomic development of the country.

LINK To Analysis

Cuba Approves First 35 MIPYME Applications- Confirms No Application Thus Far Denied. Many More Applications Expected. Result Beneficial For Biden Administration Goal To Support SME's. September 30, 2021

Manual de Aplicaciones digitales-10_3.png

EC Foreign Affairs Chief Borrell Today Visits U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken In Washington. Based Upon Ten Months Of Previous Meetings, Cuba And Libertad Act Unlikely To Be On Agenda.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
14 October 2021

11:30 a.m. Secretary Blinken meets with European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and European Commission Vice-President Josep Borrell, at the Department of State. (POOLED CAMERA SPRAY AT TOP) This event will be livestreamed on https://www.youtube.com/user/statevideo.

The Brussels, Belgium-based European Commission (EC) manages the interests for the twenty-seven (27) country members of the Brussels, Belgium-based European Union (EU). Since March 1996, the EC has publicly opposed Title III and Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”). Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset. Title IV restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims.  One Canada-based company and one Spain-based company are currently known to be subject to this provision based upon a certified claim and non-certified claim. 

In May 2019, the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) made operational Title III of the Libertad Act. Thus far, of the forty-two (42) Title III lawsuits filed, ten (10) company defendants whose headquarters are in EU-member countries.  For 546 days, EU-based defendant Palma, Spain-based Grupo Iberostar (2019 revenue approximately US$2.5 billion) has awaited a response for legal guidance from the EC.  LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Statistics   

Despite response to a letter from a member of the Brussels, Belgium-based/Strasbourg, France-based European Parliament (EP) that he would discuss issues relating to the Republic of Cuba, since 20 January 2021 when the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) became operational, neither EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission Josef Borrell nor United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken, nor any senior-level official of the EC or Biden-Harris Administration has confirmed that the Republic of Cuba and the Libertad Act have been included in subjects discussed during more than twelve meetings in nearing nine months.  

The absence of the Republic of Cuba as a subject reinforces that the Biden-Harris Administration has no overt interest in engaging issues relating to the Republic of Cuba- and will not be proactive in discussions with the EC.  And that the EC will not likely engage until it must- when a court renders a verdict against an EU-based defendant or an EU-based defendant seeks approval of a settlement with a plaintiff.  Delaying diplomatic unpleasantness until absolutely necessary so not to impact efforts and cooperation in areas of consequence.  

LINK: Report From The Commission To The European Parliament And The Council Relating To Article 7(A) Of Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 (‘Blocking Statute’) 

Related Analyses 

US Subsidiary Requests 30-Day Court Delay In Libertad Act Lawsuit. Will US Court Approve? Other Requests Were From EU-Based Defendant Parent Companies. Iberostar Waiting 528 Days For EC Guidance September 27, 2021

European Commission (EC) Reports "Several" EU-Based "Persons and Companies" With Libertad Act Title III Engagement. Iberostar Of Spain Waiting 528 Days For EC Guidance 26 September 2021 

During United Nations Meetings, European Commission And United States Continue 2021 Theme For Cuba: Neither Party Wants To Discuss- So They Don’t. For EC, Title III Not As Important As Advertised 23 September 2021

At U.S.-EU Summit Will Cuba Be Mentioned By President Biden, President Michel, Or President von der Leyen? Trajectory Suggests Not. How Does Borrell Square Statements With Action? June 14, 2021 

After Four Meetings In Brussels, Representatives Of EC, EU, and United States Have Not Discussed Cuba Despite EC Commitment To Do So May 26, 2021  

Third Meeting In Two Months- EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Borrell Again Does Not Discuss Cuba With U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken. Confirms Cuba Not Important To EU-U.S. Relations. May 04, 2021 

EC Now Has To Decide What It Perhaps Doesn’t Want To Decide- Iberostar Of Spain Libertad Act Lawsuit Is First To Report U.S. Court Recognizing EC’s Interest In Title III Lawsuits April 26, 2020  

EC/EU May Today Find End Of “Comity” By United States Courts. After One Year Waiting, EC/EU May Have Run Out Of Time. April 15, 2021  

Second Visit In Three Weeks- U.S. Secretary Of State To Brussels. EC Writes It Will "Address" Cuba. Did Not Last Time. EU Defendants Waiting One Year For Guidance. April 13, 2021  

Lost In Translation- EP Member & Media Report EC Will “mediate” With Biden Administration About Cuba On Terrorism List. Problem- EC Wrote “we will address this issue” April 02, 2021 

Confusing Message By EC/EU Not Including Libertad Act In Agendas For Meetings With Secretary Of State Blinken. Not As Important As Advertised? March 25, 2021  

In Brussels Will U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken Discuss Cuba, Libertad Act And Venezuela With EC/EU Officials?  Will He Rebuff, Sway Or Be Swayed?  Quid Pro Quo? March 23, 2021  

EC Responds To European Parliament Inquiry About EU Ambassador To Cuba Letter To President Biden- Navarro "Committed Two Major... Failures..." March 12, 2021 

Screenshot 2021-10-14 at 11-42-39 U S Department of State.png

USDOT Authorizes Third U.S. Cargo Company To Operate Flights To Cuba

On 14 July 2021, the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) granted an Emergency Exemption to Skyway Enterprises, Inc. and IBC Airways, Inc. to operate cargo flights from the United States to the Republic of Cuba through 30 November 2021. Swift Air, L.L.C. was awaiting authorization. 

On 13 October 2021, the USDOT granted an Emergency Exemption to Swift Air, L.L.C.  

Excerpts: 

Responsive Pleadings: On August 11, 2021, Viajehoy LLC, d/b/a Havana Air (Havana Air) filed a response to iAero’s application. Havana Air states that it does not object to the application and that if iAero’s application is approved, Havana Air shall also seek flying weekly rotating flights to serve Santiago de Cuba and Camagüey with one of its DOT approved carriers.  

Decision: We have decided to grant iAero’s application in part, for an exemption to operate cargo-only charter flights, and to deny the application to the extent iAero seeks to provide passenger charters. Our actions in the January 10, 2020 Notice suspending the authority of public charter operators to serve points in Cuba other than Havana, and in Order 2020-8-4 suspending carriers’ U.S.-Cuba charter authority were taken at the request of the U.S. Department of State, which expressly cited the foreign policy interests of the United States in its January 7, 2020 letter and its August 13, 2020 letter requesting the suspensions. We consulted with the Department of State to determine whether it regards the proposed iAero flights to be in the foreign policy interests of the United States and to be consistent with the exceptions to the suspension of charters between the United States and Cuba set forth in Order 2020-8-4.  

On October 12, 2021, after considering the specific circumstances presented, the Department of State provided its view that only the cargo portion of the proposed humanitarian operation would be in the foreign policy interests of the United States, and would be consistent with the Department of State’s specified exceptions to the suspension of charter flights between the United States and Cuba. Against this background, we find that it would be in the public interest to grant the requested exemption in part, to operate the proposed flights as cargo only, and to deny the application to the extent the applicant seeks to provide passenger services.  

As a final matter, we remind the applicant that a number of significant limitations and requirements remain in place concerning air transportation between Cuba and the United States. Nothing in the Department’s award of authority will relieve any party from complying with all applicable regulations and requirements of other U.S. agencies and with all applicable laws of the United States. 

LINK to notification in PDF Format  

LINKS To Previous Analyses: 

USDOT Authorizes Cargo Flights From United States To Six Airports In Cuba Through 30 November 2021 August 15, 2021

U.S. Department Of Transportation Limits Cuba Charter Flights To 3,600 Annually May 28, 2020 

“iAero Group is a purpose-driven, privately-held company that was founded in 2018 to create the leading investment platform to transform and scale high-growth potential companies in the aviation industry.  To date, iAero Group has acquired three companies: engine MRO AeroThrust Holdings (Miami, FL) in 2018, airframe MRO Miami Tech Aircraft Maintenance (Miami, FL) in 2018, and the largest charter airline in the US, Swift Air (Greensboro, NC), in 2019. iAero Group partnered with The Blackstone Group to help finance these transactions. Since then, these operating companies have been rebranded to iAero Thrust, iAero Tech, and iAero Airways.” 

MIAMI, May 23, 2019 /PRNewswire/ -- iAero Group, a leading integrated aviation platform business headquartered at Miami International Airport, completed the acquisition of Swift Air, the leading independent airline charter business in the United States. Swift Air now joins engine MRO AeroThrust and airframe MRO AeroTech under the iAero Group integrated aviation platform family.  Swift Air will now have access to iAero Group's MRO capabilities to build and maintain the highest quality and most flexible fleet of aircraft in the market to deliver even higher levels of customer satisfaction. In addition, Swift Air will be able to reduce cost, increase in-service rates, and extend the life of their fleet.  "We are extremely excited to welcome Swift Air to our family of businesses," said iAero Group Chief Executive Officer, Robert Caputo. "Swift Air will immediately benefit from our MRO and aircraft refurbishment capabilities and can further expand its capacity with our owned Boeing 737 aircraft."  Jeff Conry, Swift Air's Chief Executive Officer said, "we have been looking forward to joining iAero Group to leverage their capabilities to provide industry leading aircraft and service levels and have access to new capital to refresh and expand our fleet." 

About iAero Group

iAero Group (https://iaerogroup.com), based in Miami, FL, is an integrated aviation platform business providing a full range of services including charter airline, engine and airframe MRO, and aircraft and engine leasing. The companies within the iAero Group family include charter airline Swift Air, engine MRO AeroThrust, and airframe MRO AeroTech. Through this combination of leading companies in the aircraft charter and MRO industries, iAero Group has created unique capabilities, including a full range of aviation offerings with safety, quality, and cost advantages that benefit all customers. iAero Group is supported by Blackstone/GSO, one of the world's leading investment firms, who holds a minority interest in iAero Group.

4061311.jpg

United States Department Of State Discusses Remittance Review, Humanitarian Cargo Flights, "Havana Syndrome"

United States Department of State

Washington DC

12 October 2021

Briefing With Spokesperson Ned Price

QUESTION: The humanitarian flights that – from the U.S. to Cuba that the State Department authorized some months ago, did those ever get started? If not, why not? And if so, how many have taken place? And then is there any update on the remittance working group now that it’s been over a month and a half since they submitted their recommendations to the White House? Thanks.

MR PRICE: Sure. So I will take the question on humanitarian flights. I just don’t have an update on that in front of me. As you know, the remittance working group did provide its report to the President some number of weeks ago. It is also an issue that is not uncomplicated in terms of what we need to sort through. At the end of the day, we have a profound interest in supporting the humanitarian needs of the Cuban people, but we also have the imperative of seeing to it that additional funds do not flow into the coffers of the regime. So we’re taking a close look. The administration is taking a close look at that recommendation – at those recommendations, I should say – to determine how best we can support the Cuban people in the form of remittances while also not running afoul of that other imperative on our part.

Related Analyses

USDOT Authorizes Cargo Flights From United States To Six Airports In Cuba Through 30 November 2021 August 15, 2021 

The White House On Implementing Cuba Remittance Recommendations Received On 31 August 2021: “some of these issues are challenging...” September 30, 2021

By Today, State Department And Treasury Department Were To Deliver Remittance Recommendations To President Biden. Did They? When Will Decisions(s) Be Announced? Implemented? August 31, 2021

Healthcare Crisis In Cuba Provides Additional Questions And Opportunities For Biden-Harris Administration To Address Electronic Remittance Transfers... And Do So Practically August 19, 2021

Binary: Electronic Remittance Transfer Decision For Biden Administration And Diaz-Canel Administration; And Putting US$20 Million Into Perspective August 12, 2021

Cuba Adopting LLC Structure For Private Sector Is A Message To Biden-Harris Administration- Even If That Was Not [Primary] Intention. Familiarity For Sources Of Investment And Financing. August 30, 2021

Cuba Issues 175 Pages Of Regulations For Micro, Small And Medium-Sized Enterprises (MSME's) August 20, 2021

Defining "Transformative"- Cuba Ratifies Decree-Law Authorizing SME's: Micro (1-10 employees), Small (11-35 employees), Medium (35-100 employees). The Private Sector Has Returned. August 07, 2021

Cuba Links Resumption Of Remittances From United States To Expanding Investment Opportunities For Cuban Residents Abroad August 06, 2021

Cuba Expands Again Role Of Private Sector- Suppliers, Foreign Currency Access August 05, 2021

Cuba Suspends Tariffs And Fees For Non-Commercial (SME's Next?) Solar Systems. Another Opportunity For Biden-Harris Administration To Support U.S. Exporters And Florida Companies Should Benefit. July 30, 2021

Biden-Diaz-Canel Remittance Compromise: U.S. And Cuba Companies Suspend Transaction Fees Until 31 December 2021. Impact On 800 Publix Markets July 27, 2021

U.S. Department Of State Memorandum: The 17 Company Members Of The CRWG- Moving Remittances And Using Remittances; Cuba Entities Need Be Part Of The Process July 26, 2021

If A Product Costs At Least 2,500 Pesos (US$104.16), Customers In Cuba Now May Obtain Financing: Terms Are 2.5% Interest With 20% Down July 24, 2021

Biden Administration Wants To Deny Cuba's Government (Military) With Earnings- Conditional Resumption Of Product Filled Flights To Airports In Cuba Benefits Self-Employed; By-In From Congress? July 19, 2021

Is Biden-Harris Administration Nearing Decision To Reverse Trump-Pence Administration Prohibition On Cuba Military Earning Money From Remittances? July 15, 2021

Cuba Central Bank Authorizes Cuba's Postal Service To Provide Financial Services. Continuing Expansion For Receiving And Spending Funds Assists Private Sector Aug 27, 2021

Cuba Central Bank Moving Nearer To Regulations For Cryptocurrencies- Another Signal To United States That Cuba Is Changing. Private Sectors Are Expanding- Though Government Remains Reluctant August 27, 2021 

United States Department of State

Washington DC

12 October 2021 

Briefing With Spokesperson Ned Price 

QUESTION: Ned, a couple pointed questions on the Afghanistan comments, and I have a few others, including Havana syndrome.  And can you confirm the Havana syndrome cases or deny it, or just address that in Colombia embassy in Bogotá, in U.S. Embassy in Bogotá? 

MR PRICE: When it comes to Havana syndrome, you will probably not be surprised to hear me say we are not in the business of confirming reports. But — 

QUESTION: But I don’t understand, why are you not in the business of confirming reports? This is squarely about State Department personnel. These are happening at U.S. embassies. Who should be in the business of confirming these incidents? 

MR PRICE: We are in the business of, number one, believing those who have reported these incidents, ensuring that they get the prompt care they need in whatever form that takes, whether that is at post, whether that is back here in the Washington, D.C. area. We are in the business of doing all we can to protect our workforce and the broader chief of mission community around the world. 

QUESTION: So have they reported in Bogota U.S. embassy? 

QUESTION: Have they reported – like, are you doing all of those things for U.S. embassy in Bogota? 

MR PRICE: We are doing this everywhere an anomalous health incident is reported. But we are also doing things universally, and we are communicating with our workforce. We are instituting new training modules to ensure that outgoing State Department officers know how to detect a potential anomalous health incident, they know how to report a potential anomalous health incident, they know who – to whom to turn should they need to report it, they know the type of assistance that they can receive. Their families are apprised of these dynamics as well. And as you know, the Secretary has had an opportunity to meet with some of those who have reported AHIs. There is no higher priority that the Secretary has to the health, the safety, the security of our workforce. I’ve said this before, but even before he was Secretary of State, one of the briefings he proactively requested as the nominee for the office he now holds during the transition was a comprehensive briefing on so-called Havana syndrome or anomalous health incidents. He wanted to make sure he entered this job understanding where we were and what we had done, and importantly, what this department could do better to support our workforce at all levels. And we have taken a number of steps, including in terms of communication, in terms of care, in terms of detection, in terms of protection for our workforce, and that is something that will continue to be a priority for the Secretary. 

QUESTION: Just to follow up on that, it was this building that (inaudible) spoke about those cases in Havana and then in China. Why aren’t you confirming for the sake of transparency where there are cases reported – if they are Havana syndrome or not, it’s another thing, but where there are reported incidents, why aren’t you doing that? And then I have another question on Cuba protest. 

MR PRICE: So in many cases it is a matter of privacy of individuals, wanting to respect privacy. But let me just make clear that when cases have been reported, our posts overseas have communicated that clearly to the community within the embassy. We have also engaged – Brian McKeon has engaged with posts that have reported a number of anomalous health incidents. So it is not – certainly not – the case that we are ignoring this. We are just not speaking to the press, we’re speaking to our workforce, as you might expect when it comes to a matter of their health and safety and security.  You said you had another question? 

QUESTION: Yeah. I wanted to ask you about the Cuba’s Government decision to ban a protest that was planned for November 15th, claiming that the organizers are backed by the U.S. to overthrow the regime. Do you have any comment on that, any response? 

MR PRICE: Well, let me make one thing very clear at the outset. What happened in July, what transpired in the days and the weeks after that, was not about the United States. It was about the conduct of the Cuban regime, the unmet aspirations of the Cuban people for freedom, for dignity, for prosperity, the elements that they have been denied by this regime for far too long, since 1959.

We – the world watched. The United States watched as Cuban authorities arrest and beat peaceful protestors, journalists, independent voices in mid-July, starting on July 11th. There have been many arbitrarily detained; many are missing. We know that the government has conducted secret summary trials of those arrested. And we join their families, we join Cuba’s human rights defenders, people around the world in calling for the immediate release of all those detained – all those who are detained or missing merely for exercising their fundamental human rights. It’s the freedom of expression, it is the freedom to assemble peacefully that the Cuban Government has denied to its people.  The violence that we’ve seen, the detention that we’ve seen, the crackdowns that we’ve seen, now the prohibitions on peaceful protests that we’ve seen – all of this remind us that it is the Cuban people who are paying dearly in their fight for freedom, their fight for dignity. We call for their release. We call for the government in Havana to respect the fundamental freedoms and the fundamental rights of the Cuban people 

Related Analysis 

HAVANA Act Signed Into Law Will Further Retain Distance Between United States And Cuba- Perhaps Regardless Of Decisions Taken By Cuba. U.S. Companies On Sidelines Again. October 10, 2021

TAN_1539_01-e1556293547371.jpg

HAVANA Act Signed Into Law Will Further Retain Distance Between United States And Cuba- Perhaps Regardless Of Decisions Taken By Cuba. U.S. Companies On Sidelines Again.

With the 8 October 2021 signing into law of the HAVANA Act, the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) and the United States Congress have continued linkage between changes to United States policies and regulations relating to the Republic of Cuba and the ongoing investigation to determine responsibility for injuries sustained by employees of the United States government first reported in 2016 at locations within the city of Havana, Republic of Cuba, and continuing in locations within multiple countries, including in August 2021 in the city of Berlin, Germany.  To date, more than 200 individuals have reported injuries from “Havana Syndrome.” 

With every discussion of the injuries, there is reference to the Republic of Cuba- the name of the statute deliberately guarantees that connectivity.

Further connectivity derives from once the source(s) and delivery system(s) are determined, the political question remains for the Biden-Harris Administration and the United States Congress: Assigning direct and indirect responsibility to state actor(s) and/or non-state actor(s) and what retribution, if any, to implement. 

Even if the Republic of Cuba is not deemed a directly responsible party, the Biden-Harris Administration and the United States Congress will need to be convinced that the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba, Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Cuba (MININT), and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba (MINREX) a) did not have knowledge as to the source(s) of the delivery system(s) and b) why did they not have knowledge as to the source(s) of the delivery system(s). 

The unresolved issues relating to the injuries serve as a political brake upon any expansion of the commercial, economic, and political relationship by the Biden-Harris Administration with the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ). 

For the United States, providing the Republic of Cuba with “benefit of the doubt” will unlikely be politically viable.  Even the presence of irrefutable evidence supporting all or a portion of the position of the Republic of Cuba relating to knowledge of and/or ability to notify and/or prevent will likely not be easily digestible for the United States and particularly the United States Congress.  For some members of the United States Congress, facts will remain immaterial to their held positions that the Republic of Cuba is a bad state actor and must continue to be punished.    

For the United States business community there is additional time waiting; and expecting the Republic of Cuba will continue commercial, economic, and political infrastructure transformations which present opportunities for engagement, particularly with the re-emerging private sector (micro, small and medium-size enterprises). 

The White House
Washington DC
8 October 2021

Statement of President Joe Biden on Signing HAVANA Act Into Law

“Today, I was pleased to sign the HAVANA Act into law to ensure we are doing our utmost to provide for U.S. Government personnel who have experienced anomalous health incidents.  I want to thank Congress for passing it with unanimous bipartisan support, sending the clear message that we take care of our own.  Civil servants, intelligence officers, diplomats, and military personnel all around the world have been affected by anomalous health incidents.  Some are struggling with debilitating brain injuries that have curtailed their careers of service to our nation.  Addressing these incidents has been a top priority for my Administration.  We are bringing to bear the full resources of the U.S. Government to make available first-class medical care to those affected and to get to the bottom of these incidents, including to determine the cause and who is responsible.  Protecting Americans and all those who serve our country is our first duty, and we will do everything we can to care for our personnel and their families.” LINK To Statute: https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1828/text 

The White House
Washington DC
8 October 2021

Q    Thanks, Jen.  The President signed the HAVANA Act into law today, but he did so out of public view.  His statement today said that the United States government is offering resources to people who suffered from Havana Syndrome incidents, but he stopped short of calling these incidents “attacks.”  So, at this point, what should the public know and what can the public know about what Havana Syndrome actually is and how it is caused? 

MS. PSAKI:  The public should know that this President is the first President to acknowledge the existence of Havana Syndrome or anonymous [anomalous] health incidents — that, across the government, across the national security team, they’re taking this incredibly seriously.  

The National Security Council has worked closely with departments and agencies to take a number of significant steps: standardizing the reporting process so that all possible AHIs that are reported by U.S. personnel, regardless of department or agency affiliate — affiliation, are uniformly documented and quickly shared; improve the quality and speed of medical care, which is part of what this bill would help do; ensure there is financial support for that; ensure all relevant departments and agencies have messaged their workforce to provide guidance; increased intelligence collection and analytic focus on determining the cause of AHIs; and enlist U.S. government and outside experts to increase our understanding. 

What is important to also know and understand is that we, of course, are determined to get to the bottom as quickly as possible of the — of the attribution and cause of these incidents.  The intelligence community is in the lead on that.  They have launched a largescale investigation into the potential causes.  They’re actively examining a range of hypotheses, but they have not made a determination about the cause of these incidents or who is responsible.  

So, our focus is on implementing — starting a process that did not exist when the President took office.  It’s a huge priority for the government, the national security team.  And the President was certainly pleased to sign the bill today. 

Q    Is Havana Syndrome a threat to Americans, particularly those traveling abroad?

MS. PSAKI:  I don’t think you should make that assessment.  We have not made an attribution.  

Q    I’m asking you yeah. 

MS. PSAKI: you should not- we have not made an attribution of the source.  But we take every reported incident seriously.  And what we want to do is ensure that our national security team is using every resource at our disposal — intelligence gathering, assessing, treating every incident seriously, ensuring people receive medical care.  But without an attribution and without an assessment of the cause or the origin, I just don’t want to go further than that. 

Q    Can I follow up on that? 

MS. PSAKI:  Go ahead.  

Q    Thanks, Jen.  

MS. PSAKI:  Well, I’ll come back to you, Patsy.  Go ahead, Patsy.  And then I’ll come back to you. 

Q    Thank you, Jen.  Two questions to follow up on the HAVANA Act.  One of the complaints that I hear a lot from people who believe that they were targeted by these attacks and also suffering from the so-called Havana Syndrome is the disparity in acknowledgement and also treatment depending on the country in which they were attacked.  So, they’re saying, if they were attacked in Cuba, the government would admit and acknowledge, but if it happens in China, the government would not readily admit.  So, would you say this is a fair characterization?  Is the reason for this diplomatic or not?  And would you commit to treating all the victims and supporting them in the same way, no matter where they were attacked? 

MS. PSAKI:  It’s hard to speak to anonymous sources here, Patsy.  I would say that, as I noted earlier, our objective and the President’s commitment is to standardizing the reporting process, is to ensuring we’re improving the quality and speed of medical care, is of ensuring every case that comes forward is taken seriously, treated seriously.  That has not always been the case, but that is our objective and the commitment of this administration. 

Q    And just to follow up on that: I understand you’ve explained how you want to standardize the process of reporting, but will that include some sort of centralized support system, maybe a hotline or a task force, where the victims can go and call?  Because right now, when I’m talking to the victims, they’re saying they have to fight a skeptical bureaucracy.  They don’t know how to find care from doctors who understand the syndrome, for example.  And they just don’t know how to take care of themselves and their families having to fight all of this bureaucracy. 

MS. PSAKI:  Well, I’m not sure that your characterization — I — look, this is a priority for every national security agency.  It’s something that many members of our national security team have spoken to personally, passionately themselves and their commitment to addressing this.  We’ve also taken a number of very concrete steps.  Each agency has their own process and system, but what we’re working to do is coordinate it.  So, it’s — it’s — I think it’s not really fair to speak to one or two anonymous cases when this is an across-the-government effort, commitment, priority.  The President signed a bill into law today.  We’ve put a number of steps into place that are incredibly concrete.  The President has acknowledged this a problem.  We’re using every resource in the government to address it, and I think that really speaks to the President’s commitment. 

United States Senate
Washington DC
8 October 2021

SFRC Chairman Menendez Statement on President Joe Biden Signing HAVANA Act into Law 

WASHINGTON – Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) released the following statement after President Joe Biden signed into law the Helping American Victims Afflicted by Neurological Attacks (HAVANA Act), legislation co-authored by Menendez authorizing the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to expand protections and provide additional support to United States personnel and dependents who have suffered brain injuries as a result of suspected directed energy attacks in Havana, Cuba and around the world: 

“Nearly five years after U.S. personnel in Havana began suffering from brain injuries, it is clear that we must do much more to care for and protect personnel and their family members.  Today we are taking an important step towards fulfilling our moral obligation as a grateful nation to support injured U.S. personnel and their families—and sending a powerful message to our adversaries that we are determined to impose serious consequences for the harm these attacks have inflicted.” 

“As the list of reported incidents continues to grow, today’s enactment of our HAVANA Act makes clear that the threats and attacks against our diplomats, national security staff and intelligence officers are a national security priority for the U.S. government, as is securing proper care and needed support for those impacted by them.”

Seal_of_the_Central_Intelligence_Agency.svg.png

Cuba Confirms That Legislation/Regulation For MSME's "so far is not enough..."

Cuba's MSMEs a key strategy to boost economy

Havana, Oct 9 (Prensa Latina) The incorporation of new economic actors in Cuba as micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) is a strategy for the productive transformation of the country, the Ministry of Economy and Planning (MEP) indicated here.

International insertion and the growth of the population's satisfaction through the increase of goods and services are part of that policy, as the MEP's Deputy Minister Johana Odriozola explained during the Economic-Productive Journey 2021 being held at the Cuban Chamber of Commerce until October 28.

It is not intended, she said, to incorporate subsistence MSMEs, but to contribute to the productive transformation domestic strategy, new industries should be born, produce goods that did not exist before and raise the presence in international markets.

Those types of companies, the deputy minister added, generally export in specialized niches and, although they cannot compete with large transnationals, they specialize in certain areas that allow them joining international value chains.

The road is long and the legislation approved so far is not enough, but it is necessary to move towards public policies that boost technology-based MSMEs, innovation, with export vocation or those that are linked to exporters, the expert noted.

Those public policies, she remarked, should create incentives because the idea is that those forms of management can contribute more to the Gross Domestic Product and to the growth of the economy.

Regarding non-agricultural cooperatives (NACs), she explained that their insertion is at a lower level, a phenomenon that is also evident on a global scale.

Referring to the behavior of the economic actors on Cuba at the end of 2020, Odriozola explained that there were 1,776 entities of the socialist State enterprise, 4,857 agricultural cooperatives, 396 non-agricultural cooperatives, 100 mixed enterprises, and 602,415 freelancers.

The deputy minister pointed out that up to the closure of the previous day, there were already 555 applications for the creation of MSMEs and CNAs, of which 104 were approved, 297 are in the process of review by the MEP, 57 are being prepared by the users and 97 have been filed.

After the start of such process on September 20, 98 private MSMEs, four State-owned, and two CNAs have already been approved, she detailed.

Cuba-Viceministra.jpg

Chairman Menendez To U.S. Ambassador To Spain Nominee- "[In Cuba] Spaniards Care More About Their Hotels And Investments Than They Care About Democracy"

United States Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations
Washington DC
5 October 2021


Full Sub-Committee Hearing- Nominations

The Honorable Julissa Reynoso Pantaleon of New York, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Kingdom of Spain, and to serve concurrently and without additional compensation as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Principality of Andorra.

LINK To Ambassador Reynoso Statement In PDF Format

Exchange Between Ambassador Reynoso and The Honorable Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey), Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations: LINK To Video Of Hearing
Ambassador Reynoso Statement (minute 19 to minute 26) and Chairman Menendez Questions (minute 38 to minute 43)

U.S. Agricultural Commodity Exports To Cuba Increase 83.1% In August 2021; Up 87.4% Year-To-Date.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
October 2021

August 2021 Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Increase 83.1%- 1
54th Of 225 August 2021 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 87.4%- 2
Cuba Ranked 54th Of 2021 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets- 2
August 2021 Healthcare Product Exports US$43,533.00- 2
August 2021 Humanitarian Donations US$778,183.00- 3
2021 Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 16


AUGUST 2021 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 83.1%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in August 2021 were US$27,656,565.00 compared to US$15,099,435.00 in August 2020 and US$31,724,133,00 in August 2019.

August 2021 Exports Included: Chicken Leg Quarters (Frozen); Chicken Meat (Frozen); Chicken Legs (Frozen); Calcium Phosphate; Soybeans; Woodpulp. Poultry represented 82.1% of exports.

January 2021 through August 2021 exports were US$206,430,928.00 compared to US$110,144,983.00 for the period January 2020 through August 2020.

Since December 2001, agricultural commodity and food product exports reported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba is US$6,502,658,352.00

This report contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

ChartGreat.png

Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor To President Biden, Visiting Paris & Brussels. Will Cuba Be On France/EC/EU Agenda? Who Will Bring It Up? Will Anyone?

Whatever the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) decides to implement relating to the Republic of Cuba in terms of policy and regulations has and will either originate or need be approved by the National Security Council (NSC) at The White House.

The Brussels, Belgium-based European Commission (EC) manages the interests for the twenty-seven (27) country members of the Brussels, Belgium-based European Union (EU). Collectively, the EU has since 1996 opposed the Libertad Act.

Of all EU members, France with four of the ten Libertad Act defendants located in the EU has potentially the most to lose. Spain has three companies listed as defendants in Libertad Act lawsuits. Two members of the EU account for 70% of Libertad Act defendants with headquarters in the EU.

Opposition in 2021 by the EC/EU towards United States policy with the Republic of Cuba has been neither attentive nor intensive… and the Biden-Harris Administration knows it.

For 538 days, defendant Palma, Spain-based Grupo Iberostar (2019 revenue approximately US$2.6 billion) has awaited a response for legal guidance from the EC. LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Statistics

Since the Biden-Harris Administration commenced at 12:00 pm on 20 January 2021, published readouts of meetings and conversations by the President, Secretary of State, National Security Advisor, or any other official at The White House or United States Department of State with officials of the EC and members of the EU have not included the Republic of Cuba. 

Today, Antony Blinken, United States Secretary of State, and Jose Manuel Albares, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, met in Paris, France.  From Minister Albares: “We share a common vision of several countries in Latin America.  And I consider the United States the natural ally and partner of European Union, so nothing more evident than to be here talking to you today.”  No mention of the Republic of Cuba despite three companies headquartered in Spain listed as defendants in Libertad Act lawsuits.

The White House
Washington DC
5 October 2021

Statement by NSC Spokesperson Emily Horne on Senior Administration Official Trip to Europe


“This week, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan will travel to Zurich, Switzerland, Brussels, Belgium and Paris, France. In Zurich, Mr. Sullivan will meet with Chinese Communist Party Politburo Member and Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission Yang Jiechi. They will follow up on President Biden’s September 9 call with President Xi as we continue to seek to responsibly manage the competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. In Brussels and Paris, Mr. Sullivan will reaffirm the importance of the Transatlantic alliance and consult on a range of shared interests. He will also debrief his meeting with Director Yang to our European allies and partners. In Brussels, Mr. Sullivan will meet with NATO Allied National Security Advisors in the North Atlantic Council to discuss ongoing implementation of the June Summit decisions to modernize the Alliance and address a range of strategic challenges. While in Brussels, Mr. Sullivan will also meet with European Commission and European Council officials. He will be joined by Deputy National Security Advisor Daleep Singh for additional European Union meetings on trade, technology, and global economic issues. In Paris, Mr. Sullivan will meet with National Security Advisor Emmanuel Bonne as part of our ongoing consultations on shared bilateral and regional interests, including preparations for the meeting of President Biden and President Macron in Europe later this month.”

The Trump Administration on 2 May 2019 made operational Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”). To date, forty-two (42) lawsuits have been filed some of which have been dismissed, some of which have been revised, some of which have been refiled, some of which remain before trial judges, and some of which are at Courts of Appeals. Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.     LINK To Lawsuit Statistics  

Thus far, there are ten (10) EU-based defendants in Libertad Act Title III lawsuits filed since 2019 of which four (4) are headquartered in France and three (3) are headquartered in Spain. 

EU-based defendants total 2019/2020 revenues were approximately US$170 Billion.  EU-based defendants in Libertad Act Title III lawsuits include: Copenhagen, Denmark-based A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S (2019 revenue approximately US$39 billion); Paris, France-based BNP Paribas (2020 revenue approximately US$45 billion; assets approximately US$2.8 trillion); Amsterdam, Netherland-based Booking.com B.V. (2019 revenue approximately US$15 billion); Palma, Spain-based Iberostar Hoteles y Apartamentos S.L. (2019 revenue approximately US$2.6 billion); Palma, Spain-based Melia Hotels International S.A. (2019 revenue approximately US$2 billion); Paris, France-based Société Générale S.A. (2020 revenue approximately US$23 billion; assets approximtely US$1.6 trillion); Dusseldorf, Germany-based Trivago GmbH (2019 revenue approximately US$940 million); and Marseille, France-based CMA CGM S.A. (2020 revenue approximately US$31 billion).  Additional lawsuits are expected to be filed.  Madrid, Spain-based NH Hotel Group S.A. (2019 revenues approximately US$1.9 billion) and Paris, France-based Pernod Ricard S.A. (2020 revenue approximately US$9.3 billion) were defendants in lawsuits, but the lawsuits were dismissed by the plaintiff.  

A diplomatic challenge for EC President Ursula von der Leyen and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the EC Josef Borrell.  H.E. Dr. von der Leyen served in three cabinet positions and was the longest serving member of Federal Republic of Germany Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cabinet; and Libertad Act defendant Trivago GmbH is headquartered in Dusseldorf, Germany.  HRVP Borrell Fontelles was Minister of Foreign Affairs, EU and Cooperation of the Kingdom of Spain; and Libertad Act defendants Melia Hotels International S.A., Iberostar Hoteles y Apartamentos S.L., and NH Hotel Group S.A. are headquartered in Spain. 

Related Analyses

How Does CMA CGM Of France Know That European Commission (EC) Will Issue Decision For Libertad Act Lawsuits “in a much shorter period of time than with the prior applicants”? October 3, 2021

Not Yet Sued, World's Second-Largest Shipping Company Received Letter, Then Ceased Cuba Operations. Libertad Act As Tool Of Deterrence Worked. Biden Administration Negotiations With Cuba Preferred. October 3, 2021

US Subsidiary Requests 30-Day Court Delay In Libertad Act Lawsuit. Will US Court Approve? Other Requests Were From EU-Based Defendant Parent Companies. Iberostar Waiting 528 Days For EC Guidance September 27, 2021

European Commission (EC) Reports "Several" EU-Based "Persons and Companies" With Libertad Act Title III Engagement. Iberostar Of Spain Waiting 528 Days For EC Guidance September 26, 2021

During United Nations Meetings, European Commission And United States Continue 2021 Theme For Cuba: Neither Party Wants To Discuss- So They Don’t. For EC, Title III Not As Important As Advertised 23 September 2021

At U.S.-EU Summit Will Cuba Be Mentioned By President Biden, President Michel, Or President von der Leyen? Trajectory Suggests Not. How Does Borrell Square Statements With Action? June 14, 2021 

After Four Meetings In Brussels, Representatives Of EC, EU, and United States Have Not Discussed Cuba Despite EC Commitment To Do So May 26, 2021 

Third Meeting In Two Months- EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Borrell Again Does Not Discuss Cuba With U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken. Confirms Cuba Not Important To EU-U.S. Relations. May 04, 2021

EC Now Has To Decide What It Perhaps Doesn’t Want To Decide- Iberostar Of Spain Libertad Act Lawsuit Is First To Report U.S. Court Recognizing EC’s Interest In Title III Lawsuits April 26, 2020 

EC/EU May Today Find End Of “Comity” By United States Courts. After One Year Waiting, EC/EU May Have Run Out Of Time. April 15, 2021 

Second Visit In Three Weeks- U.S. Secretary Of State To Brussels. EC Writes It Will "Address" Cuba. Did Not Last Time. EU Defendants Waiting One Year For Guidance. April 13, 2021 

Lost In Translation- EP Member & Media Report EC Will “mediate” With Biden Administration About Cuba On Terrorism List. Problem- EC Wrote “we will address this issue” April 02, 2021 

Confusing Message By EC/EU Not Including Libertad Act In Agendas For Meetings With Secretary Of State Blinken. Not As Important As Advertised? March 25, 2021 

In Brussels Will U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken Discuss Cuba, Libertad Act And Venezuela With EC/EU Officials?  Will He Rebuff, Sway Or Be Swayed?  Quid Pro Quo? March 23, 2021 

EC Responds To European Parliament Inquiry About EU Ambassador To Cuba Letter To President Biden- Navarro "Committed Two Major... Failures..." March 12, 2021

Other Analyses 

Might France-Based Bouygues S.A. Be Defendant In Libertad Act Title III Lawsuit? How Would Macron Administration Respond? France Holds Presidency Of Council Of The European Union From January 2022 Oct 5, 2021

U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken In Paris. Will President Macron & Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian Discuss Libertad Act Lawsuits Against CMA-CGM, Societe Generale, BNP Paribas, Pernod Ricard?Oct 4, 2021

Coffee & Charcoal Have Been Imported From Cuba; U.S. Companies Want More. Agricultural Commodities/Food Products/Healthcare Products Have Been Exported To Cuba; U.S. Companies Want More. Oct 2, 2021

The White House Believes President Biden Has Not Followed President Trump's Policies, Including Those Relating To Cuba. Sep 30, 2021

Cuba's Minister Of Foreign Affairs- Country Prepared For "Responsible" Discussions With Biden-Harris Administration Despite Retention Of Trump-Pence Administration Policies Sep 30, 2021

The White House On Implementing Cuba Remittance Recommendations Received On 31 August 2021: “some of these issues are challenging...” Sep 30, 2021

Cuba Approves First 35 MIPYME Applications- Confirms No Application Thus Far Denied. Many More Applications Expected. Result Beneficial For Biden Administration Goal To Support SME's. Sep 30, 2021

New Report Data Shows Cuba Owing China US$4.643 Billion In "sovereign and hidden debt exposure" For BRI And ODA Sep 29, 2021

Libertad Act Lawsuit Against American Airlines To Continue Without Latam Airlines Group; Jury Trial Requested Sep 28, 2021

Istanbul Is Home To First La Bodeguita del Medio Franchise From Cuba. Here Is What Franchisees Must Provide- Monthly Royalty Payment And Spend 2% Of Gross Revenues For Advertising/Promotion Sep 27, 2021

US Subsidiary Requests 30-Day Court Delay In Libertad Act Lawsuit. Will US Court Approve? Other Requests Were From EU-Based Defendant Parent Companies. Iberostar Waiting 528 Days For EC Guidance Sep 27, 2021

European Commission (EC) Reports "Several" EU-Based "Persons and Companies" With Libertad Act Title III Engagement. Iberostar Of Spain Waiting 528 Days For EC Guidance Sep 26, 2021

XDNXXZLMKJOYNL5H5RASGZRHPM.jpg

Might France-Based Bouygues S.A. Be Defendant In Libertad Act Title III Lawsuit? How Would Macron Administration Respond? France Holds Presidency Of Council Of The European Union From January 2022

Might France-Based Bouygues S.A. Be Defendant In Libertad Act Title III Lawsuit?
Construction Work At Hotels
Office In ZEDM
Presence At Port Of Havana
Would Be Fifth France-Based Company To Be A Defendant

The Trump Administration on 2 May 2019 made operational Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”). To date, forty-two (42) lawsuits have been filed some of which have been dismissed, some of which have been revised, some of which have been refiled, some of which remain before trial judges, and some of which are at Courts of Appeals.  LINK To Lawsuit Statistics 

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.  There is a two-year claw-back provision.   

Thus far, 40% of European Union (EU)-based defendants in Libertad Act Title III lawsuits filed since 2019 are headquartered in France.  The companies rank amongst the thirty-largest with headquarters in France: Marseille, France-based CMA CGM S.A. (2020 revenue approximately US$31 billion); Paris, France-based BNP Paribas (2020 revenue approximately US$45 billion; assets approximately US$2.8 trillion); Paris, France-based Societe Generale S.A. (2020 revenue approximately US$23 billion; assets approximately US$1.6 trillion); Paris, France-based Pernod Ricard S.A. (2020 revenue approximately US$9.3 billion). 

Paris, France-based Bouygues Construction (Bouygues S.A. 2020 revenues approximately US$40 billion) through Bouygues Batiment International Cuba has a substantial presence (since 1999 primarily constructing and renovating hotels- estimated at nearing fifty with a total of more than 30,000 rooms; and 331 employees as of 18 February 2021) in the Republic of Cuba and in the United States including Brickell City Centre in Miami, Florida, and Pawtucket Tunnel in Rhode Island, among other projects in Florida.  A subsidiary of Bouygues S.A. is Morristown, New Jersey-based Colas USA (5,000 employees and fifty regional offices throughout the United States) and Miami, Florida-based Bouygues Construction. 

"Americaribe LLC is a general contractor with offices based in Miami, Florida and Los Angeles, California. We have operated in the U.S. and Caribbean construction market since 2002, delivering large-scale projects such as the iconic Brickell City Centre in Miami and the Waterfront Hotel in Trinidad & Tobago. We currently have operations in Florida, California, the Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Sint Marteen, Grand Cayman and Trinidad and Tobago. As a subsidiary of Bouygues Bâtiment International, a global player in construction with operations in more than 60 countries, Americaribe is able to apply its vast networks and capacity for technical and commercial innovation, cutting-edge engineering skills and expertise in development to offices, hotels, airports, hospitals, schools, housing, exhibition centers, leisure facilities, etc. The goal for Americaribe is to not only bring projects to reality with an outstanding quality, but to bring concepts of innovation all across the industry with its partners, constructing improved lifestyles for the better future. This motto, branching from Bouygues Bâtiment International, is what we paraphrase as "Shared innovation.”"

Bouygues Construction Cuba S.A.Engineering and construction” has an office in the Republic of Cuba government-operated Zona Especial de Desarollo Mariel (“ZEDM”) (a/k/a Mariel Special Economic Zone).  Link To Posts Referencing Bouygues 

According to the First-Half 2020 Financial Report, “In Cuba, Bouygues Construction continued to build hotels in response to demand from the tourism industry on the island and booked new projects in early 2020.” 

Two companies operating in the area of the ZEDM are defendants in Libertad Act Title III lawsuits: Jacksonville, Florida-based Crowley Maritime Corporation (2019 revenues approximately US$2.5 billion) and Miami, Florida-based Seaboard Marine, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Merriam, Kansas-based Seaboard Corporation (2019 revenues of US$6.8 billion). 

From Republic of Cuba government-operated Aries Transportes S.A.: “The following organize and operate on the docks: Sierra Maestra in Port of Havana, Rolando Roca Pacheco in the Port of Santiago de Cuba, on Punta Francés Beach on the Isle of Youth and in other ports or sites on national territory where ac-tivities of docking, loading and unloading go on related to cruiseline traffic and international tourism ferry traffic. It leases space, warehouses and offices for shipbuilders, tourist agencies and other entities that provide services for the business of operating cruiselines and ferries.” 

2016-2017 ZED Mariel Business Opportunities (LINK) 

"Development of ZED Mariel began with Sector A, with an area of 43.7 km², located on the western edge of the Port of Mariel.  The French company Bouygues Bâtiment International was in charge of the Master Plan for the urbanization of this area, applying the best environmental quality standards and concepts.  The Cuban government has invested over a billion USD on the development of basic and auxiliary infrastructures to ensure multi-mode connections by air, sea and land, the power supply, water supplies, sewage systems, waste treatment and info-communications, etc. which are now at the disposal of the investors.   

EXCELLENT REGIONAL LOCATION ZED Mariel is located in the center of the Caribbean Sea, at the crossroads of the principal sea traffic routes for goods. It has the most modern Containers terminal in the region, located in a deep-waterport that permits the entry of the Neo Panamax vessels using the Caribbean when the new Panama Canal is completed. This will strengthen its goal of becoming the transfer port and regional logistical hub." 

On 29 May 2019, descendants (who reside in the United States) of Mr. Rafael Lucas Sanchez Hill filed a non-Libertad Act Title III lawsuit in Spain seeking US$10 million from Palma de Mallorca, Spain-based Melia Hotels International SA. (2019 revenues approximately US$1.9 billion).  Individuals familiar with the Sanchez-Hill family indicated at the time that Bouygues Construction would likely be a defendant in a Libertad Act Title III lawsuit for properties in the Republic of Cuba constructed/renovated by the company. 

According to representatives of Bouygues Construction, the company may have had or does have a role in a project(s) among one or more of the three piers of the Terminal Sierra Maestra.  Wilmington, Delaware-registered Havana Docks Corporation claims ownership of the three piers and a street-facing building (Old Customs House) collectively known as Terminal Sierra Maestra, and filed Libertad Act Title III lawsuits against Doral, Florida-based Carnival Corporation (2019 revenues approximately US$20.8 billion); Geneva, Switzerland-based MSC Cruises S.A (2019 revenues approximately US$3.6 billion); Miami, Florida-based Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd. (2019 revenues approximately US$6.46 billion); and Miami, Florida-based Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. (2019 revenues approximately US$10.95 billion). 

Istanbul, Turkey-based Global Ports Holding (2019 revenues exceeded US$124 million), which also has a registered office in London, United Kingdom, and is listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) is not a defendant in a Libertad Act Title III lawsuit.  Global Ports Holding reports having no presence in the United States. 

Global Ports Holding has “a management agreement in Cuba to advise and consult on cruise port management best practice. The cruise terminal is in the Sierra Maestra complex, in San Francisco pier, with a current capacity for two ships.”  

According to the 2019 Annual Report, “The Board also received and discussed detailed updates from the CEO and other members of the Senior Management Team regarding various other business-related issues.  Among those, the Board reviewed the Group’s management of La Habana Cruise Port in light of declining travel to Cuba via cruise ships.  The Group has not invested in the port and its activity there has declined.” 

According to the company, the “duration of the management contract is thirty-three (33) years (2018-2033) with “no future Capex Obligation” and “Tariff Discretion.”  The company reported that the management contract was not a result of a “Competitive Process” and the Process Description was defined as an “Uncompetitive tender” with comments “GPH submitted and unsolicited tender.”  However, the 2018 Annual Report for the company references that the management contract is for fifteen (15) years: “Our new port investment strategy has been selective, choosing ports in marquee destinations (such as Barcelona, Havana, Venice, Lisbon, Kuşadası, and Valletta) which we believe are less susceptible to being replaced by others.”  

“Page 32: At GPH we continue to target ports where we can add value, by adding them to our global portfolio.  During the year we were therefore delighted to announce we had signed a 15-year management agreement for the operation of the cruise port in Havana, Cuba. The move also aligned with our stated intention to extend our interests into the Americas.  GPH will bring its global expertise to manage all aspects of the cruise port operations over the life of the agreement. We will be paid a management fee that is based on a number of factors including passenger numbers, with growth-based incentives.  In addition, we will continue to work with our Cuban partners on the design and technical specification of the cruise port investment programme, including proposed new terminals. Once these have been completed, GPH will take responsibility for their marketing and commercialisation.  The agreement is part of a significant investment by Cuba into the port area and tourism infrastructure in Havana.  We enter the port’s story at an exciting time: its two berths welcomed around 328,000 cruise passengers in 2017, some 156% higher than in 2016.”  

“Our role is to ensure this growth path continues, and with the facility expanding to six berths by 2024, the Havana port, and the allure of Cuba as a destination, offers exceptional potential.  The port itself is situated in the heart of Havana and only a 30-minute drive from Jose Marti International Airport, making it an ideal homeporting destination.  Indeed, in 2018 cruising contributed to Cuba’s best-ever year for tourism.  This represents our first agreement in the Caribbean and an important step in the history of Global Ports Holding.  The GPH team looks forward to working with our local partners and staff to drive continued growth, delivering both a world class cruise port and a great experience for passengers.  As for the wider network, we hope to add three new ports during 2019.”  

“Developments in 2018: GPH took over the operation of the cruise port in Havana in June 2018, and the remainder of the year was spent appraising the potential of the terminal and implementing our financial reporting procedures. Our new General Manager is in post, together with the support team.”   

“Plans for 2019: We will work with our Cuban partners throughout the year on the design and technical specification of the cruise port investment programme, including proposed new terminals.  In the meantime we will roll out our global best in class operating procedures and processes.”  

LINK To Post: Global Ports Holding From Turkey Could Be Next To Be Sued Using Title III; President Erdogan Will React Harshly 

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES [1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. MSC CRUISES SA CO, AND MSC CRUISES (USA) INC. [1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [1:19-cv-23591; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23590; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

ZED Mariel (ZEDM) Lawsuits Background 

From Court Filings: “CUBA’S CONFISCATION OF THE CONFISCATED PROPERTY 46. On September 29, 1960, per Resolution 436, the Cuban Government announced the confiscation without compensation of all assets and rights, whatever their nature, then owned by the Blanco Rosell Siblings and which are herein defined as the Confiscated Property. Such Confiscated Property includes, inter alia, Maritima Mariel, the 70-year Concession, Central San Ramón, Azucarera Mariel, as well as all the “all shares or stock certificates representing capital of the entities listed in the [other] Whereas of [Resolution 436], ” which included, inter alia, the 70-Year Concession and all the lands owned by these entities. See Resolution 436 at 23406.”  

“The fact of the confiscation of the Blanco Rosell Siblings’ property in Cuba was so well known that, on April 18, 2019, the day after the Trump Administration announced that it would allow Helms-Burton Act lawsuits under Title III to go forward, stories published on both Radio Marti and TV Marti identified Plaintiff’s claims to the Mariel Special Development Zone as one of the top 10 potential Helms-Burton Claims: The Mariel Special Development Zone, the star Cuban project to attract investment, was built on nationalized land where the Carranza-Bernal, Carbonell-González and Blanco-Rosell families owned sugar and hemp processing plants.” 

“THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT INCORPORATED THE CONFISCATED PROPERTY INTO THE ZONA ESPECIAL DE DESAROLLO MARIEL (“ZEDM”) (a/k/a MARIEL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE) 54. The Zona Especial de Desarollo Mariel (“ZEDM”) (a/k/a Mariel Special Economic Zone) is an agency or instrumentality of the Cuban Government.  Created by statute, the ZEDM is a special economic zone in Cuba with its own legal structure.  55. As stated above, the ZEDM has been referred to in the media as “the star Cuban project to attract investment.” See supra, ¶ 51. Starting in or around 2009, the Government of Cuba and various non-Cuban corporate partners rebuilt the Port of Mariel and constructed a container terminal in the ZEDM.  58. The ZEDM’s container terminal subsumes the Blanco Rosell Siblings’ 70-Year Concession rights, pursuant to which they possessed the right, among other things, “to plan, study, execute, maintain, and exploit public docks and warehouses in the Bay of Mariel, province of Pinar del Rio, and the construction of new buildings and works…” See Decree 2367 at 13865.”  

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. CROWLEY MARITIME CORPORATION, Defendant. [3:20-cv-01426 Middle District Florida; Transferred To Florida Southern District 1:21-cv-20443]
Murphy & Anderson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable LLP (defendant)

Jacksonville, Florida-based Crowley Maritime Corporation (2019 revenues approximately US$2.5 billion).  “Crowley, founded in 1892, is a privately-held, U.S.-owned and operated logistics, government, marine and energy solutions company headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida. Services are provided worldwide by four primary business units – Crowley Logistics, Crowley (Government) Solutions, Crowley Shipping and Crowley Fuels.”  

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD MARINE, LTD., Defendant. [1:20-cv-25176; Southern Florida District]
Horr, Novak & Skipp, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields (plaintiff)
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (defendant)

Miami, Florida-based Seaboard Marine is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Merriam, Kansas-based Seaboard Corporation (2019 revenues of US$6.8 billion). Butterball Turkey is a subsidiary of Seaboard Corporation. Seaboard Corporation 2019 Annual Report: "At Seaboard Marine, our container line operating throughout the Americas surpassed $1 billion in revenues despite fierce competition for market share by both regional and global carriers. We run multiple routes from six U.S. ports to 26 countries in the Caribbean, Central and South America."

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL; EMMA RUTH BLANCO, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF ALFREDO BLANCO ROSELL, JR; HEBE BLANCO MIYARES, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF BYRON BLANCO ROSELL; SERGIO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, in his personal capacity, and as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF ENRIQUE BLANCO ROSELL; EDUARDO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF FLORENTINO BLANCO ROSELL; LIANA MARIA BLANCO; SUSANNAH VALENTINA BLANCO; LYDIA BLANCO BONAFONTE; JACQUELINE M. DELGADO; BYRON BLANCO, JR.; MAGDELENA BLANCO MONTOTO; FLORENTINO BLANCO DE LA TORRE; JOSEPH E. BUSHMAN; CARLOS BLANCO DE LA TORRE; and GUILLERMO BLANCO DE LA TORRE; Plaintiffs, v. MSC MEDITERRANEAN SHIPPING COMPANY SA. [1:21-cv-23400; Florida Southern District].
Horr, Novak & Skipp, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Offices Of John S. Gaebe P.A. (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL; EMMA RUTH BLANCO, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF ALFREDO BLANCO ROSELL, JR; HEBE BLANCO MIYARES, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF BYRON BLANCO ROSELL; SERGIO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, in his personal capacity, and as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF ENRIQUE BLANCO ROSELL; EDUARDO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF FLORENTINO BLANCO ROSELL; LIANA MARIA BLANCO; SUSANNAH VALENTINA BLANCO; LYDIA BLANCO BONAFONTE; JACQUELINE M. DELGADO; BYRON BLANCO, JR.; MAGDALENA BLANCO MONTOTO; FLORENTINO BLANCO DE LA TORRE; JOSEPH E. BUSHMAN; CARLOS BLANCO DE LA TORRE; and GUILLERMO BLANCO DE LA TORRE; Plaintiffs, v. CMA CGM S.A. (a/k/a CMA CGM THE FRENCH LINE; a/k/a CMA CGM GROUP); CMA CGM (AMERICA) LLC. [1:21-cv-22778; Southern Florida District]
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Horr, Novak & Skipp P.A. (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe P.A. (plaintiff)

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Previous Reference Posts: 

Crowley Maritime Corporation Is 32nd Libertad Act Lawsuit- Plaintiffs Target Use Of ZEDM Port

Seaboard Marine Is 31st Libertad Act Lawsuit- Plaintiff Targets Mariel Special Economic Zone Operations

If Biden Suspends Title III, Attorney May Scramble To File Lawsuits

Related Analyses

U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken In Paris. Will President Macron & Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian Discuss Libertad Act Lawsuits Against CMA-CGM, Societe Generale, BNP Paribas, Pernod Ricard? October 04, 2021

How Does CMA CGM Of France Know That European Commission (EC) Will Issue Decision For Libertad Act Lawsuits “in a much shorter period of time than with the prior applicants”? October 3, 2021

Not Yet Sued, World's Second-Largest Shipping Company Received Letter, Then Ceased Cuba Operations. Libertad Act As Tool Of Deterrence Worked. Biden Administration Negotiations With Cuba Preferred. October 3, 2021

US Subsidiary Requests 30-Day Court Delay In Libertad Act Lawsuit. Will US Court Approve? Other Requests Were From EU-Based Defendant Parent Companies. Iberostar Waiting 528 Days For EC Guidance September 27, 2021

European Commission (EC) Reports "Several" EU-Based "Persons and Companies" With Libertad Act Title III Engagement. Iberostar Of Spain Waiting 528 Days For EC Guidance September 26, 2021

During United Nations Meetings, European Commission And United States Continue 2021 Theme For Cuba: Neither Party Wants To Discuss- So They Don’t. For EC, Title III Not As Important As Advertised 23 September 2021

At U.S.-EU Summit Will Cuba Be Mentioned By President Biden, President Michel, Or President von der Leyen? Trajectory Suggests Not. How Does Borrell Square Statements With Action? June 14, 2021 

After Four Meetings In Brussels, Representatives Of EC, EU, and United States Have Not Discussed Cuba Despite EC Commitment To Do So May 26, 2021 

Third Meeting In Two Months- EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Borrell Again Does Not Discuss Cuba With U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken. Confirms Cuba Not Important To EU-U.S. Relations. May 04, 2021

EC Now Has To Decide What It Perhaps Doesn’t Want To Decide- Iberostar Of Spain Libertad Act Lawsuit Is First To Report U.S. Court Recognizing EC’s Interest In Title III Lawsuits April 26, 2020 

EC/EU May Today Find End Of “Comity” By United States Courts. After One Year Waiting, EC/EU May Have Run Out Of Time. April 15, 2021 

Second Visit In Three Weeks- U.S. Secretary Of State To Brussels. EC Writes It Will "Address" Cuba. Did Not Last Time. EU Defendants Waiting One Year For Guidance. April 13, 2021 

Lost In Translation- EP Member & Media Report EC Will “mediate” With Biden Administration About Cuba On Terrorism List. Problem- EC Wrote “we will address this issue” April 02, 2021 

Confusing Message By EC/EU Not Including Libertad Act In Agendas For Meetings With Secretary Of State Blinken. Not As Important As Advertised? March 25, 2021 

In Brussels Will U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken Discuss Cuba, Libertad Act And Venezuela With EC/EU Officials?  Will He Rebuff, Sway Or Be Swayed?  Quid Pro Quo? March 23, 2021 

EC Responds To European Parliament Inquiry About EU Ambassador To Cuba Letter To President Biden- Navarro "Committed Two Major... Failures..." March 12, 2021