Cuba Again Expanding MSME Authorizations To Include Accessing Foreign Capital, Foreign Bank Accounts, Local Development Projects Qualify

RT America
Moscow, Russia
30 November 2021

Cuba relaxes its financial policies for the domestic market and presents a new portfolio of foreign investment businesses


Cooperatives and small and medium-sized private companies will now be able to partner with foreign capital

Havana eases its financial policies for the domestic market. This was reported on Tuesday by the Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment, Rodrigo Malmierca, when he presented a new business portfolio with more than 670 possibilities during the Second Cuba 2021 Business Forum. Among other novelties, now small and medium-sized private companies will be able, like cooperatives, to associate with foreign capital. This includes new flexibilities from the financial point of view, such as the possibility for entrepreneurs to open accounts in banks in other countries. The business portfolio also accommodates local development projects in the municipalities. So far, the most important investments the country has received are in the food production, tourism and pharmaceutical sectors. In total, the island receives investments from more than 40 countries, said the minister, who described as a priority the expansion and deepening of this mechanism as part of national development.

RT America
Moscow, Russia
30 November 2021

Cuba flexibiliza sus políticas financieras para el mercado interno y presenta una nueva cartera de negocios de inversión extranjera


Cooperativas y pequeñas y medianas empresas privadas podrán ahora asociarse con capital extranjero.

La Habana flexibiliza sus políticas financieras para el mercado interno. Así lo informó este martes el ministro de Comercio Exterior e Inversión Extranjera, Rodrigo Malmierca, al presentar durante el Segundo Foro Empresarial Cuba 2021 una nueva cartera de negocios con más de 670 posibilidades. Entre otras novedades, ahora las pequeñas y medianas empresas privadas podrán, al igual que las cooperativas, asociarse con capital extranjero. Esto incluye nuevas flexibilizaciones desde el punto de vista financiero, como la posibilidad para los empresarios de abrir cuentas en bancos de otros países. La cartera de negocios también da cabida a proyectos de desarrollo local en los municipios. Hasta el momento, las inversiones más importantes que ha recibido el país se encuentran en los sectores de la producción de alimentos, turismo y farmacéutico. En total, la isla recibe inversiones de más de 40 países, aseguró el ministro, quien calificó como prioridad la ampliación y profundización de este mecanismo como parte del desarrollo nacional.

US$400+ Million? Decision(s) By Judge At 14 December 2021 Hearing May Provide Roadmap For What Carnival, MSC, Norwegian, Royal Caribbean May Owe Havana Docks Corporation In Libertad Act Lawsuit

NOTE: ORDER RESETTING HEARING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the parties’ Joint Notice Regarding December 14th Hearing. See, e.g., Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-cv-21724, ECF No. [422]. Upon review, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the pending Motions for Summary Judgment are reset for hearing on Wednesday, January 12, 2022, at 9:30 a.m., before the undersigned in Courtroom 10-2, 400 North Miami Avenue, Miami, Florida 33128. The Court will allocate the morning and afternoon for the hearing. LINK To Order

From First Complaint (5/2/19): “Plaintiff is entitled to all money damages allowable under 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a), including, but not limited to, those equal to the sum of: a. The amount greater of: (i) the amount certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, plus interest; (ii) the amount determined by a special master pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 6083(a)(2); or (iii) the “fair market value” of the Subject Property, plus interest; b. Three times the amount determined above (treble damages); and c. Court costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.”

LINK To First Complaint (5/2/19)

LINK To Foreign Claims Settlement Commission Certification Of Loss (4/21/71)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. CARNIVAL CORPORATION, Defendant.
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. MSC CRUISES SA, MSC CRUISES SA CO, and MSC CRUISES (USA) INC., Defendants.
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., Defendant.
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD., Defendant.

SEC. 302. LIABILITY FOR TRAFFICKING IN CONFISCATED PROPERTY CLAIMED BY UNITED STATES NATIONALS. (a) Civil Remedy.-- (1) Liability for trafficking.--(A) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person that, after the end of the 3-month period beginning on the effective date of this title, traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property for money damages in an amount equal to the sum of-- (i) the amount which is the greater of-- (I) the amount, if any, certified to the claimant by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, plus interest; (II) the amount determined under section 303(a)(2), plus interest; or (III) the fair market value of that property, calculated as being either the current value of the property, or the value of the property when confiscated plus interest, whichever is greater; and (ii) court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. (B) Interest under subparagraph (A)(i) shall be at the rate set forth in section 1961 of title 28, United States Code, computed by the court from the date of confiscation of the property involved to the date on which the action is brought under this subsection. (2) Presumption in favor of the certified claims.--There shall be a presumption that the amount for which a person is liable under clause (i) of paragraph (1)(A) is the amount that is certified as described in subclause (I) of that clause. The presumption shall be rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence that the amount described in subclause (II) or (III) of that clause is the appropriate amount of liability under that clause. (3) Increased liability.--(A) Any person that traffics in confiscated property for which liability is incurred under paragraph (1) shall, if a United States national owns a claim with respect to that property which was certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, be liable for damages computed in accordance with subparagraph (C). (C) Damages for which a person is liable under subparagraph (A) or subparagraph (B) are money damages in an amount equal to the sum of-- (i) the amount determined under paragraph (1)(A)(ii), and (ii) 3 times the amount determined applicable under paragraph (1)(A)(i).

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [1:19-cv-23591; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23590; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. MSC CRUISES SA CO, AND MSC CRUISES (USA) INC. [1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES [1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

ORDER SETTING HEARING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the parties’ Joint Request for Oral Argument on Motions for Summary Judgment. See Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-cv-21724, ECF No. [376]; Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises, SA, et al., No. 19-cv-23588, ECF No. [260]; Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 19-cv-23590, ECF No. [181]; and Havana Docks Corp. v Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., No. 19-cv-23591, ECF No. [283], (collectively, the “Motions”). Upon review of the Motions, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motions are GRANTED, and the pending Motions for Summary Judgment are set for hearing on Tuesday, December 14, 2021 at 9:30 a.m. before the undersigned in Courtroom 10-2, 400 North Miami Avenue, Miami, Florida 33128. The Court recognizes that we continue to be in the midst of a global pandemic. As such, to the extent that the parties would prefer to appear by video conference, the parties should promptly notify the Court. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on October 25, 2021.

LINK To Order Setting Hearing On Motions For Summary Judgement (10/26/21)

LINK To Plaintiff's Motion For Permission To Use Sealed Records At The December 14th Hearing (11/19/21)

Cuba 2021 Business Forum To Be Held Virtually. Registration Now Open

Call for II Business Forum Cuba 2021

The Virtual Fair is the opportunity that the Organizing Committee of the II Cuba 2021 Business Forum has created for national and foreign companies participating in the event to showcase their main goods and services. Do not miss the space, register now! LINK

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is an honor to invite you to participate in the Second Edition of the Cuba 2021 Business Forum, which will be held virtually from November 29 to December 2 of this year, with the aim of continuing promoting foreign trade and investment.

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, this Forum will offer an excellent framework for discussion between national and foreign business representatives, the new actors of the Cuban economy, including those of the private sector, government officials, Chambers of Commerce and Trade and Investment Promotion Agencies, who wish to interact and exchange ideas on business and trade with the island.

This second Forum intends to provide a space for information sharing and exchange on the transformations of the Cuban economy. This will be an excellent opportunity to learn about Cuba’s main export products (both goods and services) and business opportunities in prioritized areas such as the biopharmaceutical, tourism and food and agricultural sectors.

This event will also include for the first time a virtual fair, which will allow business representatives to exhibit their products through the Business Forum platform. Another Business Forum will be held with the participation of Cubans residing abroad who have business and investment interests in the island, which will contribute to further strengthen the links between Cubans that live abroad and those that live in Cuba.

Upon registration on the Forum’s website, it will be possible to arrange work meetings with representatives of businesses from the external sector of the economy. We will be pleased if you join us in this Second Cuba 2021 Business Forum through the website www.foroempresarial.mincex.gob.cu. Registration will be open from October 4 to November 25. We look forward to your participation in the forum.

Rodrigo Malmierca Díaz
Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment
Chair of the Organizing Committee

LINK TO LETTER IN PDF FORMAT

LINK To 55-Page 2021/2022 Cuba Guide For Investment

Screenshot 2021-10-01 at 06-58-30 Home.png

Biden-Harris Administration Decision By OFAC To Extend U.S. Energy Companies Presence In Venezuela Through General License 8I Is Helpful To Cuba. Trump-Pence Administration Did The Same.

United States-based companies have continued to operate in Venezuela within provisions of licenses issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury.   

United States-based Baker Hughes Company (2020 revenues approximately US$23 billion), Chevron Corporation (2020 revenues approximately US$147 billion), Halliburton Company (2019 revenues approximately US$22 billion), Schlumberger (2020 revenues approximately US$33 billion), and Weatherford International (2020 revenues approximately US$5.4 billion).  In 2014, Weatherford pleaded guilty and was fined by the OFAC for exporting oil equipment through third countries to the Republic of Cuba. 

An argument for maintaining United States-based oil field services company operations in Venezuela is the strategic importance of preserving the value of the oil fields- and revenues from oil exports account for nearly ninety percent (90%) of the gross national product (GNP) of Venezuela.  Maintaining value of the oil fields is important also for preserving assets which may be subject to claims against Venezuela for the expropriation of assets owned by United States-based oil field services companies.  There is support for not decapitating all of the United States-based commercial presence in Venezuela for fear that non-United States-based companies will replace United States-based companies.  Officials in the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) have discussed a re-opening of the United States Embassy in Caracas.    

With commercial, economic, and political infrastructure in Venezuela strengthening and gaining elasticity, less pressures result in Venezuela maintaining, and in some instances increasing its commercial and economic support to the Republic of Cuba. 

As the distance continues to expand from 2018 when the United States demanded that President Nicolas Maduro (2013- ) vacate the Palacio de Miraflores in Caracas and no departure is reasonably believed forthcoming, there becomes an institutionalization of the issue and a perception of intractiveness, resulting in decreased interest by relevant state actors in pursuing an outcome sought by the United States.  The status quo becomes rigid and foundational.  

China, Cuba, India, Italy, Iran, Russia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and United States among others have commercial, economic, and political bilateral relationships with Venezuela and with one another.  Thus, there are interlocking relationships that need be adequately addressed for each government to agree to support any resolution to issues relating to Venezuela.

LINK To “2024 Process For Venezuela”

OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
Venezuela Sanctions Regulations
31 CFR part 591
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 8I

Authorizing Transactions Involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) Necessary for the Limited Maintenance of Essential Operations in Venezuela or the Wind Down of Operations in Venezuela for Certain Entities


(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this general license, all transactions and activities prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13850 of November 1, 2018, as amended by E.O. 13857 of January 25, 2019, or E.O. 13884 of August 5, 2019, each as incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the limited maintenance of essential operations, contracts, or other agreements, that: (i) are for safety or the preservation of assets in Venezuela; (ii) involve PdVSA or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest; and (iii) were in effect prior to July 26, 2019, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 1, 2022, for the following entities and their subsidiaries (collectively, the “Covered Entities”):

Chevron Corporation
Halliburton
Schlumberger Limited
Baker Hughes Holdings LLC
Weatherford International, Public Limited Company


Note to paragraph (a): Transactions and activities necessary for safety or the preservation of assets in Venezuela that are authorized by paragraph (a) of this general license include: transactions and activities necessary to ensure the safety of personnel, or the integrity of operations and assets in Venezuela; participation in shareholder and board of directors meetings; making payments on third-party invoices for transactions and activities authorized by paragraph (a) of this general license, or incurred prior to April 21, 2020, provided such activity was authorized at the time it occurred; payment of local taxes and purchase of utility services in Venezuela; and payment of salaries for employees and contractors in Venezuela.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this general license, all transactions and activities prohibited by E.O. 13850, as amended, or E.O. 13884, each as incorporated into the VSR, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of operations, contracts, or other agreements in Venezuela involving PdVSA or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, and that were in effect prior to July 26, 2019, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 1, 2022, for the Covered Entities.
(c) Paragraph (a) of this general license does not authorize: (1) The drilling, lifting, or processing of, purchase or sale of, or transport or shipping of any Venezuelan-origin petroleum or petroleum products; (2) The provision or receipt of insurance or reinsurance with respect to the transactions and activities described in paragraph (c)(1) of this general license; (3) The design, construction, installation, repair, or improvement of any wells or other facilities or infrastructure in Venezuela or the purchasing or provision of any goods or services, except as required for safety; (4) Contracting for additional personnel or services, except as required for safety; or (5) The payment of any dividend, including in kind, to PdVSA, or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest.
(d) This general license does not authorize: (1) Any transactions or dealings related to the exportation or reexportation of diluents, directly or indirectly, to Venezuela; (2) Any loans to, accrual of additional debt by, or subsidization of PdVSA, or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, including in kind, prohibited by E.O. 13808 of August 24, 2017, as amended by E.O. 13857, and incorporated into the VSR; or (3) Any transactions or activities otherwise prohibited by the VSR, or any other part of 31 CFR chapter V, or any transactions or activities with any blocked person other than the blocked persons identified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this general license.
(e) Effective November 24, 2021, General License No. 8H, dated June 1, 2021, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License No. 8I.

LINK To OFAC General License No. 81

Why Won't Biden Administration Permit U.S. Entities To Invest/Finance MSMEs? In December, Cuba’s FIMELSA Begins Convertible Currency-Equivalent Loans At 6.5% For 120 Days; Lower For CUP.

Cubadebate
Havana, Republic of Cuba
24 November 2021

Microcredit financial institution created for new Cuban economic actors

The Cuban banking system created a new financial institution to grant microcredits to newly launched MSMEs, as well as self-employed workers and cooperatives. Financiera de Microcréditos SA, legally recognized, arises in response to the need for these actors to be inserted into the country's economic scene, highlighted in a press conference Ayamis Losada García, director of the new company that was born from the transformation of the license of FIMELSA, a non-bank entity dedicated until now to financial intermediation within the national territory.

The institution, which will begin operating on December 15 with a national scope, will be able to grant credits in Cuban pesos (CUP) and in MLC, "in the form of microcredits", that is, small amounts of capital that allow to boost the production of goods and services. Losada García said that, in this first moment, self-employed workers, cooperatives and MSMEs that have demonstrated export capacity will receive financing, and only to make wholesale purchases that are in the country, as well as for payments to entities authorized to sell in the national territory in these coins.

In MLC, she said, the productions and services that have been contracted will be financed in exports, in sales to chain stores in MLC and to the Mariel Special Development Zone. "We need the money to return in the same amount and currency in which it was delivered," she emphasized and said that the financing granted will be placed entirely in the account of the provider of the services or products. According to Losada García, the microcredits will not have a maximum amount, and the minimum could be 100,000 CUP or 500 USD. For the delivery of the money, there is no distinction, whether it is for working capital or for investment, but the characteristics of the project will be evaluated, the directive specified and clarified that the loan must be returned as soon as possible: for MLC the maximum term, Initially, it will be 120 days, and in the case of the CUP it will "be negotiated."

Bárbara Mirabal, vice president of Banco Popular de Ahorro, explained that the amount of the loans and the terms for their repayment depend on the level of financing that has been achieved in foreign currency, taking into account that financial companies obtain the money from procedures business with banks. The objective, at first, is to accompany the economic actors who meet the established conditions, so that they become more dynamic, the money grows and other entrepreneurs who need to enter the market can join. The maximum period that must elapse between the request and the granting of the financing is 10 business days, counted after it is verified that all the information is correct.

The offices of the Financiera de Microcéditos are located at Inmobiliaria Caribe, at ave 47, No. 3413, between 34 and 36, Kohly district, Playa municipality, Havana. Those interested can contact by phone: 72027330 and 72026254 (blackboards), ext 111 and 113, and by email: cliente@microcredito.co.cu.

Frequently asked questions and answers:

1. Being a self-employed worker, can I access this type of financing? Yes, these financings are designed for economic actors, understand self-employed workers, non-agricultural cooperatives, state, private and mixed MSMEs.
2. Can I request microcredits in both types of currency? Yes, only in MLC at least one of the following three conditions must be met: Make sales to chain stores in MLC. Market in the Mariel Special Development Zone. Make exports.
3. What is the maximum amount I can ask for? The maximum amount is defined depending on the nature of the projects that are intended to be financed, but, in any case, it must be known that this type of financing (microcredits) is characterized by being rather small amounts with quick returns.
4. Can I request credit to buy in the network of stores in MLC? No.
5. If my business is new, can I apply for MLC credit to start the business? It will always be dependent on the project that it presents and the potential that can be seen in the business that is being started.
6. Is the credit payment in MLC or CUP? The money is returned in the same currency in which it is requested.
7. In what time can the credit be paid? The time depends on the type of currency, but in any case you should bear in mind that microcredits are characterized by being rather small amounts with quick returns.
8. Would the payment to the bank be monthly? The terms for the payment of principal and interest depend on the type of currency and what the parties agree to.
9. What interest rate does the bank charge for these credits? It depends on the currency in which the financing is requested, in the case of the MLC an interest of up to 6.5% is charged per year, while for the CUP the lowest rates established by the BCC are taken into account, according to the agreed terms .
10. In addition to the interest rate, is there a commission charged? Yes, commissions of up to 0.75% are charged in the case of MLC financing and up to 1% in the case of CUP.
11. In what currency are commissions paid? All obligations with the finance company are paid in the same currency in which the financing was received.
12. Do these credits have to be guaranteed? Yes, the guarantees can be the income session, the pledge of the accounts and the debit notes.
13. What currency would these guarantees be in? All obligations with the finance company are paid in the same currency in which the financing was received.
14. When credit is granted, is it credited to the customer's MLC account? No, one of the conditions for the granting of microcredits in MLC is that the financing granted be placed entirely in the account of the provider of the services or products.

LINKS To Relevant Analyses 

Update: More Than 700 Micro, Small And Medium-Sized Enterprises Approved In Cuba  November 25, 2021

OFAC & BIS To 107 Tech Companies? Cuba. Yes, You Can Go There, But We Dare You. "Encourage & Enable" Not The Same As "Access & Use." Memo: Donilon, Klain, Ricchetti, Richmond, Sullivan.  November 23, 2021

Will President Biden's Statement That His Is "a small business presidency” Extend To Supporting Small Businesses In Cuba?  November 22, 2021

Update On Registration Of Micro, Small & Medium-Size Enterprises In Cuba. Now More Than 600.  November 21, 2021

Cuba Continues To Report On Activity Of MSME's- The Numbers Increase.  November 06, 2021

Joint Venture Between Banco de Sabadell Of Spain And Banco International de Comercio In Cuba Will Provide Financing In Foreign Currency To MSMEs & Non-Agricultural Cooperatives  November 05, 2021

Bormey srl Among The First 35 Newly-Constituted Medium-Sized Enterprises In Cuba, Exported 5,000 Peanut Bars To Italy. Is United States Next? U.S. Department Of State Regulations Would Approve.  October 26, 2021

ProLimp Cleaning In Cuba Precisely Type Of Entrepreneurship Biden Administration Should Support. Will Cuba Permit U.S. Venture Capitalists?  March 08, 2021

Update: More Than 700 Micro, Small And Medium-Sized Enterprises Approved In Cuba

Cubadebate
Havana, Republic of Cuba
24 November 2021


More than 700 MSMEs and cooperatives approved since the process began

Today the Ministry of Economy and Planning approved 100 new applications from private micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), one state and two non-agricultural cooperatives (CNA). With this decision, 718 economic actors have been approved since the process began at the end of September this year. Of the MSMEs, 686 are private, 16 are state, and there are also 16 cooperatives. Due to their origin, 57% are reconversions of pre-existing businesses and 43% correspond to new ventures. In total, it is estimated that these economic actors will generate 11 thousand 12 new jobs in the economy. Of all those approved, 42 are part of local development projects, 25 have previously carried out export operations and six are incubated in the Scientific and Technological Park of Havana.

New List Of Approvals In PDF Format

Turkey's Karpowership Adds Fourth Thermal Power Barge In Cuba. Company Generating More Than 10% Of Cuba's Electricity. Good For Turkish Companies. Reinforces Cuba's Energy Production Issues.

NOTE: On 2 December 2021, London, United Kingdom-based Reuters reported: “[In November 2021] An average of 77,000 bpd of crude, jet fuel and gasoline were shipped to Venezuela's top political ally, Cuba.” Unknown is if the four Karpowership vessels dispatched to the Republic of Cuba are accessing oil and/or natural gas produced in the Republic of Cuba.

Argus Media Group
London, United Kingdom
24 November 2021

Cuba obtains fourth power barge to ease blackouts

By Canute James

Turkish contractor Karpowership is installing a fourth thermal power barge in Cuba to help alleviate chronic outages. The barges run on fuel oil procured by the Turkish company, Cuban state-owned utility UNE said. The new barge is located off the coast of the capital Havana and in early December will begin delivering 130MW to the national grid through the Tallapiedra thermoelectric plant, UNE technical director Lazaro Guerra said in a statement.

The first three barges were installed in the bay of Mariel - 40km (24.8mi) west of Havana - since 2019, and the latest will bring total barge-based capacity to 330MW, representing 12pc of the island's current generation, UNE said.

Karpowership is part of Istanbul-based Karadeniz Energy Group. Neither has not responded to repeated requests for comment from Argus.

The additional floating plant will ease Cuba's long-standing power deficit that has worsened in recent months because of a fuel shortage and equipment breakdowns. Some of Cuba's Soviet-era plants burn domestic heavy crude and others use diesel. Cuba has 5.87GW of installed generating capacity, of which 3.2GW is operational, according to UNE. Power generation this week is 2.6GW.

Cuba's fuel deficit has gotten worse partly because of falling oil supply from traditional ally Venezuela. The island's government also blames US sanctions for blocking access credit to purchase parts and equipment to upgrade its generators. "Generation reserves are low and power cuts could get worse if there are other problems with power plants," energy minister Livan Arronte said in commenting on the arrival of the fourth power barge.

Cuba's Caribbean neighbor, the Dominican Republic, is also expanding the use of barge-mounted thermal plants through an agreement with Karpowership to install a 258MW gas-fired facility. The Dominican unit will be berthed outside Boca Chica in the country's south, the Dominican energy ministry told Argus earlier this month. This will be the country's second barge-mounted, gas-fired barge complex.

Independent power producer (IPP) Transcontinental Capital -- a subsidiary of diversified US firm Seaboard -- is installing the 145MW natural gas-fired Estrella del Mar barge to replace an older unit off the coast of the capital, Santo Domingo. Karpowership has not confirmed negotiations with Haiti's state power utility EdF for the installation of barges there.

LINK To Related Analysis

Karpowership From Turkey Extends And Expands Floating Electricity Generation In Cuba; Joining Turkey's Global Ports Holding Which Manages Cruise Ship Terminal In Havana  November 19, 2021

Dialogo Chino
London, United Kingdom
25 November 2021

Can the Belt and Road help Cuba overcome its energy woes?
Highly dependent on fossil fuels and imports, Cuba joins the BRI's energy partnership, looking to China to support its transition amid economic troubles


By Gabriel López Santana

On 18 October, Cuba joined the Belt and Road Energy Partnership (BREP) of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which seeks to strengthen connectivity in infrastructure and energy investment, and promote cooperation in clean energy and efficiency in participating countries.
Cuba joins Venezuela, Bolivia and Suriname as the only Latin American countries among the partnership’s 31 members, including China.

Cuba’s entry into the BREP comes as the government of Raúl Castro and Miguel Díaz-Canel faces up to the need to renew the country’s ageing energy system, and deals with a considerable decrease in the daily barrels of crude oil sent from Venezuela.

Dependent on fossil fuels

Around 95% of the electricity generated in Cuba comes from fossil fuels, mostly provided by eight thermoelectric plants with an average of more than three decades in operation. Accordingly, less than 5% of the electricity generated in 2020 came from renewable sources, according to data from the national statistics office (ONEI).

But Cuba’s energy system is not only fossil-dependent – it is creaking, too. The long and repeated blackouts experienced by Cubans this summer, caused by failures in their battered electrical system, were one of the main factors for citizens coming out in historic demonstrations across the country on 11 July. According to a study by two Cuban academics, in order to lower the cost of electricity generation and reduce its emissions of polluting gases, the government aspires to have more than 2,000 megawatts (MW) available capacity from renewable sources by the year 2030, with 755 MW coming from biomass plants, 700 MW from solar parks and 633 MW from wind farms. This could also help Cuba achieve greater energy independence, given that 53% of its current electricity generation depends on imported sources. However, project financing will be the main obstacle in an economy that, between January 2020 and September 2021, contracted by 13% (GDP), and has seen a 60% inflation in retail prices – as well as a 6,900% increase in the informal foreign exchange market. Cuba’s goal of generating 24% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2030 is made difficult by its economic circumstances.

Prudent investment from China

Given its six decades of diplomatic and commercial relations with the Caribbean country, a demonstrated willingness to assist economically and beyond, and the recent incorporation of the island into the BREP, China could help set Cuba on the path to its renewable energy goals. President Xi Jinping himself has described Cuba as “a good friend, a good comrade, and a good brother.” Even before the BREP was created, China had already invested in biomass plants, solar and wind farms in Cuba. But these have all run up against obstacles.

This October, Cuba became the 31st member of the Belt and Road Energy Partnership at a conference held virtually in Qingdao, China. The Caribbean nation hopes cooperation with China can help upgrade its ageing energy system.

According to the China-Latin America Finance Database, the first of these investments – a US$60 million loan from the Chinese Export-Import Bank – was approved in May 2015 for the construction of a biomass plant that would use residues from the Jesús Rabí sugarcane mill, in the province of Matanzas. The project, initially proposed to Cuba by the British company Havana Energy, included the construction of four similar plants but ran into financing problems after one of the main investors withdrew. The biomass plant was not built, but the project in general remained afloat after the British firm agreed in 2017 to transfer a majority stake to Shanghai Electric Group, in exchange for financing, technology and labour for another plant, this time at Ciro Redondo, in the central province of Ciego de Ávila. Four years later, this biomass plant is connected to the national energy system but runs below capacity due to delays around sugar harvesting, as well as instability, breakdowns and high temperatures in areas of the factory.

The once powerful Cuban sugar industry is in a deep crisis: of 56 sugar plantations on the island, only 38 participated in the most recent harvest, the result of which was the worst yield in 130 years. The business group Azcuba, the governing body of the sugar industry on the island, declared to the Cuban parliament last year that the construction of two further biomass plants belonging to the same project has been paralysed due to a lack of financing. There are also no reports to date of new Chinese investments in plants of this type on the island, despite Cuba proposing another 18 as part of its Portfolio of Foreign Investment Opportunities 2021. The state of the Cuban sugar sector could determine the future of foreign investments in biomass plants, and endanger the 755 MW that the government aspires to generate from them by 2030.

Mixed fortunes for renewables

In 2017, Shanghai Electric received another US$60 million from the Chinese Export-Import Bank to rescue a solar photovoltaic (PV) park project, Mariel Solar, that the British company Hive Energy had proposed to the Cuban government, and which was also waiting for financing. The park only reported its first results in 2020. According to Mariel Solar’s website, its operation has allowed the Cuban government to save more than US$11 million in diesel costs, as of September 2021.

Slow progress

The park’s official site specifies that, once it has reached its maximum potential, the park could extend these savings to US$20 million a year, even after paying the company for its operations – an amount that represents a third of the Chinese investment. Despite the success of the Mariel Solar park, a total of only 72 PV parks have been built in Cuba, out of 210 planned by renewables development and investment company EDIFRE, with just 12 projects currently under construction. Elsewhere, the La Herradura wind farm in the east of the country, built with Chinese technology and labour, is experiencing delays to imports of parts, and will be put into operation with lower capacity than planned, according to local press reports.

According to Cuban government data, of the 506 MW of renewables that they should have in operation at the moment, only 302 MW is currently doing so. Thus, the dependence on finding Chinese investors to provide significant sums to the island is evident.

Cuba's situation will not change with membership of the Belt and Road Energy Partnership

Will renewables be a sector where China invests further in Cuba? For Luis Carlos Battista, a Cuban lawyer specialising in economy and international business, it should be, but investment is likely to focus on ensuring domestic electricity supply, rather than projects that provide energy to develop local industry. “That this has an impact on the development of other industries in which to invest later is more for the long term,” Battista continues, adding that, for Chinese investors, the benefits of wind and solar are “much more indirect than when they have created refineries, dams or hydroelectric plants in other Latin American countries.”

However, according to Johannes Werner, the editor of business news site Cuba Standard, finding investment to correspond with Cuba’s priorities may be a challenge. He points out that Chinese companies may be reticent to engage in the country, given their preference - and that of most international businesses - to avoid “unreasonable exposures and risks in the pursuit of profit”.

One month after Cuba’s official entry into the BREP, there are as yet no reports of future projects that might help to resolve the country’s energy difficulties. Battista believes that this is because of Cuba’s “inability to pay credit” and to the island having “little potential to become a significant socio-economic partner” due to its current economic policies. Such circumstances leave Cuba with little leverage in negotiating investment. Werner, for his part, does not forecast any dramatic short-term changes. “I do not believe that this situation will change with the Cuban membership of the Belt and Road Energy Partnership,” he concludes.

OFAC & BIS To 107 Tech Companies? Cuba. Yes, You Can Go There, But We Dare You. "Encourage & Enable" Not The Same As "Access & Use." Memo: Donilon, Klain, Ricchetti, Richmond, Sullivan.

OFAC & BIS To 107 Tech Companies? Cuba. Yes, You Can Go There, But We Dare You.
OFAC & BIS To Cuba’s 11.3 Million Citizens? Technology Is Great And Will Help You, And We Want You To Have It, But…
Encourage & Enable Are Not The Same As Access & Use
Self-Employed, Micro, Small And Medium-Sized Businesses In Cuba Need Access To Wireless Device Applications & Programs For Operations, Transactions, And Marketing
President Biden- “My Presidency… [Is] A Small Business Presidency” But Only For United States?
Memorandum To Messrs. Donilon, Klain, Ricchetti, Richmond, Sullivan... Looking For A “Win

The Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021), and Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) promoted during their days in office efforts to encourage and enable the 11.3 million citizens of the Republic of Cuba to access and use the Internet and obtain and use those devices, programs, and applications required for a robust “civil society” and re-emerging self-employed and micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises. 

Members of the United States Congress- Democrats, Independents, and Republicans have also continuously weighed-in with speeches, remarks, media releases, hearings, and legislation in support of- and often further in front of efforts by each occupant of the Oval Office. The efforts have frequently been bi-partisan and tri-partisan.  

Why then, have many of the largest United States-based companies whose technologies are essential as tools for individuals to connect, individuals to be heard, and for the self-employed (and owners/managers of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises) to resurrect their foundational role within commercial, economic, and political infrastructure of the Republic of Cuba opted, through self-restraint and self-policing, to deny their tools to those 11.3 million citizens who reside on the 800-mile-long archipelago which lies ninety-three miles south of Key West, Florida?  

The answerRegulatory whiplash. The management of the companies, specifically their legal counsel and their government affairs advisors are terrified that a decision taken in the morning viewed as inspired will by the afternoon be viewed by members of the United States Congress as a “betrayal of the Cuban people” and “support for Communism” and then as “not consistent with United States policy” by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.  Within months could also arrive a notification that the company has been fined hundreds of thousands of dollars or millions of dollars. 

Will the government of the Republic of Cuba benefit from the unrestricted use of Internet-based programs and applications? Yes, So what. What is critical- supporting the 11.3 million citizens of the Republic of Cuba or seeking to engage in whack amole with members of and supporters of the Diaz-Canel-Valdes-Mesa Administration (2019- )? 

If The White House and members of the United States Congress want Republic of Cuba nationals to engage amongst themselves and with family, friends, acquaintances, colleagues, and commercial partners, then remove the OFAC and BIS restrictions upon the delivery of and use of each of the Internet-based programs and applications that are every minute of every day accessed by citizens of the United States.  

Politicians voice their support for the re-emergence of the self-employed in the Republic of Cuba and for those Republic of Cuba nationals who have braved enormous obstacles to create, nurture, and sustain micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises. These efforts require the unfettered access to and use of Internet-based programs and applications. 

Critical is for the OFAC and BIS to be concise in their regulatory and policy guidance. In the public sector, often sought is language that is imprecise so that it may be interpreted and re-interpreted at will. In the private sector, precision is necessary for legal counsel and government affairs advisors. 

If the Biden-Harris Administration and members of the United States Congress want a robust Internet-based landscape in the Republic of Cuba, then the decision must be to go all-in rather than focus upon seeking how to craft language that deters rather than fosters engagement. 

It is in-or-out.  

The Honorable Joseph Biden (22 November 2021): “Economists will tell you that an increase in new businesses is one of the best signs of an economy -- an economy that is becoming more innovative and more dynamic.  And that’s because small businesses aren’t just the heart and soul of America, they’re not just the bedrock of so many communities across this country -- America’s small businesses are the primary job creators, innovators, and drivers that power our economic progress.  That’s why it’s a powerful statement about -- of the faith about -- that we have in our country -- where our country and our economy is heading that small business creation is surging -- surging in America todayWhich is why I’m proud to say: If you look at my presidency so far, it’s a jobs presidency and it’s a small business presidency.” 

The Honorable Brian Nichols, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs before United States House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, Migration and International Economic Policy (16 November 2021): “We will also continue to support increased exports of humanitarian goods to the Cuban people and to continue to work with the private sector and other stakeholders to identify viable options to ensure greater internet access for the Cuban people.” 

The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida), United States Senate (16 November 2021): “And I don't expect a lot, frankly, when the person [The Honorable Emily Mendrala, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs] in charge of the Cuba portfolio in the State Department just a year and a half ago was organizing trips for members of Congress to meet with the regime. I don't expect a lot when the people [The Honorable Juan Gonzalez, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs] at the National Security Council who are involved in the Cuba portfolio are people who are deeply involved in negotiating a failed deal with the regime. The fact of the matter is, the people in charge of this on an hourly basis in this administration are not on the side of what we’re asking for. What they want is an understanding and an agreement with this evil regime. So I’m not expecting a lot, unless the President himself makes it a priority, which so far he has not.” 

The primary decision-makers at The White House are The Honorable Ronald Klain, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff; The Honorable Jake Sullivan, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; The Honorable Michael Donilon, Assistant to the President & Senior Advisor to the President; The Honorable Steven Ricchetti, Assistant to the President & Counselor to the President; and The Honorable Cedric Richmond, Assistant to the President & Director of the Office of Public Engagement.  With respect to issues relating to the Republic of Cuba, they must view the implementation of any decision in terms of the degree of “winning” rather than degree of “losing.” 

The definition of success by the Biden-Harris Administration and members of the United States Congress must be changed from “see what we permitted, now try to figure out how to use it- because we really don’t want you to use it primarily because we don’t understand it and are afraid we might not be able to control it and then will be criticized for permitting it in the first place” to “you have developed a technology that has become ubiquitous in that it is essential for a democracy and market-based economy to develop and thrive- please now unleash those capabilities throughout the world.  If you have an issue, let us know and we will help you or get out of the way.”

LINKS To Republic Of Cuba-Google-Related Posts 

Google Global Cache Operational In Cuba... Despite No Details From The Company April 27, 2017
Google's Lack Of Transparency Harms US-Cuba Commercial Relationship December 14, 2016
Google Expands Presence In Cuba- No Payment By Cuba December 12, 2016
Google To Support Chrome Cuba-Focused Developers October 17, 2016
Google Opens Technology Center In Havana... High Speed Internet For 40 At A Time April 05, 2016

United States Department of the Treasury
Washington DC
11 August 2021

“…OFAC and BIS are issuing this fact sheet to emphasize the U.S. government’s commitment to promoting the ability of the Cuban people to seek, receive, and impart information, by highlighting the most relevant exemptions and authorizations pertinent to supporting the Cuban people through the provision of certain internet and related telecommunications services.” LINK To Complete Document In PDF Format LINK To Part 515- Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR)

Time Magazine (19 November 2021): “While there are exceptions for some telecommunications services that expand actual Internet access on the island and “directly benefit the Cuban people,” according to the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), this does not include most web services, which would only be able to provide services to Cuba under a special license. Confusion over how to interpret these regulations has led many U.S. platforms and companies to abruptly pull their services in recent years, rather than risk violating the embargo.”

Time Magazine (19 November 2021): “There are at least 107 popular tech sites, software and web services restricted from being used in Cuba, according to a compilation by Cuban programmers on Github, a site for sharing code. These services list restrictions on users in Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Syria on their websites, citing U.S. law.”

Some Of The 107 Companies And Their Applications Self-Restricted For Use In The Republic Of Cuba

Adobe
Android Developers
Apple App Store
Apple iCloud
Bitly
Coursera
Gitlab
Google Cloud
Google Developers
Google Drive
Google One
Google Play
Google Project Shield
IBM Software
Intel
Java
MailChimp
Microsoft Teams
OpenSea
Oracle
PayPal
VPN
WeTransfer
Zoom

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

LINKS To Relevant Analyses 

Update On Registration Of Micro, Small & Medium-Size Enterprises In Cuba. Now More Than 600. November 21, 2021
Cuba Continues To Report On Activity Of MSME's- The Numbers Increase. November 06, 2021
Joint Venture Between Banco de Sabadell Of Spain And Banco International de Comercio In Cuba Will Provide Financing In Foreign Currency To MSMEs & Non-Agricultural Cooperatives November 05, 2021
Bormey srl Among The First 35 Newly-Constituted Medium-Sized Enterprises In Cuba, Exported 5,000 Peanut Bars To Italy. Is United States Next? U.S. Department Of State Regulations Would Approve. October 26, 2021
ProLimp Cleaning In Cuba Precisely Type Of Entrepreneurship Biden Administration Should Support. Will Cuba Permit U.S. Venture Capitalists? March 08, 2021

Time Magazine
New York, New York
19 November 2021

‘Give Us a Break!’ Cuban Activists Say U.S. Sanctions Are Blocking Them from Online Services

A woman surfs the Internet at a public WiFi spot in the district of Marianao in Havana.
Isaac Risco—picture-alliance/dpa/AP

By Vera Bergengruen

On Nov. 9, Cuban journalist Elaine Diaz was trying to send out a newsletter to the subscribers of Periodismo de Barrio, her watchdog news site covering human rights issues on the island, when she got an error message on her screen. The U.S.-based service she had been using, MailChimp, had suddenly and unexpectedly eliminated her account. “They did it without prior warning, for being based in Cuba,” she wrote on Twitter. “It’s not the first Cuban outlet to go through this experience. Shameful.”

As Internet access has exploded on the island, an increasing number of Cuban journalists, activists, dissidents and artists find themselves locked out of the online platforms and services used by the rest of the world—not by their communist government, but due to restrictions imposed on American companies by the broad, 60-year-old U.S. embargo. In recent years, they have been abruptly blocked from cloud services, file transfer sites, social media managers, editing software, development apps, video calling, free education platforms and NFT marketplaces. It not only shuts them out of the global digital economy, several young Cubans tell TIME, it also makes it harder to create content and reach a wider audience.

The restrictions come on top of the Cuban government’s own tight grip on Internet access for its citizens through the state-owned telecommunications monopoly, ETECSA, which blocks news websites deemed critical of the regime. The agency also restricted access to social media platforms in the wake of historic protests over food and medicine shortages in July, with some calling on President Miguel Diaz-Canel to step down. The two factors have combined to hit the heart of Cuba’s protest movement. The summer protests, as well as the San Isidro demonstrations that preceded it last year, were spearheaded by young artists who rely on digital platforms to disseminate information and express and organize themselves online. As a result, the blunt instrument of the decades-old embargo is inadvertently stifling the very freedom of expression and robust civil society that the U.S. government seeks to support in Cuba, experts say, as U.S. companies try to avoid running afoul of the law.

A group of young intellectuals and artists demonstrate at the doors of the Ministry of Culture during a protest in Havana in November 2020. Some two hundred young artists are calling for "a dialogue" with the Ministry of Culture in Havana after the police broke up a 10-day protest by the San Isidro Movement (MSI) claiming the risk of epidemiological contagion. Yamil Lage—AFP/Getty Images

“It’s a classic case of our own sanctions boomeranging and biting us in the ass,” says Ted Henken, a professor of Latin American studies at Baruch College who has written a book on Cuba’s digital revolution. “The embargo is so ill-targeted and its enforcers know little about the island’s emergent digital civil society.”

Although Mailchimp ultimately reinstated Diaz’ account after she went public, that was a rare exception, according to Cuban artists and activists who spoke to TIME. (A Mailchimp spokesman told TIME the service “operates in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations” but did not clarify how Diaz’ circumstances changed.) There are at least 107 popular tech sites, software and web services restricted from being used in Cuba, according to a compilation by Cuban programmers on Github, a site for sharing code. These services list restrictions on users in Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Syria on their websites, citing U.S. law. “As time goes by, more and more websites and services are being blocked for Cubans,” says Gabriel Guerra Bianchi, a Havana photographer and artist. Like many Cuban artists and activists who had started to build a community around digital art, he was frustrated when OpenSea, a popular website for selling digital items, blocked Cuban users in May citing the embargo, locking them out of one of the largest marketplaces for non-fungible tokens (NFTs).

“Sometimes one doesn’t even know where these [blocks] are coming from—whether from here or from there,” Bianchi said. He says he doesn’t blame services like OpenSea, which he said expressed regret to their community of Cuban users. “It’s not out of bad faith from these companies, but rather it seems to be part of their security protocols to avoid future problems with the U.S. State Department.”

Cubans have lived with the impact of the U.S. embargo for generations. President John F. Kennedy imposed a near-total trade embargo on the country in 1962 after Washington’s failed attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro, citing “the subversive offensive of Sino-Soviet Communism” the regime was aligned with. As a result, Cuba, which depended heavily on trade with the U.S., became reliant on the Soviet Union, and later Venezuela, for economic and military aid. But the embargo’s restrictions on U.S.-based services have gained new urgency as web access has expanded to more Cubans. Internet usage in Cuba grew dramatically in the wake of the historic détente in 2014, when President Barack Obama and Raul Castro agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations, leading to the easing of many restrictions on business with and travel to Cuba, as well as an influx of U.S. dollars. Although Cuba only allowed full Internet access on mobile phones in 2018, more than four million citizens on the island—over a third of the population—now access the web on their smartphones.

Cubans connecting to the internet using cellphones at a Wi-Fi hot spot in a square on the outskirts of Havana in March 2016. A mobilization of protesters in the Cuban capital in November 2020, was a rare instance of Cubans openly confronting their government -- and a stark example of how having widespread access to the internet through cellphones is testing the power balance between the Cuban regime and its citizens. Mauricio Lima—The New York Times/Redux

The relationship between the two countries deteriorated again under Trump, who promised to reverse Obama’s measures and toughened the embargo by imposing over 240 sanctions during his four years in office. President Joe Biden, despite vowing during his presidential campaign that he would restore Obama-era policies of engaging with the Cuban regime, so far has not moved to ease the restrictions.

The complicated web of regulations, trade restrictions and sanctions that comprise the embargo forbid U.S. companies from providing any type of service to Cuba. While there are exceptions for some telecommunications services that expand actual Internet access on the island and “directly benefit the Cuban people,” according to the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), this does not include most web services, which would only be able to provide services to Cuba under a special license. Confusion over how to interpret these regulations has led many U.S. platforms and companies to abruptly pull their services in recent years, rather than risk violating the embargo.

Access has been tightening for years. In 2014, Coursera, a California-based online education platform that offers free classes, suddenly blocked users from Cuba as well as other sanctioned countries from logging into their accounts. The company said in a statement at the time that while export control regulations for educational services had “been unclear,” they had received information from the State Department and OFAC that allowing users in these countries to access their services was in violation of U.S. law. Similarly, link-shortening website Bitly suddenly stopped working for Cuban users in 2016, leading to a wave of broken links across Cuban websites.

In 2017, Cuban human rights activist Rosa María Payá saw an error message for her website “Cuba Decide,” an initiative calling for a national plebiscite on free elections. She found that the site had been blocked not by the communist government but because it was using Google’s Project Shield, a DDoS protection service that works with journalists, human rights organizations and elections monitoring sites. In a tweet, Payá called it “the error with which Google joins censorship in Cuba.” Google said at the time the site was being blocked due to compliance with the U.S. embargo. “I would like to know what provision of the embargo forces Google to block an initiative to promote freedom of expression?” Payá asked the Miami Herald.

Four years later, the list of web services used to create and disseminate content and organize online communities has only grown—and with it, the sudden errors that Cuban users encounter. Google blocks access in Cuba to a variety of services that might run afoul of the embargo, such as Google Cloud, Google Developers, Google One and Google Play, according to the list compiled by Cuban programmers. Some of the other apps that are blocked are Adobe, Android Developers, Gitlab, IBM software, Intel, Java, Oracle, Zoom, and a host of payment apps that are necessary to participate in much of the digital world.

PayPal, for instance, which will allow transactions that mention the words “bomb” or “cocaine,” will block any transaction with the word ‘Cuba’ in it. (When a TIME reporter tried to send another user in the U.S. $1 with the note “Cuba Libre” on Nov. 17, PayPal immediately restricted their account and put the transaction under review.) Paypal’s terms of service note that its services may not be used by residents or nationals of “any country subject to United States embargo or UN Sanctions.”

Screenshots of web services that have been blocked for Cuban users, from left: OpenSea, VPN access, and CubaDecide. From left: Courtesy Gabriel Guerra Bianchi; Courtesy Rubén Martínez Rojas; Courtesy Rosa María Payá

One day last June, Claudio Pelaez Sordo, a Cuban photo and video-journalist who works for independent news outlets, woke up to find himself no longer able to access WeTransfer, a file transfer service that had become indispensable among many Cuban artists and content creators. Unlike Google Drive, it didn’t require users to register for an account, and allowed them to send files up to 2 GB.

“The U.S. government prohibits the provision of certain products and services to specific countries. What this means is that regrettably we are unable to provide our services to you,” the error message read. Although headquartered in Amsterdam has offices in New York and Los Angeles. WeTransfer did not respond to TIME’s request for comment. “This adds itself to the long list of sites and platforms that [we] can’t access as part of the economic blockade against Cuba,” Pelaez Sordo posted on Facebook on June 10. But “if there’s something the Cuban government has taught us, it’s how to always find a way around it,” he wrote, adding the hashtag #righttolivewithoutblockade.

Young Cubans have increasingly relied on VPNs to work around these restrictions, in order to access everything from news websites blocked by the Cuban government to online services and apps blocked by U.S. sanctions. But low-cost VPNs tend to work slowly, according to people who spoke to TIME, forcing Cubans to spend their money on expensive ones if they want to access or use services that are free to access in the rest of the world. This has especially frustrated some young artists as Havana has become an unlikely hotspot for crypto art in recent months. Cuban artists have launched several art collections through NFTs, which not only open up new sources of income in their devastated economy but serve as outlets of protest and expression.

“Oh come on!!!! Really!??” tweeted Bianchi, the Havana photographer and artist, when OpenSea blocked him in May. “Cuban artists can’t have access. We are creators! Give us a break!” (An OpenSea spokesman acknowledged to TIME the service had been blocked for Cuban users due to the U.S. sanctions). When sympathetic followers from around the world suggested VPNs to bypass the block, Bianchi explained the reality: even many slow, cheap ones are out of reach for many Cubans. “This $10 dollars a month is a 10-day salary in Cuba,” he replied on Twitter. “Not only that, we don’t have credit cards in Cuba to pay, or bank accounts.”

Men hang Cuban flags over the windows of Yunior Garcia Aguilera's home in an attempt to stop him from communicating with the outside on Nov. 14, 2021. García is a playwright and leader of Archipelago, a Cuban opposition group. Ramon Espinosa—AP

The complicated web of U.S. trade restrictions under the embargo, as well as the whiplash of the recent opening and closing of U.S.-Cuba relations during the Obama and Trump administrations, has deterred American companies and platforms from trying to find a way to operate in Cuba, experts say. “I’ve worked with a lot of clients over the years who take a very conservative approach and decide they don’t want to run that risk,” says Doreen Edelman, a partner at Lowenstein Sandler who chairs their global trade and policy practice, adding that this is especially true for the start-ups who run many of these services. “They’re not going to want to pay for legal fees for stuff like this, so they’ll just follow the embargo and be done with it.”

But while the blanket Cuba embargo dates back 60 years, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control has recently been “much more surgical” in its approach to sanctions, says Laura Fraedrich, senior counsel at Lowenstein Sandler’s global trade and policy team. She points to sanctions against certain people and specific activities in countries like Russia and Venezuela. “It’s targeted at people who are in or have been in the government, and you really wonder why we couldn’t go to something like that for Cuba to mitigate some of these secondary and tertiary effects.”

Unsurprisingly, the Cuban government has used the blocking of these services as part of their broader criticism of the U.S. embargo. In a report to the U.N. Secretary-General last year, it outlined how the embargo’s impact on online communications had resulted in Cuban representatives having trouble accessing or participating in virtual U.N. meetings related to the COVID-19 pandemic, since digital platforms like Zoom and Microsoft Teams are restricted in Cuba. (The State Department referred questions to OFAC, which did not respond to TIME’s request for comment.)

It’s a rare point of agreement between the communist regime and some young Cubans. “Solidarity or just appearances?” Rubén Martínez Rojas, who lives in Havana, wrote in a Facebook post in August. “It would be interesting to know how it is possible that the U.S. is so interested in a free access internet for Cubans but prevents us from accessing digital platforms such as WeTransfer, OpenSea, Adobe and dozens of others that are accessed by the rest of the world, adding obstacles to our human development.”

A group of young activists and artists hold up lights on their mobile phones as they demonstrate at the doors of the Ministry of Culture in Havana in November 2020. Yamil Lage—AFP/Getty Images

Though a group of Republican politicians, including Florida’s Gov. Ron DeSantis and Sen. Marco Rubio, have been clamoring for the Biden Administration to do more to facilitate Internet access in Cuba to promote democratic values on the island, Rojas pointed out that goal is at direct odds with the impact of the embargo. The U.S. restrictions are preventing Cubans from creating iCloud accounts or installing applications from the App Store, necessary for anyone wanting to use an iPhone, forcing them to pay for expensive workarounds, he wrote. “No U.S. senator is worried about resolving these issues caused by this decades-long blockade which affect every inhabitant of Cuba.”

Lawmakers who have called for expanded Internet access for Cuba placed the blame squarely on the Cuban government. “The U.S. sanctions specifically do not apply to telecommunication,” a Rubio spokesperson told TIME. “It is the regime that is blocking access to it and reporting otherwise is to parrot their propaganda.” His office did not respond to the fact that many of the services in question cite the embargo as the reason for their restricting service to Cuba.

Both U.S. technology policy towards Cuba and the general policy under the embargo are beset by the same internal contradictions, says Henken, the professor at Baruch College. While their aim is to isolate or target the Cuban government, they often impact the people they are designed to support and empower, working against U.S. interests in the country, he says. “The irony is that the same U.S. politicos that support granting free and uncensored access to the internet for the Cuban people also support an embargo which puts those connections in legal and financial jeopardy,” he says.

He cites the example of Cuban opposition group Archipelago, which was behind an attempted Nov. 15 protest and relies on online activists. The November demonstrations were largely suppressed by the government, but could have easily been affected by the U.S. embargo, he says. “Just imagine if a group like Archipelago would have had one of its essential social media accounts canceled right during the planned protest, due not to the Cuban regime’s internal blockade on the free flow of information but due to the ham-handed and woefully imprecise U.S. embargo.”

Will President Biden's Statement That His Is "a small business presidency” Extend To Supporting Small Businesses In Cuba?

The White House
Washington DC
22 November 2021

Remarks by President Biden Announcing his Nominees for Chair and Vice Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System


Excerpts:

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (22 November 2021): “Economists will tell you that an increase in new businesses is one of the best signs of an economy -- an economy that is becoming more innovative and more dynamic. And that’s because small businesses aren’t just the heart and soul of America, they’re not just the bedrock of so many communities across this country -- America’s small businesses are the primary job creators, innovators, and drivers that power our economic progress. That’s why it’s a powerful statement about -- of the faith about -- that we have in our country -- where our country and our economy is heading that small business creation is surging -- surging in America today. Which is why I’m proud to say: If you look at my presidency so far, it’s a jobs presidency and it’s a small business presidency.”

LINKS To Relevant Analyses

Update On Registration Of Micro, Small & Medium-Size Enterprises In Cuba. Now More Than 600.  November 21, 2021 

Cuba Continues To Report On Activity Of MSME's- The Numbers Increase.  November 06, 2021 

Joint Venture Between Banco de Sabadell Of Spain And Banco International de Comercio In Cuba Will Provide Financing In Foreign Currency To MSMEs & Non-Agricultural Cooperatives  November 05, 2021 

Bormey srl Among The First 35 Newly-Constituted Medium-Sized Enterprises In Cuba, Exported 5,000 Peanut Bars To Italy. Is United States Next? U.S. Department Of State Regulations Would Approve.  October 26, 2021 

ProLimp Cleaning In Cuba Precisely Type Of Entrepreneurship Biden Administration Should Support. Will Cuba Permit U.S. Venture Capitalists?  March 08, 2021

Potential Substantial Consequences For Defendants If Judge In Cruise Lines Libertad Act Lawsuit Grants Motion To Unseal Thousands Of Carnival, MSC, Royal Caribbean, And Norwegian Documents

NOTE: ORDER RESETTING HEARING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the parties’ Joint Notice Regarding December 14th Hearing. See, e.g., Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-cv-21724, ECF No. [422]. Upon review, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the pending Motions for Summary Judgment are reset for hearing on Wednesday, January 12, 2022, at 9:30 a.m., before the undersigned in Courtroom 10-2, 400 North Miami Avenue, Miami, Florida 33128. The Court will allocate the morning and afternoon for the hearing. LINK To Order

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. CARNIVAL CORPORATION, Defendant.
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. MSC CRUISES SA, MSC CRUISES SA CO, and MSC CRUISES (USA) INC., Defendants.
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., Defendant.
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD., Defendant.

LINK To Foreign Claims Settlement Commission Certification Of Loss (4/21/71)
LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

Plaintiff's Motion For Permission To Use Sealed Records At The December 14th Hearing (11/19/21)

Plaintiff Havana Docks Corporation (“Havana Docks”) respectfully requests an order authorizing the use of sealed documents at the December 14th hearing.
1. Substantial discovery materials were filed as exhibits in connection with the parties’ summary judgment motions, including documents, interrogatory answers, answers to requests for admission, and deposition transcripts.
2. Because almost all of these materials were designated “confidential” or “attorneys eyes only” when produced, the protective orders required Havana Docks to seek leave to file them under seal.
3. So the parties requested, and the Court granted, leave to file these records under seal until further order of the Court. Havana Docks took no position as to the duration of any sealing.
4. Because Havana Docks’ briefs and statements of material facts cited extensively to sealed material, those documents were also filed under seal.
5. On request of the parties,1 the Court set the pending summary judgment motions for hearing on December 14, 2021.
6. Havana Docks needs to use materials filed under seal in its presentation at the December 14, 2021 hearing.
7. The standing protective order in the Royal case contains the following provision regarding the use of “confidential” and “attorneys’ eyes only” information at a hearing: Whenever … CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION or ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY INFORMATION is to be referred to or disclosed at trial or a hearing, any Party claiming confidentiality may seek leave from the Court to exclude from the room any person who is not entitled to receive CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION or ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY INFORMATION. Royal Case, No. 19-cv-23590, ECF No. 83 at ¶ 12.
8. The standing protective orders in the Carnival, MSC, and NCL cases do not contain a comparable provision. In paragraph 3, however, they provide that: Any use of Protected Material at trial shall be governed by a separate agreement or order. Carnival Case, No. 19-cv-21724, ECF No.229; MSC Case, No. 19-cv-23588, ECF No. 81; Norwegian Case, No. 19-cv-23591, ECF No. 154.
9. Havana Docks believes that all parties should be able to freely and fully present their arguments at the December 14, 2021 hearing, including through the use of sealed records. The only limitation should be to maintain as confidential personal identification information as provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a).
10. Havana Docks respectfully requests an order permitting all parties to use records that have been filed under seal at the December 14th hearing, with exception for personal identification information, which should be redacted as provided in Rule 5.2(a). See Callahan, et. al. v. United Network for Organ Sharing, --- F.4th ---- , 2021 WL 5351863, at *6 (11th Cir. Nov. 17, 2021) (“As we have long recognized, when ‘a matter is brought before a court for resolution, it is no longer solely the parties’ case, but also the public’s case.’”).
Certification Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(a)(3)
Counsel for Havana Docks certifies that he has conferred orally and in writing with counsel for the Defendants in a good faith effort to resolve by agreement the issues raised in this motion. Specifically, counsel has conferred by email on September 25, 2021 and November 16, 2021, and by phone on multiple occasions during the week of November 15, 2021. The parties, however, have been unable to resolve the issues raised in this motion.

LINK To Plaintiff's Motion For Permission To Use Sealed Records At The December 14th Hearing (11/19/21)

ORDER SETTING HEARING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the parties’ Joint Request for Oral Argument on Motions for Summary Judgment. See Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-cv-21724, ECF No. [376]; Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises, SA, et al., No. 19-cv-23588, ECF No. [260]; Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 19-cv-23590, ECF No. [181]; and Havana Docks Corp. v Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., No. 19-cv-23591, ECF No. [283], (collectively, the “Motions”). Upon review of the Motions, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motions are GRANTED, and the pending Motions for Summary Judgment are set for hearing on Tuesday, December 14, 2021 at 9:30 a.m. before the undersigned in Courtroom 10-2, 400 North Miami Avenue, Miami, Florida 33128. The Court recognizes that we continue to be in the midst of a global pandemic. As such, to the extent that the parties would prefer to appear by video conference, the parties should promptly notify the Court. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on October 25, 2021.

LINK To Order Setting Hearing On Motions For Summary Judgement (10/26/21)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [1:19-cv-23591; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23590; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. MSC CRUISES SA CO, AND MSC CRUISES (USA) INC. [1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES [1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

Update On Registration Of Micro, Small & Medium-Size Enterprises In Cuba. Now More Than 600.

Mr. Michel Santana García
Legal Adviser- Business & Foreign Investments
EMCOMED BIOCUBAFARMA
Havana, Republic of Cuba

21 November 2021

There are more than 600 MSMEs [micro, small and medium-sized enterprises] and Cooperatives approved since the process began at the end of last September.

The Ministry of Economy and Planning approved 89 new applications from private micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), four state-owned and two non-agricultural cooperatives (CNA).

With this decision, there are 615 approved economic actors since the process began at the end of September this year. Of the MSMEs, 586 are private and 15 are state-owned, and there are also 14 cooperatives.

By origin, 57% are reconversions of pre-existing businesses and 43% correspond to new ventures.

In total, it is estimated that the new economic actors will generate 9513 new jobs in the economy.

Of all those approved, 37 are part of local development projects, 23 have previously carried out export operations and six are incubated in the Science and Technology Park of Havana.

Moody's Investors Service Downgrades Cuba Rating From Ca To Caa2, Returning To Same Rating Of November 2020, November 2019, November 2018, November 2017, November 2016

Moody's Investors Service
New York, New York
18 November 2021
Rating Action: Moody's downgrades Cuba's ratings to Ca from Caa2; maintains stable outlook

New York, November 18, 2021 -- Moody's Investors Service ("Moody's") has today downgraded the government of Cuba's long-term local and foreign-currency issuer ratings to Ca from Caa2. The outlook remains stable.

The downgrade of Cuba's ratings to Ca reflects (i) reduced hard-currency inflows because of the pandemic and economic sanctions that further limit the government's external debt-service capacity; and (ii) the currency unification process that will remove a key distortion in the economy, but points to a weaker assessment of Cuba's overall credit profile.

The stable outlook on the rating reflects Moody's view that upside and downside risks to Cuba's credit profile remain balanced. Risks to the upside are constrained by current economic sanctions imposed by the US and internal economic distortions, which limit growth prospects. Downside risks reflect external liquidity challenges, which along with financial sanctions, curb the likelihood that the Cuban government would be able to access additional external funding. As a result, Moody's expects Cuba's credit profile to remain very weak and in line with a Ca rating.

Cuba's local and foreign-currency country ceilings have been lowered to Ca from Caa2. The alignment between the local-currency ceiling and the sovereign rating reflects very high government presence in the economy, weak predictability of institutions and high political and external vulnerability risks. The alignment between the foreign-currency ceiling and the local-currency ceiling incorporates Cuba's limited policy effectiveness, constraints on external indebtedness and a closed capital account.

RATINGS RATIONALE
RATIONALE FOR DOWNGRADE TO Ca FROM Caa2
REDUCED HARD-CURRENCY INFLOWS BECAUSE OF THE PANDEMIC AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FURTHER LIMIT THE GOVERNMENT'S EXTERNAL DEBT-SERVICE CAPACITY

Cuba's hard-currency inflows, particularly those related to tourism, were severely hindered by the pandemic and adversely affected by hardened constraints imposed by the Government of the United States on remittance flows to the island.

In 2020, the Cuban economy contracted by 10.9%, following a 0.2% contraction in 2019. It was severely impacted by the travel restrictions and quarantines that were implemented both domestically and internationally by governments of key tourism source markets to contain the spread of the coronavirus.

The number of visitors to Cuba had already fallen by 9.3% in 2019 as a result of the US revoking educational and export authorizations in June of that year. In 2020, visitor numbers dropped by another 74.6% compared to 2019, and through September 2021 they were equivalent to only 17% of 2020's full-year figure. A major decline in tourism has significantly reduced foreign-currency inflows to the country.

Although Cuba fully reopened its borders to tourism on 15 November 2021, Moody's expects hard-currency inflows to recover only gradually because Cuba will face strong competition from other tourism destinations in the Caribbean and due to strict limitations imposed on travelers by the US government.

Meanwhile, although there is no official data on remittances, these flows also play an important role in bringing hard currency to the island. US sanctions that restricted the flow of remittances in 2019 and 2020 were maintained through 2021. Along with the multi-year decline in financial support from Venezuela, as well as the adjustment to the new exchange rate regime, Cuba experienced a significant tightening of external financial conditions in 2020 and 2021, which has resulted in more limited availability of hard currency to import basic goods and medicines and to service external liabilities.

The sharp deterioration of economic conditions in 2020-21 -- including a limited ability to import basic goods and medicines and accelerated inflation -- contributed to an increase in social discontent. The government's severe crackdown on protests will likely prolong economic and financial sanctions that were imposed in recent years, further constraining financial flows to the island.

Cuba's limited external debt-service capacity was confirmed by the announcement made in June 2021 by the Paris Club, a group of official creditors,[1] which amended the 2015 restructuring agreement reached with Cuba. Although the new terms have not been fully disclosed, the Paris Club indicated that the revised agreement would include a deferral of payments, after anecdotal evidence pointed to Cuba missing payments in 2020. Overall, Moody's considers that Cuba's limited debt-service capacity is consistent with a credit risk profile that is associated with a Ca rating.

CURRENCY UNIFICATION PROCESS WILL REMOVE A KEY DISTORTION IN THE ECONOMY, BUT POINTS TO A WEAKER ASSESSMENT OF CUBA'S OVERALL CREDIT PROFILE

In 2021, Cuba began unifying its multiple exchange rates, targeting an ultimate rate of CUP24 per USD. This will help reduce a major economic distortion that contributed to an overestimation of Cuba's GDP. However, Moody's expects the devaluation of the CUP to lead to a material deterioration in Cuba's key economic and fiscal metrics.

Moody's assessment of economic strength will weaken given the smaller scale of the economy and lower wealth levels. Moody's estimates nominal GDP could decrease to around $15-$20 billion in 2021 from $107 billion in 2020, and income levels will be pushed lower as well. Overall, changes in these metrics point to lower resilience to shocks, which, combined with Cuba's weak economic performance, the impact distortions caused on labor flexibility, and negative demographic dynamics, denote weaker economic strength.

Similarly, fiscal strength will weaken as the debt stock relative to GDP will increase significantly given the large share of foreign-currency-denominated debt. Because of the currency devaluation, external government debt will be equivalent to three times GDP, pointing to a heavy debt burden.
Overall, these developments confirm the underlying weaknesses of Cuba's credit profile, which is reflected in the Ca rating.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on the rating reflects Moody's view that upside and downside risks to Cuba's credit profile remain balanced. Moody's expects economic performance to remain subdued in the coming years because of a gradual recovery in tourism flows. The continuation of economic sanctions will continue to weigh on investment prospects, while existing economic distortions will hinder domestic demand.
Downside risks reflect external liquidity challenges, along with the effect of financial sanctions, which curb the government's ability to access external funding. Given these elements, Moody's expects Cuba's credit profile to remain very weak and in line with a Ca rating.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS

Cuba's ESG Credit Impact Score is highly negative (CIS-4), reflecting moderate exposure to environmental risks, high exposure to social risks and a very weak governance profile. Opaque policymaking, and very low data and information transparency weigh heavily on Cuba's credit profile.

Cuba's exposure to environmental risks is moderately negative (E-3 issuer profile score). The country is exposed to hurricanes that have the potential to cause flooding, loss of crops and life, and damage to infrastructure, in particular vital hotel infrastructure on which the country depends to generate foreign exchange from tourism.

Exposure to social risks is highly negative (S-4 issuer profile score). An aging population will weigh on growth potential and raise government expenditure. Government repression of basic social freedoms and deteriorating economic conditions, as well as an aging ruling class, could spark social and political unrest, particularly as the power is very slowly transitioning away from historical leaders.

The influence of governance on Cuba's credit profile is very highly negative (G-5 issuer profile). The policymaking process is opaque, resulting in very limited policy predictability and a lack of transparency that also weakens data quality. Policy effectiveness is low, as reflected by the severe distortions in Cuba's economy, policymakers' unwillingness to address social risks in favor of maintaining a tight grip on power, and their inability to increase climate resilience by investing in better infrastructure.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): [not available] (also known as Per Capita Income)
Real GDP growth (% change): -10.9% (2020 Actual) (also known as GDP Growth)
Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 18.5% (2020 Actual)
Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -17.7% (2020 Actual) (also known as Fiscal Balance)
Current Account Balance/GDP: 0.8% (2020 Actual) (also known as External Balance)
External debt/GDP: 21.4% (2020 Actual)
Economic resiliency: caa1

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or loans) has been recorded since 1983.
On 15 November 2021, a rating committee was called to discuss the rating of the Cuba, Government of. The main points raised during the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals, including its economic strength, have materially decreased. The issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including its debt profile, has materially decreased. The issuer has become more susceptible to event risks.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Moody's would change the stable outlook on Cuba's Ca ratings to positive in the event of an easing of US economic sanctions or a renewed push toward domestic economic reforms that significantly improve Cuba's economic prospects. A significant increase in hard-currency inflows that reduces Cuba's external vulnerability would also have positive rating implication.

Evidence of increased stress on Cuba's external finances, deteriorating economic prospects because of external shocks, and reform reversals that jeopardize progress achieved on economic liberalization would exert downward pressure on the country's rating.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Ratings Methodology published in November 2019 and available at https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_1158631.

Alternatively, please see the Rating Methodologies page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology. The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.

REGULATORY DISCLOSURES

For further specification of Moody's key rating assumptions and sensitivity analysis, see the sections Methodology Assumptions and Sensitivity to Assumptions in the disclosure form. Moody's Rating Symbols and Definitions can be found at: https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_79004.

For ratings issued on a program, series, category/class of debt or security this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to each rating of a subsequently issued bond or note of the same series, category/class of debt, security or pursuant to a program for which the ratings are derived exclusively from existing ratings in accordance with Moody's rating practices. For ratings issued on a support provider, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to the credit rating action on the support provider and in relation to each particular credit rating action for securities that derive their credit ratings from the support provider's credit rating. For provisional ratings, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to the provisional rating assigned, and in relation to a definitive rating that may be assigned subsequent to the final issuance of the debt, in each case where the transaction structure and terms have not changed prior to the assignment of the definitive rating in a manner that would have affected the rating. For further information please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page for the respective issuer on www.moodys.com.

For any affected securities or rated entities receiving direct credit support from the primary entity(ies) of this credit rating action, and whose ratings may change as a result of this credit rating action, the associated regulatory disclosures will be those of the guarantor entity. Exceptions to this approach exist for the following disclosures, if applicable to jurisdiction: Ancillary Services, Disclosure to rated entity, Disclosure from rated entity.

The ratings have been disclosed to the rated entity or its designated agent(s) and issued with no amendment resulting from that disclosure. These ratings are solicited. Please refer to Moody's Policy for Designating and Assigning Unsolicited Credit Ratings available on its website www.moodys.com. Regulatory disclosures contained in this press release apply to the credit rating and, if applicable, the related rating outlook or rating review. Moody's general principles for assessing environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks in our credit analysis can be found at http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_1288235.

The Global Scale Credit Rating on this Credit Rating Announcement was issued by one of Moody's affiliates outside the EU and is endorsed by Moody's Deutschland GmbH, An der Welle 5, Frankfurt am Main 60322, Germany, in accordance with Art.4 paragraph 3 of the Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies. Further information on the EU endorsement status and on the Moody's office that issued the credit rating is available on www.moodys.com.

The Global Scale Credit Rating on this Credit Rating Announcement was issued by one of Moody's affiliates outside the UK and is endorsed by Moody's Investors Service Limited, One Canada Square, Canary Wharf, London E14 5FA under the law applicable to credit rating agencies in the UK. Further information on the UK endorsement status and on the Moody's office that issued the credit rating is available on www.moodys.com.

REFERENCES/CITATIONS

[1] Paris Club: Agreement on the debt between Cuba and the group of creditors of Cuba, June 10, 2021
Please see www.moodys.com for any updates on changes to the lead rating analyst and to the Moody's legal entity that has issued the rating. Please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on www.moodys.com for additional regulatory disclosures for each credit rating.

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

Announcement of Periodic Review: Moody's announces completion of a periodic review of ratings of Cuba, Government of
26 Oct 2021


New York, October 26, 2021 -- This publication is for information only, and does not announce a rating action. Moody's Investors Service ("Moody's") reviews all of its ratings periodically in accordance with regulations -- either annually or, in the case of governments and certain EU-based supranational organisations, semi-annually. This periodic review is unrelated to the requirement to specify calendar dates on which EU and certain other sovereign and sub-sovereign rating actions may take place.

"Moody's conducts these periodic reviews through portfolio reviews in which Moody's reassesses the appropriateness of each outstanding rating in the context of the relevant principal methodology(ies), recent developments, and a comparison of the financial and operating profile to similarly rated peers. Since 1st January 2019, Moody's issues a press release following each periodic review announcing its completion."

Moody's has now completed the periodic review of a group of issuers that includes Cuba and may include related ratings through a discussion held on 21 October 2021. The review did not involve a rating committee, and this publication does not announce a credit rating action and is not an indication of whether or not a credit rating action is likely in the near future; credit ratings and/or outlook status cannot be changed in a portfolio review and hence are not impacted by this announcement. For any credit ratings referenced in this publication, please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on www.moodys.com for the most updated credit rating action information and rating history.

The credit profile of Cuba (issuer rating Caa2) is supported by the country's "b3" economic strength, reflecting the moderate size of the economy and low growth underpinned by a narrow economic base; Cuba's "caa2" institutions and governance strength, reflecting the lack of available and timely economic data, as well as a very weak track record of timely and full debt repayment; its "baa2" fiscal strength, taking account of the government's moderate debt burden and limited debt affordability pressures, although additional liabilities are likely but not confirmable because of the lack of available data; and its "b" susceptibility to event risk, reflecting very high external vulnerability risk due to strained external finances owing to the loss of Venezuelan financial support and lower tourism receipts.

This document summarizes Moody's view as of the publication date and will not be updated until the next periodic review announcement, which will incorporate material changes in credit circumstances (if any) during the intervening period. The principal methodology used for this review was Sovereign Ratings Methodology published in November 2019. Please see the Rating Methodologies page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology. This announcement applies only to EU rated, UK rated, EU endorsed and UK endorsed ratings. Non EU rated, non UK rated, non EU endorsed and non UK endorsed ratings may be referenced above to the extent necessary, if they are part of the same analytical unit. This publication does not announce a credit rating action. For any credit ratings referenced in this publication, please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on www.moodys.com for the most updated credit rating action information and rating history.

Karpowership From Turkey Extends And Expands Floating Electricity Generation In Cuba; Joining Turkey's Global Ports Holding Which Manages Cruise Ship Terminal In Havana

Cubadebate
Havana, Republic of Cuba
19 November 2021

New floating plant for electricity generation in Cuba In this article: Barco, Cuba, Economy, Electricity, Mariel, National Electric System, Turkey, Electric Union (UNE) In this article 19 November 2021 | 74 | Floating plant in the process of unloading The arrival in Cuba of a new floating power plant for the generation of electricity will allow adding 130 megawatts (MW) of power to the National Electric System, according to the information published this Thursday, on Twitter, by Lázaro Guerra Hernández, technical director of the Union Electrical Result of an agreement between the Greater Antilles and the Turkish company Karadeniz Holding, another of these plants (also called patanas) is located in Mariel Bay, the start of which included Cuba, then, in a group of nine countries with floating facilities. for the production of electricity, in addition to being the first in Latin America. The 130 MW floating power plant to be located in the bay of Havana is already in Cuba, which will improve the country's generation capacity. #CubaViveYAvanza # FidelPorSiempre pic.twitter.com/aOwyXEQ73s - Lázaro Guerra Hernández (@ LzaroGuerraHer1) November 18, 2021 Floating plant in the process of unloading The 130 MW floating plant that is estimated to be completed this morning in Mariel is already in the process of unloading. # CubaViveYAvanza # FidelPorSiempre pic.twitter.com/aRnSOk1Ysv - Lázaro Guerra Hernández (@ LzaroGuerraHer1) November 19, 2021 

Prensa Latina News Agency
Havana, Republic of Cuba
19 November 2021

Technical Director of Union Electrica (Electrical Union, UNE), Lazaro Guerra, told Prensa Latina that power plant is currently at the Mariel port, 45 km from this capital, for the discharge of some elements and other actions that can take some days. It will be taken later to the Havana Bay, where it will start operating in December once all necessary mechanisms are adjusted. Over the weekend, Guerra reported the arrival in Cuba of a fuel skid, another element of this mobile generation project that will be added to the country’s efforts to increase its generation capacity. In this sense, the country is working hard to recover the thermic units, the main suport of the national grid, severely affected by deterioration, lack of maintenance and shortage of spare parts. Minister of Energy and Mines, Livan Arronte, on Friday checked maintenance actions of blocks 5, 7 and 8 of the Maximo Gomez thermoelectric plant, from Mariel, which will incorporate 150 MW to their energy distribution on Sunday, Nov. 21. At the last session of the National Assembly, President Miguel Diaz-Canel said that, despite the difficult conditions of Cuban economy, the government allocated funding for recovering, before the end of the year, 608 MW of power.

From Karpowership: “In October 2018, Karpowership signed a contract with Unión Eléctrica de Cuba (UNE), the state electricity company of Cuba, to deploy three Powerships of 110 MW in total for a period of 51 months. Karadeniz Powership Barış Bey and Karadeniz Powership Esra Sultan started operation in Port de Mariel in July 2019 and Karadeniz Powership Ela Sultan started operations in November 2019. In November 2019, the contract capacity was increased to 184 MW. Cuba is Karpowership’s first project in Western Hemisphere. Karpowership will supply 10% of Cuba’s total electricity needs.” 

KARPOWERSHIP 

Karpowership is a member of Karadeniz Energy Group, Istanbul, Turkey. The group is a pioneer in innovative energy projects for the last 20 years, with investments in domestic and international markets. The group started its energy investments in 1996, and is the first private electricity exporter in Turkey. Today, the group owns and operates more than 4,350 MW installed capacity globally.  Karpowership is the only owner, operator and builder of the first Powership (floating power plant) fleet in the world. Since 2010, 25 Powerships have been completed with total installed capacity exceeding 4,100 MW. Additional 4,400 MW of Powerships are either under construction or in the pipeline.  Starting from the design, and ending with delivery of electricity, Karpowership fully executes all activities in-house including but not limited to construction, site preparation, commissioning, and fuel supply. Utilizing the highest technology, Karpowership provides fast-track delivery, high efficiency, and all integrated “plug&play” project execution. Via these capabilities, Karpowership is able to successfully undertake a variety of commercial structures such as short term IPPs (Independent Power Producer), long-term IPPs, PPAs (power purchase agreements), and rental contracts with its Powership fleet.  Powerships supplied and have been supplying 60% of Gambia, 26% of Ghana, 100% of Guinea Bissau, 10% of Guinea, 25% of Lebanon, 10% of Mozambique, 15% of Senegal, 80% of Sierra Leone, 10% of Sudan, 10% of Cuba, 30% of North Sulawesi, Indonesia, 55% of East Nusa Teneggara, Indonesia, 80% of Ambon, Indonesia, 10% of Medan, Indonesia, and 16% of Zambia’s and 30% of Southern Iraq’s total electricity generation.  As of today, Karpowership has more than 2,600 direct employees from 19 different nationalities, creates employment for additional 10,000 co-workers for the construction of the Powerships and is expanding through renewables, Powerships and other innovative energy supply solutions. 

Related Analysis 

Might Cuba's Prensa Latina Have Provided Fodder For Libertad Act Title III Lawsuits Against Bouygues In France and Global Port Holdings In United Kingdom/Turkey?  September 20, 2021 

Turkey's Karadeniz Holding May Add To “Karpowership” Fleet In Cuba  December 02, 2020 

Karadeniz Holding Of Turkey Update On "Karpowership" Operations In Cuba  March 09, 2020 

Global Ports Holding From Turkey Could Be Next To Be Sued Using Title III; President Erdogan Will React Harshly  June 05, 2019 

Karadeniz Of Turkey Delivering Floating Power Plant To Cuba For 51-Month Contract  April 23, 2019 

Turkey's Karadeniz Holding Reports Electricity Contract With Cuba In October 2018; But, No Contract Signed Five Months Later  April 01, 2019

Iberostar Of Spain Files 20th Notice To Court In Libertad Act Lawsuit: No Decision From The European Commission After 582 Days

MARIA DOLORES CANTO MARTI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATES OF DOLORES MARTI MERCADE AND FERNANDO CANTO BORY V. IBEROSTAR HOTELES Y APARTAMENTOS SL [1:20-cv-20078; Southern Florida District]

Zumpano Patricios P.A. (plaintiff)
Bird & Bird (defendant)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

DEFENDANT’S STATUS REPORT

Defendant IBEROSTAR HOTELES Y APARTAMENTOS, S.L.U. (“Iberostar”) submits1 this status report pursuant to this Court’s Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Stay Proceedings dated April 24, 2020 (D.E. 17), directing Defendant to submit status reports every 30 days on its request for authorization to the European Union Commission. Defendant states as follows: 1. Since the last update filed on October 15, 2021, Iberostar continues to await a decision on its application for authorization to the European Commission to respond to the Complaint in this action which was filed with the European Commission on April 15, 2020 (the “Application”). Defendant’s Motion to Stay, ¶ 2. (D.E. 16). 1 Iberostar reserves all its rights and will move to dismiss based on its Rule 12 defenses when it receives authorization to do so from the European Commission.

LINK To Court Filing (11/12/21)
LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

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Confusing Message By EC/EU Not Including Libertad Act In Agendas For Meetings With Secretary Of State Blinken. Not As Important As Advertised? March 25, 2021  

In Brussels Will U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken Discuss Cuba, Libertad Act And Venezuela With EC/EU Officials?  Will He Rebuff, Sway Or Be Swayed?  Quid Pro Quo? March 23, 2021  

EC Responds To European Parliament Inquiry About EU Ambassador To Cuba Letter To President Biden- Navarro "Committed Two Major... Failures..." March 12, 2021 

Biden, Lopez Obrador, Trudeau To Meet At The White House. Cuba On The Agenda? "We're Prepared To Discuss..." Canada And Mexico Have Substantive Commercial/Economic/Political Relationships With Cuba

United States Department of State
Washington DC
19 November 2021

Briefing with Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian A. Nichols on the North American Leaders’ Summit and Bilateral Meetings with Canada and Mexico

QUESTION: Good morning. Thank you for doing this and taking my question. My question is: Was there a mention about Cuba and Nicaragua during the talks? Officials previewed that it would be a topic of discussion. And if so, what was the tone of the conversation with the Mexican President? And I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to ask you about your reaction on the Nicaragua’s announcement to leave the Organization of American States. Thank you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NICHOLS: So on the second part first, I’m going to limit my discussions to the North American Leaders’ Summit, but you can certainly work with our press team on other issues and we can talk at another time on those. So the leaders discussed democracy in our hemisphere and its importance extensively, and what we can do to deliver greater progress and real actions to defend democracy in our hemisphere at some length. We are all committed to making sure that this is a hemisphere that respects democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. President Biden particularly noted his concerns about the issue of corruption and how that undermines democracy, and making sure that the benefits of economic growth reach all the peoples of our hemisphere. The – President López Obrador shares those values and beliefs, though he also stated his view that the non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, which is a longstanding tenet of Mexican foreign policy, is also quite important. But they all agreed that democracy should be the hallmark of our hemisphere. So I’ll leave it there.

The White House
Washington DC
18 November 2021

The White House Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada- “Looking forward to the Summit for Democracy, the President and Prime Minister affirmed their commitment to promote democracy, human rights, and media freedom around the world.” The White House Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with President Andrés Manuel López Obrador of Mexico- No such statement. Prime Minister Trudeau confirmed that neither the Republic of Cuba nor Venezuela was discussed.

National Palace
Mexico City, Mexico
15 November 2021


H.E. Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, President of the United Mexican States: “I think that Cuba should not be isolated, politically speaking. You cannot suffocate the Cubans who have decided to stay in Cuba. I am against the blockade, I think it is inhumane, no one has the right to have a people lead a people to rebel against their government through these practices.”

The White House
Washington DC
18 November 2021


1:15 PM- THE PRESIDENT participates in a bilateral meeting with The Right Honorable Justin Trudeau, P.C., M.P., Prime Minister of Canada- Oval Office

1:30 PM- THE VICE PRESIDENT will hold a bilateral meeting with His Excellency Andrés Manuel López Obrador, President of the United Mexican States. There will be a pool spray at the top of this meeting in the Vice President’s Ceremonial Office.

2:45 PM- THE VICE PRESIDENT will hold a bilateral meeting with The Right Honorable Justin Trudeau, P.C., M.P., Prime Minister of Canada. There will be a pool spray at the top of this meeting in the Vice President’s Ceremonial Office.

3:00 PM- THE PRESIDENT participates in a bilateral meeting with His Excellency Andrés Manuel López Obrador, President of the United Mexican States- Oval Office

4:45 PM- THE PRESIDENT hosts The Right Honorable Justin Trudeau, P.C., M.P., Prime Minister of Canada, and His Excellency Andrés Manuel López Obrador, President of the United Mexican States, for the North American Leaders’ Summit (NALS)- East Room

The White House
Washington DC
17 November 2021

Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials Previewing the North American Leaders' Summit (NALS)

And Cuba -- anything on Cuba? Yunior Garcia suddenly appearing in Spain -- and Canada and Mexico as a conduit to any type of movement towards Cuba? And one final point is: We're coming on the fifth anniversary of the Colombian peace agreement that the U.S. supports. Will that be part of the conversations? What do you expect on those three fronts?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good afternoon, Juan Carlos. So, I expect that in the bilateral meeting and the trilateral meeting for there to be a long list of bilateral, trilateral, regional, and global issues. Certainly, I think, as my colleague mentioned, migration is going to be a top priority, really maintaining the momentum of Glasgow to make sure that, as the North America bloc, it's something that we're making a priority. And there's a commitment among the three to promote the development of renewables. And so, you know, I think we're prepared to discuss issues that range from Cuba, to Nicaragua, to Venezuela. I would note that the President yesterday issued a proclamation that bans entry into the United States of individuals that have been involved in the violations of human rights and the breakdown of democracy in Nicaragua into this country.

The White House
Washington DC
10 November 2021

North American Leaders’ Summit (NALS)

On November 18, President Biden will host Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada and President Andrés Manuel López Obrador of Mexico at the White House for the first North American Leaders’ Summit (NALS) since 2016. During the Summit, the United States, Mexico, and Canada will reaffirm their strong ties and integration while also charting a new path for collaboration on ending the COVID-19 pandemic and advancing health security; competitiveness and equitable growth, to include climate change; and a regional vision for migration. Strengthening our partnership is essential to our ability to build back better, to revitalize our leadership, and to respond to a widening range of regional and global challenges. With respect for each other’s sovereignty and in a true spirit of partnership, we affirm our unwavering vision that North America is the most competitive and dynamic region in the world.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
12 November 2021

Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Canadian Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly Before Their Meeting

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Well, good morning, everyone. It’s a real pleasure to be able to receive the new Foreign Minister of Canada, Mélanie Joly, here in Washington at the State Department. I’m so glad we were able to get together so quickly. We spoke on the phone just a few days ago, and I’m really grateful to Mélanie for coming here so quickly. We have a lot of work to do. We have our leaders getting together next week for the North American Leaders Summit as well as a meeting between Prime Minister Trudeau and President Biden, so we’re going to spend some time working on that. But let me simply say that we have no closer friend, no closer partner, in the world than Canada. And virtually everything that we are doing, that we’re engaged in, we’re doing it together. And so we have the world that we’re looking at together, but I’m just so grateful to have you here. (In French.)
FOREIGN MINISTER JOLY: Merci, (in French.)
SECRETARY BLINKEN: (In French.)
FOREIGN MINISTER JOLY: Well, thank you, Tony, for these warm words of welcome of yours. It’s a pleasure for me to be with you and to be in Washington. I wanted to make sure as the new Foreign Affairs Minister for Canada to come here as my first visit and my first visit – my first trip outside of Canada since COVID.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Ah, right.
FOREIGN MINISTER JOLY: So at the same time, obviously, as a Minister in the Canadian cabinet, I wanted to make sure that we reaffirm the importance of our friendship with the U.S. This historic friendship is one that we have to take care of and that we must work on. In that context, it will be a pleasure for me to address some key issues, definitely making sure that we can continue to collaborate to fight climate change, to really also address the importance of fighting for democracies and protecting also our democratic institutions and values. And of course, since we have so many of our economic ties that really is making sure that we’re united, we need to make sure that we reinforce our supply chains as, of course, we are reopening the (inaudible) our border.
(In French.)
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Merci, (in French).
FOREIGN MINISTER JOLY: (In French.) Thank you so much. Thank you.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
12 November 2021

Office of the Spokesperson

The following is attributable to Spokesperson Ned Price: Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met with Canadian Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly today in Washington, D.C. Secretary Blinken and Foreign Minister Joly emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Canada partnership and discussed a range of issues, including the upcoming North American Leaders’ Summit, our continued support for the people of Afghanistan, the situation in Haiti, and our shared commitment to promote global security and universal norms. Secretary Blinken noted his appreciation for our close collaboration as we continue to implement the Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership, including opportunities to reinforce the importance of democracy, anticorruption, and human rights at the Summit for Democracy.

USAID Administrator Samantha Power To This Week Visit EU High Representative For Foreign Affairs Josef Borrell. Will Cuba Be On The Agenda? Can They Avoid It? 649 Mentions On USAID Internet Site

Politico
Arlington, Virginia
14 November 2021

Excerpt: "Programming to strengthen democracy and fight corruption has been core to USAID's work for decades and is one of Administrator Power's top priorities for the agency."

US Agency For International Development
Washington DC
12 November 2021

EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell hosts USAID administrator Samantha Power in Brussels.

On November 19, Administrator Power will travel to Brussels, Belgium. While in Brussels, Administrator Power will participate in the European Union’s Foreign Affairs Council Development Ministers Meeting to discuss U.S. government and USAID strategic and policy priorities with the European Union (EU) and its member states. Administrator Power will also hold bilateral meetings with key EU leaders including Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, and Jutta Urpilainen, Commissioner for International Partnerships.

From USAID: Cuba

USAID provides on-going humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and their families, and politically marginalized individuals to alleviate the hardships suffered because of their political beliefs or efforts to exercise their fundamental freedoms. Since the program’s inception, USAID has provided nutritional food items, vitamins, over-the-counter medicines, and toiletries to thousands of Cuban families, providing an invaluable lifeline to improve their physical and psychological well-being.

USAID supports broad-based development activities by providing technical and material assistance to organize, train, and energize small groups of people within their communities. These efforts empower Cuban citizens to work together in an independent manner and reduce their dependence on the state. USAID also provides trainings on documenting human rights abuses according to international standards and raises awareness of such abuses within Cuba and around the world.

USAID has provided basic news and information about issues relevant to Cubans from inside Cuba and around the world. USAID programs have disseminated books, magazines, newspapers, and pamphlets to broad segments of the population. USAID also helped train hundreds of journalists over the last decade whose work has appeared in major international news outlets.

USAID programs reflect the principles enshrined in the United Nations Convention on Human Rights (link is external) and Inter-American Democratic Charter (link is external), such as freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion. USAID’s FY2015 budget for our programs in Cuba is $6.25 million. USAID Contact Email: cubaoffice@usaid.gov

LINK To USAID Foriegn Assistance Data For Cuba (2001-2022)

650 Items Listed On 15 November 2021 And 649 Items Lists On 16 November 2021: https://www.usaid.gov/site-search/Cuba

The White House
Washington DC
15 November 2021

Statement by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Cuba’s November 15 Protests

This July, the world watched as Cubans bravely took to the streets in historic protests, asserting their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly. In advance of peaceful demonstrations planned for today, the Cuban regime predictably deployed a set piece of harsh prison sentences, sporadic arrests, intimidation tactics, and acts of repudiation all in an attempt to silence the voice of Cuban people as they clamor for change, demand an end to political violence, and implore the regime to liberate the hundreds of peaceful protestors detained after July 11 just for wanting a greater say in the future of their country.

By its actions, the Cuban regime failed to respect the civil and political rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights treaties ratified by Cuba, including the right to peaceful assembly and association, the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile. There is no denying the regime’s brutal crackdown in response to July 11, which were broadcast in real time for the world to see.

The United States is committed to supporting the agency of the Cuban people as they seek to promote democratic change as an inclusive and broad-based social movement. We urge the Cuban regime to refrain from violence against peaceful protestors and to immediately release all those unjustly detained, and we call on the international community to voice their support for the Cuban people.

The Cuban regime should take this opportunity to listen to their people: to hear their frustrations and look for ways to work together to better serve the needs and ambitions of all Cubans. The United States will not waver in its support of Cubans’ pursuit of fundamental freedoms and a democratic and prosperous society.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
16 November 2021

Denunciation of Cuban Government’s Response to Peaceful Demonstrations
Ned Price, Department Spokesperson

The United States commends the courage and will of the Cuban people who stood in the face of government repression to make their voices heard yesterday. The Cuban regime again blocked the voices of the Cuban people rather than listen to them, forgoing opportunities for dialogue and positive change for the future of Cuba.

Cubans throughout the island sought to demonstrate peacefully and ask their government to respect their fundamental freedoms and address their needs. They wanted to speak freely to their government, to decry the corruption and economic mismanagement that has left them without food, medicine, or medical supplies. The Cuban regime again denied them that chance. The authorities surrounded the homes of organizers and influencers to prevent them from exercising their rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, repressed the protests where they did occur, and arrested demonstrators. The Cuban government aimed to hide what was happening from the rest of the world by revoking professional journalists’ credentials and cutting communication to organizers. Nevertheless, the international community once again witnessed the stifling of liberty by Cuba’s authoritarian regime.

Just as they did on July 11 and throughout this summer, the Cuban people courageously and peacefully attempted to initiate a discussion with their government. Time and again, the Cuban government rejected that effort with repression, sending security, police, and government-backed mobs to bully those who seek a democratic transition. We reiterate our call to the international community to press Cuba’s repressive regime to listen to its people. We join the international community in condemning the mass arrests of Cuban protestors, seeking the release of those unjustly detained in Cuba, and supporting the Cuban people’s desire to determine their own future.

Related Analyses 

US Subsidiary Requests 30-Day Court Delay In Libertad Act Lawsuit. Will US Court Approve? Other Requests Were From EU-Based Defendant Parent Companies. Iberostar Waiting 528 Days For EC Guidance September 27, 2021

European Commission (EC) Reports "Several" EU-Based "Persons and Companies" With Libertad Act Title III Engagement. Iberostar Of Spain Waiting 528 Days For EC Guidance 26 September 2021 

During United Nations Meetings, European Commission And United States Continue 2021 Theme For Cuba: Neither Party Wants To Discuss- So They Don’t. For EC, Title III Not As Important As Advertised 23 September 2021

At U.S.-EU Summit Will Cuba Be Mentioned By President Biden, President Michel, Or President von der Leyen? Trajectory Suggests Not. How Does Borrell Square Statements With Action? June 14, 2021 

After Four Meetings In Brussels, Representatives Of EC, EU, and United States Have Not Discussed Cuba Despite EC Commitment To Do So May 26, 2021  

Third Meeting In Two Months- EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Borrell Again Does Not Discuss Cuba With U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken. Confirms Cuba Not Important To EU-U.S. Relations. May 04, 2021 

EC Now Has To Decide What It Perhaps Doesn’t Want To Decide- Iberostar Of Spain Libertad Act Lawsuit Is First To Report U.S. Court Recognizing EC’s Interest In Title III Lawsuits April 26, 2020  

EC/EU May Today Find End Of “Comity” By United States Courts. After One Year Waiting, EC/EU May Have Run Out Of Time. April 15, 2021  

Second Visit In Three Weeks- U.S. Secretary Of State To Brussels. EC Writes It Will "Address" Cuba. Did Not Last Time. EU Defendants Waiting One Year For Guidance. April 13, 2021  

Lost In Translation- EP Member & Media Report EC Will “mediate” With Biden Administration About Cuba On Terrorism List. Problem- EC Wrote “we will address this issue” April 02, 2021 

Confusing Message By EC/EU Not Including Libertad Act In Agendas For Meetings With Secretary Of State Blinken. Not As Important As Advertised? March 25, 2021  

In Brussels Will U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken Discuss Cuba, Libertad Act And Venezuela With EC/EU Officials?  Will He Rebuff, Sway Or Be Swayed?  Quid Pro Quo? March 23, 2021  

EC Responds To European Parliament Inquiry About EU Ambassador To Cuba Letter To President Biden- Navarro "Committed Two Major... Failures..." March 12, 2021 

USDA Updates Usage In Cuba Of MAP And FMD Funding Authorized By 2018 Farm Bill. In Four Funding Periods In Four Years, Two Uses Of MAP; No Uses Of FMD. Anemic Response By Export Advocates.

In 2018, legislative advocates maintained that inserting a Market Access Program (MAP) and Foreign Market Development (FMD) provision in the Farm Bill was critical to “laying the groundwork” for increasing exports of agricultural commodities and food products to the Republic of Cuba.  Statements from members of Congress included: “… an important first step to regaining our presence in Cuba.”   

Most observers reasonably concluded that legislative advocates- within the United States Congress and organizations located in Washington DC and located outside of the beltway would have prominently teed-up at least one high-profile applicant to publicize in advance they would use the provision if it became law or at least one high-profile applicant to immediately and publicly request funding when the Farm Bill became law on 21 December 2018.   

The most significant impact of a low number of MAP/FMD requests in 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022 is what the lack of interest portends for other legislative efforts in the United States Congress to rescind prohibitions upon the provision of payment terms for agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.   

Use to date of USDA MAP/FMD Republic of Cuba-focused funding provisions in the 2018 Farm Bill remains anemic.  Since 2018, two entities have used MAP funding in the Republic of Cuba.  No entity has used FMD funding in the Republic of Cuba.  The USDA reported no applications were rejected. 

Since 2018, a total of eleven (11) applications were received by the USDA to use MAP and/or FMD in the Republic of Cuba.  According to the USDA in early 2021, “Although the table indicated nine expressions of interest over two years, these represent fewer than nine organizations as some of the organizations applied in multiple years.  The earlier table only included those entities that expressed interest in Cuba directly, not anyone that sought to add Cuba to a regional program.”    

According to the USDA in early 2021, at least one participant in 2021 and 2020 sought to add the Republic of Cuba to a regional program for MAP, but none for FMD.  No entity pursued or was rejected for activities in the Republic of Cuba through a regional program.  In some respects, that some entities applied more than once, but did not ultimately use MAP and/or FMD in the Republic of Cuba is more consequential because it begs the question- why did the entities apply, but not choose to use MAP and/or FMD in the Republic of Cuba?  

One entity received MAP funding (US$60,000.00) in the Republic of Cuba- Denver, Colorado-based Potatoes USA which in November 2020 delivered to the Republic of Cuba 33,118 pounds of potato seeds valued at US$44,760.00.  Sample costs are ineligible for MAP or FMD funding.  

In 2020, one (1) entity applied to use, but did not use FMD funding and four (4) entities applied to use MAP funding while one (1) entity (Potatoes USA) used MAP funding.  From the USDA, “… any unspent funds would normally remain in participants’ agreements, available for the agency to approve for plans a participant submits in a future year.”     

For PY 2021, three entities applied to use MAP funding in the Republic of Cuba; one entity used MAP funding in the Republic of Cuba.  

For PY 2022, three entities applied to use MAP funding in the Republic of Cuba; no entity has yet used MAP funding. LINK To USDA list of the 67 entities receiving MAP funding for FY 2022. 

In 2021, sixty-seven (67) entities received funding for MAP and twenty-one (21) entities received funding for FMD.  

From the USDA in early 2021, “Most MAP programs operate on a January to December year, however, some run on a July to June year.  The regulations allow groups to continue already approved activities up to thirty days after the end of the program year.  Thus, the latest a participant could continue an activity funded by MAP 21 would be July 30, 2022, if their MAP 21 program began June 1, 2021.  A participant would have until the end of January 2022, if their MAP program began January 1, 2021.  The MAP regulations allow a participant to file claims up to six months after the end of the program year.”   

From the USDA: “In 2021, FAS is transitioning FMD program funding from a fiscal year basis to a calendar year basis to better meet the administrative needs of recipient organizations.” 

Under the Market Access Program, USDA provides competitive, cost-share assistance to U.S. exporters and agricultural, fish, and forest product trade organizations for international marketing and promotion of U.S. commodities and products. More information about the program and the FY 2021 funding opportunity is available at: https://www.fas.usda.gov/programs/market-access-program-map

Under the Foreign Market Development Program, USDA partners with nonprofit agricultural and forest product trade associations to build longer-term international demand for U.S. commodities. More information about the program and the FY 2021 funding opportunity is available at: https://www.fas.usda.gov/programs/foreign-market-development-program-fmd.” 

What Is FMD & MAP? 

The USDA does not provide any payments to selected applicants in advance of the applicant making disbursements. The USDA provides payment upon receipt of an invoice from the applicant. The invoices are audited by the USDA and a claw back of payments is permitted. Any Republic of Cuba-related invoice is likely to receive additional scrutiny due to an amendment to the Farm Bill submitted by The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida), a member of the United States Senate.  

MAP: “Through the Market Access Program (MAP), FAS partners with U.S. agricultural trade associations, cooperatives, state regional trade groups and small businesses to share the costs of overseas marketing and promotional activities that help build commercial export markets for U.S. agricultural products and commodities.”  

“MAP reaches virtually every corner of the globe, helping to build markets for a wide variety U.S. farm and food products. FAS provides cost-share assistance to eligible U.S. organizations for activities such as consumer advertising, public relations, point-of-sale demonstrations, participation in trade fairs and exhibits, market research and technical assistance. When MAP funds are used for generic marketing and promotion, participants must contribute a minimum 10-percent match. For promotion of branded products, a dollar-for-dollar match is required. Each year, FAS announces the MAP application period and criteria in the Federal Register. Applicants apply for MAP through the Unified Export Strategy (UES) process, which allows eligible organizations to request funding from multiple USDA market development programs through a single, strategically coordinated proposal. FAS reviews the proposals and awards funds to applicants that demonstrate the potential for effective performance based on a clear, long-term strategic plan.”  

FMD: “The Foreign Market Development (FMD) Program, also known as the Cooperator Program, helps create, expand and maintain long-term export markets for U.S. agricultural products. Under the program, FAS partners with U.S. agricultural producers and processors, who are represented by non-profit commodity or trade associations called “cooperators,” to promote U.S. commodities overseas.”  

“The FMD program focuses on generic promotion of U.S. commodities, rather than consumer-oriented promotion of branded products. Preference is given to organizations that represent an entire industry or are nationwide in membership and scope.  

FMD-funded projects generally address long-term opportunities to reduce foreign import constraints or expand export growth opportunities. For example, this might include efforts to: reduce infrastructural or historical market impediments, improve processing capabilities, modify codes and standards, or identify new markets or new uses for the agricultural commodity or product.  

Each year, FAS announces the FMD application period and criteria in the Federal Register. Organizations apply for the FMD program through the Unified Export Strategy (UES) process, which allows applicants to request funding from multiple USDA market development programs through a single, strategically coordinated proposal. FAS reviews the proposals and awards funds to applicants that demonstrate the potential for effective performance based on a clear, long-term strategic plan.”  

Value Of MAP/FMD   

For the United States business community, the MAP/FMD amendment to the Farm Bill was significant, but more likely to provide greater financial value to the government of the Republic of Cuba than to United States food product and agricultural commodity exporters using provisions of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000.   

The likelihood of a value to United States taxpayers, as members of the United States Senate have posited, of US$28.00 returned for every US$1.00 in expenditures of MAP/FMD throughout the world, and now including the Republic of Cuba, will be challenging to measure- but it will be important to measure and the USDA should focus upon the cost-benefit analysis.

LINK TO PREVIOUS FMD/MAP USDA ANALYSES

53-Minute Meeting Between President Biden And EC President Von Der Leyen. Again, Nothing About Cuba Libertad Act Lawsuits. EC Won't React Until A U.S. Court Issues A Verdict & Damages Assessed.

The White House
Washington DC
10 November 2021

Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen


President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. met today with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. They welcomed the revitalization of U.S.-EU ties, which has led to the resolution of long-standing trade differences as well as cooperation on ending the COVID-19 pandemic, fighting climate change, and investing in the infrastructure needs of the 21st century. The leaders addressed the humanitarian situation on the European Union’s border with Belarus and expressed deep concern about the irregular migration flows. They discussed our shared commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. In addition, they expressed their continued support for political and economic stability in Northern Ireland.

The White House press office says the meeting started at 10:26 am [and ended at 11:19 am].

Participating in the President’s meeting with Her Excellency Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission:

United States
The President
T.H. Jake Sullivan, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
T.H. Daleep Singh, Deputy Assistant to the President & Deputy National Security Advisor & Deputy NEC Director
T.H. Peter Harrell, Special Assistant to the President & Senior Director for International Economics & Competitiveness, NSC
T.H. Dr. Amanda Sloat, Special Assistant to the President & Senior Director for Europe, NSC
Ms. Kelly Adams-Smith, Chargé d’affaires, U.S. Mission to the European Union
Ms. Laura Hochla, Director for European Affairs, NSC

European Commission
H.E. Ursula Von der Leyen, President of the European Commission
Mr. Bjoern Seibert, Head of Cabinet
H.E. Stavros Lambrinidis, Ambassador, European Union Delegation
Mr. Fernando Andresen Guimaraes, Diplomatic Advisor
Mr. Eric Mamer, Chief Spokesperson
Ms. Dearbhla Doyle, Head of Political, Security and Development Section, European Union Delegation

Background

The Brussels, Belgium-based European Commission (EC) manages the interests for the twenty-seven (27) country members of the Brussels, Belgium-based European Union (EU). Since March 1996, the EC has publicly opposed Title III and Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”). Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset. Title IV restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims.  One Canada-based company and one Spain-based company are currently known to be subject to this provision based upon a certified claim and non-certified claim. 

In May 2019, the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) made operational Title III of the Libertad Act. Thus far, of the forty-two (42) Title III lawsuits filed, ten (10) company defendants whose headquarters are in EU-member countries.  For 546 days, EU-based defendant Palma, Spain-based Grupo Iberostar (2019 revenue approximately US$2.5 billion) has awaited a response for legal guidance from the EC.  LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Statistics   

Despite response to a letter from a member of the Brussels, Belgium-based/Strasbourg, France-based European Parliament (EP) that he would discuss issues relating to the Republic of Cuba, since 20 January 2021 when the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) became operational, neither EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission Josef Borrell nor United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken, nor any senior-level official of the EC or Biden-Harris Administration has confirmed that the Republic of Cuba and the Libertad Act have been included in subjects discussed during more than twelve meetings in nearing nine months.  

The absence of the Republic of Cuba as a subject reinforces that the Biden-Harris Administration has no overt interest in engaging issues relating to the Republic of Cuba- and will not be proactive in discussions with the EC.  And that the EC will not likely engage until it must- when a court renders a verdict against an EU-based defendant or an EU-based defendant seeks approval of a settlement with a plaintiff.  Delaying diplomatic unpleasantness until absolutely necessary so not to impact efforts and cooperation in areas of consequence.  

LINK: Report From The Commission To The European Parliament And The Council Relating To Article 7(A) Of Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 (‘Blocking Statute’) 

Related Analyses 

US Subsidiary Requests 30-Day Court Delay In Libertad Act Lawsuit. Will US Court Approve? Other Requests Were From EU-Based Defendant Parent Companies. Iberostar Waiting 528 Days For EC Guidance September 27, 2021

European Commission (EC) Reports "Several" EU-Based "Persons and Companies" With Libertad Act Title III Engagement. Iberostar Of Spain Waiting 528 Days For EC Guidance 26 September 2021 

During United Nations Meetings, European Commission And United States Continue 2021 Theme For Cuba: Neither Party Wants To Discuss- So They Don’t. For EC, Title III Not As Important As Advertised 23 September 2021

At U.S.-EU Summit Will Cuba Be Mentioned By President Biden, President Michel, Or President von der Leyen? Trajectory Suggests Not. How Does Borrell Square Statements With Action? June 14, 2021 

After Four Meetings In Brussels, Representatives Of EC, EU, and United States Have Not Discussed Cuba Despite EC Commitment To Do So May 26, 2021  

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Second Visit In Three Weeks- U.S. Secretary Of State To Brussels. EC Writes It Will "Address" Cuba. Did Not Last Time. EU Defendants Waiting One Year For Guidance. April 13, 2021  

Lost In Translation- EP Member & Media Report EC Will “mediate” With Biden Administration About Cuba On Terrorism List. Problem- EC Wrote “we will address this issue” April 02, 2021 

Confusing Message By EC/EU Not Including Libertad Act In Agendas For Meetings With Secretary Of State Blinken. Not As Important As Advertised? March 25, 2021  

In Brussels Will U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken Discuss Cuba, Libertad Act And Venezuela With EC/EU Officials?  Will He Rebuff, Sway Or Be Swayed?  Quid Pro Quo? March 23, 2021  

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"...impose tangible and significant consequences" On Cuba Reports The United States Department Of State

United States Department of State
Washington DC
8 November 2021

Briefing With Mr. Nd Price, Spokesperson

QUESTION: On Cuba. Yesterday Jake Sullivan said that the circumstances had changed in the island. What does he mean? Is the U.S. mulling new sanctions? Is anything else to sanction?

MR PRICE: Well, I think what the National Security Advisor was referring to is that events in Cuba, certainly the events of July 11th, the events subsequent to July 11th, they have weighed heavily on our approach. And we have not been shy in speaking about and calling out the human rights abuses, the repression, the arbitrary detentions that have taken place in Cuba, since July 11th. And our policy, both before July 11th and certainly since, has focused on support for the Cuban people and accountability for the Cuban officials who have been responsible for some of the human rights abuses that we have seen.

We are – the world is expecting protests in the coming days as well, as the Cuban people have made clear that they will once again peacefully march in the streets to make clear their aspirations for democracy, human rights, civil liberties, and political rights. We have centered our efforts in Cuba, when it comes to Cuba, on this question of the rights of the Cuban people, and steps that we can take to advance the cause of democracy on the island. And we have sought, in doing so, to impose tangible and significant consequences in connection with the abuses that I mentioned before. And we are prepared to continue doing so should the repression, should the human rights abuses, should the abuses of the Cuban regime not cease.