Misunderstanding? Cuba Government: Cuban-Americans' PYME Financing, Yes. PYME Investment, Yes. PYME Ownership, No. PMYE Need For Direct Banking With United States, Not Necessary.

Cuba Government Official: PYME Financing, Yes.  PYME Investment, Yes.  PYME Ownership, No.  PMYE Need For Banking With United States, Don’t Understand Why. 

Really?  So Government Of Cuba Is Accepting With The Inefficiency And Expense Of Transferring Commercial Funds Through Third Countries?  Owners Of PYMEs Would Beg To Disagree.

An Unfortunate Convergence When An Official In Cuba And Biden-Harris Administration Share Common Ground. 

Miami Herald (22 September 2023):  “Cuba’s government is considering allowing Cuban Americans to invest in and own businesses on the island, Havana officials told representatives of U.S. companies and Cuban Americans from Miami who met Cuban leader Miguel Díaz-Canel on Friday.  Cuban officials said they are “contemplating it and working on legislation to get it done,” when asked about the possibility by several people attending the closed-door event at the Cuban mission to the United Nations, said Miami lawyer Ralph Patiño, who was present during the exchange.” 

Whether defined as PyME (pequeña y mediana empresa; small and medium enterprise), or MSME (micro, small and medium-size enterprise), or SME (small and medium-size enterprise), there has within the Republic of Cuba during the last five years been a dramatic re-emergence in the private sector: The number of private businesses, what those private businesses are doing, and how those private businesses are operating.  There has also been an increase in Republic of Cuba government-operated companies, enterprises, and organizations transitioning to “private” status.  

WLRN
Miami, Florida
29 September 2023

excerpts…

[00:00:00] Speaker 1 I'm Tim Padgett. Welcome back to the South Florida. Round up on our end…. This week, scores of private entrepreneurs from Communist Cuba visited Miami to get tips from their Cuban-American counterparts and maybe network some investment relationships. It was another sign that Cuba's government has come to the realization that private enterprise is about the only thing now that can save the island's wrecked economy. Officials in Havana, of course, blame the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba for that disaster. But either way, it's forcing them to consider deeper changes. I spoke about this with Carlos Fernandez.  He's vice minister of Cuba's Foreign Relations Ministry. He joined me from New York. Mr. Vice Minister, thank you for speaking with us.

[00:00:56] Speaker 2 (de Cossio) It's a pleasure. Thank you for having me.

[00:01:54] Speaker 1 Mr. Vice Minister, in spite of this attack, how would you describe bilateral relations between Cuba and the U.S. at this moment? Do you feel they've improved under President Biden, especially after President Trump's harder line against Cuba?

[00:02:07] Speaker 2 The line that is being applied is a loyalty to the policy or reinforcement of the aggressive measures against the Cuban economy. And the government of Biden has kept the most aggressive of those in place. In spite of that, there have been some steps in areas like migration, some level of cooperation in law enforcement, including in terrorism, by the way, and in environmental science, arts, culture, education, which are important, but they are not what one can say the essence of the bilateral relationship.

[00:02:41] Speaker 1 Well, that brings me to Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel speech last week at the U.N. General Assembly in which he criticized the U.S. for what he called its merciless economic warfare against Cuba. Diaz-Canel was obviously referring to the embargo. Why do you feel the U.S. keeps the embargo in place after more than 60 years?

[00:03:01] Speaker 2 Well, that's a question that we normally try to ask the U.S. government. Cuba is not an enemy of the United States. There's no hostile action by Cuba against the United States. There are political disagreements. Yes, we have political disagreements with reality in the U.S., as the U.S. has it with Cuba. And that's part of international relations all over the place. The reason seems to be, we're told by politicians in the U.S. that are political calculations, that it's difficult for them because votes in this election next year, all of which seems to us illegitimate reasons to continue to have a policy aimed at strangling the economy, the livelihood of the population of the whole country.

[00:03:39] Speaker 1 But the U.S., including the Biden administration, insists that it's hard to lift the embargo when Cuba remains what it calls a repressive dictatorship, one that has more than a thousand political prisoners locked up, most of them people who took part in large anti-government protests two years ago. Would it not be a positive step toward lifting the embargo if Cuba were to release most, if not all, of those prisoners?

[00:04:04] Speaker 2 Thousands of people participated in the demonstration in Cuba over two years ago. Thousands and a few hundred were prosecuted. The ones that were prosecuted were not prosecuted because of what they think or what they said or what they shouted or why they expressed. They were prosecuted for vandalizing, for attacking people, for assaulting a police station, for overturning police cars and civilian cars. And that in Cuba is a crime, as I suspect is in the United States.

[00:04:28] Speaker 1 I understand. But for the record, international human rights groups say between 507 hundred were prosecuted for the 2021 protests and that many were merely marching or demonstrating.

[00:04:38] Speaker 2 People have been put in jail for the events of January 6th in the United States who were not even present at the place just because they were accused of inciting people to go to Capitol Hill on January six, 2021.

[00:04:51] Speaker 1 At the same time, Cuba's serious economic crisis just keeps getting worse. And we're seeing record numbers of Cubans especially. Younger Cubans leaving the island. Do you feel all the blame for that rests on the U.S. and the embargo, or is the Cuban government now recognizing its own economic mistakes and mismanagement?

[00:05:11] Speaker 2 There's a combination of factors. First, we have the effects of COVID, and we have to remember that we shut the country. That depends on tourism as a main source of income, and we shut it totally. We have not recovered yet. But there's an extraordinary and artificial impact of that, which is the U.S. economic blockade, which is aimed at making the economy unworkable. And then you add to that, which is also true, that we have issues of structure in our economy that we need to improve and that we are trying to transform under very big difficulties. And we have had mismanagement, inefficiencies in what we do, which we recognize that we have to improve.

[00:05:45] Speaker 1 That, of course, brings us to the dynamic growth we're seeing in Cuba's private sector since the communist government legalized those small and medium sized businesses known as Pemex two years ago. This seems an area where the U.S. and Cuba can find common ground. Both governments have approved U.S. investment in Cuban private enterprises, but Cuba says it's waiting for the U.S. to soften the embargo and make bilateral banking available. While the U.S. says it's waiting on Cuba to present clear investment rules before it can do that. When do you see all of this getting resolved?

[00:06:18] Speaker 2 I think there's a misunderstanding. Cuba is not waiting for the U.S. to act in any measure. The growth of the private sector in Cuba is a national decision by Cuba. We're taking on our own, regardless of what the United States does. We have conceived the private sector in the past few years as part of our economic development as and as an actor in the Cuban economy. Now, this sector also suffers from the economic blockade, but Cuba does not need a bilateral banking relationship with the United States for the private sector in Cuba to prosper.

[00:06:49] Speaker 1 Most of the Cuban private sector tells us they do need it. But there's been a tendency in the past for the Cuban government to let the private sector grow and then all of a sudden clamp down on it and rein it in. Is that sort of thing finally over?

[00:07:03] Speaker 2 Well, we have approved is medium and small sized enterprises. We're not, at least for the moment, conceiving in our economic overview to have big monopolies and big concentrations of property and big concentration of wealth and big concentrations of capital. What we want is to an expansion as many as possible and add a level playing field for all, for many to have opportunity to flourish, not to have a few who concentrate and become monopolies in any sector. That is our aim. Now, this is the new reality in Cuba and regulation is coming behind it.

[00:07:38] Speaker 1 Including clear rules for foreign investment in the private sector.

[00:07:41] Speaker 2 Yes, we are trying to regulate what is becoming the normal reality. But corporate law still has to be approved a law for corporations in Cuba. What is following what's happening? When we began this three years ago, there was no clear picture of where this was going. Which were the sectors that were going to grow? Which were the territories in the country where they're going to grow the most, which was going to be their export exposure because many of them work within Cuba, but some need to import and some wish to export. That reality has to show itself so that we can regulate something that is appropriate to what's really happening.

[00:08:17] Speaker 1 Last week in New York, President Diaz-Canel also told Cuban-Americans they may be welcome in the future to own businesses in Cuba. That would seem to represent a big thaw between Havana and Miami.

[00:08:30] Speaker 2 I'm surprised by what you're saying, because I was at that meeting and the president never said that. Whoever reported that either was not present or is not or did not get a good recollection of what happened in that place. The president said that they are welcome, not not just as of this meeting that we have in place, a policy that he personally has defended that invites Cubans that live abroad in the U.S. or in Europe and Latin America, in Asia, to invest in Cuba, to be part of the economy and to participate and contribute to the Cuban economy. That is a message he ratified at that meeting. Opening actual business in Cuba for people who reside in Cuba. Cubans that live abroad can participate like a Canadian, like a Spaniard. But if you want to establish a company to be a resident in the place, and this is a law that is not only particular to Cuba, many countries around the world, if you want to establish a company, you have to be a resident in the place where you are.

[00:09:24] Speaker 1 Okay. Thank you for clarifying that. Mr. Vice Minister, we've been talking about the growth of the private sector in Cuba. Do you feel that the economic liberalization that's taking part there could lead to more political liberalization in Cuba, especially, for example, letting parties other than the Cuban Communist Party run in elections?

[00:09:46] Speaker 2 We we are not aiming at that. If you call liberalization, having money, participate in politics and having parties serve as machines so that politicians. Can be moved and then corporations and the wealthy have the capacity to finance and buy political favors. That is something we're not conceding in Cuba. We're not looking at that.

[00:10:09] Speaker 1 But you still don't think a healthy pluralism could come of it?

[00:10:12] Speaker 2 We believe that if parties, which is happens in many countries, become machineries so that money and capital can be the engine of political advancement. That is something we are not considering in Cuba. We don't think it's healthy or will be useful or appropriate for a country.

[00:10:28] Speaker 1 I see. Mr. Vice Minister, I also need to ask you about the recent controversy regarding Cuban mercenaries going to fight for Russia against Ukraine. The Cuban government insists it has broken up a ring that was trafficking those Cubans to Russia. Critics have said the Cuban government actually knew before about the mercenaries going there to fight and encouraged it. How do you respond to that? And what is the state of Cuba's relations with Russia now after Havana distanced itself recently from Moscow's Ukraine campaign?

[00:11:00] Speaker 2 This is a ring that was first detected by us, followed by us, and that was treated as through different violations of the law. One is human trafficking in which you penalize the trafficker and the person who's trafficked you treat as a victim. For us, that was not enough. And we incorporate another law, the use of another law that we have in Cuba, which is against mercenaries, which is which prohibits Cubans to take up arms against another country. So we applied that to show that we go after the trafficker and we also go after the person who is willingly attempting to involve himself in a military conflict in another country. Before we made this public. We spoke with the government of Russia, with which we have a good relationship. We spoke with the government that Ukraine, with the US government, with the European Union, with several other governments in which we talked about this. We explained our concern and we also asked for information if they had.

[00:12:02] Speaker 1 But it was just a few months ago that Cuba was signing major investment deals with Russia in the hope of getting some economic support, especially for fuel, which your government this week admitted Cuba just doesn't have enough of to meet its needs. This Russia based mercenary scandal hasn't compromised that friendship at all.

[00:12:20] Speaker 2 Our relationship with with Russia is a good relationship. We don't believe it's damaged, even though on some issues we might not have an exact point of view.

[00:12:29] Speaker 1 Vice Minister Fernandez de Cassio, thank you for speaking with us.

[00:12:33] Speaker 2 Thank you very much for this opportunity.  

[00:12:35] Speaker 1 That was my conversation yesterday with Carlos Fernandez.  He's vice minister of Cuba's Foreign Relations Ministry. Still to come, Miami-Dade County is racing to get rid of septic tanks. This is the South Florida round up on Lauren.

Links To Related Analyses 

Cuba Government Delaying Private Company Investment/Financing Regulations Is Costing Earning Potential For U.S. And Other Country Sources. Success Should Not Be Feared.  Sep 25, 2023

Surprises? U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increased 37.6% In July; Up 14.8% Year-To-Year. Coin Operated Washing Machines, Refrigerant, Microwave Ovens, Manicure/Pedicure Preps, Vehicles, Tires, Sugar  Sep 20, 2023

Biden Administration To Issue New/Revised MSME Policies. Reversing Trump Administration Decision But Not Obama Administration Decision. Bank Responsibility? OFAC Penalties?  Sep 18, 2023

WestJet Cargo Does From Canada To Cuba What FedEx And UPS Does Not (Yet) Do. But, Cuba's Private Sector Expansion Might Change That...

WestJet Cargo Launches Inaugural Flights to Havana, Cuba
27 September 2023

WestJet Cargo is excited to announce its new cargo route to Havana, Cuba, commencing on September 23, 2023. This expansion marks WestJet Cargo's first venture into the Cuban capital.  Operating one weekly flight on the YYZ – HAV route, WestJet Cargo offers 20-tonne cargo capacity per flight per week, addressing the growing demand for cargo transport in Canada.  WestJet Cargo is fully equipped to handle various cargo types, including General Cargo, Perishables, and select Dangerous Goods, ensuring secure and efficient cargo transportation to Havana.  This milestone underscores WestJet Cargo's dedication to expanding its network and delivering top-tier cargo services to Havana, Cuba.

About WestJet Cargo: A dedicated division of the WestJet Group of Companies, WestJet Cargo provides air cargo services to businesses, freight forwarders, shippers and individual customers. Providing safe, reliable air-shipping for customers and businesses, WestJet Cargo utilizes the expansive network of WestJet’s wide and narrow-bodied aircraft and its newly introduced fleet of four dedicated Boeing 737-800 Converted Freighters (BCF) to meet the diverse needs of its cargo customers.  For more information on WestJet Cargo please visit: https://www.westjetcargo.com/en-ca

Cuba Government Delaying Private Company Investment/Financing Regulations Is Costing Earning Potential For U.S. And Other Country Sources. Success Should Not Be Feared.

OFAC Authorized First Investment/Financing License Into A Cuba Private Company In May 2022.   

Because Of The Delay By Government Of Cuba In Authorizing The Delivery Of The Investment/Financing, The Private Company In Cuba Has Continued To Expand And Grow The Business.  The United States-Based Investor/Financer Has Forgone Income From Dividends And Interest.   

Why Won’t President Miguel Diaz-Canel Permit MSMEs To Accept Investment And Financing?  Re-introducing “Success” Into the Marketplace Carries Political Risk Because Not Everyone Will Be Successful And Measuring Success Has Many Variables.

The Government Of Cuba Eagerly Accepts Investment And Financing From Many Sources. 

On 10 June 2021, Washington DC-based attorney Robert L. Muse submitted a first-of-its-kind application to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury in Washington DC.   

On 10 May 2022, after an eleven-month inter-agency review, the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) approved that first-ever application which would authorize the first direct investment in and the first financing to a private company located in the Republic of Cuba which owned by a Republic of Cuba national.     

• Useful to note that the United States- based source of the direct investment and direct financing was not an individual of Cuban descent. 

From the inception of the idea to seek a license from the OFAC at the beginning of 2021, the goal was when the OFAC license was issued- and there was confidence that it would be issued, the existence of the OFAC license would be publicly disclosed.  

The reason was singular:  The objective of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council has always been to publicize what has been authorized so others may benefit from the effort devoted to making possible what others may have only thought about.  The publication about the first-ever electric (and non-electric) vehicle (cars, trucks, motorcycles, scooters, bicycles) export licenses (five since 2017) issued by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce to Colombia, Maryland-based Premier Automotive Export Ltd., reinforces that mandate to inform.  Assisting Westport, Connecticut-based PWN Exhibicon International LLC which organized in 2002 the first-ever OFAC licensed U.S.-Food & Agribusiness Exhibition in the Republic of Cuba and included 923 representatives of United States-based companies.  This event remains to-date the single-largest commercial event in the Republic of Cuba licensed by the OFAC.  

• Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022   

• With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022       

• Biden Administration Will Use Cuba's Authorization Of SMSE's As Means To Expand Support For Cuba Private Sector- U.S. Investments And Loans May Be Next June 02, 2021  

Since the first OFAC license was issued authorizing direct investment in and direct financing to a private company located in the Republic of Cuba, there is known to have been only one other- obtained within the last weeks.  That license has not been made public.  Unknown is how many applications are pending.   

• One reason for the delay by the Biden-Harris Administration issuing additional licenses?  The absence of regulations issued by the government of the Republic of Cuba which would authorize the delivery of direct investment and direct financing to private companies located in the Republic of Cuba. 

Whether defined as PyME (pequeña y mediana empresa; small and medium enterprise), or MSME (micro, small and medium-size enterprise), or SME (small and medium-size enterprise), there has within the Republic of Cuba during the last five years been a dramatic increase in the number of private businesses, what those private businesses are doing, and how those private businesses are operating.  There has also been an increase in Republic of Cuba government-operated companies, enterprises, and organizations transitioning to “private” status.  

To date, and deeply unfortunate, is a private sector marketplace within the Republic of Cuba that functions within an environment more aligned with “if it is not prohibited, then it is authorized” rather than “here are the regulations and those regulations are continually updated to reflect the changing dynamic of the private sector.”   

Nearing three years and the government of the Republic of Cuba has yet to publish regulations which explicitly describes the process by which a private company located in the Republic of Cuba may receive direct investment and direct financing from outside of the Republic of Cuba. 

The document, which could be on one 8-inch by 10-inch sheet of paper, would be electronically notarized and submitted to the financial institution where the private company maintained its operating checking account.  The information provided would include the source(s) and amount(s) of the investment, the source(s) and amount(s) of the financing.  Any changes to the investment terms or the financing terms would be provided to the financial institution.  That should be all that is required.  The private company would not be required to pay any fees other than the normal incoming electronic funds transfer fees.   

The government of the Republic of Cuba must refrain from over-complicating the process; but, that is fundamental to its DNA, so politically a heavy lift.  This is because the primary political goal is to maintain equality- and a competitive private sector will, by its DNA, result in inequality. 

On 22 September 2023, Miguel Diaz-Canel, President of the Republic of Cuba (2019- ) met in New York City at the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cuba to the United Nations with approximately forty private sector representatives- individuals, companies, and organizations.  That number should have been quadrupled- unknown if the anemic showing was due to a lack of invitations or a lack of responses to invitations.  Unfortunately, President Diaz-Canel did not use the opportunity to announce regulations for delivering direct investment to and direct financing for private companies located in the Republic of Cuba.  That was the singular message the audience was seeking.  Another in an increasingly lengthy list of missed opportunities.   

Until the government of the Republic of Cuba publishes the regulations for the delivery of direct investment and direct financing to a private company, the OFAC license issued on 10 May 2022 remains just that- issued but not implemented. 

The recipient of the OFAC license has maintained consistent contact with the United States Department of State as to the status of the implementation of the OFAC license.  The United States Department of State supports the decision to await the publication of regulations by the government of the Republic of Cuba rather than deliver the direct investment and direct financing and, absent specific authorization by the government of the Republic of Cuba, risk the operational status of the private company located in the Republic of Cuba.  The private company located in the Republic of Cuba also supports the decision to await the publication of regulations by the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

The worst kept secret is the amount of funds delivered to private companies (particularly residences used for guests and restaurants) located in the Republic of Cuba outside of authorized OFAC regulations.  These primarily originate from the State of Florida, State of New Jersey, State of Texas, State of New York, and State of California. 

• Cuba Banks Again Accepting U.S. Dollar Deposits. That's Good. Better Would Be Providing Regulations For U.S.-Sourced Direct Investment And Direct Financing To MSMEs. First OFAC License Waiting... Apr 11, 2023  

These funds also originate with individuals of Cuban descent residing outside of the United States including in Spain, Panama, Mexico, and Venezuela. 

While understandable from a micro economic perspective, this outside Republic of Cuba regulatory authorization and outside of OFAC regulatory authorization is unhelpful from a macroeconomic perspective.   

Desire to assist family, friends, colleagues is understandable.  However, there are consequences.   

Why should the government of the Republic of Cuba implement regulations for the delivery of direct investment and direct financing when both are entering the Republic of Cuba without them?  The incentive is nonexistent.  

By not making contingent the publication of regulations which would define the mechanism for the delivery of direct investment and direct financing into a private company located in the Republic of Cuba, well-intentioned individuals are removing any leverage upon the government of the Republic of Cuba.     

There is an argument to be considered for the Biden-Harris Administration to refrain from further regulatory and policy changes designed to impact private companies located in the Republic of Cuba under the government of the Republic of Cuba publishes regulations for the delivery of direct investment and direct financing. 

The Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021), and Biden-Harris Administration, endured the worst-case political scenario in the Republic of Cuba.  With the death in November 2017 of Fidel Castro, there was a presidential succession to his brother, Raul Castro, a presidential transition to his brother, Raul Castro, a presidential retirement, another presidential succession, to Miguel Diaz-Canel, and then another presidential election.  

There was no moment- a decades-in-the-making anticipatory moment, where the commercial, economic, financial, humanitarian, military, and political infrastructure within the Republic of Cuba would implode and each of those infrastructures would change and change profoundly.  

The Biden-Harris Administration seems attentive to both altering and reversing some decisions implemented during the Trump-Pence Administration, some of which were themselves reversals of some decisions implemented during the Obama-Biden Administration.   

In addition, the Biden-Harris Administration has implemented (and plans to continue to implement) new regulations and policies which it believes can result in both a less inhospitable environment for private companies operating in the Republic of Cuba and increased engagement by those private companies with individuals, organizations, and companies located in the United States. 

This all sounds good.  A triumphal kumbaya moment for career employees within the United States government.  

Unfortunately, and this is not a surprise to them as the refrain has been repeated to nearing exhaustion by companies, financial institutions, individuals, and organizations… 

• Absent direct correspondent banking, commercial funds from the United States to the Republic of Cuba and commercial funds from the Republic of Cuba to the United States will continue to require a third country.  This means to send funds, there will be three financial institutions involved- the sender, the intermediary, and the receiver.  Each financial institution will take a fee.  Many commercial fund transfers for private companies located in the Republic of Cuba are small amounts- so the three fees as a percentage of the overall transaction are substantial. 

In 2015, the Obama-Biden Administration authorized United States-based financial institutions to maintain correspondent accounts with Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions.  However, for a reason(s) that to this day remain disturbingly obtuse, the Obama-Biden Administration did not authorize Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions to maintain correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions.  The result, fund transfers must navigate an inefficient, insecure, and costly three-country journey. 

• Western Union Goes National For U.S. Tranfers To Cuba.... When Will Cuba Permit U.S. Investment And Financing For MSMEs In Cuba? No Excuse For Delays. Mar 3, 2023  

• Who Or What Is Delaying Western Union From Authorizing Commercial Transfers From U.S.-Cuba And From Cuba-U.S.? Biden? Diaz-Canel? MSME's Waiting With U.S.-Based Companies And Entrepreneurs Apr 22, 2023  

Some representatives of the Biden-Harris Administration maintain that Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions will not want to establish correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions and that United States-based financial institutions will not want to establish correspondent accounts with Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions. 

The first OFAC and BIS licenses for most of the significant commercial engagements during the twenty-nine years have been initiated by individuals, organizations, and companies not connected with individuals of Cuban descent.  A mistake for the Biden-Harris Administration to view the United States-Republic of Cuba private sector commercial and financial landscape as a singular, membership-based domain. 

The goal of the Biden-Harris Administration should be to unlock potential and then evaluate the response.  Not prejudge the response.  Because responses change as the environment changes.  Permit the private sector to determine what they require rather than instruct them on what tools they need to operate.  The philosophy should be more about “if we permit it, they will eventually use it” rather than “we will permit it only after they ask for it.” 

Permitting, as the Obama-Biden Administration did, individuals subject to Republic of Cuba jurisdiction to establish accounts at United States-based financial institutions is laudable.  And expanding, as the Biden-Harris Administration is now doing, how those accounts may be used is equally important.   

However, these opportunities remain hamstrung by the fact that transferring funds into or out of the United States-based accounts and into or out of the Republic of Cuba requires three financial institutions to touch the transaction- and each touch means a fee. 

If the Biden-Harris Administration wants to meaningly assist with connecting the private sector in the Republic of Cuba and private sector in the United States, then authorize the other half of what the Obama-Biden Administration did in 2015. 

For financial transactions, straight lines are essential.  A triangle only serves political interests and reinforces inefficiencies, lack of transparency, and excessive costs- which a re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba can not afford and should not be asked to pay.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Libertad Act Lawsuit Against Expedia: "The Court rejects Defendants' argument that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to plead around the Lawful Travel Exception."

MARIO ECHEVARRIA, ESTHER SANCHEZ, CONSUELO CUEVAS, AND CARMEN FLORIDO V. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, LLC, ORBITZ, LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., AND BOOKING HOLDINGS, INC.  Initial defendants were: TRIVAGO GMBH, BOOKING.COM B.V., GRUPO HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE I-5, AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22621; Southern Florida District].  Lawsuit dismissed with leave to amend on 16 November 2020.

Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie, LLP (defendant- Booking Holdings, Booking.com. B.A.)

Link: ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS (8/15/23)

The Court rejects Defendants' argument that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to plead around the Lawful Travel Exception.

Link: DEFENDANTS EXPEDIA GROUP, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, LLC, AND ORBITZ, LLC’S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF’S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT (8/28/23)

AFFIRMATIVE AND OTHER DEFENSES Pursuant to Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Expedia Entities affirmatively state the following defenses. By listing a defense or issue below, the Expedia Entities do not admit that they bear the burden of proof on the issue or defense, and reserve its right to contend that Echevarría bears the burden of proof on the issue. 1. Echevarría’s action is barred because Echevarría did not acquire ownership of the claims to the property at issue before March 12, 1996. See 22 U.S.C. 6082(a)(4)(B). 2. Echevarría’s action is barred because the alleged transactions and uses of the property at issue were incident to lawful travel to Cuba and necessary to the conduct of such travel. See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(B)(iii). 3. Echevarría’s action is barred by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because Echevarría is seeking to hold the Expedia Entities liable for conduct that was authorized by OFAC, U.S. Department of Treasury, under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (“CACR”), 31 CFR Part 515. 4. The damages that Echevarría seeks to recover are unconstitutional because they are wholly disproportionate, grossly excessive, and bear no relationship to any conduct and dealings that the Expedia Entities had with respect to the property at issue. 5. Echevarría’s claim for damages is barred because Echevarría is seeking to recover from other entities the same damages, arising from the same property and facts, that it is seeking to recover from the Expedia Entities. In the alternative, any recovery or compensation that Echevarría receives from other sources must be set off against any recovery that it receives from the Expedia Entities. 6. Echevarría’s action is barred for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 7. Echevarría’s action is barred because it is premised on conduct undertaken by a foreign government and outside the United States. 8. Echevarría’s action is barred by the act of state doctrine, which must be applied here because it has constitutional underpinnings. 9. Echevarría’s action is barred in whole or in part by the applicable statute of repose. See 22 U.S.C. § 6084. 10. Echevarría’s action is barred in whole or in part by Article II of the U.S. Constitution to the extent that Echevarría’s claim seeks to impose liability for foreign policy decisions made by the Executive Branch. 11. Echevarría’s action is barred in whole or in part by the Eighth Amendment. 12. Echevarría’s action is barred because the Helms-Burton Act is unconstitutionally vague. 13. Echevarría’s action is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. 14. Echevarría’s suit is barred due to lack of standing and a failure to present a justiciable case or controversy, in that Echevarría has not suffered an injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to conduct by the Expedia Entities. 15. Echevarría’s suit is barred in whole or in part by the First Amendment. PRAYER For these reasons, the Expedia Entities ask the Court to enter judgment that Echevarría take nothing, dismiss Echevarría’s suit with prejudice, assess costs against Echevarría, and award the Expedia Entities all other relief the Court deems appropriate.

Related Court Cases

MARIO ECHEVARRIA, ESTHER SANCHEZ, CONSUELO CUEVAS, AND CARMEN FLORIDO V. EXPEDIA, INC., TRIVAGO GMBLJ, A GERMAN LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, BOOKING.COM B.V., A DUTCH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, GRUPO HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE 1-5, AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22620; Southern Florida District].  Lawsuit dismissed with leave to amend on 16 November 2020.

Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie (defendant- Booking Holdings, Inc., Booking.com B.V.)
Scott Douglas & McConnico LLP (defendant- Expedia, Inc., Hotels.com GP, LLC, Hotels.com L.P., Orbitz, LLC)
Akerman LLP (defendant- Expedia, Inc., Hotels,com GP, LLC, Hotels.com L.P., Orbitz, LLC)

MARIO DEL VALLE, ENRIQUE FALLA, MARIO ECHEVARRIA V. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, ORBITZ, LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING HOLDINGS INC.  Initial defendants were: TRIVAGO GMBH, BOOKING.COM B.V., GRUPO HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE I-5, AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22619 Southern Florida District; 20-12407 11th Circuit Court of Appeals; Dismissed (8/10/23)]

Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie, LLP (defendant)
Scott Douglass & McConnico (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

Surprises? U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increased 37.6% In July; Up 14.8% Year-To-Year. Coin Operated Washing Machines, Refrigerant, Microwave Ovens, Manicure/Pedicure Preps, Vehicles, Tires, Sugar

Thus far in 2023…. US$450,869.00 in refrigerant recovery liquid. US$6,097.00 in coin operated washing machines. US$11,040.00 in microwave ovens. US$606,207.00 in used vehicles (1,500 cc to 3,000 cc). US$151,768.00 in new vehicles (1,500 cc to 3,000 cc). US$2,342,281.00 in coffee. US$1,234,503.00 in Cookies. US$694,773.00 in Waffles and Wafers. US$240,723.00 in beer. US$66,568.00 in manicure and pedicure preparations. US$13,259.00 in radial tires. US$13,008.00 in bed sheets. US$15,810.00 in carpets. US$33,530.00 in footwear. US$353,064.00 in hams. US$10,027.00 in cane sugar. US$20,617.00 in pesticides. US$13,165.00 in salt. US$27,840.00 in shampoo. US$6,806.00 in pet food.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
September 2023

July 2023 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 37.6%- 1
50th Of 225 July 2023 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 14.8%- 2
Cuba Ranked 55th U.S. 2023 Ag/Food Export Markets- 2
July 2023 Healthcare Product Exports US$0.00- 2
July 2023 Humanitarian Donations US$3,330,731.00- 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 17

JULY 2023 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 37.6%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in July 2023 were US$32,313,837.00 compared to US$23,468,476.00 in July 2022 and US$19,832,195.00 in July 2021.

July 2023 exports included among other items: Chicken Leg Quarters (Frozen); Chicken Meat (Frozen); Chicken Legs (Frozen); Meat of Swine; Preserved Chicken Meat; Pacific Salmon; Fresh Cheese; Grapes; Coffee; Cookies; Waffles and Wafers; Tomato Ketchup; Beer; Skipjack Tuna; Palm Oil; Hams; Pasta; Corn Chips; Yeasts; Carbonated Soft Drinks; Pesticide; Salt; Sugar.

January 2023 through July 2023 TSREEA exports were US$192,573,300.00 compared to January 2022 through July 2022 exports of US$167,653,569.00. Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed:US$7,096,299,666.00.

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

Biden Administration To Issue New/Revised MSME Policies. Reversing Trump Administration Decision But Not Obama Administration Decision. Bank Responsibility? OFAC Penalties?

Sad Biden-Harris Administration Finds More Digestible To Reverse A Trump-Pence Administration Decision Rather Than Change A Obama-Biden Administration Decision 

Know Your Customer (KYC) 

Compliance Issues- What Is A Bank’s Level Of Responsibility To Obtain Documents From A MSME?

Banks Want Certainty So They Are Not Subject To Enormous Fines From OFAC

OFAC Changes To The “Frequently Asked Questions” Rather Than Changes To The Code Of Federal Regulations (CFR) Will Not Be Enough For Most Banks.

Still No Correspondent Banking- Retaining A Triangle Rather Than A Straight Line

Biden Administration Retains Distain For Commerce

Interesting Who Was Briefed And Who Was Excluded- Continuing To Maintain That The U.S.-Cuba Commercial Landscape Is First And Only For Individuals Of Cuban Descent Is A Mistake

First OFAC And BIS Licenses For Most Of The Significant Commercial Engagements During The Last Twenty-Five Years Have Been By Individuals, Organizations, And Companies Not Connected With Individuals Of Cuban Descent

United States Department of State
Washington DC
18 September 2023 at 1:15 pm

• “Thank you for reaching out about Cuba.  We can offer the following on background, attributable to a State Department official.  The United States stands with the Cuban people and seeks to support their pursuit of freedom, prosperity, and a future of greater dignity.  In May 2022, the Biden Administration announced several policy measures focused on empowering the Cuban people.  These measures focused on actions that would benefit the Cuban people, foster the Cuban entrepreneurial spirit, and allow families to reconnect with one another, all while continuing to deny resources to the Cuban military.   We believe the private sector is Cuba’s best hope for generating economic development and employment to improve the standards of living for the Cuban people and reduce the current high-levels of migration.  Since the Cuban government began its slow opening to the private sector, Cuban entrepreneurs have proven themselves to be nimble and effective under very difficult circumstances, delivering a better life for themselves and their neighbors.  By supporting independent entrepreneurship and civil society we support the Cuban people in their efforts to improve the economic condition of their country, generate employment, and escape poverty.  Entrepreneurs continue to advocate meaningful and practical ways that the U.S. government can support their growth.  The policy of this Administration is to take measures to support the Cuban people and promote independent economic prosperity while restricting to the furthest extent possible any benefit to the Cuban military.  There is nothing further to announce at this time.” 

On 19 September 2023, the United States Department of State, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce are reported to publish new Republic of Cuba-related regulations and revised Republic of Cuba-related regulations. 

The focus is upon assisting the redevelopment of Micro, Small, and Medium-Size Enterprises (MSMEs) owned by Republic of Cuba nationals residing in the Republic of Cuba.

MSMEs are expected to be authorized to engage with and to have operating accounts within financial institutions located in the United States.  Financial institutions located outside of the United States will again be permitted to engage in U-Turn transactions.  Individuals subject to United States jurisdiction may be authorized by general license (as permitted now by a specific license from the OFAC) to provide direct investment in and direct financing to a MSME.  

• U-turn financial transactions are essential for customers located outside of the United States for Denver, Colorado-based Western Union Company (2022 revenue US$4.5 billion) to manage electronic remittance transfers to the Republic of Cuba.  For example, when a customer in Spain uses an online portal or visits a retail location to send funds to the Republic of Cuba, Western Union Company needs to have an operating account in Spain from which to send the funds to the Republic of Cuba.  Absent U-turn authorization, the remittance cannot be sent to the Republic of Cuba and cannot be sent to another financial institution.  

On 10 May 2022 the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) through a two-year license issued by the OFAC-authorized the first direct investment in and direct financing to a privately-owned company in the Republic of Cuba owned by a Republic of Cuba national.  The OFAC license application was submitted on 10 June 2021.  

• LINK: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022   

• LINK: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022      

• LINK: Biden Administration Will Use Cuba's Authorization Of SMSE's As Means To Expand Support For Cuba Private Sector- U.S. Investments And Loans May Be Next June 02, 2021 

NOTE: Despite numerous entreaties for nearing two years, the government of the Republic of Cuba has yet to publish regulations for the process by which a MSME may obtain direct foreign investment and direct financing. 

The Biden-Harris Administration has, although with unnecessary delay, authorized Republic of Cuba-based MSMEs to establish operating accounts at financial institutions located in the United States. 

The Biden-Harris Administration has reversed a 9 October 2019 decision by the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) and re-authorized U-Turn transactions by financial institutions located outside of the United States.  This change will be particularly of value to Western Union Company and other electronic payment processors. 

However, troubling that the Biden-Harris Administration finds far more digestible to reverse a decision by the Trump-Pence Administration than reverse a decision by the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017). 

In 2015, the Obama-Biden Administration authorized United States-based financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions, but did not authorize Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions.  The regulations were managed by the OFAC. 

Absent direct correspondent banking, commercial transactions from the Republic of Cuba to the United States and from the United States to the Republic of Cuba will continue to be required to use a third-country.  For small transactions likely by an MSME, the financial institution fees may be onerous and thus discouraging. 

Fixing the problem with direct correspondent banking is not a big deal.  It is a technical fix to make workable what is not malfunctioning, but is nonfunctioning.  A transaction requiring a third-country connection is not cost-effective, not efficient, and not transparent.  It is expensive, inefficient, and absent transparency. 

• LINK: State Department, NSC, OFAC, BIS, USDA Don't Understand Requirements For Financial Plumbing To Function Efficiently.  They Excel In Creating, Maintaining, And Defending Clogs.  

If Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions choose not to seek correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions, then MSME activity will remain constrained.   

Consequential to permit the choice- engage or the status quo.  Engagement will require efficiency and transparency, both of which have generally been avoided by the government of the Republic of Cuba.  Force them to choose. 

In the banking system, the most efficient process to move funds is through point-to-point transactions.  Straight lines rather than triangles.  Think of two one-way arteries operating adjacent to one another.  In this instance, a two-way financial autobahn. 

In June 2022, Elk Grove Village, Illinois-based Chicago, Illinois-based First American Bank (2022 assets approximately US$6 billion) acquired from Centennial Bank an operating account (and Republic of Cuba-focused branch personnel) for the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in Washington, DC.  First American Bank has since ceased managing the account for the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba.  If Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions are authorized by the OFAC to establish correspondent accounts with First American Bank and if First American Bank were to establish a correspondent account with a Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institution, there would be an opportunity for direct two-way fund transfers for authorized transactions by MSMEs and other authorized transactions (agricultural commodities, food products, healthcare products (medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, informational materials, travel (visa processing, overflight fees, landing fees, accommodation payments- Airbnb, etc.), remittances, and entrepreneurial activities (direct investment to and direct financing for privately-owned companies located in the Republic of Cuba, etc.).  This same scenario would apply to almost any United States-based financial institution.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

In A Rarity... Cuba Deputy Foreign Minister Meets With U.S. Assistant Secretary Of State. Precursor To New U.S. Policy Announcement(s)? Rumors Swirl...

United States Department of State
Washington DC
14 September 2023

Press Briefing With Mathew Miller, Spokesperson

“QUESTION: Yeah, yeah. Very, very different region. I was wondering whether you have any reaction or comment or how you view the fact that Cuba is heading a Group of 77 summit as of tomorrow for two days in La Habana with leaders such as Lula expected, and 30 of such leaders. What is your view on that? And in that context, of course, could you give us an update or readout of the meetings, apparently, that the deputy Cuban foreign minister [Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Fernandez de Cossio] had with people in this house and any readout —

MR MILLER: People in his house or —

QUESTION: Well, no, in the – at the Department of State.

MR MILLER: You mean people in the State Department, in the State Department. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

QUESTION: And where – or where in fact, if it was actually here or not? I think he also met somebody at the White House.

MR MILLER: Assistant Secretary [of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs] [Brian] Nichols, yeah.

QUESTION: But any readout you can have on that.

MR MILLER: So I don’t have any comment on the first question you asked. I will say with respect to the meeting that involved the State Department that you asked about, on Monday, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian Nichols met with the Cuban vice foreign minister. At this meeting, Assistant Secretary Nichols and the vice foreign minister discussed human rights, migration, and other issues of bilateral interest, and it follows a number of meetings. We do routinely meet with officials from the Cuban embassy here in Washington.

QUESTION: But not at that level.

MR MILLER: Not at that level, no. I mean, not always someone here, but we do regularly have discussions about those issues.

QUESTION: Yeah, yeah. And any progress whatsoever on whether or not Cuba should be lifted from the list of state sponsored of – states that sponsor terrorism?

MR MILLER: We have not made any determination that I can report today.”

NOTE: Media reporting that Juan Gonzalez, Senior Director- Western Hemisphere Affairs for the National Security Council (NSC) at The White House, also participated in the meeting with Mr. Nichols.

Buffalo, New York, Native Matt Lee, AP's Long-Serving U.S. Department State Correspondent, References M&T Bank During Briefing About Iran

Although Buffalo, New York-Based M&T Bank Not Connected With Iran Discussion, Connectively With Matthew Lee, United States Department Of State Correspondent For New York, New York-Based Associated Press (AP), Served As Reference During Press Briefing At The United States Department Of State. 

M&T Bank Did Host Operating Accounts For The Government Of The Republic Of Cuba Before Relinquishing Them Due To Burden Of OFAC Compliance. 

United States Department of State
Washington DC
13 September 2023

Excerpts [Link To Complete Transcript]

Press Briefing With Mathew Miller, Spokesperson

[For Context, First Question Asked] MATTHEW LEE (ASSOCIATED PRESS):  “I want to go back to the Iran stuff that you were talking about yesterday, and the assertion from the administration that billions of dollars in escrow accounts had been sent back or withdrawn by Iran during the previous administration without any restrictions at all.  Do you have any more?

MR LEE:  … at M&T Bank, right, and draw it down to zero.  And you should be able to tell, or someone should be able to tell, if it was at zero or not, right?  Why can’t you tell- I don’t understand.

MR MILLER:  These are not accounts held in the United States.”

In 2015, the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) authorized United States-based financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions, but did not authorize Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions.  The regulations were managed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury.

In 2015, Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank (2017 assets approximately US$2.9 billion) acquired accounts for the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in Washington, DC, and the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cuba to the United Nations in New York after Buffalo, New York-based M&T Bank Corporation (2022 assets approximately US$200 billion) notified the embassy and mission that it would no longer provide services due to challenges with regulatory compliance for many accounts with embassies and missions.   

Stonegate Bank in 2015 received a license from the OFAC for a correspondent account at Banco Internacional de Comercia SA (BICSA), a member of Republic of Cuba government-operated Grupo Nuevo Banca SA, created by Corporate Charter No. 49 in 1993 and commenced operation in 1994.   

• According to the Republic of Cuba, “Its [BICSA] main activity is ‘enterprises’ bank’ carried through its central services and five branches based in the country’s capital, Santiago de Cuba and Villa Clara. It records all transactions in real time providing its customers with card and remote banking services while it is working on developing other methods of electronic banking.  Its institutional clients, national or foreign, receive a complete accounting and documentary service, while national entities also enjoy of significant volumes of credit facilities. Practically all sectors of the economy benefit from all this, such as that of agriculture, the food industry, the basic and light industries, transportation, aviation, fishing, construction, domestic and foreign trade, the iron and steel industry, sugar, informatics, communications and others with not only economic importance but also social, such as health, water supply, education, culture and sports.  Credit policy followed by the Bank is dictated in a collegiate way by its Credit Committee on the basis of a strict analysis and control in loan making.  The Bank counts on correspondents in the five continents, the majority are first class banks, mainly Europeans and Americans.  Equity capital of shareholders (Grupo Nueva Banca with the biggest share and Bancholding), near the USD95 millions with a balance ranging from 550 to 600 millions, make sure the Bank has a strong solvency ratio.” 

Without explanation the Obama-Biden Administration did not authorize BICSA under a license from the OFAC to have a correspondent account at Stonegate Bank, so Stonegate Bank routed transactions for approximately eighty (80) customers on a regular basis through Panama City, Panama-based Multibank (2019 assets approximately US$5 billion) which had dealings with the Republic of Cuba. 

In 2017, Conway, Arkansas-based Home BancShares (2022 assets approximately US$22.8 billion) through its subsidiary Centennial Bank purchased Stonegate Bank.  Stonegate Bank operations were absorbed into Centennial Bank.   

On 16 June 2020, Bogota, Colombia-based Grupo Aval Acciones y Valores SA (2022 assets approximately US$90.1 billion) reported that “On May 25th, Banco de Bogotá, through its subsidiary Leasing Bogotá S.A. Panamá, acquired 96.6% of the ordinary shares of Multi Financial Group [Multibank]. As part of the acquisition process, MFG’s operation in Cuba was closed and as part of the transaction. Grupo Aval complies with OFAC regulations and doesn't have transactional relationships with Cuba.” 

In June 2022, Elk Grove Village, Illinois-based Chicago, Illinois-based First American Bank (2022 assets approximately US$6 billion) acquired from Centennial Bank an operating account (and Republic of Cuba-focused branch personnel) for the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in Washington, DC.  First American Bank has since ceased managing the account for the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba.  If BICSA is authorized by the OFAC to establish a correspondent account with First American Bank and if First American Bank were to establish a correspondent account with BICSA, there would be an opportunity for direct two-way fund transfers for authorized transactions (agricultural commodities, food products, healthcare products (medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, informational materials, travel (visa processing, overflight fees, landing fees, accommodation payments- Airbnb, etc.), remittances, and entrepreneurial activities (direct investment to and direct financing for privately-owned companies located in the Republic of Cuba, etc.).  This same scenario would apply to almost any United States-based financial institution.   

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

President Biden Continues One-Year Extension Of Trading With The Enemy Act Provisions Relating To Cuba

The White House
Washington DC
13 September 2023

Presidential Determination No. 2023-10         
 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

SUBJECT: Continuation of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act
 
Under section 101(b) of Public Law 95-223 (91 Stat. 1625; 50 U.S.C. 4305 note), and a previous determination on September 2, 2022 (87 FR 54859, September 8, 2022), the exercise of certain authorities under the Trading With the Enemy Act is scheduled to expire on September 14, 2023.
 
I hereby determine that the continuation of the exercise of those authorities with respect to Cuba for 1 year is in the national interest of the United States.
 
Therefore, consistent with the authority vested in me by section 101(b) of Public Law 95-223, I continue for 1 year, until September 14, 2024, the exercise of those authorities with respect to Cuba, as implemented by the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515.

The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to publish this determination in the Federal Register.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

Default Judgement Against Government Of Cuba For US$2.595 Billion Issued By U.S. District Court In Colorado.

Civil Action No. 21-cv-02497-NYW-NRN: ALFREDO VILLOLDO, and GUSTAVO E. VILLOLDO, individually, and as Administrator, Executor, and Personal Representative of the Estate of Gustavo Villoldo Argilagos, Plaintiffs, v. THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, Defendant. 

JUDGMENT in favor of Gustavo E. Villoldo, Gustavo (I) E. Villoldo and against The Republic of Cuba pursuant to 48 Memorandum Opinion and Order, by Clerk on 9/1/2023. (ebuch) (Entered: 09/01/2023) LINK 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 42 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Motion for Default Judgment, by Judge Nina Y. Wang on 9/1/2023. (ebuch) (Entered: 09/01/2023) LINK 

Excerpt From Judgement 

This action having been commenced by Plaintiffs Alfredo Villoldo, individually, and Gustavo E. Villoldo, individually, and as Administrator, Executor, and Personal Representative of the Estate of Gustavo Villoldo Argilagos, on September 14, 2021 by the filing of the Complaint and Summons, and copies of the Complaint, Summons, and Notice of Suit, with translations of said documents into Spanish, having been served via diplomatic channels on Defendant the Republic of Cuba (“Defendant”) on April 28, 2022 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4), and proof of service, in the form of a certified copy of the diplomatic note, having been filed with the Clerk of the Court on May 25, 2022, Defendant not having answered the Complaint, the time for answering the Complaint having expired, the Court granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment on March 7, 2023, and Plaintiff Alfredo Villoldo having filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice on April 18, 2023, it is: 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that: 1. With respect to Plaintiffs Gustavo E. Villoldo, individually and as Administrator, Executor, and Personal Representative of the Estate of Gustavo Villoldo Argilagos, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1330 to grant full faith and credit to the Corrected Second Amended Final Judgment rendered in Plaintiffs’ favor against Defendant by the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida on May 25, 2021 nunc pro tunc to August 19, 2011.  2. The finding of the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court that the terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity in 28 U.S.C. § 1605A applied with respect to Gustavo E. Villoldo and the Estate of Gustavo Villoldo Argilagos was supported by competent evidence; and 3. Plaintiffs Gustavo E. Villoldo, individually and as Administrator, Executor, and Personal Representative of the Estate of Gustavo Villoldo Argilagos, have judgment against Defendant in the amount of $2,595,000,000 for purposes of enforcement. 

LINK To Related Analysis 

U.S. Federal Judge In Colorado Agrees To Enforce Part Of US$2.79 Billion Judgment Against Government Of Cuba For Torture. March 15, 2023

JetBlue And Other Airlines To Suspend All Flights From The United States To Cuba- Lack Of Demand.

JetBlue Corporate Communications (1 September 2023): “JetBlue has made the decision to suspend all routes to Cuba with the final day of service being September 17, 2023.  

In 2016, JetBlue made history when it touched down in Cuba, becoming the first U.S. airline to operate a commercial flight between the two countries in more than 50 years, ushering in a new era of low fares and great service to Cuba that we believe the market benefited from.  

Demand for travel to the island has been significantly affected by restrictions on travel to Cuba that were put in place after we launched service. We look forward to resuming our service to Havana and continuing to pursue opportunities within Cuba should travel become more accessible in the future.

Exiting Havana will allow us to redeploy additional aircraft on our top performing routes where demand for JetBlue’s low fares and award-winning service is growing.  

JetBlue will proactively provide an automated full refund to their original form of payment to customers who are affected by the route suspension.”

Aviancion Online (3 September 2023): “U.S. airlines have applied to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) for an idle waiver on several routes due to depressed demand for travel between the United States and Cuba. Due to the frequency limitations of the Cuban non-open skies market, there are currently more flights and seats than demand warrants. 

JetBlue requested a three-year idle extension from DOT for 20 weekly frequencies between the U.S. and Cuba that it uses to operate between Fort Lauderdale, Florida and Havana and returns one weekly frequency to DOT that it uses to provide service between New York JFK and the Cuban capital.  The airline has concluded that services to Havana are not sustainable in the current market and will end all operations to Cuba effective September 17, 2023. JetBlue also informed the DOT that it does not wish to “hoard” frequencies for other air carriers to use.  If the Department grants the airline’s three-year dormancy waiver for its 20 weekly frequencies between the U.S. and Cuba. If in the dormancy period other airlines apply to the DOT to operate JetBlue’s frequencies, the airline will either return the frequencies before the years or agree to some procedure if it wishes to return to Havana again in the future. 

Delta Air Lines has applied to the DOT for a seasonal waiver, from October 29, 2023 through March 30, 2024, for its seven Atlanta-Havana frequencies and seven of its fourteen Miami-Havana frequencies. Although demand between the U.S. and Cuba remains depressed, the airline expects demand for travel between the two countries to recover and reintroduce service again.  Delta previously requested downtime relief for the 2023 summer season for its services on the Atlanta-Havana route, after which the Department granted the request. Due to the adverse situations in the Cuban market in the face of pent-up demand in the Cuba-U.S. market, the airline expects the DOT to accept its request for downtime relief and be able to preserve its frequencies.

On June 8, 2023, United Airlines notified the Department of the suspension of its Newark-Havana services as of October 29, 2023 due to economic circumstances, thus Cuba loses all nonstop connections to New York.  The airline also explained that it does not want extended downtime for these frequencies and will focus all its operations to Havana from its Houston-Intercontinental hub. At present, United is the only U.S. airline that does not offer flights between Florida and Cuba.”

Paris Club Of Creditor Nations Reported To Propose New Repayment Schedule For Cuba Which Has Not Maintained A Previous 76% Write-Off From 2015.

AFP (31 August 2023): “The Paris Club of creditors on Wednesday proposed a new timetable for the repayment of Cuban debt amid the communist island's worst economic crisis in decades, the state-owned press agency said.  The agency reported that William Roos, the club's co-chairman, had during a visit to the country "proposed to establish a new timetable according to Cuba's ability to pay, and thus work together to find a solution" to payment delays. 

• NOTE: Mr. Roos is Assistant Secretary for Multilateral, Development and Trade Affairs, Direction Générale du Trésor (French Treasury). 

A 2015 agreement between Cuba and the club wiped $8.5 billion of a sum of $11.1 billion owed, the rest being converted into investment projects or repayment staggered until 2033.  But Cuba's financial difficulties have prevented the country from making payments due in 2019 and forced it to seek a moratorium on repayments until 2022.  In June 2021, the parties agreed on a further delay.  The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors whose role is to find solutions to countries' debt repayment difficulties.  Cuba also owes money to the London Club of private creditors.  In February last year, the Russian Duma ratified a plan to restructure $2.3 billion of Cuban debt.” 

THE GROUP OF CREDITORS OF CUBA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA AGREE TO DEFER PAYMENTS DUE UNDER THE 2015 AGREEMENT [LINK]

“10 June 2021: The representatives of the Group of Creditors of Cuba and of the Government of the Republic of Cuba met in Paris on June 9, 2021 to amend the terms of the Arrangement dated 12 December 2015. 

This agreement provides more time to the Republic of Cuba to honor several payments due under the 2015 Arrangement, while maintaining the present value of these amounts.

During the meeting, the delegation of the Republic of Cuba provided a description of the economic and financial situation of its country and presented the measures taken by the Government of the Republic of Cuba to support Cuban economic development in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. 

The representatives of the Governments of the Group of Creditors of Cuba and the Republic of Cuba confirmed their willingness to preserve the 2015 Arrangement and their commitment to ensure the full implementation of this arrangement, which is a key milestone and entailed a normalization of financial relationships between the Group of Creditors of Cuba and the Republic of Cuba.  

Background note: The Group of Creditors of Cuba includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.” 

AGREEMENT ON THE DEBT BETWEEN CUBA AND THE GROUP OF CREDITORS OF CUBA [Link]

“12 December 2012: The representatives of the Group of Creditors of Cuba and of the Government of the Republic of Cuba met from 10 December to 12 December and agreed on 12 December 2015 on an arrangement to clear USD 2.6 billion of debt in arrears due to the Group of Creditors of Cuba over an 18-year period. 

This arrangement offers a framework for a sustainable and definitive solution to the question of arrears due by the Republic of Cuba to the Group of the Creditors of Cuba covering a total stock of debt of USD 11.1 billion, including late interest, as of 31 October 2015. 

During the meeting, the delegation of the Republic of Cuba provided a description of the economic and financial situation of its country and presented the measures taken by the Government of the Republic of Cuba aimed at supporting the Cuban economic development.

The Group of Creditors of Cuba welcomed progress made by the Republic of Cuba towards the normalization of its relations with creditors and the international financial community. 

Realization of payments under a formal commitment of the Republic of Cuba to fully clear its arrears is a necessary and important step for the normalization of financial relationships between the Group of Creditors of Cuba and the Republic of Cuba. The Group of Creditors of Cuba's export credit agencies that wish to do so will resume their export credit activities.  

Background note: The Group of Creditors of Cuba includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.” 

Paris Club’s claims as of 31 December 2022, excluding late interest (in USD million) [Link]

ODA: Official Development Assistance
NODA: Non-Official Development Assistance
Cuba ODA: US$238 million; NODA: US$4.589 billion; TOTAL: US$4.827 billion

Who are the members of the Paris Club? 

“The Paris Club is a group of currently 22 permanent members.  Other creditor countries can participate in negotiation meetings on a case by case basis, provided that certain conditions are met.  Finally, representatives of international financial institutions or countries can be invited to attend the meetings as observers.  

The 22 Paris Club permanent members are countries with large exposure to other States woldwide and that agree on the main principles and rules of the Paris Club. The claims may be held directly by the government or through its appropriate institutions, especially Export credit agencies. These creditor countries have constantly applied the terms defined in the Paris Club Agreed Minutes to their bilateral claims and have settled any bilateral disputes or arrears with Paris Club countries, if any.

The following countries are permanent Paris Club members: AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, BRAZIL, CANADA, DENMARK, FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, IRELAND, ISRAEL, ITALY, JAPAN, KOREA, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Other official creditors can also actively participate in negotiation sessions or in monthly "Tours d'Horizon" discussions, subject to the agreement of permanent members and of the debtor country. When participating in Paris Club discussions, invited creditors act in good faith and abide by the practices described in the table below. The following creditors have participated as creditors in some Paris Club agreements or Tours d'Horizon in an ad hoc manner: Abu Dhabi, Argentina, China, Czech Republic, India, Kuwait, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, South Africa (* prospective member on 8 July 2022), Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey” 

LINK To Related Analysis 

In London, China Bank Proceeds With Lawsuit Against Cuba For Potential US$1.3 Billion. Another Plaintiff In London Received Legal Fees From Cuba- That Lawsuit Continues In Litigation.. Jun 28, 2023

Cuba Minister Of Foreign Affairs Said That Only U.S. Vessels Are Permitted For U.S. Exports To Cuba. That Was Inaccurate.

H.E. Bruno Rodriguez, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba, referenced in a statement on 29 June 2023 that exports agricultural commodities and food products from the United States to the Republic of Cuba using provisions of the Trade Sanctions and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 require the use of United States-registered (owned) vessels. 

Was he accurate? 

• The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. 

• The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis and with payment terms) export of medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, medicines, and pharmaceuticals.   

“Havana, 29 June 2023 (Prensa Latina News Agency)- Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez reiterated the denunciation that the United States prevents the importation of products from that country to Cuba, by virtue of the blockade imposed on the island more than 60 years ago.  In his Twitter profile, the top representative of Cuban diplomacy clarified that the markedly discriminatory character for the authorization of the sale of some agricultural products constitutes a very singular exception, rigorously limited, which cannot be called trade.  The Cuban Foreign Minister pointed out in his message that the law establishes that Cuba must pay for these sales in cash and in advance, and prohibits the granting of commercial credits.  In addition -he pointed out- it imposes other conditions, in violation of the rules of international trade and freedom of navigation.  He cited as an example the obligation to transport any cargo in U.S. ships, which return empty, thus preventing the import of Cuban products, which makes this relationship -he said- brutally unidirectional as it does not work today in any part of the world, not even in war situations.” [emphasis added] 

Answer from the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce: 

22 August 2023: “BIS regulations do not require the vessel to be United States-registered (owned).  The vessel becomes subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) when it enters the U.S., regardless of whether it’s U.S. or foreign-flagged.  In addition, cargo vessels most likely qualify for License Exception AVS so a license is not required in most situations.  As far as Cuban imports and the 180-day rule, those regulations fall under the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), so we would recommend you contact OFAC for questions regarding Cuban imports and vessels returning to the U.S. from Cuba.  BIS Office of Congressional and Public Affairs.” 

OFAC CUBA SANCTIONS 

779. What are the “180-day rule” and the “goods/passengers-on-board rule”? 

The 180-day rule is a statutory restriction prohibiting any vessel that enters a port or place in Cuba to engage in the trade of goods or the purchase or provision of services there from entering any U.S. port for the purpose of loading or unloading freight for 180 days after leaving Cuba, unless authorized by OFAC. This restriction is applied even if a vessel has stopped in Cuba solely to purchase services unrelated to the trade of goods, such as planned ship maintenance. The 180-day rule is separate from a second statutory restriction – the goods/passengers-on-board rule – which prohibits any vessel carrying goods or passengers to or from Cuba or carrying goods in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest from entering a U.S. port with such goods or passengers on board, unless authorized or exempt. There are certain exceptions to these rules. For a complete description of the 180-day rule, the goods/passengers-on-board rule, and the general licenses and exemptions that apply, see 31 CFR §§ 515.206, 515.207, and 515.550.  Date Released November 8, 2017 

§ 515.206 Exempt transactions.  (a) Information and informational materials.  (1) The importation from any country and the exportation to any country of information or informational materials as defined in § 515.332, whether commercial or otherwise, regardless of format or medium of transmission, are exempt from the prohibitions and regulations of this part except for payments owed to Cuba for telecommunications services between Cuba and the United States, which are subject to the provisions of § 515.542.  (2) This section does not authorize transactions related to information or informational materials not fully created and in existence at the date of the transaction, or to the substantive or artistic alteration or enhancement of information or informational materials, or to the provision of marketing and business consulting services by a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Such prohibited transactions include, without limitation, payment of advances for information or informational materials not yet created and completed, provision of services to market, produce or co-produce, create or assist in the creation of information or informational materials, and payment of royalties to a designated national with respect to income received for enhancements or alterations made by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to information or informational materials imported from a designated national.  (3) This section does not authorize transactions incident to the transmission of restricted technical data as defined in the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730–774, or to the exportation of goods for use in the transmission of any data. The exportation of such goods to designated foreign countries is prohibited, as provided in § 515.201 of this part and § 785.1 of the Export Administration Regulations.  (4) This section does not authorize transactions related to travel to Cuba when such travel is not otherwise authorized under § 515.545.  Note to paragraph (a): See § 515.545 for general licenses authorizing certain travel-related and other transactions that are directly incident to the export, import, or transmission of informational materials and certain transactions related to the creation, dissemination, or artistic or other substantive alteration or enhancement of informational materials.  (b) Donation of food. The prohibitions contained in this part do not apply to transactions incident to the donation of food to nongovernmental organizations or individuals in Cuba. 

§ 515.207 Entry of vessels engaged in trade with Cuba.  Except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury (or any person, agency or instrumentality designated by him), by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses or otherwise, (a) No vessel that enters a port or place in Cuba to engage in the trade of goods or the purchase or provision of services, may enter a U.S. port for the purpose of loading or unloading freight for a period of 180 days from the date the vessel departed from a port or place in Cuba; and (b) No vessel carrying goods or passengers to or from Cuba or carrying goods in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest may enter a U.S. port with such goods or passengers on board.  Note to § 515.207: For the waiver of the prohibitions contained in this section for vessels engaged in certain trade and travel with Cuba, see § 515.550.  [58 FR 34710, June 29, 1993, as amended at 66 FR 36687, July 12, 2001; 80 FR 2292, Jan. 16, 2015; 80 FR 56918, Sept. 21, 2015].

§ 515.550 Certain vessel transactions authorized.  (a) Unless a vessel is otherwise engaging or has otherwise engaged in transactions that would prohibit entry pursuant to § 515.207, § 515.207 shall not apply to a vessel that is: (1) Engaging or has engaged in trade with Cuba authorized pursuant to this part; Note to paragraph (a)(1): The authorization in this paragraph includes, for example, trade with Cuba authorized pursuant to § 515.533, § 515.559, or § 515.582, or by specific license.  (2) Engaging or has engaged in trade with Cuba that is exempt from the prohibitions of this part (see § 515.206); (3) Engaging or has engaged in the exportation or reexportation to Cuba from a third country of agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical devices that, were they subject to the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR parts 730 through 774) (EAR), would be designated as EAR99; (4) A foreign vessel that has entered a port or place in Cuba while carrying students, faculty, and staff that are authorized to travel to Cuba pursuant to § 515.565(a); or (5) Carrying or has carried persons between the United States and Cuba or within Cuba pursuant to the authorization in § 515.572(a)(2) or, in the case of a vessel used solely for personal travel (and not transporting passengers), pursuant to a license or other authorization issued by the Department of Commerce for the exportation or reexportation of the vessel to Cuba.  (b) Unless a vessel is otherwise engaging or has otherwise engaged in transactions that would prohibit entry pursuant to § 515.207, § 515.207(a) shall not apply to a foreign vessel that has engaged in the exportation to Cuba from a third country only of items that, were they subject to the EAR, would be designated as EAR99 or would be controlled on the Commerce Control List only for anti-terrorism reasons.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Links To Related Analyses 

U.S. Agricultural Commodity/Food Exports To Cuba Increased 60.8% In June 2023; Up 11.1% Year-To-Year. Surprise: US$30,241.00 In Sugar. Coffee Thus Far In 2023- US$1.9 Million. Aug 15, 2023  

U.S. Agricultural Commodity/Food Product Exports To Cuba Increased 3.7% In May 2023; Up 1.7% Year-To-Year. Jul 6, 2023  

Milestone... With US$19 Million Purchases In April 2023, Cuba Has Purchased US$7 Billion In Agricultural Commodities And Food Products From U.S.; Exports Up 6.4% In April 2023; Up 1.1% Year-To-Year. Jun 26, 2023  

State Department, NSC, OFAC, BIS, USDA Don't Understand Requirements For Financial Plumbing To Function Efficiently.  They Excel In Creating, Maintaining, And Defending Clogs. May 16, 2023   

Port Of Mariel Reports Readiness To Receive Neo-Panamex Vessels May 15, 2023  

Mr. de Cossio At MINREX In Cuba Not Quite Accurate With His Comments About Biden-Harris Administration Efforts With MSMEs And Remittances December 20, 2022 

Coffee & Charcoal Have Been Imported From Cuba; U.S. Companies Want More. Agricultural Commodities/Food Products/Healthcare Products Have Been Exported To Cuba; U.S. Companies Want More. October 02, 2021

U.S. Agricultural Commodity/Food Exports To Cuba Increased 60.8% In June 2023; Up 11.1% Year-To-Year. Surprise: US$30,241.00 In Sugar. Coffee Thus Far In 2023- US$1.9 Million.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
August 2023

June 2023 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 60.8%- 1
47th Of 223 June 2023 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 11.1%- 2
Cuba Ranked 56th Of U.S. 2023 Ag/Food Export Markets- 2
June 2023 Healthcare Product Exports US$57,167.00- 2
June 2023 Humanitarian Donations US$3,296,330.00- 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 17

JUNE 2023 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 60.8%%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in June 2023 were US$37,071,007.00 compared to US$23,055,838.00 in June 2022 and US$28,256,268.00 in June 2021.

June 2023 exports included among other items: Bacon; Butter; Olive Oil; Sunflower Oil; Rapeseed Oil; Sugar; Waffles and Wafers; Coffee; Pasta; Communion Wafers; Ice Cream; Cookies; Powdered Milk; Beer; Toilet Paper; Chicken Leg Quarters (Frozen); Chicken Meat (Frozen); Chicken Legs (Frozen); Meat of Swine; Preserved Chicken Meat.

January 2023 through June 2023 TSREEA exports were US$160,259,463.00 compared to January 2022 through June 2022 exports of US$144,185,093.00. Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed:US$7,063,985,829.00.

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

New Filings To Court Of Appeals For Cruise Line Libertad Act US$439.2 Million Verdict. Arguing About Definition Of "Amici" And Planning For 2024 Request By Loser(s) For U.S. Supreme Court Review?

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES [Consolidated to 1:19-cv-23591; 1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District; 23-10171, 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. MSC CRUISES SA CO, AND MSC CRUISES (USA) INC. [Consolidated to 1:19-cv-23591; 1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District; 23-10171, 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [Consolidated to 1:19-cv-23591; 1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District; 23-10171, 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [Consolidated to 1:19-cv-23591; 1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District; 23-10171, 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

LINK: Libertad Act Title 3 Lawsuit Filing Statistics

LINK: Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee Carnival Corporation (6/30/23)

Excerpt: “Argument: Carnival did not use 'property' that was 'confiscated' from Havana Docks.  Havana Docks' limited concession did not confer a right to conduct passenger operations.  Havana Docks' concession would have expired in 2004.  Carnival did not engage in trafficking because its conduct was 'incident' and 'necessary' to 'lawful travel'.  Carnival's travel was 'lawful'- Carnival’s use of the termina was ‘necessary to” the conduct of its lawful travel.  Havana Docks is not a proper plaintiff because it is not a United States national.  At a minimum, the damages award should be set aside.  The 'one-satisfaction rule' prohibits duplicative awards for the value of the terminal.  The damages award violates the Due Process Clause.” 

LINK: Joint Brief For Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd., MSC Cruises S.A., MSC Cruises S.A. Co., And MSC Cruises (USA), Inc. (6/30/23) 

LINK: Brief Of The Chamber Of Commerce Of The United States Of America As Amicus Curiae In Support Of Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees And Reversal (7/7/23) 

LINK: Brief Of Amici Curiae U.S. Travel Association, United States Tour Operators Association, Inc., And American Society Of Travel Advisors, Inc., In Support Of Appellants/Cross-Appellees Brief Of Amici Curiae U.S. Travel Association, United States Tour Operators Association, Inc., And American Society Of Travel Advisors, Inc., In Support Of Appellants/Cross-Appellees (7/7/23) 

LINK: Brief For Amicus Curiae Peter Kucik, Former OFAC Official, In Support Of Appellants And Reversal (7/7/23) 

Excerpt: “BY IGNORING OFAC’S VIEWS, THE DISTRICT COURT GAVE THE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE TRAVEL EXCEPTION AN UNDULY NARROW READING.  OFAC manifestly meant for the people-to-people travel exception to apply broadly. By disregarding its views, the district court adopted an unnaturally crabbed reading of the provision and undermined the Executive’s leading role to conduct foreign policy toward Cuba.” 

LINK: Motion For Leave To File Brief Of Cruise Lines International Association As Amicus Curiae In Support Of Defendants-Appellants And Reversal (7/7/23) 

LINK: Opposition To Motion For Leave To File Amicus Brief Of Cruise Lines International Association (7/11/23) 

Excerpt: Havana Docks has no problem with the four appellants in this case rounding up as many amici as they wish, as long as those amici are independent of appellants. Thus, Havana Docks did not object to any of the other three amicus briefs filed in support of appellants. 2. Proposed amicus CLIA, however, does not meet even this minimal standard, because CLIA is not independent of appellants. Rather, as CLIA itself recognizes, “Defendants-Appellants … are four of the six voting members of [CLIA’s] Global Executive Committee, which voted to authorize and file the proposed brief.” CLIA Mot. 1 n.*. In other words, CLIA is not just a trade association that happens to include appellants among its members (as some of the other amici—the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and various travel-related associations—may be). Rather, CLIA is controlled by appellants, and (by CLIA’s own admission) appellants themselves “voted to authorize and file” the CLIA brief. Id. USCA11 Case: 23-10171 Document: 101 Date Filed: 07/11/2023 Page: 50 of 57 2 3. CLIA’s motion identifies no precedent in the history of American law where an entity controlled by a party has been allowed to file an amicus brief in support of that party. That omission is not surprising: an amicus brief filed by an entity controlled by a party provides no independent perspective, but instead simply allows that party to evade the court’s word limitations. If this brief is allowed, no logical stopping point would prevent amicus briefs filed by a party’s corporate subsidiaries, affiliates, or other controlled entities. 4. CLIA’s assertion that its “internal operations are not relevant to this motion,” id. at 5, can only be described as puzzling. No one is challenging CLIA’s “internal operations” per se. Rather, Havana Docks is simply pointing out that it would be an unprecedented abuse of the amicus process to allow an entity concededly controlled by certain litigants to file an amicus brief in support of those very same litigants. 5. Such abuse is particularly manifest here because the record developed below shows that appellants used CLIA as a joint defense group to coordinate their legal strategy in response to private lawsuits (like this one) filed under Title III of the LIBERTAD Act, Pub. L. No. 104- 114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996). As Bradley M. Rose, CLIA’s longtime outside USCA11 Case: 23-10171 Document: 101 Date Filed: 07/11/2023 Page: 51 of 57 3 General Counsel, explained in a declaration filed below, every CLIA member is required to sign an agreement known as the “CLIA Common Legal Interest Agreement” in an effort to bring their communications within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. See Carnival Dkt. (No. 19-21724) 318-40 at ECF pp. 3-4. As a joint defense group, CLIA “spearheaded” a “common legal strategy … related to challenging Title III, defending potential Title III litigation, and resolving Title III claims on behalf of its members.” 

LINK: Cruise Lines International Association’s Reply In Support Of Motion For Leave To File Brief As Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants And Reversal (7/18/23) 

Excerpt: Plaintiff-Appellee Havana Docks opposes CLIA’s motion, but its arguments lack merit. First, Havana Docks contends that Defendants-Appellants seek to use CLIA’s proposed brief to “evade the court’s word limitations.” ECF No. 101, at 2 (Opp.). Basic math refutes that claim. Each of the four Defendants-Appellants was entitled to file a separate brief of up to 13,000 words, for a total of 52,000 words. See Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(i). Even so, three of the Defendants-Appellants successfully sought leave to file a joint opening brief not to exceed 20,000 words—a reduction of 19,000 words as compared with the aggregate limit to which they were entitled. See ECF No. 76 (requesting leave); ECF No. 78 (granting leave). CLIA has its own arguments to make in the proposed amicus curiae brief—arguments the parties have not made and which do not reflect an attempt to exceed the aggregate word limits that Defendants-Appellants’ briefs don’t approach in the first place. Second, and relatedly, Havana Docks argues that the Court should deny leave to file because four of the six voting members of CLIA’s executive USCA11 Case: 23-10171 Document: 105 Date Filed: 07/18/2023 Page: 4 of 9 - 3 - committee are Defendants-Appellants in this case. Havana Docks thus argues that CLIA cannot provide an “independent perspective” on the issues in the case. Opp. 2. That objection is just another way of saying that CLIA shouldn’t be able to file an amicus brief because its and its members’ interests are aligned with Defendants-Appellants’. But that is often the case—as then-Judge Alito noted, “corporations, unions, trade and professional associations, and other parties with ‘pecuniary’ interests appear regularly as amici” before the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. Neonatology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 131-32; see also Prairie Rivers Network, 976 F.3d at 763 (“To be sure, the fiction that an amicus acts as a neutral information broker, and not an advocate, is long gone.”). Indeed, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require proposed amici to declare their “interest” in the case. Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(3)(A). As to the composition of CLIA’s executive board, the Court should not endorse Havana Docks’ attempt to use the fact that it has sued four of the six members of CLIA’s board as a reason to exclude the trade group that speaks for the entire industry. Third, Havana Docks incorrectly asserts that CLIA’s brief is duplicative of amicus curiae briefs filed by the U.S. Travel Association and a former official from the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Opp. 4. Neither of those USCA11 Case: 23-10171 Document: 105 Date Filed: 07/18/2023 Page: 5 of 9 - 4 - briefs provides the perspective of the cruise industry in particular—a focus of CLIA’s proposed brief. Nor do those briefs discuss the broader context of travel to Cuba between 2015 and 2017 to situate the cruise industry’s operations in the broader setting of the overall travel industry. CLIA’s brief highlights factual and historical nuance and explains the broader commercial context of this dispute. See Prairie Rivers Network, 976 F.3d at 763. Finally, Havana Docks relies on the district court’s denial of leave to file to urge the same result before this Court. Opp. 5. But the district court denied leave for reasons that do not apply here. For one thing, CLIA’s proposed brief before this Court discusses different issues than the brief CLIA proposed filing before the district court. CLIA’s proposed district court brief discussed the constitutional problems with Havana Docks’ interpretation of the LIBERTAD Act. See Dkt. No. 313-1, Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:19-CV-21724-BB (S.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2021). The district court denied leave on the grounds that the Defendants-Appellants had already addressed those constitutional issues in their summary judgment briefs. See Dkt. No. 358, at 2-3, Havana Docks Corp. (Oct. 15, 2021). Here, in contrast, CLIA’s proposed brief brings to the Court’s attention factual and historical context that no party or other amicus brief has raised. Moreover, CLIA’s interests in this USCA11 Case: 23-10171 Document: 105 Date Filed: 07/18/2023 Page: 6 of 9 - 5 - appeal are even stronger than its interests before the district court, because any decision from this Court will be binding on CLIA’s members throughout the Circuit. Given these stakes, there are good reasons for the Court to allow CLIA’s voice to be heard.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. District Court Dimisses Libertad Act Lawsuit Against Expedia, Booking, Hotels, Trivago, Orbitz. All About Timing.

MARIO DEL VALLE, ENRIQUE FALLA, MARIO ECHEVARRIA V. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, ORBITZ, LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING HOLDINGS INC.  Initial defendants were: TRIVAGO GMBH, BOOKING.COM B.V., GRUPO HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE I-5, AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22619 Southern Florida District; 20-12407 11th Circuit Court of Appeals] 

Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie, LLP (defendant)
Scott Douglass & McConnico (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

LINK To Order Granting Motion To Dismiss (8/10/23) 

LINK To Libertad Act Title 3 Lawsuit Filing Statistics

“The Court finds that Plaintiffs Falla and Pou cannot plead a claim for relief under the Helms Burton Act because they acquired claims after the Act’s claims bar date, which acts as a total bar to recovery. Further, the Court finds that all three of the Plaintiffs fail to adequately plead that the Defendants knowingly and intentionally trafficked in the confiscated properties. Because these findings are sufficient to determine that the third amended complaint must be dismissed and therefore dispositive, the Court declines to address the remainder of the parties’ arguments relating to the Act, its definitions, and application here.” 

“4. Conclusion: For the reasons stated above, the Court grants the Defendants’ joint motion to dismiss the complaint (ECF No. 112) and dismisses the third amended complaint, with prejudice. (ECF No. 100.) The Plaintiffs have had multiple opportunities to plead valid claims and knowing and intentional trafficking by the Defendants, but they have failed to do so. Further, the Plaintiffs have not requested leave to amend; nor have they indicated in their response to the Defendants’ motion any inclination whatsoever to do so. Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Industries Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court.”)  The Court will separately enter judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. The Clerk is directed to close this case. Any pending motions are denied as moot.”

Why Is USAID Administrator Samantha Power Risking Lawsuit For Failing To Disclose Data Sought By FOIA Request Filed In 2022 About PPE Deliveries In 2022 To Cuba.

USAID Administrator Samantha Power Risking Lawsuit For Failing To Disclose Data About PPE Deliveries In 2022 To Cuba. 

FOIA Filed In October 2022 And USAID Continues To Refuse To Provide Information 

What Is USAID Hiding?  

• 24 August 2023: “Thank you for your continued patience while we process your FOIA request. Unfortunately, USAID is experiencing a backlog of FOIA requests.  Please know that USAID management is very committed to providing responses to FOIA requests and remedying the FOIA backlog. I will provide you with an update on or before September 5, 2023.”

• 16 August 2023: “Thank you for your continued patience while we process your FOIA request. Unfortunately, USAID is experiencing a backlog of FOIA requests. Please know that USAID management is very committed to providing responses to FOIA requests and remedying the FOIA backlog. I will provide you with an update on or before August 23, 2023.”

• 17 July 2023: “Thank you for your continued patience. Additional search time is needed to complete your request. I will provide you with an update on or before July 31, 2023.” 

• 16 June 2023: “Greetings, Thank you for your continued patience.  Additional search time is needed to complete your request. I will provide you with an update on or before June 30, 2023.” 
  

• 24 May 2023: “Greetings, We are still working on your FOIA request and should have a response for you by June 14, 2023.” 

“This acknowledges receipt of your October 14, 2022, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).  Specifically, you requested all information about the following delivery in August 2022/September 2022/October 2022 from USAID of PPE to Cuba: 1) How was the donation delivered- air, vessel? 2) What is the brand/manufacturer of the PPE? 3) Was the delivery directly to a Republic of Cuba government-operated entity or through first the U.S. Embassy in Havana? 4) What was the U.S. Dollar value of the delivered 43 sets of PPE? 5) What is the U.S. Dollar value of the 57 sets of PPE to be delivered? 6) Did USAID use its government funding for the purchase(s)?   (Date Range for Record Search: From 08/01/2022 To 10/14/2022).  You also requested expedited processing and a fee waiver.

Expedited Processing: The FOIA provides that expedited processing is warranted if the request involves circumstances in which the lack of expedited processing could (1) reasonably be expected to pose an imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual, or (2) an urgency to inform the public about an actual or alleged federal government activity, if made by a person primarily engaged in disseminating information.  You indicated you requested expedited processing "because the public has an urgent and compelling need for information about the all information about the following delivery in August 2022/September 2022/October 2022 from USAID of PPE to Cuba: 1) How was the donation delivered- air, vessel? 2) What is the brand/manufacturer of the PPE? 3) Was the delivery directly to a Republic of Cuba government-operated entity or through first the U.S. Embassy in Havana? 4) What was the U.S. Dollar value of the delivered 43 sets of PPE? 5) What is the U.S. Dollar value of the 57 sets of PPE to be delivered? 6) Did USAID use its government funding for the purchase(s)?  (Date Range for Record Search: From 08/01/2022 To 10/14/2022).  After review of your justification, your request for expedited processing is denied.  Your rationale does not articulate an imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual, nor is it an urgency to inform the public.  Below is information on how to submit an appeal for this expedited processing denial.

Fee Waiver: The FOIA provides that fees should be waived or reduced if disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations and activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.  As a member of the media, the only applicable fee is duplication.  Duplication is $0.10 per page, but the first 100 pages are free.  After review of the fee waiver criteria, your fee waiver request is moot.  Since the only applicable fee is duplication, and USAID routinely furnishes responsive records to FOIA requesters in electronic format, it's most likely there will be no duplication fees to assess. 

Appeal rights: You have a right to appeal the denial of expedited processing.  Your appeal must be received by USAID no later than 90 days from the date of this communication.  To protect its workforce from COVID-19, USAID is implementing maximum telework.  Our FOIA professionals are therefore working from home and do not have access to postal mail and fax machine.  Please send your appeal to foia@usaid.gov, and address it to the Deputy Director of the Bureau for Management, Office of Management Services.  In addition, please include your tracking number in your email. 

Extending the FOIA’s Time Limits due to Unusual Circumstances: The FOIA provides that an agency  may extend its time limits when “unusual circumstances” occur in the processing of a request. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B)(i) (2016).  Those “unusual circumstances” are set forth in the statute, 5 U.S.C § 552(a)(6)(B)(iii), and are described as: 1) The need to search for records from field facilities or other locations separate from the office processing the request; 2) The need to search, collect and examine voluminous records; and 3) The need for consultation with another agency.   

Based upon the records you have requested, we have determined that one or more unusual circumstances will occur during the processing of your request.  Accordingly, your response time-limit has been extended beyond the 20 days required by statute; therefore, 10 additional processing days have been added to your request.  To mitigate this action, you may limit the scope of the request so that it can be processed more quickly or to arrange an alternative time to respond.” 

LINK: In Controversial Decision, Biden-Harris Administration Directs (Indirectly) US$2 Million In U.S. Taxpayer Funds To Cuba For Hurricane Ian Support. Some Members Of Congress Irate. October 18, 2022 

United States Department of State
Washington DC
18 October 2022

U.S. Support for Hurricane Ian Recovery Efforts in Cuba
Ned Price, Department Spokesperson

“Following the devastating impact of Hurricane Ian, the United States is providing to the Cuban people critical humanitarian aid to trusted international partners working directly with Cubans whose communities were devastated by the storm. The United States, through the U.S. Agency for International Development, will provide $2 million in funding for emergency relief to those in need in Cuba. The United States will work with trusted, independent organizations operating in the country who have a long presence in hurricane-affected communities. We are currently reviewing applications from organizations such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to provide this assistance. We stand with the Cuban people as they work to recover from this disaster. The United States will continue to monitor and assess humanitarian needs in coordination with our trusted partners and the international community, and we will continue to seek ways to provide meaningful support to the Cuban people, consistent with U.S. laws and regulations.”

Bruno Rodriguez, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba, using Twitter: "We appreciate humanitarian assistance offer made by the US. This material contribution that is worth 2 million USD, channelled through the International Federation of Red Cross, will add up to our recovery efforts in support of the victims of the ravages caused by #HurricaneIan."

United States Department of State
Washington DC
19 October 2022

Question Posed: “Prior to today's announcement that USAID was spending US$2 million in taxpayer funds for indirect assistance to Cuba, when was the last time that taxpayer funds were directed, directly or indirectly, by the United States government to Cuba?” 

United States Department of State
Washington DC
21 October 2022

“Thanks for the question and your patience. The following is offered on background and should be attributable to a State Department spokesperson: Each year since 1996, USAID and the Department of State have funded democracy programs that support human rights, fundamental freedoms, and democratic values in Cuba.  In September 2022, USAID provided personal protective equipment in response to diminished fire-fighting capacity following the large-scale oil fire at the Matanzas Oil Terminal.  In 2008, USAID provided $1.6 million to non-governmental organization (NGO) partners for emergency relief supplies in response to the impact of Hurricane Gustav.  USAID also funded emergency relief commodities through a disaster response cable for damages caused by hurricanes in 2004-2006.  USAID provided $50,000 for Hurricane Charley in 2004, $100,000 for Hurricane Dennis in 2005, and $100,000 for Hurricane Wilma in 2006.  Since early 2021, we have prioritized review of license applications to export privately sourced or donated goods to the Cuban people, focusing specifically on U.S. agricultural and medical exports to Cuba.”

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. Agricultural Commodity/Food Product Exports To Cuba Increased 3.7% In May 2023; Up 1.7% Year-To-Year.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
July 2023

May 2023 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 3.7%- 1
54th Of 221 May 2023 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 1.7%- 2
Cuba Ranked 55th Of U.S. 2023 Ag/Food Export Markets- 2
May 2023 Healthcare Product Exports US$11,190.00- 2
May 2023 Humanitarian Donations US$4,880,403.00- 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 17

MAY 2023 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 3.7%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in May 2023 were US$26,476,991.00 compared to US$25,514,586.00 in May 2022 and US$25,514,586.00 in May 2021. 

May 2023 exports included among other items: Waffles and Wafers; Coffee; Cookies; Powdered Milk; Beer; Toilet Paper; Chicken Leg Quarters (Frozen); Chicken Meat (Frozen); Chicken Legs (Frozen); Meat of Swine; Preserved Chicken Meat.

January 2023 through May 2023 TSREEA exports were US$123,188,456.00 compared to January 2022 through May 2022 exports of US$121,129,255.00. Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed: US$7,026,914,822.00.

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

In London, China Bank Proceeds With Lawsuit Against Cuba For Potential US$1.3 Billion. Another Plaintiff In London Received Legal Fees From Cuba- That Lawsuit Continues In Litigation..

"FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: CRF Makes Significant Progress in Legal Battle with Cuba

LONDON, UK — 28 June 2023 — CRF I Limited**, a significant holder of defaulted Cuban sovereign debt, today announced important progress in its ongoing legal battle with the Republic of Cuba and the Banco Nacional de Cuba (BNC).

1. Justice Cockerill Denies Cuba's Attempt to Appeal**: Justice Cockerill of the English High Court has rejected Cuba's appeal request in the litigation, affirming the court's original decision in favour of CRF I Limited (CRF). This decision is an important step forward for CRF, limiting Cuba's defensive options and significantly enhancing CRF's position in the case.

2. Cuba Faces Legal Action from ICBC**: In an unprecedented move, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, through ICBC Standard Bank has initiated legal proceedings against Cuba for approximately EUR1.1bn. This action follows significant pressure from CRF for ICBC to protect its interests as the custodian of CRF's Cuban assets. ICBC's decision to litigate against Cuba is a significant step forward for CRF and adds another dimension to Cuba's mounting legal challenges.

3. Cuba Compensates CRF for Legal Expenses**: In a recent development, the Cuban government has reimbursed CRF for the court ordered legal costs following CRF's initial victory in the UK High Court. This compensation acknowledges the validity of CRF's claims and is a positive indication for CRF and its investors.

CRF remains committed to protecting its interests and those of its investors. Despite the ongoing challenges, CRF continues to advocate for a fair resolution of the debt issue with the Cuban government.  But a negotiated outcome requires goodwill on both sides, and so far the Cuban side have declined to negotiate.

About CRF** CRF is an investment entity created specifically to invest in defaulted Cuban sovereign debt. It holds the largest known portfolio of such debt and is asserting its legal rights to recoup these debts in full. Contact Information- David Charters, Director, cuba.recovery@gmail.com

LINK TO MEDIA RELEASE IN PDF FORMAT

22-06-2023- Order by Judge for Permission/refusal to appeal before The Hon. Mrs Justice Cockerill   
19-04-2023- Order by Judge Order approved before The Hon. Mrs Justice Cockerill

LINK: Verdict By London Court In Cuba Debt Lawsuit: From Court- Money Remains Owed By Cuba, Cuba Lawfully Changed Assignment Process, Plaintiff Will Seek New Assignment. Another Year In Court? April 04, 2023

Court Judgement Excerpt: “CONCLUSIONS AND SERVICE OUT- 400. In conclusion: i) BNC consented on its own behalf to the assignment by ICBC to CRF of its rights and obligations under the Agreements; ii) It lacked capacity to consent on behalf of Cuba to the assignment by ICBC to CRF of its rights under the Guarantee; iii) Accordingly, the rights and obligations of ICBC under the Agreements were validly assigned to CRF, with the result that CRF is entitled to rely on the contractual provisions contained therein as to the jurisdiction of the English court, waiver of immunity and service of process.  401. I therefore find and declare that: i) BNC, on its own behalf, consented to the assignment of the debts represented by the Agreements by ICBC to CRF; ii) Accordingly, the debts represented by the Agreements have been validly assigned by ICBC to CRF; APPROVED JUDGMENT CRF v Banco 94 iii) The Court has jurisdiction to try the debt claims herein; iv) BNC is not immune from the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to the SIA; and v) The conditions for the service of the Claim Form out of the jurisdiction upon BNC have been satisfied.”

LINK TO 3-PAGE APPROVED JUDGEMENT (4 April 2023)

LINK TO 94-PAGE APPROVED JUDGEMENT IN PDF FORMAT (4 April 2023)

“London, UK, 4th April 2023
Cuba Defeated in English High Court by CRF
CRF I Limited v. Banco Nacional de Cuba and Republic of Cuba - CL-2020-000092 090

Following a landmark ruling by the English High Court in favour of CRF I Limited, Mr. David Charters, the Chairman of CRF provided a series of quotes for a press release, highlighting the company's commitment to ethical business practices and its intent to work closely with the Cuban government to reach a mutually beneficial solution.  Mr. Charters stated, "We are pleased that a Senior Judge in the English High Court has recognised CRF as a responsible creditor, and not a vulture fund, contrary to Cuban assertions. This decision reaffirms our commitment to conducting business in an ethical and responsible manner." 

Mr. Charters continued, "We have always maintained that the claims of bribery against CRF I Limited and our colleague Jeet Gordhandas were baseless, and we are pleased that this has been confirmed by a costs order against Cuba. We remain committed to upholding the highest standards of integrity and transparency in our business dealings."  In response to a prior recent statement from Cuban Justice Minister Silvera, Mr. Charters welcomed Cuba's recognition of CRF as a legitimate creditor: "We welcome the statement from Minister Silvera that Cuba will recognize our legitimate debts and legitimate creditors, as CRF is both. We look forward to working with the Cuban government to find a mutually beneficial solution." 

Emphasising CRF's commitment to supporting the Cuban economy, Mr. Charters added, "CRF remains committed to finding a solution with Cuba that has zero impact on its budget for at least 5 years, recognising the difficult economic situation the country is facing. We believe that a mutually beneficial solution can be reached through constructive dialogue and cooperation."  Addressing a technical point in the judgement, Mr. Charters concluded, "BNC was the Central Bank of Cuba and remains responsible for managing these unpaid Cuban debts. Cuba won a technical point in this judgement which we have already remedied and we do not expect this issue to impact the eventual final outcome, which is a complete victory for CRF."” 

"Further to our press release earlier this morning, please see below a further release by Rosenblatt: The Rosenblatt team - Harvey Rands, George Jackson, Madeleine Binkley and Tracy Tsao - is pleased to have obtained a landmark judgment establishing jurisdiction against Banco Nacional de Cuba in respect of Cuban sovereign debt held by their client CRF I Limited.  In judgment handed down yesterday, the Commercial Court held that CRF are a legitimate creditor of Cuban sovereign debt payable by Banco Nacional de Cuba, the former Cuban central bank, having agreed to an assignment of two debt positions from ICBC Standard Bank to CRF.  The court rejected Cuba’s contrived allegations both of bribery, and that CRF is a vulture fund. Cuba’s allegation of bribery was cynically maintained without foundation for two years before being dropped shortly before trial.  CRF may now proceed to a substantive trial to enforce recovery of the sovereign debt that it unequivocally owns. In the meantime, Banco Nacional de Cuba has been ordered to make a payment of £575,000 to CRF on account of costs.  The Republic of Cuba relied on Cuban law to establish that the Banco Nacional de Cuba could not consent to an assignment of Cuban sovereign debt on its behalf. Accordingly, CRF have now made an express request directly to the Republic of Cuba for consent to assign the underlying guarantees, which they have no ground to refuse in accordance with the judgment handed down.

Other Release Notes:  It's important to note that CRF has already re-filed and Cuba must accept the assignment or risk being deemed unreasonably withholding. Cuba has bought themselves 28 days.  CRF appears to be the clear winner in this situation, as it has a draft order for costs. This suggests that CRF has a strong case and is likely to come out on top.  Another important point to consider is that CRF is a bona fide creditor. This means that they have a legitimate claim to the funds in question, which strengthens their position in any legal proceedings.  Finally, it's worth noting that all creditors know exactly how to put Cuba in the crosshairs. This suggests that Cuba may face additional legal challenges in the future if they continue to withhold funds from CRF or other creditors. Ultimately, it's in Cuba's best interest to resolve this situation as quickly and fairly as possible."

Granma
Havana, Republic of Cuba
4 April 2023

República de Cuba gana pleito en Londres: CRF no es acreedor del Estado cubano
La sentencia acoge el planteamiento sostenido por la parte cubana durante el proceso y desestima la reclamación de CRF contra el Estado cubano

En audiencia desarrollada este martes 4 de abril (08.45 horas de Londres) en la Alta Corte de Inglaterra y Gales, la jueza Sara Cockerill notificó a los abogados de las partes la sentencia correspondiente a la demanda interpuesta por el fondo buitre CRF I Limited contra la República de Cuba y el Banco Nacional de Cuba (BNC).  La sentencia acoge el planteamiento sostenido por la parte cubana durante el proceso y desestima la reclamación de CRF contra el Estado cubano. La resolución judicial confirma que las irregularidades cometidas por funcionarios del BNC, sujetas a investigación penal primero y a sentencia judicial después, fueron motivos razonables para que el gobierno cubano negara su consentimiento en ceder la deuda a favor de CRF.  El documento afirma, tal como venía alegando la República de Cuba, que el BNC no cuenta con capacidad legal ni autoridad para representar al país. Ello ratifica que CRF es un extraño en los instrumentos financieros que reclamaba contra Cuba y no le asistía el derecho a establecer la demanda en Londres; la República de Cuba es, por tanto, inmune a la jurisdicción inglesa y no tiene obligación alguna de responder con su patrimonio ante esta demanda.  Como se ha explicado anteriormente, el objeto central del proceso judicial fue determinar si el tribunal inglés era competente para conocer la reclamación de CRF como acreedor del BNC y de la República de Cuba.  De acuerdo con la sentencia notificada esta mañana, CRF no es acreedor del Estado cubano, lo que significa que la República de Cuba queda fuera del pleito. En lo adelante el proceso continuará solamente contra el Banco Nacional de Cuba, quien tendrá derecho a establecer las reclamaciones que le permite la ley inglesa.  

Google Translate: “In a hearing held this Tuesday, April 4 (08:45 London time) at the High Court of England and Wales, Judge Sara Cockerill notified the lawyers for the parties of the judgment corresponding to the lawsuit filed by the vulture fund CRF I Limited against the Republic of Cuba and the National Bank of Cuba (BNC). The ruling accepts the approach sustained by the Cuban party during the process and dismisses the CRF claim against the Cuban State. The judicial resolution confirms that the irregularities committed by BNC officials, first subject to criminal investigation and later to a judicial sentence, were reasonable grounds for the Cuban government to deny its consent to assign the debt in favor of CRF. The document affirms, as the Republic of Cuba had been claiming, that the BNC does not have the legal capacity or authority to represent the country. This confirms that CRF is a stranger in the financial instruments that it claimed against Cuba and did not have the right to establish the claim in London; the Republic of Cuba is, therefore, immune to English jurisdiction and has no obligation to respond with its assets to this claim. As previously explained, the central purpose of the judicial process was to determine whether the English court was competent to hear the claim of CRF as a creditor of the BNC and of the Republic of Cuba. According to the sentence notified this morning, CRF is not a creditor of the Cuban State, which means that the Republic of Cuba is out of the lawsuit. From now on, the process will continue only against Banco Nacional de Cuba, who will have the right to establish the claims allowed by English law.”

LINK TO 94-PAGE APPROVED JUDGEMENT IN PDF FORMAT (4 April 2023)

On Monday, 23 January 2023, at 10:00 am in London, United Kingdom, an eight-day Jurisdiction Trial commenced with pre-reading for two days, 18 January 2023 and 19 January 2023.  The trial was held at the High Court of Justice, City Court House, Rolls Building, 7 Rolls Buildings, Fetter Ln, London EC4A 1NL. Presiding: Mrs. Justice Sara Cockerill.  

CRF I Limited (Cayman Islands), V. Banco Nacional de Cuba, The Republic of Cuba.  High Court of Justice, Business And Property Courts Of England And Wales, Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial Court [Part 7 Claim- General Commercial Contracts], Royal Courts of Justice. [CL-2020-000092 Filed 18 February 2020; Court Filing Fee £10,000.00 (approximately US$13,000.00].  

From Court Filing: “CRF is a company incorporated under the laws of the Cayman Islands. It was established to invest in defaulted Cuban sovereign debt.  CRF gradually acquired a portfolio of Cuban sovereign debt which was valued in the total principal sum of EUR189 million by 31 March 2016, and EUR1,200 million by 26 November 2017.  The majority of that portfolio, and the part that is relevant to these proceedings, was settled by way of risk participation at ICBC.  That is a common arrangement in the sovereign debt market.”   

Rosenblatt (plaintiff)
Memery Crystal (plaintiff- firm merged with Rosenblatt)
7 King’s Bench Walk (plaintiff)
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher UK LLP (previously for plaintiff)
PCB Byrne LLP (defendant)
Essex Court Chambers (defendant)
Uria Menendez (defendant)  

Links To Related Analyses 

Four Convicted Cubans Are Defense Witnesses In London Bank Trial; One From Prison. Actual Bribery No Longer Defense Strategy; Allegation Of Bribery Remains. Skeletons Tell All? January 18, 2023 

36 Months Of Litigation; US$5.8 Million On Attorneys By Cayman Islands-Based Plaintiff And Havana-Based Defendants, Now London Trial. KCs Lead Sides. Issues: Interpol Red Notice, Jurisdiction, Bribery Jan 13, 2023   

China-Owned Bank In London Sues Cuba Central Bank And Government Of Cuba. Either Sue For Custodian Account Holders Or Be Sued By Them? Embarrassing For Cuba To Be Sued By "Good Friend." December 21, 2021  

NOTE: On 28 May 2021, London, United Kingdom-based ICBC Standard Bank Plc filed a lawsuit against Banco Nacional de Cuba and the Government of the Republic of Cuba. The lawsuit (CL-2021-000343) was filed in the High Court of Justice, Commercial Court, Part 7 Claim, Central Commercial Contracts and Arrangements. ICBC Standard Bank Plc is represented by London, United Kingdom-based Herbert Smith Freehills LLP.  The defendants have no counsel listed.  The last update to the lawsuit was 22 November 2021.  The claim document has been completed, but has not been served.  No documents have been filed- and no documents could be filed for months.  LINK  Total amount of claim by ICBC Standard Bank Plc against Banco National de Cuba and Government of the Republic of Cuba is approximately 200 Million Euros (approximately US$224.8 million).  Total amount of interest is approximately 1 Billion Euros (approximately US$1.12 billion).  

Gibson Dunn & Crutcher (London) Represented Plaintiff In US$100 Million Lawsuit Against Cuba. Firm Represents Plaintiff In Libertad Act Lawsuits In Florida, New Jersey, Texas. China A Defendant. December 07, 2021  

UK Lawsuit Seeks US$100+ Million From Central Bank Of Cuba & Government Of Cuba. Four Countries. Three Banks.  Questions- Defining A "Loan" And Capacity To Contract. Read The 14 Court Filings. December 06, 2021