Maersk To Libertad Act Lawsuit Plaintiffs- Sue Cuba Not Us; You Don't Own The Port; Louisiana Has No Jurisdiction- Company Is Foreign

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL; EMMA RUTH BLANCO, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF ALFREDO BLANCO ROSELL, JR; HEBE BLANCO MIYARES, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF BYRON BLANCO ROSELL; SERGIO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, in his personal capacity, and as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF ENRIQUE BLANCO ROSELL; EDUARDO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF FLORENTINO BLANCO ROSELL; LIANA MARIA BLANCO; SUSANNAH VALENTINA BLANCO; LYDIA BLANCO BONAFONTE; JACQUELINE M. DELGADO; BYRON DIAZ BLANCO, JR.; MAGDELENA BLANCO MONTOTO; FLORENTINO BLANCO DE LA TORRE; JOSEPH E. BUSHMAN; CARLOS BLANCO DE LA TORRE; and GUILLERMO BLANCO DE LA TORRE VERSUS A.P. MOLLER-MAERSK A/S (a/k/a A.P. MOLLER-MAERSK GROUP); MAERSK A/S (a/k/a MAERSK LINE A/S); MAERSK, INC.; and MAERSK AGENCY U.S.A., INC [2:21-cv-00339 Eastern District of Louisiana].

Pusateri, Johnston, Guillot & Greenbaum, LLC (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)

Link To Motion To Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim (7/6/21)
Link To Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction (7/6/21)

Excerpts From Motion To Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim

As an initial matter, Article III standing is not established by the mere fact that Helms-Burton gives Plaintiffs a right to sue persons who traffic in confiscated property. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (“Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.”); see also Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc. No. 4:20-CV-482-A, 2020 WL 4464665, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2020) (dismissing plaintiff’s Helms-Burton claim based on his failure to establish Article III standing). “Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirement by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”

Plaintiffs primarily allege that in 1960, the Cuban government seized the Confiscated Property from the Blanco Rosell Siblings without compensation. (Compl. ¶¶ 2–5, 88, 93.) Plaintiffs further allege that the Cuban Government created ZEDM, built a container terminal allegedly incorporating the Confiscated Property, and subsuming their concession rights, and that, as a result, ZEDM traffics in the Confiscated Property. (Id. ¶¶ 95–103.)

Any injury from the alleged confiscation; creation, management, or control of the ZEDM, or the building of the Port of Mariel or its container terminal, is traceable only to the Cuban Government. Plaintiffs have no standing to sue Maersk, or anyone else, for an “injury that results from the independent action of [the Cuban Government which is] not before the court.” Simon, 426 U.S. at 41–42.

Plaintiffs do not allege that they own claims to the Port of Mariel or its container terminal, as required by Helms-Burton. Indeed, neither the port nor the terminal is part of the Confiscated Property—even as defined in the Complaint. (Compl. ¶ 4). Plaintiffs also fail to allege, because they cannot, that they had a right to use or benefit from either. This case is thus distinguishable from other Helms-Burton cases where the allegations were sufficient to allege Article III standing. For example, in Havana Docks, the plaintiff had a certified claim to “waterfront real property in the Port of Havana, Cuba, identified as the Havana Cruise Port Terminal[,]” which the plaintiff “owned, possessed, managed , and used . . . from 1917 until the Cuban Government confiscated it in 1960.” Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises SA Co., 484 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1187 (S.D. Fla. 2020). The complaint alleged that the defendant cruise line “use[d] the [Havana Cruise Port Terminal] by regularly embarking and disembarking their passengers on the [Havana Cruise Port Terminal]. Id. The court held standing existed because plaintiff was not receiving “the benefit of its interest in the [Havana Cruise Port Terminal] . . . .” Id. at 1992. By contrast, Plaintiffs have not suffered a “real” injury because they do not have a claim, certified or otherwise, to the Port of Mariel, its container terminal, or to any benefit arising from them.

Excerpts From Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction

a. Because Louisiana unquestionably is not a “paradigm forum” and none of the Maersk defendants is “at home” in the State of Louisiana, the exercise of general jurisdiction is impermissible.
b. Because the facts here fail to create the requisite “substantial connection” between the Maersk defendants, the State of Louisiana and plaintiffs’ Cuba-centric claims, specific jurisdiction likewise does not exist under the facts of this case.
IV. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) does not afford this Honorable Court personal jurisdiction over the foreign-country defendants, as the exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate the governing jurisdictional tenets.

Lawsuit Against Spain's Melia Hotels International Takes Another Turn... Government Of Spain Never Served Cuba. Repeat. Start Again.

On 29 May 2019, descendants of Mr. Rafael Lucas Sanchez Hill, acting as Central Santa Lucia L.C., filed a lawsuit in Spain seeking US$10 million from Palma de Mallorca, Spain-based Melia Hotels International S.A. (2019 revenues approximately US$2 billion) seeking damages for the use of land upon which a hotel is located in the Republic of Cuba. The lawsuit is not using provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).  

In June 2021, the presiding judge learned that due to a procedural administrative error of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain, the Republic of Cuba was not properly served with the lawsuit.  As a result, the government of the Republic of Cuba and Republic of Cuba government-operated Gaviota could not respond to the lawsuit as it had not been officially served.   

Thus, the 3 May 2021 order of the judge withdrawing the lawsuit for lack of inclusion of “an indispensable party” is nullified.  Likewise, the plaintiff appeal to the Provincial Court is nullified. 

The plaintiff must now again wait (which could take several months) for the government of Spain to officially transmit the lawsuit summons to the government of the Republic of Cuba and Republic of Cuba government-operated Gaviota.  One served, the government of the Republic of Cuba and Gaviota will to decide whether or not to appear in the lawsuit against Melia Hotels International S.A. 

If the government of the Republic of Cuba and Gaviota decide not to appear, the judge will again withdraw the lawsuit, plaintiffs will again appeal.  If the government of the Republic of Cuba and Gaviota appear, then the case will proceed before the same judge in the same venue: Court No. 24 in Palma de Mallorca. 

Links To Court Filings: 

Al Juzgado De Primera Instancia Número 24 De Palma De Mallorca (11 June 2021) 

Interlocutòria Nº 222/2021 (23 June 2021) 

Antecedents De Fet (23 June 2021) 

Links To Previous Posts: 

Judge Rules Against Plaintiffs In Non-Libertad Act Title III Lawsuit Against Spain's Melia Hotels; Lawsuit Will Continue May 04, 2021 

In Lawsuit Filed In Spain Against Melia Hotels, Plaintiff Argues That Government Of Cuba Is Not Required To Be A Defendant; Melia Hotels Says Otherwise February 10, 2021 

Court In Spain Requires Government Of Cuba And Gaviota Tourism Company Be Included In "Unjust Enrichment" Lawsuit Against Melia Hotels International January 16, 2021

Cuba Should Sign On To OECD 15% Minimum Corporate Income Tax Statement; Most Of Its Trading And Investment Sources Are Signers

The Miguel Diaz-Canel Administration (2019- ) should consider adopting soonest the 15% minimum corporate income tax framework announced on 1 July 2021 by the Paris, France-based Organisation For Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) with support from 139 country members who combined represent more than 90% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 

The Republic of Cuba’s goal with respect to corporate taxation should not to be an outlier.  The goal should be continuity with the global community, particularly as competition amongst countries will continue to increase and those with mainstream, transparent, and consistent corporate income tax policies will be magnets for opportunity while those eschewing continuity with the global community will be avoided.  The Republic of Cuba should embrace being amongst the majority because those in the minority will be subject to additional scrutiny rather than additional opportunities.  The issue is one of optics and substance. 

Although the Republic of Cuba is not among the thirty-nine members of the OECD, its primary commercial, economic, and political connectors are, among them: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, and United States; and Brazil, China, and India are Key Partners of the OECD. 

Significantly, among the 139 countries joining the Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges from the Digitalization of the Economy are the Republic of Cuba’s most important sources of commercial, economic, and political connectivity: China, France, Germany, Mexico, Russian Federation, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United States, and Vietnam.   

While the adoption by the Republic of Cuba of the 15% minimum corporate income tax may neither directly nor significantly impact today the Republic of Cuba, its adoption would 1) provide continuity and connectively to global taxation norms 2) align its corporate taxation code with the OECD, thus mainstream and 3) remove an obstacle for companies considering exporting to, importing from, or providing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as the more mainstream the Republic of Cuba is, the more aligned with its primary country market connectors, the fewer impediments for companies to overcome when determining whether a commercial relationship with the Republic of Cuba is worth the often considerable effort.   

China, Spain, Russia, and Vietnam signed the statement.  Without their commercial, economic, and political connectivity with the Republic of Cuba, the archipelago of 11.3 million citizens could not have the resources to remain today as it does.  The Diaz-Canel Administration should promptly join these countries and sign the statement.   

OECD
Paris, France
1 July 2021

130 Countries And Jurisdictions Join Bold New Framework For International Tax Reform  

130 countries and jurisdictions have joined a new two-pillar plan to reform international taxation rules and ensure that multinational enterprises pay a fair share of tax wherever they operate.  130 countries and jurisdictions, representing more than 90% of global GDP, joined the Statement establishing a new framework for international tax reform. A small group of the Inclusive Framework’s 139 members have not yet joined the Statement at this time.  The remaining elements of the framework, including the implementation plan, will be finalised in October. 

The framework updates key elements of the century-old international tax system, which is no longer fit for purpose in a globalised and digitalised 21st century economy.  The two-pillar package – the outcome of negotiations coordinated by the OECD for much of the last decade - aims to ensure that large Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) pay tax where they operate and earn profits, while adding much-needed certainty and stability to the international tax system. 

Pillar One will ensure a fairer distribution of profits and taxing rights among countries with respect to the largest MNEs, including digital companies. It would re-allocate some taxing rights over MNEs from their home countries to the markets where they have business activities and earn profits, regardless of whether firms have a physical presence there.  Pillar Two seeks to put a floor on competition over corporate income tax, through the introduction of a global minimum corporate tax rate that countries can use to protect their tax bases. 

The two-pillar package will provide much-needed support to governments needing to raise necessary revenues to repair their budgets and their balance sheets while investing in essential public services, infrastructure and the measures necessary to help optimise the strength and the quality of the post-COVID recovery.  Under Pillar One, taxing rights on more than USD 100 billion of profit are expected to be reallocated to market jurisdictions each year. The global minimum corporate income tax under Pillar Two - with a minimum rate of at least 15% - is estimated to generate around USD 150 billion in additional global tax revenues annually. Additional benefits will also arise from the stabilisation of the international tax system and the increased tax certainty for taxpayers and tax administrations. 

“After years of intense work and negotiations, this historic package will ensure that large multinational companies pay their fair share of tax everywhere,” OECD Secretary-General Mathias Cormann said. “This package does not eliminate tax competition, as it should not, but it does set multilaterally agreed limitations on it. It also accommodates the various interests across the negotiating table, including those of small economies and developing jurisdictions. It is in everyone’s interest that we reach a final agreement among all Inclusive Framework Members as scheduled later this year,” Mr Cormann said.  Participants in the negotiation have set an ambitious timeline for conclusion of the negotiations. This includes an October 2021 deadline for finalising the remaining technical work on the two-pillar approach, as well as a plan for effective implementation in 2023. Further information on the continuing international tax reform negotiations is also available at: https://oe.cd/bepsaction1. 

• LINK To OECD Website

• LINK To Statement (English)

• LINK To Statement (Spanish)

“The [OECD] is an international organisation that works to build better policies for better lives. Our goal is to shape policies that foster prosperity, equality, opportunity and well-being for all. We draw on 60 years of experience and insights to better prepare the world of tomorrow.  Together with governments, policy makers and citizens, we work on establishing evidence-based international standards and finding solutions to a range of social, economic and environmental challenges. From improving economic performance and creating jobs to fostering strong education and fighting international tax evasion, we provide a unique forum and knowledge hub for data and analysis, exchange of experiences, best-practice sharing, and advice on public policies and international standard-setting.”

Standard Bank
Johannesburg, South Africa
2 July 2021

Republic of Cuba 

• Company Tax: exempt for the first eight years, 15% rate from the ninth year.

• Tax Rate For Foreign Companies: Companies with total foreign ownership are taxed at a rate of 35%.  The income of foreign companies without a permanent establishment in the country are taxed at 4%, without any deduction.

• Capital Gains Taxation: Capital gains are taxed as ordinary corporate income.

• Main Allowable Deductions and Tax Credits: Deductible items include: the costs of production and goods sold, distribution and sales expenses, general and administrative expenses, operating expenses, financial expenses. Mandatory provisions are also tax-deductible.  Exemptions exist in certain cases: foreigners and franchise holders located in free-trade zones or industrial estates are exempt from tax on profits and labor force tax.

• Other Corporate Taxes: There is a payroll tax, a stamp tax, a road tax, an agricultural land tax (levied per hectare ranging from CUP 30 to CUP 120 based on the four designated types of land), a property tax (2%), a property transfer tax (1% to 4%), a tax on the use and exploitation of forestry and wild fauna (levied per hectare ranging from CUP 45 to CUP 180 based on the four designated types of land), a tax on the use of workforce (starting from 20% on the first year of employment to 5% on the fifth and consecutive years) and social security contributions (determined yearly by the state budget).  

• LINK To Johannesburg, South Africa-based Standard Bank Cuba Page

• LINK To Paris, France-based Groupe Credit du Nord Cuba Page

• LINK To Cuba Office Of Tax Administration

• LINK To Ernst & Young (EY) Presentation (Page 39) 

ThomsonReuters
London, United Kingdom
1 July 2021

PARIS, July 1 (Reuters) - Most of the countries negotiating a global overhaul of cross-border taxation of multinationals have backed plans for new rules on where companies are taxed and a tax rate of at least 15%, they said on Thursday after two days of talks.  The Paris-based Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, which hosted the talks, said a global minimum corporate income tax of at least 15% could yield around $150 billion in additional global tax revenues annually.  It said 130 countries, representing more than 90% of global GDP, had backed the agreement at the talks. 

New rules on where the biggest multinationals are taxed would shift taxing rights on more than $100 billion of profits to countries where the profits are earned, it added.  "With a global minimum tax in place, multinational corporations will no longer be able to pit countries against one another in a bid to push tax rates down," U.S. President Joe Biden said in a statement.  "They will no longer be able to avoid paying their fair share by hiding profits generated in the United States, or any other country, in lower-tax jurisdictions," he said.  One source close to the talks said it had taken tough negotiations to get Beijing on board. A U.S. administration official said there were no China-specific carveouts or exceptions in the deal. 

MINIMUM TAX 

The minimum corporate tax does not require countries to set their rates at the agreed floor but gives other countries the right to apply a top-up levy to the minimum on companies' income coming from a country that has a lower rate.  The Group of Seven advanced economies agreed in June on a minimum tax rate of at least 15%. The broader agreement will go to the Group of Twenty major economies for political endorsement at a meeting in Venice next week.  Technical details are to be agreed by October so that the new rules can be implemented by 2023, a statement from countries that backed the agreement said. 

The nine countries that did not sign were the low-tax EU members Ireland, Estonia and Hungary as well as Peru, Barbados, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sri Lanka, Nigeria and Kenya.  Holdouts risk becoming isolated because not only did all major economies sign up, but so did many noted tax havens such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands.  Irish Finance Minister Paschal Donohoe, whose country has attracted many big U.S. tech firms with its 12.5% corporate tax rate, said he was "not in a position to join the consensus," but would still try to find an outcome he could support. 

In the European Union, the deal will need an EU law to be passed, most likely during France's presidency of the bloc in the first half of 2022, and that will require unanimous backing from all EU members.  Welcoming the deal as the most important international tax deal reached in a century, French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire said he would try to win over those holding out.  "I ask them to do everything to join this historical agreement which is largely supported by most countries," he said, adding that all big digital corporations would be covered by the agreement. 

THRESHOLDS 

The new minimum tax rate of at least 15% would apply to companies with turnover above a 750-million-euro ($889-million) threshold, with only the shipping industry exempted.  The new rules on where multinationals are taxed aims to divide the right to tax their profits in a fairer way among countries as the emergence of digital commerce had made it possible for big tech firms to book profits in low tax countries regardless where they money was earned.  Companies considered in scope would be multinationals with global turnover above 20 billion euros and a pre-tax profit margin above 10%, with the turnover threshold possibly coming down to 10 billion euros after seven years following a review.  Extractive industries and regulated financial services are to be excluded from the rules on where multinationals are taxed.  Implementation of the deal could still prove rocky not least in the U.S. Congress, where Representative Kevin Brady, the top Republican on the tax-writing U.S. House Ways and Means Committee, described it as "a dangerous economic surrender that sends U.S. jobs overseas, undermines our economy and strips away our U.S. tax base." 

Foreign Policy Magazine
Washington DC
2 July 2021

A higher minimum. Developing countries are still pushing for a higher minimum. In a statement, the 37-member states of the African Tax Administration Forum accepted the agreement in principle but vowed to continue its campaign to increase the minimum rate to at least 20 percent. A higher rate is essential for African nations, the group said, pointing to the larger reliance on corporate tax revenues as a proportion of the overall tax take in their countries than in more wealthy nations. 

Shrinking tax rates. Still, it may help arrest a trend over the last several decades of declining corporate rates. According to the Tax Foundation, the average corporate tax rate globally was roughly 40 percent in 1980; that figure has dropped to 23.85 percent in 2020.

LINK TO THIS COMPLETE COUNCIL ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Cuba Owes Partner Canada's Sherritt International Corporation Tens Of Millions Of US Dollars. But, Both Cuba & Patient Company (And Shareholders) Anticipate Profitable Role With Electric Vehicles

Prensa Latina News Agency
Havana, Republic of Cuba
25 June 2021

Cuba Appreciates The Trust Of Canadian Businessmen 

Ottawa, Jun 25 (Prensa Latina) Cuba thanked the eve the trust of Canadian entrepreneurs who do business with the island despite the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States, diplomatic sources indicated.  The ambassador of Havana in Ottawa, Josefina Vidal, received on Thursday Leon Binedell, the new president and CEO of the Sherritt International Corp. company, and also David Pathe, who previously held that position.  In her Twitter account, the official expressed her gratitude to both of them for contributing to the economic development of the Caribbean country. 

On the island, Sherritt started a joint venture with the Cuban state since 1995, to exploit deposits and other investments in the energy sector existing until today.  The Comandante Pedro Sotto Alba-Moa Nickel S.A. plant, managed by Sherritt, exceeds its 101 percent nickel plus cobalt extraction plans, while compensating the limitations of another similar plant, Cuban authorities reported last December.  Currently, the Caribbean nation occupies the ninth place in the world in terms of nickel production and is the fifth global reserve of this metal and the third for cobalt. 

The Toronto-based firm maintains its business in Cuba despite the intensification of the US blockade with the activation of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act during the administration of former White House chief Donald Trump.  This measure, designed to curb foreign investment, allows the claim in United States courts of compensation for properties nationalized in Cuba when the Revolution triumphed in 1959.  However, the Cuban government maintains that foreign companies have total legal security based on Law 80 on the Reaffirmation of Cuban Dignity and Sovereignty, as well as other provisions adopted to guarantee foreign investments in the country. 

Sherritt International Corporation
Toronto, Canada
28 April 2021

SELECTED Q1 2021 HIGHLIGHTS · Adjusted EBITDA(1) was $30.2 million, up 602% from last year, and reflective of strong production totals at the Moa Joint Venture (Moa JV), improved nickel and cobalt prices, and reduced administrative costs. Q1’s Adjusted EBITDA total represents Sherritt’s highest since Q3 2018. · Sherritt’s share of finished nickel production at the Moa JV was 4,188 tonnes, up 9% from last year while Sherritt’s share of finished cobalt production was 477 tonnes, up 19%. The growth was largely attributable to high inventories of mixed sulphides at the refinery in Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta and improved refinery reliability. Production totals for Q1 2020 were adversely impacted by the disruption of mixed sulphides deliveries to the refinery caused by rail blockades in Canada and by extended transit times for shipping vessels from Cuba. · NDCC(1) at the Moa JV was US$3.83/lb, the lowest total since Q4 2019. · Received US$5 million in distributions from the Moa JV, indicative of improved nickel and cobalt market conditions. · Received US$5.7 million in Cuban energy payments. Sherritt anticipates continued variability in the timing of collections through the remainder of 2021, and is working with its Cuban partners to ensure timely receipts. · Received a $20.3 million prepayment against nickel deliveries in 2021. The prepayment is consistent with Sherritt’s efforts to enhance its liquidity. 

Collections against overdue amounts owed to Sherritt by its Cuban energy partners in Q1 were adversely impacted by a combination of factors, including the ongoing effects of U.S. sanctions against Cuba, Cuba’s reduced access to foreign currency on account of the global pandemic, and the country’s launch of a currency unification process. Total overdue scheduled receivables at March 31, 2021 were US$154.2 million, up from US$145.9 million at December 31, 2020. Subsequent to quarter end, Sherritt received US$4.5 million in Cuban energy payments. Sherritt anticipates variability in the timing and the amount of energy payments through the remainder of 2021, and continues to work with its Cuban partners to ensure timely receipt of energy payments. 

During the quarter, US$5.7 million of Cuban energy payments were received compared to US$30.1million in the fourth quarter of 2020.   

Cuban energy payments were lower than the agreed-upon payments as COVID-19 and ongoing impact of U.S. sanctions limited Cuba’s access to foreign currency, in addition to the impact of currency unification. Further information on Cuban currency unification is included in note 10 of the Corporation’s condensed consolidated financial statements for the three months ended March 31, 2021.  

Sherritt anticipates variability in the timing and the amount of energy payments through the remainder of 2021 and continues to work with its Cuban partners to ensure timely receipt of energy payments. 

The Corporation’s cash balances are deposited with major financial institutions rated A-or higher by Standard and Poor’s except for institutions located in Cuba that are not rated.  

The total cash held in Cuban bank deposit accounts was $78.6 million as at March 31, 2021 (December 31, 2020 -$80.0 million). As at March 31, 2021, $74.4 million of the Corporation’s cash and cash equivalents was held by Energas (December 31, 2020 -$75.0 million). These funds are for use locally by the joint operation and will be transferred to the Corporation upon foreign exchange approval.  

On January 1, 2021, the Cuban government unified its two currencies and discontinued use of the Cuban convertible peso (CUC), with a six-month transition period for the CUC to be phased out of the economy. The Cuban peso (CUP) remains as the sole Cuban currency at a current exchange rate of 24 CUP:US$1. Further legislation and regulation may be enacted in 2021 as the Cuban government evaluates the impact of the currency unification process.  

There was no impact to the functional currencies of the Corporation’s Cuban entities as a result of currency unification and the U.S. dollar remains the functional currency of these Cuban entities.  

While receipts of overdue amounts owed to the Corporation during the three months ended March 31, 2021 were lower than the agreed-upon payments, in part due to currency unification, the Corporation expects this delay in repayment to be temporary while the Cuban government transitions to a single currency.  

During the three months ended March 31, 2021, the Corporation also incurred lower labour and other service costs at its Cuban entities as a result of Cuban currency unification. The Corporation continues to monitor the impact of currency unification on its Cuban operations. All Cuban receivables remain owing to the Corporation and are denominated in U.S. dollars. 

Finished nickel and cobalt production at the Moa Joint Venture and Fort Site during the three months ended March 31, 2021wasnot materially impacted by COVID-19. While cobalt market conditions have improved since the start of 2021, some near-term volatility is expected as a result of the continued negative impact of COVID-19 on the global economy. Receipts of Cuban energy payments from the Oil and Gas and Power segments were limited as COVID-19and ongoing impact of U.S. sanctions limited Cuba’s access to foreign currency during the three months ended March 31, 2021, in addition to the impact of Cuban currency unification. The timing and amount of receipts of Cuban energy payments is dependent upon Cuba’s economy and access to foreign currency. 

Sherritt International Corporation
Toronto, Canada
8 June 2021

Sherritt Receives US$28 Million in Distributions; Reschedules Refinery Shutdown to Q3

TORONTO--(BUSINESS WIRE)-- Sherritt International Corporation (“Sherritt”) (TSX:S), a world leader in the mining and refining of nickel and cobalt, today announced that it has received a combined total of US$28 million in distributions as a result of the latest dividend declared by the Moa Joint Venture (“Moa JV”).  

The combined total consists of Sherritt’s 50% share of the distribution, or US$14 million, and US$14 million re-directed by the General Nickel Company, Sherritt’s joint venture partner, from its 50% share to be applied against amounts owed to Sherritt from Energas. Through June 4, Sherritt has received a total of US$33 million in distributions from the Moa JV in 2021.  

“The receipt of 100% of dividends declared by the Moa JV is indicative of strong operational performance and improved nickel and cobalt prices in 2021,” said Leon Binedell, President and CEO of Sherritt International. “Just as important, it demonstrates the flexibility and resourcefulness of our Cuban partners in addressing overdue amounts owed in light of the economic challenges the country faces as a result of ongoing U.S. sanctions and the impact of COVID-19.”  The Corporation also announced that its planned full-facility maintenance shutdown of the refinery in Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta will be deferred to August from the previously scheduled June period to mitigate the risk of COVID-19 on employee and contractor health and safety.  

“Ensuring the health and safety of our employees and the communities in which we operate are of paramount importance,” Mr. Binedell said. “While the number of local COVID-19 cases is declining and vaccinations accelerating, we elected to take extra caution and deferred the plant-wide maintenance shutdown until the third quarter. Although this rescheduling will not impact our guidance for the year, it will result in finished production totals to be higher in Q2 and lower in Q3 than previously anticipated.”  Consistent with previous disclosure, Sherritt’s full-facility shutdown will last approximately 11 days and include all of the refinery and utility plants. Sherritt’s guidance for 2021 production, unit cost and capital spend at the Moa JV will not be impacted by the rescheduling of the shutdown.  

Forward-Looking Statements 

This press release contains certain forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements can generally be identified by the use of statements that include such words as “believe”, “expect”, “anticipate”, “intend”, “plan”, “forecast”, “likely”, “may”, “will”, “could”, “should”, “suspect”, “outlook”, “potential”, “projected”, “continue” or other similar words or phrases. Specifically, forward-looking statements in this document include, but are not limited to, statements regarding rescheduled shutdown timing and anticipated production, unit cost and capital spend at the Moa JV. 

Forward looking statements are not based on historical facts, but rather on current expectations, assumptions and projections about future events, including commodity and product prices and demand; the level of liquidity and access to funding; production results; realized prices for production; rehabilitation provisions; availability of regulatory and creditor approvals and waivers; compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations; and certain corporate objectives, goals and plans. By their nature, forward looking statements require the Corporation to make assumptions and are subject to inherent risks and uncertainties. There is significant risk that predictions, forecasts, conclusions or projections will not prove to be accurate, that those assumptions may not be correct and that actual results may differ materially from such predictions, forecasts, conclusions or projections. 

The Corporation cautions readers of this press release not to place undue reliance on any forward looking statement as a number of factors could cause actual future results, conditions, actions or events to differ materially from the targets, expectations, estimates or intentions expressed in the forward looking statements.  

These risks, uncertainties and other factors include, but are not limited to, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic; changes in the global price for nickel, cobalt, oil and gas, fertilizers or certain other commodities; level of liquidity; access to capital; access to financing; the risk to Sherritt’s entitlements to future distributions from the Moa Joint Venture; risks associated with the Corporation’s joint venture partner; variability in production at Sherritt’s operations in Cuba; risks related to Sherritt’s operations in Cuba; risks related to the U.S. government policy toward Cuba, including the U.S. embargo on Cuba and the Helms-Burton legislation; potential interruptions in transportation; uncertainty of gas supply for electrical generation; the Corporation’s reliance on key personnel and skilled workers; the possibility of equipment and other failures; risks associated with mining, processing and refining activities; uncertainty of resources and reserve estimates; the potential for shortages of equipment and supplies, including diesel; supplies quality issues; risks related to environmental liabilities including liability for reclamation costs, tailings facility failures and toxic gas releases; risks related to the Corporation’s corporate structure; political, economic and other risks of foreign operations; risks associated with Sherritt’s operation of large projects generally; risks related to the accuracy of capital and operating cost estimates; foreign exchange and pricing risks; compliance with applicable environment, health and safety legislation and other associated matters; risks associated with governmental regulations regarding climate change and greenhouse gas emissions; risks relating to community relations and maintaining the Corporation’s social license to grow and operate; credit risks; competition in product markets; risks in obtaining insurance; uncertainties in labour relations; uncertainty in the ability of the Corporation to enforce legal rights in foreign jurisdictions; uncertainty regarding the interpretation and/or application of the applicable laws in foreign jurisdictions; legal contingencies; identification and management of growth opportunities; uncertainty in the ability of the Corporation to obtain government permits; risks to information technologies systems and cybersecurity; failure to comply with, or changes to, applicable government regulations; bribery and corruption risks, including failure to comply with the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act or applicable local anti-corruption law; the ability to accomplish corporate objectives, goals and plans for 2021; and the Corporation’s ability to meet other factors listed from time to time in the Corporation’s continuous disclosure documents. Additional risks, uncertainties and other factors include, but are not limited to, the ability of the Corporation to achieve its financial goals; the ability of the Corporation to implement and successfully achieve its business priorities; and the ability of the Corporation to comply with its contractual obligations, including, without limitation, its obligations under debt arrangements. Readers are cautioned that the foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive and should be considered in conjunction with the risk factors described in this press release and in the Corporation’s other documents filed with the Canadian securities authorities, including without limitation the Management’s Discussion and Analysis for the three months ended March 31, 2021 and the Annual Information Form of the Corporation dated March 17, 2021 for the year ended December 31, 2020, which is available on SEDAR at www.sedar.com. 

The Corporation may, from time to time, make oral forward-looking statements. The Corporation advises that the above paragraph and the risk factors described in this press release and in the Corporation’s other documents filed with the Canadian securities authorities should be read for a description of certain factors that could cause the actual results of the Corporation to differ materially from those in the oral forward-looking statements. The forward-looking information and statements contained in this press release are made as of the date hereof and the Corporation undertakes no obligation to update publicly or revise any oral or written forward-looking information or statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by applicable securities laws. The forward-looking information and statements contained herein are expressly qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement.

LINK TO 6-Page Report From Sherritt International Corporation- Nickel: The Critical Metal That Will Drive the Electric Vehicle Revolution

U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 44.5% In May 2021; Up 64.9% Year-To-Year

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
July 2021

May 2021 Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Increase 44.5%- 1
50th Of 221 May 2021 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 64.9%- 2
Cuba Ranked 50th Of 2021 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets- 2
May 2021 Healthcare Product Exports US$0.00- 2
May 2021 Humanitarian Donations US$1,787,739.00- 3
2021 Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 16

MAY 2021 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 44.5%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in May 2021 were US$29,848,778.00 compared to US$20,650,953.00 in May 2020 and US$27,657,054.00 in May 2019.

May Exports Included: Chicken Leg Quarters (Frozen); Chicken Meat (Frozen); Chicken Legs (Frozen); Soybeans; Woodpulp; Wine; Beans; Protein Concentrates.

January 2021 through May 2021 exports were US$130,685,900.00 compared to US$76,728,924.00 for the period January 2020 through May 2020.

Since December 2001, agricultural commodity and food product exports reported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba is US$6,426,913,324.00.

This report contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

LINK To Complete Report In PDF Format

Cuba Has 259 References In 664-Page United States 2021 Trafficking In Persons Report

United States Department of State
Washington DC
1 July 2021

The 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report marked the first time the U.S. Department of State applied this new provision, finding 12 governments had a “policy or pattern” of trafficking, including: Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Russia, South Sudan, Syria, and Turkmenistan.

The 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report includes the following 11 governments with a documented “policy or pattern” of human trafficking, trafficking in government-funded programs, forced labor in government-affiliated medical services or other sectors, sexual slavery in government camps, or the employment or recruitment of child soldiers: Afghanistan, Burma, China, Cuba, Eritrea, North Korea, Iran, Russia, South Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan

Tier 3: Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, China, Comoros, Cuba, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, North Korea, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Russia, South Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Venezuela

The Government of Cuba does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Cuba remained on Tier 3. During the reporting period, there was a government policy or government pattern to profit from labor export programs with strong indications of forced labor, particularly its foreign medical missions program. Despite the lack of significant efforts, the government took some steps to address trafficking. Some reports indicated the government continued training law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges on trafficking crimes. However, in 2020, the government capitalized on the pandemic by increasing the number and size of medical missions and refused to improve the program’s transparency or address labor violations and trafficking crimes despite persistent allegations from observers, former participants, and foreign governments of Cuban officials’ involvement in abuses.

The government failed to inform participants of the terms of their contracts, which varied from country to country, confiscated their documents and salaries, and threatened medical professionals and their family members if participants left the program. Within Cuba, the government did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting trafficking crimes. Authorities did not report identifying victims and lacked a comprehensive package of housing and other services for victims and did not protect potential trafficking victims from being detained or charged for unlawful acts their traffickers coerced them to commit. The government did not criminalize all forms of forced labor or sex trafficking.

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT

Arkansas Senator Boozman Will Re-introduce Legislation To Permit Payment Terms And Financing For U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba. He Should Wait Until There Are Contracts In Place.

Will Arkansas Senator Boozman And Supporters Learn From Previous Legislative Strategies?
Will Arkansas Companies Provide Payment Terms? Embarrassing If Not
Will Arkansas Bank Provide Financing For Transactions? Embarrassing If Not
Essential For Use Confirmation Prior To Introducing Legislation
No Need To Hurry- Focus First On Getting Everything Supportive In Place
Direct Correspondent Banking Remains An Integral Component

The Honorable John Boozman (R- Arkansas) a two-term member of the United States Senate who is anticipated to seek re-election in November 2022, plans to re-introduce legislation to change cash-in-advance payment terms required by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 for United States agricultural commodity and food product exports to the Republic of Cuba.   

Senator Boozman is the ranking member of the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.  Senator Boozman is a member of the Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. 

Three companies in the State of Arkansas with connectivity to the Republic of Cuba include Springdale, Arkansas-based Tyson Foods (2020 revenues approximately US$43 billion); Stuttgart, Arkansas-based Riceland Foods (2020 revenues approximately US$1.3 billion); and Conway, Arkansas-based Home BancShares (2020 assets approximately US$17 billion) among others.  Will Senator Boozman ensure each of the three have statements of support issued in conjunction with the introduction of legislation? 

Absent a compelling narrative to precisely demonstrate how benefits of a statutory change to the cash-in-advance payment terms for agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba will immediately be measurable, quantifiable, and visible, proponents within the United States Congress and outside of the United States Congress will find a legislative highway robust with bipartisan obstacles. 

Learn From The Past 

The public roll-out of legislation should include contingent executed contracts between United States exporters (including at least one United States financial institution) and Republic of Cuba government-operated Empresa Comercializadora de Alimentos (Alimport), the primary contracting entity for agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.   

Executed contingent contracts are permitted by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.   

Proponents of legislation would be wise to placate opponents by including a provision in the legislation requiring a first-year semi-annual report from the BIS to appropriate committees of the United States Congress.  The reports would include whether payment terms or financing provided to Republic of Cuba entities by United States exporters and United States financial institutions are in arrears.  This is an unappealing and commercially intrusive provision, but may be an appropriate additive to placate opponents.    

The following are examples of executed contingent contracts with payment term laddered transactions which should be negotiated promptly and ideally executed and then confirmed in tandem with the introduction of legislation.  The execution of these contracts will serve as confidence-building mechanisms for United States exporters and for the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

• An executed contingent contract for poultry valued at US$1 million whereby the United States exporter will provide Alimport with payment terms of fifteen (15) days.  

• An executed contingent contract for corn valued at US$1 million whereby the United States exporter will provide Alimport with payment terms of thirty (30) days.  

• An executed contingent contract for soybeans valued at US$1 million whereby the United States exporter will provide Alimport with payment terms of forty-five (45) days.  

• An executed contingent contract for woodpulp valued at US$1 million whereby the United States exporter will provide Alimport with payment terms of sixty (60) days.  

• An executed contingent contract for rice valued at US$1 million whereby the United States exporter will provide Alimport with payment terms of ninety (90) days.  

• An executed contingent contract for pork valued at US$1 million whereby a United States financial institution will provide directly to Alimport or indirectly through the United States exporter with payment terms of one hundred twenty (120) days.  

This last executed contingent contract is essential because it includes the participation of a financial institution.  Would today Greenwich Village, Colorado-based CoBank (2020 assets approximately US$159 billion), Conway, Arkansas-based Home BancShares (2020 assets approximately US$17 billion), or New York, New York-based J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (2002 assets approximately US$3 trillion) for example provide financing to a United States exporter for a transaction relating to the Republic of Cuba?   

Will CoBank or Home BancShares or J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. among others provide direct or indirect financing based upon the financial statements provided by Alimport?  Will Alimport (https://www.alimport.com.cu) provide financial statements?  Will Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions provide financial statements?  

Instructive to note that Government of Vietnam-operated Vinafood 1 & Vinafood 2 have provided payment terms to Alimport of two years to pay for rice (25%/30% broken).  Not unique for non-United States companies exporting products to the Republic of Cuba to anticipate waiting up to one year or more than one year for payment from Republic of Cuba government-operated entities; and to factor these delays into their pricing. 

Importance Of Direct Correspondent Banking To Changing Payment Terms 

In 2017, Home BancShares through its Centennial Bank subsidiary purchased Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank (2017 assets approximately US$2.9 billion).  In 2015, the OFAC authorized Stonegate Bank to have an account with Republic of Cuba government-operated Banco Internacional de Comercia SA (BICSA).  However, because the Obama Administration would not authorize BICSA under a general or specific license from the OFAC to have an account with Stonegate Bank, United States export-related funds were sent and received through Panama City, Panama-based Multibank, which had extensive dealings with the Republic of Cuba before its purchase in 2020 by Bogota, Colombia-based Banco de Bogota (2002 assets approximately U$56 billion) when all activities ceased relating to the Republic of Cuba.   

Without bilateral direct correspondent banking accounts, the payment process for funds from the United States to the Republic of Cuba and from the Republic of Cuba to the United States remains triangular rather than a straight line- which would be more efficient, more secure, more transparent, more timely (same day versus two or more days), and less costly.

TSREEA Background 

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash-in-advance basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992.  Healthcare products are not subject to the cash-in-advance payment requirement. 

Since the first TSREEA-authorized exports in December 2001 (corn and poultry), United States agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba is US$6,426,913,324.00 through 31 May 2021.   

Products exported consistently include chicken leg quarters, chicken meat, chicken legs, soybeans, soybean oil cake, soybean oil, corn, phosphates, woodpulp, herbicides, brewing/distilling dregs, pork, wheat, powered milk, rice, and peas & lentils, among others.  LINK To U.S. Export History 

Learning From 2018 Farm Bill 

The necessity for executed contingent contracts to accompany the public roll-out of any legislation is to learn from the disastrous legislative strategy in 2018 when legislative advocates maintained that inserting a Market Access Program (MAP) and Foreign Market Development (FMD) provision in the Farm Bill was critical to “laying the groundwork” for increasing exports of agricultural commodities and food products to the Republic of Cuba.  Statements from members of Congress included: “… an important first step to regaining our presence in Cuba.”  Yet, there was not one application to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 2018 or 2019- and since 2019 a total of eight applications were received by the USDA to use MAP and/or FMD.   

Most observers of the legislative process reasonably concluded that legislative advocates- within the United States Congress and organizations located in Washington DC and located outside of the beltway would have prominently teed-up at least one high-profile applicant to publicize in advance they would use the provision if it became law or at least one high-profile applicant to immediately and publicly request funding when the Farm Bill became law on 21 December 2018.   

The most significant impact of a shockingly low number of MAP/FMD requests in 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 is what the lack of interest portends for other legislative efforts in the United States Congress to rescind prohibitions upon the provision of payment terms for agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  Since 2019, a total of eight applications were received by the USDA to use MAP and/or FMD. 

MAP & FMD Programs At USDA 

In 2018, legislative advocates maintained that inserting a Market Access Program (MAP) and Foreign Market Development (FMD) provision in the Farm Bill was critical to “laying the groundwork” for increasing exports of agricultural commodities and food products to the Republic of Cuba.  Statements from members of Congress included: “… an important first step to regaining our presence in Cuba.”  Yet, there was not one application to the USDA in 2018 or 2019.   

Most observers reasonably concluded that legislative advocates- within the United States Congress and organizations located in Washington DC and located outside of the beltway would have prominently teed-up at least one high-profile applicant to publicize in advance they would use the provision if it became law or at least one high-profile applicant to immediately and publicly request funding when the Farm Bill became law on 21 December 2018.   

The most significant impact of a shockingly low number of MAP/FMD requests in 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 is what the lack of interest portends for other legislative efforts in the United States Congress to rescind prohibitions upon the provision of payment terms for agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.   

Use to date of USDA MAP/FMD Republic of Cuba-focused funding provisions in the 2018 Farm Bill has been anemic.  Since 2018, One entity has used MAP funding in the Republic of Cuba.  No entity has used FMD funding in the Republic of Cuba.  The USDA reported no applications were rejected.   

Since 2019, a total of eight applications were received by the USDA to use MAP and/or FMD.  According to the USDA, “Although the table indicated nine expressions of interest over two years, these represent fewer than nine organizations as some of the organizations applied in multiple years.  The earlier table only included those entities that expressed interest in Cuba directly, not anyone that sought to add Cuba to a regional program.”    

According to the USDA, at least one participant in 2021 and 2020 sought to add the Republic of Cuba to a regional program for MAP, but none for FMD.  No entity pursued or was rejected for activities in the Republic of Cuba through a regional program.  In some respects, that some entities applied more than once, but did not ultimately use MAP and/or FMD in the Republic of Cuba is more consequential because it begs the question- why did the entities apply, but not choose to use MAP and/or FMD in the Republic of Cuba?  

One entity received MAP funding (US$60,000.00) in the Republic of Cuba- Denver, Colorado-based Potatoes USA which in November 2020 delivered to the Republic of Cuba 33,118 pounds of potato seeds valued at US$44,760.00.  Sample costs are ineligible for MAP or FMD funding.  

In 2020, one (1) entity applied to use, but did not use FMD funding and four (4) entities applied to use MAP funding while one (1) entity (Potatoes USA) used MAP funding.  From the USDA, “… any unspent funds would normally remain in participants’ agreements, available for the agency to approve for plans a participant submits in a future year.”     

In 2021, no entity applied to use FMD funding, and three entities applied to use MAP funding, but no entity has yet used MAP funding.  From the USDA, “Most MAP programs operate on a January to December year, however, some run on a July to June year.   

The regulations allow groups to continue already approved activities up to thirty days after the end of the program year.  Thus, the latest a participant could continue an activity funded by MAP 21 would be July 30, 2022, if their MAP 21 program began June 1, 2021.  A participant would have until the end of January 2022, if their MAP program began January 1, 2021.  The MAP regulations allow a participant to file claims up to six months after the end of the program year.”  In 2021, sixty-seven (67) entities received funding for MAP and twenty-one (21) entities received funding for FMD.  

LINK TO THIS COMPLETE 4-PAGE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

LINK To Previous Analysis: USDA Accepting MAP/FMD Applications For Funding Use In Cuba; Since 2018, Only 8 Applications And 1 Use May 05, 2021

U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken Discusses Cuba While In Italy- Theme Continues To Be "empower"

United States Department of State
Washington DC
29 June 2021

Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Lucia Duraccio of RAI TG1

QUESTION: The last question is about Cuba. A few days ago, United States voted against the UN resolution to end the Cuba embargo. It has been the – if I remember well – 29th time —

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: — while 184 countries voted yes. Why Cuba is still the enemy? I mean, the dialogue begun by Former President Obama is over forever?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: We’re in the midst of reviewing our Cuba policy. We’ve – President Biden’s been in office for about six months. There have been a lot of things on our plate. He focused immediately on revitalizing our relationships with our partners and allies, like Italy, re-engaging in multilateral institutions – rejoining the Paris Climate Agreement, re-engaging with the World Health Organization, convening a summit of leaders on climate. And then, of course, we’ve had the G7, which has made very important progress with all of our countries working together. On COVID, a billion vaccines for the world, working to – on climate, to prevent the financing of coal-fired plants, the biggest contributor to global emissions. A very strong and important agenda, both bilaterally with our closest partners and multilaterally in these international organizations.

And so there’s only so much you can do in six months’ time, so one of the things that we’re looking very hard at right now is the policy toward Cuba. It’s under review. I can tell you that as a matter of basic principle, the – any policy we pursue would have democracy and human rights at its heart, and we would want to make sure that we’re doing whatever we can to empower the Cuban people to decide their own future.

QUESTION: I know human rights are important also about Cuba, but you talk to Saudi Arabia, to Turkey. Maybe dialogue is necessary to improve the condition of people, Cuban people?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: We’ve never resisted dialogue anywhere. The question is: What is the overall policy? And that’s what we’re reviewing. We’ve done that in a number of areas. We spent some months reviewing our policy toward North Korea, for example, and announced that policy just a few weeks ago. We’re doing the same on Cuba.

U.S. Department Of State Transforms Approximately US$172 Million In 2020 Into “billions of dollars’ worth of exports”? An Exaggeration? Yes. Deceptive? Definitely. A Lie? Close.

Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations
New York, New York
23 June 2021

Mr. Rodney Hunter- Minister Counselor Political Affairs 

“Every year we authorize billions of dollars’ worth of exports to Cuba, including food and other agricultural commodities, medicines, medical devices, telecommunications equipment, other goods, and other items to support the Cuban people.” 

A statement lacking appropriate context such as the one delivered on 23 June 2021 is not unique to the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ).  The theme is familiar to statements delivered during the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021), Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), Bush-Cheney Administration (2001-2009), and Clinton-Gore Administration (1993-2001). 

The use of the phrase “we authorize” is deliberately crafted to suggest an exercise of benevolence by the government of the United States. 

The use of the phrase “billions of dollars’ worth of exports to Cuba,” is far more egregious as the goal is to suggest that the Republic of Cuba is a beneficiary of, once again, benevolence by the government of the United States. 

During the Bush-Cheney Administration was created the authorization for United States exporters (paid exports and donated exports) to add value to a specific license application or notification- so that the exporters would not continue to seek licenses which would burden the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.  BIS licenses are generally valid for two years.  As a result, license applications and notifications became in part based upon statements by the importer in the Republic of Cuba and in part based upon the inspirational and aspirational belief by United States exporters.  This is how an export value can shift from an agreed to US$10,000.00 to what might be hoped for in two years… US$100,000.00.  In the same manner, a US$1 million contract could become US$100 million in a license or notification.   

For perspective, in any given month, there are generally approximately twelve exporters (often the same throughout the year) with products (paid or donated) delivered from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  With the total 2020 export value of approximately US$172 million, achieving one billion let alone two billion or billions is challenging… 

An indisputable fact is “billions of dollars’ worth of exports” on an annual basis do not flow now and have never flowed since 1961 from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- and exports may be defined in this calculation as products sold and products donated. 

In fact, the list of products referenced by Mr. Hunter are products statutorily authorized, protected, and commercial in nature by provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000.   

TSREEA transactions, CDA transactions, and other authorized transactions are controlled by regulations implemented (1992 to present) by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and BIS. 

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash-in-advance basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose.  The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA. 

TSREEA exports in 2019 were US$257,659,479.00, in 2020 were US$163,354,728.00, and thus far in 2021 are US$101,737,122.00.  The single year record for TSREEA exports to the Republic of Cuba was US$710,086,323.00 in 2008.  During the last twenty years, the average TSREEA year exports was US$319,853,227.00  

Products exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba since the first TSREEA exports in December 2001 were US$6,397,064,546.00 as of 30 April 2021 with payments from the Republic of Cuba to the United States through third countries as the United States government has refused to authorize the full implementation of direct correspondent banking. 

Exports of healthcare products (medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals) and telecommunications equipment to the Republic of Cuba are subject to provisions of the CDA, which require end use-verification, but are not subject to cash-in-advance payment requirements.  Exports have included: Medicaments (penicillin and insulin); Dentifrices (toothpastes); Laboratory regents; Ultrasonic scanning equipment; Artificial limbs; Medical appliances; Surgical appliances (dental); Opthalmic (eye); Cannulae (tubing) and gelatin capsules. 

CDA exports in 2019 were US$1,096,505.00, in 2020 were US$936,013.00, and thus far in 2021 are US$50,899.00. 

Products exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba using the CDA were US$26,755,590.00 as of 30 April 2021. 

In 2015 and 2016, the OFAC and BIS expanded the list of products authorized for export from the United States and from third countries of the Republic of Cuba with a focus upon products (non-durable, durable, and consumable) to entities not affiliated with the government of the Republic of Cuba.  The value of exports within these categories since 2015 are approximately US$27 million primarily through four United States-based companies. 

Donations from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in 2019 were US$7,150,989.00, in 2020 were US$4,605,055.00, and thus far in 2021 are US$1,118,883.00.  

LINK TO JUNE 2021 MONTHLY REPORT ON U.S. EXPORTS TO CUBA

Bush-Cheney Administration Licensing Background 

For the first agricultural commodities (corn and poultry) exported (US$4,318,906.00) in December 2001 to the Republic of Cuba, United States companies were required to obtain/have a license/authorization from the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) of the United States Department of Commerce for the exact value(s) of the product(s) to be exported to the Republic of Cuba.  In 2002, the BXA was renamed the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). 

When the government of the Republic of Cuba continued and then expanded its purchases of agricultural commodities and food products into 2002, despite initial statements that the 2001 purchases were to be a “one off” so United States companies were not to expect further orders, there began discussions between exporters and representatives of the BIS about opportunities to create a more efficient licensing process. 

One such decision by the BIS was to permit, and then encourage, United States companies to apply for a license that would attempt to include an estimate of what potentially might be exported by the company; and licenses were to be valid for up to two years.  In some instances, the export qualified under the “export exception” provision and would not require certain BIS processes.  A goal was to lessen the paperwork for the BIS and the United States companies. 

For example, if a United States company wanted to export corn to Republic of Cuba government-operated Empresa Cubana Importadora Alimentos (Alimport), under the auspice of the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Republic of Cuba (MINCEX), and had a contract or anticipated a contract or wanted to have all documentation necessary so the company could approach Alimport and say they were “ready to go," the BIS encouraged the company to add to the expected or desired quantities and U.S. Dollar values.  Simply put, if the reasonable expectation was to export corn valued at US$1 million, the company would use US$5 million or US$10 million or US$100 million… whatever they wanted to use. 

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

LINK TO RELATED POST: 

Let's Put The US$4.3 Billion In 2015 U.S. Commerce Department Licenses In Perspective... Politics Versus Reality [14 March 2016]

Teck Resources Of Canada In Libertad Act Lawsuit Argues That Plaintiff "fails to identify any jurisdictionally meaningful activities"

HEREDEROS DE ROBERTO GOMEZ CABRERA, LLC v. TECK RESOURCES LIMITED [1:20-cv-21630; Southern Florida District]

Hirzel Dreyfuss & Dempsey, PLLC (plaintiff)
Roig & Villarreal, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Office of David A. Villarreal, P.A. (plaintiff)
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman (defendant)

LINK TO: Defendant Teck Resources Limited’s Notice Of Filing Supplement To Its Response To Motion For Reconsideration And Leave To Amend, And Memorandum Of Law In Support Thereof (6/23/21)

Excerpts:

HRGC argued to this Court that the evidence regarding “Red Dog” was “newly discovered” hoping to convince this Court that the Purported New Evidence was not previously available.

HRGC’s assertion is simply untrue.

Red Dog was formed in 1989 and the information that HRGC now suggests only recently became available has been easily and publicly available for many years. See Exs. A-E. Thus, while this evidence may be new to HRGC because it failed to perform diligence at any earlier time (which seems to be the case for many of the issues before this Court), the information was readily available to anyone who visited the websites of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (www.sec.gov) or Teck itself (www.teck.com), or elsewhere on the Internet. Plaintiff’s evident failure to exercise diligence does not transmute readily available information into newly discovered evidence appropriate for a motion for reconsideration.

Seaboard Marine In Libertad Act Lawsuit Argues As Other Defendants Have- Plaintiffs Did Not Own Claim Before 12 March 1996

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD MARINE, LTD., Defendant. [1:20-cv-25176; Southern Florida District].

Horr, Novak & Skipp, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields (plaintiff)
Barakat Law (plaintiff)
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (defendant)

LINK TO: Defendant’s Reply In Support Of Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (5/11/21)

Excerpts:

Even so, Plaintiffs argue that the allegation that Seaboard operated one vessel to the Port of Mariel a few weeks after the initial Complaint was served “defeats Seaboard’s claims.” (Opp’n 21–22.) The operative complaint does not allege that the initial Complaint’s allegation provided Seaboard with the requisite knowledge. Nor could it. The initial Complaint does not identify the Port of Mariel (or the container terminal) as property confiscated by the Cuban Government and to which Plaintiffs own a claim.

Second, Plaintiffs identify no allegation of activity by Seaboard that amounts to trafficking “through the ZEDM.”

Lastly, the Opposition does not address, and therefore concedes,7 that there are no allegations showing Seaboard’s scienter as to trafficking through the ZEDM. There are no facts alleged to show that Seaboard knew or had reason to know that the ZEDM trafficked in confiscated property and that Seaboard intended to cause, direct, participate in, or profit from that activity. (Mot. 12.) For this additional and independent reason, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Seaboard trafficked through the ZEDM.

Lest there be any doubt, courts have unanimously held that plaintiffs that acquire a claim to confiscated property by inheritance must have done so before March 12, 1996.

Plaintiffs argue that the estates acquired claims to confiscated property before March 12, 1996 because the estates “maintain[ed] the original acquisition date [by the Rosell Siblings] of the confiscated property.” (Opp’n at 3.) But the caselaw is clear that property does not become part of an estate until the death of the decedent. (Mot. at 16); see also Sharps v. Sharps, 214 So. 2d 492, 495 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1968) (applying rule). Plaintiffs identify no caselaw to the contrary.

Because the estates did not acquire claims to the confiscated property before March 12, 1996, they cannot bring Title III claims.

With Rally In Ohio, President Trump Seeking To Extract 10% Of Cuban-American Representation In 118th United States Congress

The Honorable Donald Trump, 45th President of the United States (2017-2021) attended a rally on 26 June 2021 at the Lorain County fairground located in Wellington, Ohio, approximately forty miles southwest of Cleveland, Ohio.

The rally was to support the candidacy of Mr. Max Miller, a former staff member at The White House, who is seeking the 2022 nomination of the Republican Party for the 16th District from Ohio in the United States House of Representatives.

Former President Trump is supporting Mr. Miller rather than the incumbent, The Honorable Anthony Gonzalez (Ohio; R-16th) who is serving a second term and is of Cuban descent. Representative Gonzalez voted in January 2021 to impeach then-President Trump.

The current “Cuban-American” representation in the 117th United States Congress:

United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Cruz (R- Texas)
The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida)
The Honorable Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey)

United States House of Representatives
The Honorable Albio Sires (New Jersey; D- 8th)
The Honorable Alex Mooney (West Virginia; R-2nd)
The Honorable Anthony E. González (Ohio; R- 16th)
The Honorable Mario Díaz-Balart (Florida; R-25th)
The Honorable Carlos Gimenez (Florida; R- 26th)
The Honorable Maria Elvira Salazar (Florida; R- 27th)
The Honorable Nicole Malliotakis (New York; R- 11th)

LINK To Previous Post:
President Trump Seeking To Oust Cuban-American Member Of Congress; Exacting Revenge More Important Than Number Of Cuban-Americans In Congress? [March 17, 2021]

Was Money Paid? LafargeHolcim Of Switzerland Reports First Libertad Act Lawsuit Settlement To Court; Both Sides To "Bear Its Own Attorney's Fees, Costs And Expenses"

UPDATE: Statement received on 30 June 2021 from LafargeHolcim: "The parties, with the assistance of Philips ADR, are pleased to have reached an agreement resolving this matter. The terms of the agreement are confidential and we decline to comment further."

WILLIAM H. CLAFLIN ET AL V. LAFARGEHOLCIM LTD; INVERSIONES IBERSUIZAS S.A.; HOLCIM TRADING SA (F/K/A) UNION MARITIMA INTERNACIONAL SA; DE RUITER OUDERLANDE B.V.; LAS PAILAS DE CEMENTO S.A.U.; and UNKNOWN SUBSIDIARY OF THE LAFARGEHOLCIM GROUP [1:20-cv-23787; Southern Florida District].

Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Roig Lawyers (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)
Roig, Tutan, Rosenberg, Martin & Bellido (plaintiff)
Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher (defendant)

JOINT STIPULATION FOR VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE (06/22/21)

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the parties through undersigned counsel that the above-captioned action is dismissed, with prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). The parties further stipulate that each party shall bear its own attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses.

PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED STATUS REPORT REGARDING SERVICE UPON FOREIGN DEFENDANTS (06/18/21)

Plaintiffs, through their undersigned counsel, respectfully submit their Amended Status Report Regarding Service Upon Foreign Defendants. On June 1, 2021, pursuant to the Court’s May 26, 2021 Order (Dkt. 39), Plaintiffs submitted their Status Report Regarding Service Upon Foreign Defendants (Dkt. 41), reporting, inter alia, “[t]hat the process of serving the remaining foreign defendants remains underway.” The foreign defendants who have not been served are Inversiones Ibersuizas S.A.; Holcim Trading SA (F/K/A) Union Maritima Internacional SA; de Ruiter Ouderlande B.V.; and Las Pailas de Cemento S.A.U. (“Foreign Defendants”).*In addition, Plaintiffs informed the Court that Plaintiffs and LafargeHolcim had “reached an agreement in principle to settle this action in its entirety” and that the parties were “working diligently to consummate their settlement agreement and expect that the agreement will be completed on or before June 28, 2021.” (Dkt. 41). * Plaintiffs did not request that Clerk of the Court issue a summons to Defendant Unknown Subsidiary of the LafargeHolcim Group.

The settlement was finalized on June 17, 2021. Immediately after the settlement was finalized, Plaintiffs’ counsel instructed Plaintiffs’ vendor, TransPerfect Legal Solutions, to request cancellation of Hague Convention service upon the Foreign Defendants. TransPerfect has confirmed that its foreign partner has requested cancellation of service upon the Foreign Defendants.

LINK TO: With First Libertad Act Lawsuit Settlement, How Will Effectiveness And Deterrence Be Measured? Has It Worked? May Never Know… That’s A Problem. Settlements Must Be Disclosed (20 June 2021)

Judge Orders Discovery Process To Continue In Royal Caribbean Cruises Libertad Act Lawsuit

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23590; Southern Florida District]

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

LINK To Interim Order On Plaintiff’s Motion To Compel

Excerpts

This cause is before the Court on Havana Docks Corporation’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Compel Production of Evidence Withheld Under the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine (ECF No. 86). Upon review of the Motion, Defendant’s Response in Opposition (ECF No. 91), and Plaintiff’s Reply (ECF No. 92), the Court has determined an in camera review of certain documents is necessary to make its privilege determination.

Specifically, Plaintiff seeks otherwise responsive documents related to exchanges with COMAR, S.A., claiming that COMAR is a department of the Cuban Government and thus Defendant’s expectation of confidentiality in such communications was unreasonable under the circumstances; it avers that a subset of these communications should not be protected in any event because they reflect business rather than legal advice (ECF No. 86 at 10, 13). Defendant avers in response that it retained COMAR to, in relevant part here, provide legal advice and opinions to Defendant and to represent Defendant regarding its business activity in Cuba (ECF No. 91 at 13-14).

Defendant argues further that it reasonably relied on this belief the communications were confidential and thus should be permitted to withhold the 755 documents in question because they protected by attorney-client privilege (id.). (ECF No. 91 at 13-14). Plaintiff maintains that COMAR was appointed by the Cuban government to represent Defendant in negotiations with the Cuban government, and Defendant, knowing these facts, had sufficient reason to question the loyalty of COMAR as to render any assumption of confidentiality unreasonable (ECF No. 92 at 8-9). Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant has offered no evidence to rebut the contention that COMAR represented parties on both sides of Defendant’s negotiations with the Cuban government, nor evidence to permit the conclusion that all of the communications at issue were legal advice (id. at 9-10).

I find that an in camera inspection is warranted. The resort to in camera to inspect the content of the communications does not here implicate an impermissible attempt to shift the burden to the Court to determine that which the privilege holder should have established through affidavits. See MapleWood Partners, L.P. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 295 F.R.D. 550, 627 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (explaining circumstances under which court should decline invitation to conduct in camera review to resolve privilege disputes).

Defendant here asserts that it entered into an attorney-client relationship with COMAR and offers a supporting affidavit as well as an executed copy of the written service agreement outlining the scope of COMAR’s representation, which refers to the legal advice and opinions to be provided by COMAR, and, says Defendant, includedan express statement that the services to be performed were deemed confidential (ECF No. 91 at 14). The description of withheld documents Defendant offers here to support its privilege claim, however, invokes generic recitations that COMAR provided legal advice and leaves out details that would fully explain Defendant’s relationship with COMAR (ECF No. 86-5). Put differently, Defendant’s facts lack sufficient specificity to carry its burden, particularly in light of the fact that COMAR is not a private law firm, was appointed by the Cuban government, and, further, the service agreement is not limited to the provision of legal services.

At United Nations, Biden-Harris Administration Continues Trump-Pence Administration Position On Cuba; Reversing Obama-Biden Administration 2016 Vote. Cuba Advocates Should Remain Worried

Today, the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) reversed the 2016 vote (to abstain) of the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) and continued the position (to vote against) of the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) at the United Nations General Assembly.

The vote reflects continuity for the Biden-Harris Administration which since taking office on 20 January 2021 has not reversed any Trump-Pence Administration decisions relating to the Republic of Cuba which were reversals-plus of decisions taken by the Obama-Biden Administration.

Rodney Hunter
Political Coordinator
New York, New York
June 23, 2021

AS DELIVERED

Thank you, Mr. President, and thank you, members of the General Assembly. The United States stands with the Cuban people and seeks to support their pursuit of freedom, prosperity, and a future of greater dignity.

As with other Member States, the United States determines its conduct of economic relationships with other countries in accordance with its national interests. Sanctions are a legitimate way to achieve foreign policy, national security, and other national and international objectives, and the United States is not alone in this view or in this practice.

Sanctions are one set of tools in our broader effort toward Cuba to advance democracy, promote respect for human rights, and help the Cuban people exercise the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore oppose this resolution.

We recognize the challenges the Cuban people face. That is why the United States is a significant supplier of humanitarian goods to the Cuban people and one of Cuba’s principal trading partners. Every year, we authorize billions of dollars worth of exports to Cuba, including food and other agricultural commodities, medicines, medical devices, telecommunications equipment, consumer goods, and other items to support the Cuban people.

Advancing democracy and human rights remain at the core of our policy efforts toward Cuba. We are engaging directly with a large swath of Cuban civil society, empowering the Cuban people to determine their own futures. We are also engaging directly with the Cuban government to denounce abuses and push for reform. The United States stands with all who defend freedom in Cuba.

Cubans, as all people, deserve the right to freedom of expression, assembly, and culture. No government should silence its critics through violations of their human rights. We celebrate the diverse backgrounds and ideas of Cuban artists, entrepreneurs, religious leaders, human rights defenders, journalists, and environmental activists – just a few of the many people in Cuba with a strong voice and a desire to be heard.

The United States opposes this resolution. We encourage this body to support the Cuban people in their quest to determine their own future. Thank you, Mr. President.

Ambassador Samantha Power
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
U.S. Mission to the United Nations
New York City
October 26, 2016

“For more than 50 years, the United States had a policy aimed at isolating the government of Cuba. For roughly half of those years, UN Member States have voted overwhelmingly for a General Assembly resolution that condemns the U.S. embargo and calls for it to be ended. The United States has always voted against this resolution. Today the United States will abstain. [Applause.]

Thank you. Let me explain why. In December 2014, President Obama made clear his opposition to the embargo and called on our Congress to take action to lift it. Yet while the Obama Administration agrees that the U.S. embargo on Cuba should be lifted, I have to be clear, we don’t support the shift for the reason stated in this resolution. All actions of the United States with regard to Cuba have been and are fully in conformity with the UN Charter and international law, including applicable trade law and the customary law of the sea. We categorically reject the statements in the resolution that suggest otherwise.

But the resolution voted on today is a perfect example of why the U.S. policy of isolation toward Cuba was not working – or worse, how it was actually undermining the very goals it set out to achieve. Instead of isolating Cuba, as President Obama has repeatedly said, our policy isolated the United States. Including right here at the United Nations.

Under President Obama, we have adopted a new approach: rather than try to close off Cuba from the rest of the world, we want the world of opportunities and ideas open to the people of Cuba. After 50-plus years of pursuing the path of isolation, we have chosen to take the path of engagement. Because, as President Obama said in Havana, we recognize that the future of the island lies in the hands of the Cuban people, of course.

In the nearly two years since President Obama announced the shift in our approach, we have amended the regulations implementing the embargo six times – most recently on October 14 – finding ways to increase engagement between our governments and our people. We have re-established diplomatic relations with the Government of Cuba; re-opened embassies in our respective capitals; resumed regularly scheduled commercial flights between the U.S. and Cuba; facilitated people-to-people travel; eased restrictions on American businesses and entrepreneurs who want to do business in Cuba; and stopped limiting how often Cuban Americans can visit their families on the island. President Obama memorably became the first sitting U.S. President to visit Cuba since 1928; and, in a much more modest journey here in New York, I made the first visit by a U.S. Ambassador to the UN to Cuba’s mission to the United Nations since the Cuban revolution. Today, we add to that list the first-ever U.S. abstention on the UN General Assembly resolution calling for the embargo to be ended.

Abstaining on this resolution does not mean that the United States agrees with all of the policies and practices of the Cuban government. We do not. We are profoundly concerned by the serious human rights violations that the Cuban government continues to commit with impunity against its own people – including arbitrarily detaining those who criticize the government; threatening, intimidating, and, at times, physically assaulting citizens who take part in peaceful marches and meetings; and severely restricting the access that people on the island have to outside information.

As President Obama made clear when he traveled to Havana, we believe that the Cuban people – like all people – are entitled to basic human rights, such as the right to speak their minds without fear, and the right to assemble, organize, and protest peacefully. Not because these reflect a U.S.-centric conception of rights, but rather because they are universal human rights – enshrined in the UN Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – which all of our 193 Member States are supposed to respect and defend. Rights that are essential for the dignity of men, women, and children regardless of where they live or what kind of government they have.

Let me be among the first to acknowledge – as our Cuban counterparts often point out – that the United States has work to do in fulfilling these rights for our own citizens. And we know that at times in our history, U.S. leaders and citizens used the pretext of promoting democracy and human rights in the region to justify actions that have left a deep legacy of mistrust. We recognize that our history, in which there is so much that makes us proud, also gives us ample reason to be humble.

We also recognize the areas in which the Cuban government has made significant progress in advancing the welfare of its people, from significantly reducing its child mortality rate, to ensuring that girls have the same access to primary and secondary school as boys.

But none of this should mean that we stay silent when the rights of Cuban people are violated, as Member States here at the United Nations have too often done. That is why the United States raised these concerns directly with the Cuban government during our historic dialogue on human rights in Havana on October 14, which shows that, while our governments continue to disagree on fundamental questions of human rights, we have found a way to discuss these issues in a respectful and reciprocal manner. We urge other Member States to speak up about these issues as well.

The United States believes that there is a great deal we can do together with Cuba to tackle global challenges. That includes here at the United Nations, where the decades-long enmity between our nations has at best been a distraction – and at worst, an obstacle – to carrying out some of the most important work of this institution and helping the world’s most vulnerable people.

Let me close by giving just one example – a very moving example. In 2014, we were confronted with the deadliest outbreak of Ebola in our planet’s history. The most dire projections estimated that more than a million people could be infected within a few months. Yet while experts made clear that the only way to stop the epidemic was to confront it at its source, the international community was slow to step up. Many were paralyzed.

It was in that context that President Obama decided to deploy more than 3,000 U.S. personnel to the epicenter of the outbreak, where they joined hundreds of Americans working for non-governmental organizations and humanitarian agencies in the hardest hit areas. President Obama also set about rallying other Member States to do their part. One of the very first countries to step forward was Cuba, which sent more than 200 health professionals to the region – an awe-inspiring contribution for a country of just 11 million people.

One of them was a 43-year-old Cuban doctor named Felix Sarria Baez, who was dispatched to an Ebola Treatment Unit in Sierra Leone. In the course of treating those infected, Dr. Baez came down with the symptoms of the virus – and he quickly went from being the doctor to being a patient. As his condition deteriorated, he was airlifted to Geneva, where, for two days, he drifted in and out of consciousness. He nearly died, yet miraculously he pulled through, and eventually returned to Havana, where he says he regained his strength by cradling his two-year-old son.

I’d like you to think, just for one moment, about what it took to save the life of Dr. Baez – a man who risked his life to save people from a country on the other side of the world. He was initially treated in the clinic where he worked, which had been built with the help of a U.S.-based NGO. From there, he was transported to a clinic run by doctors from the British ministry of defense. Then he was airlifted to Switzerland aboard a medical transport plan operated by an American charter service. Upon arriving at the hospital in Geneva, he was treated by Swiss doctors with a Canadian-developed experimental treatment.

Look at all the nations that played a part in saving the life of that brave doctor – a doctor who, after recuperating in Havana, actually chose to return to Sierra Leone, so that he could rejoin his colleagues in the field, saving the lives of Sierra Leoneans. Dr. Baez and all his colleagues belonged to Cuba’s Henry Reeve Contingent – which responds to international disasters and epidemics – and takes its name from a young American born in Brooklyn, who at the age of 19 traveled to the Cuba to join the country’s struggle for independence, and gave his life in 1876 fighting alongside Cubans for their freedom.

When Dr. Baez returned to Sierra Leone, he was asked why he had come back after all he had been through. He said, simply, “I needed to come back. Ebola is a challenge that I must fight to the finish here, to keep it from spreading to the rest of the world.”

That – what I’ve just described – is what the United Nations looks like, when it works. And noble efforts like these are precisely why the United States and Cuba must continue to find ways to engage, even as our differences persist. Today, we will take another small step to be able to do that. May there be many, many more – including, we hope, finally ending the U.S. embargo once and for all. I thank you.”

NEW YORK, June 23 (Reuters) - U.S. President Joe Biden's administration on Wednesday continued Washington's tradition of voting against an annual United Nations General Assembly resolution calling for an end to a U.S. economic embargo on Cuba.

The resolution was adopted for the 29th time with 184 votes in favor, three abstentions and two no votes - the United States and Israel. The U.N. vote can carry political weight, but only the U.S. Congress can lift the more than 50-year-old embargo.

The United States consistently voted against the U.N. resolutions for 24 years but abstained for the first time in 2016 under former President Barack Obama, as Washington and Havana forged a closer relationship. Washington then returned to opposing the resolution under President Donald Trump's administration. Trump also rolled back nearly all measures Obama had taken to ease the embargo and improve ties between the United States and its old Cold War foe.

Will Cuba Seek EUA From United States FDA? Not Required, But Politically Might Be Prudent Marketing Strategy To Reinforce What Cuba Can Do Under Sanctions

With questions about efficacy enveloping the Republic of Cuba's entries into the COVID-19 vaccine global marketplace, Republic of Cuba manufacturers should consider seeking EUA from the Biden Administration. One candidate to provide assistance who already has an OFAC license to conduct clinical trials for a cancer vaccine is Buffalo, New York-based Roswell Park Comprehensive Cancer Center. Or, the manufacturers could retain legal counsel to assist with the process.

U.S. Food & Drug Administration- Washington DC

About Emergency Use Authorizations (EUAs) LINK To FDA

The Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) authority allows FDA to help strengthen the nation’s public health protections against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats including infectious diseases, by facilitating the availability and use of medical countermeasures (MCMs) needed during public health emergencies.

Under section 564 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), when the Secretary of HHS declares that an emergency use authorization is appropriate, FDA may authorize unapproved medical products or unapproved uses of approved medical products to be used in an emergency to diagnose, treat, or prevent serious or life-threatening diseases or conditions caused by CBRN threat agents when certain criteria are met, including there are no adequate, approved, and available alternatives. The HHS declaration to support such use must be based on one of four types of determinations of threats or potential threats by the Secretary of HHS, Homeland Security, or Defense.

Please note: a determination under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act that a public health emergency exists, such as the one issued on January 31, 2020, does not enable FDA to issue EUAs. On February 4, 2020, the HHS Secretary determined that there is a public health emergency that has a significant potential to affect national security or the health and security of United States citizens living abroad, and that involves the virus that causes COVID-19. Subsequent HHS declarations supporting use of EUAs and based on this determination are described in the blue boxes below.

Havana, Jun 24 (EFE) .- Cuba will begin the process to certify its Covid-19 vaccines Abdala and Soberana 02 with the World Health Organization (WHO) as soon as they are approved by its national regulatory body, after finding them 92 percent and 62 percent effective in clinical trials, respectively. “We have maintained exchanges with the WHO and PAHO (Pan American Health Organization) and we keep them informed of the progress of the results that we have obtained. The dialog is permanent. We, of course, have already communicated with the PAHO office,” said the director of science and innovation of the state group Biocubafarma, Rolando Pérez, in a press conference Thursday. The WHO establishes that for a vaccine candidate to be considered, it must demonstrate an efficacy equal to or greater than 50 percent.

Soberana 02, from the Finlay Institute of Vaccines (FIV), showed 62 percent efficacy with a two-dose schedule in a trial with 44,010 volunteers, while Abdala, from the Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (CIGB), was tested with a sample of 48,000 people in a three-dose schedule and reached an efficacy of 92.2 percent, according to data released by these institutions.

The main directors of Biocubafarma, the CIGB and the IFV indicated that the dossier to request the emergency use of Abdala has already been presented to the Center for State Control of Medicines, Equipment and Medical Devices, while that of Soberana 02 will take place in the next few days. Once this authorization is obtained, its mass rollout will begin in Cuba, which maintains its objective of immunizing the entire population of 11.2 million this year and hopes to become the first country in the world to immunize its entire population with its own vaccines. That step will also make them the first coronavirus vaccines developed in Latin America.

Nations such as Venezuela, Argentina, Mexico and Vietnam had already shown interest in having potential Cuban vaccines in recent months, while Iran – where Sovereign 02 was also tested – has announced the imminent emergency use of that formula, which was renamed Pasteur. On Thursday a donation of 30,000 doses of Abdala also arrived in Venezuela, a country that wants to buy 12 million units.

However, the president of Biocubafarma, Eduardo Martínez, regretted that in the leap from large-scale manufacturing the island has run into “serious logistical difficulties” due to not being able to have all the necessary supplies and materials. The scientists attributed these problems in part to the United States embargo and in part to the shortage of these products due to high demand during the pandemic, although for now they maintain their goal of producing millions of doses with which they hope cover both domestic and export demand.

The two formulas are already being administered to Cubans under health intervention studies and in parallel with clinical trials as a strategy to curb infections on the island, which is in its the third and worst wave of the pandemic. More than 2.2 million people have received at least one dose of Abdala or Soberana 02. The Caribbean country has accumulated 174,789 cases and 1,209 deaths from Covid-19 to date, according to data from the Ministry of Public Health.

Prensa Latina News Agency- Havana, Republic of Cuba

Havana, June 22 (Prensa Latina) Varied foreign press media highlighted today the news that Cuba´s anticovid vaccine candidate Abdala, reached 92.28 percent of effectiveness in clinical studies, phase III.

Engineered by the Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering Center (BGEC), the drug showed these numbers in its three-dose program, fulfilling the requirements by World Health Organization (WHO) to become a vaccine. The good news of this drug´s effectiveness transcended borders this Monday and many have been the acknowledgements abroad.

Listín Journal newspaper, CDN and NDigital television chains, from Dominican Republic, published the information broadcast yesterday and highlighted the Cuban achievement, specifying that Abdala gets to be the second vaccine candidate from the Caribbean island to meet the requirements set by WHO.

The news was also shown in television chains like CNN in Spanish, Russia Today, Latin American subscription German television chain DW Español, North American newspaper The New Herald, and many more.

Abdala´s good news is added to the previous one reported by the Finlay Vaccine Institute (FVI) from the Caribbean island last Saturday that Soberana 02 had reached a 62 percent of effectiveness in the two-dose plan. Such variable remains to be checked in the three-dose plan formula, last from which is Soberana PLUS, by FVI as well.

After learning results from Abdala, president of the Republic Díaz-Canel highlighted the achievement on his twitter account. ¨I think of (José) Martí, who wrote that ¨it is not the acquired and casual intelligence that brings honor to men; but the way they use it and save it. There is but one way to live on, that is to serve¨.

And it is that Abdala carries the name of a poem from Cuba´s National Hero, and it carries its image in the Revolution Square in Havana in the graphic label. Cuban authorities have announced that in a couple of weeks, they hope to ask the Medical Devices and Drug Control State Center, the regulating authority, for the permission to use the emergency vaccines.

The New York Times

New York, New York

22 June 2021

Cuba reports a high success rate for its homegrown Abdala vaccine.

By Ed Augustin

Cuba began its Covid-19 mass vaccination campaign more than a month ago with homegrown, unproven vaccines, wagering that they would prove effective enough to blunt the rapid spread of the coronavirus on the cash-strapped Caribbean island. The gamble appears to be paying off.

The Cuban health authorities said on Monday that their country’s three-shot Abdala vaccine had proved about 92 percent effective against the coronavirus in late-stage clinical trials.

Throughout the pandemic, Cuba has declined to import foreign vaccines while striving to develop its own, the smallest country in the world to do so.

The announcement places Abdala among the most effective Covid vaccines in the world, according to data from clinical trials, on a par with Pfizer-BioNTech’s 95 percent rate, Moderna’s 94.1 percent, and Russia’s Sputnik V at 91.6 percent. On Saturday, Cuba’s state-run biotech corporation, BioCubaFarma, said that another of its vaccines, Sovereign 2, had 62 percent efficacy after two of its three required doses. Results for the full three doses are expected in the next few weeks.

The vaccine news was seen as a rare cause for celebration on an island that has been hammered both by the pandemic, which has devastated its tourism industry, and by Trump-era economic sanctions that have not been eased by the Biden administration.

Cuba is currently experiencing its worst coronavirus outbreak since the start of the pandemic. It reported 1,561 new cases on Monday, a record. In May the health authorities began a mass vaccination campaign in Havana before the completion of Phase 3 trials, which assess a vaccine’s effectiveness and safety. The emergency step was intended to help combat the Beta variant, first detected in South Africa, which was spreading rapidly in the Cuban capital. Close to one million Cubans — about 9 percent of the national population — have now received all three doses of either Abdala or Sovereign 2, according to official figures. Officials say they are seeing a slowing of the virus’s spread in Havana, where vaccinations have been concentrated so far.

Countries including Mexico, Argentina, Vietnam and Iran have expressed interest in Cuba’s coronavirus vaccines. The high announced rate of efficacy could reinforce hopes that biotechnology exports will help lift Cuba from the depths of its economic crisis.

Libertad Act Lawsuit Against Pernod Ricard Dismissed- Plaintiff Argument About Duty Free Sales Don't Sway Court

MARLENE CUETO IGLESIAS AND MARIAM IGLESIAS ALVAREZ V. PERNOD RICARD [1:20-cv-20157; Southern Florida District]

IPS Legal Group, P.A. (plaintiff)

Law Offices of Andre G. Raikhelson LLC (plaintiff)

Ainsworth & Clancy PLLC (plaintiff)

Carlton Fields P.A. (defendant)

Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A. (defendant)

LINK To Order (6/17/21)

Excerpts:

Defendant moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, in part, on the grounds that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Pernod is a French corporation organized under foreign law. Its principal place of business is located at 12 Place des Etats-Unis, 75783 Paris Cedex 16, France. And while Pernod is a foreign publicly traded company that, through its subsidiaries, does business in the State of Florida, Pernod does not maintain a registered agent in the State of Florida. Consequently, the Court found that Defendant’s contacts with the State of Florida alone were insufficient to establish the general jurisdiction requirements of the Florida Long Arm statute over Defendant. Furthermore, in dismissing the First Amended Complaint, the Court found that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege an alter-ego theory. However, even if Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that Pernod USA was the alter ego of Defendant Pernod for purposes of satisfying Florida’s long-arm requirement of “substantial and not isolated activity” in the state, Pernod’s connections with Florida are not “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home” here.

The Court acknowledges that the Plaintiffs did add an allegation that one of Defendant’s United States subsidiaries “allows international travelers departing from the Miami Airport . . . to purchase Havana Club and Martell Cohiba Cognac, duty free.” (DE 57 ¶ 31). And in response to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs argue “Defendant’s action of marketing, selling, and distributing the Havana Club rum through PRSA’s web site to Florida Residents is more than sufficient to establish the minimum contacts necessary to enable Florida courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant.”

However, Plaintiffs fail to appreciate the fact that this allegation and argument regarding duty-free shops in international airports and generally accessible websites would render foreign corporations subject to personal jurisdiction in nearly every major city in the United States where a consumer has access to an airport and the internet. Courts in this circuit have routinely found that general and specific personal jurisdiction cannot be premised on allegations of similar or even more substantial contacts than these.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above and in the Court’s order dismissing the First Amended Complaint (DE 55), it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (DE 64) for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.

With First Libertad Act Lawsuit Settlement, How Will Effectiveness And Deterrence Be Measured? Has It Worked? May Never Know… That’s A Problem. Settlements Must Be Disclosed

With First Libertad Act Lawsuit Settlement, How Will Effectiveness And Deterrence Be Measured?  Has It Worked?  May Never Know… That’s A Problem.  Settlements Must Be Disclosed 

Defendant may not want public- can result in issues with shareholders, governments, employees, regulators, and create a benchmark for other defendants. 

Plaintiff may not want public- can provide other defendants with a benchmark for settlements- which might be lower than desired. 

The Libertad Act may need to be amended with a provision to require public disclosure of awards, judgements, and settlements. 

If A Settlement Is Secret, Then Where Is The Deterrent?

Taxpayers Paid For It; Should Benefit From Knowing How It Is Used

All Settlements Using Title III Of The Libertad Act Should Be Public

Courts Are Public Entities- Any Decision/Settlement Should Be Public

The United States Department Of State Should Publish All Title IV Decisions

Some May Never See The Accountability They Seek

A Twenty-Five-Year-Old Volcano Erupted- Everyone Needs To See The Lava

In 1996, the United States enacted a law with a provision specifically designed to deter the use of expropriated assets in the Republic of Cuba: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”). 

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.   

Title III languished suspended (in six-month intervals) for twenty-three (23) years through three presidencies and half of a fourth presidency: Clinton-Gore Administration (1993-2001), Bush-Cheney Administration (2001-2009), Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), and Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) until 2 May 2019.  The Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) has not suspended Title III of the Libertad Act.   

Title III was a dormant volcano.  When it spewed, however, rather than molten rock was a moderate flow of complaints, summonses, summonses, motions and appeals.  An estimated US$19 million in billable hours from attorneys and their supporting entities. 

A primary goal of Title III was to publicly shame (through the courts) “traffickers” to cease activity in the Republic of Cuba- and do so in a high-wattage manner whereby others would be deterred from the same activity.   

Weeks after the two-year anniversary of the implementation of Title III, there has been announced a first settlement in a Libertad Act Title III lawsuit; this one filed on 11 September 2020.

WILLIAM H. CLAFLIN ET AL V. LAFARGEHOLCIM LTD; INVERSIONES IBERSUIZAS S.A.; HOLCIM TRADING SA (F/K/A) UNION MARITIMA INTERNACIONAL SA; DE RUITER OUDERLANDE B.V.; LAS PAILAS DE CEMENTO S.A.U.; and UNKNOWN SUBSIDIARY OF THE LAFARGEHOLCIM GROUP [1:20-cv-23787; Southern Florida District]. 

Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)

Roig Lawyers (plaintiff)

Fields PLLC (plaintiff)

Tutan, Rosenberg, Martin & Bellido (defendant)

Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher (defendant)

Plaintiff has 22nd largest certified combined claim (US$$11,686,342.59) consisting of the 37th  Largest Claim CU-1393 (US$7,508,689.96) for Helen A Claflin; 181st Largest Claim CU-1394 (US$623,674.31) for William H Claflin III; 72nd Largest Claim CU-1395 (US$2,927,190.31) for Mary G. Rentschler; and 182nd Largest Claim CU-1396 (US$623,674.31) for Anne C. Allen; 3953rd Largest Claim CU-1397 (US$3,113.70) for John W. Weeks.  Defendant is St. Gallen, Switzerland-based LafargeHolcim Ltd. (2020 revenue approximately US$27 billion).  

If all the court decisions, court judgements, settlements and out-of-court agreements are not fully disclosed in a timely manner, how will any taxpayer-funded deterrent be measurable? 

Given the immense domestic and international implications for decisions arising from the lawsuits, essential that all decisions be in the public domain. 

This exposure is especially significant with respect to any “private settlements” among plaintiffs and defendants.  The Libertad Act authorizes private settlements- a trafficker and owner of the expropriated asset can agree on compensation, but there is nothing in the Libertad Act compelling disclosure of any compensation. 

From a United States-based law firm: “It’s a very odd and recent idea that settlements should be allowed to be secret.  Without a court case, sure, people can settle their affairs with each other privately on any terms they like.  But once someone invokes a law that claims a public policy purpose, like the Libertad Act, then the citizens of this country ought to know exactly how that law is working in practice. Is it achieving its policy goals, or is just a means for Cuban Americans to extort tolls from businesses trading with and investing in Cuba?  Think for example about American Airlines being sued for transporting passengers to and from Cuba under various federal licenses and route allocations.  Clearly the United States government not only approved but encouraged the company to provide that service.  So, should that case be settled, doesn’t the public have a right to know what a litigant got from deploying a federal law against that United States company?  Another thing, the filing fee in a federal case doesn’t even cover the wages of the janitor who cleans the courtrooms.  Taxpayers foot the bill for judges’ salaries and pensions, and law clerks and administrative staffs’ wages, the costs of bailiffs, the cost of court houses and their maintenance, and on and on.  Why should someone be free to use that infrastructure to procure money from another private party without taxpayers knowing how much they actually received by using a public law and its enforcement mechanism, the federal court system?” 

From the Chicago, Illinois-based American Bar Association (ABA) on United States Federal Courts Funding:   

https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_policy/independence_of_the_judiciary/federal-court-funding/

 Title IV 

Title IV of the Libertad Act restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims.  One Canada-based company is currently known as subject to this provision based upon a certified claim.  One Spain-based company is known as subject to this provision based upon a non-certified claim. 

The United States Department of State has refused to provide any information relating to the use of Title IV- not the number of letters sent, not the identity of the recipients, not whether any recipient has ceased “trafficking” as a result of receiving a letter.  There is no statute prohibiting the release of data (number of letters sent, years when letters sent) relating to Title IV.   

There is value to current plaintiffs and defendants and to potential plaintiffs and defendants from having data from which they weigh the value of their lawsuit, the value of filing a lawsuit, and the value of seeking a Title IV letter. 

Title III Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics 

The Trump Administration on 2 May 2019 made operational Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).  

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.   

The Trump Administration on 2 May 2019 made operational Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).  

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.   

40 Lawsuits Filed (15 certified claimants & 25 non-certified claimants)

1 Settlement (certified claimants)

4 Of Dismissed Lawsuits At Court Of Appeals 

US$258,400.00+ Court Filing Fees (not including attorney court appearance fees)

83+ Law Firms

235+ Attorneys

14,400+ Filed Court Documents

US$19+ Million Law Firm Billable Hours (estimated 85% by defendants)

15 Countries Impacted

119 Plaintiffs (some in multiple cases) 

4 Class Action Requests

80 Defendants (including corporate parent, subsidiaries; some sued in multiple lawsuits)

26 United States Defendants (not including subsidiaries)

15 Republic of Cuba Initial Defendants (eleven remaining)

30 Non-United States Defendants

9 European Union-Based Defendants

5 Companies Notified As Potential Defendants   

Lawsuits Filed In United States District Courts in Southern Florida (26), Middle District Florida (1), Washington DC (2), Western Washington State (1), Nevada (1), Southern District New York (2), Eastern District Louisiana (1), Northern Texas (1), New Jersey (1), Southern Texas (2), and Delaware (2).  Some of the lawsuits have been transferred, some cases have been consolidated, and some cases have been dismissed.  For filing an action brought under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, P.L. 104-114, 110 Stat. § 785 (1996) the fee is US$6,800.00. 

83 Law Firms Retained By Plaintiffs/Defendants: Ainsworth & Clancy; Allen & Overy;; Akerman; Andrews & Springer; Arent Fox; Aronovitz Law; Astigarraga Davis Mullins & Grossman; Baker & McKenzie; Ballard Spahr; Barakat Law; Berenthal & Associates; Berliner Cooch & Taylor; Berliner Corcoran & Rowe; Corcoran & Rowe; Bird & Bird; Boies Schiller Flexner; Bracewell; Broad & Cassel; Carlton Fields; Carlton Fields Jorden Burt; Coffey Burlington; Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton; Colson Hicks Eidson; Cooch and Taylor; Creed & Gowdy; Cross Castle; Cueto Law Group; Duane Morris, Dubbin & Kravetz; Ewusiak Law; Fields PLLC; Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher; Hirzel Dreyfuss and Dempsey; Hogan Lovells; Holland & Knight; Horr, Novak & Skipp, P.A.; IPS Legal Group; Jones Day; Jones Walker; Kantrowitz, Goldhamer, & Graifman; Kelly Hart & Hallman; Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton; Law Office of Alexander Villarreal; Law Office of Andre G. Raikhelson; Law Offices of John S. Gaebe; Law Offices of Paul Sack; Law Offices of Robert L. Muse; Mandel & Mandel; Manuel Vazquez PA; McGuire Woods; MoloLamken; Margol & Margol; Mayer Brown; Morgan, Lewis & Bockius; Morris James; Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell; Murphy & Anderson; Nelson Mullins; Pacifica Law Group; Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman; Potter Anderson & Corroon; Pusateri, Johnston, Guillot & Greenbaum; Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman; Rasco Klock Perez & Nieto; Reed Smith; Reid Collins & Tsai; Rice Reuther Sullivan & Carroll; Rivero Mestre; Rodriguez Tramont & Nunez; Roig, Tutan, Rosenberg, Martin & Bellido; Roig & Villarreal; Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess; Scott Douglass & McConnico; Sidley Austin; Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson; Steptoe & Johnson; Trenam, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye, O’Neill & Mullins; Venable; Walden Macht & Haran; Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford; Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor; Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher; Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr; Zumpano Patricios.  

Countries Impacted: Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Panama, Republic of Cuba, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States. 

Certified Claimant Participation: Of the 5,913 claimants certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC), these (original claim value in parenthesis) have filed Libertad Act lawsuits: 2nd largest certified claimant North American Sugar (US$97,373,414.72); 8th largest certified claimant Exxon Mobil Corporation (US$71,611,002.90 and US$173,157.12); 9th largest certified claimant The Francisco Sugar Company (US$53,389,438.37); 31st largest certified claimant Havana Docks Corporation (US$9,179,700.08); 37th largest certified claimant Helen Claflin (US$7,508,689.96); 67th largest certified claimant King Ranch (US$3,216,084.97); 72nd largest certified claimant Mary Rentschler (US$2,929,577.88); 88th largest certified claimant Julies Shepard (US$2,033,959.17); 181st largest certified claimant William Claflin (US$623,674.31); 182nd largest certified claimant Anne Allen (US$623,674.00); 195th largest certified claimant Javier Garcia-Bengochea (US$547,365.24); 3,953rd largest certified claimant John Weeks (US$3,114.00). 

In the third quarter of 2019, the then twenty-eight, now twenty-seven member Brussels, Belgium-based European Union (EU) confirmed its intention to issue a Request For Proposal (RFP) to law firms in the United States.  The law firm(s) would be retained to file “amicus curiae” (friend-of-the-court) motions and other motions on behalf of each Libertad Act Title III lawsuit defendant who is domiciled in the EU.  The RFP has yet to materialize.  

Since 2 May 2019, some filings have been appealed, consolidated, dismissed, refiled, reversed, and transferred within districts and from district to district.  Some defendants have been dismissed, but the case continues with other defendants. 

Libertad Act 

The Trump Administration has made operational Title III and further implemented Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”). 

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.   

Title IV restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims.  One Canada-based company and one Spain-based company are currently known to be subject to this provision based upon a certified claim and non-certified claim. 

Suspension History 

Title III was suspended every six months since the Libertad Act was enacted in 1996- by President William J. Clinton (1993-2001), President George W. Bush (2001-2009), President Barack H. Obama (2009-2017) and through the first two years of President Donald J. Trump (2017-2021).   

·        On 16 January 2019, The Honorable Mike Pompeo, United States Secretary of State, reported a suspension for forty-five (45) days. 

·        On 4 March 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a suspension for thirty (30) days. 

·        On 3 April 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a further suspension for fourteen (14) days through 1 May 2019. 

·        On 17 April 2019, the Trump Administration reported that it would no longer suspend Title III. 

·        On 2 May 2019, certified claimants and non-certified claimants were permitted to file lawsuits in United States courts. 

Certified Claims Background 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims is approximately US$8,750,130,510.77.  

The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

From the certified claim filed by Texaco: “The Cuban corporation was intervened on June 29, 1960, pursuant to Resolution 188 of June 28, 1960, under Law 635 of 1959.  Resolution 188 was promulgated by the Government of Cuba when the Cuban corporation assertedly refused to refine certain crude oil as assertedly provided under a 1938 law pertaining to combustible materials.  Subsequently, this Cuban firm was listed as nationalized in Resolution 19 of August 6, 1960, pursuant to Cuban Law 851.  The Commission finds, however, that the Cuban corporation was effectively intervened within the meaning of Title V of the Act by the Government of Cuba on June 29, 1960.” 

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International; the certified claim also includes land adjacent to the Jose Marti International Airport in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  The third-largest certified claim valued at US$97,373,414.72 is controlled by New York, New York-based North American Sugar Industries, Inc.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement.   

Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 requires that an asset had a value of US$50,000.00 when expropriated by the Republic of Cuba without compensation to the original owner.  Of the 5,913 certified claims, 913, or 15%, are valued at US$50,000.00 or more.  Adjusted for inflation, US$50,000.00 (3.70% per annum) in 1960 has a 2021 value of approximately US$162,850.00.  The USFCSC authorized 6% per annum, meaning the 2021 value of US$50,000.00 is approximately US$233,000.00.  

The ITT Corporation Agreement 

In July 1997, then-New York City, New York-based ITT Corporation and then-Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based STET International Netherlands N.V. signed an agreement whereby STET International Netherlands N.V. would pay approximately US$25 million to ITT Corporation for a ten-year right (after which the agreement could be renewed and was renewed) to use assets (telephone facilities and telephone equipment) within the Republic of Cuba upon which ITT Corporation has a certified claim valued at approximately US$130.8 million.  ETECSA, which is now wholly-owned by the government of the Republic of Cuba, was a joint venture controlled by the Ministry of Information and Communications of the Republic of Cuba within which Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based Telecom Italia International N.V. (formerly Stet International Netherlands N.V.), a subsidiary of Rome, Italy-based Telecom Italia S.p.A. was a shareholder.  Telecom Italia S.p.A., was at one time a subsidiary of Ivrea, Italy-based Olivetti S.p.A.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International. 

LINK TO LIBERTAD ACT LAWSUIT FILING STATISTICS

LINK TO 17-PAGE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Spanish Foreign Minister Does Not Mention Cuba During Conversation With U.S. Secretary Of State... Why?

United States Department of State

Washington DC

11 June 2021

Secretary Blinken’s Call with Spanish Foreign Minister González Laya

Office of the Spokesperson

The below is attributable to Spokesperson Ned Price:

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke today with Spanish Foreign Minister Arancha González Laya to reaffirm the strong U.S.-Spain alliance, friendship, and Transatlantic relationship. Secretary Blinken emphasized the U.S. commitment to migration conducted through regular channels and in a safe, orderly, and humane manner. The Secretary also reiterated U.S. support for NATO, including an increase to common funding, and highlighted our commitment to working with the EU and other partners to address shared challenges, including in the Middle East, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.