Four Years Later, "The 2024 Process" For Venezuela May Have Renewed Interest Given Visit To Caracas By Biden-Harris Administration Officials This Weekend

The United States Congress may vote on legislation to prevent the oil and natural gas providers from sourcing product in the Russian Federation.  If there is a vote, it will likely have the two-thirds required in each chamber to override a veto by United States President Joseph Biden.  The Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) has a problem in not wanting to take decisions that will exacerbate the price of oil and natural gas for United States consumers- particularly with the mid-term elections eight months from now, but also not wanting to veto legislation that seems so right at the moment.   

One beneficially may be Venezuela- which has the world’s largest oil reserves.  To date, United States companies remain permitted (from Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) through Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) through Biden-Harris Administration (2021- )) to engage with some assets in Venezuela by licenses issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury.   

The political question: From where is sourcing oil less foul- from the Russian Federation while it attacks Ukraine or from the Nicolas Maduro-Delcy Rodriguez Administration (2013- ) in Caracas? Bet with Venezuela cutting a deal because it believes the timing is right for a deal as attention by the United States lies elsewhere. There is the C-word that impacts everything Venezuela and that is the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela’s commercial, economic, and political support to the Miguel Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ).

That representatives of The White House and United States Department of State are in Caracas this weekend is a win for President Maduro. Don’t discount the prospect of a release on humanitarian grounds some or all of the United States nationals imprisoned in Venezuela as a quid pro quo.Other than the Russian Federation, a country with oil and/or natural gas, regardless of its relationship with the United States, has a meaningful moment to extract something of value from the United States.Check out “The 2024 Process” created in 2017 and presented in 2018.

The 2024 Process
(first published 2018; revised)

“2024” May Unlock A Solution For Venezuela
Need For Multilateral Quid Pro Quo
For Cuba- 25/25/25/25
Many Companies Have An Interest In Venezuela
Maduro Isn’t Likely Going Unless Assassinated Or Four Governments Agree
Guaido Fatally Contaminated By Connectivity With Trump Administration
What Is The Realistic “Mission Set”
Adhering To Aspirational & Desired Instead Of Doable
The Process Will Not Be A Moment, It Will Be A Series Of Moments

LINK TO ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Federal Judge Rules Libertad Act Lawsuit Against Carnival, MSC, Norwegian, And Royal Caribbean Will Be Heard By Jury In May 2022. "Cuban-Americans" On Jury May Be Problematic For Defendants. 

Surprise That Decision About Summary Judgement Did Not Arrive Before Decision About Trial By Jury. 

Voire Dire Challenge To Select Impartial Jurists In South Florida. 

How Many Residents Of South Florida Do Not Have An Opinion About Cuba?  Obama? Trump?

Jury Of Peers” Will Likely Include Individuals Of Cuban Descent. 

Might There Be Impetus For A Settlement Given Uncertainties Of Juries 

All 42 Libertad Act Lawsuits Impacted By Upcoming Decision By Biden-Harris Administration Whether To Provide Answers To 11th Circuit District Court Of Appeals 

More Appeals Certain 

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [1:19-cv-23591; Southern Florida District] 

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23590; Southern Florida District] 

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. MSC CRUISES SA CO, AND MSC CRUISES (USA) INC. [1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District] 

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES [1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District] 

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

LINKS To Court Filings 

OMNIBUS ORDER ON MOTIONS TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S JURY TRIAL DEMAND (2/22/22)

PLAINTIFF HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO UNSEAL THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT RECORD (2/21/22) 

DEFENDANT CARNIVAL CORPORATION’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO UNSEAL THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT RECORD (2/16/22) 

LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

Government Of Cuba Supports Russian Federation... Russian Federation Defers US$2.3 Billion In Loan Payments Until 2027.

Moscow, Feb 22 (Prensa Latina News Agency) The State Duma (Lower House of Parliament) of Russia today ratified the protocols that modify the Russian-Cuban intergovernment loan agreements and allow Cuba's payments of commercial loans to be deferred until 2027.

By: Elsy Fors Garzon

According to Deputy Finance Minister Timur Maksimov, the ratification bill (No. 70935-8) provides for the restructuring of Cuba’s debt with Russia within the framework of four intergovernment loan agreements, indicated the official website of the legislature on the decision adopted in the plenary session on Tuesday.

The restructuring was carried out as part of the approach endorsed by President Vladimir Putin to extend to the island a multilateral initiative to alleviate the debt burden of less developed countries, adopted in 2020 by the G20 states, he explained.

Between 2006 and 2019, Russia provided Cuba with export loans equivalent to 2.3 billion dollars, according to the note published by the State Duma.

He indicated that these funds were granted to the Caribbean island to finance projects in the fields of energy, metallurgy, transport infrastructure and the supply of products to develop and support its economy.

Since the beginning of 2020, due to the difficult situation in the country, caused by the tightening of the US blockade and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic crisis, Cuba stopped paying the state loans provided by Russia and in September requested the restructuring .

Following Havana’s request, the Moscow Government signed the corresponding inter-government protocols on August 7, 2021, according to which the last reimbursement must be made on December 15, 2027.

Continuation Of The National Emergency With Respect To Cuba And Of The Emergency Authority Relating To The Regulation Of The Anchorage And Movement Of Vessels

The White House
Washington DC
23 February 2022

CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO CUBA AND OF THE EMERGENCY AUTHORITY RELATING TO THE REGULATION OF THE ANCHORAGE AND MOVEMENT OF VESSELS

On March 1, 1996, by Proclamation 6867, a national emergency was declared to address the disturbance or threatened disturbance of international relations caused by the February 24, 1996, destruction by the Cuban government of two unarmed, United States-registered civilian aircraft in international airspace north of Cuba. On February 26, 2004, by Proclamation 7757, the national emergency was expanded to deny monetary and material support to the Cuban government. On February 24, 2016, by Proclamation 9398, and on February 22, 2018, by Proclamation 9699, the national emergency was further modified based on continued disturbances or threatened disturbances of the international relations of the United States related to Cuba. The Cuban government has not demonstrated that it will refrain from the use of excessive force against United States vessels or aircraft that may engage in memorial activities or peaceful protest north of Cuba.

Further, the unauthorized entry of any United States-registered vessel into Cuban territorial waters continues to be detrimental to the foreign policy of the United States because such entry could facilitate a mass migration from Cuba. It continues to be United States policy that a mass migration from Cuba would endanger United States national security by posing a disturbance or threatened disturbance of the international relations of the United States.

Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing the national emergency with respect to Cuba and the emergency authority relating to the regulation of the anchorage and movement of vessels set out in Proclamation 6867, as amended by Proclamation 7757, Proclamation 9398, and Proclamation 9699. This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress. JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

The White House
Washington DC
23 February 2022

Dear Madam Speaker: (Dear Madam President:)

Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, within 90 days prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. In accordance with this provision, I have sent to the Federal Register for publication the enclosed notice stating that the national emergency with respect to Cuba that was declared on March 1, 1996, in Proclamation 6867, as amended by Proclamation 7757 on February 26, 2004, Proclamation 9398 on February 24, 2016, and Proclamation 9699 on February 22, 2018, is to continue in effect beyond March 1, 2022.

There remains a need to continue this national emergency, based on a disturbance or threatened disturbance of the international relations for the United States related to Cuba. The unauthorized entry of any United States-registered vessel into Cuban territorial waters continues to be detrimental to the foreign policy of the United States.

The unauthorized entry of vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States into Cuban territorial waters is currently a violation of Federal law. Further, the unauthorized entry of United States-registered vessels into Cuban territorial waters continues to be detrimental to United States foreign policy and counter to the purpose of Executive Order 12807, which is to ensure, among other things, safe, orderly, and legal migration. The possibility of large-scale unauthorized entries of United States-registered vessels into Cuban territorial waters would disturb the international relations of the United States regarding Cuba by allowing for or providing the means to facilitate a mass migration of Cuban nationals and threatening our national security.

Therefore, I have determined that it is necessary to continue the national emergency with respect to Cuba and the emergency authority relating to the regulation of the anchorage and movement of vessels set out in Proclamation 6867, as amended by Proclamation 7757, Proclamation 9398, and Proclamation 9699. Sincerely, JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

Since Biden Administration Took Office On 20 January 2021, How Often Do Officials Of The Governments Of The United States And Cuba Meet? Discuss Remittances, Banking, Private Businesses? No Answers.

On 14 February 2022, this question was sent to the United States Department of State in Washington DC and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Havana, Republic of Cuba:  

[T]he number of official face-to-face meetings (in person or by video or by telephone) and the subject(s) discussed between officials of the United States Department of State and officials of the government of the Republic of Cuba for the period 20 January 2021 through the most recent meeting.  Of specific interest, but not limited to, is/are meeting(s) relating to the delivery of remittances, direct correspondent banking, and direct investment in and delivery of financing to private businesses.”  

On 16 February 2022, the United States Department of State responded, but did not answer in totality the question.   

Attributable to a State Department spokesperson: “The United States government regularly engages with the Cuban government on issues of mutual interest, including through meetings between our diplomats in the United States and in Cuba.  Our policy toward Cuba focuses first and foremost on support for the Cuban people, including their political and economic well-being, and human rights.” 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba has not responded to the question.

For Cuba, Payment Terms For Milk Powder Traveling 16,445 Miles, 30+ Days From New Zealand, Is Better Financial Decision Than Using Cash To Import From U.S. With Two Day Delivery. Will It Last?

For Cuba, receiving payment terms for milk powder traveling 16,445 nautical miles and taking more than a month to arrive from New Zealand is considered a better financial decision than using cash to import from the United States. 

The distance average to Cuba of ports for its current three-largest sources of milk powder is 9,449 nautical miles with delivery average of 34.3 days to 10.8 days. 

The greatest distance from Cuba of ports in the United States from which milk powder could be delivered is 1,465 nautical miles; average delivery from six primary ports is 2.0 days.  

Since 2020, Container Shipping Costs From Asia Have Increased As Much As 500%. 

Might Cuba Give To Current New York State Governor Kathy Hochul What It Did Not Give To Then New York State Governor Andrew Cuomo? 

At present, the less credit available to the Republic of Cuba inversely increases the value of sourcing exports from the United States despite the Republic of Cuba’s distain of laws, regulations, and policies of the United States.  The current landscape is for United States companies neither viable nor preferred for the long term. 

Using 20 Knots Speed
Port of Wellington, New Zealand- 16,445 nautical miles, 34.3 days at sea
Port of Montevideo, Uruguay- 6,695 nautical miles; 13.9 days at sea
Port of Antwerp, Belgium- 5,208 nautical miles; 10.8 days at sea

Using 20 Knots Speed
Port of NY/NJ- 1,465 nautical miles; 3.1 days at sea
Port of Norfolk, Virginia- 1,165 nautical miles; 2.4 days at sea
Port of Houston, Texas- 1,097 nautical miles; 2.3 days at sea
Port of New Orleans, Louisiana- 826 nautical miles; 1.7 days at sea
Port of Mobile, Alabama- 731 nautical miles; 1.5 days at sea
Port of Jacksonville, Florida- 560 nautical miles; 1.2 days at sea

The Republic of Cuba reported production of 455 million kilograms (116,697,363 gallons) of fresh milk in 2020.  According to the Montevideo, Uruguay-based Pan American Dairy Federation, each person should have access to 150 liters (39.6 gallons) of milk per year.  For the Republic of Cuba’s 11.3 million residents, that would be 450,870,000 gallons.  

In 2019, the Republic of Cuba was reported to have imported approximately US$136 million in Concentrated Milk, the country’s fifth-largest import;  the Republic of Cuba was the 36th largest global importer of Concentrated Milk.  The primary reported country sources were: New Zealand (US$47.2 million), Uruguay (US$33.5 million), The Netherlands (US$14.6 million), Belgium (US$13.4 million), Mexico (US$9.08 million), Germany (US$4.22 million). 

In 2020, the Republic of Cuba was reported to have imported powdered milk primarily from three countries- New Zealand (18,470 metric tons valued at US$62,594,000.00), Belgium (6,628 metric tons valued at US$19,913,000.00), Germany (reported US$8,560,000.00 and US$15,812,000.00), and Uruguay (3,695 metric tons valued at US$13,334,000.00) according to Geneva, Switzerland-based Trade Map.  

In 2021, the average price of United States-sourced whole milk powder exports was US$3,110.00 per metric ton compared to US$2,981.00 per metric ton in 2020.  In 2021, the average price of United States-sourced skim milk powder exports was US$2,768.00 per metric ton compared to US$2,475.00 per metric ton in 2020.   

In November 2021, the average export price for Nonfat Dried Milk and Skim Milk Powder (NFDM/SMP) was US$3,075.00 per metric ton and Whole Milk Powder (WMP) was US$3,199.00 per metric ton.  For shipping (with inland freight cost unknown), given container price inflation, perhaps US$1,000.00 per container (less than United States West Coast to China) which would equate to average approximately US$80.00 per metric ton (US$3.5 cents per pound).  

From Statistics New Zealand (9 February 2022) 

0402100002 Dairy produce; milk and cream, concentrated or containing added sugar or other sweetening matter, skimmed milk powder, spray process, fat content not over 1.5%.  Kilograms: 

2018: US$2,167,840.00 (1,008,000 Kilograms)
2019: US$3,050,040.00 (1,410,500 Kilograms)
2020: None
2021: None
2022: Not Yet Reported

0402210019 Dairy produce; whole milk powder, concentrated, not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter, of a fat content exceeding 1.5% (by weight), n.e.c. in item no. 0402.21.  Kilograms: 

2018: US$16,925,161.00 (5,516,125 Kilograms; 5,516 Metric Tons)
2019: US$44,660,178.00 (13,893,675 Kilograms; 13,893 Metric Tons)
2020: US$65,931,561.00 (18,223,875 Kilograms; 18,224 Metric Tons)
2021: US$22,063,547.00 (6,297,400 Kilograms; 6,297 Metric Tons)
2022: Not Yet Reported

Trade Sanctions Reform And Export Enhancement Act Of 2000 (TSREEA) 

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis only) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose.  Since December 2001 when the first purchases were delivered using provisions of the TSREEA, more than US$6,572,910,533.00 in agricultural commodities and food products have been delivered directly from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  

Powdered Milk Highest Year Exports From The United States To The Republic Of Cuba 

Total milk exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba since 2001 are approximately US$109 million. 

Milk & Cream CNTD W/N SWT POWDER GRAN/SLDS 1.5% (highest years)
2008- US$13,304,622.00 (4.08% of total 2008 exports to Cuba)
2006- US$12,568,170.00 (3.69% of total 2006 exports to Cuba)
2005- US$29,584,712.00 (8.44% of total 2005 exports to Cuba)
2004- US$25,691,962.00 (6.55% of total 2004 exports to Cuba)

HS Code (0402100000): Dairy produce; milk and cream, not concentrated, no containing added sugar or other sweetening matter, of a fat content, by weight, exceeding 1% but not exceeding 6%. 

A very small quantity of MILK AND CREAM CNTD W/N SWT POWDER GRAN/SLDS 1.5% was exported to the Republic of Cuba since 2004. 

HS Code (0401100000): Dairy produce; milk and cream, not concentrated, no containing added sugar or other sweetening matter, of a fat content, by weight, not exceeding 1%. 

2021- US$19,163.00 (.006% of total 2021 exports to Cuba)

HS Code (0401500000): Milk & Cream, Not Concntrd/swtn, Fat Contnt Ov 10% (l)
HS Code (0402990000): Milk/Cream, Whthr/not Concentrated, Sweetnd, Nesoi (kg)

The Governor Of New York Debacle                

From 20/21 April 2015, then Governor of the State of New York, The Honorable Andrew Cuomo (D), embarked on a twenty-seven (27) hour quixotic journey to the Republic of Cuba.  To date, there have been no published reports of exports of products to the Republic of Cuba from the seven (7) participating companies.  The Governor and his staff (more than fifteen participated including seven focused upon media) embraced the “planting seeds” analogy… There are few seeds that do not create something within seven years.  Governor Cuomo neither included a representative of the New York State Department of Agriculture & Markets nor a representative of the Albany, New York-based New York Farm Bureau.  He included two companies that produce agricultural products (yogurt and dairy); neither obtained orders.  One of the companies was New Berlin, New York-based Chobani Global Holdings, LLC.   

A member of the delegation was Mr. Kevin Ellis, Chief Executive Officer of Auburn, New York-based Cayuga Milk Ingredients which processes approximately one billion gallons annually of milk.  Mr. Ellis, despite efforts to follow-up directly with Republic of Cuba government-operated entities and obtain directly assistance from Governor Cuomo, reported receiving neither responses nor orders.     

In 2020, the average cost per metric ton of milk powder from Auburn, New York, to Port Mariel, Republic of Cuba, was US$2,385.00 with shipping from the Port of New York/New Jersey (NY/NJ) adding US$185.00 per metric ton.  From the Port of NY/NJ to Port Mariel is 1,465 nautical miles taking approximately 3.1 days at sea. 

U.S. Exporters Have An Inverted Advantage

Given the Republic of Cuba's chronic shortage of foreign exchange, inability to remain current on sovereign debt, and routinely unable to pay as per contracted terms commercial debt owed by Republic of Cuba government-operated companies, there are an increasingly decreasing number of sources for credit.   

As a result, the Republic of Cuba has been forced to increase the percentage of purchases made with cash.   

Imports of agricultural commodities and food products from the United States are required by United States law to be paid for in cash; and shipping from the United States to the Republic of Cuba is from one to three days.   

For the Republic of Cuba, no longer is paying more for commodities solely due to the receipt of extended payment terms always a viable option- because the option is increasingly not available.    

At present, the less credit available to the Republic of Cuba inversely increases the value of sourcing exports from the United States despite the Republic of Cuba’s distain of laws, regulations, and policies of the United States.  The current landscape is for United States companies neither viable nor preferred for the long term. 

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Links To Related Analyses 

January 2022 Economic Eye On Cuba Monthly U.S. Export Report 

Coffee & Charcoal Have Been Imported From Cuba; U.S. Companies Want More. Agricultural Commodities/Food Products/Healthcare Products Have Been Exported To Cuba; U.S. Companies Want More. October 02, 2021 

AFP
Paris, France
3 February 2022

In the early days of communism in Cuba, Fidel Castro had pledged that every child under seven would have a liter of subsidized milk every day. For some time, they did -- but today, many go without.  To circumvent the US embargo against Cuba and lagging domestic production, milk has to come from the other side of the world in an obstacle race that deprives many on the island of the staple.  

Regla Caridad Zayas, a 59-year-old diabetic, said the milk powder that the Cuban state supplies monthly to her and others with special dietary needs dried up months ago. She is supposed to get a kilo of powder, which makes 10 liters (2.6 gallons) of milk, every month. Sitting at a rickety table from which she sells coffee outside her house, Zayas said the bodegas, or subsidized food stores, no longer carry the commodity.  In the supermarket, it is also nigh impossible to find: milk has become the latest casualty in a long history of chronic food shortages in Cuba, which on Monday marks six decades of US sanctions. And it will continue to be in short supply in Havana and four other provinces, due to a lack of "financing, boats and suppliers," Internal Trade Minister Betsy Diaz said in October.  

To find milk powder, Cuba looks all the way to New Zealand -- its main supplier with 18,470 tons in 2020 -- as well as Belgium (6,628 tons) and Uruguay (3,695 tons), according to specialized export and import data site Trade Map.  Official Cuban data shows that the island produced 455 million kilograms of fresh milk in 2020, far short of what it needs.  According to the PanAmerican Dairy Federation, each person should have access to 150 liters of milk per year -- some 1.6 billion liters, and about the same in kilograms, for Cuba's 11.2 million inhabitants.  

The cheapest and easiest would be to get the milk from the United States -- one of the world's largest exporters and less than 200 kilometers (124 miles) from Cuba's coastline.  Since 2000, food products have been excluded from the US embargo on trade with Havana. But Cuba must pay cash and in advance -- onerous conditions for a country in deep economic crisis, with little foreign exchange and no access to loans.  Getting products from the other side of the planet is not easy, either: more than 10,000 containers of food and other products were stuck last month in ports around the world due to pandemic supply chain issues, the government said.  

For decades, revolutionary leader-turned-president Fidel Castro made a point of supplying cheap, subsidized milk to all children under the age of seven and people with chronic diseases. His brother and successor Raul proposed in 2007 to go even further by "producing milk so that all those who want to drink a glass of milk can do it."  But today, even the guaranteed monthly ration of three kilos of powdered milk for children is running out. For other recipients such as Zayas, there is none.  “Truly, everything is disappearing," said Claudia Coronado, a 29-year-old mother of two children aged three and seven, while standing in one of Havana's ubiquitous food queues. "We were used to not having chicken for a month, but milk, that was always sacrosanct.”  "I have a daughter of eight, she's no longer getting milk," said Jenny Mora, 29, who said she often has no choice but to turn to the black market and pay exorbitant prices.  

The store outside of which the two women are queuing only accepts foreign currency -- itself also only available on the parallel market. A sachet of one kilogram (two pounds) of milk powder costs $6.30 -- a fortune in a country where the average monthly salary is $163.  Economist Omar Everleny Perez said that without government help, it was more profitable for farmers to sell their product on the black market.  Farmer Domingo Diaz, 79, blames the US embargo for "about 90 percent" of the milk shortage. He blames the communist government for the rest. Though it raised the purchase price to help producers, the government did nothing to secure access to cow feed, he said. undernourished, the animals produce very little. "The milk problem affects everyone, it drives me mad, too," said Diaz, as he tried to squeeze milk from a lean beast.

Is ZIM Of Israel Servicing Port In Cuba? Yes, 2016 Through 2021. Unclear Is 2022. Fear Of Becoming Sixth Shipping Company To Be Defendant In Libertad Act Lawsuit? Cautious? Or All Normal?

Is Israel’s ZIM Shipping Servicing Cuba? Yes, 2016 To 2021. Unclear In 2022.
Was Simple To Obtain Shipping Information And Schedules In 2021.

Is ZIM Concerned?  A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S, CMA CGM Group, Crowley Maritime Corporation, MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company SA, Seaboard Marine, Ltd. Defendants In Libertad Act Title III Lawsuits.     

Haifa, Israel-based ZIM Integrated Shipping Services Ltd. (2021 revenues approximately US$9 billion) has provided services for the Republic of Cuba and from the United States to the Republic of Cuba including to Terminal de Contanedores de Mariel SA (TC Mariel).    

  • No reference to the Republic of Cuba in the Zim Integrated Shipping Services Limited in 31 December 2019 Consolidated Financial Statements.  

  • No reference to the Republic of Cuba in Form 20-F submitted on 21 March 2021 to the United States Securities And Exchange Commission (SEC). 

  • Reference to the Republic of Cuba under the caption “Intra America & Caribbean” as CUX- Cuba Express on page eleven of the fifteen-page Zim Complete Sales KitLINK 

  • Reference to the Republic of Cuba in the three-page ZIM World Trade Lines under the caption “Intra America & Caribbean” as CUX- Cuba Express on page two.  LINK 

In October 2016, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury revised a regulation that prohibits unless authorized by the OFAC a vessel that visits the Republic of Cuba from entering a port in the United States within 180 days of its departure from the Republic of Cuba.  Vessels originating from ports outside of the United States and transiting through the Republic of Cuba may use the 180-day rule revision provided the vessel does not load non-approved cargoes bound for the United States.  ZIM Integrated Shipping Services Ltd provided service from the Port of Mobile. Alabama, and the Port of Mariel, Republic of Cuba. 

On 30 December 2020, ZIM Integrated Shipping Services Ltd. filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a registration statement on Form F-1 for an Initial Public Offering (IPO) in the United States.  The company expected to raise US$300 million to US$500 million providing the company with a market capitalization of US$1.5 billion.  New York, New York-based Citigroup Inc., New York, New York-based Goldman Sachs & Co., LLC., and London, United Kingdom-based Barclays plc were global coordinators and New York, New York-based Jefferies Group LLC and Oslo, Norway-based Clarksons Platou Securities AS acted as joint bookrunners for the proposed offering.   

Mr. Eyal Ofer, a member of the family that controls ZIM Integrated Shipping Services Ltd., has since 1995 served as a Director of Miami, Florida-based Royal Caribbean Group (2019 revenues US$10.9 billion).  Ofer family members have been major shareholders of Royal Caribbean Group. 

Eyal M. Ofer has served as a director of the Company since May 1995. Mr. Ofer is a global maritime shipping and real estate business leader and philanthropist. As the Chairman of a multi-generational family group, Ofer Global, he leads a private portfolio of international businesses principally focused on shipping, real estate, energy, technology, banking and investments. Its interests span Europe, North America, the Near East, Australasia and South East Asia. Mr. Ofer heads Ofer Global’s various divisions, including: Zodiac Group, an international shipping enterprise operating a diversified fleet of over 160 vessels worldwide; Global Holdings Group, a real estate holding group specializing in large scale iconic office buildings, hotels and luxury residential developments, as well as other investment and development assets; and O.G. Tech Ventures, a single LP Venture Capital fund with a focus on Round A tech investments. Mr. Ofer also chairs the Eyal & Marilyn Ofer Family Foundation, a philanthropic foundation established for the charitable giving of his family in support of education and the arts.” 

From the Royal Caribbean Group 2019 Form SEC 10-K filing: “On August 27, 2019, two lawsuits were filed against Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, also known as the Helms-Burton Act.” 

“Libertad Act” 

The Trump Administration on 2 May 2019 made operational Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).  Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.  Thus far, forty-two (42) Title III lawsuits have been filed in jurisdictions throughout the United States.  LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Statistics  

Port Mariel 

The Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba-controls Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), which has interests in the tourism, financial investment, import/export, and remittance sectors.  The Special Development Zone of Mariel (ZEDM) is managed by Republic of Cuba government-operated Almacenes Universales S.A., a subsidiary of GAESA.  Almacenes Universales S.A. focuses upon “professional, technical and skilled workers linked to logistics activities, warehousing, transportation and port activities.”   

GAESA is on the State Department’s List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (“Cuba Restricted List” or “CRL”).  The CRL is a list of entities and subentities “under the control of, or acting for or on behalf of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba.”  GAESA is on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons by the OFAC pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), 31 C.F.R. part 515.  

Since 2013, vessels from the United States and other countries have been calling at TC Mariel, located approximately forty (road) miles from the city of Havana.  TC Mariel is managed by Singapore-based PSA International Pte Ltd (2019 revenues approximately US$4 billion).  The container terminal is within the 180-square-mile ZEDM.  The facility has 2,300 feet of jetty and four quay cranes which can accommodate 13,000 TEU Neo-Panamax vessels.    

Libertad Act Lawsuits Filed Against Shipping Companies For Using Port Mariel 

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL; EMMA RUTH BLANCO, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF ALFREDO BLANCO ROSELL, JR; HEBE BLANCO MIYARES, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF BYRON BLANCO ROSELL; SERGIO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, in his personal capacity, and as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF ENRIQUE BLANCO ROSELL; EDUARDO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF FLORENTINO BLANCO ROSELL; LIANA MARIA BLANCO; SUSANNAH VALENTINA BLANCO; LYDIA BLANCO BONAFONTE; JACQUELINE M. DELGADO; BYRON BLANCO, JR.; MAGDELENA BLANCO MONTOTO; FLORENTINO BLANCO DE LA TORRE; JOSEPH E. BUSHMAN; CARLOS BLANCO DE LA TORRE; and GUILLERMO BLANCO DE LA TORRE; Plaintiffs, v. MSC MEDITERRANEAN SHIPPING COMPANY SA. [1:21-cv-23400; Florida Southern District].  Clerk Default Judgement Entered By Court On 1/25/22.   

Horr, Novak & Skipp, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Offices Of John S. Gaebe P.A. (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (defendant)

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL; EMMA RUTH BLANCO, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF ALFREDO BLANCO ROSELL, JR; HEBE BLANCO MIYARES, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF BYRON BLANCO ROSELL; SERGIO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, in his personal capacity, and as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF ENRIQUE BLANCO ROSELL; EDUARDO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF FLORENTINO BLANCO ROSELL; LIANA MARIA BLANCO; SUSANNAH VALENTINA BLANCO; LYDIA BLANCO BONAFONTE; JACQUELINE M. DELGADO; BYRON BLANCO, JR.; MAGDALENA BLANCO MONTOTO; FLORENTINO BLANCO DE LA TORRE; JOSEPH E. BUSHMAN; CARLOS BLANCO DE LA TORRE; and GUILLERMO BLANCO DE LA TORRE; Plaintiffs, v. CMA CGM S.A. (a/k/a CMA CGM THE FRENCH LINE; a/k/a CMA CGM GROUP); CMA CGM (AMERICA) LLC.  [1:21-cv-22778; Southern Florida District]  

Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Horr, Novak & Skipp P.A. (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe P.A. (plaintiff)

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL; EMMA RUTH BLANCO, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF ALFREDO BLANCO ROSELL, JR; HEBE BLANCO MIYARES, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF BYRON BLANCO ROSELL; SERGIO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, in his personal capacity, and as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF ENRIQUE BLANCO ROSELL; EDUARDO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF FLORENTINO BLANCO ROSELL; LIANA MARIA BLANCO; SUSANNAH VALENTINA BLANCO; LYDIA BLANCO BONAFONTE; JACQUELINE M. DELGADO; BYRON DIAZ BLANCO, JR.; MAGDELENA BLANCO MONTOTO; FLORENTINO BLANCO DE LA TORRE; JOSEPH E. BUSHMAN; CARLOS BLANCO DE LA TORRE; and GUILLERMO BLANCO DE LA TORRE VERSUS A.P. MOLLER-MAERSK A/S (a/k/a A.P. MOLLER-MAERSK GROUP); MAERSK A/S (a/k/a MAERSK LINE A/S); MAERSK, INC.; and MAERSK AGENCY U.S.A., INC [2:21-cv-00339; Eastern District of Louisiana].

Pusateri, Johnston, Guillot & Greenbaum, LLC (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. CROWLEY MARITIME CORPORATION, Defendant. [3:20-cv-01426 Middle District Florida; Transferred To Florida Southern District 1:21-cv-20443]. 

Murphy & Anderson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe P.A. (plaintiff)
Horr, Novak & Skipp P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable LLP (defendant)

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD   MARINE, LTD., Defendant. [1:20-cv-25176; Southern Florida District].

Horr, Novak & Skipp, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields (plaintiff)
Barakat Law (plaintiff)
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (defendant)

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

LINKS To Previously-Published Analyses 

Will Israel Shipping Company About To IPO In U.S. Become 33rd Libertad Act Lawsuit? Project For Jared Kushner?  January 06, 2021 

Journal of Commerce: Mariel port head outlines Cuba’s long-term shipping prospects September 05, 2016

Below As Of 6 February 2022

Below As Of 6 January 2021

World's Largest Shipping Company, MSC Of Switzerland, To Respond (As Expected) To Clerk Default Judgement In Libertad Act Lawsuit For Using Cuba Port; Retains Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer

From MSC: “At MSC we offer reliable and efficient shipping services to and from Cuba, for a host of markets and suppliers seeking to do business in and out of the Republic of Cuba.  If this is the first time you’ve shipped to the largest island in the Caribbean be sure to take a look at our in-depth country guide, covering everything from general trade information to import and export procedures, designed to ensure the smooth transport of your goods to or from Cuba.” 

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL; EMMA RUTH BLANCO, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF ALFREDO BLANCO ROSELL, JR; HEBE BLANCO MIYARES, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF BYRON BLANCO ROSELL; SERGIO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, in his personal capacity, and as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF ENRIQUE BLANCO ROSELL; EDUARDO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF FLORENTINO BLANCO ROSELL; LIANA MARIA BLANCO; SUSANNAH VALENTINA BLANCO; LYDIA BLANCO BONAFONTE; JACQUELINE M. DELGADO; BYRON BLANCO, JR.; MAGDELENA BLANCO MONTOTO; FLORENTINO BLANCO DE LA TORRE; JOSEPH E. BUSHMAN; CARLOS BLANCO DE LA TORRE; and GUILLERMO BLANCO DE LA TORRE; Plaintiffs, v. MSC MEDITERRANEAN SHIPPING COMPANY SA. [1:21-cv-23400; Florida Southern District].  Clerk Default Judgement Entered By Court On 1/25/22.   

Horr, Novak & Skipp, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Offices Of John S. Gaebe P.A. (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (defendant)

Excerpt: 

“Defendant MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company SA SHALL file its response to the Complaint, (ECF No. 1), on or before Monday, May 9, 2022. No extensions will be granted absent compelling circumstances.”  

Links To Court Filings
Order On Final Default Judgement Procedure (1/28/22)
Certificate Of Service (2/5/22)
Joint Stipulation Regarding Waiver Of Service Of Summons, Set Aside Of The Entry Of Default, And Response To The Complaint (2/7/22)
Order Reopening Case (2/8/22)

First Clerk Default Judgement: Switzerland-Based MSC Shipping Does Not Respond To Libertad Act Lawsuit. Judge Must Rule. Will Defendant Challenge? Probably. Damages Trial Likely Next.  January 25, 2022

LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

96,760 Cuban Nationals Entered Re-Emerging Private Sector In 2021. Number Of Micro, Small & Medium-Size Enterprises (MSME's) Increased To 1,812.

Granma
Havana, Republic of Cuba
7 February 2022

Aumentó en 2021 la motivación por el trabajo: se emplearon 236 000 cubanos

De acuerdo con los datos del MTSS, a 236 000 personas se les asignó ocupación, y 12 655 no se ubicaron, pero accedieron a cursos de habilitación para desempeñar oficios y empezaron a prepararse

Autor: Yenia Silva Correa

La implementación de la Tarea Ordenamiento, desde su concepción, procura propiciar mayor interés por incorporarse a trabajar, y, cuantitativamente, esa motivación aumentó en 2021.

«Si en 2020 el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (MTSS) registró que se emplearon unas 147 000 personas, al cerrar 2021 se habían ubicado 236 000», explicó a Granma Ariel Fonseca Quesada, director general de Empleo del MTSS.

Entre las personas de especial interés que el Código de Trabajo reconoce, a partir de la importancia que tiene lograr su ubicación laboral, están los graduados de las enseñanzas superior, técnico-profesional y de las escuelas de oficio, así como los licenciados del servicio militar y quienes egresan de establecimientos penitenciarios.

En 2021, entre quienes acudieron a las direcciones municipales de Trabajo, «los que más aumentaron fueron las personas sin vínculo laboral, y, de estos casos, 169 000 se incorporaron al empleo».

De acuerdo con los datos del MTSS, a 236 000 personas se les asignó ocupación, y 12 655 no se ubicaron, pero accedieron a cursos de habilitación para desempeñar oficios y empezaron a prepararse. Como parte de esta estrategia, se busca atraer más fuerza de trabajo hacia actividades productivas y menos hacia el sector presupuestado.

«El año pasado, el 59 % de esas personas vinculadas se ubicó en el sector estatal, y el 41 % restante en el no estatal. De los trabajadores que se insertaron en el sector estatal, el 70 % lo hizo en el ámbito empresarial y el 30 % en el presupuestado». Fonseca Quesada especificó que «de ese 30 %, más de la mitad se incorporó al sector de la Salud, vinculada al enfrentamiento a la covid-19».

También el año pasado se emplearon más de 5 000 personas en el ramo cooperativo, «en el cual todavía hay reservas de empleo».

Las cifras hablan del interés del Estado en ofrecer trabajo a mujeres y jóvenes, pues el 35 % de los ubicados no rebasa los 35 años, y el 34 % es del sexo femenino.

«Lo que originó que aumentara la motivación para el empleo se mantiene; ahora tenemos que lograr que las estrategias de empleo en los municipios se parezcan y respondan a las necesidades reales del desarrollo local, y que incluso, desde la comunidad se genere la posibilidad de trabajar», argumentó el Director General de Empleo del MTSS.

English Translation (Google)

Motivation for work increased in 2021: 236,000 Cubans were employed

According to MTSS data, 236,000 people were assigned a job, and 12,655 were not located, but they accessed qualification courses to perform trades and began to prepare

Author: Yenia Silva Correa

The implementation of the Planning Task, from its conception, seeks to foster greater interest in joining work, and, quantitatively, this motivation increased in 2021.

"If in 2020 the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MTSS) registered that some 147,000 people were employed, by the end of 2021 236,000 had been located," Ariel Fonseca Quesada, general director of Employment of the MTSS, explained to Granma.

Among the people of special interest that the Labor Code recognizes, based on the importance of achieving their job location, are graduates of higher education, technical-professional and trade schools, as well as graduates of military service. and those who leave penitentiary establishments.

In 2021, among those who went to the municipal Labor directorates, "those who increased the most were people without employment, and, of these cases, 169,000 joined employment."

According to MTSS data, 236,000 people were assigned a job, and 12,655 were not located, but accessed qualification courses to perform trades and began to prepare. As part of this strategy, it seeks to attract more labor force to productive activities and less to the budgeted sector.

«Last year, 59% of those linked people were located in the state sector, and the remaining 41% in the non-state sector. Of the workers who entered the state sector, 70% did so in the business sphere and 30% in the budgeted sector. Fonseca Quesada specified that “of that 30%, more than half joined the Health sector, linked to the confrontation with covid-19.”

Also last year, more than 5,000 people were employed in the cooperative branch, "in which there are still job reserves."

The figures speak of the interest of the State in offering work to women and young people, since 35% of those located do not exceed 35 years of age, and 34% are female.

“What caused the motivation for employment to increase remains; Now we have to ensure that the employment strategies in the municipalities resemble and respond to the real needs of local development, and that even, from the community, the possibility of working is generated, "argued the General Director of Employment of the MTSS.

From U.S. Department Of State: There Is A "lack of trained mechanics on the island to service electric vehicles." So, Who Are Servicing These Vehicles? Is The Video "Fake News"

Ministry of Transport of the Republic of Cuba (MINTRANS): Before 2030, MINTRANS plans for 45% of the total number of vehicles owned by Republic of Cuba government-operated companies will be electric vehicles.  A goal is to introduce more than 56,000 electric vehicles of which about 36,000 will be imported while 17,000 will be retrofitted from existing combustion engine vehicles.  A goal is to install 38,000 charging stations throughout the country with 16,000 fast charging stations and the remainder slow or semi-fast charging stations.  An additional 2,000 slow and fast charging stations will in public places while 180 50KV fast charging stations will be located to supply public services.  The first Cuban company to utilize electric vehicles in the Republic of Cuba was Republic of Cuba government-operated Aguas de la Habana.  The company operates a twenty-two Nissan e-NV200 vehicles.  LINK To YouTube Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uNhxN0aevXc

On 3 December 2021, a spokesperson of the United States Department of State was quoted: “The Biden Administration has clearly articulated the United States’ goal to accelerate and deploy electric vehicles and charging stations, create good-paying, union jobs, and enable a clean transportation future to combat climate change. However, the United States Embassy in Cuba does not operate any electric vehicles nor has any solar power charging stations at our Embassy compound or residences in Havana. At this time, it would be unlikely that the United States Embassy consider importing one or more electric vehicles for use in Cuba in the near future due to impediments in the electrical infrastructure and lack of trained mechanics on the island to service electric vehicles.”   

Currently operating in the Republic of Cuba are Amsterdam, Netherlands-based Stellantis N.V.-owned Sochaux, France-based Peugeot DTSR-171 electric vans (through Republic of Cuba-based distributor) and Yokohama, Japan-based Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., Nissan NV200e electric vans. Republic of Cuba government-operated companies Aguas de la Habana (with twenty-two vehicles) and ETECSA use electric vans. These companies would not be using electric vehicles in the Republic of Cuba if mechanics were lacking. 

Links To Republic Of Cuba EV-Related Analyses

U.S. Department Of State Appoints "Chief Sustainability Officer"- Mandate Text Includes Focus On "Electrifying Fleet" And "Host Partners" Does This Mean EVs For Cuba? President Biden Supports? February 10, 2022 

While Promoting EV Use In The United States, Biden-Harris Administration Refuses To Permit Exports Of EVs To Cuba For Use By Re-Emerging Private Sector- And U.S. Embassy In Havana Does Not Want One. February 08, 2022

Surprise Decision: Biden-Harris Administration Renews Trump-Pence Administration License To Export EVs To Embassies In Cuba. Company Offers To Donate EV Chargers To U.S. Embassy/Ambassador Residence  January 25, 2022 

President Biden Rejects BIS License Application To Export Electric Vehicles/Chargers To Cuba's Self-Employed, MSME's. Reversal Of "General Policy Of Approval." President Trump Authorized EV Exports.  December 20, 2021  

Beginning Today Residents Of Cuba May Purchase And Install Residential Solar Systems. Cost 55,000.00 Pesos (US$2,300.00). Call 7833-3333.  November 04, 2021  

Cuba Has Nickel And Cobalt. Vehicle Electric Batteries Use Nickel And Cobalt. Cuba Should Benefit.  September 25, 2021  

Cuba Owes Partner Canada's Sherritt International Corporation Tens Of Millions Of US Dollars. But, Both Cuba & Patient Company (And Shareholders) Anticipate Profitable Role With Electric VehiclesJuly 03, 2021  

Restriction On Sale Of Premium Gasoline May Benefit Electric Vehicles & Solar Panels; Embassies ConcernedApril 07, 2017  

Florida Company Receives License To Export Electric Vehicles To Cuba; Charging Stations From New Jersey-Based CompanyJanuary 25, 2017

Despite Nickel Prices At Seven-Year High, Cuba Owes Sherritt Approximately CA$156 Million; Sherritt "continues to be in discussion with its Cuban partners to expedite payment of overdue receivables."

Sherritt International Corporation
Toronto, Canada
10 February 2022

“Sherritt is a world leader in the mining and refining of nickel and cobalt -- metals essential for the growing adoption of electric vehicles. Its Technologies Group creates innovative, proprietary solutions for oil and mining companies around the world to improve environmental performance and increase economic value.  Sherritt is also the largest independent energy producer in Cuba.” 

LINK To Review of Financial and Operational Results
LINK To 2021 Fourth Quarter Report (2021 Annual Report)

Q4 Earnings Call- Review of Financial and Operational Results 

Excerpts (emphasis added): 

Cash and cash equivalents at December 31, 2021 were $145.6 million, down from $163.4 million at September 30, 2021. During the quarter, the Moa JV deferred distributions to its partners as it assessed the impact of delays in customer deliveries caused by flooding in B.C. and congestion at the Vancouver port on its expected cash needs. Subsequent to the year end, Sherritt received $8.1 million as its share of Moa JV distributions. 

During the quarter, the Corporation received US$6.5 million in Cuban energy payments, which were offset by the interest payment of $14.8 million on the second lien notes and sustaining capital expenditures of $2.9 million. 

During 2021, Sherritt received a total of $52.8 million in direct and re-directed distributions from the Moa JV and its partner, General Nickel Company S.A. (GNC). 

Received US$6.5 million in Cuban energy payments. Sherritt anticipates continued variability in the timing of collections into 2022, and is working with its Cuban partners to ensure timely receipts. 

Total overdue scheduled receivables at December 31, 2021 were US$156 million, up from US$152.5 million at September 30, 2021. Subsequent to year end, Sherritt received US$2.2 million in Cuban energy payments. Collections on overdue amounts from Sherritt’s Cuban energy partners continue to be adversely impacted by Cuba’s access to foreign currency as a result of ongoing U.S. sanctions and the global pandemic. While Sherritt anticipates improved economic conditions in Cuba in 2022, it continues to anticipate variability in the timing and the amount of energy payments in the near term, and continues to work with its Cuban partners to ensure timely receipt of energy payments. 

Of the $145.6 million of cash and cash equivalents, $64.2 million was held in Canada, down from $82.1 million at September 30, 2021 and $78.9 million was held at Energas, up from $76.7 million at September 30, 2021. The remaining amounts were held in Cuba and other countries. 

Nickel prices hit a seven-year high in Q4 2021, climbing to US$9.59/lb on November 24. The price increase was driven by improving market fundamentals, including strong demand from across multiple industries, consumer stockpiling, reduced inventory levels, and ongoing supply disruptions caused by COVID-19. Rising nickel prices and favourable market conditions were jolted by the rapid spread of the Omicron variant and concerns of its impact on the global economy in early December, causing prices to soften slightly through to the end of the quarter. Nickel prices closed the year at US$9.49/lb, representing a 27% increase for 2021 relative to the closing price of 2020 of US$7.50/lb. 

Since the start of 2022, nickel prices have sustained their recent momentum, reaching US$10.89/lb on January 21, the highest price in more than 10 years. It is anticipated that nickel prices will maintain their current robustness through the end of 2022 based on forecasts provided by industry analysts. 

Strong nickel demand in Q4 was reflected by the continued decrease in inventory levels since the start of 2021. In Q4, nickel inventory levels on the London Metals Exchange (LME) fell by 35% from 157,062 tonnes at the start of the period to 101,886 tonnes on December 31. Similarly, inventory levels on the Shanghai Futures Exchange fell 35% to 2,406 tonnes, down from 3,728 tonnes at the start of the quarter. 

Industry analysts, including Wood Mackenzie and S&P Global, have forecast continued strong demand and market tightness through to the end of the 2022. LME nickel inventories continued to decline in 2022, falling below 100,000 tonnes on January 10, reaching 85,644 tonnes on February 9, the lowest level since November 2019. 

Visibility of market fundamentals, including inventory levels, in the mid-term is limited given the economic uncertainty caused by the pandemic and news from Indonesia suggesting that the country, one of the world’s largest suppliers of nickel, plans to curtail exports in an effort to support a domestic refining and processing activities. 

The long-term outlook for nickel remains bullish on account of the strong demand expected from the stainless steel sector, the largest market for nickel, and the electric vehicle battery market. Some market observers, such as Wood Mackenzie, have forecast a prolonged nickel supply deficit beginning in 2025 due to recent developments in the electric vehicle market and insufficient nickel production coming on stream in the near term. 

Over the past year, multiple automakers and governments have announced plans for significant investments to expand electric vehicle production capacity to meet growing demand as well as more aggressive timelines to phase out the sale of internal combustion engines. In 2021, more than 6.5 million plug-in electric vehicles were sold despite the global pandemic. Industry observers estimate that the number of electric vehicles sold in 2022 will grow to 8.6 million units. CRU has forecast that electric vehicles sales will grow to 17.4 million units by 2025. 

As a result of its unique properties, high-nickel cathode formulations remain the dominant choice for long-range electric vehicles manufactured by automakers with Class 1 nickel being an essential feedstock in the battery supply chain. Sherritt is particularly well positioned given our Class 1 production capabilities and the fact that Cuba possesses the world’s fourth largest nickel reserves. 

Cobalt prices rose steadily in Q4 2021, closing on December 31 at US$33.78/lb, up 30% from US$25.88/lb at the start of the quarter according to data collected by Fastmarkets MB. 

Higher cobalt prices in Q4 2021 were primarily driven by increased buying from electric vehicle battery manufacturers. Cobalt is a key component of rechargeable batteries providing energy stability. Higher cobalt prices in Q4 2021 were also impacted by increased stockpiling by consumers and ongoing supply logistics disruptions in South Africa, where cobalt produced in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the source of almost two-thirds of the world’s supply, is sent before being shipped internationally. 

Industry observers, such as CRU, expect cobalt prices to continue to be robust in the near term as limited new sources of supply have been announced to fill expected demand over the next five years. 

The outlook for cobalt over the long term remains bullish as demand is expected to grow to approximately 280,000 tonnes by 2025, representing a compound annual growth rate of 13.5% according to CRU. 

Sherritt continues to be in discussion with its Cuban partners to expedite payment of overdue receivables, increase availability of natural gas needed for power production activities, and extend the power generation agreement with Energas, which is currently slated to expire in March 2023. In Q4 2021, Sherritt received approval from the Energas board for a feasibility study extending the Power agreement, and submitted a formal application for the extension to the Cuban government. 

Forward-Looking Statements 

These risks, uncertainties and other factors include, but are not limited to, the impact of infectious diseases (including the COVID-19 pandemic), changes in the global price for nickel, cobalt, fertilizer, oil, gas, or certain other commodities; security market fluctuations and price volatility; level of liquidity; access to capital; access to financing; the risk to Sherritt’s entitlements to future distributions from the Moa Joint Venture; uncertainty about the pace of technological advancements required in relation to achieving ESG targets; identification and management of growth opportunities risk of future non-compliance with debt restrictions and covenants; Sherritt’s ability to replace depleted mineral reserves; risks associated with the Corporation’s joint venture partners; variability in production at Sherritt’s operations in Cuba; risks related to Sherritt’s operations in Cuba; risks related to the U.S. government policy toward Cuba, including the U.S. embargo on Cuba and the Helms-Burton legislation; potential interruptions in transportation;

U.S. Department Of State Appoints "Chief Sustainability Officer"- Mandate Text Includes Focus On "Electrifying Fleet" And "Host Partners" Does This Mean EVs For Cuba? President Biden Supports?

The White House
Washington DC
9 February 2022

Remarks by President Biden at a Roundtable with CEOs of Electric Utilities to Discuss His Build Back Better Agenda

State Dining Room: “I asked the question for a selfish reason. Because when I said -- this is going to generate jobs well beyond your site. And -- and so, there are going to be people manufacturing those battery storage facilities. People man- -- I mean -- so I mean, this has such a ripple effect that -- God willing. And what's going to happen is, I predict -- you know, right now, in some cases, China is ahead of us, but I think we're going to end up having a significant export market as well that's going to create thousands of good-paying jobs here in the United States.  It's going to be in our interests to have this, you know, move around the world.” 

United States Department of State
Washington DC
9 February 2022

Designation of Under Secretary for Management John R. Bass as Chief Sustainability Officer

Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

With a footprint in nearly every country, the Department of State has seen firsthand the impacts of a changing climate on our operations.  From drought to worsening air quality, the climate crisis has not only had implications for our personnel and their families, but also our host country partners around the world.  The years ahead will be critical to slowing the pace of global temperature rise and preventing the worst impacts of climate change.  The Department of State is mobilizing on all fronts to tackle the climate crisis, including changing the way we operate at home and abroad to curb emissions, improve sustainability, and adapt to climate hazards. 

There has never been a more urgent moment.  That is why I have designated Under Secretary for Management John R. Bass as the Department’s Chief Sustainability Officer.  In this role, he will lead the Department’s efforts to advance the rigorous federal climate and sustainability ambitions and priorities set by the Administration under Executive orders 14008 and 14057.   

Under Secretary Bass will set the vision for and oversee implementation of the Department’s sustainability, adaptation, and resilience goals. He will be supported by the Deputy Chief Sustainability Officer who leads the Greening Diplomacy Initiative within the Office of Management Strategy and Solutions, as well as the Climate and Sustainability Working Group comprising multiple Department bureaus and offices.

The Department is building on more than a decade of climate actions that have curbed emissions, enhanced climate adaptation, and made our operations more sustainable.  We are proud to be the premier federal agency in terms of harnessing renewable energy in our domestic operations and are working to electrify our fleet at home and abroad.  Our embassies and consulates are built to be U.S. Green Building Council Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Silver certified or better, so we can ensure our facilities are resilient and highlight innovative U.S. technologies.  We are also advancing sustainability and resilience in our overseas operations through actions like installing rainwater harvesting systems in drought-stricken areas and installing on-site renewable energy. There is a lot more to be done, however.  I have full confidence that Under Secretary Bass will take our efforts to the next level and demonstrate the Department’s full commitment to leading by example in tackling the climate crisis. 

Biography 

John Bass was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on December 17, 2021, as the Under Secretary for Management.  A career Senior Foreign Service officer, he served as Senior Advisor at the Foreign Service Institute from 2020-2021, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan 2017-2020, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from 2014 to 2017, Executive Secretary of the State Department from 2012 to 2014, and U.S. Ambassador to Georgia from 2009 to 2012. He began his diplomatic career in 1988 and has also served in positions in U.S. missions in Iraq, Italy, Belgium, and Chad.  In Washington, Ambassador Bass’s assignments have included service on Vice President Cheney’s staff, as Chief of Staff and advisor to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, as Director of the State Department’s Operations Center and in several assignments focused on European security issues. He has received numerous State Department performance awards.  The son of a public servant and a U.S. Air Force officer, Bass was born and raised in upstate New York. A graduate of Syracuse University, he speaks Italian and French. He is married to U.S. diplomat Holly Holzer Bass.

Ministry of Transport of the Republic of Cuba (MINTRANS): Before 2030, MINTRANS plans for 45% of the total number of vehicles owned by Republic of Cuba government-operated companies will be electric vehicles.  A goal is to introduce more than 56,000 electric vehicles of which about 36,000 will be imported while 17,000 will be retrofitted from existing combustion engine vehicles.  A goal is to install 38,000 charging stations throughout the country with 16,000 fast charging stations and the remainder slow or semi-fast charging stations.  An additional 2,000 slow and fast charging stations will in public places while 180 50KV fast charging stations will be located to supply public services.  The first Cuban company to utilize electric vehicles in the Republic of Cuba was Republic of Cuba government-operated Aguas de la Habana.  The company operates a twenty-two Nissan e-NV200 vehicles.  LINK To YouTube Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uNhxN0aevXc

Has Cuba Provided An Opportunity For Biden-Harris Administration To Renew Electronic Remittance Services? Orbit S.A. In Cuba Now Permitted To Engage. Can It Meet U.S. Conditions? A False-Flag?

Associated Press
New York, New York
8 February 2022

By Andrea Rodriguez 

Cuba authorized a new financial institution to manage remittances and carry out other transfer operations after Washington blacklisted Fincimex, for 20 years a counterpart of Western Union, the main money transfer company from the United States.  

The Official Gazette published the resolution signed by the president of the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC), Martha Sabina Wilson, accepting Orbit SA's request to "manage and process international transfers from abroad to Cuba" and "provide payment services from abroad through its infrastructure.  Until November 2020, remittances were operated by Western Union with Fincimex, but in the framework of the tightening of United States sanctions on the island, in October of that year the government of then President Donald Trump canceled the permit for the company of his country and included Fincimex in a list of restricted companies, arguing that the Cuban counterpart was part of a conglomerate under military administration. 

The origin of the firm Orbit SA is unknown except for the fact that the BCC resolution indicated in its considerations that it was incorporated on "February 3, 2020 with headquarters in Havana." Nor if Western Union will resume its agreement with the island. with this new financial institution or when the income of remittances will become effective.  

[According to the regulations, the BCC may cancel or modify the license at the request of Orbit S.A. in the event of non-compliance by the entity with the applicable legal provisions in force. The Official Gazette indicates that Orbit S.A., was incorporated by Notarial Deed No. 54, of February 3, 2020, with headquarters in Havana, but no other precise information appears, such as members of the company or corporate purpose.] 

Trump promoted the greatest adjustment of the measures against the Caribbean nation in decades with the aim of pressuring a change in the political model. In addition to the restrictions on remittances, he eliminated the permissions for U.S. travel to the island, issued provisions to suspend cruise ships, and increased persecution of third-country companies operating in Cuba. It also paralyzed consulate and embassy activity.  His successor, Democrat Joe Biden, promised in his electoral campaign r adopt the policy of rapprochement promoted by Barack Obama, but to date has deepened Trump's policy with new sanctions on the grounds that Havana repressed protests in July. Meanwhile, Cuba is going through a severe economic crisis exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic with shortages of food and medicine and lack of fuel. The embargo against Cuba turned 60 last week and was imposed in the framework of the Cold War after the revolution that had triumphed in 1959 with Fidel Castro at the head deepened.  

Last week, a State Department spokesman said the Biden administration was exploring options to facilitate remittances to Cuba while partially reopening the consulate to facilitate obtaining some categories of visas for which Cubans are currently required. travel to Guyana to process them.  

Although the Cuban government never reported the number of remittances entering the country in 2020 – when the pandemic broke out – experts estimated the transfers that emigrants sent to their families on the island at around 3.5 billion dollars. Western Union used to do some 240,000 transactions a month for annual amounts between $900 million and $1.5 billion at its more than 400 branches. Other amounts traveled through banks or through mules or currency dealers. 

LINK TO Gaceta Oficial 4 February 2022

English Translation (Google) 

GOC-2022-122-O13 RESOLUTION 11/2022 WHEREAS: ORBIT S.A. constituted by Notarial Deed No. 54, of 3 February 2020, based in Havana, has requested a license from the Central Bank of Cuba to establish within the national territory a non-banking financial institution, specialized in managing and processing international transfers, as well as providing payment services for goods and services through its infrastructure, in both cases from abroad.  

WHEREAS: Decree-Law 362, “Of the Institutions of the Banking System and Financiero”, of September 14, 2018, in its Article 7.1, establishes that the Bank Central de Cuba, depending on the type of institution to be created, issues the license that corresponds and defines the scope and class of operations to be carried out, as well as any other provisions of mandatory compliance in the exercise of the business of financial intermediation.  

THEREFORE: In the exercise of the powers and attributions conferred in Article 25, subsection d), of Decree-Law 361 "Of the Central Bank of Cuba", of September 14, 2018, I RESOLVE  

FIRST: Grant License in favor of ORBIT S.A. based in Havana, to engage in non-banking financial activity in the Republic of Cuba, under the terms arranged below: 1. Manage and process international transfers from abroad to Cuba. 2. Provide payment services from abroad, through its infrastructure, by goods and services duly authorized, according to current legislation.  

SECOND: ORBIT S.A. applies intensified due diligence to these operations and complies as an obligated subject all the provisions of Decree-Law 317 "On the prevention and combating money laundering, financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”, of December 7, 2013 and its legal provisions complementary. February 4, 2022 OFFICIAL GAZETTE 339  

THIRD PARTY: ORBIT S.A. You will not be able to carry out operations in which you commit with its assets to advance financing to any counterparty, as well as carry out operations reserved exclusively for banks, unless expressly authorized by the Central Bank of Cuba. FOURTH: ORBIT S.A. will request the registration of the License in the Registry of Financial Institutions and Non-Financial Entities attached to the Central Bank of Cuba, within fifteen business days following the notification of this license, in compliance with the provisions of Article 20.2 of Decree-Law 362 of 2018.  

FIFTH: ORBIT S.A. within thirty business days of notification of this Resolution, carries out all the legal procedures that proceed to adapt its legal documentation to what is authorized in this license, and communicates to the Secretary of the Central Bank of Cuba the changes that have taken place.  

SIXTH: The Central Bank of Cuba can cancel or modify this License upon request of ORBIT S.A. or when the provisions of this LICENSE are breached, or in the Decree-Law 362 of September 14, 2018, or other current legal provisions applicable. BE PUBLISHED in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Cuba. FILE the original in the Secretariat of the Central Bank of Cuba. GIVEN in Havana, on the thirty-first day of January, two thousand and twenty-two.   Marta Sabina Wilson Gonzalez Minister

United States Department of State
Washington DC
4 February 2022

QUESTION: Yeah, thank you. Thank you for having me. Yesterday, secretary (inaudible) announced that the United States is considering reestablishing remittances to Cuba. My question is: Does the Biden administration really believe that it would be helping to the Cuban people and not the Miguel Diaz-Canel government? Can you tell us about the measures that the Washington will take to restore remittance to Cuba? Thank you.

MS PORTER: Thanks for your question, Luis. So broadly speaking, our policy towards Cuba focuses first and foremost for the support of the Cuban people, and that would include their political and economic well-being, and that would also include human rights. So that means that we’re committed to promoting accountability for Cuban Government officials involved in any human rights abuses.

I’d also say that, following the July 2021 protests, that the Biden-Harris administration created a remittance working group to explore options to facilitate remittances to Cuba that would go to benefit the Cuban people, and that would allow Cuban families to support one another, and also minimize or eliminate benefits to the – both the Cuban regime and its military.

Also, in August of 2021, the remittance working group shared its analysis, including additional options, with other members of the administration, and the administration continues to consider these options, as well as explore innovative solutions, and that also includes digital payments as a part of these solutions. Outside of that, we don’t have a specific timetable to share at this time.

LINKS To Remittance-Related Analyses 

Cuba Could Resolve Western Union's Certified Claim By Waiving Four Months Of Electronic Remittance Transfer Fees. Biden Administration Should Support And Negotiate Certified Claims Settlement. September 17, 2021 

Biden-Diaz-Canel Remittance Compromise: U.S. And Cuba Companies Suspend Transaction Fees Until 31 December 2021. Impact On 800 Publix Markets July 27, 2021 

U.S. Department Of State Memorandum: The 17 Company Members Of The CRWG- Moving Remittances And Using Remittances; Cuba Entities Need Be Part Of The Process July 26, 2021 

Is Biden-Harris Administration Nearing Decision To Reverse Trump-Pence Administration Prohibition On Cuba Military Earning Money From Remittances? July 15, 2021 

At 6:00 PM Today, Final [For Now] Western Union Transactions With Cuba Are [Temporarily Perhaps] Suspended November 23, 2020 

Cuba Central Bank May Provide Option For Western Union To Continue Services To Cuba: REDSA November 26, 2020 

Western Union Data For Transfers To Cuba: 2.88 Million Annually- 24% To Havana; Florida 1st, Texas 2nd, New Jersey 3rd; US$200,000+ Could Be Aboard Each Flight From Miami November 19, 2020  

Cuba Has Options To Retain Western Union Electronic Remittance Services- Transfer To A Bank? November 17, 2020 

If Western Union Ends Remittance Services To Cuba, That Means A Return Of “Mules On Steroids”- The Impact Could Cripple MIA November 16, 2020 

Western Union Preparing To End Money Transfers To Cuba On 22 November 2020.... Will Cuba Permit It? November 13, 2020 

Cuba Says Western Union's 407 Distribution Points Will Close; Western Union Not Giving Up- 2016 Seems So Long Ago... October 28, 2020 

Western Union Receives A Message From OFAC- Don't Work With Generals, Work With Civilians October 24, 2020 

Western Union May Cease Money Transfers From Outside Of The United States To Cuba February 18, 2020 

Delta Air Lines & Western Union Plus US$1.15 Million Could Be Keys To Resolving Certified Claims June 04, 2019 

Western Union Supporting Entrepreneurship Program For Young Cubans July 09, 2016 

Western Union Expands Operations In Cuba June 07, 2016 

Western Union Expands Remittance Services To Cuba March 21, 2016

Despite Nearing 70% Decrease In Visitor Arrivals, Cuba Increased 2021 Food/Ag Imports From United States By 86.5%- Ranking Cuba 53rd Of 2021 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets.

Given the Republic of Cuba's chronic shortage of foreign exchange, inability to remain current on sovereign debt, and routinely unable to pay as per contracted terms commercial debt owed by Republic of Cuba government-operated companies, there are an increasingly decreasing number of sources for credit.  As a result, the Republic of Cuba has been forced to increase the percentage of purchases made with cash.  Imports of agricultural commodities and food products from the United States are required by United States law to be paid for in cash; and shipping from the United States to the Republic of Cuba is from one to three days.  For the Republic of Cuba, no longer is paying more for commodities solely due to the receipt of extended payment terms always a viable option- because the option is not available.  At present, the less credit available to the Republic of Cuba inversely increases the value of exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, despite, for the Republic of Cuba, its dislike of the commercial, economic, and political laws, regulations, and policies of the United States.  The current landscape is for United States companies neither viable nor preferred for the long term.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
February 2022

December 2021 Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Increase 98.5%- 1
53rd Of 213 December 2021 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
2020-To-2021 Exports Increase 86.5%- 2
For 2021 Cuba Ranked 53rd Of 2021 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets- 2
December 2021 Healthcare Product Exports US$0.00- 2
December 2021 Humanitarian Donations US$1,242,356.00- 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 16


DECEMBER 2021 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 98.5%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in December 2021 were US$28,091,304 compared to US$14,145,158.00 in December 2020 and US$4,371,126.00 in December 2019.

December 2021 Exports Included: Chicken Leg Quarters (Frozen); Chicken Meat (Frozen); Chicken Legs (Frozen); Swine Meat; Woodpulp; Fruit Juices; Baby Food; Mixed Spices; Non-Alcoholic Beverages; Cream (10% Fat).

2021 exports were US$304,774,413.00 compared to 2020 exports of US$163,354,728.00.

Since December 2001, agricultural commodity and food product exports reported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba is US$6,601,001,837.00.

This report contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

Click here for a list of agricultural commodities eligible for export to Cuba under Section 902(1) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000

LINK To Report In PDF Format

While Promoting EV Use In The United States, Biden-Harris Administration Refuses To Permit Exports Of EVs To Cuba For Use By Re-Emerging Private Sector- And U.S. Embassy In Havana Does Not Want One.

The White House
Washington DC
8 February 2022

FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Ensuring Future is Made in America

Tritium Announces EV Charger Manufacturing Facility in Tennessee; To Produce Up To 30,000 Buy America-Compliant Chargers Per Year, Create 500 Jobs

Since his first day in office, President Biden relentlessly focused on an industrial strategy to revitalize our manufacturing base, strengthen critical supply chains, drive down prices, and position U.S. workers and businesses to compete and lead globally in the 21 st century. This whole-of-government effort is leading to a historic recovery in domestic manufacturing. During President Biden’s first year in office, the economy added 367,000 manufacturing jobs – the most in nearly 30 years. The U.S. economy grew at the fastest pace in nearly 40 years in 2021, and manufacturing as a share of U.S. GDP has returned to pre-pandemic levels. Manufacturing activity has seen a significant expansion every month that President Biden has been in office, consistently above pre-pandemic levels.

The Build America, Buy America Act in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law expands on the Biden-Harris Administration’s work to ensure that the future is made in America by American workers by strengthening and expanding Buy America rules to all taxpayer-funded infrastructure and public works projects.

Today, President Biden and Jane Hunter, CEO of Tritium, will announce that Tritium will break ground on its first U.S. manufacturing facility in Lebanon, Tennessee. This facility will house six production lines that will produce up to 30,000 Buy America-compliant DC Fast Chargers per year at peak production and create 500 local jobs.

This is the latest of announcements in recent weeks by major companies announcing investments in U.S. manufacturing and jobs, including Intel, General Motors, and Boeing, and more than $200 billion in investments in domestic manufacturing of semiconductors, electric vehicles, aircraft, and batteries announced since 2021.

In addition to Tritium, EV charging manufacturers large and small are investing and expanding U.S. operations, driven by the Administration’s economic strategy, Made in America policies, and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law:

Siemens, which is investing and expanding its U.S. manufacturing operations to support electric vehicle infrastructure in America, will produce 1 million EV chargers by 2025. This investment, spurred by the passage of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, is the latest in the company’s strategic plan to meet accelerating electric vehicle charging demand, and expand its U.S. manufacturing capabilities.

ABB, which currently manufactures Buy America-compliant transit bus chargers in the U.S., will expand its US EV charging manufacturing operations, including Level 2 and DC Fast Chargers, over the coming five years, employing hundreds of Americans and producing thousands of EV chargers each year.

FreeWire Technologies, based in Oakland, California, currently manufactures Buy America-compliant battery-integrated EV charging equipment, and recently announced groundbreaking on a research, manufacturing, and testing facility in Newark, California. FreeWire currently employs and plans to add more than 200 jobs in electrification and clean energy in and around disadvantaged communities this year.

Dunamis Clean Energy Partners, a Black- and woman-owned EV charger manufacturer based in Detroit, Michigan, will manufacture Level 2 EV chargers and charging connectors in a new production facility in Detroit beginning this summer. Dunamis’ training and workforce development efforts will focus on underrepresented, economically disadvantaged communities most impacted by greenhouse gas emissions.

The future of the auto industry is electric, and America can own that future by building more here at home, creating good-paying jobs in the process. In August, President Biden set an ambitious target and roadmap to get to 50% of electric vehicle (EV) sale shares in the U.S. by 2030. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law included a down payment on the EV future, with more than $7 billion in funding to secure an American EV supply chain, from materials processing to battery manufacturing and recycling, along with $7.5 billion to build out the first-ever nationwide public EV charging network.

This charging network will provide a convenient, reliable, affordable and equitable charging experience, with a focus on serving national highway corridors, rural areas, and underserved communities. It will also accelerate the adoption of electric vehicles, fight the climate crisis, and support domestic manufacturing jobs.

Later this week, Department of Transportation Secretary Buttigieg and Department of Energy Secretary Granholm will announce the state allocations and guidance for the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law’s National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Formula Program, which will provide $5 billion over five years to help states create a network of EV charging stations along designated Alternative Fuel Corridors on the Interstate Highway System.

The Biden-Harris Administration has already taken action to prepare for the build-out of the nationwide public EV charging network.  

In December, Vice President Harris announced the EV Charging Action Plan to outline the steps the Administration is taking to accelerate the EV charging investments in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law.   

In December, the Department of Energy and the Department of Transportation announced the creation of the Joint Office of Energy and Transportation, which will support and accelerate deployment of the national EV charging network, including by providing technical assistance to states as they develop their comprehensive EV charging plans.  

Last week, the Department of Transportation released an EV Rural Charging Toolkit, a one-stop resource for rural communities to plan and implement EV charging infrastructure projects. 

Ministry of Transport of the Republic of Cuba (MINTRANS): Before 2030, MINTRANS plans for 45% of the total number of vehicles owned by Republic of Cuba government-operated companies will be electric vehicles.  A goal is to introduce more than 56,000 electric vehicles of which about 36,000 will be imported while 17,000 will be retrofitted from existing combustion engine vehicles.  A goal is to install 38,000 charging stations throughout the country with 16,000 fast charging stations and the remainder slow or semi-fast charging stations.  An additional 2,000 slow and fast charging stations will in public places while 180 50KV fast charging stations will be located to supply public services.  The first Cuban company to utilize electric vehicles in the Republic of Cuba was Republic of Cuba government-operated Aguas de la Habana.  The company operates a twenty-two Nissan e-NV200 vehicles.  LINK To YouTube Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uNhxN0aevXc

Vice President of the United States Kamala Harris charging an electric vehicle while visiting Maryland.

"The Patissier By Ricardo Velez" In Madrid: Dark Red Cherries Infused In Havana Club 7 Year Rum

The Patissier by Ricardo Velez
C. de Columela, 9
28001 Madrid, Spain

A 3-min walk from the Puerta de Alcalá… 

Dark red cherries in Havana Club 7 Year Rum with sugar and almond oil. 

Editor Note: Over ice cream- a delicious experience.

Minister Admits Issues With Outside Capital- Preserving What Investors Don't Want. Removing Incentives For Private Sector Employees Unhelpful. Private Sector Can't Be "Laboratory Experiment."

H.E. Rodrigo Malmierca Díaz Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment of the Republic of Cuba.

Excerpts From Interview With Bohemia Magazine:

“Then we have other problems associated with the risk rating to do any business. In other words, Cuba is an indebted country, with certain difficulties today to be able to meet its external financial commitments. If the interested party is guided by the criteria of international risk rating agencies, it is not an attractive country to invest in”.

“These are internal decisions. The hiring of personnel through an employing agency responds to its own policies. We have been very careful to try to prevent people who work with foreign capital investments, simply for that reason, and perhaps doing the same thing as another in a state company, from earning much more.

“And that is something that we have tried to preserve through the employing agencies, although foreign investors do not like it. There are also other things they don't like, and we're not going to change them for that. For example, land ownership is State property, it is endorsed in the Constitution.

“Many foreigners want to buy the land where the hotels are going to be built. Here we do not sell it, we give it in usufruct, and it can be long-term. In other places it is sold. This sometimes makes it difficult for investors to come to Cuba.

“Now, beyond these objective obstacles, we have other subjective problems, related to deficiencies and internal failures. For example, the delays in the negotiation processes, the poor or deficient preparation of the projects and the negotiating groups. People say: 'there is a lot of bureaucracy'. Actually that is not the cause of the arrears. In the process of final approval by the Government there are no great delays, but in the companies. The required priority is not given to the IE, and these delays sometimes last for years. Of years".

Bohemia
Havana, Republic of Cuba
27 January 2022

Economy: when investment is pressing

Of external obstacles, internal obstacles, successes and dissatisfactions with foreign investment; controversies about the state monopoly, among other topics, BOHEMIA dialogues exclusively with Rodrigo Malmierca Díaz, Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment

Beyond the objective limitations, if the negotiating processes are assumed with greater efficiency, the benefits for the country would be greater, values ​​Rodrigo Malmierca Díaz, head of the Mincex. (Photo: Yasset Llerena Alfonso).

After a nosedive, the economy begins to emerge slowly, upwards. Many plans and dreams on the Caribbean Island depend on keeping the invisible enemy at bay, the mutant of covid-19, which is turning the planet upside down again. Reaching them will not be easy. Nor impossible. That is why now, perhaps more clearly than ever, it is a question of attracting –almost falling in love– foreign investors, despite the Goliath of the North.

Cuba pursues a desired prosperity, through many sacrifices and resistance. The greatest of his riches is in the town, cheerful, enterprising, educated... However, there is still a lot of fallen leaves to sweep along the way.

Just at two in the afternoon, Rodrigo Malmierca Díaz, head of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment (Mincex), enters the large meeting room impassively. After greeting us with the knuckles of the hands, we thank him for the courtesy of receiving us, despite his busy schedule.

While we taste an aromatic coffee, I review in my memory the last intervention that the Minister made before the Cuban legislators. His affirmation in the plenary: “the results with foreign investment are insufficient”, flutters in my mind.

— What problems slow down or limit the expected impact of foreign investment (EI) in the Cuban economy?

—EI is something relatively new in the Revolution. Before the triumph of January 1959, the country was practically sold to foreign capital, especially the United States. The first steps were to nationalize all those properties, the best lands, the electricity and telephone companies, the sugar mills, and rescue them for the people.

“So we spent almost 30 years of the revolutionary period without going to the IE as something we wanted. Later, at the end of the 1980s, the first attempts were made to attract foreign capital to support the economic and social development plans of the Revolution. I would say that when the first Law 77 was approved in 1995, the attempts we made to attract foreign capital were still very limited. Because we considered it a necessary evil.

“That norm was restrictive in the sense of preserving much national sovereignty – until now that interest is maintained. The same as the majority in all those businesses outside of the Cuban part, at that time few were 50 to 50. Some sectors of the economy were not open to foreign capital, for example, the sugar industry and agriculture itself. A few years ago we started promoting them.

“In the VI Party Congress in 2011, if you look at the Guidelines, EI is still spoken of as a complement to the national effort for the development of the country, and it was not considered an important element. That changes when the policies are approved, at the end of 2013, prior to the new law in June 2014.

“Already in the VII and VIII party congress, the Guidelines speak of the importance of EI as something strategic for the development of the current stage. We began to give it a more relevant role. Now, one could ask: why doesn't foreign capital come en masse to invest in Cuba?

“There are several factors. First, due to the economic, financial and commercial blockade of the United States Government, which has also intensified in recent times. Capital transfers have become very difficult, everything related to the financial sector, banks are threatened with sanctions.

“They activated Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, which allows citizens or companies to sue any company, Cuban or foreign, in the courts of the United States. All of these are real, objective obstacles that create a lot of fear.

“Then we have other problems associated with the risk rating to do any business. In other words, Cuba is an indebted country, with certain difficulties today to be able to meet its external financial commitments. If the interested party is guided by the criteria of international risk rating agencies, it is not an attractive country to invest in”.

—You referred in Parliament to investor complaints, for example, the issue of staff recruitment.

“These are internal decisions. The hiring of personnel through an employing agency responds to its own policies. We have been very careful to try to prevent people who work with foreign capital investments, simply for that reason, and perhaps doing the same thing as another in a state company, from earning much more.

“And that is something that we have tried to preserve through the employing agencies, although foreign investors do not like it. There are also other things they don't like, and we're not going to change them for that. For example, land ownership is State property, it is endorsed in the Constitution.

“Many foreigners want to buy the land where the hotels are going to be built. Here we do not sell it, we give it in usufruct, and it can be long-term. In other places it is sold. This sometimes makes it difficult for investors to come to Cuba.

“Now, beyond these objective obstacles, we have other subjective problems, related to deficiencies and internal failures. For example, the delays in the negotiation processes, the poor or deficient preparation of the projects and the negotiating groups. People say: 'there is a lot of bureaucracy'. Actually that is not the cause of the arrears. In the process of final approval by the Government there are no great delays, but in the companies. The required priority is not given to the IE, and these delays sometimes last for years. Of years".

— Is it a mentality problem?

—Prejudice influences this, because it is true that we spent more than 30 years thinking that EI was a bad thing, and we didn't want it. Some people still have that stuck in their heads. And since December 2016, the army general in a closing of the National Assembly of People's Power, spoke about this, and made a call to banish those prejudices.

“However, it is easier to say it, than for people to really change their mentality. They are subjective, transversal problems in the economy and we have to solve them”.

— Is there a lack of company culture?

—In Cuba we have problems with investments in general. The processes are slow. Feasibility studies do not always comply with what was initially projected. You say, I'm going to do this, I'm going to have a percentage rate of return on investment, and in three or five years I'll pay back the financing. And that in the end is not fulfilled. Neither with foreign investment, nor with the national one.

“With foreign capital we have the challenge that the foreign investor feels attracted to do the business. The attractions that we put at his disposal are not enough, that the staff is prepared and can quickly take on new technologies, the country's stable environment, the tax incentives granted by law. All of that helps. But if the man says: 'I'm going to go to Cuba, and in addition to defying the pressures of the US government, it turns out that they don't give me prompt attention.' Whoever has capital is going to invest it with the aim of making money. If you have to spend a year negotiating, of course that is not attractive.

Economy: when investments are urgent.

The financial measures imposed by the Trump administration were designed – with macabre precision – to strangle the Cuban economy. (Photo: Martha Vecino Ulloa).

“That is why we say, despite all the problems, the blockade, Cuba's risk rating, that we do not have the liquidity to meet our obligations, if we were more efficient when dealing with these negotiation processes, we would have better results.

“That is a battle that we have to fight from the Mincex, because we are the rectors of this activity, and we are called to win it in all sectors of the economy. Because that is where the companies are, the negotiating groups that interact with foreign capital.”

— How much do EI contribute to the national economy?

—Since Law 118 was approved, until today, there are deals agreed for more than 7,000 million dollars. It's not little.

— Is that capital already operational?

—Not everything is operational, because that is another problem. Sometimes we approve the business, and the capital cannot come because the banks do not transfer it. We have this type of difficulties that are closely linked to the US government's blockade.

“If you look at, for example, Cuban exports of rum, tobacco, nickel, telecommunications, they are mainly carried out by businesses with foreign capital. The millions of dollars that Cuba exports, thanks to these associations, add up to many. This is a sample of what the Party and the Government maintain, we need EI, it is good for the economy and we have to promote it”.

Economy: when investments are urgent.

—In Parliament, the deputy prime minister, and head of Economy and Planning, Alejandro Gil Fernández, criticized the EI. What changes result from this?

—At another time there was a lot of foreign capital invested in the substitution of imports, production and services for the Cuban population. Then they collected those cucs, went to the bank and exchanged them for dollars. Now they cannot do that, because there is a very strict exchange control. Today the country has no liquidity.

“We agree with the deputy prime minister. Today the new IE that we create must be sustainable from the point of view of liquidity in foreign currency, export, or sell in the Mariel Special Development Zone (ZEDM), which operates in foreign currency.

“Many businesses from previous times, from the 90s, had failures in the time of agreement, and we have dissolved them. Some, because they did not meet the intended objective. For example, some said: we are going to build four hotels here. So, time passed, but they didn't do any.

“Today businesses are established with a pattern of performance. You have six months to start the investment, and if you can't, you must tell us, so we can evaluate if we dissolve it, or what we do. That cannot be eternal. There are others that we have renewed, they are maintained, and they work well.

“Law 118 on Foreign Investment has a key idea: all businesses with foreign capital are approved by the Government on a case-by-case basis. In the rest of the world this is not the case. But in Cuba that is the guarantee that this EI pays taxes to the economic and social development plans, we do not sacrifice sovereignty, the financing has a legal source, and the future is not mortgaged”.

— What are the possibilities for the new economic actors (Mipymes, CNA) to open up to EI?

—In order to have access to the IE, it is mandatory for the Cuban party to be a legal entity, as established by Law 118. Mipymes are already companies and achieve that legal status. The latest adjustments we made to the policy give the possibility for a Mipyme, or a CNA, to do business with foreign capital.

“What doesn't change? What I just explained. That is approved by the Government, it is not for free enterprise. They go through the same procedures as the state company. Same. Without differentiated treatment for one or the other”.

— How many foreign trade MSMEs have already been approved? The last data is three.

-Yes. There are several, but they have the objective of dedicating themselves fundamentally to foreign trade of non-state forms of management. They are not formed to associate with foreign capital, although they could do so eventually.

“In Cuba, wholesale trade is really very limited, and that creates problems for the non-state sector. That's why when you want to import things, perfect, you can do it through the specialized companies that are state-owned. In the Eighth Congress of the Party, in the Central Report, the army general reiterated that foreign trade will continue to be a State monopoly”.

island rocking

From the academy there are repeated controversies related to the monopoly of foreign trade in Cuba. Not with an eye on private management, but on strengthening the socialist state company.

The practice, criterion of truth, reaffirms that the entities approved to carry out these activities directly have improved their management and income. Like from night to day. In the last Round Table carried out by BOHEMIA, the results and arguments of the Shrimp Company were very eloquent.

- What do you think?

“We have to look at this with an open mind. In our country there are thousands of companies, if each one did foreign trade, I doubt very much that they would do it efficiently. This activity has certain conditions, you have to prepare very well to exercise it. About seven or eight years ago we did something that we call concentration of purchases.

"What was that? The products of widespread use, such as tires or fertilizers, we said: we are going to import them centrally. Why? Because the more volumes we imported, the cheaper it was, and the more conditions we had to organize distribution, according to the economic plan. In practice, this showed very good results for the country. Saved tens of millions of dollars.

“In the current conditions, what are we doing? Giving more value to consignments. What is a consignment? It is a warehouse, which is here, the foreign supplier pays for the warehouse and the risk of having those goods there until they are purchased. Although of course, the consignment tire is more expensive. But what is the attraction? Well, I go and buy it today. I don't have to wait a month for the boat with the tires. This has to be balanced.

“We want, above all, exporting companies to bring them the benefits for this concept. In this sense, we have given many entities, even small ones, the power to carry out foreign trade. But they have to learn to do it right. Something similar happens in the world, not all companies do this activity, only the specialized ones. The others are supplied by the wholesalers who buy these goods”.

—Of course, in an environment of strong competition. Because there it does not happen that for a piece of paper, or a stamp, a management is delayed.

-Of course. That kind of thing can't happen. I am very aware of this because the companies rightly tell us: 'I need the raw material, they said it would arrive this month, and it will not arrive until next month'. When you go deeper into that, the contract was made late, because there was no money; or the supplier, with whom you already had a debt, cut off the supplies, waiting for the previous payment.

“The same thing happens, when they had everything ready, they couldn't ship the container because there are many problems with transportation and associated delays. We have containers stranded in various places. Due to covid-19 there is a very difficult situation, the price of freight has tripled. With money in hand, sometimes you can't bring things either. There are many factors that influence that. It is not, with all due respect to academics, that you can or cannot do foreign trade directly”.

— With the transition to financial planning, will the possibilities of further decentralizing foreign trade be more expeditious?

“That has associated complications. It is not just about the actual activity of foreign trade. It has to do with planning, wholesale trade. They are different factors.

Bohemia
Havana, Republic of Cuba
27 January 2022

Economía: cuando apremian las inversiones

De obstáculos externos, trabas internas, aciertos e insatisfacciones con la inversión extranjera; polémicas sobre el monopolio estatal, entre otros temas, dialoga BOHEMIA en exclusiva con Rodrigo Malmierca Díaz, ministro de Comercio Exterior y la Inversión Extranjera

Más allá de las limitaciones objetivas, si se asumen los procesos negociadores con mayor eficiencia, los beneficios para el país serían superiores, valora Rodrigo Malmierca Díaz, titular del Mincex. (Foto: Yasset Llerena Alfonso).

Luego de una caída en picada, la economía comienza a emerger de manera lenta, ascendente. De mantener a raya al enemigo invisible, mutante de la covid-19, que vuelve a virar al revés el planeta, dependen muchos planes y sueños en la Isla caribeña. Alcanzarlos no será fácil. Tampoco imposible. Por eso ahora, quizás con mayor claridad que nunca, se trata de atraer –casi enamorar– a los inversores foráneos, a pesar del Goliat del Norte.

Cuba persigue una prosperidad anhelada, a golpe de muchos sacrificios y resistencias. La mayor de sus riquezas está en el pueblo, alegre, emprendedor, instruido… Sin embargo, todavía queda mucha hojarasca que barrer en el camino.

Justo a la dos de la tarde entra, impasible, al amplio salón de reuniones, Rodrigo Malmierca Díaz, titular del Ministerio de Comercio Exterior y la Inversión Extranjera (Mincex). Luego de saludarnos con los nudillos de las manos, le agradecemos por la gentileza de recibirnos, a pesar de su abultada agenda.

Mientras degustamos un aromático café, repaso en la memoria la última intervención que hiciera el Ministro ante los legisladores cubanos. Su afirmación en el plenario: “los resultados con la inversión extranjera son insuficientes”, revolotea en mi mente.

— ¿Qué problemas frenan o limitan el impacto esperado de la inversión extranjera (IE) en la economía cubana?

—La IE es algo relativamente nuevo en la Revolución. Antes del triunfo de enero de 1959, el país estaba vendido prácticamente al capital extranjero, sobre todo, a los Estados Unidos. Los primeros pasos fueron nacionalizar todas esas propiedades, las mejores tierras, las compañías de electricidad y teléfono, los centrales azucareros, y rescatarlos para el pueblo.

“Así nos pasamos casi 30 años del período revolucionario sin acudir a la IE como algo que deseáramos. Después, a finales de los años 80, se comenzaron a hacer los primeros intentos de atraer el capital extranjero para apoyar los planes de desarrollo económico y social de la Revolución. Diría que cuando se aprobó la primera Ley 77 en 1995, todavía eran muy limitados los intentos que hacíamos para atraer al capital extranjero. Porque lo considerábamos como un mal necesario.

“Aquella norma era restrictiva en el sentido de preservar mucho la soberanía nacional –hasta ahora se mantiene ese interés. Igual, que la mayoría en todos esos negocios fuera de la parte cubana, en esa época pocos eran 50 a 50. Algunos sectores de la economía no estaban abiertos al capital externo, por ejemplo, la industria azucarera y la propia agricultura. Hace pocos años fue que comenzamos a promoverlos.

“En el VI Congreso del Partido en 2011, si revisa en los Lineamientos, todavía se habla de la IE como un complemento del esfuerzo nacional por el desarrollo del país, y no se consideraba un elemento importante. Eso cambia cuando se aprueban las políticas, a finales de 2013, previo a la nueva ley en junio de 2014.

“Ya en el VII y VIII congreso partidista, los Lineamientos hablan de la importancia de la IE como algo estratégico para el desarrollo de la actual etapa. Empezamos a darle un papel más relevante. Ahora, uno pudiera preguntar: ¿por qué el capital extranjero no viene masivamente a invertir en Cuba?

“Son varios factores. Primero, por el bloqueo económico, financiero y comercial del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos que además se ha recrudecido en los últimos tiempos. Se han hecho muy difíciles las transferencias de capital, todo lo relacionado con el sector financiero, los bancos están amenazados de sanciones.

“Activaron el Título III de la Ley Helms-Burton, que le permite a ciudadanos o empresas demandar en los tribunales de los Estados Unidos a cualquier empresa, cubana o extranjera. Todo eso son obstáculos reales, objetivos, que crean mucho temor.

“Después tenemos otros problemas asociados a la calificación de riesgo para hacer cualquier negocio. O sea, Cuba es un país endeudado, con determinadas dificultades hoy para poder cumplir con sus compromisos financieros externos. Si el interesado se guía por los criterios de las calificadoras de riesgo internacionales, no es un país atractivo para invertir”.

—Usted se refirió en el Parlamento a quejas de los inversores, por ejemplo, el tema de la contratación del personal.

—Estas son decisiones internas. La contratación del personal a través de una agencia empleadora responde a políticas propias. Hemos sido muy cuidadosos en tratar de evitar que las personas que trabajan con inversiones de capital extranjero, simplemente por esa razón, y a lo mejor haciendo lo mismo que otra en una empresa estatal, gane mucho más.

“Y eso es algo que hemos tratado de preservar por las vías de las agencias empleadoras, aunque no les gusta a los inversionistas foráneos. También hay otras cosas que no les gusta, y no por ello vamos a cambiarlas. Por ejemplo, la propiedad de la tierra es patrimonio del Estado, está refrendado en la Constitución.

“Muchos extranjeros quieren comprar el terreno donde se van a construir los hoteles. Aquí no lo vendemos, lo cedemos en usufructo, y puede ser a largo plazo. En otros lugares sí se vende. Esto a veces dificulta que los inversores vengan a Cuba.

“Ahora, más allá de estos obstáculos objetivos, tenemos otros problemas subjetivos, relacionados con deficiencias y fallas internas. Por ejemplo, las demoras de los procesos de negociación, la mala o deficiente preparación que tienen los proyectos y los grupos negociadores. La gente dice: ‘hay mucha burocracia’. En realidad esa no es la causa de los atrasos. En el proceso de aprobación final por parte del Gobierno no están las grandes dilaciones, sino en las empresas. No se le da la prioridad requerida a la IE, y esas tardanzas, a veces, son de años. De años”.

— ¿Es un problema de mentalidad?

—En esto influyen los prejuicios, porque es verdad que nos pasamos más de 30 años pensando que la IE era algo malo, y no la queríamos. Alguna gente todavía tiene eso metido en la cabeza. Y desde diciembre de 2016, el general de ejército en una clausura de la Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, habló de esto, e hizo un llamado a desterrar esos prejuicios.

“No obstante es más fácil decirlo, a que las personas de verdad cambien la mentalidad. Son problemas subjetivos, transversales en la economía y tenemos que resolverlos”.

— ¿Falta cultura empresarial?

—En Cuba tenemos problemas con las inversiones en general. Los procesos son lentos. Los estudios de factibilidad no siempre cumplen con lo que se proyectó inicialmente. Usted dice, voy a hacer esto, tendré una tasa de retorno de la inversión de tanto por ciento, y en tres o cinco años recupero el financiamiento. Y eso al final no se cumple. Ni con la inversión extranjera, ni con la nacional.

“Con el capital extranjero tenemos el desafío de que el inversionista foráneo se sienta atraído a hacer el negocio. No basta con los atractivos que ponemos a su disposición, de que el personal esté preparado y pueda asumir las nuevas tecnologías de manera rápida, el ambiente de estabilidad del país, los incentivos fiscales que concede la ley. Todo eso ayuda. Pero si el hombre dice: ‘voy a ir a Cuba, y además de desafiar las presiones del Gobierno norteamericano, resulta que no me dan una atención rápida’. Quien tiene capital lo va a invertir con el objetivo de ganar dinero. Si se tiene que meter un año negociando, por supuesto que eso no es atractivo.

Economía: cuando apremian las inversiones.

Las medidas financieras impuestas por la administración Trump fueron diseñadas –con macabra precisión– para estrangular la economía cubana. (Foto: Martha Vecino Ulloa).

“Por eso decimos, a pesar de todos los problemas, del bloqueo, de la calificación de riesgos de Cuba, que no tenemos liquidez para cumplir las obligaciones, si fuéramos más eficientes a la hora de enfrentar estos procesos de negociación, tendríamos mejores resultados.

“Esa es una batalla que tenemos que echar desde el Mincex, porque somos los rectores de esta actividad, y estamos llamados a ganarla en todos los sectores de la economía. Porque ahí es donde están las empresas, los grupos negociadores que interactúan con el capital extranjero”.

— ¿A cuánto ascienden los aportes de la IE a la economía nacional?

—Desde que se aprobó la Ley 118, hasta la actualidad, hay negocios pactados por más de 7 000 millones de dólares. No es poco.

— ¿Ese capital ya está operativo?

—No todo está operativo, porque ese es otro problema. A veces aprobamos el negocio, y el capital no puede venir porque los bancos no lo transfieren. Tenemos ese tipo de dificultades que están muy vinculadas al bloqueo del Gobierno norteamericano.

“Si se miran, por ejemplo, las exportaciones cubanas de ron, tabaco, níquel, telecomunicaciones, son principalmente realizadas por negocios con capital extranjero. Suman muchos los millones de dólares que Cuba exporta, gracias a esas asociaciones. Ello es una muestra de lo que sostienen el Partido y el Gobierno, la IE nos hace falta, es bueno para la economía y tenemos que impulsarla”.

Economía: cuando apremian las inversiones.

—En el Parlamento, el viceprimer ministro, y titular de Economía y Planificación, Alejandro Gil Fernández, hizo críticas a la IE. ¿Qué cambios se derivan de esto?

—En otro momento había mucho capital extranjero invertido de cara a la sustitución de importaciones, las producciones y servicios para la población cubana. Entonces ellos cobraban esos cuc, iban al banco y los cambiaban por dólares. Ahora no pueden hacer eso, porque hay un control de cambio muy estricto. Hoy el país no tiene liquidez.

“Coincidimos con el viceprimer ministro. Hoy la nueva IE que hagamos debe tener sostenibilidad desde el punto de vista de la liquidez en divisa, exportar, o vender en la Zona Especial de Desarrollo Mariel (ZEDM), que opera en divisas.

“Muchos negocios de épocas anteriores, de los años 90, tenían fallas en el tiempo de concertación, y los hemos disuelto. Algunos, porque no cumplieron con el objetivo previsto. Por ejemplo, unos decían: vamos a hacer aquí cuatro hoteles. Entonces, pasaba el tiempo, pero no hacían ninguno.

Silence… 48 Hours And Nothing From Cuban-American Members Of U.S. Congress After Biden-Harris Administration 507-Word Statement Abandons Cuba’s Private Sector.  Cuba Policy Review Completion?

Silence… 48 Hours And Nothing From Cuban-American Members Of U.S. Congress After Biden-Harris Administration 507-Word Statement Abandons Cuba’s Private Sector.  Cuba Policy Review Completion In Doubt.  Does Anyone Care?  Seems Not. 

“Addressing the situation in Cuba is a top priority for the Biden-Harris Administration.”   United States Department of State (31 January 2022) 

The normal response time is calculated in minutes rather than hours for members of the United States Congress to respond to statements relating to the Republic of Cuba that originate from the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ). 

Since Monday, 31 January 2022, when the United States Department of State released its 507-word policy statement, there have been no official statements from any of the ten members of the United States Congress who identify as “Cuban-American.”  No Tweets.  No posts to Facebook.  No YouTube videos.   

The current “Cuban-American” representation in the 117th United States Congress:  United States Senate: The Honorable Ted Cruz (R- Texas); The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida); The Honorable Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey).  United States House of Representatives: The Honorable Albio Sires (New Jersey; D- 8th); The Honorable Alex Mooney (West Virginia; R-2nd); The Honorable Anthony González (Ohio; R- 16th); The Honorable Mario Díaz-Balart (Florida; R-25th); The Honorable Carlos Gimenez (Florida; R- 26th); The Honorable Maria Elvira Salazar (Florida; R- 27th); The Honorable Nicole Malliotakis (New York; R- 11th). 

Probable relief for The White House (National Security Council- NSC), Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of State, United States Department of Commerce, and Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury.  No pressure means to need to decide.  Thus, no reason to complete and publish a Cuba Policy Review- that has been in process since 28 January 2021. 

What has since 20 January 2021 the Biden-Harris Administration done to provide support for entrepreneurs, self-employed, micro, small & medium-size enterprises (MSME’s) in the Republic of Cuba? 

Authorized direct investment in a MSME? No.
Authorized direct financing to a MSME? No.
Authorized direct export of electric vehicles to an MSME? No.
Authorized direct correspondent banking permitting funds to efficiently move directly from the United States to an MSME in the Republic of Cuba and move directly from an MSME in the Republic of Cuba to the United States? No.

Comments From Biden, Blinken, Obama 

“But Cuba is not represented solely by its leadership. There are many different sectors that we can and should work with to support progress in Cuba- including entrepreneurs, religious groups, universities, young people and human rights defenders.”  Joseph Biden, Candidate for Democratic Party Nomination for President of the United States 

“Which is why I’m proud to say: If you look at my presidency so far, it’s a jobs presidency and it’s a small business presidency.”  Joseph Biden, President of the United States 

The United States recommits to accompanying the Cuban people in your quest to determine your own future.  We will support those improving the lives of families and workers, cuentapropistas who have forged their own economic paths, and all who are building a better Cuba- and a better tomorrow for themselves in Cuba.”  Antony Blinken, United States Secretary of State  

“Addressing the situation in Cuba is a top priority for the Biden-Harris Administration.”   United States Department of State 

In a global economy, powered by ideas and information, a country's greatest asset is its people.  In the United States, we have a clear monument to what the Cuban people can build: it’s called Miami.  Here in Havana, we see that same talent in cuentapropistas...And in recent years, the Cuban government has begun to open up to the world, and to open up more space for that talent to thrive.  In just a few years, we’ve seen how cuentapropistas can succeed while sustaining a distinctly Cuban spirit.”  Barack Obama, President of the United States (when there was a Vice President Joseph Biden) 

The Biden-Harris Administration is politically constipated with respect to the decision-making process for its policies toward the Republic of Cuba.  The Biden-Harris Administration needs to locate promptly a political laxative. 

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Related Analyses Links 

U.S. Department Of State Points To The White House For Answer About Completion Of Cuba Policy Review. They Don't Know? Why Don't They Know? Can't Say? Why Not? January 31, 2022  

507-Word New Statement: U.S. Department Of State Responds To Question About Status of Cuba Policy Review. Ignores Cuba’s Re-Emerging Private Sector- The Self-Employed, MSMEs. Why? January 31, 2022  

United States Department Of State Responds To Question From Reporter About Status Of "Cuba Policy Review" Commenced In January 2021: "... we'd be happy to get you more information." January 28, 2022  

Not Yet… “Cuba Policy Review” 365 Days Since Announcement. Is The Biden-Harris Administration Committed To Entrepreneurs, Self-Employed, MSME’s In Cuba? No- All Words. No Action. January 27, 2022 

Cuba Advocates Take Note: U.S. Department Of State Reiterates Importance Of Working With U.S. Congress "on the landing but also at takeoff, also mid-air"  April 09, 2021 

U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken Reminds & Emphasizes To Congress That Biden Administration Has Not Yet Made Changes To Trump Administration Cuba Policies- And Congress Will Be Consulted  March 10, 2021 

What Did U.S. Secretary Of State-Designate Antony Blinken Say About Cuba During His Confirmation Hearing? "Objectives... Makes Very Good Sense To Me"  January 20, 2021

U.S. Department Of Justice Requests And Is Granted Until 11 March 2022 To Decide Whether To Submit Answers To Six Questions To Court Of Appeals

“ORDER: The motion filed by the United States for an extension of time, up to and including April 11, 2022, to file the amicus brief is GRANTED. The motion for an extension to March 11, 2022, to notify the Court that the United States elects not to file an amicus brief is GRANTED.” 

Appearance of Counsel Form (1/25/22)
Extension of Time (1/19/22)
Amended Motion By The United States Regarding Amicus Participation (1/13/22)
Motion By The United States Regarding Amicus Participation (1/13/22)
Appearance Of Counsel Form (1/13/22)

MARIO DEL VALLE, ENRIQUE FALLA, MARIO ECHEVARRIA V. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, ORBITZ, LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING HOLDINGS INC. Initial defendants were: TRIVAGO GMBH, BOOKING.COM B.V., GRUPO HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE I-5, AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22619 Southern Florida District; 20-12407 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]

Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie, LLP (defendant)
Scott Douglass & McConnico (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

JAVIER GARCIA-BENGOCHEA V. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINE, A FOREIGN CORPORATION [1:19-cv-21725 Southern Florida District; 20-12960 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Creed & Gowdy (plaintiff- appellate)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

JAVIER GARCIA-BENGOCHEA VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23592; Southern Florida District; 20-14251 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Creed & Gowdy, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant) 

MARIO DEL VALLE, ENRIQUE FALLA, ANGELO POU, Plaintiffs - Appellants, versus TRIVAGO GMBH, a German Limited Liability Company, BOOKING.COM B.V., a Dutch Limited Liability Company, GRUPO HOTELERO CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE 1-5, MARIELA ROE 1-5, EXPEDIA, INC., et al., Defendants - Appellees. No. 20-12407-DD. 

JAVIER GARCIA-BENGOCHEA, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus CARNIVAL CORPORATION, a foreign corporation d.b.a. Carnival Cruise Lines, Defendant - Appellee. No. 20-12960-BB. 

JAVIER GARCIA-BENGOCHEA, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., Defendant - Appellee. No. 20-14251-BB. 

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida 

BEFORE: JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BURKE,* District Judge.
ORDER: The Court invites the United States – through the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, and/or the Office of the Legal Adviser to the State Department –to file an amicus brief in Mario Del Valle, et al., v. Trivago GMBH, et al., No.20-12407 (argued Oct. 4, 2021), Javier Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corporation, No. 20-12960 (argued Oct. 4, 2021), and Javier Garcia-Bengochea v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD., No. 20-14251 (argued Oct. 4, 2021), pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 29(a)....The Court invites the United States to address the following questions concerning the Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6082:...The court asks that the U.S. file its amicus brief by 2/25/22... AJ, KCN and LCB (See attached order for complete text) [20-12407, 20-12960, 20-14251] [Entered: 12/20/2021 04:48 PM]

The Court invites the United States to address the following questions concerning the Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6082:

1. Does the term “United States national” in 22 U.S.C. §§ 6082(a)(4)(B) and 6082(a)(4)(C) refer to the plaintiff bringing the action, or the original claimant to the confiscated property, or both?

2. What does the word “acquire[ ]” in 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B) mean? Is inheritance encompassed in the term “acquire[ ]?” And if “acquire[ ]” does include inheritance, at what point is a claim “acquire[d]” by an heir within the meaning of the statute?

3. How, if at all, does the phrase “assignment for value” in 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(4)(C) affect the pool of eligible claimants compared to the pool of eligible claimants under 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(4)(B)?

4. What effect, if any, does the President’s ability to suspend Title III pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 6085(b) have on defining the class of eligible claimants who can bring an action under 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)? Does the President’s ability to suspend Title III imply that the statute was drafted to allow the heirs of American citizens – whose property was unlawfully confiscated and “trafficked” by third parties – to bring claims under 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)?

5. What effect, if any, does the lawful travel exception, 22 U.S.C. §6023(13)(B)(iii), have on the plaintiffs’ claims? What effect, if any, does the possibility that the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) can change the permissible reasons for travel to Cuba have on the lawful travel exception?

6. What does the phrase “incident to lawful travel” in 22 U.S.C. §6023(13)(B)(iii) mean? Who or what defines “lawful travel” (e.g. OFAC)? What guidance should persons and entities look to in determining whether their activities are “incident to lawful travel?”


The Court asks that the United States file its amicus brief by February 25, 2022, at which time the parties in the cases will be permitted to respond. Should the United States elect not to file an amicus brief, it should so notify the Court by January 25, 2022.

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL
UNITED STATES SOLICITOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Southern District Attorneys)

LINKS 

Court Of Appeals "Invites" Biden-Harris Administration To Answer Six Questions In Libertad Act Lawsuits That May Impact More Than Cuba Lawsuits. Will They Answer? Due By 25 January 2022.  December 31, 2021 

American Airlines Libertad Title III Lawsuit Becomes First To Seek Review By United States Supreme Court. Twenty-Nine Months From District Court To SCOTUS Is Fast.  December 20, 2021 

LINK To Libertad Act Title III Lawsuit Statistics