An Extraordinary Statement: President Biden Defines Cuba As A "Failed State" And Confirms No Change For Remittances; Will He Revise Definition?

The White House
Washington DC
15 July 2021

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr, 46th President of the United States, referred to the Republic of Cuba as a “failed state” in answering a question at The White House today during a press conference with H.E. Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Wikipedia: “A failed state is a political body that has disintegrated to a point where basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government no longer function properly (see also fragile state and state collapse). A state can also fail if the government loses its legitimacy even if it is performing its functions properly. For a stable state it is necessary for the government to enjoy both effectiveness and legitimacy. Likewise, when a nation weakens and its standard of living declines, it introduces the possibility of total governmental collapse. The Fund for Peace characterizes a failed state as having the following characteristics: Loss of control of its territory, or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force; Erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions; Inability to provide public services; Inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.”

Encyclopedia Britannica: “Common characteristics of a failing state include a central government so weak or ineffective that it has an inability to raise taxes or other support, and has little practical control over much of its territory and hence there is a non-provision of public services. When this happens, widespread corruption and criminality, the intervention of state and non-state actors, the appearance of refugees and the involuntary movement of populations, sharp economic decline, and military intervention from both within and without the state in question can occur. Metrics have been developed to describe the level of governance of states. The precise level of government control required to avoid being considered a failed state varies considerably amongst authorities. Furthermore, the declaration that a state has "failed" is generally controversial and, when made authoritatively, may carry significant geopolitical consequences.

Failed state, a state that is unable to perform the two fundamental functions of the sovereign nation-state in the modern world system: it cannot project authority over its territory and peoples, and it cannot protect its national boundaries. The governing capacity of a failed state is attenuated such that it is unable to fulfill the administrative and organizational tasks required to control people and resources and can provide only minimal public services. Its citizens no longer believe that their government is legitimate, and the state becomes illegitimate in the eyes of the international community.

A failed state is composed of feeble and flawed institutions. Often, the executive barely functions, while the legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy, and armed forces have lost their capacity and professional independence. A failed state suffers from crumbling infrastructures, faltering utility supplies and educational and health facilities, and deteriorating basic human-development indicators, such as infant mortality and literacy rates. Failed states create an environment of flourishing corruption and negative growth rates, where honest economic activity cannot flourish.

The dynamics leading to and compounding state failure are many and varied, including civil war, ethnic violence or genocide, and predatory government and bureaucratic behaviour. State failure comes in degrees and is often a function of both the collapse of state institutions and societal collapse. A strong state provides core guarantees to its citizens and others under its jurisdiction in the three interrelated realms of security, economics, and politics. A failed state cannot maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and minimize internal conflict. It cannot formulate or implement public policies to effectively build infrastructure and deliver services or effective and equitable economic policies. In addition, it cannot provide for the representation and political empowerment of its citizens or protect civil liberties and fundamental human rights. Thus, state failure manifests itself when a state can no longer deliver physical security, a productive economic environment, and a stable political system for its people.

The total collapse of the state marks the final, extreme phase of state failure, and very few states can be described as completely failed or collapsed. Yet, research demonstrates that many states suffer from various degrees of weakness and are therefore potential candidates for failure. Weak states were failing with increasing frequency, most of them in Africa but also a handful in Asia and the Middle East, and failed states are known to be hospitable to and to harbour dangerous nonstate actors such as warlords and groups that commit terrorist acts. For example, at the end of the 20th century, Somalia descended into state collapse under rival warlords, and Afghanistan, a failed state under the Taliban regime, harboured the terrorist group al-Qaeda. Furthermore, state failure poses pressing humanitarian issues and possible emergency relief and state-building responsibilities for the international community. Consequently, understanding the dynamics of state failure and strengthening weak nation-states in the developing world assumed new urgency.”

The White House
Washington DC
15 July 2021

Q I have a couple of questions for you. Also a question for the Chancellor. But, Mr. President, with respect to Latin America and the developments there in the last week-plus --

PRESIDENT BIDEN: Yes.

Q -- what are the circumstances under which you would send American troops to Haiti? That's the first question. The second question is: When it comes to Cuba, what is your current thinking on American sanctions toward Cuba and the embargo? And today, your Press Secretary said that communism is a “failed ideology.” I assume that's your view. I was wondering if you could also give us your view on socialism.

PRESIDENT BIDEN: In two minutes or less. (Laughter.)

Obviously, I know why they elected you president. (Laughter.) Well, let me start off by answering the question relative to Haiti and Cuba. And communism is a failed system -- a universally failed system. And I don't see socialism as a very useful substitute, but that's another story.

With regard to whether the circumstances in which we would send military troops to Haiti: We -- we’re only sending American Marines to our embassy to make sure that they are secure and nothing is out of whack at all. But the idea of sending American forces into Haiti is not on the agenda at this moment, number one.

Number two, with regard to Cuba: Cuba is a -- unfortunately, a failed state and repressing their citizens. There are a number of things that we would consider doing to help the people of Cuba, but it would require a different circumstance or a guarantee that they would not be taken advantage of by the government -- for example, the ability to send remittances to -- back to Cuba. I would not do that now because the fact is it’s highly likely that the regime would confiscate those remittances or big chunks of it.

With regard to the need COVID on -- I mean -- excuse me -- they have a COVID problem on -- in Cuba. I'd be prepared to give significant amounts of vaccine if, in fact, I was assured an international organization would administer those vaccines and do it in a way that average citizens would have access to those vaccines.

And one of the things that you did not ask but we're considering is -- they've cut off access to the Internet. We're considering whether we have the technological ability to reinstate that access.

Is Biden-Harris Administration Nearing Decision To Reverse Trump-Pence Administration Prohibition On Cuba Military Earning Money From Remittances?

If Biden-Harris Administration Removes Quarterly Limits On Remittances To Cuba Will It Also Reverse Trump-Pence Administration Policy And Permit Cuba’s Military To Control And Earn Money From Each Remittance? 

Trump Administration Did Not Cancel Remittances; It Cancelled A Revenue Stream For Cuba’s Military 

Cuba Has Options To Retain Western Union Electronic Remittance Services
GASEA Transfers Or Sells Assets Of Fincimex to BICSA Or Another Bank
Cuba Banks Have A History With Transferring Operations

Biden-Harris Administration Has Restricted Connectivity To Military-Controlled Companies In China And Myanmar (Burma), But OK For Cuba? 

Calculating Desire To Help Family & Friends More Important To Members Of Congress And [Florida] Voters Than Providing Revenue To Cuba’s Military 

Restrictions Upon Connectivity With Cuba Military Received Bipartisan Support In The United States Congress Including By Senators Robert Menendez (D), Marco Rubio (D), Rick Scott (D) 

How Will 45th President Of The United States React?
How Will Governor Of Florida React?

To paraphrase statements by government officials in past administrations, the United States government must decide how and whether to respond to the “crisis you have rather than the crisis you want” based upon “realities on the ground.”  There are thus both limitations and opportunities.  

The Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) is evaluating how to confront what some individuals serving in the administration have hoped for- a moment to implement what in 2020 then-candidate Biden said he would implement if he became President Biden.  The do-what-you-said-you-would-do similarities to the “Trump Promise” about moving the United States Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem- he said it and he did it.  For others in the Biden-Harris Administration, a moment of dread as they believe there are no good domestic political outcomes for the administration- they want to be wrong, but feel they are right. 

The Biden-Harris Administration seems prepared to conclude without conditionality the only immediately viable means of re-establishing a direct electronic remittance transfer process from the United States to the Republic of Cuba requires at this time the participation of and limited revenue to two entities controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba.   

In announcing a decision, the Biden-Harris Administration would confirm humanitarian value trumps political indigestion.  The decision may be a weekend statement from The White House or United States Department of State or United States Department of the Treasury.    

The [Miguel] Diaz-Canel Administration (2019- ) in Havana was not inclined in 2020 and is not inclined in 2021 to permit the use of non-FAR-controlled entities, so the Biden-Harris Administration has a decision:  Implement what it has said it wants to do on terms that it does not want while preparing for and then absorbing the bipartisan incoming political projectiles from the United States Congress, state capitals, county seats, city officers, and town representatives… and the 45th President of the United States.  Or do nothing now, continue with the Cuba Policy Review, and await a moment, which may not arrive, defined by less political drama.  The Republic of Cuba is prepared to suffer.  Their question to the United States: Is the government of the United States prepared to allow the suffering?    

The Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) prohibited (with exceptions) individuals subject to United States jurisdiction and United States-based companies from engagement with entities controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba.  Thus far, the Biden-Harris Administration has not made changes to the prohibitions.     

• In June 2017, the United States Department of State created the Cuba Restricted List in accordance with National Security Presidential Memorandum-5 (Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba).  “The U.S. government generally prohibits direct financial transactions with listed entities and sub-entities because they would disproportionately benefit the Cuban military, intelligence, and security services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba.”   

• In September 2019, the Trump-Pence Administration limited to US$1,000.00 per quarter remittances and further restricted the recipients of remittances from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  The Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) had removed limitations.   

• In June 2020, the Cuba Restricted List was updated to include Republic of Cuba government-operated Financiera Cimex (Fincimex), a Panama-registered subsidiary of Republic of Cuba government-operated Corporacion Cimex which is a subsidiary of Grupo de Administracion Empresarial S.A. (GAESA) and controlled by the FAR.  Fincimex was permitted to continue as a component of electronic remittance transfers. 

• In September 2020, the Cuba Restricted List was updated to include Republic of Cuba government-operated American International Services (AIS) which was a component of the electronic remittance delivery process for Denver, Colorado-based Western Union Company (2020 revenues approximately US$5 billion).    

• In November 2020, the Cuba Restricted List was updated to prohibit Fincimex from continuing as a component of electronic remittance transfers with Western Union Company. 

• In January 2021, Republic of Cuba government-operated Banco Financiero Internacional S.A. (BFI) was added to the Cuba Restricted List.  BFI was a component of electronic remittance transfers with Western Union Company. 

The Republic of Cuba had evaluated, but decided against, options relating to Fincimex, including the sale or transfer of the subsidiary to a non-FAR-controlled Republic of Cuba government-operated entity, such as a financial institution (Banco de Crédito y Comercio S.A. (BANDEC), Banco Popular de Ahorro S.A. (BPA), Banco Internacional de Comercio S.A. (BICSA), and Banco Metropolitano S.A. (BM)) each of which could seamlessly absorb and maintain Fincimex operations.    

There is history for one Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institution transferring operations to another Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institution.  

From Banco Metropolitano S.A.: “(“BM”) is a Cuban commercial bank that has presence only in Havana.  Its corporate object is the pursuit of banking businesses, including but not limited to financial intermediation activities.  BM started its operations in 1996 with a Havana branch office specialized in the provision of banking services solely to the diplomatic community, as well as the foreign natural and legal persons who were residents in Cuba.  By resolution of Banco Central de Cuba (the Cuban Central Bank of “BCC,” for its Spanish acronym), BM’s corporate object, customer base, product portfolio and services were expanded effectively 2004 when BM acquired 30 offices hitherto held by Banco de Crédito y Comercio (“BANDEC,” for its Spanish acronym) and more than 50 offices hitherto held by Banco Popular de Ahorro (“BPA,” for its Spanish acronym), all located in Havana.  As a result, BM established a representative presence in every municipality of the province of Havana.”  

In 2015, BICSA, a member of Republic of Cuba government-operated Grupo Nuevo Banca SA, created by Corporate Charter No. 49 on 29 October 1993 and commenced operation on 3 January 1994, was vetted by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and approved for a correspondent banking relationship with Conway, Arkansas-based Home BancShares (2019 assets approximately US$14 billion) through its subsidiary Centennial Bank which in 2017 purchased Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank.   

Stonegate Bank  

In 2015, the OFAC authorized Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank (2017 assets approximately US$2.9 billion) to have an account with BICSA.  However, because the Obama Administration would not authorize BICSA under a license from the OFAC to have an account with Stonegate Bank which would make fully-operational Direct Correspondent Banking, United States export-related funds were sent and received through Panama City, Panama-based Multibank, which had, but no longer has extensive dealings with the Republic of Cuba.  From Bogota, Colombia-based Grupo Aval on 16 June 2020: “On May 25th, Banco de Bogotá, through its subsidiary Leasing Bogotá S.A. Panamá, acquired 96.6% of the ordinary shares of Multi Financial Group.  As part of the acquisition process, MFG’s operation in Cuba was closed and as part of the transaction.  Grupo Aval complies with OFAC regulations and doesn't have transactional relationships with Cuba.”   

Supporting Small Businesses 

If the Biden-Harris Administration creates as expected a policy and regulatory framework whereby individuals subject to United States jurisdiction may deliver equity investments and provide loans to cuentapropistas (self-employed) and SME’s, then the existing financial transaction infrastructure throughout the Republic of Cuba will be woefully inadequate to manage what would likely be thousands of commercial checking and savings accounts with foreign exchange arriving (investments and loans), foreign exchange departing (investor dividends, loan repayments, input purchases) on a daily basis. 

The Biden-Harris Administration would need to authorize direct correspondent banking so that electronic funds transfers could arrive efficiently, transparently, and cost-effectively.  When using an electronic payment platform such as Western Union, using checking accounts to send and receive funds is far less expensive than when using currency, credit card or debit card. 

On 14 July 2021, H.E. Alejandro Gil, Minister of Economy and Planning of the Republic of Cuba, reported that during the coming weeks regulations published for the operation of small and medium-size enterprises (SME’s).

LINK TO COMPLETE 3-PAGE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

LINKS To Previous Analyses 

Western Union Data For Transfers To Cuba: 2.88 Million Annually- 24% To Havana; Florida 1st, Texas 2nd, New Jersey 3rd; US$200,000+ Could Be Aboard Each Flight From Miami November 19, 2020 

Cuba Has Options To Retain Western Union Electronic Remittance Services- Transfer To A Bank? November 17, 2020 

If Western Union Ends Remittance Services To Cuba, That Means A Return Of “Mules On Steroids”- The Impact Could Cripple MIA November 16, 2020

U.S. Secretary Of State And Canada Foreign Minister Speak- Readout Does Not Mention Cuba. Is This Plausible? White House and State Department Third Day Of Responses

The United States Department of State
Washington DC
14 July 2021

Secretary Blinken’s Call with Canadian Foreign Minister Garneau

The below is attributable to State Department Spokesperson Ned Price: Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke with Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau today to discuss collaboration between the United States and Canada to defeat the COVID-19 pandemic and the Foreign Minister’s trip to the Middle East. Noting our shared democratic values, they also discussed efforts to promote democracy and security throughout the Western Hemisphere. Secretary Blinken and Foreign Minister Garneau also reviewed progress towards the goals as outlined in the Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership.

NOTE: At 1:50 pm on 14 July 2021, Global Affairs Canada was requested to provide a readout of Minister Garneau’s discussion with Secretary Blinken. As of 6:50 am on 15 July 2021 there has been no response. This inquiry was delivered prior to the daily press briefing in Washington DC at the United States Department of State.

The United States Department of State
Washington DC
14 July 2021

QUESTION: All right. And then secondly, there was a call this – or a meeting this morning between Jake Sullivan and the French foreign minister. And I don’t expect you to talk about that, but there was also a call that the Secretary had with the Canadian foreign minister today, and the Secretary will be meeting with Foreign Minister Le Drian later today. But in the readouts of both Jake’s meeting and the Secretary’s call with the Canadian, the word “Haiti” is not mentioned at all. And I am just wondering, did they discuss Haiti, at least from the Secretary’s – in the Secretary’s call?

MR PRICE: Matt, if I recall the readout, it did make a reference to the Western Hemisphere and I think specifically a reference to —

QUESTION: It’s a big hemisphere.

MR PRICE: There is a lot going on in the hemisphere, too. But of course, Haiti is top of mind for the Secretary in this hemisphere. There are other countries as well that are top of mind, Cuba and Venezuela among them, that we talked about here yesterday alone. So I can assure you that issues —

QUESTION: So they did talk about Haiti and Cuba?

MR PRICE: I can assure you —

QUESTION: Not just the Western Hemisphere?

MR PRICE: — that issues of —

QUESTION: And the Monroe Doctrine and —

MR PRICE: — democracy and human rights and working together with our closest allies and partners in the world – and France would certainly qualify as one of our closest allies – that issue did come up.

QUESTION: The Department of Homeland Security’s Secretary said today that Haitians and Cubans fleeing political violence and arriving on U.S. shores will not be permitted to enter the United States and instead will be sent to a third country. Given the State Department is responsible for third-country referrals, are you in discussions with third countries? Has a third country agreed to take in Haitians and Cubans who are seeking refuge in that instance?

MR PRICE: Well, what Secretary Mayorkas was illustrating yesterday was our sincere concern with the reality, and that is that anyone who takes to the seas to seek refuge in the United States, be it from Cuba or from Haiti, would put their life at own risk – at their own risk and would not gain entry to the United States. This is a journey that is dangerous and not one that would allow them to secure entry. That was really the humanitarian concern that Secretary Mayorkas was voicing yesterday. I don’t have anything for you on third countries. Obviously, we work very closely with DHS when it comes to issues of asylum, but I wouldn’t want to comment beyond that.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.) This gets to what you were discussing yesterday, but reportedly Cuba, the internet restrictions have been eased slightly. But there – the Cuban foreign minister yesterday accused the United States of orchestrating the protests again through Twitter campaigns, through social media campaigns. Do you have any further comment on the situation there with the internet, and also about the detention of a journalists for the Spanish newspaper ABC, ABC?

MR PRICE: Well, when it comes to the detention of Camila Acosta of ABC, we know that the world is watching as Cuban authorities arrest and beat dozens of their own citizens, and that includes journalists and independent voices. We know that many remain missing. We join their families, Cuban human rights defenders, and people around the world in calling for the immediate release of those detained or missing for merely demanding freedom by exercising what is a universal right to free assembly and free expression. Violence and detentions of Cuban protesters and disappearances of independent activists remind us, constantly remind us that many Cubans pay very dearly for exercising rights that should be universal. And universal means everywhere around the world and anyone.

When it comes to the internet shutdowns, we spoke about this yesterday indeed, but we do condemn the use of partial or complete government-imposed internet shutdowns. We call on Cuba’s leaders to demonstrate restraint and urge respect for the voice of the people by opening all means of communication, both online and offline. The abuse of journalists, of independent voices, the attempted suppression, including through technological means, of the voice of the Cuban people, this is not something that could ever silence or quell the legitimate aspirations of the Cuban people for freedom, for human rights, for what their own government has denied to them for far too long.

QUESTION: Yeah, just – if I can, just one follow-up on Cuba, your comments about the internet, matter of internet access there. Senator Rubio has called for the U.S. to use satellite-based technology to provide internet access to overcome Cuban Government efforts to cut that. Is that something that the administration is considering?

MR PRICE: We are considering any number of ways and we have considered any number of ways to support the Cuban people – that is, to support them, their humanitarian needs; it is to support them in their broader efforts to secure greater degrees of liberty and freedom and human rights. But I don’t have anything specific to offer at this time.

The White House
Washington DC
14 July 2021

Q And then, secondly, on Cuba: What is the status of the review of the Trump-era policy?

MS. PSAKI: Sure. So, I would say, Steve, that -- and you and others who’ve covered this certainly know that, one, first, I will confirm, of course, we’re still reviewing our Cuba policy with an eye toward its impact on the political and economic wellbeing of the Cuban people. The nature of the kinds of changes that were made by the previous administration, like redesignated -- redesignating Cuba as a state sponsor of terror, carries significant statutory restrictions. We’ve been running a thorough policy process on these and other issues with support for democracy and human rights always at the core of our work.

Now there’s no question that the protests over the weekend and the events of the last several days are significant event -- significant events. And it was the largest protest we’ve seen in Cuba in a long time. That will obviously have an impact on how we proceed. So, we will see how things develop in the days ahead and develop our policy responses accordingly. We don't want to do it as one-offs. We want to look at it, as we have been, with a comprehensive approach in mind.

Q And then just quickly on Cuba: DHS Secretary Mayorkas is warning people there, “If you take to the sea, you will not come to the United States” -- why is that?

MS. PSAKI: Well, first, I think it's important to understand the context of what the Secretary was conveying yesterday, which is just that it is still the case that it is not -- the way to come to the United States is not through -- through processes of trying to come to the border without going through an asylum process or coming by sea without going through an asylum application process.

There are certainly programs that -- through which that some of them have been -- have not been reinstated, I should say, that were in place -- put in place by the Trump administration that are being reviewed, as he said yesterday. That would apply to the individuals and people of Haiti and the people of Cuba as well.

Those have not been reinstated. They're being reviewed. That's what the Secretary said yesterday. What he was reiterating is that this is not the time to travel irregularly. It's dangerous. People can lose their lives, as they have in the past.

Q And as the administration tries to figure out the root causes of migration to the country, don't we know that the reason people want to leave Cuba is because they don't like communism?

MS. PSAKI: We --

Q And so, as you're trying to figure out, like, what the processes are for these people who want to leave Cuba, is --

MS. PSAKI: Well, I’m not sure what your question is.

Q You guys have spent a lot of time --

MS. PSAKI: Why are people leaving Cuba? Or what is the process for them getting here? I can explain either of them, but you tell me.

Q Sure. Yeah. Do you think that people are leaving Cuba because they don't like communism?

MS. PSAKI: I think we've been pretty clear that we think people are leaving Cuba -- or not -- leaving Cuba or protesting in the streets, as well, because they are opposed to the oppression, to the mismanagement of the government in the country. And we certainly support their right to protest. We support their efforts to speak out against their treatment in Cuba.

I will say, separately, an important question is also: What happens when people are seeking protection or what happens when they are attempting to flee? In the past, as I noted, we've had several humanitarian programs, such as Family Reunification Parole Programs for both Haiti and Cuba. Those were policies or pol- -- processes that were in place prior to the Trump administration.

Though have not -- those have not been turned back on, as Secretary Mayorkas said yesterday. He also said we're assessing the status of those parole programs. Haitian and Cuban nationals in the United States with a fear of return for -- for -- to their home countries may be eligible for protection, such as asylum, under U.S. law. Haitian nationals already in the United States may be eligible for Temporary Protected Status.

But migrants interdicted in the Caribbean, who manifested in fear, are referred to USCIS for protection screening. That's what happens. Those who do not manifest in fear or who are not found to have a credible fear following the screening are repatriated to their country of origin. Those found to have a well-founded fear of persecution or torture are not brought to the United States; they are referred to a third country for resettlement.

I'm sharing all of that with you so people understand what the process is when they're trying to make what a treacherous journey is and a challenging journey where people can lose their lives.

But certainly, we have said many times -- and I will reiterate here -- that we support not -- not just the -- the role of peace -- of protest and peaceful protest. We stand with the Cuban people in their call for pre- -- freedom from both the pandemic and from decades of oppression and economic suffering to which they have been subjected by Cuba's authoritarian regime.

Q Just to return to Cuba, will we hear from the President this week? He said the other day that he would speak out on that. And secondly, is it -- is his position still that he feels that the Trump policies were a failure, didn’t effect change? Is that still his policy?

MS. PSAKI: Well, again, I would say: One, in terms of whether you’ll hear from him, he says that often, as you know. And what he means is he speaks out publicly nearly every day at events; sometimes you all ask questions. If there's an update to provide on what we're doing, on what our policies are, certainly he’ll provide that. Is there a planned speech or trip? Not at this time.

In terms of our policies: Again, I would say, Alex, that we are continuing to review our policies. It's been an ongoing process to review the policies that were put in place by the prior administration.

We also recognize that this was a significant event over the last couple of days, the largest protest in a long time that we saw in Cuba -- people speaking out -- Cuban people speaking out, calling for freedom from both the pandemic and from decades of repression. That's significant. And, of course, that will play a role as we consider and factor in what our policies will be moving forward.

I would also note, though, that we will do that through the prism of what will help the people of Cuba, not what will help pad the pockets of the regime. And that is challenging circumstance, given the control of the of the regime currently on the people.

Q Thanks, Jen. So, as we speak, outside, right now, there's solidarity protests with the Cuban people right outside the fences of the White House. We've been seeing this all across the country, here. And Democratic lawmakers in South Florida have actually called on Biden to come down to Miami to give a speech. You all are reviewing your policies, but is there a way that you believe -- either to answer these calls -- that you can more forcefully show support for the Cuban people in that way? Or is there anything in the works?

MS. PSAKI: Through a speech?

Q Yeah. It -- it’s been asked. So --

MS. PSAKI: Well, certainly I understand that, but I would say that I think what is most important to the Cuban people is understanding that the United States stands with them and their call for freedom from both the pandemic and from the decades of repression and economic suffering to which they have been subjected -- subjected by Cuba's authoritarian regime.

And also, I would just note that, again, it is a policy process that has been under review. There were a number of policies that were put in place by the prior administration. We want to do that in a comprehensive and not a one-off manner. We want to do it through the prism of what is going to help the Cuban people directly and help incentivize a change in behavior, if that is possible.

And certainly, the events, the protests, the reaction, the continued oppression of the Cuban people weighs in on our decision-making process. But I don't have any speech or visit to preview for you.

Q And then -- so then, on policy changes: On the campaign trail, Biden promised that he would reinstate the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program. Is that -- can you give us a readout, maybe, on where that process has gone so far in these comprehensive reviews or --

MS. PSAKI: There is, again, an ongoing review. Of course, the events and the protests and the reaction and the continued oppression of the Cuban people will weigh in on our -- will be a factor in the -- our decision-making process. But I don't have anything to preview for you.

Q A question on Cuba, and then a question on COVID after that.

MS. PSAKI: Sure.

Q Given the lack of Internet access in Cuba, how is the administration monitoring the situation, the crackdown on protesters? And if the administration determines that there is violence against protesters, what options are at the President's disposal?

MS. PSAKI: Well, first, I would say we continue to call for the swift release of pe- -- those peaceful protesters who have been unjustly detained. Again, we stand with the Cuban people and their call for freedom from both the pandemic and from decades of repression.

The protests in Cuba, as you all know, have largely stopped because of the regime’s violent crackdown and retaliatory measures against Cubans exercising their fundamental and universal rights. This is unacceptable.

Of course, we will continue to call for a change in approach, and we will continue to review our own policies about what is possible and work with our partners around the world in a coordinated fashion as well.

Q -- for just a moment. I know that President Biden has previously said that his administration is going to work to address illegal immigration in Central America by addressing root causes of it, including corruption. And I'm wondering, with what we're seeing right now in Cuba and Haiti -- I think that was just that that can be a very long and tricky process that can lead to very dangerous situations. Do you think that that throws any sort of wrench into the administration’s, kind of, plan to address illegal immigration in Central America in that way?

MS. PSAKI: I don't think so. But tell me more about your question.

Q I mean, really, I'm just asking, you know, given what we're seeing in Cuba and Haiti, it's clear that trying to address these issues -- while I think everyone would agree that's important -- leads to potentially, you know, a lot of unrest. Do -- does that give anybody pause in the Biden administration for addressing illegal immigration in Central America in that way?

MS. PSAKI: No.

Biden-Harris Administration Considerations. Counterintuitive? Might Now Be Time For A U.S. Ambasador To Cuba? Three U.S. Senators Believe So.

Two questions to which the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) seeks answers as it determines how to respond to the protests in the Republic of Cuba commencing on Sunday, 11 July 2021:

1) Are the events in the Republic of Cuba a crisis for the United States? and 2) Is the Republic of Cuba near, at or beyond an inflection point such that a response from the United States Government is necessary?

Thus far, the answer to the first question is no.

The answer to the second question generates greater complexity because the commercial, economic, and political infrastructure in the Republic of Cuba continues to change- not necessarily because of desire, but a result of the lessening of external support to the Republic of Cuba prioritized to maintaining existing yet grotesquely inefficient commercial, economic, and political infrastructure. The Republic of Cuba continues to change, glacier-like in most aspects, and not at the velocity preferred by the 11.3 million citizens residing atop the 800-mile archipelago and acutely by individuals of Cuban descent residing in the United States and their supporters in the United States Congress.

Important too to remind that the mistakes of the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) and [Raul] Castro Administration (2008-2019) to not mandate expansive opportunities for United States companies to re-engage widely and deeply throughout the commercial and economic sectors in the Republic of Cuba provided for the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) a landscape from which to easily and swiftly remove what re-engagement existed. Had the widespread presence of United States companies in the Republic of Cuba been responsible for thousands of employment opportunities within hundreds of operations- and for the last seven years influence the decisions of the Republic of Cuba, where the country is today may not have been where the country is today.

The Republic of Cuba since 1959 has never been defined by a moment, but rather as a series of moments. The bilateral relationship between the Republic of Cuba and the United States has also never been defined by a moment, but rather as a series of moments- each former building atop the latter.

The Republican Party wants the Biden-Harris Administration to be aggressive knowing that President Biden is disinclined to do so- with the result a Biden-Harris Administration portrayed as “soft” on Communism and Socialism- a political death star given United States election dynamics for 2021, 2022, and 2024.

The Democratic Party wants the Biden-Harris Administration to return to the Obama-Biden Administration policies impacting the Republic of Cuba. President Biden was never going to embrace again the quid-absent-quo strategy announced on 17 December 2014 that would soon be surgically undone by the Trump-Pence Administration.

The goal of the Biden-Harris Administration is to de-escalate by not reinforcing the narrative that there exists a crisis in the Republic of Cuba which necessitates a response by the United States. Absent a crisis, the Biden-Harris Administration can delay a response. The Diaz-Canel Administration (2019- ) also wants, domestically, to portray absence of a crisis- but simultaneously wants what is happening in the Republic of Cuba to be viewed in the United States as a crisis- so as to stimulate the Biden-Harris Administration to modify its policies and regulations relating to the Republic of Cuba. Yes, it’s complicated.

The events in Haiti are a crisis for Haiti. But, are the events in Haiti a crisis for the United States? Thus far, no.

The events in the Republic of Cuba are a crisis for the Republic of Cuba. But, are the events in the Republic of Cuba a crisis for the United States? Thus far, no.

As head-of-state, President Joe Biden needs to project empathy. The Democratic Party needs to show strength. As head-of-state, President Miguel Diaz-Canel needs to project empathy. The Communist Party needs to show strength.

The demonstrations in the Republic of Cuba do create pressure upon the Biden-Harris Administration to complete its Cuba Policy Review and then implement the recommendations of its Cuba Policy Review. Some members of the United States Congress will ask "what is being done to support those who protest?"

The government of Cuba may benefit from the demonstrations because it is seeking from the Biden Administration any change to existing policies and regulations- and believes that regardless of the intention of those policies and regulations, the government of Cuba can create value from them rather than endure pressures from them. May seem counterintuitive....

As for whether the demonstrations serve as a trigger for greater unrest and sustainable unrest and then catalyst for fundamental and prompt commercial, economic, and political changes within Cuba. Doubtful.

Three members of the United States Senate, who requested anonymity, are supportive of the appointment of a United States Ambassador to the Republic of Cuba believing the protests commencing on Sunday, 11 July 2021, provide a unique opportunity- provided the individual is fluent in the Spanish language, formidable, media savvy (a former journalist for example), has a successful private sector career, can negotiate, not adverse to confrontation, and, as one United States Senator shared, “appreciates the value of being an “eternal pest.’” One of the United States Senators offered that the idea had been shared with officials at The White House. The nominee could be one of the 5,913 individuals (or company representative) with certified claims for expropriated property against the Republic of Cuba. The nominee could be an individual of Cuban descent, although the Republic of Cuba may refuse to accept his/her credentials- which might provide the Biden-Harris Administration a victory.

As quo for the quid, the Republic of Cuba would expectantly request that H.E. Lianys Torres Rivera as Charge d’Affaires ad Interim For Bilateral Missions, who arrived to the United States during the Trump Administration in January 2021, be credentialed as Ambassador Extraordinary And Plenipotentiary.

Lastly, will be watching to see if the demonstrations are repeated on Sunday, 18 July 2021, with the same intensity and same geographical distribution as the demonstrations on Sunday, 11 July 2021. If the demonstrations are repeated, what will be the response from the Diaz-Canel Administration?

Carnival Corporation And Royal Caribbean Win/Lose "In Part" With Libertad Act Cuba Lawsuit Court Rulings

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23590; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

LINK: ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL (7/12/21)
LINK: JOINT NOTICE OF RESOLUTION OF PRIVILEGE DISPUTE REGARDING COMAR (7/12/21)

Excerpts:

This cause is before the Court on Havana Docks Corporation’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Compel Production of Evidence Withheld Under the Attorney-Client Privilege. ECF No. 86. Plaintiff challenges Defendant’s assertion of privilege over the following: (1) documents related to Defendant’s knowledge of the Act and OFAC regulations, for which Plaintiff argues that Defendant waived privilege; (2) certain exchanges pertaining to contract negotiations between Defendant and the Cuban Government. Defendant filed a Response, ECF No. 91, and Plaintiff further filed a Reply, ECF No. 92. Upon consideration of the Motion, Response, Reply, and being otherwise apprised in the matter, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is DENIED in part and DENIED as withdrawn in part.

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES [1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

LINK: ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL EVIDENCE WITHHELD UNDER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE (7/13/21)

Excerpts:

Plaintiff, Havana Docks Corporation, filed a motion to compel Defendant, Carnival Corporation, to produce eleven documents that are a series of emails, that include some attachments.1 (ECF Nos. 234; 239). The parties put those emails into two groups: “Talking Points” (eight emails) and “Other Lobbying Communications” (three emails). (Id.). Carnival withholds the emails, which are responsive to discovery requests Plaintiff issued, as protected attorney-client communications and/or work product. (Privilege Logs, ECF Nos. 239-8; 239-9).3 Carnival filed a response to Havana Docks’ motion, and Havana Docks filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 241; 245; 256; 259).4 The Honorable Beth Bloom referred the motion to me. (ECF No. 80). I reviewed the eleven documents in camera and on June 14, 2021, I heard oral argument. For the reasons that follow, I grant Havana Docks’ motion in part.

LINK To Libertad Act Title III Lawsuit Filing Statistics

For Second Day, United States Department Of State and The White House Answer Questions About Cuba

The White House
Washington DC
13 July 2021

Press Gaggle by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre
Aboard Air Force One En Route Philadelphia, PA

As for Cuba, yesterday, as well, the President recognized the protests that are happening in Cuba, calling them “remarkable,” saying that the Cuban people are demanding their freedom from an authoritarian regime. The President reiterated that the United States stands firmly with the people of Cuba as they assert their universal rights. And he called on the government of Cuba to refrain from violence or attempts to silence the voice of the people of Cuba.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
13 July 2021

We continue to follow widespread, peaceful protests throughout Cuba as Cubans are calling for freedom and human rights. They are standing up to Cuba’s authoritarian regime. Their basic needs are not being met and they are understandably exhausted. We commend the people of Cuba for showing great bravery, the strength of their will, and the power of their voice. In response, the Cuban Government has attempted to silence their voices and communications through internet shutdowns, violence, and arbitrary detentions of dozens of protesters, journalists, activists, and other repressive tactics. We remain deeply concerned by the Cuban Government’s, quote, “call to combat” and by the images of violence that we have seen over the past two days. We call for calm and we condemn any violence against those protesting peacefully, and we equally call on the Cuban Government to release anyone detained for peaceful protest.

Turning to Venezuela, the United States strongly condemns the unjust detention of 2015 National Assembly representative Freddy Guevara and harassment of Interim President Juan Guaido in Venezuela. These reprehensible acts are incompatible with efforts to create conditions for comprehensive negotiations between the Venezuelan opposition and the Nicolas Maduro regime to resolve Venezuela’s crisis. We call for the immediate release of Congressman Guevara and urge the international community to join us in condemning his detention in the strongest terms. Venezuelans have suffered for far too long under a regime that engages in widespread repression and human rights abuses, targeting those who are attempting to build a democratic country with leaders and institutions that are accountable to the people.

QUESTION: Okay. On Cuba, there are quite a few critics of the previous administration’s Cuba policy who are now, because you haven’t changed that policy at all, by extension, critics of this administration’s Cuba policy who have pointed out or made the argument that the very sharp reduction in remittances that Cuban Americans are allowed to send back to the island is one, not the – not – surely not the only, but is one reason why the basic needs of Cuban people are not being met, as – in your words.

Do you accept – do you see any validity to that argument? And whether you do or not, are remittances or – and allowing them or allowing them to go back up to the level that they were under the Obama administration, is that part of the review?

MR PRICE: Well, I would say our review is taking a broad look at what we can do to support the core principles at the center of our policy, and that is democracy and human rights. To your point, Matt, we are always considering options available to us that would allow us to support the Cuban people, to support their humanitarian needs, which are indeed profound, and they are profound because of not anything the United States has done, but from the actions and inactions, mismanagement, corruption of the Cuban regime.

Look, the other point I would make is that current U.S. policy, the so-called embargo, it allows humanitarian goods to reach Cuba, and we do expedite any request to export humanitarian or medical supplies to the island. We regularly authorize the export of agricultural products, medicine, medical equipment, and humanitarian goods to Cuba. And we’ve authorized billions of dollars’ worth of goods over the past couple decades, since the latest iteration of this has been in effect. But just in 2020 alone, we exported more than $175 million worth of goods to Cuba, including food and medicine, to help the Cuban people. In the first six months of 2021 alone, Cuba imported $123 million worth of, in this case, chicken from the United States.

Now, the pandemic has added an extra layer of pain and suffering onto the Cuban people as it has around the world, and we share the concern that the Cuban people have as they have faced an exponential rise in COVID cases across the island. Now, Cuba has made a sovereign decision regarding how it will address the pandemic, and that includes, in this case, the use of its own indigenously produced vaccine. Cuba, as you know, has not joined COVAX. The Cuban Government could always decide to receive outside vaccine donations, but the Cuban Government has decided not to do so yet.

QUESTION: Well, okay, but – so does that mean you do or do not agree with the argument that a sharp reduction in remittances has contributed to the lack of basic needs for —

MR PRICE: Matt, I have not seen a comprehensive study of it, so I’m not prepared to comment on that from here. What I would say, again, is that we are always looking for ways that we can support the Cuban people. We are consistent – we are constantly reviewing what policy measures might bring that about, and by “bring that about” I mean support of democracy, support for human rights on the island. That policy review is ongoing. We are engaging a wide range of stakeholders. We’re taking a close look not only what our immediate predecessor did but, of course, the actions of the Obama-Biden administration, administrations before that. Across any number of policy areas, we are seeking to learn from and to take into account the lessons of previous administrations – what they’ve done well, where there’s room to do something better or to do something different – and so that’s what we’re doing here. This is no different.

QUESTION: All right. And then just the last one: You mentioned that the current U.S. policy – you called it the “so-called embargo.” What exactly would you call it?

MR PRICE: The embargo. I’m not arguing with that.

QUESTION: Can I follow up on that regarding remittances?

QUESTION: Because my understanding is that the wire transfers are part of the late November, post-election additional sanctions by the Trump administration and that that is what many Cuban Americans are complaining about, where they can no longer send – from Miami, who support the overall embargo. So I was wondering today if there was any running room, any flexibility that the administration would be considering. Then I asked that question of Senator Menendez within the last hour or two and he said absolutely not, because the Cuban Government takes 20 percent off the top on the remittances and then transfers the money to pesos, the dollars to pesos, and so the people there are getting a fraction of what their relatives are sending home. That said, I understand he’s been in touch with the White House at the highest levels on this very issue today. Is there anything that the White House would do that would go against the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who wrote section two Helms-Burton?

MR PRICE: Far be it from me to speak for our – speak for the White House. I will —

QUESTION: Well, as an administration official, how likely – especially one where nominations go through that committee and are being held by a singular – single Republican.

MR PRICE: What I will say is that – and I think there is widespread support; we recognize this in the administration; there is widespread support for this idea in Congress – is that the idea that Americans, and especially Cuban Americans, have the potential to be, and oftentimes are, the best – our best ambassadors for what we hope to see on the island nation of Cuba. That is also central to our policy review. We have absolutely been in touch with senior members of Congress. I won’t be in a position to confirm those discussions or to read them out, but as part of our dialogue when it comes to our review of the Cuba policy, we have engaged with Congress. In the aftermath – well, I shouldn’t say the aftermath, of course; they’re still ongoing – in the midst of the protests on Cuba, we have been engaged with senior members of Congress as well. We do recognize that for our policies to have the most effect, to have broad legitimacy and support, it’s important that they have, to the maximum extent possible, support of Congress, and, of course, Cuba is no different. So those consultations are ongoing. Our policy review is ongoing. Even in the midst of that review, we’re going to be looking for ways we can support the Cuban people.

QUESTION: Well, when you said that our Cuban Americans are the best advocates, the best ambassadors for democracy versus authoritarianism, let’s say – I’m paraphrasing, but that seems to be the import of what you’re saying – is there some flexibility, as you said you’re discussing with members of Congress, to some of the travel restrictions, COVID permitting?

MR PRICE: Again, I’m not in a position to preview what we might do going forward from the podium. What I can say is that even before these protests started, we are looking for ways in the midst of COVID, in the midst of the other hardships that the Cuban people have endured because of, again, the corruption, the mismanagement of their own government – perhaps the indifference of their own government – we are looking for ways that we might support the Cuban people in a way that’s consistent with our interests, that’s consistent with our values. We are, of course, doing that in the midst of these protests. These protests are about many things, but certainly the suffering of the Cuban people that is – has been made all the more acute during the pandemic. It’s top of mind. Of course, their quest for additional freedom, for human rights, central to it as well, and what we can do in a way that is responsible and effective to support those aims, including their humanitarian needs, we’ll continue to consider and move forward as appropriate.

QUESTION: Thanks, Ned. Yesterday Jen Psaki said at the White House podium that the United States has spent something like $20 million to support democracy assistance programs in Cuba since 2009. Can you give us some granular detail on how that money was spent? Was it mostly for broadcast channels? Was there nothing else? And if it was mostly for broadcast, was that normal operating costs, or was that above and beyond what had already been budgeted in previous years?

MR PRICE: Well, what Jen was referring to yesterday was the fact that we do provide economic support funds for democracy promotion programs to Cuba on an annual basis, and that amount has been $20 million per year for several years now. And now these U.S.-funded programs, they are – they do go to broadcast funding. They inform the Cuban public through support for independent media. They support Cubans to promote free expression in their communities. They increase access to information on democracy, participatory government, human rights, and market economics. They provide emergency and humanitarian assistance to human rights defenders and to political prisoners, and they prepare those who seek, who aspire, to have a voice in a free and democratic Cuba. All of this funding, all of these programs, they do adhere to the laws and the guidelines laid out in the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 and the Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act.

We’ve made no secret of the fact that support for democracy, support for human rights, is really at the core of our approach to Cuba. They are going to be anchors of our – not only our policy review, but where we net out on that policy. I would make one other point, that as these protests have taken place, we have seen the Cuban Government respond with internet shutdowns, with blackouts. These are government-imposed internet shutdowns. And so just as we’ve been doing with this funding, we call on Cuba’s leaders to demonstrate restraint, to urge respect for the voice of the people by opening all means of communication, both online and offline. Shutting down technology, shutting down information pathways – that does nothing to address the legitimate needs and aspirations of the Cuban people. And so we’ve been very clear on that from the start.

QUESTION: So just to drill down a tiny bit on a technical detail, is it fair to assume that that money has come out of this building and/or USAID? And did it go strictly through NGOs?

MR PRICE: Well, of course, we’re not providing any funding directly to the Cuban Government. Oftentimes, as you know, we work through partners on the ground. For additional details you may want to reach out USAID for how they may administer it.

QUESTION: Because during the campaign, President Biden said that Trump’s reversals on Cuba policy have inflicted harm to the Cuban people and done nothing to advance democracy and human rights. So does President Biden still want to change Trump’s policy on Cuba? And when would be a good time, if not now?

MR PRICE: Well, we are undertaking a review of our – of a Cuba policy precisely to determine how best we can support the human rights of Cubans, how best we can support the prospect for democracy on the island. Now, of course, successive administrations have sought in some ways to do that, and so as I said before, we are going to be taking a close look at what has and has not worked in the past, and unfortunately, in the case of Cuba there may be more that has not worked than what has worked. And so we are going to be, as we’ve done in other cases as well, studying that very closely to determine what we can do most effectively, consistent with our values, consistent with our interests, to move the ball forward, especially when it comes to democracy and human rights.

QUESTION: Will Cuba become a priority now, after the events on the ground?

MR PRICE: Well, of course, you heard from the President directly, you heard from the Secretary directly standing right here. We have not been shy about speaking to what is going on. Of course, it’s always a priority for us when citizens are taking to the streets peacefully to express their aspirations for democracy and human rights. We’ll continue to watch this very closely.

QUESTION: On Cuba – just because you’re on Cuba – my colleague asked about the urgency of this ongoing policy review. Is there a timeline for completion? I think we’ve continued to ask, and obviously the protests sort of lend a greater immediacy to the question.

On the Cuba policy review, of course, we are moving as expeditiously as appropriate in this case. We are making sure that we are consulting with, as I said before, a broad and wide variety of stakeholders. We are taking a close look at what the United States can best do to support the needs of the Cuban people, to support their legitimate and long-denied aspirations for democracy and human rights.

Today's Comments About Cuba From President Biden, Secretary Of State Blinken, White House Press Secretary Psaki- Who Inappropriately Equates "Sales" With "Assistance"

The White House
Washington DC
12 July 2021

“The Cuban people are demanding their freedom from an authoritarian regime. I don’t think we’ve seen anything like these protests in a long long time if, quite frankly ever,” he said. “The US stands firmly with the people of Cuba as they assert their universal rights. And we call on the government of Cuba to refrain from violence in their attempt to silence the voices of the people of Cuba.”

Mr. President, would you consider changing the embargo on Cuba? Would you consider making any changes to the embargo with Cuba? When you will be ready to change Trump's reversal on Cuba, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: We are going to have more to say about Cuba and Haiti as the week goes on and -- so stay tuned.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
12 July 2021

Secretary of State Antony Blinken

Good afternoon, everyone. Good to see you all. Let me just say, before turning to today’s report, I want to speak briefly to the situation in two countries in the hemisphere. Over the weekend, tens of thousands of Cubans took to the streets on the island to exercise their rights to assemble peacefully and express their views. The protesters called for freedom and human rights. They criticized Cuba’s authoritarian regime for failing to meet people’s most basic needs, including food and medicine. In many instances, peaceful protesters were met with repression and violence. The Biden-Harris administration stands by the Cuban people and people around the world who demand their human rights and who expect governments to listen to and serve them rather than try to silence them. Peaceful protesters are not criminals, and we join partners across the hemisphere and around the world in urging the Cuban regime to respect the rights of the Cuban people to determine their own future, something they have been denied for far too long.

QUESTION: Thanks, Mr. Secretary. Could I follow up on your remarks on Cuba? I was wondering what implications this has for U.S. policy. There’s a policy review underway. Does this affect the timeline and when do you expect that to be finished? Ideas like remittances, travel, things that were – that took place under Obama, are those still on the cards now after this? And on that note, the president of Cuba today said that the U.S. was provoking social unrest. Do you have any response to that?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: The policy review that you point to focuses on the political and economic well-being of the Cuban people, and obviously we’re looking carefully and closely at what has just happened, what indeed is happening. And as we stated many times, at the heart of the review and at the heart of the policy that would result are democracy and human rights. That’s core to our efforts. That will be reflected in the policy. I think it would be a grievous mistake for the Cuban regime to interpret what is happening in dozens of towns and cities across the island as the result or product of anything the United States has done. It would be a grievous mistake because it would show that they simply are not hearing the voices and will of the Cuban people – people deeply, deeply, deeply tired of the repression that has gone on for far too long, tired of the mismanagement of the Cuban economy, tired of the lack of adequate food, and of course, inadequate response to the COVID pandemic. That is what we are hearing and seeing in Cuba, and that is a reflection of the Cuban people, not of the United States or any other outside actor.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
12 July 2021

QUESTION: Okay. Back in 2015, July 2015 when relations were restored and President Obama said that it was – the policy of sanctions and so on was a failed policy. And then there was a great deal of hope and so on. But then the preceding administration collapsed all that hope down. But you guys seem to be following the same kind of policy as the previous administration. What are you doing, let’s say, to show people that there are actually – there are benefits to good governance and all that stuff?

MR PRICE: I certainly would not say that we are following the previous – the policy of the previous administration. As you know, our Cuba policy is under review. But importantly – and I think this is a pivotal distinction – our policy, as you heard from the Secretary, it focuses on the wellbeing of the Cuban people, and at the center of that policy are democracy and our human rights. And what we are assessing in the context of that policy review is how the United States can best support the aspirations of the Cuban people. So that policy review remains ongoing. It is something – the issue of human rights on the island is very important to us, and we’re seeing yesterday and today in the streets all throughout Cuba that it is very important, as you might expect, to the Cuban people as well. And as we undertake this review, at the center of that review will be the welfare and the wellbeing of those Cuban people.

QUESTION: That’s exactly what the previous administration said their policy was towards Cuba, right?

MR PRICE: Again, we haven’t spoken – we haven’t spoken —

QUESTION: So until your review is complete, why is Said incorrect in saying that you’re following – you’re doing the exact same thing that the Trump administration did?

MR PRICE: Well, he was speaking of our policies towards Cuba. And again, our —

QUESTION: Well, yeah. You haven’t changed the previous administration’s policies, right, so until that review is complete, you’re doing the same thing, right?

MR PRICE: Well, I can assure you that we are going about this —

QUESTION: You’re doing the same thing as the previous administration did, right? You haven’t changed the policy.

MR PRICE: We have not announced our Cuba policy, but what we have said is that democracy and human rights are at the center of it.

QUESTION: Just on that, does the administration still consider Cuba a state sponsor of terrorism?

MR PRICE: We – there’s been no change. As you know, the state sponsor of terrorism list is –it’s evaluated, and the report is released once a year. When we have a new report to release, we’ll do that.

QUESTION: So that’s part of the policy review in general of – for Cuba policy?

MR PRICE: We are always reviewing issues of state sponsorship for countries around the world pursuant to the requirement to put forward the state sponsor of terrorism list. Our review of Cuba and Cuba policy, it is taking place in parallel to that.

QUESTION: So separate, but parallel?

MR PRICE: I think that is a fair characterization.

The White House
Washington DC
12 July 2021

Q And the other matter for me is on Cuba. The President -- we saw the President's statement today about the demonstrations there on the island yesterday. Two questions on that. But why hasn't President Biden taken steps to undo some of the things that his predecessor, Donald Trump, did to overturn the overtures made by President Obama? And then, secondly, we heard there's a -- obviously, a great cry yesterday -- or during these protests for vaccines. Has Cuba -- on the list to get vaccines from the United States?

MS. PSAKI: Well, first, let me say that we have actually provided, over the course of the last several months, a great deal of assistance to Cuba. I just want to note this because I think it's important for people to understand. Since, FY- -- since 2009, which is quite some time ago, Congress has directed $20 million in democracy assistance annually. But even if you look at last year: Last year alone, the U.S. exported $176 million of goods to Cuba. In the first six months of 2021, Cuba imported $123 million worth of chicken from the United States -- just as an example. Obviously, one of the issues that the ind- -- that protesters are justifiably out there in the streets protesting about is hunger, is lack of access to vaccines, et cetera. But we are continuing to provide a range of assistance, which we will continue to do. LINK TO COMPLETE UNITED STATES EXPORT REPORT

I will say, on vaccines, one of the challenges, Jonathan, which you may be familiar with, is that Cuba has not joined COVAX and has indicated they intend to vaccinate their population using the Abdala vaccine, which they're -- the Pan American Health Organization has been out there urging Cuban scientists to publish their -- their results in the peer-reviewed literature on this vaccine.

So, in terms of -- COVAX would be a mechanism that we have provided, as you all know, vaccines to a range of countries in the world. We certainly recognize and understand that access to vaccines is one of the issues that a number of individuals in the streets is voicing concern about, but we have to determine what the mechanism would be to work with the Cuban people to get vaccines to them. That's something we're working through.

Q Jen, just to follow up on Cuba: Can you give us a sense of where the President's policy review on Cuba is right now? Do you anticipate making any changes, as Jonathan asked? And where do you see it going from here?

MS. PSAKI: Well, I will say first -- and I meant to say this in response to Jonathan -- but there's every indication that yesterday's protests were spontaneous expressions of people who are exhausted with the Cuban government's economic mismanagement and repression. And those -- these are protests inspired by the harsh reality of everyday life in Cuba, not people in another country. I'm saying that because I think there have been a range of accusations out there, as you well know, Jeff.

In terms of our assessment of a future -- our current pol- -- our policy, I should say, it continues to be -- our approach continues to be governed by two principles: First, support for democracy and human rights -- which is going to continue to be at the core of our efforts -- through empowering the Cuban people to determine their own future. Second, Americans, especially Cuban Americans, are the best ambassadors for freedom and prosperity in Cuba. I don't have anything to predict for you in terms of any policy shift. Obviously, given the protests were just happening over the last 24 to 48 hours, we're assessing how we can be helpful directly to the people of Cuba in these circumstances.

Q You hinted at this, but the President of Cuba did directly accuse the United States of basically fomenting these protests because of the embargo and that leading to a lack of medicine and the other things. Do you have a specific response to him?

MS. PSAKI: Well, I'd first say that the U.S. embargo allows humanitarian goods to reach Cuba. We exidite [sic] -- expedite any request to export humanitarian or med- -- medical supplies to Cuba. That continues to be the case.

And the United States regularly authorizes the export of agricultural products, medicine, medical equipment, and humanitarian goods to Cuba -- and, since 1992, has authorized the export of billions of dollars of those goods to Cuba. So that's simply inaccurate in terms of the facts that are stated. But, again, I would restate what I said a little bit earlier in response, which is that there's every indication that yesterday's protests were reactions of the people in Cuba to exhaustion of the governance of the -- of the leaders in the state, the economic mismanagement, and the repression that we're seeing take place against the people of the country.

Q A few months ago, when asked about Cuba policy, you said it was not a priority for the President to review U.S. policy toward Cuba. Do the events of this weekend change that?

MS. PSAKI: Well, I would say, Kelly, that we, of course, are monitoring closely. You saw the -- the statement the President -- we put out in the President's name this morning from -- in his voice, of course, conveying his support for the people of Cuba; making clear that he doesn't support the approach of the government of Cuba, which he's -- he has never held -- he has never been -- held back on.

In terms of where it ranks in a priority order, I'm not in a position to offer that, but I can tell you that we will be closely engaged. We will be looking to provide support to the people of Cuba. We certainly, you know, support the freedom of speech, the freedom of press, the freedom of -- when we believe they deserve to have access to the economic support and medical support, health supplies that many of them are asking for.

Q And, on Cuba, in this White House statement today you note the, quote, “tragic grip of the pandemic.” But under current U.S. sanctions that were put in place by the last administration but have not been changed by this administration, Cuban exiles cannot send remittances to their family that lives in Cuba. So why is the Biden administration continuing that policy?

MS. PSAKI: Well I would say, again, even under the embargo, there are a number of exemptions, I should say -- humanitarian assistance, medical supplies that we've continued to provide assistance to the people of Cuba, even with that in place. But I have nothing to preview for you in terms of a change of policy.

Q But even though the President said he was going to reverse the policy, you can't say when he plans to reverse the policy?

MS. PSAKI: Again, these protests happened yesterday, I think, or over the last two days.

Q But he made the promise in September.

MS. PSAKI: I certainly understand, Kaitlan, but there's nothing I can preview for you. But to be accurate, there are exemptions that we can send hed- -- medical supplies, we can send humanitarian supplies. That's something we've been doing for some time from the U.S. government.

Q Yeah, I just had two quick ones. So, first, on Cuba: Recently, the New York Times described the American flag as “alienating to some.” We've seen these Cuban protesters flying the American flag as a symbol for freedom. We saw it in Hong Kong as well. So, does the administration support international protesters flying the American flag? And what message do you have to Americans who are wary of flying it here in the U.S.?

MS. PSAKI: Well, I would say, first, the President certainly values and respects the -- the symbol- -- symbol of the American flag. He's someone who certainly waves it outside of his house, or does in Delaware and -- and other places where he's lived throughout his time. But he also believes that people have the right to peaceful protest, and he thinks both can be true.

Statement By President Biden About Sunday Protests In The Republic Of Cuba

The White House
Washington DC
12 July 2021

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Statement by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. on Protests in Cuba

We stand with the Cuban people and their clarion call for freedom and relief from the tragic grip of the pandemic and from the decades of repression and economic suffering to which they have been subjected by Cuba's authoritarian regime. The Cuban people are bravely asserting fundamental and universal rights. Those rights, including the right of peaceful protest and the right to freely determine their own future, must be respected. The United States calls on the Cuban regime to hear their people and serve their needs at this vital moment rather than enriching themselves.”

Analysis

The demonstrations create pressure upon the Biden Administration to complete its Republic of Cuba Policy Review and then implement the recommendations of its Republic of Cuba Policy Review. Some members of the United States Congress will ask "what is being done to support those who protest?"

The government of the Republic of Cuba may benefit from the demonstrations because it is seeking from the Biden Administration any change to existing policies and regulations- and believes that regardless of the intention of those policies and regulations, the government of the Republic of Cuba can create value from them rather than endure pressures from them. May seem counterintuitive....

The relationship between the Republic of Cuba and the United States has never been defined by a moment, but rather a series of moments.

Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, Venezuela Elections Impacting Democrat And Republican Strategies For Mid-Term, Presidential Elections In Florida And Other States; Brazil Consequential

Seeking to deflect expected Republican Party messaging leading to United States elections in 2021, 2022, and 2024 could solidify further political calculations by the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) to maintain distance from Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) level re-engagement with the Republic of Cuba. 

The Democratic Party continues to develop and implement strategies to counter those of Mr. Trump-Governor Pence during the 2016 campaign and the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) during the 2020 campaign. 

Republican Party Has Successfully Injected Themes Of Communism And Socialism Into Messaging For United States Federal, State, And Local Elections.  Headache For Democratic Party Given Nearness Of Dates To United States Elections: 

• November 2021 Nicaragua Presidential Election & Venezuela Regional/Local Elections

• October 2022 Brazil Presidential Election

• July 2024 Mexico Presidential Election

• October 2024 Cuba And Venezuela Presidential Elections; Brazil Hosts G20 

United Nations General Assembly September 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024 Where Presidents Of Brazil, Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, And President Biden Likely To Participate 

Brazil Could See Former President Lula Against Current President Bolsonaro Impacting Democrat And Republican Strategies For Mid-Term & Beyond Elections In Florida And Other States   

• Republican Messaging- Democrats Want Corrupt, Convicted Socialist Friendly With President Diaz-Canel In Cuba, President Maduro In Venezuela, President Ortega In Nicaragua.  Democrat Messaging- If They Engage.  Republicans Support Corrupt, Climate Change Denier, Reckless Environmentalist, COVID-19 Disaster Manager, Friend Of 45th President Of The United States 

Senator Marco Rubio (R- Florida) Re-Election In 2022, Governor Ron DeSantis (R-Florida) Re-Election In 2022 & Senator Rick Scott (R- Florida) Re-Election In 2024.  Each Have Presidential Aspirations. 

And… The Unknown Impact Of The 45th President Of The United States 

The state of Florida remains a primary focus of the Democratic Party and Republican Party as they prepare for elections on Tuesday, 2 November 2021; Tuesday, 8 November 2022; and Tuesday, 5 November 2024.  There may be nine or more individuals who seek the 2024 presidential nomination of the Republican Party, with respective campaigns commencing as early as 2022. 

The Sunshine State’s 14,523,803 voters (as of 21 April 2021): 5,267,864 Democrats; 5,178,159 Republicans; 3,829,504 No Party Affiliation; and 248,276 Minor Party will vote once (2024) for president, twice (2022 and 2024) for United States Senator, and twice (2022 and 2024) for twenty-eight members of the United States House of Representatives.   

Since 2000, the Republican Party has won four of six presidential elections in the state of Florida: 51.2%-47.9% in 2020; 49.0%-47.8% in 2016; 52.1%-47.1% in 2004; and 48.9%-48.8% in 2000.  The Democratic Party won by 50.0%-49.1% in 2012 and 51.0%-48.2% in 2008.   

On Tuesday, 8 November 2022, redistricting resulting from the 2020 United States Census will impact elections for the United States Congress (435 seeking two-year terms in the 435-member United States House of Representatives and 34 seeking six-year terms in the 100-member United States Senate).  One-third of the seats in the United States Senate are up for election every two years. 

The state receiving the most attention in 2022 will be Florida which will have gained one seat in the United States House of Representatives.  There will be contests for twenty-eight members of the United States House of Representatives, one seat in the United States Senate (where the incumbent Republican may have 2024 presidential aspirations), and for governor (where the incumbent Republican may have 2024 presidential aspirations).  The Republican incumbent in the other United States Senate seat whose re-election is in 2024 may also have 2024 presidential aspirations.   

Although there may be twenty candidates seeking on 2 October 2022 to succeed H.E. Jair Bolsonaro (2018- ), President of the Federative Republic of Brazil (population approximately 221 million), the candidate most likely to cause Florida-based indigestion for the Biden-Harris Administration is Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (known as Lula) who was President of Brazil from 2003 to 2010.  He was a founding member of the Workers’ Party and sought the presidency three times before the election in 2002.  There is no certainty that President Bolsonaro will seek re-election. 

President Bolsonaro (21 March 1955) of the Alliance for Brazil (Independent) Party will be sixty-seven years of age on election day in 2022.  Former President Lula (27 October 1945) of the Workers’ Party (PT) will be seventy-five years of age on election day in 2022. 

From Wikipedia: “The President and Vice President of Brazil are elected using the two-round system. Citizens may field their candidacies for the Presidency and participate in the general elections, which are held on the first Sunday of October (in this instance, 2 October 2022).  If a candidate receives more than 50% of the overall vote, he/she is elected.  If the 50% threshold is not met by any candidate, a second round of voting is held on the last Sunday of October (in this instance, 30 October 2022). In the second round, only the two candidates who receive the most votes from the first round may participate.  The winner of the second round is elected President of Brazil.  The President selects his/her Vice President.” 

Creating political indigestion for the Biden-Harris Administration are the dynamics of the Brazil election process.  The election will be held on Sunday, 2 October 2022.  If no candidate receives more than 50% of the overall vote, a second election would be held on Sunday, 30 October 2022.  A multiple moment October Surprise. 

If President Bolsonaro receives enough votes to participate in the run-off, and former President Lula is the opponent, the incumbent will continue to link former President Lula to the Republic of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua; along with the ideologies of communism and socialism; and dictatorship form of government.   

With the United States elections on Tuesday, 8 November 2022, there may thus be a triple impact by the Brazil elections.   

The Republican Party and its nominated candidates will likely have two election result opportunities during the month of October 2022, along with a recognition in Brazil of former President Lula’s birthday on 27 October 2022, and likely G20 Summit, to imply philosophical connectivity to former President Lula, the Republic of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, with candidates of the Democratic Party seeking offices in the state of Florida and other states.  The debate about ideology will be infused within the campaigns for representation in federal, state, and local offices. 

The focus by the Republican Party on the election in Brazil will not be because there are so many voters of Brazilian descent in the state of Florida.  The focus will be because of the ideological optics that former President Lula presents in terms of messaging differentiation for the Republican Party.  Gaining support of registered voters who are of Brazilian descent is a plus.   

The goal is seeking to gain support from voters who want changes to the governments of the Republic of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela- and can be convinced that the Republican Party is the means to those ends- Capitalism and Democracy good, Communism and Socialism bad.  

The headaches for the Democratic Party will have their beginnings in November 2021 with a presidential election in Nicaragua and local and regional elections in Venezuela and continue through October 2022 with the presidential election in Brazil, and then to October/November 2024 with presidential elections in the Republic of Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela:   

• On 7 November 2021 voters in Nicaragua will elect their president and national assembly.  H.E. Daniel Ortega, President of Nicaragua (2006- ), and his wife, H.E. Rosario Maria Murillo Zambrana, Vice President of Nicaragua since 2017, are expected to be re-elected. 

• On 21 November 2021, voters in Venezuela will elect candidates for local and regional positions.  The current government is expected to prevail.   

• On 5 October 2022, voters in Brazil will elect its president.  If no candidate obtains 50% of the vote, there will be a run-off on 30 October 2022.  

• On 1 July 2024, voters in Mexico will elect a successor to the current President, H.E. Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, who is restricted to one term. 

• On 10 October 2024, voters in the Republic of Cuba will elect their President.  H.E. Miguel Diaz-Canel, President of the Republic of Cuba (2019- ), has not confirmed an intention to seek a second five-year term.  President Diaz-Canel, who is also First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Republic of Cuba, is not permitted a third presidential term.   

• Brazil hosts G20 Summit. 

• H.E. Nicolas Maduro, President of Venezuela (2013- ), has not confirmed an intention to seek re-election in November 2024 or December 2024- perhaps coinciding with 5 November 2024 election for President of the United States. 

If, before Tuesday, 5 November 2024, Miguel Diaz-Canel remains President of the Republic of Cuba, Daniel Ortega remains President of Nicaragua, and Nicolas Maduro remains President of Venezuela, expect the presidential nominee and vice-presidential nominee of the Democratic Party and Republican Party to blame one another for permitting and enabling that outcome while advocating they will change the trajectory of those countries… count upon the State of Florida to be the primary focus of the messaging- but also with robust commentary in other states.  

The great unknown is the impact of The Honorable Donald Trump, 45th President of the United States, who supported President Bolsonaro and excoriated Presidents Diaz-Canel, Maduro, and Ortega.  He was also unabashed from commenting upon decisions by the government of Mexico.  His decisions could make challenging preferred messaging by candidates of both political parties throughout 2021, 2022, and 2024.  The three likely themes: Capitalism- great, Communism- terrible, Democracy- best, and Socialism- bad.  Republicans- strong.  Democrats- weak.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

American Airlines To Libertad Act Plaintiff- Reference To Supreme Court Case Is Correct, But Plaintiff Wrong On Who It Helps

ROBERT M. GLEN V. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., [1:19-cv-23994 Southern Florida District; 4:20-cv-00482-A Transferred To Northern Texas District; 5th Circuit Court of Appeals 20-10903]

Reid Collins & Tsai (plaintiff)
Ewusiak Law, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Day (defendant)
Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP (defendant)

Link To: Response to Plaintiff-Appellant’s Rule 28(j) Letter in Glen v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 20-10903, notifying the Court of TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, No. 20-297 (U.S. June 25, 2021) (“Op.”) (7/1/21)

ORAL ARGUMENT HEARD before Judges King, Dennis, Ho. Arguing Person Information Updated for: Craig Boneau arguing for Appellant Robert M. Glen; Arguing Person Information Updated for: Benjamin C. Mizer arguing for Appellee Incorporated American Airlines [20-10903] (SME) [Entered: 07/07/2021 12:02 PM] [Transcript Not Yet Available; Audio Available]

Excerpts From Response:

Appellant is right that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, No. 20-297, is directly on point, but he is wrong about which party it helps. The Supreme Court’s opinion confirms that Congress “may not simply enact an injury into existence, using its lawmaking power to transform something that is not remotely harmful into something that is.” Op. at 10 (citation omitted). Appellant is not harmed by American Airlines’ alleged trafficking because he has no property interest in the underlying properties. As American has explained, the properties were appropriated (1) in Cuba (2) by the Cuban government (3) from Cuban nationals. Appellee’s Br. 17. In other words, the seizures were entirely foreign to the United States and domestic to Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act (“HBA”) does not purport to invalidate or otherwise reach those prior appropriations, and Appellant has no legally protected property interest in the underlying properties. See id. And without a concrete injury to an underlying property interest, Appellant has no standing under TransUnion to invoke the HBA’s trafficking cause of action.

Appellant tries to get around this fundamental defect by arguing that the HBA creates a statutory claim analogous to a common law suit for trespass or unjust enrichment. But the common law has never recognized an injury for trespassing on or unjustly benefitting from a third party’s property, and Congress did not purport to provide such a remedy. But even assuming Congress did, TransUnion makes clear that “Congress’s say-so” does not suffice to “treat an injury as concrete for Article III purposes.” Op. at 11 (cleaned up).

Finally, Appellant now concedes that he “does not allege a claim based solely on a technical statutory violation of the Act by American Airlines.” Appellant’s 28(j) Ltr. at 2. This concession defeats his earlier argument that American’s alleged “violation of the Act on its own confers standing.” Appellant’s Br. 23.

Maersk To Libertad Act Lawsuit Plaintiffs- Sue Cuba Not Us; You Don't Own The Port; Louisiana Has No Jurisdiction- Company Is Foreign

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL; EMMA RUTH BLANCO, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF ALFREDO BLANCO ROSELL, JR; HEBE BLANCO MIYARES, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF BYRON BLANCO ROSELL; SERGIO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, in his personal capacity, and as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF ENRIQUE BLANCO ROSELL; EDUARDO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF FLORENTINO BLANCO ROSELL; LIANA MARIA BLANCO; SUSANNAH VALENTINA BLANCO; LYDIA BLANCO BONAFONTE; JACQUELINE M. DELGADO; BYRON DIAZ BLANCO, JR.; MAGDELENA BLANCO MONTOTO; FLORENTINO BLANCO DE LA TORRE; JOSEPH E. BUSHMAN; CARLOS BLANCO DE LA TORRE; and GUILLERMO BLANCO DE LA TORRE VERSUS A.P. MOLLER-MAERSK A/S (a/k/a A.P. MOLLER-MAERSK GROUP); MAERSK A/S (a/k/a MAERSK LINE A/S); MAERSK, INC.; and MAERSK AGENCY U.S.A., INC [2:21-cv-00339 Eastern District of Louisiana].

Pusateri, Johnston, Guillot & Greenbaum, LLC (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)

Link To Motion To Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim (7/6/21)
Link To Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction (7/6/21)

Excerpts From Motion To Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim

As an initial matter, Article III standing is not established by the mere fact that Helms-Burton gives Plaintiffs a right to sue persons who traffic in confiscated property. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (“Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.”); see also Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc. No. 4:20-CV-482-A, 2020 WL 4464665, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2020) (dismissing plaintiff’s Helms-Burton claim based on his failure to establish Article III standing). “Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirement by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”

Plaintiffs primarily allege that in 1960, the Cuban government seized the Confiscated Property from the Blanco Rosell Siblings without compensation. (Compl. ¶¶ 2–5, 88, 93.) Plaintiffs further allege that the Cuban Government created ZEDM, built a container terminal allegedly incorporating the Confiscated Property, and subsuming their concession rights, and that, as a result, ZEDM traffics in the Confiscated Property. (Id. ¶¶ 95–103.)

Any injury from the alleged confiscation; creation, management, or control of the ZEDM, or the building of the Port of Mariel or its container terminal, is traceable only to the Cuban Government. Plaintiffs have no standing to sue Maersk, or anyone else, for an “injury that results from the independent action of [the Cuban Government which is] not before the court.” Simon, 426 U.S. at 41–42.

Plaintiffs do not allege that they own claims to the Port of Mariel or its container terminal, as required by Helms-Burton. Indeed, neither the port nor the terminal is part of the Confiscated Property—even as defined in the Complaint. (Compl. ¶ 4). Plaintiffs also fail to allege, because they cannot, that they had a right to use or benefit from either. This case is thus distinguishable from other Helms-Burton cases where the allegations were sufficient to allege Article III standing. For example, in Havana Docks, the plaintiff had a certified claim to “waterfront real property in the Port of Havana, Cuba, identified as the Havana Cruise Port Terminal[,]” which the plaintiff “owned, possessed, managed , and used . . . from 1917 until the Cuban Government confiscated it in 1960.” Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises SA Co., 484 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1187 (S.D. Fla. 2020). The complaint alleged that the defendant cruise line “use[d] the [Havana Cruise Port Terminal] by regularly embarking and disembarking their passengers on the [Havana Cruise Port Terminal]. Id. The court held standing existed because plaintiff was not receiving “the benefit of its interest in the [Havana Cruise Port Terminal] . . . .” Id. at 1992. By contrast, Plaintiffs have not suffered a “real” injury because they do not have a claim, certified or otherwise, to the Port of Mariel, its container terminal, or to any benefit arising from them.

Excerpts From Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction

a. Because Louisiana unquestionably is not a “paradigm forum” and none of the Maersk defendants is “at home” in the State of Louisiana, the exercise of general jurisdiction is impermissible.
b. Because the facts here fail to create the requisite “substantial connection” between the Maersk defendants, the State of Louisiana and plaintiffs’ Cuba-centric claims, specific jurisdiction likewise does not exist under the facts of this case.
IV. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) does not afford this Honorable Court personal jurisdiction over the foreign-country defendants, as the exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate the governing jurisdictional tenets.

Lawsuit Against Spain's Melia Hotels International Takes Another Turn... Government Of Spain Never Served Cuba. Repeat. Start Again.

On 29 May 2019, descendants of Mr. Rafael Lucas Sanchez Hill, acting as Central Santa Lucia L.C., filed a lawsuit in Spain seeking US$10 million from Palma de Mallorca, Spain-based Melia Hotels International S.A. (2019 revenues approximately US$2 billion) seeking damages for the use of land upon which a hotel is located in the Republic of Cuba. The lawsuit is not using provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).  

In June 2021, the presiding judge learned that due to a procedural administrative error of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain, the Republic of Cuba was not properly served with the lawsuit.  As a result, the government of the Republic of Cuba and Republic of Cuba government-operated Gaviota could not respond to the lawsuit as it had not been officially served.   

Thus, the 3 May 2021 order of the judge withdrawing the lawsuit for lack of inclusion of “an indispensable party” is nullified.  Likewise, the plaintiff appeal to the Provincial Court is nullified. 

The plaintiff must now again wait (which could take several months) for the government of Spain to officially transmit the lawsuit summons to the government of the Republic of Cuba and Republic of Cuba government-operated Gaviota.  One served, the government of the Republic of Cuba and Gaviota will to decide whether or not to appear in the lawsuit against Melia Hotels International S.A. 

If the government of the Republic of Cuba and Gaviota decide not to appear, the judge will again withdraw the lawsuit, plaintiffs will again appeal.  If the government of the Republic of Cuba and Gaviota appear, then the case will proceed before the same judge in the same venue: Court No. 24 in Palma de Mallorca. 

Links To Court Filings: 

Al Juzgado De Primera Instancia Número 24 De Palma De Mallorca (11 June 2021) 

Interlocutòria Nº 222/2021 (23 June 2021) 

Antecedents De Fet (23 June 2021) 

Links To Previous Posts: 

Judge Rules Against Plaintiffs In Non-Libertad Act Title III Lawsuit Against Spain's Melia Hotels; Lawsuit Will Continue May 04, 2021 

In Lawsuit Filed In Spain Against Melia Hotels, Plaintiff Argues That Government Of Cuba Is Not Required To Be A Defendant; Melia Hotels Says Otherwise February 10, 2021 

Court In Spain Requires Government Of Cuba And Gaviota Tourism Company Be Included In "Unjust Enrichment" Lawsuit Against Melia Hotels International January 16, 2021

Cuba Should Sign On To OECD 15% Minimum Corporate Income Tax Statement; Most Of Its Trading And Investment Sources Are Signers

The Miguel Diaz-Canel Administration (2019- ) should consider adopting soonest the 15% minimum corporate income tax framework announced on 1 July 2021 by the Paris, France-based Organisation For Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) with support from 139 country members who combined represent more than 90% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 

The Republic of Cuba’s goal with respect to corporate taxation should not to be an outlier.  The goal should be continuity with the global community, particularly as competition amongst countries will continue to increase and those with mainstream, transparent, and consistent corporate income tax policies will be magnets for opportunity while those eschewing continuity with the global community will be avoided.  The Republic of Cuba should embrace being amongst the majority because those in the minority will be subject to additional scrutiny rather than additional opportunities.  The issue is one of optics and substance. 

Although the Republic of Cuba is not among the thirty-nine members of the OECD, its primary commercial, economic, and political connectors are, among them: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, and United States; and Brazil, China, and India are Key Partners of the OECD. 

Significantly, among the 139 countries joining the Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges from the Digitalization of the Economy are the Republic of Cuba’s most important sources of commercial, economic, and political connectivity: China, France, Germany, Mexico, Russian Federation, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United States, and Vietnam.   

While the adoption by the Republic of Cuba of the 15% minimum corporate income tax may neither directly nor significantly impact today the Republic of Cuba, its adoption would 1) provide continuity and connectively to global taxation norms 2) align its corporate taxation code with the OECD, thus mainstream and 3) remove an obstacle for companies considering exporting to, importing from, or providing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as the more mainstream the Republic of Cuba is, the more aligned with its primary country market connectors, the fewer impediments for companies to overcome when determining whether a commercial relationship with the Republic of Cuba is worth the often considerable effort.   

China, Spain, Russia, and Vietnam signed the statement.  Without their commercial, economic, and political connectivity with the Republic of Cuba, the archipelago of 11.3 million citizens could not have the resources to remain today as it does.  The Diaz-Canel Administration should promptly join these countries and sign the statement.   

OECD
Paris, France
1 July 2021

130 Countries And Jurisdictions Join Bold New Framework For International Tax Reform  

130 countries and jurisdictions have joined a new two-pillar plan to reform international taxation rules and ensure that multinational enterprises pay a fair share of tax wherever they operate.  130 countries and jurisdictions, representing more than 90% of global GDP, joined the Statement establishing a new framework for international tax reform. A small group of the Inclusive Framework’s 139 members have not yet joined the Statement at this time.  The remaining elements of the framework, including the implementation plan, will be finalised in October. 

The framework updates key elements of the century-old international tax system, which is no longer fit for purpose in a globalised and digitalised 21st century economy.  The two-pillar package – the outcome of negotiations coordinated by the OECD for much of the last decade - aims to ensure that large Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) pay tax where they operate and earn profits, while adding much-needed certainty and stability to the international tax system. 

Pillar One will ensure a fairer distribution of profits and taxing rights among countries with respect to the largest MNEs, including digital companies. It would re-allocate some taxing rights over MNEs from their home countries to the markets where they have business activities and earn profits, regardless of whether firms have a physical presence there.  Pillar Two seeks to put a floor on competition over corporate income tax, through the introduction of a global minimum corporate tax rate that countries can use to protect their tax bases. 

The two-pillar package will provide much-needed support to governments needing to raise necessary revenues to repair their budgets and their balance sheets while investing in essential public services, infrastructure and the measures necessary to help optimise the strength and the quality of the post-COVID recovery.  Under Pillar One, taxing rights on more than USD 100 billion of profit are expected to be reallocated to market jurisdictions each year. The global minimum corporate income tax under Pillar Two - with a minimum rate of at least 15% - is estimated to generate around USD 150 billion in additional global tax revenues annually. Additional benefits will also arise from the stabilisation of the international tax system and the increased tax certainty for taxpayers and tax administrations. 

“After years of intense work and negotiations, this historic package will ensure that large multinational companies pay their fair share of tax everywhere,” OECD Secretary-General Mathias Cormann said. “This package does not eliminate tax competition, as it should not, but it does set multilaterally agreed limitations on it. It also accommodates the various interests across the negotiating table, including those of small economies and developing jurisdictions. It is in everyone’s interest that we reach a final agreement among all Inclusive Framework Members as scheduled later this year,” Mr Cormann said.  Participants in the negotiation have set an ambitious timeline for conclusion of the negotiations. This includes an October 2021 deadline for finalising the remaining technical work on the two-pillar approach, as well as a plan for effective implementation in 2023. Further information on the continuing international tax reform negotiations is also available at: https://oe.cd/bepsaction1. 

• LINK To OECD Website

• LINK To Statement (English)

• LINK To Statement (Spanish)

“The [OECD] is an international organisation that works to build better policies for better lives. Our goal is to shape policies that foster prosperity, equality, opportunity and well-being for all. We draw on 60 years of experience and insights to better prepare the world of tomorrow.  Together with governments, policy makers and citizens, we work on establishing evidence-based international standards and finding solutions to a range of social, economic and environmental challenges. From improving economic performance and creating jobs to fostering strong education and fighting international tax evasion, we provide a unique forum and knowledge hub for data and analysis, exchange of experiences, best-practice sharing, and advice on public policies and international standard-setting.”

Standard Bank
Johannesburg, South Africa
2 July 2021

Republic of Cuba 

• Company Tax: exempt for the first eight years, 15% rate from the ninth year.

• Tax Rate For Foreign Companies: Companies with total foreign ownership are taxed at a rate of 35%.  The income of foreign companies without a permanent establishment in the country are taxed at 4%, without any deduction.

• Capital Gains Taxation: Capital gains are taxed as ordinary corporate income.

• Main Allowable Deductions and Tax Credits: Deductible items include: the costs of production and goods sold, distribution and sales expenses, general and administrative expenses, operating expenses, financial expenses. Mandatory provisions are also tax-deductible.  Exemptions exist in certain cases: foreigners and franchise holders located in free-trade zones or industrial estates are exempt from tax on profits and labor force tax.

• Other Corporate Taxes: There is a payroll tax, a stamp tax, a road tax, an agricultural land tax (levied per hectare ranging from CUP 30 to CUP 120 based on the four designated types of land), a property tax (2%), a property transfer tax (1% to 4%), a tax on the use and exploitation of forestry and wild fauna (levied per hectare ranging from CUP 45 to CUP 180 based on the four designated types of land), a tax on the use of workforce (starting from 20% on the first year of employment to 5% on the fifth and consecutive years) and social security contributions (determined yearly by the state budget).  

• LINK To Johannesburg, South Africa-based Standard Bank Cuba Page

• LINK To Paris, France-based Groupe Credit du Nord Cuba Page

• LINK To Cuba Office Of Tax Administration

• LINK To Ernst & Young (EY) Presentation (Page 39) 

ThomsonReuters
London, United Kingdom
1 July 2021

PARIS, July 1 (Reuters) - Most of the countries negotiating a global overhaul of cross-border taxation of multinationals have backed plans for new rules on where companies are taxed and a tax rate of at least 15%, they said on Thursday after two days of talks.  The Paris-based Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, which hosted the talks, said a global minimum corporate income tax of at least 15% could yield around $150 billion in additional global tax revenues annually.  It said 130 countries, representing more than 90% of global GDP, had backed the agreement at the talks. 

New rules on where the biggest multinationals are taxed would shift taxing rights on more than $100 billion of profits to countries where the profits are earned, it added.  "With a global minimum tax in place, multinational corporations will no longer be able to pit countries against one another in a bid to push tax rates down," U.S. President Joe Biden said in a statement.  "They will no longer be able to avoid paying their fair share by hiding profits generated in the United States, or any other country, in lower-tax jurisdictions," he said.  One source close to the talks said it had taken tough negotiations to get Beijing on board. A U.S. administration official said there were no China-specific carveouts or exceptions in the deal. 

MINIMUM TAX 

The minimum corporate tax does not require countries to set their rates at the agreed floor but gives other countries the right to apply a top-up levy to the minimum on companies' income coming from a country that has a lower rate.  The Group of Seven advanced economies agreed in June on a minimum tax rate of at least 15%. The broader agreement will go to the Group of Twenty major economies for political endorsement at a meeting in Venice next week.  Technical details are to be agreed by October so that the new rules can be implemented by 2023, a statement from countries that backed the agreement said. 

The nine countries that did not sign were the low-tax EU members Ireland, Estonia and Hungary as well as Peru, Barbados, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sri Lanka, Nigeria and Kenya.  Holdouts risk becoming isolated because not only did all major economies sign up, but so did many noted tax havens such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands.  Irish Finance Minister Paschal Donohoe, whose country has attracted many big U.S. tech firms with its 12.5% corporate tax rate, said he was "not in a position to join the consensus," but would still try to find an outcome he could support. 

In the European Union, the deal will need an EU law to be passed, most likely during France's presidency of the bloc in the first half of 2022, and that will require unanimous backing from all EU members.  Welcoming the deal as the most important international tax deal reached in a century, French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire said he would try to win over those holding out.  "I ask them to do everything to join this historical agreement which is largely supported by most countries," he said, adding that all big digital corporations would be covered by the agreement. 

THRESHOLDS 

The new minimum tax rate of at least 15% would apply to companies with turnover above a 750-million-euro ($889-million) threshold, with only the shipping industry exempted.  The new rules on where multinationals are taxed aims to divide the right to tax their profits in a fairer way among countries as the emergence of digital commerce had made it possible for big tech firms to book profits in low tax countries regardless where they money was earned.  Companies considered in scope would be multinationals with global turnover above 20 billion euros and a pre-tax profit margin above 10%, with the turnover threshold possibly coming down to 10 billion euros after seven years following a review.  Extractive industries and regulated financial services are to be excluded from the rules on where multinationals are taxed.  Implementation of the deal could still prove rocky not least in the U.S. Congress, where Representative Kevin Brady, the top Republican on the tax-writing U.S. House Ways and Means Committee, described it as "a dangerous economic surrender that sends U.S. jobs overseas, undermines our economy and strips away our U.S. tax base." 

Foreign Policy Magazine
Washington DC
2 July 2021

A higher minimum. Developing countries are still pushing for a higher minimum. In a statement, the 37-member states of the African Tax Administration Forum accepted the agreement in principle but vowed to continue its campaign to increase the minimum rate to at least 20 percent. A higher rate is essential for African nations, the group said, pointing to the larger reliance on corporate tax revenues as a proportion of the overall tax take in their countries than in more wealthy nations. 

Shrinking tax rates. Still, it may help arrest a trend over the last several decades of declining corporate rates. According to the Tax Foundation, the average corporate tax rate globally was roughly 40 percent in 1980; that figure has dropped to 23.85 percent in 2020.

LINK TO THIS COMPLETE COUNCIL ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Cuba Owes Partner Canada's Sherritt International Corporation Tens Of Millions Of US Dollars. But, Both Cuba & Patient Company (And Shareholders) Anticipate Profitable Role With Electric Vehicles

Prensa Latina News Agency
Havana, Republic of Cuba
25 June 2021

Cuba Appreciates The Trust Of Canadian Businessmen 

Ottawa, Jun 25 (Prensa Latina) Cuba thanked the eve the trust of Canadian entrepreneurs who do business with the island despite the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States, diplomatic sources indicated.  The ambassador of Havana in Ottawa, Josefina Vidal, received on Thursday Leon Binedell, the new president and CEO of the Sherritt International Corp. company, and also David Pathe, who previously held that position.  In her Twitter account, the official expressed her gratitude to both of them for contributing to the economic development of the Caribbean country. 

On the island, Sherritt started a joint venture with the Cuban state since 1995, to exploit deposits and other investments in the energy sector existing until today.  The Comandante Pedro Sotto Alba-Moa Nickel S.A. plant, managed by Sherritt, exceeds its 101 percent nickel plus cobalt extraction plans, while compensating the limitations of another similar plant, Cuban authorities reported last December.  Currently, the Caribbean nation occupies the ninth place in the world in terms of nickel production and is the fifth global reserve of this metal and the third for cobalt. 

The Toronto-based firm maintains its business in Cuba despite the intensification of the US blockade with the activation of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act during the administration of former White House chief Donald Trump.  This measure, designed to curb foreign investment, allows the claim in United States courts of compensation for properties nationalized in Cuba when the Revolution triumphed in 1959.  However, the Cuban government maintains that foreign companies have total legal security based on Law 80 on the Reaffirmation of Cuban Dignity and Sovereignty, as well as other provisions adopted to guarantee foreign investments in the country. 

Sherritt International Corporation
Toronto, Canada
28 April 2021

SELECTED Q1 2021 HIGHLIGHTS · Adjusted EBITDA(1) was $30.2 million, up 602% from last year, and reflective of strong production totals at the Moa Joint Venture (Moa JV), improved nickel and cobalt prices, and reduced administrative costs. Q1’s Adjusted EBITDA total represents Sherritt’s highest since Q3 2018. · Sherritt’s share of finished nickel production at the Moa JV was 4,188 tonnes, up 9% from last year while Sherritt’s share of finished cobalt production was 477 tonnes, up 19%. The growth was largely attributable to high inventories of mixed sulphides at the refinery in Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta and improved refinery reliability. Production totals for Q1 2020 were adversely impacted by the disruption of mixed sulphides deliveries to the refinery caused by rail blockades in Canada and by extended transit times for shipping vessels from Cuba. · NDCC(1) at the Moa JV was US$3.83/lb, the lowest total since Q4 2019. · Received US$5 million in distributions from the Moa JV, indicative of improved nickel and cobalt market conditions. · Received US$5.7 million in Cuban energy payments. Sherritt anticipates continued variability in the timing of collections through the remainder of 2021, and is working with its Cuban partners to ensure timely receipts. · Received a $20.3 million prepayment against nickel deliveries in 2021. The prepayment is consistent with Sherritt’s efforts to enhance its liquidity. 

Collections against overdue amounts owed to Sherritt by its Cuban energy partners in Q1 were adversely impacted by a combination of factors, including the ongoing effects of U.S. sanctions against Cuba, Cuba’s reduced access to foreign currency on account of the global pandemic, and the country’s launch of a currency unification process. Total overdue scheduled receivables at March 31, 2021 were US$154.2 million, up from US$145.9 million at December 31, 2020. Subsequent to quarter end, Sherritt received US$4.5 million in Cuban energy payments. Sherritt anticipates variability in the timing and the amount of energy payments through the remainder of 2021, and continues to work with its Cuban partners to ensure timely receipt of energy payments. 

During the quarter, US$5.7 million of Cuban energy payments were received compared to US$30.1million in the fourth quarter of 2020.   

Cuban energy payments were lower than the agreed-upon payments as COVID-19 and ongoing impact of U.S. sanctions limited Cuba’s access to foreign currency, in addition to the impact of currency unification. Further information on Cuban currency unification is included in note 10 of the Corporation’s condensed consolidated financial statements for the three months ended March 31, 2021.  

Sherritt anticipates variability in the timing and the amount of energy payments through the remainder of 2021 and continues to work with its Cuban partners to ensure timely receipt of energy payments. 

The Corporation’s cash balances are deposited with major financial institutions rated A-or higher by Standard and Poor’s except for institutions located in Cuba that are not rated.  

The total cash held in Cuban bank deposit accounts was $78.6 million as at March 31, 2021 (December 31, 2020 -$80.0 million). As at March 31, 2021, $74.4 million of the Corporation’s cash and cash equivalents was held by Energas (December 31, 2020 -$75.0 million). These funds are for use locally by the joint operation and will be transferred to the Corporation upon foreign exchange approval.  

On January 1, 2021, the Cuban government unified its two currencies and discontinued use of the Cuban convertible peso (CUC), with a six-month transition period for the CUC to be phased out of the economy. The Cuban peso (CUP) remains as the sole Cuban currency at a current exchange rate of 24 CUP:US$1. Further legislation and regulation may be enacted in 2021 as the Cuban government evaluates the impact of the currency unification process.  

There was no impact to the functional currencies of the Corporation’s Cuban entities as a result of currency unification and the U.S. dollar remains the functional currency of these Cuban entities.  

While receipts of overdue amounts owed to the Corporation during the three months ended March 31, 2021 were lower than the agreed-upon payments, in part due to currency unification, the Corporation expects this delay in repayment to be temporary while the Cuban government transitions to a single currency.  

During the three months ended March 31, 2021, the Corporation also incurred lower labour and other service costs at its Cuban entities as a result of Cuban currency unification. The Corporation continues to monitor the impact of currency unification on its Cuban operations. All Cuban receivables remain owing to the Corporation and are denominated in U.S. dollars. 

Finished nickel and cobalt production at the Moa Joint Venture and Fort Site during the three months ended March 31, 2021wasnot materially impacted by COVID-19. While cobalt market conditions have improved since the start of 2021, some near-term volatility is expected as a result of the continued negative impact of COVID-19 on the global economy. Receipts of Cuban energy payments from the Oil and Gas and Power segments were limited as COVID-19and ongoing impact of U.S. sanctions limited Cuba’s access to foreign currency during the three months ended March 31, 2021, in addition to the impact of Cuban currency unification. The timing and amount of receipts of Cuban energy payments is dependent upon Cuba’s economy and access to foreign currency. 

Sherritt International Corporation
Toronto, Canada
8 June 2021

Sherritt Receives US$28 Million in Distributions; Reschedules Refinery Shutdown to Q3

TORONTO--(BUSINESS WIRE)-- Sherritt International Corporation (“Sherritt”) (TSX:S), a world leader in the mining and refining of nickel and cobalt, today announced that it has received a combined total of US$28 million in distributions as a result of the latest dividend declared by the Moa Joint Venture (“Moa JV”).  

The combined total consists of Sherritt’s 50% share of the distribution, or US$14 million, and US$14 million re-directed by the General Nickel Company, Sherritt’s joint venture partner, from its 50% share to be applied against amounts owed to Sherritt from Energas. Through June 4, Sherritt has received a total of US$33 million in distributions from the Moa JV in 2021.  

“The receipt of 100% of dividends declared by the Moa JV is indicative of strong operational performance and improved nickel and cobalt prices in 2021,” said Leon Binedell, President and CEO of Sherritt International. “Just as important, it demonstrates the flexibility and resourcefulness of our Cuban partners in addressing overdue amounts owed in light of the economic challenges the country faces as a result of ongoing U.S. sanctions and the impact of COVID-19.”  The Corporation also announced that its planned full-facility maintenance shutdown of the refinery in Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta will be deferred to August from the previously scheduled June period to mitigate the risk of COVID-19 on employee and contractor health and safety.  

“Ensuring the health and safety of our employees and the communities in which we operate are of paramount importance,” Mr. Binedell said. “While the number of local COVID-19 cases is declining and vaccinations accelerating, we elected to take extra caution and deferred the plant-wide maintenance shutdown until the third quarter. Although this rescheduling will not impact our guidance for the year, it will result in finished production totals to be higher in Q2 and lower in Q3 than previously anticipated.”  Consistent with previous disclosure, Sherritt’s full-facility shutdown will last approximately 11 days and include all of the refinery and utility plants. Sherritt’s guidance for 2021 production, unit cost and capital spend at the Moa JV will not be impacted by the rescheduling of the shutdown.  

Forward-Looking Statements 

This press release contains certain forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements can generally be identified by the use of statements that include such words as “believe”, “expect”, “anticipate”, “intend”, “plan”, “forecast”, “likely”, “may”, “will”, “could”, “should”, “suspect”, “outlook”, “potential”, “projected”, “continue” or other similar words or phrases. Specifically, forward-looking statements in this document include, but are not limited to, statements regarding rescheduled shutdown timing and anticipated production, unit cost and capital spend at the Moa JV. 

Forward looking statements are not based on historical facts, but rather on current expectations, assumptions and projections about future events, including commodity and product prices and demand; the level of liquidity and access to funding; production results; realized prices for production; rehabilitation provisions; availability of regulatory and creditor approvals and waivers; compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations; and certain corporate objectives, goals and plans. By their nature, forward looking statements require the Corporation to make assumptions and are subject to inherent risks and uncertainties. There is significant risk that predictions, forecasts, conclusions or projections will not prove to be accurate, that those assumptions may not be correct and that actual results may differ materially from such predictions, forecasts, conclusions or projections. 

The Corporation cautions readers of this press release not to place undue reliance on any forward looking statement as a number of factors could cause actual future results, conditions, actions or events to differ materially from the targets, expectations, estimates or intentions expressed in the forward looking statements.  

These risks, uncertainties and other factors include, but are not limited to, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic; changes in the global price for nickel, cobalt, oil and gas, fertilizers or certain other commodities; level of liquidity; access to capital; access to financing; the risk to Sherritt’s entitlements to future distributions from the Moa Joint Venture; risks associated with the Corporation’s joint venture partner; variability in production at Sherritt’s operations in Cuba; risks related to Sherritt’s operations in Cuba; risks related to the U.S. government policy toward Cuba, including the U.S. embargo on Cuba and the Helms-Burton legislation; potential interruptions in transportation; uncertainty of gas supply for electrical generation; the Corporation’s reliance on key personnel and skilled workers; the possibility of equipment and other failures; risks associated with mining, processing and refining activities; uncertainty of resources and reserve estimates; the potential for shortages of equipment and supplies, including diesel; supplies quality issues; risks related to environmental liabilities including liability for reclamation costs, tailings facility failures and toxic gas releases; risks related to the Corporation’s corporate structure; political, economic and other risks of foreign operations; risks associated with Sherritt’s operation of large projects generally; risks related to the accuracy of capital and operating cost estimates; foreign exchange and pricing risks; compliance with applicable environment, health and safety legislation and other associated matters; risks associated with governmental regulations regarding climate change and greenhouse gas emissions; risks relating to community relations and maintaining the Corporation’s social license to grow and operate; credit risks; competition in product markets; risks in obtaining insurance; uncertainties in labour relations; uncertainty in the ability of the Corporation to enforce legal rights in foreign jurisdictions; uncertainty regarding the interpretation and/or application of the applicable laws in foreign jurisdictions; legal contingencies; identification and management of growth opportunities; uncertainty in the ability of the Corporation to obtain government permits; risks to information technologies systems and cybersecurity; failure to comply with, or changes to, applicable government regulations; bribery and corruption risks, including failure to comply with the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act or applicable local anti-corruption law; the ability to accomplish corporate objectives, goals and plans for 2021; and the Corporation’s ability to meet other factors listed from time to time in the Corporation’s continuous disclosure documents. Additional risks, uncertainties and other factors include, but are not limited to, the ability of the Corporation to achieve its financial goals; the ability of the Corporation to implement and successfully achieve its business priorities; and the ability of the Corporation to comply with its contractual obligations, including, without limitation, its obligations under debt arrangements. Readers are cautioned that the foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive and should be considered in conjunction with the risk factors described in this press release and in the Corporation’s other documents filed with the Canadian securities authorities, including without limitation the Management’s Discussion and Analysis for the three months ended March 31, 2021 and the Annual Information Form of the Corporation dated March 17, 2021 for the year ended December 31, 2020, which is available on SEDAR at www.sedar.com. 

The Corporation may, from time to time, make oral forward-looking statements. The Corporation advises that the above paragraph and the risk factors described in this press release and in the Corporation’s other documents filed with the Canadian securities authorities should be read for a description of certain factors that could cause the actual results of the Corporation to differ materially from those in the oral forward-looking statements. The forward-looking information and statements contained in this press release are made as of the date hereof and the Corporation undertakes no obligation to update publicly or revise any oral or written forward-looking information or statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by applicable securities laws. The forward-looking information and statements contained herein are expressly qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement.

LINK TO 6-Page Report From Sherritt International Corporation- Nickel: The Critical Metal That Will Drive the Electric Vehicle Revolution

U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 44.5% In May 2021; Up 64.9% Year-To-Year

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
July 2021

May 2021 Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Increase 44.5%- 1
50th Of 221 May 2021 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 64.9%- 2
Cuba Ranked 50th Of 2021 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets- 2
May 2021 Healthcare Product Exports US$0.00- 2
May 2021 Humanitarian Donations US$1,787,739.00- 3
2021 Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 16

MAY 2021 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 44.5%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in May 2021 were US$29,848,778.00 compared to US$20,650,953.00 in May 2020 and US$27,657,054.00 in May 2019.

May Exports Included: Chicken Leg Quarters (Frozen); Chicken Meat (Frozen); Chicken Legs (Frozen); Soybeans; Woodpulp; Wine; Beans; Protein Concentrates.

January 2021 through May 2021 exports were US$130,685,900.00 compared to US$76,728,924.00 for the period January 2020 through May 2020.

Since December 2001, agricultural commodity and food product exports reported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba is US$6,426,913,324.00.

This report contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

LINK To Complete Report In PDF Format

Cuba Has 259 References In 664-Page United States 2021 Trafficking In Persons Report

United States Department of State
Washington DC
1 July 2021

The 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report marked the first time the U.S. Department of State applied this new provision, finding 12 governments had a “policy or pattern” of trafficking, including: Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Russia, South Sudan, Syria, and Turkmenistan.

The 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report includes the following 11 governments with a documented “policy or pattern” of human trafficking, trafficking in government-funded programs, forced labor in government-affiliated medical services or other sectors, sexual slavery in government camps, or the employment or recruitment of child soldiers: Afghanistan, Burma, China, Cuba, Eritrea, North Korea, Iran, Russia, South Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan

Tier 3: Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, China, Comoros, Cuba, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, North Korea, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Russia, South Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Venezuela

The Government of Cuba does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Cuba remained on Tier 3. During the reporting period, there was a government policy or government pattern to profit from labor export programs with strong indications of forced labor, particularly its foreign medical missions program. Despite the lack of significant efforts, the government took some steps to address trafficking. Some reports indicated the government continued training law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges on trafficking crimes. However, in 2020, the government capitalized on the pandemic by increasing the number and size of medical missions and refused to improve the program’s transparency or address labor violations and trafficking crimes despite persistent allegations from observers, former participants, and foreign governments of Cuban officials’ involvement in abuses.

The government failed to inform participants of the terms of their contracts, which varied from country to country, confiscated their documents and salaries, and threatened medical professionals and their family members if participants left the program. Within Cuba, the government did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting trafficking crimes. Authorities did not report identifying victims and lacked a comprehensive package of housing and other services for victims and did not protect potential trafficking victims from being detained or charged for unlawful acts their traffickers coerced them to commit. The government did not criminalize all forms of forced labor or sex trafficking.

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT

Arkansas Senator Boozman Will Re-introduce Legislation To Permit Payment Terms And Financing For U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba. He Should Wait Until There Are Contracts In Place.

Will Arkansas Senator Boozman And Supporters Learn From Previous Legislative Strategies?
Will Arkansas Companies Provide Payment Terms? Embarrassing If Not
Will Arkansas Bank Provide Financing For Transactions? Embarrassing If Not
Essential For Use Confirmation Prior To Introducing Legislation
No Need To Hurry- Focus First On Getting Everything Supportive In Place
Direct Correspondent Banking Remains An Integral Component

The Honorable John Boozman (R- Arkansas) a two-term member of the United States Senate who is anticipated to seek re-election in November 2022, plans to re-introduce legislation to change cash-in-advance payment terms required by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 for United States agricultural commodity and food product exports to the Republic of Cuba.   

Senator Boozman is the ranking member of the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.  Senator Boozman is a member of the Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. 

Three companies in the State of Arkansas with connectivity to the Republic of Cuba include Springdale, Arkansas-based Tyson Foods (2020 revenues approximately US$43 billion); Stuttgart, Arkansas-based Riceland Foods (2020 revenues approximately US$1.3 billion); and Conway, Arkansas-based Home BancShares (2020 assets approximately US$17 billion) among others.  Will Senator Boozman ensure each of the three have statements of support issued in conjunction with the introduction of legislation? 

Absent a compelling narrative to precisely demonstrate how benefits of a statutory change to the cash-in-advance payment terms for agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba will immediately be measurable, quantifiable, and visible, proponents within the United States Congress and outside of the United States Congress will find a legislative highway robust with bipartisan obstacles. 

Learn From The Past 

The public roll-out of legislation should include contingent executed contracts between United States exporters (including at least one United States financial institution) and Republic of Cuba government-operated Empresa Comercializadora de Alimentos (Alimport), the primary contracting entity for agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.   

Executed contingent contracts are permitted by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.   

Proponents of legislation would be wise to placate opponents by including a provision in the legislation requiring a first-year semi-annual report from the BIS to appropriate committees of the United States Congress.  The reports would include whether payment terms or financing provided to Republic of Cuba entities by United States exporters and United States financial institutions are in arrears.  This is an unappealing and commercially intrusive provision, but may be an appropriate additive to placate opponents.    

The following are examples of executed contingent contracts with payment term laddered transactions which should be negotiated promptly and ideally executed and then confirmed in tandem with the introduction of legislation.  The execution of these contracts will serve as confidence-building mechanisms for United States exporters and for the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

• An executed contingent contract for poultry valued at US$1 million whereby the United States exporter will provide Alimport with payment terms of fifteen (15) days.  

• An executed contingent contract for corn valued at US$1 million whereby the United States exporter will provide Alimport with payment terms of thirty (30) days.  

• An executed contingent contract for soybeans valued at US$1 million whereby the United States exporter will provide Alimport with payment terms of forty-five (45) days.  

• An executed contingent contract for woodpulp valued at US$1 million whereby the United States exporter will provide Alimport with payment terms of sixty (60) days.  

• An executed contingent contract for rice valued at US$1 million whereby the United States exporter will provide Alimport with payment terms of ninety (90) days.  

• An executed contingent contract for pork valued at US$1 million whereby a United States financial institution will provide directly to Alimport or indirectly through the United States exporter with payment terms of one hundred twenty (120) days.  

This last executed contingent contract is essential because it includes the participation of a financial institution.  Would today Greenwich Village, Colorado-based CoBank (2020 assets approximately US$159 billion), Conway, Arkansas-based Home BancShares (2020 assets approximately US$17 billion), or New York, New York-based J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (2002 assets approximately US$3 trillion) for example provide financing to a United States exporter for a transaction relating to the Republic of Cuba?   

Will CoBank or Home BancShares or J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. among others provide direct or indirect financing based upon the financial statements provided by Alimport?  Will Alimport (https://www.alimport.com.cu) provide financial statements?  Will Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions provide financial statements?  

Instructive to note that Government of Vietnam-operated Vinafood 1 & Vinafood 2 have provided payment terms to Alimport of two years to pay for rice (25%/30% broken).  Not unique for non-United States companies exporting products to the Republic of Cuba to anticipate waiting up to one year or more than one year for payment from Republic of Cuba government-operated entities; and to factor these delays into their pricing. 

Importance Of Direct Correspondent Banking To Changing Payment Terms 

In 2017, Home BancShares through its Centennial Bank subsidiary purchased Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank (2017 assets approximately US$2.9 billion).  In 2015, the OFAC authorized Stonegate Bank to have an account with Republic of Cuba government-operated Banco Internacional de Comercia SA (BICSA).  However, because the Obama Administration would not authorize BICSA under a general or specific license from the OFAC to have an account with Stonegate Bank, United States export-related funds were sent and received through Panama City, Panama-based Multibank, which had extensive dealings with the Republic of Cuba before its purchase in 2020 by Bogota, Colombia-based Banco de Bogota (2002 assets approximately U$56 billion) when all activities ceased relating to the Republic of Cuba.   

Without bilateral direct correspondent banking accounts, the payment process for funds from the United States to the Republic of Cuba and from the Republic of Cuba to the United States remains triangular rather than a straight line- which would be more efficient, more secure, more transparent, more timely (same day versus two or more days), and less costly.

TSREEA Background 

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash-in-advance basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992.  Healthcare products are not subject to the cash-in-advance payment requirement. 

Since the first TSREEA-authorized exports in December 2001 (corn and poultry), United States agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba is US$6,426,913,324.00 through 31 May 2021.   

Products exported consistently include chicken leg quarters, chicken meat, chicken legs, soybeans, soybean oil cake, soybean oil, corn, phosphates, woodpulp, herbicides, brewing/distilling dregs, pork, wheat, powered milk, rice, and peas & lentils, among others.  LINK To U.S. Export History 

Learning From 2018 Farm Bill 

The necessity for executed contingent contracts to accompany the public roll-out of any legislation is to learn from the disastrous legislative strategy in 2018 when legislative advocates maintained that inserting a Market Access Program (MAP) and Foreign Market Development (FMD) provision in the Farm Bill was critical to “laying the groundwork” for increasing exports of agricultural commodities and food products to the Republic of Cuba.  Statements from members of Congress included: “… an important first step to regaining our presence in Cuba.”  Yet, there was not one application to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 2018 or 2019- and since 2019 a total of eight applications were received by the USDA to use MAP and/or FMD.   

Most observers of the legislative process reasonably concluded that legislative advocates- within the United States Congress and organizations located in Washington DC and located outside of the beltway would have prominently teed-up at least one high-profile applicant to publicize in advance they would use the provision if it became law or at least one high-profile applicant to immediately and publicly request funding when the Farm Bill became law on 21 December 2018.   

The most significant impact of a shockingly low number of MAP/FMD requests in 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 is what the lack of interest portends for other legislative efforts in the United States Congress to rescind prohibitions upon the provision of payment terms for agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  Since 2019, a total of eight applications were received by the USDA to use MAP and/or FMD. 

MAP & FMD Programs At USDA 

In 2018, legislative advocates maintained that inserting a Market Access Program (MAP) and Foreign Market Development (FMD) provision in the Farm Bill was critical to “laying the groundwork” for increasing exports of agricultural commodities and food products to the Republic of Cuba.  Statements from members of Congress included: “… an important first step to regaining our presence in Cuba.”  Yet, there was not one application to the USDA in 2018 or 2019.   

Most observers reasonably concluded that legislative advocates- within the United States Congress and organizations located in Washington DC and located outside of the beltway would have prominently teed-up at least one high-profile applicant to publicize in advance they would use the provision if it became law or at least one high-profile applicant to immediately and publicly request funding when the Farm Bill became law on 21 December 2018.   

The most significant impact of a shockingly low number of MAP/FMD requests in 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 is what the lack of interest portends for other legislative efforts in the United States Congress to rescind prohibitions upon the provision of payment terms for agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.   

Use to date of USDA MAP/FMD Republic of Cuba-focused funding provisions in the 2018 Farm Bill has been anemic.  Since 2018, One entity has used MAP funding in the Republic of Cuba.  No entity has used FMD funding in the Republic of Cuba.  The USDA reported no applications were rejected.   

Since 2019, a total of eight applications were received by the USDA to use MAP and/or FMD.  According to the USDA, “Although the table indicated nine expressions of interest over two years, these represent fewer than nine organizations as some of the organizations applied in multiple years.  The earlier table only included those entities that expressed interest in Cuba directly, not anyone that sought to add Cuba to a regional program.”    

According to the USDA, at least one participant in 2021 and 2020 sought to add the Republic of Cuba to a regional program for MAP, but none for FMD.  No entity pursued or was rejected for activities in the Republic of Cuba through a regional program.  In some respects, that some entities applied more than once, but did not ultimately use MAP and/or FMD in the Republic of Cuba is more consequential because it begs the question- why did the entities apply, but not choose to use MAP and/or FMD in the Republic of Cuba?  

One entity received MAP funding (US$60,000.00) in the Republic of Cuba- Denver, Colorado-based Potatoes USA which in November 2020 delivered to the Republic of Cuba 33,118 pounds of potato seeds valued at US$44,760.00.  Sample costs are ineligible for MAP or FMD funding.  

In 2020, one (1) entity applied to use, but did not use FMD funding and four (4) entities applied to use MAP funding while one (1) entity (Potatoes USA) used MAP funding.  From the USDA, “… any unspent funds would normally remain in participants’ agreements, available for the agency to approve for plans a participant submits in a future year.”     

In 2021, no entity applied to use FMD funding, and three entities applied to use MAP funding, but no entity has yet used MAP funding.  From the USDA, “Most MAP programs operate on a January to December year, however, some run on a July to June year.   

The regulations allow groups to continue already approved activities up to thirty days after the end of the program year.  Thus, the latest a participant could continue an activity funded by MAP 21 would be July 30, 2022, if their MAP 21 program began June 1, 2021.  A participant would have until the end of January 2022, if their MAP program began January 1, 2021.  The MAP regulations allow a participant to file claims up to six months after the end of the program year.”  In 2021, sixty-seven (67) entities received funding for MAP and twenty-one (21) entities received funding for FMD.  

LINK TO THIS COMPLETE 4-PAGE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

LINK To Previous Analysis: USDA Accepting MAP/FMD Applications For Funding Use In Cuba; Since 2018, Only 8 Applications And 1 Use May 05, 2021

U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken Discusses Cuba While In Italy- Theme Continues To Be "empower"

United States Department of State
Washington DC
29 June 2021

Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Lucia Duraccio of RAI TG1

QUESTION: The last question is about Cuba. A few days ago, United States voted against the UN resolution to end the Cuba embargo. It has been the – if I remember well – 29th time —

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: — while 184 countries voted yes. Why Cuba is still the enemy? I mean, the dialogue begun by Former President Obama is over forever?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: We’re in the midst of reviewing our Cuba policy. We’ve – President Biden’s been in office for about six months. There have been a lot of things on our plate. He focused immediately on revitalizing our relationships with our partners and allies, like Italy, re-engaging in multilateral institutions – rejoining the Paris Climate Agreement, re-engaging with the World Health Organization, convening a summit of leaders on climate. And then, of course, we’ve had the G7, which has made very important progress with all of our countries working together. On COVID, a billion vaccines for the world, working to – on climate, to prevent the financing of coal-fired plants, the biggest contributor to global emissions. A very strong and important agenda, both bilaterally with our closest partners and multilaterally in these international organizations.

And so there’s only so much you can do in six months’ time, so one of the things that we’re looking very hard at right now is the policy toward Cuba. It’s under review. I can tell you that as a matter of basic principle, the – any policy we pursue would have democracy and human rights at its heart, and we would want to make sure that we’re doing whatever we can to empower the Cuban people to decide their own future.

QUESTION: I know human rights are important also about Cuba, but you talk to Saudi Arabia, to Turkey. Maybe dialogue is necessary to improve the condition of people, Cuban people?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: We’ve never resisted dialogue anywhere. The question is: What is the overall policy? And that’s what we’re reviewing. We’ve done that in a number of areas. We spent some months reviewing our policy toward North Korea, for example, and announced that policy just a few weeks ago. We’re doing the same on Cuba.

U.S. Department Of State Transforms Approximately US$172 Million In 2020 Into “billions of dollars’ worth of exports”? An Exaggeration? Yes. Deceptive? Definitely. A Lie? Close.

Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations
New York, New York
23 June 2021

Mr. Rodney Hunter- Minister Counselor Political Affairs 

“Every year we authorize billions of dollars’ worth of exports to Cuba, including food and other agricultural commodities, medicines, medical devices, telecommunications equipment, other goods, and other items to support the Cuban people.” 

A statement lacking appropriate context such as the one delivered on 23 June 2021 is not unique to the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ).  The theme is familiar to statements delivered during the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021), Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), Bush-Cheney Administration (2001-2009), and Clinton-Gore Administration (1993-2001). 

The use of the phrase “we authorize” is deliberately crafted to suggest an exercise of benevolence by the government of the United States. 

The use of the phrase “billions of dollars’ worth of exports to Cuba,” is far more egregious as the goal is to suggest that the Republic of Cuba is a beneficiary of, once again, benevolence by the government of the United States. 

During the Bush-Cheney Administration was created the authorization for United States exporters (paid exports and donated exports) to add value to a specific license application or notification- so that the exporters would not continue to seek licenses which would burden the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.  BIS licenses are generally valid for two years.  As a result, license applications and notifications became in part based upon statements by the importer in the Republic of Cuba and in part based upon the inspirational and aspirational belief by United States exporters.  This is how an export value can shift from an agreed to US$10,000.00 to what might be hoped for in two years… US$100,000.00.  In the same manner, a US$1 million contract could become US$100 million in a license or notification.   

For perspective, in any given month, there are generally approximately twelve exporters (often the same throughout the year) with products (paid or donated) delivered from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  With the total 2020 export value of approximately US$172 million, achieving one billion let alone two billion or billions is challenging… 

An indisputable fact is “billions of dollars’ worth of exports” on an annual basis do not flow now and have never flowed since 1961 from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- and exports may be defined in this calculation as products sold and products donated. 

In fact, the list of products referenced by Mr. Hunter are products statutorily authorized, protected, and commercial in nature by provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000.   

TSREEA transactions, CDA transactions, and other authorized transactions are controlled by regulations implemented (1992 to present) by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and BIS. 

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash-in-advance basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose.  The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA. 

TSREEA exports in 2019 were US$257,659,479.00, in 2020 were US$163,354,728.00, and thus far in 2021 are US$101,737,122.00.  The single year record for TSREEA exports to the Republic of Cuba was US$710,086,323.00 in 2008.  During the last twenty years, the average TSREEA year exports was US$319,853,227.00  

Products exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba since the first TSREEA exports in December 2001 were US$6,397,064,546.00 as of 30 April 2021 with payments from the Republic of Cuba to the United States through third countries as the United States government has refused to authorize the full implementation of direct correspondent banking. 

Exports of healthcare products (medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals) and telecommunications equipment to the Republic of Cuba are subject to provisions of the CDA, which require end use-verification, but are not subject to cash-in-advance payment requirements.  Exports have included: Medicaments (penicillin and insulin); Dentifrices (toothpastes); Laboratory regents; Ultrasonic scanning equipment; Artificial limbs; Medical appliances; Surgical appliances (dental); Opthalmic (eye); Cannulae (tubing) and gelatin capsules. 

CDA exports in 2019 were US$1,096,505.00, in 2020 were US$936,013.00, and thus far in 2021 are US$50,899.00. 

Products exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba using the CDA were US$26,755,590.00 as of 30 April 2021. 

In 2015 and 2016, the OFAC and BIS expanded the list of products authorized for export from the United States and from third countries of the Republic of Cuba with a focus upon products (non-durable, durable, and consumable) to entities not affiliated with the government of the Republic of Cuba.  The value of exports within these categories since 2015 are approximately US$27 million primarily through four United States-based companies. 

Donations from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in 2019 were US$7,150,989.00, in 2020 were US$4,605,055.00, and thus far in 2021 are US$1,118,883.00.  

LINK TO JUNE 2021 MONTHLY REPORT ON U.S. EXPORTS TO CUBA

Bush-Cheney Administration Licensing Background 

For the first agricultural commodities (corn and poultry) exported (US$4,318,906.00) in December 2001 to the Republic of Cuba, United States companies were required to obtain/have a license/authorization from the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) of the United States Department of Commerce for the exact value(s) of the product(s) to be exported to the Republic of Cuba.  In 2002, the BXA was renamed the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). 

When the government of the Republic of Cuba continued and then expanded its purchases of agricultural commodities and food products into 2002, despite initial statements that the 2001 purchases were to be a “one off” so United States companies were not to expect further orders, there began discussions between exporters and representatives of the BIS about opportunities to create a more efficient licensing process. 

One such decision by the BIS was to permit, and then encourage, United States companies to apply for a license that would attempt to include an estimate of what potentially might be exported by the company; and licenses were to be valid for up to two years.  In some instances, the export qualified under the “export exception” provision and would not require certain BIS processes.  A goal was to lessen the paperwork for the BIS and the United States companies. 

For example, if a United States company wanted to export corn to Republic of Cuba government-operated Empresa Cubana Importadora Alimentos (Alimport), under the auspice of the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Republic of Cuba (MINCEX), and had a contract or anticipated a contract or wanted to have all documentation necessary so the company could approach Alimport and say they were “ready to go," the BIS encouraged the company to add to the expected or desired quantities and U.S. Dollar values.  Simply put, if the reasonable expectation was to export corn valued at US$1 million, the company would use US$5 million or US$10 million or US$100 million… whatever they wanted to use. 

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

LINK TO RELATED POST: 

Let's Put The US$4.3 Billion In 2015 U.S. Commerce Department Licenses In Perspective... Politics Versus Reality [14 March 2016]