Cuba On 21 June 2021 To Cease Accepting U.S. Dollars As Cash Bank Deposits- U.S. Financial Sanctions Blamed

Reuters
London, United Kingdom
10 June 2021

Cuba suspending cash bank deposits in dollars, citing U.S. sanctions

Cuba said on Thursday it would temporarily stop accepting cash bank deposits in dollars, blaming tighter U.S. sanctions that are restricting its ability to use greenbacks abroad, although it will still accept transfers. The move came shortly before the government was due to present its annual resolution to end the crippling, decades-old U.S. trade embargo on the Communist-run country at the United Nations General Assembly.

Some Cubans and analysts speculated it was an attempt to control the black market price of the dollar. That has risen to more than twice the official exchange rate since the import-dependent country started opening stores selling in hard currency and stopped selling greenbacks due to a cash crunch. Cuban bank account holders will have until June 21 to deposit dollars before the suspension takes effect.

"It is ever more difficult for Cuba to find international banking or financing institutions willing to receive, convert or process U.S. currency in cash," the Cuban Central Bank said in a statement shared by state-run media. It added that the measure would not affect operations carried out by transfer or deposits in other currencies that are freely convertible and accepted in Cuba.

More than 20 banks have stopped processing transactions involving Cuba since former President Donald Trump tightened U.S. sanctions on the island nation, Central Bank Vice President Yamile Berra Cires said in a roundtable discussion on state television.

For many years, Cuba had a 10% tax on dollars, citing how difficult it was for the government to use them because of the U.S. embargo. But it lifted that tax last year as it opened more shops selling in hard cash rather than in the local currency.

U.S. President Joe Biden, a Democrat, vowed during his campaign to reverse some of Republican Trump's Cuba measures that “have inflicted harm on the Cuban people and done nothing to advance democracy and human rights.” But he has yet to roll back any measures and his administration has said a shift in policy toward Cuba is not among its top foreign policy priorities.

LINK To Articles From Granma:

http://www.granma.cu/cuba/2021-06-11/banco-central-de-cuba-informa-suspension-temporal-de-la-aceptacion-de-depositos

http://www.granma.cu/pensar-en-qr/2021-06-10/en-vivo-informan-temas-de-interes-especial-para-nuestro-pueblo-10-06-2021-19-06-45

U.S. Agricultural Commodity & Food Product Exports To Cuba Increased 177.7% In April; Up 81.4% Year-To-Year

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
June 2021

April 2021 Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Increase 177.7%- 1
53rd Of 218 April 2021 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 81.4%- 2
Cuba Ranked 54th Of 2021 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets- 2
2021 Healthcare Product Exports US$48,059.00- 2
2021 Humanitarian Donations US$353,875.00- 3
2021 Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 16

APRIL 2021 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 177.7%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in April 2021 were US$32,133,008.00 compared to US$11,569,079.00 in April 2020 and US$16,366,542.00 in April 2019.

April Exports Included: Chicken Leg Quarters (Frozen); Chicken Meat (Frozen); Chicken Legs (Frozen); Soybeans; Woodpulp; Coffee (roasted/organic); Corn Chips; Cereal; Toilet Paper.

Since December 2001, agricultural commodity and food product exports reported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba is US$6,397,064,546.00.

This report contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

Despite Efforts To Constrain Development Of Micro, Small & Medium-Sized Enterprises, They Are Essential For Cuba To Expand Its Economy And Increase Salaries

Granma
Havana, Republic of Cuba
8 June 2021

Council of Ministers Approves Improvement of Cuban Economic Actors

During a recent session, the Council of Ministers approved plans to improve the work of all actors in the Cuban economy, including the socialist state enterprise; non-agricultural cooperatives; micro, small and medium-sized enterprises; as well as the self-employed

Author: Yaima Puig Meneses

The Council of Ministers reaffirmed that the state enterprise is the principal actor in the national economy and must perform as such. Photo: Estudios Revolución

During its most recent session, the Council of Ministers approved plans to improve the work of all actors in the Cuban economy, including the socialist state enterprise; non-agricultural cooperatives; micro, small and medium-sized enterprises; as well as the self-employed, all of which are called upon to promote the development of the nation, in their respective arenas.

With this decision we are approving a framework for all actors involved in our economic panorama, which goes beyond simple recognition of them, stated the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba and President of the Republic, Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez.

Noting as an essential principle guiding the process of improvement, upon introducing the subject, Political Bureau member and Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz reiterated that the state enterprise is defined as the principal actor in the national economy and, as such, must perform.

Among other principles, he recalled that the expansion of activities conducted by non-state forms of management will not lead to a broader process of privatization, since limits that cannot be exceeded have been established. "Recognizing, diversifying and strengthening the work of economic actors" is another objective of the needed improvement effort, with a view toward all economic actors functioning as defined.

Referring in particular to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, he explained that they will be part of the state and private sectors, and similar management conditions will be established for both. In the case of private companies, he explained that the list of activities which self-employed workers are not permitted to conduct will serve as a starting point to establish the arenas in which companies will operate. Initially, they will not be allowed to engage in some professional activities, including those that are approved for the self-employed, including computer programming, bookkeeping, translation and interpretation, veterinary care for pets and domestic animals, design and certain types of advisement.

The Prime Minister insisted on the importance of achieving sustained progress in the task, which must advance purposefully and gradually to avoid mistakes. "We need to move forward intelligently, to consolidate each step we take and be able to achieve sustainability."

As part of this discussion, presented were the principal findings from the experiment conducted with non-agricultural cooperatives, initiated in March of 2012. Between 2012 and 2014, 498 cooperatives of this type were authorized.

The Prime Minister explained that the information gathered during reviews during the experimental stage indicated that, in spite of deficiencies, the viability of the approved policy was confirmed. Considering this reality, the decision was made to conclude the experiment and gradually extend the creation of non-agricultural cooperatives to all previously approved sectors, with the exception of construction.

Marrero noted that as part of the measures designed, regulations meant to improve the work of all the economic actors will be issued at the same time.

Based on this decision by the Council of Ministers, work will begin on the respective legal norms for their implementation. As progress is made in this task, the population will be provided updated information.

President Díaz-Canel emphasized that the document approved will advance improvement, as a broad and comprehensive process that provides continuity and follow-up for the Policy Guidelines approved by the 6th and 7th Congresses of the Communist Party of Cuba and reaffirmed at the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba.

The steps outlined, he said, establish a framework for the country's economic actors, which, above all, reaffirm the centrality of the state enterprise system. Based on what is approved, we will be in a better position," he said, "to advance in certain aspects such as relieving the state of activities that are not fundamental to the economy’s performance, and make better use of the workforce, especially the highly qualified.

"We need the state sector to be more proactive, to be more efficient, to shake off some of the inertia, to be more innovative," he emphasized. He also commented on the importance of consolidating an adequate relationship between the state sector and the non-state sector, which would allow for greater efficiency and innovation.

This improved relationship should allow forgetter use of human potential, productive capacity, experience gained and innovation.

If the process is conducted well, he said, we can successfully integrate the two sectors, strengthen the economy and speed up the country's development. The process will be gradual, but this does not mean we will delay implementation.

It is vital that these measures reach the municipal level, to ensure that different forms of management are involved in territorial development strategies and contribute to the economic growth of localities, where projects can generate employment, increase production and provide services.

Let us definitively eliminate the obstacles that prevent our economic actors from performing with agility, with the ability to contribute to development, he emphasized.

"Here, anything that is inefficient, corrupt or illegal; anything that tends to hinder, that is not innovative or proactive, is harmful, whether it is in the state or non-state sector."

The economy of the future and the present

Foreseeing, designing and planning were fundamental to the process of elaborating the country’s Economic Plan and State Budget for the year 2022, conditioned to a significant extent by the control being achieved of the COVID-19pandemic.

Designed within the context of monetary re-ordering, the Plan of the Economy for next year is based, in the first place, on the concept of centralized planning, stated First Deputy Minister of Economy and Planning Leticia Morales González. This implies consciously leading the process of economic and social development in the country, favoring the incorporation of all forms of property and management. The design fundamentally projects counteracting the effects of economic deceleration; continuing to promote greater interaction between all economic actors; increasing efficiency, efficacy, productivity and innovation; as well as adhering to and continuing to work on the National Development Plan through 2030, she said. While acknowledging the complexity of making projections in such a difficult time, Morales insisted on the urgency of seeking solutions to our problems on our own. "We must work hard, we must find solutions, we must identify potential... and we must be able to reflect all of this in the Plan," she emphasized.

The challenge is to reflect the scenario we foresee within the 2022 Plan, with both objectivity and optimism. The goal cannot be to consider what we have done, and plan to do a little more; no, the goal is to identify what we have not yet done and the capacity we have to do more, she stated.

Also on the agenda for the highest government body’s meeting was a report by the First Deputy Minister of Economy and Planning on the economy’s performance as of the end of April, a period that demonstrated the need to continue seeking untapped potential and produce more.

Production of rice, eggs and corn, she stated, surpassed projections, not the case for starchy vegetables, beans, fresh milk for the industry and pork.

She added that projected indicators of production and efficiency were not met in the sugar industry this season, evident in the backlog accumulated in cane milling.

Regarding employment, she noted that a total of 166,966 persons visited municipal labor offices in search of a job. Of the positions accepted, 55,442 were in the state sector and 50,183 in the non-state sector.

Another issue evaluated by Council of Ministers members was the progress made in implementation of the National Economic and Social Development Plan through 2030, a guiding document for the National Planning System, which directs development efforts with a view toward eliminating structural imbalances in the economy with a strategic vision and closely articulated with the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations 2030 Agenda.

Serving the vulnerable, wherever needed

Later in the meeting, Minister of Labor and Social Security Marta Elena Feitó Cabrera presented policy proposals to strengthen prevention and social work in neighborhoods, and for support to individuals, families and households, as well as groups and communities in situations of social vulnerability. As an essential aspect, the Minister commented on support offered to the necessary transformation of preventative social work at the community level, as the most important link. This policy involves recovering the founding principles of social work based on Comandante en jefe Fidel Castro’s conception of preventing, assisting and transforming, thus addressing the full scope of needed action, currently organized at the national, provincial and municipal levels.

She explained that, on the basis of experience gained, the Ministry has identified the need to transform work currently conducted by social workers and recover the original conception of social prevention, particularly in attention to adolescents and focused follow-up on community efforts. Referring to the second document, she explained that its objective is to raise the quality of social services to address situations of social vulnerability, improve, diversify and broaden protection provided by Social Assistance and its services, including the participation of diverse actors. Regarding both policies, which were approved by the Council of Ministers, Deputy Prime Minister Inés María Chapman Waug, emphasized that they constitute fundamental tools that should facilitate local analyses and the adoption of necessary measures to guide programs implemented in each territory. This community work, today more than ever, is essential, she stated. Hence her insistence on including, among actions taken, the projection of social research and coherent work in neighborhoods.

The effects of drought in Cuba

As part of the day's agenda, the president of the National Institute of Water Resources, Antonio Rodríguez, presented an update on the current nationwide drought, reporting that, between December 2020 and April 2021, rainfall on the island has reached only 54% of the average for this period. The lowest provincial accumulations over the last four months were recorded in Havana, Ciego de Avila and Sancti Spiritus, all with precipitation below 30% of the historic average. Additionally, Mayabeque, Cienfuegos, Santiago de Cuba, Camagüey, Matanzas and Villa Clara recorded between 30% and 50%. These low precipitation levels, he noted, have produced an increase in the number of areas impacted by the drought. At the end of November 2020, 13% of the country's municipalities were suffering the effects of limited rainfall, and by the end of March 2021 the figure reached 45%. Nationwide, 552,852 persons are affected by the drought. The populations of Havana, Artemisa, Santiago de Cuba, Camagüey and Guantánamo account for 81% of the total.

In order to alleviate the impact on the population, action being taken to maintain and improve pipelines and networks, construct interconnections between systems, increase the number of pumping stations, and drill wells, among other efforts, which have improved service to more than 780,260 inhabitants, principally in the provinces of Havana, Santiago de Cuba, Las Tunas and Guantánamo, Camagüey and Artemisa. He recalled that, during the 2003-2005 period, a severe drought affected someTwo million people in the country, a figure that was reduced between 2020 and 2021 to about 500,000, as a result of investments made in the water sector nationwide.

Government work in Sancti Spíritus

As the last item on the agenda and in compliance with provisions established in the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba, the governor of Sancti Spiritus, Teresita Romero Rodríguez, presented an accountability report on her administration’s work in the province, the first to conduct this process before the Council of Ministers.

Many actions have been taken, she stated, to improve the populations’ quality of life in the midst of the complex situation the nation is facing, as a result of the escalation of the unjust economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the U.S. government on Cuba; damage caused by three severe meteorological events in the province; and the great effort required to confront the COVID-19 epidemic.

Among principal priorities during 2020 and 2021, the Governor identified work to support the food program in the territory. Other programs such as health and education have also been prioritized, while progress was made in the computerization of society and in meeting objectives established in provincial housing policy.

In order to continue advancing in the government’s effectiveness, Governor Romero cited several arenas which require more work. Among these, she emphasized follow-up on the implementation of monetary re-ordering; the identification of untapped potential to generate income for the local budget, as well as the control of expenses and their destinations; improving the quality of services provided the population; and promoting local development projects, in accordance with strategic lines approved in each municipality.

Several members of the Council of Ministers offered their opinions and suggestions for the government’s future efforts in this central territory, which faces a period of much work, learning, and overcoming challenges, in order to increasingly improve the population’s quality of life, and the body approved the Governor’s accountability report and the Resolution proposed in this regard.

Will Cuba Permit Limited Edition “Cuban-American” Hand-Rolled Cigars To Be Created In The United States From 100 Pounds Of Tobacco From Cuba? U.S. Company May Provide Grower Financing

Will the Republic of Cuba permit a limited edition of 10,000 “Cuban-American” hand-rolled cigars to be created in the United States from one hundred pounds of filler, binder, and wrapper sourced from the Republic of Cuba?  If they do, a United States company is ready and may ask the Biden-Harris Administration to authorize crop financing.     

It has sort of happened before. 

For the Republic of Cuba, the re-introduction to the United States marketplace of tobacco leaf grown in the Republic of Cuba would provide a third Hecho en Cuba- Made in Cuba moment, or, depending upon labeling regulations, Procedente de Cuba- Sourced from Cuba moment.   

The government of the Republic of Cuba, through Republic of Cuba government-operated Corporacion Habanos S.A., (2020 revenues US$507 million; 2019 revenues US$531 million) prefers to add value to its agricultural commodity patrimony- grow the tobacco, process the tobacco, create the cigar, create the cigar band, create the cigar box, and then export the final product, thus gaining added-value for its twenty-seven cigar brands. 

With the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) training its Republic of Cuba policy towards supporting the self-employed and privately-owned businesses, including those within the agricultural sector, Washington DC might approve an importation and even financing, but how will the [Miguel] Diaz-Canel Administration in Havana respond?  

There are tobacco plantations (small, medium, and large) in the Republic of Cuba that were, prior to the 1959 Revolution, and have remained since, owned by families rather than the government of the Republic of Cuba.  They sell their crop to the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

Tampa, Florida-based J.C. Newman Cigar Co. confirmed the company would entertain providing crop financing for a tobacco plantation which conforms to the “independent Cuban entrepreneurs” requirements of the United States Department of State.  In 2016, the United States Department of State certified certain coffee plantations and charcoal sourcing areas in the Republic of Cuba as meeting the requirements- and those requirements continued to be maintained, without interruption, through the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) and Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021). 

On 2 June 2021, J.C. Newman Cigar Co. wrote to the United States Department of State to request that raw tobacco from the Republic of Cuba grown by “independent Cuban entrepreneurs” be eligible for import to the United States.  From 1895 to 1962, J.C. Newman Cigar Co. imported tobacco from the Republic of Cuba and retains custody of the last bale of pre-embargo tobacco imported from the Republic of Cuba.   

The request was to “include section IV, chapter 24, heading 2401 (unmanufactured tobacco)” in the list of Goods and Services Eligible for Importation.  LINK To Letter   

Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
United States Department of State
Washington DC

Goods and Services Eligible for Importation: “In accordance with the policy changes announced by the President on December 17, 2014, to further engage and empower the Cuban people, Section 515.582 of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (31 CFR Part 515 – the CACR) authorizes the importation into the United States of certain goods and services produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs as determined by the State Department as set forth on the Section 515.582. The goods whose import is authorized by Section 515.582 are goods produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs, as demonstrated by documentary evidence, that are imported into the United States, except for goods specified in the following sections/chapters of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTS).”   

To date, only coffee beans (one importer) and charcoal (two importers) have been included on the list of goods authorized for export from the Republic of Cuba to the United States.  Republic of Cuba government-operated Cubaexport (under the auspice of the Ministry for Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment of the Republic of Cuba) has refused requests to authorize coffee beans for direct export to the United States and thus far refused requests to authorize bulk honey and cocoa beans for direct export to the United States.    

In August 2016, New York, New York-based Nestle Nespresso USA, Inc., a subsidiary of Vevey, Switzerland-based Nestle SA (2019 revenues approximately US$93 billion), introduced to the United States the first of multiple releases of the “Cafecito de Cuba” capsule.  The coffee beans are exported from the Republic of Cuba to Switzerland for processing and then exported to the United States and other countries for sale-at-retail.   

In January 2017 and July 2018, Hialeah, Florida-based Fogo Premium Lump Charcoal purchased a total of four twenty-foot containers of charcoal from the Republic of Cuba for distribution throughout the United States.   

In May 2019, Foley, Alabama-based GulfWise Commerce LLC, affiliated with Foley, Alabama-based Woerner Companies (2019 revenues exceeded US$40 million) purchased two forty-foot containers of charcoal from the Republic of Cuba for distribution (including through Amazon.com and True Value hardware stores) throughout the United States. 

From Mr. Drew Newman, General Counsel, J.C. Newman Cigar Co.: Premium cigar tobacco generally ranges from US$6.00 per pound (basic filler tobacco) to between US$20.00 and US$50.00 (for the finest wrapper leaves).  In general, sixty pounds of tobacco is required to create approximately 1,000 cigars.  One hundred pounds of tobacco can create approximately 1,600 cigars.  Cigars are a blend of tobaccos.  At minimum, five different types of tobaccos are needed to make a cigar (a wrapper leaf, a binder leaf, and three different types of filler leaves).  To create a “Clear Havana” or a cigar with 100% tobacco from Cuba, we would need five different types of tobacco leaves.  With one hundred pounds of one type of tobacco from Cuba, we could blend it with tobacco from the United States to create approximately 10,000 cigars. 

Investment & Financing? 

Currently, only donations to the self-employed, small and medium-sized businesses in the Republic of Cuba are authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury.    

If the Biden-Harris Administration authorizes direct investment and direct loans to the self-employed and small and medium-size enterprises in the Republic of Cuba, particularly those focused upon agriculture, then J.C. Newman Cigar Co. would have both an opportunity and incentive to engage directly with a family-owned tobacco plantation located in the Republic of Cuba and provide crop financing as is standard in the tobacco industry throughout the world.  That financing could include funding to purchase agricultural equipment.   

In November 2017, Moline, Illinois-based Deere & Company (2019 revenues approximately US$39.2 billion) and Peoria, Illinois-based Caterpillar Inc. (2019 revenues approximately US$53.8 billion) established distribution centers located in the Republic of Cuba.   

Antioch, Tennessee-based Wirtgen America, Inc., a subsidiary of Windhagen, Germany-based Wirtgen Group (2019 revenues approximately US$3 billion), a construction equipment machinery subsidiary (acquired in 2017) of Deere & Company has also delivered products to the Republic of Cuba.  Deere & Company reported that the company would provide financing for equipment purchases by authorized Republic of Cuba entities.    

Caterpillar Inc.’s distributor for Caribbean Sea-area countries, San Juan, Puerto Rico-based RIMCO, manages a distribution center in Havana which provides sales, service and rental of brands including Caterpillar and Duluth, Georgia-based AGCO Corporation (2019 revenues approximately US$9.3 billion).  There are no United States government prohibitions upon Caterpillar or RIMCO from providing, directly or indirectly, payment terms and/or financing for equipment exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  

Additional Observation 

If cigar tobacco from the Republic of Cuba were to be permitted to be exported to the United States for the purpose of being a component(s) of a cigar produced in the United States, which component(s) of a cigar would be likely from the Republic of Cuba- wrapper, binder, or filler, to produce the highest quality and most marketable cigar for distribution in the United States? 

From a long-time tobacco industry insider with direct knowledge of the Republic of Cuba:  It is not a simple, direct answer. The complicated part is there is a perennial debate in the cigar industry about the influence of the wrapper on the taste of cigar. Two schools, diametrically opposed; one says that the wrapper accounts for 70 percent of the flavor; the other says exactly the opposite, no more than 30 percent of the final flavor profile, something that more closely reflects the proportion of the wrapper leaf to the whole cigar. I happen to fall in the former category. So, if that being true, then the key ingredient would be the wrapper leaf. Cuban wrapper, at its best which is not always a given, is distinct in its coloration (Colorado or deep reddish brown) and, IMHO, its unique taste, a somewhat indescribable combination of earthiness and spiciness only rarely found in wrapper outside Cuba. But that observation -- the uniqueness in Cuban tobacco flavors -- suggests that the filler is also a dynamic ingredient in the final flavor profile. With filler, the variability is probably less of an issue -- top quality wrapper leaf requires a consistency of appearance in addition to its taste -- and therefore might be a key element in producing a cigar that mirrored the often-alleged superiority of Cuban cigar taste profiles, again, something I would describe generally as earthier and spicier than most non-Cuban tobaccos. What has been a constant among the most knowledgeable men in the industry is that they have talked wistfully about being allowed to use Cuban tobacco in their own blends with Dominican and Nicaraguan tobaccos, using those distinct flavor elements to create something entirely new to the market. Binder tobacco seems to me to be less of an issue...it's one leaf that might add some complexity but wouldn't be a game-changer in any interpretation of the role the three leaf varieties have in a final product.

COMPLETE 3-PAGE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

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J.C. Newman Cigar Co. Wants To Add Tobacco Leaves To Coffee & Charcoal As Authorized Imports From Cuba

Cigar Aficionado
New York, New York
3 June 2021

Legislation

J.C. Newman Hoping To Import Cuban Tobacco
Petitions U.S. Government To Make Cigars in the U.S. With Cuban Tobacco

By Gregory Mottola

When Drew Newman of J.C. Newman Cigar Co. read an article about the legal importation of Cuban coffee into the United States, he had an idea: why not tobacco? Of course, the obvious answer is the 60-year-old U.S. embargo on Cuban cigars and tobacco, but he figured if the U.S. government allowed Cuban coffee to come into the United States, then his family’s Tampa, Florida cigar company should be able to do the same with tobacco. Newman was so inspired by this idea that he decided to petition the government. Yesterday, he sent a letter to the Office of Economic Sanctions Policy & Implementation asking that the U.S. Department of State rethink its position on importing raw, unfermented Cuban tobacco leaf. 

“The U.S. government allows coffee and other goods from Cuba to be legally imported so long as they are from ‘independent Cuban entrepreneurs,’ ” Newman said. “I am petitioning the U.S. government to add tobacco leaves grown by independent farmers—not the Cuban government—to this list.” 

More than 125 years old, J.C. Newman Cigar Co. has a long history with Cuban tobacco. Like many American cigar manufacturers before the 1961 embargo, the company (then known as M&N Cigar) imported tobacco from Cuba and rolled the cigars in the United States, first in Cleveland and then in Tampa, creating a product known as a “Clear Havana.” From a tax perspective, it was far less expensive to import raw leaf and make the cigars in the U.S. than to import finished, branded cigars that were made in Cuba, which is why Clear Havanas were generally less expensive than Cuban-made brands such as Romeo y Julieta or H. Upmann. “Before President Kennedy imposed the Cuban embargo, my family imported millions of pounds of Cuban tobacco into the United States,” Newman said. “We rolled Clear Havanas, cigars that were made entirely from Cuban tobacco, in our El Reloj cigar factory in Tampa.” 

If the petition works, it would be a return of sorts to the old, pre-embargo days for J.C. Newman, a return the 39-year-old Newman hopes he’ll see in his lifetime. On a larger scale, such a policy change would not only create new opportunities for J.C. Newman, but could possibly re-ignite an entire industry of Clear Havana production in the U.S. “Prior to the embargo, far more cigars were rolled with Cuban tobacco in Tampa than in Cuba because Tampa was home to the world’s best cigar factories,” Newman says. “Allowing us to import Cuban tobacco leaves would allow us to support independent Cuban farmers and to prove, once again, that we can roll better cigars with Cuban tobacco than Cuba can.”

It’s certainly an ambitious proposal, but it’s not without its political problems. Even if the U.S. grants Newman his wish, there are more potential obstacles to overcome regarding Cuba’s complicated economic policies on private ownership and trade. Most major businesses in Cuba, whether industrial or agricultural, are nationalized under the present Communist regime, meaning that most transactions are technically property of the Cuban government. While recent reforms in Cuba have led to some private ownership, dealing with an “independent Cuban farmer” may prove to be difficult if the government decides to step in, as tobacco is a prized—and tightly controlled—source of income for the cash-strapped nation. For this reason, Cuban officials may not be willing to allow farmers to sell off portions of such a lucrative crop if it brings no income to the country.  

But there’s an additional hurdle. Habanos S.A. is still extremely protective of its tobacco appellation and how the origin of denonimation (D.O.P.) is marketed globally. Habanos, a state-run monopoly formed in 1994, controls the promotion and distribution of all premium, handmade cigars that leave the island. Only Habanos can legally classify a cigar as being Cuban or containing Cuban tobacco, and there are presently no third-party premium cigars containing Cuban leaf that Habanos has officially sanctioned. None of this seems to worry Newman much. He’s confident that if he can get stateside permission to import tobacco, his company will find a way to do business that leaves the Cuban government out of the equation. “The Cuban government should not be afraid of having independent farmers export their tobacco to the United States,” he says. “If the Cuban government believes that their cigar rollers are some of the best in the world, they should not be afraid of having American cigar makers roll cigars with Cuban tobacco again just like we did before the embargo.” 

LINK To Text Of Letter From J.C. Newman Cigar Co. In PDF Format

United States Department of State
Washington DC

Section 515.582 List
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
Goods and Services Eligible for Importation

“In accordance with the policy changes announced by the President on December 17, 2014, to further engage and empower the Cuban people, Section 515.582 of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (31 CFR Part 515 – the CACR) authorizes the importation into the United States of certain goods and services produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs as determined by the State Department as set forth on the Section 515.582. The goods whose import is authorized by Section 515.582 are goods produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs, as demonstrated by documentary evidence, that are imported into the United States, except for goods specified in the following sections/chapters of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTS).” 

United States Department of State
Washington DC

“The Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation is responsible for developing and implementing foreign policy-related sanctions adopted to counter threats to national security posed by particular activities and countries. 

SPI builds international support for implementation of economic sanctions, provides foreign policy guidance to the Department of Treasury and Commerce on sanctions implementation, and works with Congress to draft legislation that advances U.S. foreign policy goals in these areas. 

The Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation (TFS/SPI) maintains and enforces sanctions to maximize their economic impact on our targets and minimize the damage to U.S. economic interests. We also work to remove economic sanctions when appropriate to reward and incentivize improved behavior or demonstrate U.S. support for newly established democratic governments. In addition, SPI conducts outreach on sanctions issues to a wide range of interested parties including NGOs, companies, diaspora groups, and others. 

Other USG Resources: 

Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury  – OFAC plays a primary role in administering and enforcing many U.S. sanctions programs. In coordination with the Department of State, OFAC issues licenses where appropriate for a variety of goods, services and transactions. OFAC’s website is a useful resource on sanctions programs and on individuals and entities subject to sanctions. 

Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce  – The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), is responsible for developing export control policies and issuing export licenses for particular goods/end users/destinations as appropriate in consultation with State, DOD, and Energy. The BIS website is a useful resource for information on which destinations are subject to foreign policy related controls.” 

Related Posts: 

After A Long Wait... Nespresso Of Switzerland Announces "For A Limited Time" New Releases Of "Cafecito de Cuba" & "Cafe de Cuba" (8/20/20) 

Might Cubaexport In 2020 Permit “Independent Entrepreneurs” To Export Coffee Beans, Cocoa and Honey To The United States? (1/20/20)

Libertad Act Lawsuit Against Fanjul Family In Florida For "Trafficking" In Sugar Dismissed By Plaintiff

Francisco Industries, Inc. v. ASR Group International, Inc. [1:21-cv-21679]. 

Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton PA (plaintiff)
Rasco Klock Perez & Nieto, P.L. (defendant)

LINK To Notice Of Voluntary Dismissal (5/27/21) 

On 2 May 2021, Summit, New Jersey-based Francisco Sugar Company (OTCPK: FRAZ), the 9th largest Certified Claimant (US$53,389,438.37), filed a Libertad Act Title III lawsuit against West Palm Beach, Florida-based ASR Group International, Inc. (2019 revenues approximately US$500 million) relating to a shipment of sugar from the Republic of Cuba to the United Kingdom.  ASR Group International is a part of the commercial holdings of the Fanjul brothers (estimated net worth US$8.2 billion)- Alfonso "Alfy" Fanjul Jr., José "Pepe" Fanjul, Alexander Fanjul, and Andres Fanjul. 

The Trump Administration (2021-2021) on 2 May 2019 made operational Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).  Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.    

PREVIOUS POST:

Fanjul Family Responds To Libertad Act Lawsuit-Plaintiff "conduct is malicious and aimed only at tarnishing the reputation of ASR Group and the Fanjul family." (11 May 2021) 

Biden Administration Will Use Cuba's Authorization Of SMSE's As Means To Expand Support For Cuba Private Sector- U.S. Investments And Loans May Be Next

By authorizing privately-owned SMSE's, the government of the Republic of Cuba expands the engagement landscape for the Biden Administration (2021- ) to shift from only authorizing donations to cuentapropistas to authorizing individuals and companies in the United States to deliver direct investment and direct loans to the re-emerging private sectors located throughout the Republic of Cuba. On the scale of importance for the United States business community, the Diaz-Canel Administration (2019- ) has delivered a significant decision which can rekindle the interest in the Republic of Cuba by United States companies.

Granma
Havana, Republic of Cuba
2 June 2021

Aprueba Consejo de Ministros perfeccionamiento de actores de la economía cubana

El Consejo de Ministros aprobó en su más reciente sesión el perfeccionamiento de los actores de la economía cubana, que incluye a la empresa estatal socialista; a las cooperativas no agropecuarias; a las micro, pequeñas y medianas empresas y al trabajo por cuenta propia, convocados todos a impulsar, cada uno desde su ámbito, el desarrollo de la nación.

“The Council of Ministers approves the improvement of actors in the Cuban economy

The Council of Ministers approved in its most recent session the improvement of the actors of the Cuban economy, which includes the socialist state enterprise; non-agricultural cooperatives; to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and self-employment, all summoned to promote, each one from their own sphere, the development of the nation.”

Prensa Latina
Havana, Republic of Cuba
2 June 2021

Impulsa Cuba perfeccionamiento de actores de la economía

La Habana, 2 jun (Prensa Latina) Cuba avanza hoy en el perfeccionamiento de la economía y la integración de sus actores, luego de que el Consejo de Ministros aprobara disposiciones relacionadas con la empresa estatal socialista y otras formas de gestión.

“Cuba promotes improvement of economic actors

Havana, Jun 2 (Prensa Latina) Cuba is advancing today in the improvement of the economy and the integration of its actors, after the Council of Ministers approved provisions related to the socialist state enterprise and other forms of management.”

United States Department of State
Washington DC
20 May 2021

United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken

“The United States recommits to accompanying the Cuban people in your quest to determine your own future. We will support those improving the lives of families and workers, cuentapropistas who have forged their own economic paths, and all who are building a better Cuba – and a better tomorrow for themselves in Cuba.” (Emphasis added.)

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
6 April 2021

“Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment is opening the door to Cuban Americans who want to participate in foreign investment projects as the island tries to jump-start its beleaguered economy and encourage Washington to loosen sanctions. Katia Alonso, the ministry’s director of foreign capital investments, told the Miami Herald by email in response to a list of questions that Cuba won’t reject potential business bids from Cuban Americans based on the sole fact that they live in the U.S. — something she said the law has never prohibited, though in the past exile entrepreneurs haven’t always been welcomed either. “Cuba is open to foreign capital regardless of its place of origin,” Alonso explained, “so if a Cuban American were interested — whether they were born in the U.S. or migrated to that country — in investing on the island, their interest would be evaluated just like any other potential investor from any other place of origin.””

The White House
Washington DC
22 March 2016

President Barack Obama at the Gran Teatro de la Habana

“In a global economy, powered by ideas and information, a country’s greatest asset is its people. In the United States, we have a clear monument to what the Cuban people can build: it’s called Miami. Here in Havana, we see that same talent in cuentapropistas...And in recent years, the Cuban government has begun to open up to the world, and to open up more space for that talent to thrive. In just a few years, we've seen how cuentapropistas can succeed while sustaining a distinctly Cuban spirit. Being self-employed is not about becoming more like America, it’s about being yourself.”

Two words. Fourteen letters. The Phrase "Havana Syndrome" Continues To Constrain Biden-Harris Administration Decisions Impacting U.S. Relationship With Cuba

China Syndrome.  Iran Syndrome.  Russia Syndrome.  Venezuela Syndrome.  Each would be preferred to Havana Syndrome by advocates seeking changes by the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) to decisions by the Trump Administration (2017-2021) relating to the Republic of Cuba. 

The incidences of Havana Syndrome were first reported in the Republic of Cuba, then in the People’s Republic of China, then in the Russian Federation, then in the United States (Virginia and Washington DC). 

For the government of the Republic of Cuba the central issue impacting it remains while there are officials within the United States intelligence community of agencies and departments and offices who can believe the Raul Castro Administration (2008-2018) did not directly conduct the operations that inflicted harm upon United States government personnel in the Republic of Cuba, there is consensus that such an endeavor by a third party could not have become operational absent knowledge of, if not approval by President Raul Castro, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba, and the Ministry of Interior (MINIT) of the Republic of Cuba.  

The repeated and forcefully-delivered denials of the Miguel Diaz-Canel Administration (2018- ) that neither it nor the Raul Castro Administration bear responsibly- any responsibility for the “alleged health incidents” (31 May 2021 by Camaguey, Cuba-based Radio Cadena Agramonte) strains for the United States intelligence community even its sometimes-elastic view of complicity. 

As the United States Department of State, United States Department of Defense (DOD), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) continue their investigations accompanied by medical facilities operated by public and private entities, and prodded continually by members of the United States Congress and their committees and subcommittees, challenging will be for the Biden-Harris Administration to do what it may want to do, and what it may believe it needs to do relating to the Republic of Cuba. 

There is no political merit badge available from the United States Congress to the Biden-Harris Administration for returning to what was prior to 20 January 2017 or for rewarding current or future behavior of the Diaz-Canel Administration absent conclusive evidence that the Raul Castro Administration, FAR, and MININT did not do and did not know what was happening in 2016 and 2017 in the Republic of Cuba.    

Havana Syndrome will continue to be a material brake upon the Biden-Harris Administration and will negatively impact the structure of the commercial, economic, and political bilateral relationship with the Republic of Cuba. 

The more swiftly does an acceptable cause-and-effect materialize and Havana Syndrome has a metamorphosis to another moniker, the less formidable a glide path will exist for the Biden-Harris Administration to re-engage where there was disengagement and for engagement where none existed. 

NBC News
Washington DC
26 May 2021

Diplomats send letter to State Dept. leaders saying 'Havana Syndrome' sufferers not getting proper care The letter adds to pressure on the Biden administration from Congress to better care for affected U.S. workers and get to the bottom of how they got sick. 

By Josh Lederman 

WASHINGTON — A group of U.S. diplomats and other government staffers suffering from symptoms consistent with "Havana Syndrome" are voicing frustration with the Biden administration's early response, and warning that injured workers are still being denied proper care. 

In a letter to State Department leadership obtained by NBC News, the staffers say that in recent months, the government has continued to "reject scientific evidence regarding the injuries and treatment needs" and to "invalidate our injuries and experiences," alleging that military and intelligence officials injured by the same unexplained phenomenon are being treated more seriously.  LINK To Letter 

"After four years of challenges, we were hopeful that the new administration would welcome a partnership with us to ensure those affected receive the care and treatment they need and ensure appropriate care for the new cases," the staffers wrote. "Unfortunately, our experience thus far has fallen short of our renewed expectations." 

The letter adds to growing pressure on the Biden administration from Congress to better care for affected U.S. workers and get to the bottom of how they suffered brain injuries — still largely a mystery more than four years after the government started investigating what at first it called "targeted attacks." Like the Trump administration, the Biden administration has not found a definitive cause or culprit. 

The letter was sent Tuesday to Brian McKeon, a deputy secretary of State, and was accompanied by a list of 11 recommendations for how the staffers say the administration could better ensure safety and medical care for its workers. Copies were distributed to their offices of several U.S. senators who this month signed onto a bipartisan bill to provide financial support to those suffering from the mysterious incidents. 

The letter was sent on behalf of 21 U.S. government workers and their spouses who are considered potential or confirmed Havana Syndrome cases injured overseas, including in Cuba and China. In March, the group had asked Amb. Pamela Spratlen, the official overseeing the State Department's response, to attend a formal meeting to address their concerns, but write that they're still waiting.  "Senior Department leadership's continued refusal to meet with and hear directly from its injured personnel is discouraging," the staffers write. 

NBC News is not publishing the names of the signatories, many of whom have not been publicly identified, but confirmed the letter's authenticity with several of those who signed it.  "The Department leadership is aware of the letter and looks forward to discussing its contents with all relevant parties," a State Department spokesman said by email. "We have no higher priority than the safety and security of U.S. personnel, their families, and other U.S. citizens." 

In their list of 11 requests to the administration, the staffers ask that evaluations and medical care for all newly or potentially injured workers be centralized at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, where some recent injuries have been treated. In the first years after the incidents arose, the government sent workers to University of Miami and then to University of Pennsylvania, creating an inconsistent hodgepodge of treatments and testing regimens, and in recent years workers have continued to say they have to fight to get treated at Walter Reed. 

"It was incredibly frustrating," said Marc Polymeropoulos, a veteran former CIA officer who says he was hit in a Moscow hotel room in 2017. Polymeropoulos, who did not sign the letter, said he'd ultimately taken the extraordinary step of speaking out publicly to secure treatment at the military hospital. "It reached the point when my health deteriorated that I had no choice to go public and plead for health care at Walter Reed." 

The staffers are also urging the administration to increase diagnostic and treatment options for children affected by Havana Syndrome, ensure long-term monitoring of injured workers for 10 to 20 years, and conduct baseline testing on diplomats before they're sent abroad — something Canada's government is now doing in the wake of the unexplained incidents.  They also want the State Department to work more closely with the Pentagon and other agencies on developing "identification devices" for potential incidents, and to provide affected employees with some type of formal acknowledgement of their injuries, such as a letter or award from the secretary. 

Although many diplomats whom the State Department confirmed were injured in Cuba received FBI victim letters or other documentation from the State Department, workers injured later in other countries have struggled to get the government to substantiate their injuries, leading to what they've described as exhausting struggles to obtain worker's compensation or other benefits and care. 

No longer considered limited to Cuba and China, the incidents have expanded in scope with new reports of injuries in Russia, Western Europe, and even in the United States, with recent suspected incidents occurring near the White House.  Last month, the Republican and Democratic leaders of the elite Senate Intelligence Committee issued a joint statement calling the incidents "debilitating attacks" and warning that "this pattern of attacking our fellow citizens serving our government appears to be increasing." 

In 2018, NBC News first reported that U.S. intelligence agencies considered Russia the main suspect, suspicion that remains strong in the U.S. government despite a lack of definitive evidence. Russia and Cuba have both adamantly denied involvement.  Last year, a State Department-commissioned study from the National Academies of Sciences found the injuries consistent with directed microwave energy, furthering the long-suspected prospect that a futuristic microwave weapon is being deployed. 

A number of Canadian diplomats and their families also suffered similar brain injuries in Havana, leading Ottawa to cut back its diplomatic presence in Cuba. Earlier this month, NBC News reported that a group of Canadian diplomats had sent their government a letter accusing it of withholding information about new cases of brain injury resulting from "Havana Syndrome" that Canada's government has not publicly disclosed. 

Responding Tuesday to the new letter from staffers, the State Department said that Secretary of State Antony Blinken is receiving regular updates about the situation and has "made clear that this is a priority for him." A spokesperson said the investigation into "what happened to our staff and their families" was ongoing. 

LINK To Article: https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/diplomats-send-letter-state-dept-leaders-saying-havana-syndrome-sufferers-n1268580

Vice President Kamala Harris "I believe that the businesses, in particular, our private business sector, have a very significant role to play" Will There Be The Same Belief For Cuba?

The White House
Washington DC
27 May 2021

For Immediate Release

REMARKS BY VICE PRESIDENT HARRIS BEFORE A MEETING WITH PRIVATE SECTOR LEADERS TO DISCUSS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE

Vice President’s Ceremonial Office

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, I want to thank this distinguished group of leaders for joining us this afternoon for this discussion. We promise it to be a very productive discussion about how we can collaborate, how we can maximize opportunities in promise and hope and potential and resources.

And, as you all know, on March 24th, the President asked me to lead our nation's diplomatic efforts as it relates to the Northern Triangle and Mexico. And as I've said many times over the past two months, the work that we are doing is guided by two fundamental principles: one, that most people don't want to leave home. They don't want to leave their grandmother. They don't want to leave the language they speak, the culture they know. And when they do, it is often for one of two reasons: Because they are either fleeing some harm or because to stay home prevents them from satisfying basic needs for themselves or their family.

The second principle with which we are approaching this initiative is the -- the real belief that we have the capacity to give people hope -- and hope, in particular, in this case, that if they stay, that help is on the way.

And so these are the guiding principles for our work. And in that vein, we also really fully appreciate that in order for us -- as an administration, as the United States government -- to really maximize the potential of our work, it has to be through collaboration and partnership -- through public-private partnerships; through the work that we are doing with also reaching out to nonprofits and foundations; the work we are doing to internationalize this effort, predominantly through the work that we do with our allies in the U.N.; doing the work of engaging civil society; doing the work of understanding that the benefit of this effort will probably not evidence itself overnight, but will be well worth it.

But we do understand our work is in the context of longstanding issues that are both about acute factors and -- and are about longstanding and deep-rooted factors that include issues of violence and corruption; that include issues of food insecurity; that include the impact that everyone around the world has experienced in terms of extreme weather conditions. And so, the work we are doing is guided, though, with the dominant principle that when we work together, when we combine resources -- limited, though they are, for each one of us -- we can maximize the potential to give people in that region hope. And -- and in that way, also show what it means to be a good neighbor, because this is also in the context of the Western Hemisphere. And in that way, we know that we are interconnected and, in many ways, interdependent when it comes to many issues.

So, today, we are launching our call to action for businesses to invest in the Northern Triangle. And that is one of the specific reasons that I've asked these business leaders to join us today. And so, this focus includes digital inclusion -- everything from digital inclusion to workforce development.

I believe that the businesses -- in particular, our private business sector -- have a very significant role to play, as we all know, in creating jobs, in promoting economic opportunity, and in long-term development.

I am proud that we have companies already in the United States who have committed to act. We have MasterCard, who intends to partner across sectors to bring 5 million people in the region into the digital economy and to support 1 million small businesses. This is a commitment that's already been made. I'm excited to -- to report that Microsoft will work with local partners to expand broadband access for up to 3 million people in the region in the next year. I'm pleased to report that Nespresso will expand coffee-sourcing activities in Guatemala and start, in Honduras and El Salvador, supporting local communities and farming communities with a minimum of $150 million in purchases, in price premiums, and technical assistance.

So these are but a few examples of the commitments that have already been made. But the call to action is to bring these leaders and others together so that we can do what I think we can do best, which is make a commitment to get something done and then see it through, understanding that giving hope is not about just having a dream of giving hope, it is about action that results in tangible benefit that gives people a sense of what is possible for themselves and for their families. So, with that, again, I welcome you all. I thank you for this time. And I'm very much looking forward to our discussion today.

After Four Meetings In Brussels, Representatives Of EC, EU, and United States Have Not Discussed Cuba Despite EC Commitment To Do So

United States Department of State
Washington DC
26 May 2021

Office of the Spokesperson 

“U.S.-EU: Joint Press Release by the EEAS and Department of State on Consultations Between Deputy Secretary Wendy Sherman and Secretary General Stefano Sannino” The following is the text of a joint press release by the U.S. Department of State and the European External Action Service. 

On May 26, Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and European External Action Service [EEAS] Secretary General Stefano Sannino met in Brussels to reaffirm the strength of the U.S.-EU [European Union] partnership on key foreign policy and security issues.  They welcomed the upcoming EU-U.S. Summit taking place on 15 June as an important step in the revitalized transatlantic partnership. The two sides underscored the shared U.S.-EU interest in strengthening the rules-based international order and pledged further close cooperation in support of democratic values, global and regional stability, and universal human rights.  They discussed a range of foreign policy issues of mutual concern, such as Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and the recent violence in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. They exchanged views on the Eastern Mediterranean, Western Balkans, Afghanistan, Syria, Myanmar, the Indo-Pacific, Ethiopia, and Venezuela. They also underscored a shared interest in improving connectivity by supporting partners in setting up regulatory environments that are conducive to sustainable connectivity, as well as through quality infrastructure development and projects consistent with the highest transparency, digital, and green standards as part of their respective approaches to the Indo-Pacific region. They agreed to continue close consultations in view of possible joint approaches and actions by the EU and the U.S. that can bring about positive change.

Deputy Secretary Sherman and Secretary General Sannino held the first high-level meeting of the U.S.-EU dialogue on China.  The two sides reiterated that the United States’ and EU’s relations with China are multifaceted and comprise elements of cooperation, competition, and systemic rivalry.  They highlighted issues of shared concern, including ongoing human rights violations in Xinjiang and Tibet, the erosion of autonomy and democratic processes in Hong Kong, economic coercion, disinformation campaigns, and regional security issues, in particular the situation in the South China Sea.  They discussed the importance of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the work of international organizations, including World Health Organization forums and the World Health Assembly.  They also discussed pursuing constructive engagement with China on issues such as climate change and non-proliferation, and on certain regional issues.  The two sides decided to continue meetings in this dialogue at senior official and expert levels to discuss reciprocity, including economic issues; resilience; human rights; security; multilateralism; and engagement.  The next high-level meeting will take place in winter 2021/2022.” 

The text included reference to ten countries and additional geographical areas.  Venezuela was listed.  The Republic of Cuba was not listed.  According to a representative of the European Commission (EC) there was no discussion of Republic of Cuba, including within the confines of the confirmed discussion about Venezuela.  No discussion of the implementation by the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) in May 2019 of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”) and use of Title IV of the Libertad Act by the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ).  

EU-based defendants in Title III Libertad Act lawsuits total 2019 revenues were US$158 Billion.  EU-based defendants in Libertad Act Title III lawsuits include: Copenhagen, Denmark-based A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S (2019 revenue approximately US$39 billion); Paris, France-based BNP Paribas (2019 revenue approximately US$49 billion); Amsterdam, Netherland-based Booking.com B.V. (2019 revenue approximately US$15 billion); Palma, Spain-based Iberostar Hoteles y Apartamentos S.L. (2019 revenue approximately US$2.6 billion); Palma, Spain-based Melia Hotels International S.A. (2019 revenue approximately US$2 billion); Paris, France-based Pernod Ricard S.A. (2019 revenue approximately US$10.5 billion); Paris, France-based Société Générale S.A. (2019 revenue approximately US$27.4 billion); and Dusseldorf, Germany-based Trivago GmbH (2019 revenue approximately US$940 million).  Additional lawsuits are expected to be filed.  Madrid, Spain-based NH Hotel Group S.A. (2019 revenues approximately US$1.9 billion) was a defendant in a lawsuit, but the lawsuit was dismissed by the plaintiff.

Thus far, the EC, EU, and United States Department of State have confirmed that the Republic of Cuba has not been discussed during any meeting since 20 January 2021. 

Background  

EC/EU Interaction With United States Department Of State

15 February 2021- European Parliament (EP) Member Wrote About Cuba To EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the EC Josep Borrell  

24 March 2021- Secretary Of State Blinken Visits Brussels- Cuba Not Discussed

29 March 2021- Mr. Borrell Writes To EP Member He Would “Address” Cuba With Biden Administration

15 April 2021- One Year Since EU-Based Libertad Act Lawsuit Defendant Asked EC For Guidance

15 April 2021- Secretary Of State Blinken Visits Brussels- Cuba Not Discussed

4 May 2021- Secretary Of State Blinken Visits London, Meets Mr. Borrell- Cuba Not Discussed

26 May 2021- Deputy Secretary Of State Sherman Visits Brussels, Meets Mr. Stefano Sannino- Cuba Not Discussed

15 June 2021- President Biden Visit To Brussels For U.S.-EU Summit

On 29 March 2021, HRVP Borrell responded to an inquiry from Mr. Javier Moreno Sanchez, a member of the Strasbourg, France-based EP who is a member of the “Group of Friendship and Solidarity with the People of Cuba.” The response from HRVP Borrell was inaccurately publicized as an agreement by Mr. Borrell to “mediate” rather than “address” the issue with the United States:

“Dear Members of the European Parliament, Thank you for your letter of 15 February on the designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism by the previous US administration. As I have stated to Foreign Minister Rodriguez at the EU-Cuba Joint Council on 20 January, the EU rejects this designation. The decision taken by the previous US administration has no factual basis, given the positive role Cuba has played in the peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, ELN). The ELN members were in Cuba as part of the now aborted peace negotiations with the Colombian government, having travelled there at the request of the Colombian government for the negotiation process, which has had the full support of the EU. As I have indicated in my statement referred to above (1), this designation adds to the hardship caused to the Cuban people by the US embargo. In our contacts with the new US administration, we will address this issue and call on the US to lift this designation. Yours faithfully, Josep Borrell Fontelles”  

Libertad Act 

The Trump Administration has made operational Title III and further implemented Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”). 

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.   

Title IV restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims.  One Canada-based company and one Spain-based company are currently known to be subject to this provision based upon a certified claim and non-certified claim. 

Suspension History 

Title III was suspended every six months since the Libertad Act was enacted in 1996- by President William J. Clinton (1993-2001), President George W. Bush (2001-2009), President Barack H. Obama (2009-2017) and through the first two years of President Donald J. Trump (2017-2021).   

·       On 16 January 2019, The Honorable Mike Pompeo, United States Secretary of State, reported a suspension for forty-five (45) days. 

·       On 4 March 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a suspension for thirty (30) days. 

·       On 3 April 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a further suspension for fourteen (14) days through 1 May 2019. 

·       On 17 April 2019, the Trump Administration reported that it would no longer suspend Title III. 

·       On 2 May 2019, certified claimants and non-certified claimants were permitted to file lawsuits in United States courts. 

Certified Claims Background 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims US$8.7 billion.  

The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

From the certified claim filed by Texaco: “The Cuban corporation was intervened on June 29, 1960, pursuant to Resolution 188 of June 28, 1960, under Law 635 of 1959.  Resolution 188 was promulgated by the Government of Cuba when the Cuban corporation assertedly refused to refine certain crude oil as assertedly provided under a 1938 law pertaining to combustible materials.  Subsequently, this Cuban firm was listed as nationalized in Resolution 19 of August 6, 1960, pursuant to Cuban Law 851.  The Commission finds, however, that the Cuban corporation was effectively intervened within the meaning of Title V of the Act by the Government of Cuba on June 29, 1960.” 

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International; the certified claim also includes land adjacent to the Jose Marti International Airport in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  The third-largest certified claim valued at US$97,373,414.72 is controlled by New York, New York-based North American Sugar Industries, Inc.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement. 

Unable To Convince Plaintiff To Withdraw Libertad Act "Trafficking" Lawsuit, Fanjul Family Requests 30 Day Extension To Respond

Francisco Industries, Inc. v. ASR Group International, Inc. [1:21-cv-21679]. 

Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton PA (plaintiff)
Rasco Klock Perez & Nieto, P.L. (defendant)

LINK: Unopposed Motion For An Extension Of Time To File A Response To Plaintiff’s Complaint (5/21/21) 

Excerpt: 

“Under present deadlines, Defendant’s response to the Complaint is due on May 24, 2021. Undersigned counsel requests a thirty (30) day extension, up to and including June 23, 2021. This extension is necessary as a result of current deadlines in other matters and to give sufficient time for counsel to acquaint themselves with the case and to prepare a response to the Complaint. The amount of time sought is the minimum amount of time needed to prepare a response to the Complaint.”

Previous Posts: 

Fanjul Family Responds To Libertad Act Lawsuit-Plaintiff "conduct is malicious and aimed only at tarnishing the reputation of ASR Group and the Fanjul family." (5/11/21) 

Cuban vs. Cuban: 9th Largest Certified Claimant Sues Billionaire Fanjul Family-Controlled Company For Trafficking In Sugar From Cuba To UK. This Lawsuit Could Be A Brawl. (5/11/21)

U.S. Department Of State Lists Cuba As Not Cooperating Fully With United States Antiterrorism Efforts

14 May 2021

Pursuant to section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2781), and Executive Order 13637, as amended, I hereby determine and certify to the Congress that the following countries are not cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts: Iran, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea), Syria, Venezuela, and Cuba. This determination and certification shall be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.

Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State.
[FR Doc. 2021-10948 Filed 5-24-21; 8:45 am]

LINK To Federal Register Post

LafargeHolcim Of Switzerland Settles Libertad Act Title III Lawsuit. First Settlement And First For Certified Claimant. Potential Multi-Million Payout? Who Is Next?

WILLIAM H. CLAFLIN ET AL V. LAFARGEHOLCIM LTD; INVERSIONES IBERSUIZAS S.A.; HOLCIM TRADING SA (F/K/A) UNION MARITIMA INTERNACIONAL SA; DE RUITER OUDERLANDE B.V.; LAS PAILAS DE CEMENTO S.A.U.; and UNKNOWN SUBSIDIARY OF THE LAFARGEHOLCIM GROUP [1:20-cv-23787; Southern Florida District].

Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Roig Lawyers (plaintiff)
Tutan, Rosenberg, Martin & Bellido (defendant)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)
Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher (defendant)

Plaintiff has 22nd largest certified combined claim (US$$11,686,342.59) -37th Largest Claim CU-1393 (US$7,508,689.96) Helen A Claflin; 181st Largest Claim CU-1394 (US$623,674.31) William H Claflin III; 72nd Largest Claim CU-1395 (US$2,927,190.31) Mary G. Rentschler; 182nd Largest Claim CU-1396 (US$623,674.31) Anne C. Allen; 3953rd Largest Claim CU-1397 (US$3,113.70) John W. Weeks. Defendant is St. Gallen, Switzerland-based LafargeHolcim Ltd. (2020 revenue approximately US$27 billion).

Based upon Libertad Act Title III award criteria, settlement could be annual interest since the asset was expropriated plus treble damages plus attorney fees for a total that could reach US$140 million. Unknown if settlement amount will be disclosed by Plaintiff or Defendant.

With first settlement involving certified claimants (of which there are 5,913), unlikely the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) will suspend Libertad Act Title III lawsuits. LINK To Lawsuit Statistics

LINK: Joint Stipulation And Proposed Order Regarding Stay And Tolling Deadlines (5/19/121)
LINK: Joint Stipulation And Proposed Order Regarding Stay And Tolling Deadlines (5/21/21)

LINK: Complaint (9/11/2020)

Damages Sought In Complaint: "WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that judgment be entered in their favor and against Defendants: 1.Awarding Plaintiffs actual damages as provided under the Act, in the amount of the higher of: (a)the current fair market value of the Confiscated Soledad Property in the amount to be proven at trial, presently estimated to be $270 million, which, because this is an FCSC certified claim is trebled pursuant to the Helms Burton Act (22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(3)) for a total damages award of approximately $810 million, or; (b)the treble of $11,686,342.59, the amount certified by the FCSC, with interest since August 6, 1960, to be proven at trial, which at the FCSC rate of interest of 6% results in a total damages award of approximately $160 million. 2.Awarding Plaintiffs pre-judgment interest as allowed by law; 3.Ordering Defendants to pay Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A)(ii);"

Excerpts:

WHEREAS Plaintiffs and LafargeHolcim jointly stipulated on May 19, 2021 to extend LafargeHolcim’s time to respond to the Complaint and stay all deadlines for 5 days;

Plaintiffs and LafargeHolcim participated in a mediation on April 22, 2021 and thereafter reached an agreement in principle to settle this action on May 20, 2021;

WHEREAS, having reached a settlement in principle, Plaintiffs and LafargeHolcim are working to prepare and execute a definitive settlement with the assistance of mediator Judge Layn R. Phillips (ret.), and those efforts remain ongoing;

Other Libertad Act Title III Lawsuits Involving Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD MARINE, LTD., Defendant. [1:20-cv-25176; Southern Florida District].

Horr, Novak & Skipp, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields (plaintiff)
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (defendant)

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL; EMMA RUTH BLANCO, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF ALFREDO BLANCO ROSELL, JR; HEBE BLANCO MIYARES, in her personal capacity, and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF BYRON BLANCO ROSELL; SERGIO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, in his personal capacity, and as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF ENRIQUE BLANCO ROSELL; EDUARDO BLANCO DE LA TORRE, as Administrator Ad Litem of the ESTATE OF FLORENTINO BLANCO ROSELL; LIANA MARIA BLANCO; SUSANNAH VALENTINA BLANCO; LYDIA BLANCO BONAFONTE; JACQUELINE M. DELGADO; BYRON DIAZ BLANCO, JR.; MAGDELENA BLANCO MONTOTO; FLORENTINO BLANCO DE LA TORRE; JOSEPH E. BUSHMAN; CARLOS BLANCO DE LA TORRE; and GUILLERMO BLANCO DE LA TORRE VERSUS A.P. MOLLER-MAERSK A/S (a/k/a A.P. MOLLER-MAERSK GROUP); MAERSK A/S (a/k/a MAERSK LINE A/S); MAERSK, INC.; and MAERSK AGENCY U.S.A., INC [2:21-cv-00339 Eastern District of Louisiana].

Pusateri, Johnston, Guillot & Greenbaum, LLC (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. CROWLEY MARITIME CORPORATION, Defendant. [3:20-cv-01426 Middle District Florida; Transferred To Florida Southern District 1:21-cv-20443].

Murphy & Anderson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields PLLC (plaintiff)
Law Offices of John S. Gaebe P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable LLP (defendant)

Ambassador Brian Nichols Hearing For Nomination As Assistant Secretary Of State For Western Hemisphere Affairs; Chairman Menendez Focuses Upon Cuba

The Honorable Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey), Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, focused his entire first opportunity for questions to the nominees to question Ambassador Nichols on issues relating to the Republic of Cuba. Subjects included health issues by United States diplomats, remittances, agricultural commodity and food product exports, and exporting of services.

The Honorable Benjamin Carden (D- Maryland) focused upon corruption; referred to the Republic of Cuba as a "corrupt country."

The Honorable Jeanne Shaheen (D- New Hampshire) asked about "Havana Syndrome."

United States Senate
Washington DC
19 May 2021
Hearing

The Honorable Brian A. Nichols of Rhode Island, a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Career Minister, to be an Assistant Secretary of State (Western Hemisphere Affairs).

LINK To Testimony

LINK To Chairman Robert Menendez Opening Statement

LINK To Hearing Video

Hearing transcript not yet available.

The Word For Today Is "cuentapropistas" And It Is The Fulcrum Around Which Biden Administration Cuba Policy Revolves

United States Department of State
Washington DC
20 May 2021

Secretary’s Message to the Cuban People on Cuban Independence Day

Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

On Cuban Independence Day, we recognize the strength and diversity of the Cuban people and their many contributions to the world. We celebrate the strong bonds between our two peoples, as well as the diverse backgrounds and ideas of Cuban artists, entrepreneurs, religious leaders, human rights defenders and advocates for equality, journalists, and environmentalists– just a few of the many people in Cuba with a strong voice and a desire to be heard. The United States stands with you and seeks to support you as you pursue freedom, prosperity, and a future of greater dignity. We recognize the challenges many of you face in your daily lives. We acknowledge your important contributions to the global conversation, and we seek to hear and amplify your voices in order to realize opportunities and address challenges.

The United States recommits to accompanying the Cuban people in your quest to determine your own future. We will support those improving the lives of families and workers, cuentapropistas who have forged their own economic paths, and all who are building a better Cuba – and a better tomorrow for themselves in Cuba.

Court In Iberostar Libertad Act Lawsuit Continues To Wait- European Commission Requests More Time To Respond. Now 398 Days. Testing Court Patience?

MARIA DOLORES CANTO MARTI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATES OF DOLORES MARTI MERCADE AND FERNANDO CANTO BORY V. IBEROSTAR HOTELES Y APARTAMENTOS SL [1:20-cv-20078; Southern Florida District]

Zumpano Patricios P.A. (plaintiff)
Bird & Bird (defendant)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

Excerpt: “On May 18, 2021, the European Commission sent a new communication to Iberostar in which the Commission confirmed that “[f]or the reasons we detailed in the letter dated 30 March 2021, the procedure is ongoing as we move forward on the assessment and the mandatory consultations.””

LINK To Defendant’s Response To Order To Show Cause (5/19/21)

LINK To Defendant’s Status Report (5/19/21)

LINK To Order Denying Renewed Motion To Vacate Stay (5/4/21)

Remittances: Will Biden-Harris Administration Repeat Mistakes Of Obama-Biden Administration And Learn From Mistakes Of Trump-Pence Administration? No Triangles. Yes Loans. Yes Investments.

Biden-Harris Administration Will Remove Limits On Remittances To Cuba
New Remittance Definition Should Include Investment & Loans For Self-Employed
Encourage Cuban-American “Ambassadors” To Legally Invest In And Export To Independent Businesses
Correspondent Banking Will Make Remittances More Transparent, More Efficient, More Cost-Effective
Western Union Could Lower Customer Transaction Fees With Correspondent Banking
U.S. Exporters Could Get Paid Faster And With Less Expense With Correspondent Banking
Again Permitting “U-turn” Transactions Provides Incentivizes Cuba To Re-Engage With Financial Sector
What Is Now Permitted Makes Sense Initially, But Then The Logic Falls Apart

On-the-record, on-background, and off-the-record, officials throughout the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) forcefully remind observers that it is neither the third term of the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) nor the second term of the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021).   

Now past the one hundred eighteen-day mark (or 8.08% of the four-year term), the Biden Administration with respect to the Republic of Cuba is maintaining policies and regulations enacted during the Trump-Pence Administration- which were reversals of policies and regulations enacted during the Obama-Biden Administration which were reversals of policies and regulations enacted during the Bush-Cheney Administration (2001-2009). 

If the Biden-Harris Administration wants to distinguish its Republic of Cuba policies and regulations from both its predecessors in The White House, then focus upon 1) permitting financial transactions to be more transparent, more direct, and more efficient and 2) authorize anyone subject to United States jurisdiction to engage in transactions with and provide loans and investments to independent businesses in the Republic of Cuba.   

During the Biden-Harris Administration the United States private sector could become the largest source of direct foreign investment and loans in the Republic of Cuba… channeled directly to the self-employed and directly to independent businesses located throughout the Republic of Cuba. 

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury should rephrase existing regulations to make easier, more transparent, and less costly for entrepreneurs in the Republic of Cuba to engage with their counterparts in the United States and for entrepreneurs in the United States to engage with their counterparts in the Republic of Cuba.  Only an individual absent private sector commercial experience would believe strangling the movement of capital benefits the United States in its re-engagement with the re-emerging private sector (self-employed) the Republic of Cuba. 

The Biden-Harris Administration wants to increase membership in unions so it crafts regulations making membership more attractive.  The same logic goes for the Republic of Cuba.  If the Biden-Harris Administration wants to increase the demand from entrepreneurs in the United States to re-engage with entrepreneurs in the Republic of Cuba, and simultaneously frustrate the Miguel Diaz-Canel Administration in the city of Havana, then increase, overwhelm the supply of the means of production.  This begins with the efficient and transparent movement of capital.  

Does This Make Sense?  Initially, It Does- But Then Falls Apart  

Today, an individual subject to United States jurisdiction 1) may travel to the Republic of Cuba 2) use credit cards and debit cards in the Republic of Cuba 3) open a bank account in the Republic of Cuba 4) use a bank, credit union, or money services business to process remittances to or from the Republic of Cuba 5) utilize online payment platforms to facilitate or process authorized transactions involving the Republic of Cuba and 6) send remittances (gifts not loans or investments) to certain individuals and independent non-governmental organizations in Cuba that encourage the development and operation of private businesses by self-employed individuals. 

Today, a company subject to United States jurisdiction 1) may process credit and debit card transactions for individuals traveling to, from, or within the Republic of Cuba, and related settlements, for third-country financial institutions 2) financial institutions may have a correspondent account at a financial institution in the Republic of Cuba 3) financial institutions in the Republic of Cuba may not have a correspondent account with a United States financial institution 4) banking institutions are not permitted to process “U-turn” transactions, i.e., funds transfers originating and terminating outside the United States, where neither the originator nor the beneficiary is a person subject to United States jurisdiction 5) may export medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, informational materials, artwork, agricultural commodities and food products 6) may import agricultural commodities, artwork, informational materials, and products produced by registered self-employed and 7) may import medications for clinical trials and create joint ventures to market the medications. 

Here is the rub: Mr. Smith from Washington DC may have an account at a bank in Havana, but Mr. Smith may not directly transfer any money from his checking account in Washington DC to his account at the bank in Havana.  He may transfer the funds from Washington to Paris and then from Paris to Havana.  If Mr. Smith wants to have an investment in an independent business in Havana, wants to receive payment for a product or service sold to an independent business, wants to send additional funds, or receive a profit-sharing payment from an independent business, United States regulations do not permit him to do so.   

The example just screams from a billboard “Support Your Local Business!”  This is the logic those appointed to serve deem perfectly acceptable, exceedingly practical, demonstrably efficient, and devoid of practical inefficiencies.   

Today, when receiving payment from the Republic of Cuba or sending payment to the Republic of Cuba there is no straight-line transaction.  It is a triangle.  And often not an equilateral triangle or isosceles triangle.  Distance can create an acute triangle or obtuse triangle.  In banking, triangles are harmful, not helpful.   

A financial institution in a third country is always involved- and it receives a fee for that involvement.  Is the triangle necessary?  No.  Does the triangle provide the United States government with increased opportunities to monitor the transactions?  No.  Does the triangle increase the cost for an individual subject to United States jurisdiction and company subject to United States jurisdiction?  Yes.  Does the triangle increase the cost to a Republic of Cuba national and Republic of Cuba-based company?  Yes. 

Inflicting as much pain as possible upon those engaging in a transaction involving the United States was never logical as it served as a perpetual boomerang of pain for those involved in statutorily protected export transactions.  The message to agricultural interests in the United States- you may legally export your products to the Republic of Cuba, but by the time you are done, you wish you hadn’t done so.  That is an inspirational message from the taxpayer-funded United States Department of State, United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Agriculture, and United States Department of Commerce?  Reminds of… “We’re from the government and here to help…”   

United States policy is not solely focused upon increasing the financial costs associated with engagement with the Republic of Cuba.  The focus is also upon increasing inefficiencies for each transaction.  The goal is to assault individuals and companies with an upper cut (increased costs) and a body blow (inefficiencies) and a left jab (multiple compliance layers for each transaction).  Most companies do not wait for a TKO or KO, they throw in the towel. 

When a United States-based financial institution employee reads “Cuba” on any document (outgoing or incoming), there is a nearing 100% certainty the transaction will be subjected to additional compliance review and then returned to the customer- even if the transaction is specifically authorized.  If the transaction makes it past an employee, computer systems will most certainly flag it and terminate it.  Financial institutions in the United States are warry of all Republic of Cuba-related transactions.  For the farmer awaiting payment for a shipment of poultry, soybeans, corn, wood, and other products, the delay is unhelpful to their already challenging bottom-line.   

NOTE: Since the first exports of agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in December 2001, more than US$6,364,931,538.00 has been received as payment from the Republic of Cuba- every penny through a third country where a financial institution takes a fee. 

One-Way Correspondent Banking Does Not Work 

In 2015, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury authorized Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank (2017 assets approximately US$2.9 billion) to have a correspondent account with Republic of Cuba government-operated Banco Internacional de Comercia SA (BICSA), a member of Republic of Cuba government-operated Grupo Nuevo Banca SA, created by Corporate Charter No. 49 on 29 October 1993 and commenced operation on 3 January 1994.  Stonegate Bank provided commercial operating accounts for the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in Washington DC, the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cuba to the United Nations in New York City, and other types of OFAC-authorized transactions for more than eighty customers.  In September 2017, Stonegate Bank was purchased by Conway, Arkansas-based Home BancShares (2019 assets approximately US$14 billion) through its Centennial Bank subsidiary.  Despite intense advocacy, the Obama-Biden Administration National Security Council (NSC) inexplicably and stubbornly (and according to some exporters, stupidly) refused to permit BICSA a correspondent account with Stonegate Bank, so Stonegate Bank processed transactions for approximately eighty (80) customers on a regular basis through Panama City, Panama-based Multibank, which had dealings with the Republic of Cuba.   However, on 16 June 2020, Bogota, Colombia-based Grupo Aval reported: “On May 25th, Banco de Bogotá, through its subsidiary Leasing Bogotá S.A. Panamá, acquired 96.6% of the ordinary shares of Multi Financial Group.  As part of the acquisition process, MFG’s operation in Cuba was closed and as part of the transaction.  Grupo Aval complies with OFAC regulations and doesn't have transactional relationships with Cuba.”   

The stated-publicly baseline for Biden-Harris Administration engagement with the Republic of Cuba: “… it’s a policy that will be governed by two principles.  First is the support for democracy and human rights.  It will be at the core of our efforts through empowering the Cuban people to determine their own future.  And second, we believe that Americans, and especially Cuban Americans, are the best ambassadors for freedom and prosperity in Cuba.  We’re committed to making human rights a core pillar of our U.S. foreign policy.  That certainly applies to Cuba, just as you’ve heard me reference it across the board, and includes redoubling our dedication to human rights throughout our own hemisphere.”  United States Department of State (February 2021). 

If “Cuban Americans” are to be the primary front-line messengers for Biden-Harris Administration policies, then they will require financial tools to forge an impactful, sustainable, efficient, and transparent journey.  Sending money as gifts to family and friends is helpful.   

Sending investment funding and providing loans to someone who wants to have or wants to expand a small business can be transformative.  Is not the goal of the Biden Administration to extract as many Republic of nationals as possible from commercial and economic reliance upon the government of the Republic of Cuba? 

Would not be impactful for registered self-employed to open hundreds, thousands of accounts at financial institutions in the Republic of Cuba?  Where they could receive funds transparently and directly from their investor or customer within hours.  Where they could deliver profit-sharing funds and supplier payments transparently and directly within hours.  Each transaction transparent and compliant with United States financial institution regulations.  Yes, the transaction activity could overwhelm the financial sector within the Republic of Cuba- but, would that be such an undesired outcome?  The financial sector would be required to meet the demand or explain to customers the reasons for the failure to adapt to the marketplace. 

The Republic of Cuba may not embrace direct correspondent banking due to the requirements of the United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Justice, and United States Federal Reserve for all correspondent accounts regardless of country.  Again, there is a point here- let it be the Republic of Cuba who declines to re-establish a “normalized” financial landscape with the United States. 

Regarding the re-authorization of “U-turns” where financial institutions were permitted to process non-United States-related transactions involving the Republic of Cuba, the prism through which a decision to again permit “U-turns” should not be solely whether permitting “U-turns” benefits the Republic of Cuba.  It does.  More important is the transparency required for “U-turns” which remains an important goal of the United States.  Also, not permitting “U-turns” is an additional reason for financial institutions to avoid all Republic of Cuba-related authorized transactions.  

If the Biden-Harris Administration wants “prosperity in Cuba” then it should re-calibrate the means to that end.  Doing so will demonstrate removing impediments for re-engagement with the self-employed in the Republic of Cuba is the most efficient means of creating indigestion for the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

No one in the United States must engage commercially with the Republic of Cuba.  The Biden-Harris Administration must seed the garden.  Those seeds must be focused upon making easier and more transparent the movement of funds and the use of those funds. 

No “Carve-Out”

Commercial engagement with the Republic of Cuba should not have a unique “carve-out” for individuals of Cuban descent who are subject to United States jurisdiction.  The Biden-Harris Administration should ensure that all individuals subject to United States jurisdiction are subject to the same regulations as those regulations relate to commercial engagement with the Republic of Cuba.   

The Biden-Harris Administration will instruct OFAC to remove the US$1,000.00 per quarter limit upon remittances to the Republic of Cuba from individuals subject to United States jurisdiction that was instituted on 9 September 2019 by the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021).  When the OFAC does make the change to the remittance regulation, it must also expand the definition of remittance to include loans and investments in an independent business. 

Western Union Activity 

Since 9 September 2019, the U.S. Dollar value of remittances from the United States to the Republic of Cuba has not measurably decreased.  This is true despite the decision by the OFAC implemented on 26 November 2020 which prohibited remittance forwarders from using the distribution services within the Republic of Cuba of companies controlled (as defined by the United States Department of State) by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba (FAR).

Most impacted by the 26 November 2020 decision by the OFAC was Denver, Colorado-based Western Union Company (2019 revenues US$5.3 billion) which serviced through 407 distribution locations in the Republic of Cuba approximately 20% of all remittances to the Republic of Cuba.  Those distribution locations were deemed operated by a FAR-controlled company.  Remittances from the United States to the Republic of Cuba have continued using third-parties, usually individuals serving as couriers, resulting in far less transparency, efficiency, and security. 

Link To Post: At 6:00 pm Today, Final [For Now] Western Union Transactions With Cuba Are [Temporarily Perhaps) Suspended https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2020/11/23/final-for-now-western-union-transactions-with-cuba-are-temporarily-perhaps-suspended

Link To OFAC Frequently Asked Questions About Cuba https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/cuba-sanctions 

693. What did the September 9, 2019 amendment to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) do?  

Effective October 9, 2019 an amendment to the CACR revises certain authorizations for remittances to Cuba to impose new requirements and limitations, eliminates the authorization for donative remittances, and revises the authorization commonly known as the “U-turn” general license. 

The September 9, 2019 amendment revises the “U-turn” general license located at 31 CFR § 515.584(d) to eliminate the authorization for banking institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction to process “U-turn” transactions; i.e., funds transfers that originate and terminate outside the United States where neither the originator nor beneficiary is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The amended “U-turn” general license authorizes banking institutions that are persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to reject and not require them to block such transactions. For more on changes to the “U-turn” general license, please see FAQ 757. 

With respect to remittances, the September 9, 2019 rule amends the general license authorizing family remittances to (1) place a cap of $1,000 as the maximum amount that one remitter can send to one Cuban national as a family remittance per quarter, and (2) exclude close relatives of prohibited officials of the Government of Cuba or close relatives of prohibited members of the Cuban Communist Party as authorized recipients of family remittances. (The prohibited officials themselves were already barred from being recipients of such remittances. See 31 CFR § 515.570(a), as well as 31 CFR § 515.339 for the definition of “close relatives”.) The September 9, 2019 rule also amends the general license authorizing remittances to certain individuals and independent non-governmental organizations in Cuba to now authorize remittances to certain additional “self-employed individuals” (See 31 CFR § 515.570(g), as well as 31 CFR § 515.340, for the new definition of “self-employed individuals”). Effective October 9, 2019, OFAC eliminated the general license for donative remittances that was previously located at 31 CFR § 515.570(b). For more on changes to remittances, please see FAQ 732. 

732. What types of remittances are allowed to be made by persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to persons in Cuba? What are the applicable conditions and requirements?  

OFAC currently authorizes a number of categories of remittances from persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to persons in Cuba. The September 9, 2019 rule amended certain general licenses related to specific remittance categories, including family remittances. The September 9, 2019 rule also eliminated the general license for donative remittances that was previously located at 31 CFR § 515.570(b). 

Family remittances. Effective October 9, 2019, OFAC placed a cap on family remittances of $1,000 in any consecutive three-month period. Accordingly, persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction are authorized to make remittances to nationals of Cuba who are close relatives of the remitter, provided that the remitter’s total family remittances to any one Cuban national do not exceed $1,000 in any consecutive three-month period. In addition, the recipient may not be a prohibited official of the Government of Cuba, as defined in § 515.337 or a prohibited member of the Cuban Communist Party, as defined in § 515.338, or a close relative of such persons, as defined in § 515.339. See 31 CFR § 515.570(a) for additional applicable conditions. 

Remittances to certain individuals and independent non-governmental organizations in Cuba. Effective October 9, 2019, OFAC amended the general license that authorizes remittances to certain individuals and independent non-governmental organizations in Cuba to further authorize remittances that encourage the development and operation of private businesses by self-employed individuals. Section 515.340 of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations defines “self-employed individual” to mean a Cuban national who satisfies one or more of the following conditions: (a) is an owner or employee of a small private business or a sole proprietorship, including restaurants (paladares), taxis, and bed-and-breakfasts (casas particulares); (b) is an independent contractor or consultant; (c) is a small farmer who owns his or her own land; or (d) is a small usufruct farmer who cultivates state-owned land to sell products on the open market. Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction are authorized to make remittances to individuals and independent non-governmental entities in Cuba, including pro-democracy groups and civil society groups, and to members of such groups or organizations, to support: humanitarian projects in or related to Cuba that are designed to directly benefit the Cuban people and the Cuban people through activities of recognized human rights organizations, independent organizations designed to promote a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy, and activities of individuals and non-governmental organizations that promote independent activity intended to strengthen civil society. See 31 CFR § 515.570(g) for additional applicable conditions. 

Also, effective October 9, 2019, OFAC removed the general license that authorized persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to make donative remittances to persons in Cuba, and such remittances are no longer authorized. Finally, effective November 26, 2020, OFAC amended 31 CFR § 515.570 to exclude from the scope of the authorization any transaction relating to the collection, forwarding, or receipt of remittances involving any entity or subentity identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. 

See 31 CFR § 515.570 for a complete description of what the OFAC general licenses related to remittances authorize and the restrictions that apply, as well as statements of specific licensing policy. 

For remittances from Cuban nationals to persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction, see 31 CFR § 515.587. Please also note that, effective November 26, 2020, OFAC amended 31 CFR § 515.587 to exclude from the scope of the authorization any transaction relating to the collection, forwarding, or receipt of remittances involving any entity or subentity identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. 

733. Is a bank, credit union, or money services business (MSB) such as a money remitter permitted to process my authorized remittances to or from Cuba?  

Yes. Pursuant to a general license at 31 CFR § 515.572(a)(3), banking institutions, as defined in 31 CFR § 515.314, U.S.-registered brokers or dealers in securities, and U.S.-registered money transmitters are permitted to process authorized remittances to or from Cuba without having to obtain a specific license, subject to the recordkeeping and reporting requirements set forth in 31 C.F.R § 515.572(b). Please note, effective November 26, 2020, OFAC amended 31 CFR § 515.572(a)(3) to exclude from the scope of the authorization any transaction relating to the collection, forwarding, or receipt of remittances involving any entity or subentity identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. For a complete description of what the OFAC general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.572(a)(3). 

736. May the U.S. dollar be used to conduct transactions in Cuba or with Cuban nationals?   

In certain circumstances, yes. Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction may engage in transactions in U.S. dollars in Cuba or with Cuban nationals with respect to activity that is authorized pursuant to the CACR. For example, payments for telecommunications services in Cuba provided pursuant to 31 CFR § 515.542 may be made in U.S. dollars. Further, the use of U.S. dollars for transactions that are exempt from the prohibitions of or not otherwise prohibited by the CACR is also authorized. For example, payments related to the importation or exportation of informational materials as defined in 31 CFR § 515.332, such as books or musical recordings, may be made in U.S. dollars. 

The September 9, 2019 amendment to the CACR eliminates the authorization for banking institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction to process “U-turn” transactions in 31 CFR § 515.584(d). In addition, the amendment replaces the “U-turn” authorization with an authorization to reject such transactions. For more on changes to the “U-turn” general license, please see FAQ 757. 

737. Are authorized travelers permitted to open bank accounts in Cuba?     

Yes. Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction who are traveling to Cuba pursuant to one of the 12 authorized categories of travel may open and maintain bank accounts in order to access funds while located in Cuba for authorized transactions, and are authorized to close such accounts. For a complete description of what this general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR §  515.560(c)(6). In accordance with  NSPM-5, OFAC amended this general license to exclude from the authorization certain direct financial transactions with entities and sub-entities identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. For a description of the scope of the prohibition on direct financial transactions and the restrictions and exceptions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.209. 

740. Can credit card network operators that are persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction process credit and debit card transactions for individuals traveling to, from, or within Cuba, and related settlements, for third-country financial institutions?  

Yes, credit card network operators that are persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction may process such transactions and related settlements for third-country financial institutions. Section 515.584(c) of the CACR authorizes all transactions incident to the processing and payment of credit and debit cards transactions for third-country nationals traveling to, from, or within Cuba. 

742. Are financial institutions other than banks permitted to open correspondent accounts in Cuba?  

Depository institutions, as defined in 31 CFR § 515.333, which include certain financial institutions other than banks, are permitted to open correspondent accounts at banks in Cuba. See 31 CFR § 515.584(a). 

743. Are Cuban banks permitted to open correspondent accounts at U.S. banks?  

No. U.S. depository institutions are permitted to open correspondent accounts at Cuban banks located in Cuba and in third countries, and at foreign banks located in Cuba, but Cuban banks are not generally licensed to open such accounts at U.S. banks. See note to 31 CFR § 515.584(a). 

744. May correspondent accounts authorized pursuant to 31 CFR § 515.584(a) or used for transactions authorized by 31 CFR § 515.584(g) be established and maintained in U.S. dollars?   

Yes. Correspondent accounts of depository institutions (as defined in 31 CFR § 515.333) at a financial institution that is a national of Cuba authorized pursuant to § 515.584(a) may be established and maintained in U.S. dollars. Such accounts may be used only for transactions that are authorized by or exempt from the CACR. Transactions necessary to establish and maintain such correspondent accounts —– such as originating, processing, and terminating authorized funds transfers in U.S. dollars —– are authorized. 

Additionally, correspondent accounts used for transactions authorized by 31 CFR § 515.584(g), which permits banking institutions as defined in 31 CFR § 515.314(g) that are persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to accept, process, and give credit to U.S. dollar monetary instruments presented indirectly by a financial institution that is a national of Cuba, may be denominated in U.S. dollars. 

However, financial institutions that are nationals of Cuba remain prohibited from opening correspondent accounts at a U.S. financial institution. For a complete description of what these general licenses authorize and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.584(a) and (g).  

745. May U.S. banks open and operate accounts for Cuban nationals lawfully present in the United States?  

Banking institutions are permitted to maintain accounts for certain Cuban nationals present in the United States in a non-immigrant status or pursuant to other non-immigrant travel authorization. Although the account may remain open while the Cuban national is not in the United States, access to such accounts must be limited to while the Cuban national is lawfully present in the United States. For a complete description of what the OFAC general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.571(a)(5). A Cuban national in Cuba would not be able to access such an account to make and receive certain payments pursuant to the authorization in 31 CFR § 515.584(h); separate accounts would be required to utilize each of these authorizations. 

756. May a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction utilize online payment platforms to facilitate or process authorized transactions involving Cuba or a Cuban entity?  

Yes. Subject to certain exceptions, transactions that are ordinarily incident to an authorized transaction are permitted. See the examples in 31 CFR § 515.421. Such transactions may include use of online payment platforms to facilitate authorized transactions. Authorized transactions ordinarily incident to licensed transactions exclude direct financial transactions with Cuba Restricted List entities, as well as, effective September 24, 2020, lodging, paying for lodging, or making any reservation for or on behalf of a third party to lodge, at any property in Cuba on the Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List to the extent prohibited by  § 515.210, if the terms of the applicable general or specific license expressly exclude such transactions. See 31 CFR § 515.421(5)-(6). Also, effective November 26, 2020, OFAC amended 31 CFR § 515.421 to make clear that a transaction relating to the collection, forwarding, or receipt of remittances involving any entity or subentity identified on the Cuba Restricted List is not authorized as an ordinarily incident transaction where the terms of the general or specific license expressly exclude any such transactions. For a complete description of the scope of transactions ordinarily incident to a licensed transaction and the restrictions and exceptions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.421.  

757. Are U.S. banking institutions authorized to process “U-turn” transactions in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest?  

No. Effective October 9, 2019, banking institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction are not permitted to process “U-turn” transactions, i.e., funds transfers originating and terminating outside the United States, where neither the originator nor the beneficiary is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction. While banking institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction are no longer authorized to process “U-turn” transactions, they are authorized to reject such transactions, subject to certain conditions (see 31 CFR § 515.584(d)).

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Critique Of Cuba In U.S. Department Of State "2020 Report On International Religious Freedom" Includes Property Claims

United States Department of State
Washington DC
12 May 2021

2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Cuba
Office of International Religious Freedom

LINK To Report
LINK To Report In PDF Format

Excerpts:

The country’s constitution contains written provisions for religious freedom and prohibitions against discrimination based on religious grounds. According to the religious freedom advocacy organization Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) and religious leaders, the Cuban Communist Party (CCP), through its Office of Religious Affairs (ORA) and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), continued to control most aspects of religious life. CSW’s annual report concluded the government “violated freedom of religion or belief routinely and systematically” through arbitrary detentions, false charges, threats, and harassment of religious leaders and religious freedom defenders. The report also noted that during the COVID-19 pandemic, the government confiscated food that some religious groups intended to provide to those in need, blocked overseas humanitarian aid, and threatened and charged religious leaders for “spreading disease.”

CSW’s annual report concluded that the government “violated freedom of religion or belief… routinely and systematically” through arbitrary detentions, false charges, threats, and harassment of religious leaders and religious freedom defenders.

According to media, between June and July, evangelical Protestant pastors Uberney Aguilar and Yalina Proenza received at least six visits and official summons from various government agents aimed at shutting down their congregation, Jehovah Shalom Church, in Holguin. The pastors said that starting in 2017, they met in a property owned by a member of their congregation. On July 9, Holguin Minister of Justice Nelson Flavio Plutin Santos and Ormani Rodriguez Tamayo, the head of the provincial Department of Associations, denied their request for government recognition, which they had submitted in 2019. Due to government public health restrictions, they continued to hold outdoor services.

Other land ownership issues remained unresolved, including that of the land owned by the Western Baptist Convention, which the government confiscated extralegally in 2012 and later transferred to two government companies. According to observers, the confiscation was in retaliation for the refusal of the Western Baptist Convention to agree to various ORA demands to restructure its internal governance and expel some pastors. The Methodist Church of Cuba said it continued its efforts to reclaim properties confiscated by the government more than 60 years ago, including a theater adjacent to the Methodist church in Marianao, Havana. The Methodist Church reportedly submitted all necessary ownership documentation, but government officials again took no action on the case during the year.

Section IV. U.S. Government Policy and Engagement

Embassy officials did not meet with or otherwise engage with the ORA during the year due to lack of responsiveness from the government. In public statements and through social media postings, U.S. government officials, including the Secretary of State, continued to call upon the government to respect its citizens’ fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of religion and expression. On October 5, the Secretary stated, “Vast swathes of humanity live in countries where religious freedom is restricted, from places like…Cuba, and beyond.”

Embassy officials met with the head of the CCC and discussed obstacles unregistered churches faced to gain official status.

Embassy officials met in person and virtually with leaders of a range of registered and unregistered religious groups, including Protestants, Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslims, and Catholics. They discussed the principal issues of religious freedom and tolerance affecting each group, including freedom of assembly, church expansion, access to state-owned media, and their inability to open private religious schools.

On December 2, 2020, in accordance with the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, as amended, the Secretary of State again placed the country on the Special Watch List for having engaged in or tolerated severe violations of religious freedom.

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Obstacles In Cuba For Caterpillar And John Deere Continue As Cuba Promotes Sale Of Tractors From Other Countries To Cuba Farmers

El Nuevo Herald (11 March 2021) Excerpts:  The Cuban government began selling tractors for dollars to peasants in different cities of the country. Herminio Martínez Gens, the first peasant from Villa Clara to buy a tractor in hard currency -in cash- thanked “the Revolution” for allowing him to purchase the valuable device for US$27,000.00.  The tractor, of Belarusian origin, costs between US$8,227.00 and US$21,706.00 in different markets around the world.  The Ministry of Agriculture sells the tractors in seven establishments located in some provincial capitals such as Santa Clara, Santiago de Cuba and Havana, and expects that eight new stores will be opened in the coming months, according to the official press. 

MTW will increase the delivery of tractors to Cuba 8 times (18 March 2015) 

“Minsk Tractor Plant has been reached substantial agreements on cooperation with the Cuban side, the implementation of which is planned for the near future.  A discussion of interaction vectors in the supply of "Belarus" tractors to “Island of Freedom” was held at MTW during a visit of representatives of the Cuban company “Transimport”. It will be recalled that this company is a traditional partner of our company in the Latin American State. As is reported in the Department of promotion and sales of products to foreign countries of Marketing-center, MTW exported 57 "Belarus" tractors to Cuba last year. During the meeting on the MTW, there was a talk about the ways of interaction in 2015. Representatives of the parties have agreed the terms and purchase amount of tractors by Cuban partner for this year. It should be noted that "Transimport" is a state company that provides central purchasing of agricultural machinery for the needs of public sector of the Cuban economy. Partner of MTW expressed an intention to purchase about 450 Belarusian tractors in 2015. In order to implement these plans during the negotiations that took place at our enterprise there was a discussion about mechanism and timing of deliveries using the credit resources of the Belarus Development Bank within the framework of the Decree No. 534 providing for support of exports of the domestic goods.  Source- Belarus MTW Review”

500 «Belarus» tractors will be sent to Cuba (15 June 2015) 

“During the visit to this Latin American country the management team of MTW agreed on delivery of Belarusian machinery. The contract for 13 million USD was signed. The Parties agreed to continue a close cooperation in the field of machine manufacturing. Signing of the next set of documents in the amount of 7 million USD is under preparation in the near-term prospect.  Alexander Kazakevitch, Deputy Marketing Director for Commerce in International Markets - Head of the Department of "Minsk Tractor Works":  There is an interest to the countries of Latin America and Eastern Asia, in other words to those countries where the presence of "Belarus" tractors is a single nature or negligible. Therefore our enterprise sets the task to enter new markets or secure those where our share is negligible.  We work hard to be worthy of delivery.  Our experts often visit Latin America to fulfill in full those agreements that were reached at the distance. Face-to-face contact has not been canceled.  Countries of Africa can be prospective regions for us. Egypt is traditional market for us, where we have opened the Trading House this year. We try to enter into sufficiently new markets for us: Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe.  Today MTW supplies its machinery to more than 80 countries of the world. Minsk Tractor Works also has long-standing relations and annual contracts with Cuba. In this case the matter is to consolidate the market of Latin America and enhance cooperation with a number of states of the region. Among constant partners of MTW are Venezuela, Nicaragua, Peru and Chile.”  

NOTE: On 13 May 2021, the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council received the following: "The company "Veragodna" has been a reliable supplier to farms and organizations, clusters of Belarusian agricultural machinery and spare parts for five years. We invite you to consider the supply of the following equipment on FCA terms: Minsk, Republic of Belarus. 1. Tractor BELARUS 82.1 - 16800 $" The company estimated at approximately US$3,000.00 as the cost for shipping one tractor to the Republic of Cuba. LINK To Offer (English) In PDF Format. LINK To 2021 Catalog (Russian)

About Holding “MTW-HOLDING”  Minsk tractor works was founded on May 29, 1946. Today the works, which employs more than 16000 people, has turned into one of the largest manufacturers of agricultural machinery not only in CIS countries, but also worldwide. And the famous trademark “Belarus” is of great value to us — not only commercial, but also to a certain extent patriotic.  The works was approaching the producing of world famous tractors step by step. The starting engine was the first product of the works, the production of tractors started with track-type vehicles. And in 1953 the production of air-tired tractors started, which determined further specialization of the enterprise. And in 1958 Minsk Tractor Works produced its one hundred thousandth tractor.  Developing foreign markets MTW was the first among tractor manufacturers in the CIS to certify all the produced tractors for compliance with European Union standards at Silsoe institution (UK). In early May 2000 our enterprise (has- удалить) obtained an ISO-9001 certificate of conformity for tractor design and manufacture. And it means that the quality system, established at MTW, meets the requirements of international standards. It was also confirmed by the results of certification audit, performed by TUV-Thuringia (Germany). Today customers are offered more than a hundred models of tractors, in more than two hundred assembly options for all climatic and operational conditions. New models have vast unitizing opportunities with agricultural machines of different manufacturers. All the traded tractors have international certificates confirming their compliance with the European Union standards and homologation tests in the largest test centers of Western countries. OJSC “MTW” designs, manufactures and exports wheeled tractors and spare parts for them, launches their production under a license abroad, establishes and conducts service of delivered machines, provides training on operation and maintenance of produced machinery. 

Background Analysis For Caterpillar And John Deere 

Will Caterpillar And Deere Disclose Use Of Payment Terms And Financing For Exports To Cuba? (29 January 2021) 

Might Caterpillar/RIMCO Be Next Defendants In Title III Lawsuit? Cuba Distributor In Area As Crowley And Seaboard? (7 January 2021) 

John Deere Could Provide US$30 Million In Financing For U.S. Exports To Cuba (3 November 2017)